The Structure of Law-of-War Perfidy

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I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................1
II. PERFIDY IN MODERN CONFLICT ......................................4
III. LAW-OF-WAR PERFIDY CODIFIED .................................9
    A. EARLY CODIFICATIONS .............................................17
    B. THE HAGUE REGULATIONS .......................................26
    C. 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I .................................33
IV. PERFIDY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CHIVALRY ..................45
V. MILITARY DECEPTION SHORT OF PERFIDY .....................51
VI. PERFIDY AND LAW-OF-WAR APPLICATION THRESHOLDS ....57
VII. THE FUTURE OF LAW-OF-WAR PERFIDY ......................59
VIII. CONCLUSION ..............................................................62

I. INTRODUCTION

Perfidy and its close relation treachery are potent accusations. Few offenses yield the affront, insult, and sting of perfidious or treacherous betrayals of trust. Still fewer inflict such persistent and far-reaching stigma on an accused and his legacy. The identities and misdeeds of betrayers—Judas, Brutus, Doña Marina, Benedict Arnold, or Harold Cole—provok peculiarly enduring and collective enmity. It is clear that perfidy’s wounds cut deep. Betrayals of good faith alter more than the immediate and relative positions of the victim and betrayer, however. Perfidious betrayals inflict communal, even systemic harm to our faith in entire modes of accepted interaction and exchange. Even a single instance of perfidy can permanently compromise an entire mode interaction.

The remedies for perfidy reinforce the point. In personal, professional, and international relations, treachery and perfidy warrant the most draconian and often irreversible reactions. Early professional military codes prescribed

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summary death for treacherous correspondence with enemies. Earlier, medieval notions of honor and chivalry sanctioned unending blood feuds to avenge knights killed by treachery. Thomas Jefferson, the acknowledged author of the American Declaration of Independence, cited English perfidy among the grievances justifying full-scale revolt, violent war, and permanent secession from the British monarchy.

Jefferson’s use of the term was plainly political rather than legal. Yet even at that early date in the development of the law of nations, perfidy and treachery were established legal concepts in the customs and usages of war. Originally grounded in broad, customary notions of chivalry and

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1 American Articles of War of 1775, Additional Articles, art. 1. (Nov. 7, 1775); the Massachusetts Articles of War, art. 27 (Apr. 5, 1775); British Articles of War of 1765 §XIV, art. XIX; Articles of War of James II, art. VIII (1688).


3 American Declaration of Independence, Jul. 4, 1776, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/declare.asp. Jefferson and his co-signers’ allegation of perfidy referred specifically to the conduct of mercenaries employed by the English. Id. The Declaration of Independence includes several references to the law of war of the period. Id. See also JOHN FABIAN, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 15-27 (2012).

4 Law-of-war commentators have intermittently regarded perfidy and treachery as synonymous. Lieutenant Colonel Willard B. Cowles, High Government Officials as War Criminals, 39 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 54, 58 (1945) (asserting, “The words ‘treachery’ and ‘perfidy’ are essentially synonymous.”)[hereinafter Cowles]. See also infra discussion accompanying notes 118 - 124.

5 CORNELIUS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WAR 3 (The Law Book Exchange, Ltd. 2008) (1737). Van Bynkershoek’s treatise, originally published in Latin, is thought to have been especially influential in the American Revolution. Id. at v. Although associated with an exceptionally permissive view of lawful conduct in combat, Van Bynkershoek specifically disapproved of perfidy. Id. He observed,

Nor ought fraud to be omitted in a definition of war, as it is perfectly indifferent whether stratagem or open force be used against an enemy. There is, I know, a great diversity of opinion upon this subject: Grotius quotes a variety of authorities on both sides of the question. For my part, I think that every species of deceit is lawful, perfidy only excepted; not that any thing may not lawfully by done against an enemy, but because, when a promise has been made to him, both parties are devested of the hostile character as far as regards that promise.

Id. at 3 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). See also 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURE BELLII LIBRI TRES 175 (James Scott ed., John C. Rolfe trans., 1933) (1612) (noting military leaders were permitted to counter treachery with treachery); PIERINO BELLI, A TREATISE ON MILITARY MATTERS AND WARFARE 88 (James Brown Scott
honorable combat, the prohibition of perfidy later matured into a specific prohibition of the positive laws of war. Much more than a mere prohibition of underhanded or dishonorable conduct, the prohibition of perfidy is an essential buttress to the law of war as a medium of exchange between combatants – a guarantee of minimum respect and trust between belligerents even in the turmoil of war. Indeed, it may be difficult to conceive of an operative or effective war convention at all without guarantees against and protections from perfidy.

This article analyzes in unprecedented depth the historical groundings and twentieth century evolution of the structure of law-of-war perfidy. The twentieth century, easily one of the most dynamic periods of both international law and of warfare, witnessed a gradual evolution in positive expressions of the perfidy prohibition. Amid seismic shifts in the conduct, scale, participants, and means of warfare, States codified progressively narrower conceptions of perfidy, ultimately incorporating discrete legal elements into the offense. Currently, the vast majority of States’ militaries operate subject to three categories of perfidy: simple perfidy; prohibited perfidy and grave perfidy. The effect has been to convert a popularly and intuitively understood moniker for betrayal of trust or confidence into a technically bound term of art, comparatively divested of much of its customary import and broad coverage.

Twenty-first century conflicts, pitting culturally, professionally, and even ethically asymmetrical foes, have seen a spike in perfidious conduct. Respect for the perfidy prohibition remains a crucial legal and even mass-market bellwether for honorable and privileged conduct by belligerents.6 Perfidy features consistently in the subject matter of international criminal tribunals, international and domestic. Yet conceptions of perfidy that merely restate imprecise codifications or offer more than a vague sensibility of perfidy are elusive. At the same time, claims to a corresponding, broad-based perfidy prohibition derived from notions and principles of chivalry

6 Neal A. Richardson & Spencer J. Crona, Make Iraqis Pay for Acts of ’Perfidy,’ L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003 (arguing that insurgent law-of-war violations, particularly perfidy, have received inadequate prosecutorial attention) [hereinafter Richardson & Crona]

7 Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 8.2(b)(xi), 8.2(e)(ix), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (identifying respectively “killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army” and “killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary” as war crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction). The U.S. Military Commissions Act of 2009 includes “Using Treachery of Perfidy” among offenses chargeable against alien unlawful combatants at military commissions. 10 U.S.C. 950t(17).
and honor are overstated, typically grounded in little more than nostalgia, and hardly deserving to be regarded as law.

As this article will demonstrate, giving effect to States’ twentieth century narrowing of the perfidy prohibition leaves critical, widely-accepted values of the law of war unvindicated. A conception of perfidy at once consistent with principled understandings of the extant law, while protecting minimal concerns of humanity, and all the while preserving something of the law of war as a system of minimum good faith between adversaries is highly elusive. Only State consensus on a broader conception of and structure to prohibited perfidy, perhaps through a more clearly conceived general principle, will prevent erosion of enduring law-of-war values and the law of war itself by modern and emerging forms of deceptive warfare.

II. PERFIDY IN MODERN CONFLICT

A Department of Defense report to the U.S. Congress observed that instances of perfidy in the 1991 Persian Gulf War were rare.\(^8\) Since that clash of symmetrically organized, if not symmetrically capable, conventional armed forces, however, battlefields have seen a dramatic upswing in perfidy and other forms of allegedly treacherous warfare.\(^9\) Dinstein observes, “One of the hallmarks of the hostilities in Iraq, in 2003, was that much of the fighting on the Iraqi side was conducted by ‘fedayeen’

\(^8\) Dep’t of Defense, Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War—Appendix on the Role of the Law of War, 21 I.L.M. 612, 631 (1992). The report cites two examples in its discussion of perfidy. The report first notes an incident that popular accounts had misidentified as perfidious:

Iraqi tanks entered Ras Al-Khafji with their turrets reversed, turning their guns forward only at the moment action began between Iraqi and Coalition forces. While there was some media speculation that this was an act of perfidy, it was not; a reversed turret is not a recognized indication of surrender per se. Some tactical confusion may have occurred, since Coalition ground forces were operating under a defensive posture at that time, and were to engage Iraqi forces only upon clear indication of hostile intent, or some hostile act.

who fought Coalition forces out of uniform."\(^\text{10}\) After U.S.-led forces displaced the Iraqi Baathist regime, insurgents routinely feigned civilian status in connection with hostilities throughout Iraq. Repeated incidents of perfidy greatly compromised U.S. forces’ trust in apparently civilian objects. A U.S. aviation commander describes routinely attacking planters, garbage piles and vehicles outside Iraqi homes in response to enemy use of civilian cars and objects to house improvised explosive devises.\(^\text{11}\) The commander relates, “‘[A]ny vehicle in the street was . . . destroyed. Any planter in the street was . . . destroyed by [aircraft] fire. Any garbage pile was . . . destroyed—anything Iraqis don’t normally have outside of their home.’”\(^\text{12}\)

Similarly, in the second battle for Fallujah, a rare instance when Iraqi insurgents committed to a sustained, open battle with U.S. and Iraqi government forces, feigned civilian status appears to have been routine. A U.S. Army Major observed,

“[I]t was a very simple tactic they would use—they knew that we wouldn’t shoot at them if they didn’t have a weapon, if they were walking in the street. So a lot of times they would fire from one building, drop their weapon and run to another building, where another cache was. We kept finding these caches strategically located throughout the city. So they’d run from one to another without a weapon thinking that we wouldn’t shoot at

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\(^\text{10}\) Yoram Dinstein, Jus in Bello Issues Arising in the Hostilities in Iraq in 2003, 80 INT’L LEGAL STUD. 43 (2006); Richardson & Crona, supra note 6 (calling for prosecution of Iraqi perfidy against U.S. forces in 2003 invasion of Iraq). Richardson & Crona relate:

Fedayeen fighters waved a white flag and then opened fire on U.S. soldiers preparing to accept surrender. Still another was the recent operation in which an ostensibly pregnant woman lured three American soldiers to their deaths by pretending to be in distress at a checkpoint and then detonating concealed explosives. We now know that those incidents were not acts of ad hoc martyrdom but instead were deliberated and sanctioned at the highest levels of the Iraqi hierarchy.


\(^\text{12}\) Id.
them because that was against our ROE [rules of engagement]. But at that point, we were 100 percent sure that everyone to our front was enemy, and we were coming through to kill everything we possibly could as we came through the city. When you have to call that off, it’s kind of a difficult thing. . . . [S]omeone would walk right through your formation or around your formation, count your people, and probably come back and shoot at you later on.”

Recent acts reminiscent of prohibited perfidy have become a familiar feature of hostilities short of international armed conflict as well, including the Colombia and Gaza conflicts. Indeed, the attacks of

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13 Id. at 231.


September 11, 2001 that launched the U.S. Global War on Terrorism, had they taken place in an unequivocally international armed conflict, would unquestionably have constituted prohibited law-of-war perfidy. In fact, the U.S. Congressional Authorization to Use Military Force referred to the attacks as “acts of treacherous violence.” Even U.S. responses have seemingly skirted the line between perfidy and lawful ruse.

Perfidy also appears as a prominent component of modern law-of-war enforcement mechanisms. For instance, the United States Department of Defense Office of Military Commissions is currently prosecuting the charge of “using treachery or perfidy” against Abd al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al Nashiri. The specification of Al Nashiri’s perfidy charge reads:

In that Abd al Rahim Hussayn Muhammad al Nashiri, an alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial by military commission, did, in or around Aden, Yemen, on or about 12 October 2000, in the context of and associated with hostilities, invite the confidence and belief of one or more persons onboard USS Cole (DDG 67), including but not limited to then FN Raymond Mooney, USN, that two men dressed in civilian clothing, waving at the crewmembers onboard USS Cole (DDG 67), and operating a civilian boat, were entitled to protection

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17 See NATIONAL COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 1-10 (2004) (describing use of civilian attire to gain access to and take control of civilian aircraft for purposes of fatal attacks).

18 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). Although Congress’s constitutional power includes the authority to “define and punish offenses against the law of nations,” it is unlikely the AUMF’s preamble is an exercise of this function. U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. I, § 8, cl. 10. The AUMF use of the term “treacherous” is more likely political in this instance rather than legal.

19 A May 2011, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and special forces operation against al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden reportedly gained intelligence, including DNA samples of the bin Laden family, by sending operatives posing as medical workers administering vaccinations to bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Mark Mazetti, Vaccination Ruse Used in Pursuit of Bin Laden, NY TIMES, Jul. 11, 2011.


under the law of war, and intending to betray that confidence and belief, did thereafter make use of that confidence and belief to detonate explosives hidden on said civilian boat alongside USS Cole (DDG 67), killing 17 Sailors of the United States Navy and injuring one or more persons, all crewmembers onboard USS Cole (DDG 67).\footnote{22 Id. (internal citations omitted). It will be interesting to learn whether Al-Nashiri’s military commission applies rules of treachery and perfidy which have been more lenient concerning feigned civilian status in preparation for attack. See e.g. Matthew Morris, ‘Hiding Amongst a Crowd’ and the Illegality of Deceptive Lighting, 54 NAVAL L. REV. 235, 236, 239-42 (2007) (citing INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICT AT SEA ¶¶ 110-11 (1994)).}

A second U.S. military commissions charge sheet, working its way through the Office of the Military Commissions Prosecutor, grounds a perfidy charge against Ali Musa Daqduq, a Hezbollah operative. Daqduq is charged, \textit{inter alia}, with using U.S. and Iraqi uniforms in an attack on U.S. forces in Iraq.\footnote{23 Charlie Savage, \textit{Prisoner in Iraq Tied to Hezbollah Faces U.S. Military Charges}, \textit{NY TIMES}, Feb. 23, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/world/middleeast/us-approves-military-tribunal-case-for-detainee.html?_r=0 (including a link to a pdf copy of the eight-page draft charge sheet).} The charges against Daqduq focus on improper use of enemy uniforms,\footnote{24 Id., Charge I, Specifications 1 – 5.} but also include a specification of law-of-war perfidy based on the same attack.\footnote{25 Id., Charge III, the Specification.} Although the attack produced the requisite casualties for perfidy, use of enemy uniforms or feigning friendly force status does not classically constitute resort to a law-of-war protected status as friendly forces do not enjoy law-of-war protection from their comrades. Accordingly, Daqduq’s conduct seems more consistent with improper use of enemy uniforms than with perfidy.\footnote{26 \textit{See} discussion supra accompanying note 128.} Whether the charge reflects a change in the official U.S. position is at present uncertain.\footnote{27 This uncertainty is likely to persist as Iraqi authorities recently released Daqduq from custody permitting him to return to his native Lebanon. Matthew Levitt, \textit{Malaki Government’s Whitewashing of Hezbollah}, \textit{THE WEEKLY STANDARD}, Nov. 20, 2012, at http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/maliki-government-s-whitewashing-hezbollah_663733.html; Michael R. Gordon, \textit{Against U.S. Wishes, Iraq Frees Man Accused of Killing US Soldiers}, \textit{NY TIMES}, Nov. 16, 2012.}
kinetic hostilities. As with other emerging forms of warfare, at first blush perfidy appears to capture much of what many find intuitively objectionable about cyber attacks. Most cyber attacks seem somehow underhanded and dishonest. Popular conceptions of how they work almost always envision deception or misrepresentation. It is commonly imagined that to succeed cyber attacks must gain and betray the confidence of their targets. It seems malware that makes clear to its target it identity or advertises openly what it is will never succeed. Malicious code must seemingly present itself as something it is not, usually something innocuous, to achieve its goal. In fact, cyber attacks appear in a variety of forms, many of which involve little if any overt deception or misrepresentation, yet the potential for misrepresentations and deceit abound.

More important however, cyber hostilities illustrate clearly the potential for harm achieved by deception to undermine confidence in a vital mode of human interaction. Security concerns and maintaining integrity of systems, connections and data now dominate cyber dialogue to the point of distraction. How the law of war will regulate deception in cyber warfare and other emerging forms of hostilities, if at all, is sure to be a critical issue. And a sound conception of the state of law-of-war perfidy will be essential to any reform effort.

III. LAW-OF-WAR PERFIDY CODIFIED

The law of war operates within and through a series of legal bifurcations. To begin, commentators and jurists have long recognized private international law and public international law as separate legal regimes.\(^{28}\) Classically, public international law was comprised of laws of war and laws of peace.\(^{29}\) Within that bifurcation, the law of war itself has been split into a *jus ad bellum*, regulating States’ resort to force\(^{30}\) and a *jus
in bello, regulating conduct during hostilities. The jus in bello, the focus of this article, is then frequently split into rules applicable to targeting, formerly termed Hague Law, and rules for treatment of persons under control of an enemy belligerent, so-called Geneva Law. One finds a further bifurcation in the sources of the law of war. Like international law generally, law-of-war obligations exist in both treaty and customary form.

In addition to splitting the sources of regulation in war, States have bifurcated the modes of regulating conduct in war. On one hand, they have developed specific, codified prohibitions to limit belligerents’ resort to means and methods of war. On the other, States have accepted restraints on the conduct of hostilities in the form of general principles. Expressions of each mode of regulation, specific prohibition and general principle, can be found in either treaty or customary form. While splitting the jus in bello between specific prohibitions and broad principles has offered States regulatory flexibility and diversity, the arrangement renders many normative contours elusive, particularly where one finds overlap between these two modes of regulation. The law-of-war prohibition of perfidy is a good example.

The specific prohibitions of the jus in bello surface as both stand-alone treaties and as protocols to preexisting treaty regimes. Whatever their

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33 See SASSOLI ET AL., supra note 31, at 149-50, 152-54.


35 The fielding and use of exploding projectiles, military balloons, poisonous gases, and cluster munitions each produced important new treaties to account for respective
configuration, law-of-war rules that materialize as specific prohibitions share the usual advantages of codified law. In most cases, specific prohibitions reduce the ambiguity of reliance on broad principles. For instance, a number of specific law-of-war prohibitions include consecutive or cumulative elements of application and descriptive instructions that greatly aid implementation. Resort to specific provisions rather than reliance on principle is sometimes viewed as a progressive development in humanitarian terms. The massively influential Commentaries to the 149 Geneva Conventions observe with respect to the Third Convention, “The time for declarations of principle is past; the 1929 Convention showed the impacts on the conduct of hostilities and the victims of war. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474 [hereinafter 1868 St Petersburg Declaration]; Hague IV, Declaration I, Concerning the Prohibition, for the Term of Five Years, of the Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons or Other New Methods of a Similar Nature, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839, 1 Bevans 270, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 994; Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods in Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65; Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 357.


International law, including the law of war, generally recognizes as sources of legal obligations both codified international instruments such as treaties, as well as the customary practice of States undertaken from a sense of obligation, whether codified or not. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 38(1)(a) & (b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].

See, e.g. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 13, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. Medical units and hospitals have long enjoyed specific protection from attack. Protection ceases only if medical facilities are used for hostile purposes. The Additional Protocol rule specifies four acts not considered hostile and also prescribes fairly elaborate procedures for attacking misused medical facilities, including warnings and a period for rehabilitation. Id.
advantages to be gained from detailed provisions.”39 In practical terms, specific prohibitions ease incorporation into military doctrine, dissemination to and instruction of armed forces, as well as enforcement by criminal courts.40 The task of military legal advisors is in some sense easier when specific prohibitions are encountered as well. While they typically grant less operational flexibility, specific prohibitions usually offer clear support to military lawyers required to advise against unlawful military plans.

To some extent, the process that generates specific prohibitions also enriches and refines the law of war. It is rare to find a specific prohibition derived solely from custom. Specific law-of-war prohibitions typically result from formidable diplomatic conferences attended by States’ official representatives. To an increasing degree, non-governmental organizations and other private humanitarian interests also participate in law-of-war treaty conferences voicing diverse interests and non-military, private perspectives.41 Official statements and recorded exchanges of States’ views on contentious law-of-war issues produce useful legislative histories, record accepted understandings of adopted text, and identify the outer limits of substantive consensus on discrete and emerging legal issues.

Finally, resort to specific law-of-war prohibitions bolsters legal legitimacy.42 Specific prohibitions provide States unequivocal opportunities

41 Zoe Pearson, Non-Governmental Organizations and The International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of International Law, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 243, 254 (2006) (relating at the Rome Statute Conference, NGO influence “was crucial to the outcome of particular statute provisions”) (citing Marlies Glasius, Expertise in the Cause of Justice: Global Civil Society Influence on the Statute for an International Criminal Court, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 137 (2002)). The Rome Statute Diplomatic Conference was not the first to include NGOs and international organizations. The 1974-1977 diplomatic conferences that produced the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions included scores of NGOs and even liberation movements including, the African National Congress, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and Amnesty International. 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 14, at 351-408.
to consent to or to reject international rules. Public international law, including the law of war, remains fundamentally a consent-based system of regulation. Few sources of international law match ratification of a specific prohibition as an indication of consent to regulation and therefore regulatory legitimacy. And the act of ratification reflects more than approval of substantive rules. Ratification is evidence of a State’s clear willingness to cede sovereignty and prerogative to the international legal system. Likewise, rejection of a specific prohibition, a proposed provision, or a prohibition accepted as part of a treaty is strong evidence of either a State’s disagreement with substantive norms, or, more fundamentally, its reluctance to commit the issue to the international legal system at all.

As a second mode of regulation, States have resorted to custom and general principles to control the conduct of hostilities. International custom and principles regulated warfare long before the advent of

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966) 5-6, 177 (describing international law as essentially normative in character, as distinguished from rule-based).


44 A contingent of international lawyers has remained skeptical of the value of codification. In the heyday of positivist efforts, Oppenheim admitted that codification retards the “organic growth of the law through usage into custom.” LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-41 (2d ed., 1912) [hereinafter OPPENHEIM 1912];

45 This paper uses the term “principles” to refer to core rules that form part of the international customary law applicable in armed conflict. I do not mean to refer to “general principles of law” as a more general source of international obligations and authority. See ICJ Statute, supra note 37, art. 38(a)(3); IAN BROWNLIE, PUBLIC PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-17 (7th ed., 2008) [hereinafter BROWNLIE]. Brownlie and other prominent commentators identify “general principles of law recognized by civilized States” as a source of international law drawn primarily from municipal legal systems, in particular from private law. BROWNLIE, supra, at 17; 1 GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 18 (7th ed., 1996); INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 68 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970)). Oppenheim, however, identifies a “general International Law” captured by treaty rather than custom. OPPENHEIM 1912 , supra note 44, at 23-24.
multilateral law-of-war treaties and conventions. And after more than a century of international codification of specific prohibitions, law-of-war principles still perform critical regulatory functions in combat. Rather than address or prohibit specific means or methods of war, law-of-war principles regulate broadly, even generically.

Widely accepted principles of the law of war include military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity. Each principle reflects, and through application or enforcement vindicates, enduring human values judged important enough to survive the breakdown of order that accompanies armed conflict. By contrast to many specific prohibitions, law-of-war principles operate nearly universally, with far less regard for technical legal elements, peculiarities of conflict classification or the status of affected persons. Principles are often useful to regulate emerging.

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46 Thomas Holland, a critical figure in late-nineteenth century efforts to codify the laws and customs of war, observed, “The evolution of customary rules, designed to lessen the sufferings resulting from warfare, was the earliest achievement of the nascent science of International Law.” THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND (1908). See also HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 210-17 (1992) (recounting pre-twentieth century evolution of law-of-war principles and customs).

47 UNITED STATES ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 164 (2005) (identifying four principles of the law of war, including military necessity/military objective, distinction/discrimination, proportionality and humanity/unnecessary suffering).

48 Law-of-war commentators continue to debate the precise and even general nature of these values. Christopher Greenwood, The Law of Weaponry at the Start of the New Millennium, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 185, 189 (Michael N. Schmitt and Leslie C. Green, eds, 1998) (observing, “The law of armed conflict (or international humanitarian law) is primarily concerned with preserving, as far as possible, certain core humanitarian values during hostilities.”).


50 Many specific prohibitions of the law of war operate under quite narrow
military technology and tactics not anticipated or addressed by specific law-of-war prohibitions. Law-of-war principles transcend particular means or methods of warfare, regulating the conduct of all forms of organized violence meeting the armed conflict threshold.\(^{51}\)

True to their mutable form, the precise meaning and content of the principles of the law of war remain in flux and are often subject to dispute.\(^{52}\) A survey of just a small sampling of authoritative law-of-war sources finds mention of as few as two and as many as six principles.\(^{53}\) Although on circumstances or in favor of discrete classes of persons on the battlefield. For instance, most of the Geneva Conventions’ specific prohibitions concerning the treatment of interned persons operate only in favor of captives who meet rigorous qualification standards for the status of prisoner of war or civilians whose nationality qualifies them as protected persons. See 1949 Geneva Convention III, supra note 49, art. 4; 1949 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 49, art. 4.

\(^{51}\) In a well-documented study of the customary law of war, the International Committee of the Red Cross concluded that each of the four principles of the law of war operates in both international and non-international armed conflicts. ICRC CIL STUDY, supra note 34, at 3-5, 29-32, 46-49, 237-40 (2005). Similarly a manual dedicated to identifying law-of-war rules applicable in non-international armed conflict concludes that three principles apply to such conflicts. NIAC MANUAL, supra note 14, at \(\S\) 1.2 (identifying “distinction, prohibition of necessary suffering, and humane treatment”). Omission of the principles of proportionality and military necessity appear to be judgments as to their inclusion in the principle of distinction rather than a conclusion that neither applies in non-international armed conflict. Id.

\(^{52}\) Theodor Meron, Editorial Comment: The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 238, 247 (1996) (observing, “In international humanitarian law, change through the formation of custom might be faster, but less precise in content, that the adjustment of law through treaty making.”).

occasion codified by treaty, law-of-war principles generally take the form of diffuse custom and widely varied State usage. Consequently, and predictably, regulation by principle has proved a relatively indeterminate, though flexible method of restraining conduct in warfare, especially in comparison with regulation by specific prohibitions.

Although doctrinally separate, these two modes of law-of-war regulation have not been distinct in terms of coverage. Many specific law-of-war prohibitions find inspiration in, execute, or merely duplicate one or more law-of-war principles. And conversely, it can often be said that law-of-war principles capture or represent aggregations of fairly specific, codified prohibitions.


55 For example, States codified the widely recognized principle of discrimination in a 1977 Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Article 48 of the Protocol states, “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population, and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.” Additional Protocol I, art. 48.
The prohibition on perfidy is such a rule, seeming to appear in the form of both a specific prohibition and, perhaps, a general principle. Through the twentieth century, with increasing specificity, the law of war transformed perfidy from a loosely defined principle governing means and methods of warfare broadly into a discrete and technical bar of a narrow range of behavior resulting in strictly prescribed physical consequences. Thus a complete understanding of perfidy requires familiarity with both a host of specific law-of-war treaty provisions as well as a broad familiarity with general law-of-war principles, customs, and usage.

A. Early Codifications

Perfidy began life as a codified and specific law-of-war prohibition in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. Nearly every comprehensive law-of-war instrument of the period included prohibitions on perfidy or treachery. While the influences of international law Positivism are evident in these earliest codes and treaties, their expressions on the subject of perfidy remain vague. These earliest prohibitions seem to have reserved a great deal to the subjective prerogatives of the armed forces expected to honor them.

Widely recognized as the first serious codification of the customs and usages of war and issued as instructions to Union forces in the American Civil War, the U.S. Lieber Code included two provisions purporting to express customary military practice with respect to perfidy or treachery.56

Article 51 further converts the principle of discrimination into specific prohibitions. A series of discrimination-inspired prohibitions includes attacks “not directed at a specific military objective . . . which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific objective or . . . employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 38, art. 51(4). Unlike the 1949 Conventions, ratification of Additional Protocol I is not universal. International Committee of the Red Cross, State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as of 23 August 2012, at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf (identifying 177 States Parties to Additional Protocol I); Richard R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 275 (1965) (explaining inputs to customary law of war).

56 Adjutant General’s Office, War Department, General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (24 Apr. 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code] reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 34, at 3. Elihu Root, Francis Lieber, Opening Address at American Society of International Law Meeting, April 24, 1913, 7 AM. J. INT’L L. 453 (1913) [hereinafter Root]. The Code was the work of law professor Dr. Francis Lieber. A board of officers including Generals Hitchcock, Cadwalader, Harstuff and Martindale, along with Lieber himself reviewed the project.
Articles 16 and 101 of the Code instructed:

Art. 16. Military necessity . . . admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy . . .

Art. 101. While deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means of hostility, and is consistent with honorable warfare, the common law of war allows even capital punishment for clandestine or treacherous attempts to injure an enemy, because they are so dangerous, and it is difficult to guard against them.

As a nascent but now surely dated effort at codification, Lieber’s formulation of perfidy presents modern readers a number of interpretive dilemmas. The reference to clandestine attempts at injury is ambiguous, even to those familiar with military customs of the period. In military intelligence usage, clandestine operations commonly refer to missions of concealed existence.\(^{57}\) Although the Code later addresses the practices of spies\(^{58}\) and traitors\(^{59}\) whose pursuits often involve clandestine acts, no accompanying article of the Code defines a clandestine attempt or employs the term.

A treatise contemporary to the Code described prohibited assassinations as involving “the cover of a disguise,” perhaps indicating the type of.


\(^{58}\) Lieber Code, supra note 56, art. 103.

\(^{59}\) Id., arts. 90-91.
operation envisioned by Lieber. Yet the same treatise describes spying as "a kind of clandestine practice . . . allowable by . . . rules." Moreover, Halleck's international law treatise, known to have greatly influenced Lieber observed, "The implements of war, which may be lawfully used against an enemy, are not confined to those which are openly employed to take human life . . . but also include secret and concealed means of destruction . . . ." Secrecy has long been an acceptable, even imperative aspect of military operations. Therefore it is doubtful that Lieber's prohibition of clandestine injury intended that all secret or concealed operations would qualify under the article's prohibition.

By comparison, it is likely the Code's reference to treachery carried more particular meaning for military practitioners of the time and operated with greater doctrinal force than did Lieber's treatment of clandestine operations. The Code does not define treachery, or perfidy for that matter. Yet given the longstanding legal significance of perfidy and treachery, military leaders of the period would likely have held definite notions of each concept. In fact, line officers of the period carried out many legal functions without the assistance of military lawyers at all. Court-martial practice of the period typically employed line and staff officers appointed as ad hoc judge advocates, rather than members of the Judge Advocate Department itself. Consequently officers and commanders likely had comparatively greater familiarity and facility with legal terms and notions than one finds today. It would not have been surprising for military commanders of the

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60 HALLECK'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 565 (Sherston Baker, ed., 3d ed. 1893) (1861) [hereinafter HALLECK].

61 HALLECK, supra note 60, at 562 (emphasis added).


63 Contemporaries of Lieber such as General Henry Halleck, a formidable jurist in his own right, regarded the Code as merely "'principles of the law of war, or the general rules . . . ." Childress, supra note 56, at 36 (quoting Letter from General Henry Halleck, to General S.A. Hurlburt, (June 22, 1863) (on file with Eldridge Papers, Huntington Library). General Halleck emphasized the importance of clarifying the Code through application "'in actual and hypothetical cases.'" Id.

64 Many preliminary legal matters associated with courts-martial did not require participation of a judge advocate. 1 COLONEL WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 190 (2d ed., 1886) (reprinted 1920).

65 Id. at 183, 185. Winthrop observed, "While judge advocates are more commonly selected from officers of the line, it is by no means unusual to detail staff officers as such at remote posts or where the command is supplied with but a limited number of line officers. Under such circumstances, assistant surgeons especially have been thus employed." Id. at 183.

66 Military commanders have long been the focal point of military justice procedures.
period to have held relatively firm understandings of what constituted treachery without the aid of a technical definition or formal legal advice. It is also likely that the article’s open-ended phrasing was intended to convey room for subjective interpretation. Lieber’s Code is in fact styled as instructions to armed forces rather than a legal instrument or hornbook, reinforcing the understanding that he wrote for a relative lay audience.

The most prudent reading probably understands that Lieber perceived from law-of-war custom a prohibition broad enough to cover a wide range of dishonorable belligerent activity through the Code’s perfidy and treachery prohibitions. Lieber’s separate treatment of permissible and impermissible deception supports the notion that he deduced a flexible, yet shared understanding of honorable and good faith conduct between warring parties. The Code defines permissible deception to include only acts that do not “involve the breaking of good faith either positively pledged . . . or supposed by the modern law of war to exist.” Three negative examples clarify Lieber’s notions of honorable combat:

Art. 63. Troops who fight in the uniform of their enemies, without any plain, striking, and uniform mark of distinction of their own, can expect no quarter.

Art. 65. The use of the enemy’s national standard, flag, or other emblem of nationality, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy in battle, is an act of perfidy by which they lose all claim to the protection of the laws of war.

Art. 117. It is justly considered an act of bad faith, of infamy or fiendishness, to deceive the enemy by flags of


67 Study of Lieber’s work apart from the Code suggests he intended his work to leave room for considerations of morality in the operation of the law of war. Childress, supra note 56, at 36.

68 Id., art 15.
protection. Such an act of bad faith may be good cause for refusing to respect such flags.\textsuperscript{69}

While undoubtedly an important starting point for later, more specific prohibitions on perfidy, the Lieber Code prohibition may more closely resemble a codified general principle than a specific prohibition of perfidy. Law-of-war commentary labels the entire Code in similarly general terms. In fact, a Lieber historian has argued the Code is misunderstood as purely a work of legal positivism. Childress argues Lieber’s justifications for rules “resulted in part from his conviction that legal positivism in international law is inadequate.”\textsuperscript{70} He notes that Lieber understood and expressed in his Code a unity between law and morality.\textsuperscript{71} Informed by common notions of morality, Lieber’s perfidy provisions might have appeared clearer and less vague to his military contemporaries.

Other influential military jurists shared this view of perfidy. In his widely respected treatise, General Halleck expressed the distinction between honorable means of warfare and perfidy in moral rather than legal or technical terms. Halleck observed,

> Whenever we have expressly or tacitly engaged to speak the truth to an enemy, it would be perfidy in use to deceive his confidence in our sincerity. But if the occasion imposes upon us no moral obligation to disclose to him the truth, we are perfectly justifiable in leading him into error, either by words or actions . . . it is the breach of good faith, express or implied, which constitutes the perfidy, and gives to such acts the character of lies.\textsuperscript{72}

Inspired by the Lieber Code, a series of multilateral law-of-war instruments soon emerged, each addressing perfidy. Two un-adopted, though ultimately influential efforts, the 1874 Brussels Declaration and the 1880 Oxford Manual, included specific provisions prohibiting perfidy and treachery in combat.\textsuperscript{73} Though acknowledged to have been deeply

\textsuperscript{69} Id. See also Childress, supra note 56, at 50-51 (identifying Articles 63, 65, and 117 as indicative of the bounds of Lieber’s conception of perfidy).


\textsuperscript{71} Id. at 36.

\textsuperscript{72} HALLECK supra, note 60 at §16. Halleck cites to an impressive collection of early law-of-war treatises to support his expression of perfidy. Id.

\textsuperscript{73} Final Protocol, Signed at Brussels, Project of an International Declaration
influenced by their American forerunner, one finds in the Brussels Declaration and Oxford Manual evolutionary departures from Lieber’s formula prohibiting perfidy that proved persistent features of later twentieth century rules. In particular, both the Declaration and Manual introduced a small degree of specificity to the perfidy prohibition not found in the Lieber Code, marking an important preliminary move from general principle to specific prohibition.

Where Lieber drafted an immensely open-textured perfidy rule, the authors of the Brussels Declaration and Oxford Manual were far more selective and specific with their prohibitions. The Brussels Declaration famously prefaced its enumerated prohibitions on means of injuring enemies with the following fundamental law-of-war principle:

The laws of war do not recognize in belligerents an unlimited power in the adoption of means of injuring the enemy.74

The succeeding article of the Declaration enumerates a series of specific prohibitions evidently intended to discharge the principle. Two of the article’s enumerated prohibitions relate directly to perfidy and treachery, including “murder by treachery of individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army” and “improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention.”75 Contemporaneous readers may have appreciated the Declaration’s preceding prohibition on “employment of poison or poisoned weapons” and the prohibition on “improper use of a flag of truce or . . . uniform of the enemy” as a corollaries to perfidy or treachery as well.76 Still, and somewhat surprisingly, beyond these examples the


74 Brussels Declaration, supra note 73, art 12.
75 Id., art 13.
76 Grotius regarded killing by poison as contrary to custom though he included no specific reference to treachery or perfidy. HUGO GROTIAN, 2 DE JURE BELL AC PACIS, Book III, Ch. IV, § 15, 651 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1625). Ancient Asian codes of conduct in war did associate the use of poison with treachery. See W. S. Armour, Customs of Warfare in Ancient India, 8 THE GROTIUS SOCIETY: PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 71, 73 (1922). Armour remarks, “The discovery that [poisoned weapons] were not fitting for honourable warriors was a great one. ‘They who without turning their back on their enemies are killed in battle . . . go to heaven if they do not use treacherous weapons.’” Id.
Declaration provides no technical definition of treachery.

Appearing just six years later, the 1880 Oxford Manual provides more deliberate treatment of perfidious conduct. In fact, perfidy appears in the Manual’s opening section on General Principles. Clearly drawing on the Brussels Declaration, Article 4 of the Manual states,

The laws of war do not recognize in belligerents an unlimited liberty as to the means of injuring the enemy. They are to abstain especially from all needless severity, as well as from all perfidious, unjust, or tyrannical acts.  

Standing alone, the reference to perfidy offers little in terms of practical regulation and, like its predecessors, no technical definition. Perhaps, like the Lieber Code’s intended U.S. audience, military commanders of the late-nineteenth century were adequately steeped in custom to identify perfidious acts without more. Perhaps also States were unwilling to cede any further prerogative to the international legal system. The greatest significance of the provision may merely be its juxtaposition with one of the most fundamental and widely accepted expressions of law-of-war principles – the newly acknowledged international legal limit on resort to means of injuring enemies.

The Oxford Manual’s more pragmatic and specific contributions to the prohibition of perfidy are found in a subsequent section addressing “Means of Injuring the Enemy.” Here, the Manual enhances its general prohibition on perfidy with a series specific prohibitions related to honorable warfare. Indeed, a preamble to the section states, “As the struggle must be honourable (Article 4) . . . ” Four prohibitions follow, including, “To make use of poison . . . ; . . . treacherous attempts upon the life of an enemy; as, for example, by keeping assassins in pay or by feigning surrender; To attack an enemy while concealing the distinctive signs of an armed force . . . ,” and finally, a reproduction of the Brussels Declaration provision on misuse of enemy flags and uniforms and internationally protected emblems.

More than mere illustrations, the Oxford Manual’s specific prohibitions seem to mark an important evolution in perfidy doctrine. While the Brussels Declaration had previously enumerated treacherous murder and misuse of
emblems, the Oxford Manual’s addition of assassination, feigning surrender, and conducting attack out of uniform as examples of prohibited conduct clarifies that understandings of perfidy, treachery, and honorable conduct in war are premised on an assumption of good faith between belligerents. What the Oxford Manual makes plain, that neither uncodified custom, the Lieber Code, nor the Brussels Declaration did, is that humane and lawful warfare require that enemies possess a modicum of trust in one another. At a minimum, enemies had to be assured that honoring law-of-war rights and duties would not result in tactical or operational disadvantage.

The 1874 Brussels Declaration and Oxford Manual’s move from the general to the specific was not without cost. Perceived legal innovations on the part of the Brussels Declaration drafters provoked reluctance and skepticism on the part of Great Britain especially, which did not participate in its drafting, signed nonetheless, but then lead efforts to discourage ratification.80

That drafters put too fine a point on some rules seems to have caused great concern, though the treachery provisions did not attract specific attention or comment. The British indictment is curious given the distinctly military character of the commission that produced the Declaration.81 Defending the Declaration twenty-five years later, a Russian representative observed it was not “an international scientific code, but . . . a common basis for all the instructions which the Governments are to give to their

80 PERCY BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS 108-09 (1908); HALLECK, supra note 60, at 554. Updating General Halleck’s treatise, Sherston related the British representative’s assessment of the Brussels Declaration:

When the more important articles of the Project came to be examined and discussed, instead of mere rules for the guidance of military commanders based upon usage, upon which a general understanding could be show to be desirable in the interests of humanity, the articles were seen to contain or imply numerous innovations, for which no practical necessity was proved to exist, and the result of which would have been greatly to the advantage of Powers having large armies, constantly prepared for war, and systems of compulsory military service.

Id.

81 “[A]mong 32 members of the Conference, 18 were military men, 10 were diplomats and 4 were legal experts and senior officials with no connection to the military and diplomatic professions.” Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle of Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary Suffering, 299 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 98, 100 (1994) (quoting G. Rolin-Jaquemyns, Chronique du Droit International 1871-1878, VII REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LÉGISLATION COMPAREÉ, 90-91 (1875)).
armies and which shall be binding in time of war.”

Neither does the Oxford Manual’s failure to attract widespread adoption appear to have been based on its treatment of perfidy or treachery. Nor does any other substantive rule expressed in the Manual appear to have been particularly objectionable. Rather, European militaries seem still to have been fundamentally skeptical of committing to international codification the rules and customs they had previously entrusted to internal military codes and martial manuals, and above all military sensibilities. Following publication of the Oxford Manual, Field Marshal von Moltke offered his support for the goal of “softening of manners” in war but remarked this, “would not be attained by means of a codification of the law of war.”

Lacking a third-party enforcement mechanism, von Moltke observed the Manual would do nothing to curb infractions in war.

Together, despite their inchoate status of adoption, the 1874 Brussels Declaration and 1880 Oxford Manual reflect an important developmental moment in law-of-war treatment of perfidy. Each confirms the perfidy prohibition’s place as a central tenet of the law regulating the conduct of hostilities, as well as the prohibition’s roots in traditions of honorable, even chivalrous, warfare. And together, they signal an early effort to evolve perfidy from generally prohibited conduct to a specific and technically proscribed method of warfare. These early and specific treatments would be mimicked to varying degrees by succeeding law-of-war instruments of the

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82 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES 475 (James Brown Scott ed., 1920) [1899 HAGUE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS].

83 Many European powers ratified the 1868 St. Petersbourg Declaration during this period. 1868 St. Petersbourg Declaration, supra note 35, in Schindler & Toman, supra note 34, at 93 (listing 1868 signatories). However, unlike is the Manual and the Brussels Declaration before it, the St. Petersbourg Declaration did not regulate war in any comprehensive fashion. The 1868 Declaration addressed only the narrow issue of prohibiting certain projectiles. Yet the Declaration’s preamble did highlight overarching observations on humanity in war. In fact, some regard the 1868 Declaration’s true importance to lie in its preamble rather than its substantive provisions. Meyrowitz, supra note 81, at 99.

84 BORDWELL, supra note 80, at 114-115 (quoting Letter from Count Helmut von Moltke to Dr. Johan Bluntschi, 13 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 80-82 (1881)). It is worth noting that codified law-of-war rules were not alone in attracting the ire of prominent military professionals. Law-of-war custom also inspired well-heeled resistance. The seminal Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz wryly observed, “War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will . . . [A]ttached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, know as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it.” CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 75 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans., eds., 1976) (1832).

85 Id. at 114.
B. The Hague Regulations

Touted as the first international assembly not convened to conclude a war in progress, the 1899 Hague Peace Conferences produced the first multilateral treaty to regulate comprehensively the conduct of hostilities on land. Seemingly inspired by the First Conferences’ success and mood, States soon reconvened at The Hague for a second round, the 1907 Second Hague Peace Conferences. The Second Conferences produced a broader assortment of conventions, covering topics not addressed by the conventions of the 1899 Conferences. Yet with respect to the regulation of the conduct of hostilities on land, found in the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention and its annexed Regulations, the Second Conferences largely reproduced the text of the 1899 Second Convention. Thus it is the negotiations and preparatory work of the 1899 Conference that provides greatest insight to the formation of the Hague Conventions on the conduct of hostilities and their treatment of perfidy and treachery in particular.

It would be difficult to overstate the symbolic significance of the Hague Regulations to the legal restraint of combat in the twentieth century. Much like the 1949 Geneva Conventions today, during the early and mid-twentieth century, the Regulations were, for many, synonymous with the law of war. Yet to say the Regulations profoundly or even meaningfully altered actual conduct in war may be giving them too much, or rather the wrong kind, of credit. The Hague Convention’s si omnes clause,

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86 1899 HAGUE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 82, at v. The proceedings of the Conferences appeared much earlier in Dutch and French language summations. Id.
88 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention IV].
89 Adam Roberts, Land Warfare from Hague to Nuremberg, [hereinafter Roberts] in Howard et al., supra note 2, at 134 (describing Nuremberg Tribunal’s transformation of Hague Regulations into customary international law despite the Regulations’ innovations and expansions of law-of-war custom).
90 Telford Taylor, a U.S. prosecutor at the post-World War II Nuremberg International Military Tribunal observed, “Many of the provisions of the 1907 Hague Conventions regarding unlawful means of combat . . . were antiquarian. Others had been observed only
restricting operation to conflicts comprised exclusively of States Parties, frequently limited the field of material application of its land warfare Regulations. However, the Regulations’ position as a symbolic inroad to sovereignty and as the bedrock of later international instruments is indisputable. The Regulations attracted widespread ratification by developed States, were nearly the exclusive source of comprehensive land combat regulation during two World Wars, and were ultimately partially during the First World War and almost completely disregarded during the Second World War . . . .” Tami Davis Biddle, *Air Power, in* Howard et al., supra note 2, at 155. Geoffrey Best argues the Regulations' had minimal influence on military thinking prior to World War I. GEOFREY BEST, LAW AND WAR 46 (citing I. A. D. Draper, Implementation of International Law in Armed Conflicts, 48 INT’L AFFAIRS 46, 55-56 (1972)) [hereinafter BEST]. As for the Regulations’ post-WWI performance, Best classifies them primarily as “opportunities to showcase how the enemy had treacherously reneged on only recent promises.” BEST, supra, at 47.

91 Article 2 of the 1907 Hague Conventions states, “The provisions contained in the Regulations referred to in Article 1 as well as in the present Convention do not apply except between Contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.” See e.g., A.W.G. Raath & H.A. Styrdom, The Hague Conventions and the Anglo-Boer War, 24 S. Afr. Y.B. INT’L AFFAIRS 149 (1999) (noting British reliance on the 1899 Hague Second Convention *si omnes* clause to preclude operation of the Regulations in the Second Boer War). Raath & Styrdom note that in addition to the *si omnes* clause, racial prejudices and attitudes toward non-European fighters also limited the Regulations’ influence on combat.

For example, in February 1900, Field Marshal Lord Wolseley, commander-in-chief at the British War Office, availed himself of the nebulous concept of 'civilised nations' to subvert the binding force of the laws and customs of war in the following terms:

I know the Boers of all classes to be most untruthful in all their dealings with us and even amongst themselves. They are very cunning, a characteristic common to all untruthful races .... To attempt to tie our hands in any way, no matter how small, by the 'Laws and Customs of War' proposed for Civilized nations at the Peace Conference, would be in my opinion suicidal, for the Boers would not be bound by any such amenities.

*Id.* at 156 (citing War Office 32/850, Wolseley to parliamentary under-secretary, 14.2.1900 quoted in SB Spies, Methods of Barbarism: Roberts and Kitchener and civilians in the Boer Republics, January 1900- May 1902, 311 (1978).

92 Schindler & Toman, *supra* note 34, at 85-86 (indicating original States signatory and those later acceding to Hague Convention IV and Regulations).

93 The Geneva Conventions that operated during the First and Second World Wars respectively remained narrow and discrete regulations for the treatment of only the wounded with respect to the former conflict and the wounded and prisoners of war with respect to the latter. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, July 6, 1906, 35 Stat. 1885, T.S. No. 464;
determined to reflect custom in their entirety, forming the primary legal basis for war crimes convictions at the Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals.

The Hague Regulations’ treatment of perfidy and treachery are found in two adjacent articles addressing hostilities generally. First, Article 22 repeats the Brussels and Oxford instruments’ fundamental provision concerning means of war. Article 22 states, “The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not limited.” Second, Article 23 lists methods of war “especially forbidden” including “to employ poison . . . to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army,” and “to make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag or the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges of the Geneva Convention.”

Considering the groundwork laid by the Lieber Code, the Brussels Declaration and the Oxford Manual, the Hague Regulations’ treatment of

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95 Trial of the Major War Criminals, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, Nuremberg, 254 (1947). The United Nations General Assembly has also expressed the view that the Hague Regulations reflect customary international law. G.A. Res. 95 (I), at 188, U.N. Doc. A/236 (Dec. 11, 1946). The conclusion that the Regulations reflected custom was, in fact, a finding of critical importance to the convictions at the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg. The base treaty of the Regulations prevented their operation during any armed conflict that involved a non-party to the Conventions. See Hague Convention (II), supra note 87, art. 2. The Convention states, “The provisions contained in the Regulations . . . are only binding on the Contracting Powers, in case of war between two or more of them. These provisions shall cease to be binding from the time . . . a non-Contracting Power joins one of the belligerents.” Id. Finding the Regulations to reflect custom permitted the IMT to apply their provisions to conduct during the Second World War notwithstanding the participation of States not party to the Regulations such as Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia. Earlier, First World War belligerents rejected operation of the Regulations on the basis of opposing State Parties’ allies’ failure to ratify or accede. Coleman Phillipson, International Law and the Great War 175 (1915).
perfidy appears to reflect a relative retreat to generality. While the Regulations retained their predecessors’ references to poison and misuse of enemy and legally protected emblems, the Hague drafters declined to adopt the Oxford Manual reference to “honourable” warfare. Also missing are the Manual and the Lieber Code references to assassination and feigning surrender as examples of treachery.

The relative generality of the Regulations’ treatment of perfidy is difficult to explain. By way of mandate, the Regulations’ drafters enjoyed greater liberty to innovate and clarify than two of their predecessors. Professor Lieber was charged merely to codify custom. Similarly, the preface of the Oxford Manual made clear the authors’ choice not to innovate but merely to codify accepted ideas and customs. By contrast, the Hague Regulations, like the Brussels Declaration before, included the goal of not only codifying custom but also to “revise the general laws and customs of war.” Yet given this generously permissive drafting mandate as well as the opportunity to reflect on and revisit their previous work from the First 1899 Conference, the authors of the Second Hague Conference made no change to their original treatment of perfidy and treachery, nor any substantive change to the work of other preceding instruments. Substitution of the phrase “To kill or wound treacherously” for the phrase “Murder by treachery” was the Regulations’ only modification to the perfidy and treachery provisions of the Brussels Declaration.

The best available explanation for this stasis or even regression is that international politics and the delegates’ egos and personalities had a hand in the Regulations’ failure to advance or develop codification of the perfidy prohibition, as well as other *jus in bello* provisions of the Regulations. The Record of Proceedings of the 1899 Hague Conference portrays a struggle of

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96 In fact, it appears a sub-commission of the First Hague Conference produced the initial drafts of the Regulations almost entirely from the 1874 Brussels Declaration. See 1899 HAGUE CONFERENCES PROCEEDINGS, supra note 86, at 415-16. The record of proceedings provides a helpful side-by-side reproduction of the texts of the Declaration and the Regulations. *Id.* at 564-78.
97 The delegates considered the work of the Oxford Manual in discussions of other provisions of the Regulations, such as belligerent occupation. 1899 HAGUE CONFERENCES PROCEEDINGS, *supra* note 82, at 510-11.
98 Brussels Declaration, *supra* note 73, preamble.
100 A Danish delegate proposed the change in the meeting of a sub-commission, thinking “murder” to have been used incorrectly by the Brussels Declaration. 1899 HAGUE CONFERENCES PROCEEDINGS, *supra* note 82, at 491. The subcommittee added reference to wounding later at the behest of a French delegate. *Id.* at 557.
sorts between the representatives of Great Britain and Russia over the legacy of the 1874 Brussels Declaration. From diplomatic records it seems the British were eager to preserve the effect of their decision not to support the Declaration decades earlier. A sensitivity and reluctance toward overreaching custom and overcommitting to international law matters traditionally reserved to military prerogative pervades the British representatives’ comments throughout.

Meanwhile the Russians, through the forceful and tireless efforts of their formidable delegate Fyodor Fyodorovich Martens, approached the Conference as an opportunity finally to give legal effect to their prized 1874 Brussels Declaration. It is clear from the record of proceedings that Russia viewed the *jus in bello* proceedings of the 1899 Hague Conference simply as a second opportunity to win approval of the Brussels Declaration. A brilliant and persuasive diplomat and drafter, Martens ultimately managed both to establish the Declaration as the starting point for discussion of the regulation of land warfare at the Conference and also to preserve the majority of its substantive provisions in the various committee and plenary proceedings.

The immediate effect was to produce the world’s first comprehensive law-of-war treaty. The collateral effect for the perfidy prohibition, and perhaps other nascent law-of-war codifications, was a degree of doctrinal stagnation. One finds in the Hague Regulations not a perfidy prohibition revised and updated to reflect notions of modern sensibilities in war, but rather a nearly rote reproduction of mid-to-late nineteenth century nascent positivism.

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101 See 1899 Hague Conference Proceedings, *supra* note 82, at 416-17. At an early meeting of the commission responsible for rules of land warfare, General John Ardagh observed,

> Without seeking to know the motives to which may be attributed the non-adoption of the Brussels Declaration, it is permissible to suppose that the same difficulties may arise at the conclusion of our labors at The Hague. In order to brush them aside and to escape the unfruitful results of the Brussels conference . . . we would better accept the Declaration only as a general basis for instructions to our troops on the laws and customs of war . . .

*Id.* at 416-17. General Ardagh repeated his position later in the Conferences. *Id.* at 517.

102 See *id.* at 417, 505-507, 518.

As for perfidy itself, the Conferences included no discussion or consideration of clarifying the prohibition. No delegation proposed adding a more specific articulation, formulating a definition, or identifying additional examples or specific prohibitions of perfidious means or methods. In fact, evidence of skepticism toward such an effort can be found in at least one national report on the Conferences. The U.S. delegation to the 1899 Hague Conference argued, “the reproach of cruelty and perfidy, addressed against [poison gas] shells, was equally uttered formerly against firearms and torpedoes, both of which are now employed without scruple.”

One finds confirmation, however, that delegates did not regard the Regulations’ enumeration of examples of perfidy to be exhaustive. In particular, the Regulations’ reference to methods “especially forbidden” made clear that other forms of treachery may have been prohibited as well (just not “especially”). As an example that would be codified in an international instrument sixty years later, a French delegate to the Convention observed, “making [a person] prisoner by treachery is likewise prohibited.”

Thus between the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, States attempted several codifications of the perfidy prohibition. In some sense these efforts reflected an evolution from reliance on un-codified custom or vague principle. In particular, a number of legal instruments included examples of perfidious conduct in hostilities. Overall, however, early codifications of perfidy seem to have been part of larger efforts directed at securing commitment to instruct armies on general law-of-war topics and principles rather than endeavors to advance or secure doctrinal clarity. No early instrument rendered a technical definition of perfidy or treachery. Application of these early prohibitions of perfidy likely required deep familiarity with military professional custom, some sense of battlefield morality and ethics, a high degree of tolerance for subjective variation, and a strong dose of context.

105 1899 HAGUE CONFERENCES PROCEEDINGS, supra note 82, at 557.
106 Id.
107 Law-of-war commentators have remarked on the apparent selectivity and subjective
All the same, change was not far off. Legal academics and commentators soon saw fit to expand and clarify the Hague formula. Shortly after the 1907 Hague Regulations’ entry into force, the influential law-of-war commentator J. M. Spaight defined treachery as follows:

It is the essence of treachery that the offender assumes a false character by which he deceives his enemy and thereby is able to effect a hostile act which, had he come under his true colours, he could not have done. He takes advantage of his enemy’s reliance on his honour.108

Spaight’s formulation, including his expression of forbearance and detrimental reliance on the part of the deceived victim, would prove highly influential. However, incorporation of Spaight’s element-based definition into treaty form would not come for nearly six decades.

In fact, misunderstanding and error concerning perfidy and treachery under the Hague Regulations appear to have reigned for a time at the Tokyo International Military Tribunal. Among charges against Japanese leadership was violation of the Article 23(b) prohibition on treacherous attack. The prosecutor argued, “An attack without warning on another nation with which Japan was at peace constituted treachery of the worst type, and under the provisions of the Hague Convention the killing of any human being during such attack became murder.”109

The prosecutor’s error in conflating violations of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello evaded even the judges who seem to have found fault not in application of the Hague Regulations to a strategic decision whether to resort to force at all but in the argument that the Pearl Harbor attack was a

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108 JAMES MOLONY SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 87 (1911).
violation any particular confidence or trust.\footnote{Id. (citing Memorandum to Sir William Webb from Justice BVA Röling 37 (undated) and Tokyo IMT Judgment, Pal Dissent, 1038-39).} The Tribunal opined that, given preexisting tension in the Pacific, the United States should have been on notice of the possibility of Japanese invasion, thus vitiating illegal treachery.\footnote{Id.} As Boister and Cryer state well, the entire Tribunal seems to have confused common notions of betrayal with legal notions of treachery.\footnote{Id. at 172.}

Overall, early and mid-twentieth century treatments of perfidy remained expressions at the level of generality expected of a principle rather than specific prohibitions, though change was coming.

\section*{C. 1977 Additional Protocol I}

It is perhaps surprising that none of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions addresses perfidy directly, nor does any of their early predecessors. The omission, however, is in fact consistent with the Conventions’ longstanding, exclusive focus on prescribing treatment of persons in enemy custody. For over a century, the Geneva tradition restricted itself to prescribing treatment of persons under the control of an enemy belligerent—the victims of war.\footnote{Treaties identified with the Hague tradition did not reciprocate the Geneva tradition’s forbearance. For instance, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations include provisions concerning the treatment and capture of prisoners of war. 1899 Hague Convention II, supra note 87, chapter II; 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 88, chapter II. \textit{See also} discussion supra accompanying note 32.} For the majority of their experience, the Geneva Conventions left regulation of targeting and the conduct of hostilities, and therefore perfidy, almost entirely to treaties and instruments of the Hague tradition.

Beginning in 1956, however, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) proposed Geneva treatment of actual conditions of combat as part of the Committee’s mission to develop the law of war generally.\footnote{The ICRC proposed its Draft Rules for the conduct of hostilities at its XIXth International Conference in New Delhi, India in 1957. Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, 1956, \textit{in} Schindler & Toman, \textit{supra} note 34, at 339. The draft provoked little reaction from States, however a resolution at the following year’s conference encouraged the ICRC “to pursue the development of International Humanitarian Law.” \textit{Id.} at xxix-xxx.} The ICRC and others noted the relative dormancy of the Hague tradition in
developing and codifying rules applicable to the use of weapons. Additionally, radical changes in the nature of warfare, especially the development of aerial bombardment and changes in the nature of persons involved in hostilities bolstered calls to update the *jus in bello*. In 1977, perfidy and rules for targeting operations generally finally found their way into the Geneva Conventions lineage, namely, through Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

If the aim of prior law-of-war treaties had been gradually to evolve perfidy from a broad custom into a specific prohibition, AP I clearly finished the job. The AP I provision on perfidy is a sharp conversion of the perfidy prohibition from broad principle into an expression of a specific prohibition. Through AP I, States appear finally to have dealt with perfidy squarely as a specific prohibition rather than through the broad allusions and intimations of the preceding instruments of the Hague tradition. Compared with its forebears, the AP I perfidy prohibition relies to a far lesser extent on the readers’ familiarity with military custom and subjective notions of chivalry. At the time it entered force AP I included the only treaty-based definition of the term at all. But with codification and specificity came a critical narrowing of the prohibition.

Article 37 of the AP I states,

> It is prohibited to kill, injure or capture an adversary by resort to perfidy. Acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence, shall constitute perfidy.

The most immediately noticeable change from the Hague Regulations’ formula is semantic. AP I substitutes the term perfidy for treachery. There is some evidence that commentators had previously regarded the terms as

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115 *Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949* xxix (Yves Sandoz et al. eds, 1987) [hereinafter AP I Commentary]. The ICRC notes coordination and agreement with the Government of the Netherlands, in its capacity as depositary of the Hague Conventions, concerning its expansion into topics of hostilities. *Id.*


synonymous. Yet some law-of-war scholars detect a difference between the two terms. Within the latter view, most consider that treachery still describes a broader class of dishonorably deceptive acts than perfidy. On the other hand, an ICRC commentary to AP I claims States abandoned treachery because the term was considered “too narrow.”

A pair of commentators concurs, concluding that perfidy is the broader term, absorbing practices such as assassination not covered by treachery. Some considered treachery, especially the French “trahison,” to be an exclusively municipal term, inapplicable to behavior toward an international enemy. As with so many facets of law-of-war perfidy, the question remains unsettled.

Perhaps the second most conspicuous change from the Hague formulation concerns the requisite consequences of perfidy. AP I adds capture to killing and injury as effects sufficient to constitute prohibited perfidy. Recall the Hague Regulations had only addressed wounding or

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118 Cowles, supra note 4, at 58. Colonel Cowles notes Spaight’s earlier work on treachery, cited above, as equivalent to the expression of perfidy. Id. at 58 (citing SPAIGHT, supra note 108, at 87).

119 UK MANUAL, supra note 53, ¶ 15.12.1 (noting “The definition of perfidy . . . may also be used as guidance as to the meaning of ‘treachery’ in internal armed conflicts,”); DEPT’OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, ¶ 50 (1956).


121 Schmitt, Assassination, supra note 120, at 617. Professor Schmitt observes, “Treachery, as construed by early scholars, is thus broader than the concept of perfidy; nevertheless, the same basic criteria that are used to distinguish lawful ruses from unlawful perfidies can be applied to determinations of treachery. Id.

122 AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 115, at ¶1491.


124 AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 115, at ¶ 1488. The commentary notes the concern with limits on the term trahison originated at the 1874 Brussels Declaration Conference. Id. (citing XX1st International Conference of the Red Cross, Reaffirmation and Development of the Laws and Customs Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Report Submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (May 1969)).

125 Concern with perfidious or treacherous capture was not new, however. Recall that a French delegate had declared his government’s understanding that Hague Regulations Article 23(b) also prohibited treacherous captures. 1899 HAGUE CONFERENCES
killing by treachery. Thus States Parties to API are now clearly prohibited from resorting to perfidy to accomplish captures. It is unclear whether capture now constitutes a sufficient effect to constitute perfidy by States not party to AP I. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court does not include capture among effects sufficient to establish the war crime of perfidy. On the other hand, the ICRC has concluded that the addition of capture now reflects customary international law, binding on States not party to API.127

Regardless, AP I clearly describes these effects as required elements. Where the Hague Regulations presented killing and injury as “especially forbidden” examples of perfidy, AP I appears to forbid or prohibit only those deceptions and violations of confidence that result in killing, injury or capture. Deceitful, even bad faith claims to law-of-war protection that are leveraged to produce some other form of military advantage, short of casualties or capture of persons do not fall within AP I prohibited perfidy. Such acts may constitute “improper use” if conducted by resort to certain enumerated protected emblems such as UN insignia, uniforms of neutrals or enemies, or emblems of the Red Cross. But they are not regarded as prohibited perfidy by AP I.128

A highly influential commentary on AP I confirms that damage to property, even civilian or specially protected objects does not fall within the Protocol’s perfidy prohibition. The conclusion follows quite clearly from the treaty text. Therefore sabotage of military equipment or facilities by

126 ICC Rome Statute, supra note 40, art. 8(2)(b)(xi), (e).
127 ICRC CIL STUDY, supra note 34, at 225.
128 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 38, arts. 38-39. The Article 39(b) rule against using enemy uniforms is not accepted universally. While there is general consensus against using enemy uniforms while conducting attacks, the U.S. for instance, maintains enemy uniforms may be used to avoid detection during tactical movement or for information gathering. FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 53, ¶ 54 (observing, “In practice, it has been authorized to make use of national flags, insignia, and uniforms as a ruse.”). A draft U.S. military commission charge sheet perhaps calls into question the U.S. view, however. See text supported infra notes 23-25 (discussing Daqduq charge sheet). The U.S. did not include Article 37 among provisions it regards as either reflective of custom or supportable as custom through state practice in its most recent, though surely dated, official communication concerning AP I. McNeill Memorandum, supra note 54.
resort to otherwise perfidious means is not prohibited by AP I. Such operations might run afoul of other rules, such as the rules against improper use of emblems, indiscriminate attack,\(^{130}\) or the requirements of taking precautions in the attack.\(^ {131}\) Still, otherwise perfidious attacks that only produce physical damage to objects are not within the Article 37 prohibition. The exclusion is especially curious given the Protocol’s extensive regime of protection of civilian objects.\(^ {132}\)

Further narrowing in the scope of perfidy coverage by API is evident from academic analysis. Influential commentators also interpret the Protocol to include a proximity requirement. Bothe, Partch, and Solf contend, “the act of perfidy must be the proximate cause of the killing, injury or capture. A remote causal connection will not suffice.”\(^ {133}\) In other words, the physical consequences to a person must result immediately from the forbearance secured by feigned protected status. As a negative example Bothe and his co-authors cite a lethal ambush arising from earlier, feigned injury as inadequate to establish prohibited perfidy.\(^ {134}\) Other important commentators concur, observing the deception and act of hostility must “constitute means of achieving one and the same object.”\(^ {135}\) Only the unofficial ICRC commentary to AP I offers a contrary suggestion.\(^ {136}\)

Inchoate effects are seemingly also not within AP I prohibited perfidy. Commentators have observed that the killing, wounding, or capture requirements of prohibited perfidy do not include failed attempts at these effects.\(^ {137}\) The majority view holds that effects must actually be achieved to

\(^{130}\) Additional Protocol I, supra note 38, arts. 48, 51.

\(^{131}\) Id. art. 57.

\(^{132}\) See id., arts 48, 52. One of the chief goals of convening the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conferences was to extend and develop protections for civilians and civilian objects from the effects of military targeting and attack. See AP I Commentary supra note 115, ¶¶ 2000-15. United Nations General Assembly support for the Additional Protocols also emphasized civilian protection. See also U.N.G.A. Res. 2675 (XXV) Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts (Dec. 9, 1970).

\(^{133}\) Bothe et al., supra note 129, at 204.

\(^{134}\) Id.


\(^{136}\) AP I Commentary, supra note 115, ¶1492. The commentary portrays a situation involving perfidious conduct that merely results in delaying an enemy attack rather than killing, wounding or capture. The commentary observes that while initially the act would not violate the AP I prohibition, people would undoubtedly be killed in later combat. The commentary seems to suggest later casualties might suffice to constitute prohibited perfidy, though controversy on the point is admitted. Id.

\(^{137}\) Matthew Morris, “Hiding Amongst a Crowd” and the Illegality of Deceptive Lighting, 54 Naval L. Rev. 235 (2007) (noting “some question whether an unsuccessful
fall within the prohibition. The ICRC commentary notes the point as well.\footnote{AP I COMMENTARY, supra note 115, ¶ 1492.}

Perhaps formalistic in the extreme, the conclusion is easily implied from the text of both the AP I and Hague expressions. Given the decades of experience and the opportunity at the AP I conference to address the point, States seem to have declined to include attempts in the perfidy prohibition, holding fast to, and only augmenting with capture, the required effects of killing and wounding. The ICRC commentary notes hopefully that general rules of treaty interpretation might counsel a reading that prohibits attempts.\footnote{Id., ¶ 1493 (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 53).} More realistically, it is very likely that theories of liability employed by international criminal law mechanisms and domestic implementations of the perfidy prohibition would reach inchoate acts nonetheless.\footnote{See ICC Rome Statute, supra note 14, art 25(f) (outlining individual responsibility on the basis of attempts at crimes).}

Lest one get the sense that API treatment of perfidy was entirely regressive, narrowing of the perfidy prohibition produced a degree of clarity lacking since the earliest codifications. The most valuable AP I refinement of perfidy was the addition of a definition of the term. Recall that previous instruments had merely employed the term “treacherously” or simply referred to perfidy itself. Many included illustrative examples or had identified conduct that was “especially forbidden.” But overall, preexisting treatments of perfidy and treachery left a great deal to subjective interpretation.\footnote{See supra discussion accompanying notes 64 - 67.}

By contrast, the second clause of Article 37 of AP I identifies three essential elements of perfidy. They include: an invitation of confidence that an adversary is entitled to protection; an acceptance in that the target of intended perfidy exercises forbearance or accords the claimed protection; and finally a betrayal of that confidence in bad faith with physically harmful human consequences. A legal contractual analogy is apt. As defined in AP I, one might say prohibited perfidy involves an offer, acceptance, breach, and damages.\footnote{U.C.C. § 2-206 (1977). (describing elements of offer and acceptance in U.S. contract law).} The offer comes in the form of an enemy invitation to accord protection. Like contract law, the offer may be verbal or implied by attempt to kill the enemy through the use of false surrender is banned”\footnote{See supra discussion accompanying notes 64 - 67.}.\footnote{See supra discussion accompanying notes 64 - 67.}
conditions surrounding the interaction such as by the attacker/oferor’s outward appearance. Acceptance is expressed as forbearance or by according protection. That is, in recognition and acceptance of the claimed protected status, the combatant target/offeree declines to attack the offeror, and instead affords the respect and protection owed to law-of-war protected classes. Finally, breach occurs through enemy violation of the combatant’s confidence that forbearance or protection was called for and produces damages in the form of killing, injury or capture.

To clarify the contractual offer analogy, not every invitation to confidence lies within the scope of perfidy. To satisfy the API definition of perfidy, an invited confidence must be based on an international legal protection derived from the law of war. At the API diplomatic conference, States rejected in committee an ICRC proposal to apply the term ‘confidence’ to include obligations of general international law and broader moral obligations. The States of the relevant API drafting committee determined that confidence “must be tied to something more precise and should not be tied to internal or domestic law.” Thus for purposes of perfidy, invitations of confidence or trust must match up with specific law-of-war protective provisions. For example, inviting an enemy to accord the protection owed to civilians, the wounded and sick, or to

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143 XI 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 41, at 98, 100; XV ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 41, at 381.
144 XIV 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 41, at 264. Speaking on a draft article on perfidy a U.S. delegate observed, “In the English text, . . . the word ‘confidence seemed to relate that notion to a feeling of legal or moral obligation. . . . Experience showed that there was no uniform standard of morality in the world in general, and still less in time of war.” Id.
145 A report from the Third Committee noted, "The initial effort was directed toward finding an appropriate, general definition of perfidy. The key suggestion in this connexion [sic] came from [a] tripartite amendment, which proposed to define ‘confidence’ in terms of whether one was entitled to, or obliged to accord, protection under international law. The Committee agreed that confidence could not be an abstract confidence, but must be tied to something more precise and should not be tied to internal or domestic law. I thin end, it was decided to refer to confidence in protection under ‘international law applicable in armed conflicts’, by which was meant the laws governing the conduct of armed conflict which were applicable to the conflict in question."

Id
146 See 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 38, arts. 48 & 51 (stating “Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants . . . ”)
a prisoner of war\textsuperscript{148} satisfies the offer element of AP I perfidy. On the other hand, feigning the status of a military journalist or an assistant to military religious personnel would not qualify, as neither is entitled to specific protection under the law of war. Similarly, States declined explicitly to include deceptive use of enemy uniforms, insignia, and emblems from the AP I treatment of perfidy. AP I, like the Hague Regulations, treats misuse of enemy uniforms, along with those of neutral States, separately from perfidy.\textsuperscript{149}

The perhaps regrettable, though interpretively compelled, conclusion is that AP I identifies multiple versions or categories of perfidy. Article 37 at once defines perfidy generally yet also identifies a seeming subclass of perfidy that is prohibited. A plain reading indicates that only those acts of perfidy that result in killing, wounding or capture are prohibited by AP I. To be sure, the ICRC Commentary to AP I strains against this understanding. Indeed, an overall sense of ICRC disappointment at the results of Article 37 runs throughout the Commentary. Its entire treatment of Article 37 appears to be in the nature of damage control. As evidence, the Commentary resorts to nearly every form of alternative or ontological argument of international law against the impression that the text of AP I leaves a class of perfidy outside its prohibition – a class of permissible perfidy.\textsuperscript{150}

Yet one strains to find in Article 37 the textual ambiguity that traditionally occasions resort to broader means of interpretation.\textsuperscript{151} A report

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\textsuperscript{148} See 1949 Geneva Convention III, \textit{supra} note 49, art. 13 (stating, “Any unlawful act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited.”).

\textsuperscript{149} This is not to suggest that resort to teleological or functional interpretations or resort to a treaty’s object and purpose are supplemental means of interpretation. Vienna Convention article 31 appears to regard such ontological interpretive approaches as primary means of interpretation. Vienna Convention, \textit{supra} note 43, art. 31(1). See also Luigi Sbolci, \textit{Supplementary Means of Interpretation, in The Law of Treaties Beyond The Vienna Convention} 147-49 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011) (elaborating supplemental means of treaty interpretation); Mark E. Villiger, \textit{Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties} 421-23 (2009) (outlining methods of treaty interpretation captured by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention). Yet an understanding of
\end{footnotesize}
by the Committee responsible for addressing perfidy ultimately concluded Article 37 “does not prohibit perfidy, per se, but merely ‘to kill, injure or capture and adversary by resort to perfidy.’” Nor was it simply the case that the two-fold character of perfidy resulting from Article 37 escaped the attention of the delegates. An Indian delegate clearly identified the failure of the Article to prohibit perfidy per se. He suggested unsuccessfully, “the principle should first be established that perfidy was unlawful, and that, consequently, ‘it is forbidden to kill, injuring or capture and adversary by resort to perfidy.’”

Those yearning for a broader, more humanitarian vision of prohibited perfidy might draw consolation from later provisions of AP I. In particular, Art 38 addresses specifically the misuse of important law-of-war protective emblems. And neither provision concerning misuse of emblems includes the requirements of killing, wounding, or capture found in prohibited perfidy. Yet the deliberate narrowing of prohibited perfidy by API is plain.

Still, it is important to realize that despite its seemingly comprehensive treatment of the conduct of hostilities and targeting, API does not regulate exclusively. In large part, the precise state of the codified perfidy prohibition may be a function of one’s understanding of the relationship between AP I and the 1907 Hague Regulations. In general, AP I is envisioned as operating alongside rather than as displacing or replacing the Regulations. Judge Meron notes that although AP I codifies a number of Hague rules it “does not always state those rules fully, comprehensively or

the object and purpose of the perfidy prohibition must surely be limited to the provision itself and not broader understandings of the object and purpose of restraints on warfare generally.

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152 XV 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 41, at 382.
153 XIV 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 41, at 268
154 Id.
155 Article 38 states.

1. It is prohibited to make improper use of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun or of other emblems, signs or signals provided for by the Conventions or by this Protocol. It is also prohibited to misuse deliberately in an armed conflict other internationally recognized protective emblems, signs or signals, including the flag of truce, and the protective emblem of cultural property.

2. It is prohibited to make use of the distinctive emblem of the United Nations, except as authorized by that Organization.
definitively.”\textsuperscript{156} The AP I Preamble is worded somewhat ambiguously in this respect. The Preamble recites the goal to “reaffirm and develop” existing law-of-war provisions, yet makes no reference to particular, pre-existing instruments. Conference discussion and a vote at a plenary meeting of the AP I Diplomatic Conference, clarifies that a majority of States present included the Hague Regulations in the AP I mandate to reaffirm the preexisting law of war.\textsuperscript{157} The ICRC commentary asserts as much as well.\textsuperscript{158}

Yet a coherent theory of the relationship between the two treaties remains elusive. The Protocol’s omission of examples cited in previous law-of-war instruments is notable. AP I abandons treatment of poison, which had previously been thought to be a treacherous means of combat. Like the Hague Regulations, AP I also declines to address assassination as part of perfidy or treacherous conduct. Omissions have led commentators to conclude the AP I transition to the term perfidy absorbed the omitted examples, especially assassination.\textsuperscript{159} A prominent study on assassination dismisses this view as unlikely and inconsistent with early practice concerning treachery, however.\textsuperscript{160} The ICRC Commentary notes that omission of previous examples was merely an effort to include only examples that attracted unanimous agreement.\textsuperscript{161}

Still, one finds in AP I inconsistent treatment of the provisions of the Hague Regulations. In some cases, States used AP I to restate Hague provisions. For instance, the AP I formulation prohibiting unnecessary suffering appears, in substance, nearly word-for-word from the Hague expression.\textsuperscript{162} AP I also reproduces, nearly verbatim, the Brussels

\textsuperscript{156} Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age 271 (1998).
\textsuperscript{157} VII 1977 Additional Protocols Official Records, supra note 41, at 167-68.
\textsuperscript{158} AP I Commentary, supra note 115, ¶1488 (asserting “this Part does not aim to replace the Hague Regulations of 1907, but is concerned with developing them.”).
\textsuperscript{159} Kendall supra note 4, at 1075; Zengel supra note 4, at 622.
\textsuperscript{160} Schmitt, Assassination, supra note 120, at 617.
\textsuperscript{161} AP I Commentary, supra note 115, at ¶1503 (citing XV 1977 Additional Protocols Official Records, supra note 41, at 382.
\textsuperscript{162} Additional Protocol I, supra note 38, art. 35(2). AP I states, “It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles, and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” Id. The 1907 Hague Regulations state in relevant part, “it is especially forbidden . . . to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.” 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 88, art 23(e). Interestingly, the English translation of the 1899 Convention substitutes “of a nature to” in place of “calculated to.” The 1907 English translation’s alternation has suggested to some addition of a scienter element. But see M.G. Cowling, The Relationship between Military Necessity and the Principle of Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering in the Law of Armed Conflict, 25 S. Afr. Y.B. Int’l L. 131, 140 (2000) (discerning no
Declaration and Hague notions that means and methods of warfare are not unlimited.\textsuperscript{163} In other cases, however, AP I alters or omits important Hague provisions. That AP I would reproduce Hague provisions in some places, yet, as with perfidy, alter them in others leaves a somewhat troubling interpretive dilemma. Sound statutory interpretation counsels giving legal effect to these differences, suggesting that restated provisions should be regarded as replaced and that omitted references in restated rules should be regarded as continuing in force. The Hague Regulations’ perfidy provisions are firmly in the former class and thus a strong interpretive case can be made for their obsolescence.

Finally, the AP I narrowing of the perfidy prohibition is not limited to substantive treatment. AP I enforcement and implementation measures also confirm a narrowing of the notion of prohibited perfidy. Part V, Section II of AP I addresses “Repression of Breaches” through a system of enforcement measures that builds on the grave breaches regime introduced by the 1949 Geneva Conventions.\textsuperscript{164} AP I includes perfidy among six acts that constitute grave breaches when “committed wilfully . . . and causing death or serious injury to body or health . . . .”\textsuperscript{165} Unlike its five counterparts, perfidy is little affected by the death or serious injury requirement. Recall that AP I prohibited perfidy requires such consequences itself. Instead, the grave breach provision’s narrowing effect comes from the form of confidence invited. Article 85 describes only “the perfidious use, in violation of Article 37, of the distinctive emblem of the red cross, red crescent or red lion or of other protective signs recognized by the Conventions or the Protocol.”\textsuperscript{166} Thus only confidence invited with respect to particular law-of-war protective emblems registers as a grave breach of AP I. Perfidious resort to civilian status or that of wounded and sick does not constitute a grave breach of AP I.

The practical consequences of these narrowed enforcement provisions are significant. Simple breaches, as opposed to grave breaches, of the perfidy prohibition carry no duty on the part of AP I States Party to enact

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\footnotesize practical difference between operation of the 1899 and 1907 statements of unnecessary suffering): Meyrowitz, supra note 83, at 102. However, no meaningful change appears in the French version, which States chose as the official text of both Hague Conventions.
\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Id.}, art. 35(1).
\textsuperscript{165} Additional Protocol I, supra note 38, art. 85(3).
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Id.}, art. 85(3)(f).
\end{flushright}
domestic penal sanctions against perpetrators. Nor do simple breaches of perfidy give rise under AP I and the Conventions’ grave breaches regime to a duty on the part of States Party to search for perpetrators. Similarly, States Parties are not required by AP I to prosecute or extradite perpetrators of simple breaches of the Protocol under the principle of aut dedere aut judicare. Perhaps most significantly, the system of universal jurisdiction that is part of the grave breach regime, does not extend to simple breaches. Therefore the traditional minimums for international criminal jurisdiction, nationality, territoriality, etc. . . ., apply to simple perfidy. Finally and perhaps most importantly, prosecutions of simple breaches of perfidy cannot rely on the severely negative gravitas that attends grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and their Protocol.

Ultimately, it seems the best understanding of the codified law-of-war perfidy prohibition of AP I appreciates three varieties of perfidy: simple perfidy; prohibited perfidy; and grave perfidy. Simple perfidy includes all acts, regardless of consequences, that falsely invite an enemy to accord law of war protection and then betray that confidence in bad faith. Prohibited perfidy includes only perfidious acts that proximately result in death, injury, or capture of the betrayed enemy. And grave perfidy constitutes prohibited perfidy against a person protected by one of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, most likely a combatant qualifying for prisoner-of-war status.

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167 The obligation to enact penal sanctions for grave breaches appears identically in all four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Geneva Convention I, supra note 49, arts. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 49, arts. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 49, arts. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 49, arts. 146. States Parties are not explicitly required by the grave breach system to enact penal sanctions for simple breaches. They are required merely “take measures necessary for suppression” of simple breaches. Id.
by false resort only to the protected emblems of the Red Cross.

The remaining doctrinal question is, what remains of the customs and principles codified and seemingly narrowed by AP I and its forebears? Do broader principles concerning perfidy in war persist to limit the conduct of war in meaningful and relevant ways?

IV. PERFIDY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CHIVALRY

Beyond occasional judicial notice and regular citations in military legal manuals, treaty law itself makes clear that international custom and principles continue to operate in the modern law of war. Since the 1899 Hague Second Convention, nearly every significant law-of-war treaty has included, in either its preamble or operative sections, a version of the Martens Clause. The 1899 Hague Convention preamble states,

Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience; . . .

Initially proposed by the influential Russian delegate Martens to resolve debate over the rights of inhabitants of occupied territory to resist invading forces, the eponymous Martens Clause soon took on far greater

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172 See supra discussion and sources at note 53.


174 1899 Hague Convention II, supra note 87, preamble.

175 See discussion supra accompanying notes 102 - 103.
significance. The Clause now stands both as a testament to the limits of States’ agreement on codified rules and also as confirmation of their conviction that absence of treaty provisions does not give rise to lawlessness in war.

Although typically offered as an account of the continuing role of custom as a source of law-of-war obligations, the Martens Clause may also inform the role of general law-of-war principles. That is, as much as it preserves custom alongside treaties, the Clause may also be fairly understood as an endorsement of the continued operation of law-of-war principles. The term “usages” calls to mind long-standing, law-of-war references to the “customs and usages” of war that predated major codifications. Better yet, the Clause’s resort to “laws of humanity” tracks a widely acknowledged principle of the law of war. The Clause is perhaps the clearest indication that, despite their late nineteenth-century enthusiasm for codification, States envisioned a continuing role for unwritten custom and general law-of-war principles.

The law-of-war principle most frequently identified with a prohibition of perfidy is chivalry or as it is in some cases expressed, honor. Chivalry is not unanimously recognized as a modern principle of the law of war. In

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176 1899 HAGUE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 82, at 547-48.
180 BOTHE ET AL., supra note 129, at 202. (asserting perfidy is “derived from the principle of chivalry”); Davis Brown, Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict, 47 HARV. INT’L L. J. 179, 203 (2006) (including perfidy in discussion of chivalry. See also CANADIAN MANUAL, supra note 53, at ¶ 7 (stating, chivalry is reflected in specific prohibitions such as those against dishonourable or treacherous conduct and against misuse of enemy flags or flags of truce.”).
fact, few modern sources include it at all. How or exactly when chivalry came to be omitted from mainstream articulations of the principles of the law of war is unclear. The most notable exceptions are the Canadian Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, a 1956 U.S. legal manual on land warfare and a draft law-of-war manual circulated among U.S. government agencies for a number of years.

The Canadian Manual concedes the principle’s ambiguity immediately after announcing it, observing, “The concept of chivalry is difficult to define. It refers to the conduct of armed conflict in accordance with certain recognized formalities and courtesies.” The Manual identifies explicitly none of these formalities or courtesies. Some academic commentators also include chivalry as a modern principle of the law of war. Professor Wingfield, for instance, defines chivalry as, “the principle which forbids perfidy or treachery in military operations, while still permitting legitimate ruses of war.”

The concept is, of course, typically associated with warfare of the Middle Ages. Common notions of medieval warfare are bound up with romantic visions of scrupulously observed courtesies between belligerents.

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182 FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 53, ¶ 3. Though obviously dated, FM 27-10 remains the U.S. Army’s primary law-of-war manual. The manual includes no elaboration on the principle of chivalry beyond its initial enumeration among basic principles.


184 CANADIAN LOAC MANUAL, supra note 53, ¶ 202.7.


186 Wingfield, supra note 185, at 112.

Yet even in that period, instances of feigned retreat (although there is generally no recognized legal duty to spare retreating forces\textsuperscript{188}) and other seemingly dishonorable acts are found in accounts of Norman battles against English forces in the 11\textsuperscript{th} century as well as Mongol tactics of the period.\textsuperscript{189}

Worse, it was not at all unheard of for medieval combatants to resort to abject forms of perfidy. Accounts of outright perfidy include the English Tudors’ desperate efforts to survive elimination by capturing the castle of Edward I at Conwy. Reduced to insufficient numbers to take the castle by force, the Tudors sent a carpenter who, when admitted to perform work, attacked the guards and opened the gates for a follow-on force.\textsuperscript{190} Similarly, a historian recounts instances of knights entering a walled town, announcing themselves as allies, then slaughtering the defenders.\textsuperscript{191}

G. I. A. D. Draper, counsels rejecting medieval chivalry as a source of the modern principle altogether. He observes, the chivalry of the age of Crusades is “not the area in which [a] positive contribution of chivalry to the story of restraints in warfare can properly be sought.”\textsuperscript{192} Rather than constitute a reliable or fundamental principle, chivalry seems often to have been merely an implied contract between an elite and homogenous class of combatants.

Thin enforcement of chivalry extends to modern military practice as well. Research reveals no instances of international criminal enforcement of the principle. The nearest military criminal provision to chivalry may be a punitive article of the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.). General Article 134 of the U.C.M.J. prohibits “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces [and] all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces . . . .”\textsuperscript{193} Fifty-

\textsuperscript{188} But see Gabrielle Blum, \textit{The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers}, 2 J. Legal Analysis 115, 154-64 (2010) (Blum argues for reconsideration of the principles of distinction and necessity to account for threat posed by enemy forces rather than mere status)

\textsuperscript{189} Jon Latimer, \textit{Deception in War} 10 (2001) (citing Charles Oman, \textit{1 A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages} 162 (1978)) [hereinafter Latimer]. Latimer concedes, however, that other historians contest whether such retreats were in fact deliberate. \textit{Id.} (citing Hans Delbrück, \textit{3 History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History} 159 (1982)).

\textsuperscript{190} Latimer \textit{supra} note 189, at 13 (citing J. G. D. Davies, \textit{Owen Glyndwr} 45-50 (1934)).

\textsuperscript{191} Wingfield, \textit{supra} note 185, at 131 (citing Barbara Tuchman, \textit{A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14\textsuperscript{th} Century} 64 (Knopf 1993) (1978)).

\textsuperscript{192} Draper, \textit{supra}, note 185, at 17.

\textsuperscript{193} 10 U.S.C. §934.
three enumerated examples of service discrediting conduct, from animal abuse to wearing unauthorized insignia, follow the General Article. Article 134 also permits unenumerated charges based on breaches of service customs.\footnote{Manual for Courts-Martial United States IV-112 (2008). The Manual explains breaches of customs of service as behavior inconsistent with “long established practices which by common usage have attained the force of law in the military or Community affected by them.” Id.} While some examples allude to notions of honorable service,\footnote{Id. at ¶¶ 62, 69, 83, 89, 107 (enumerating Adultery, Wrongful Cohabitation, Fraternization, Indecent Language, Straggling as punishable offenses).} none tracks or even approximates perfidy or law-of-war principles generally.

Although, as noted above, principles have long been conceded to operate vaguely, notions of chivalry at this point may be so indeterminate as to approach the vanishing point of law.\footnote{Lauterpacht famously employed the phrase, “if international law is, in some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.” Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 360, 382 (1952).} Even champions of the principle of chivalry concede its erosion as a recognized limit on warfare.\footnote{Sharp observes, “Chivalrous conduct is a broad concept which has lost its effectiveness as an independent principle that governs the conduct of war.” Sharp, supra note 185, at 31.} In addition to suffering ambiguity, customary chivalry has at times rested on false assumptions of universality. Howard notes that “an assumption of common values” governing the conduct of hostilities marked the Grotian era – a period from the late seventeenth century to the Hague Conferences.\footnote{Howard, supra note 107, at 7-8.} Yet he argues the twentieth century World Wars marked the end of this era and especially its accompanying assumptions with respect to law-of-war custom and principles. The World Wars revealed that notions of accepted conduct and especially of honor and chivalry were not universal, particularly in East Asia where honor was derived from “a totally different cultural tradition.” Chivalry seems ultimately to be found in the eye of the beholder rather than generally accepted laws of war.\footnote{See Guy Roberts, supra note 116, at 115. Roberts observes, “Chivalry has proven to be an ineffective deterrent to proscribed conduct in modern warfare . . . . In short, chivalry is not generally recognized as a practical restraint on war . . . .” Id. at 115-16 (citing Dep’t of the Army, 2 International Law, Pamphlet 27-161-2, 15 (1962)).} And regardless whether one accepts chivalry as an extant principle of the law of war or not, such an honor-bound tenet seems unlikely to operate effectively in combat pitting asymmetric or non-peer competitors as so many modern armed
In response, some maintain the groundings of custom and principles of the law of war have shifted. Perhaps law-of-war principles no longer spring from contractual promissory exchanges but rather “informal conventions” that prescribe lawful behavior, drawn from “norms of human dignity and individual rights.” Under such a theory, the prospect that an enemy will not reciprocate adherence to law-of-war principles weakens the case for retaliatory abandonment of law. The theory is attractive with respect to the most widely accepted principles such as necessity, discrimination, proportionality, and humanity. However, whether a principle as debated and indeterminate as chivalry would continue to operate in the face of persistent enemy violations seems unlikely.

Ultimately, the case for an extant principle of chivalry that includes a prohibition on perfidy broader than that articulated by current treaty law seems doubtful. Claims to chivalry’s survival in the modern law of war seem more nostalgic than descriptive. Chivalry as a principle, and any conception of prohibited perfidy it included, would be unlikely to actually regulate the conduct of hostilities or form a reliable basis for law-of-war enforcement efforts such as criminal prosecution. Few military trial counsel, few international tribunal prosecutors, and few operational legal advisors would dare hitch their professional reputations to an analysis of perfidy that strayed so far from the codified perfidy prohibition.

Much like the Hague Regulations’ early twentieth-century track record has been described, a chivalry-based perfidy prohibition might constitute at most merely an “aid to vilification.”

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203 The United States military justice system offers the potential of charging war crimes at court-martial on the basis of law-of-war principles. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 18 establishes general court-martial jurisdiction “to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the law of war.” 10 U.S.C. § 818. To the author’s knowledge no U.S. court-martial has tried such a case to completion.

204 Best, supra note 90, at 47.
V. MILITARY DECEPTION SHORT OF PERFIDY

A complete picture of law-of-war perfidy finally requires an understanding of what perfidy is not. Since the 1880 Oxford Manual, caveats concerning legitimate military deception and ruses of war have closely followed codifications of the perfidy prohibition. States have clearly and consistently distinguished ruses and other acceptable forms of military deception from perfidy and treachery. As with perfidy itself, however, a complete understanding of permissible ruses and deception is elusive.

What unifies ruses and perhaps distinguishes them best from perfidy is their resort to means unrelated to law-of-war protection. Lawful ruses do not seek to deceive adversaries with regard to duties or obligations under the law of war. In particular ruses do not feign law-of-war protected status such as the *hors de combat* or civilian.205 Ruses do not invite an enemy to place confidence—to rely detrimentally upon—an apparent claim to the protections of the law of war.

Kalshoven describes ruses as “those acts which the enemy would have had reason to expect, or in any event had no reason not to expect.”206 Thus, the range of permissible ruses is in some sense tied to historic military practice and custom. Yet at the same time, the most successful deceptions seem to involve significant innovation and imagination.207 Specific examples of permissible deception have included, “decoys, dummy artillery pieces, aircraft, or tanks; ambushes; mock operations; feigned attacks or retreats; communicating with non-existent units; simulating the noise of an advancing column; using small units to simulate large forces; allowing the enemy to intercept false documents; altering landmarks and road signs; and misinformation . . . .”208 Military history is replete with such clever schemes

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205 The term *hors de combat* describes classes of combatants who no longer take part in hostilities either voluntarily through surrender or by physical incapacitation from combat. See FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 69 (2001) (describing protection under Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for persons *hors de combat*).


208 Solis, supra note 178, at 427 (citing Additional Protocol I, supra note 38, art. 37); DINSTEIN, supra note 34, at 240; THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ¶ 471 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed., 2008).
of deception, often pivotal to tactical and even strategic outcomes.\footnote{David Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War (1989) (describing especially, the Soviet deception concept of *Maskirovka*); Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack 7 (1988) (explaining psychological effects of surprise based on deception); Charles Cruikshank, Deception in World War II (1979) (recounting dozens of military deception schemes from strategic to tactical levels).

210] Guy Hartcup, Camouflage: A History of Concealment and Deception in War 12 (1980) [hereinafter Hartcup]. Hartcup adds, “The first troops to wear khaki were the Indian Guides, a paramilitary force raised by Col Sir Harry Lumsden in 1846.” Id. at 12 (citing P. Cadell, Beginnings of Khaki, 31 J. Soc. Army Hist. Res. (1953)). Camouflage historians surmise that military resistance to camouflage was rooted in notions of honor and manliness. Berhens notes that at the end of the nineteenth century camouflage was thought “unmanly or effeminate.” Roy Behrens, Camoupedia 8 (2009) (citing H.G. Wells, War and the Future: Italy, France and Britain at War in 1917 (1917)) [hereinafter Behrens]. Behrens also surmises that early camouflage demonstrations too frequently embarrassed political and military decision makers generating resistance. Id. at 213. He observes, “Undoubtedly one of the reasons why military officers were resistant to camouflage is that during their inspections too often if made them look stupid.” Id. Behrens’s text includes a photograph of a well-camouflaged soldier at the feet of President Wilson and General John ‘Blackjack’ Pershing. Id.


214] Hartcup, supra note 210, at 7. Hartcup elaborates that military camouflage is more complex, involving “concealment, deception or misdirection, and screening.” Id.

synthetic materials that resembled natural materials. Today, the wear of camouflage-patterned clothing is so-widely used by armed forces as to be on many contexts itself a distinctive and visible representation of or claim to combat status on the battlefield.

Although widely accepted and practiced as a means of military ruse, camouflage may be underappreciated as a source of close questions concerning perfidy. For instance, there is debate whether disguising military objectives as civilian objects constitutes lawful camouflage. One commentator observes, “it is a common practice, not prohibited by Geneva Protocol I, to disguise a military object to appear to be a civilian object.” Although the practice described might be more accurately labeled ‘mimicry,’ this view has been thought technically correct in some cases.

During the Second World War, industrial camouflage schemes went to extraordinary length to give aircraft factories and other military industrial complexes the appearance of civilian neighborhoods. The United States fabricated complete towns, including houses, streets and trees, atop the roofs of the Boeing Corporation’s Seattle military aircraft assembly plants. Other U.S. industrial camouflage schemes included the addition of false church spires to critical manufacturing buildings. In fact, U.S. industrial camouflage practice was advanced enough to inspire a manual on the topic jointly published by the Department of Agriculture and the Pratt Institute Art School. The manual recommends camouflaging roofs of critical factories to resemble small homes and back yards.

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216 See ANN ELIAS, CAMOUFLAGE AUSTRALIA: ART, NATURE, SCIENCE AND WAR (2011) [hereinafter ELIAS]. Elias observes, “It was in WWI, in France and later Britain, Germany and the US, that innovations in military camouflage developed, and when camouflage units and camouflage specialists were first made officially part of military organisations.” Id. at 4.


218 Thayer, supra note 212, at 477 (observing, “Mimicry makes an animal appear to be some other thing, whereas [protective coloration] makes him cease to appear to exist at all.”).

219 BEHRENS, supra note 210, at 39, 120.

220 BEHRENS, supra note 210, at 39. The Douglas and Lockheed companies employed similar schemes at their aircraft manufacturing sites. Id. at 120.

221 Id. U.S. aircraft manufacturers hired civilian camoufleurs to cover buildings with dummy civilian structures. Id.


223 Id. at 51. In fairness, a large part of the manual’s work is dedicated to topics other
The U.S. was not alone in the practice of masking military objectives as civilian objects. The civil defense plan of Australia involved disguising munitions bunkers and bomber hangers to simulate domestic houses and public buildings. If fact, Australia went a step further than masking civilian industrial sites. At the Bankstown military fighter and interceptor station, outside Sydney, the Australian Air Force employed one of the most elaborate civilian mimicry efforts of the war. Under the guidance of the dogmatic proponent of camouflage William Dakin, the Australians configured the base to appear as a small rural town. Ann Elias relates the project:

The results exceeded Dakin’s expectations. Out of plywood, hessian and linoflage, camouflage labourers built spectacular structures mimicking the types of domestic and commercial buildings commonly found in the Bankstown region in 1940. But hidden behind their innocent-looking facades, ones that blended so well with the Sydney environs, were fighter and bomber aircraft and munitions dumps. Aircraft hideouts masquerading as domestic houses, other buildings as a sawmill, an ironmonger’s store with a quick release door in a simulated wall, a grandstand, an advertisement hoarding, a ‘hovel’ to fit in the low socio-economic profile of the area.

The Bankstown project is not merely remarkable for its elaborate and confident mimicry of “innocent-looking” objects. The Australians’ professed purpose for the Bansktown scheme was “for attack as well as defence, and for aggressive surprise. These roughly made large-scale buildings mimicking the vernacular architecture of Sydney concealed bomber and fighter planes ready to take to the air at short notice . . .”

Other Allied powers engaged in similar schemes. After their debacle at Dunkirk, the British disguised domestic pill-boxes and gun positions as
“public lavatories, chicken houses, or romantic ruins . . .”\textsuperscript{228} Yet discretion, or perhaps a stronger sensibility for potential treachery than their allies, led the British to reject proposals to affix church false steeples on a high building at the Rolls-Royce factory at Derby in May 1939.\textsuperscript{229} An official disapproved, rightly concluding that the scheme would induce enemy bombardments of churches if discovered.\textsuperscript{230}

To be sure, a critical aspect of perfidy is present in each of these camouflage schemes, namely, feigned resort to a protected law-of-war status, namely a civilian object. But, permitting retroactive application of the AP I perfidy prohibition, none of the schemes would likely constitute prohibited perfidy. Each scheme failed directly to result in enemy casualties or capture. While the equipment produced by camouflaged industrial facilities might ultimately have produced enemy casualties, the majority view does not include such effects as sufficient to constitute perfidy. Only the Bankstown project was capable of combining its deception with any form of offensive action or attack. Still, the linkage between the hangars’ feigned civilian status and any enemy pilots being shot down by interceptors launched from the base is likely too remote for API prohibited perfidy.

Yet the traditional concerns of perfidy, the suspicion generated generally toward the feigned protected class especially, are surely apposite to each scheme. Despite widespread practice, the dangerous implications of such schemes for civilians and civilian objects are clear. An enemy confronting feigned civilian objects would inevitably come to view with suspicion and soon with enmity the entire class of civilian. More dangerously, that enemy might view suspiciously other or even all law-of-war classes of protection, launching a dangerous tit-for-tat spiral toward unrestrained war. It seems highly unlikely that any State committed to honoring the object and purpose of restraints in war would adopt such schemes today. Still, only such purposive analyses or very broad conceptions of fairness and good faith in the conduct of warfare could be said to limit resort to civilian camouflage and mimicry for general military advantage. It is unclear from law-of-war doctrine and scholarship whether such a general duty existed at the time or whether such a duty exists today.

Applying by analogy the distinctions States have made so regularly between perfidy and legitimate military deception and ruses is equally difficult in modern warfare. Some examples are relatively straightforward.

\textsuperscript{228} HARTCUP, supra note 210, at 81.
\textsuperscript{229} Id. at 54.
\textsuperscript{230} Id.
For instance, use of enemy signals has traditionally been regarded as an acceptable form of deception.\textsuperscript{231} Use of false distress signals or signals reserved for medical aircraft is prohibited.\textsuperscript{232} It seems clear then that vectors of cyber attack that mimic enemy cyber traffic for malicious or destructive purposes constitute lawful ruses. While masking malware as medical or distress cyber signals would not.

Applying the traditionally accepted use of camouflage to cyberspace, however, produces confounding analytical difficulty. At first blush, a number of cyber attack scenarios seem relevant to the camouflage distinction. In particular, logic bombs and other malware that lies dormant or hidden for latter use seem in many respects to resemble use of camouflage or mimicry. These surreptitious cyber means appear to constitute important features of States cyber arsenals.\textsuperscript{233} Logic bombs typically embed themselves in surrounding, authorized code. Even if noticed, the code comprising the best logic bombs will seem innocuous to all but the keenest eyes and electronic scans. Thus the conclusion that logic bombs are a form of lawful camouflage is attractive.

On closer examination, however, difficulties arise. As related earlier, the least objectionable uses of camouflage involve matching an object or person’s appearance with a natural environment. The use of naturally occurring foliage and other features of terrain is most common. It is in this sense that camouflage is understood as an effort to escape notice at all. Mimicry, on the other hand, though often conceived as a form of camouflage, does not involve escaping notice but rather deceiving the viewer as to the nature of the object or person perceived. The Second World War industrial camouflage schemes described previously are more likely forms of mimicry. They did not really escape the notice of enemy aircraft crews. They deceived aircrews as to their true military nature.

Upon reflection, cyber camouflage seems much more similar to civilian mimicry than to pure camouflage. Most fundamentally, cyber space seems not to offer anything like a natural environment. Being an entirely human creation, all of cyberspace, including its pathways, the cables, satellites, nodes, and signals of networks, and its endpoints, the terminals, servers, memory, programs and processors constitute manmade objects for law-of-

\textsuperscript{231} German IHL Manual, supra note 53, ¶ 471.
\textsuperscript{233} See Walker, supra note 238, at 349-51 (describing hidden “force positioning” and latent “kill switches” in cyber space).
war purposes. More importantly, all of cyber space constitutes an instrumentality – a means of accomplishing functionality or some desired end. In the overwhelming majority of cases, malware that seeks to go unnoticed cannot pose merely as part of a naturally occurring background. Rather, hidden malware such as a logic bomb or deeply embedded rootkit mimics the innocuous, usually civilian, objects or lines of code that surround it. Indeed, the goal of the malware designer is entirely for users and detection programs to perceive malware as a seamless part of legitimate background code.

VI. PERFIDY AND LAW-OF-WAR APPLICATION THRESHOLDS

In addition to doctrinal narrowing by API and the conceptual difficulties surrounding analogies to accepted lawful forms of deception and mimicry, a number of important structural facets of the law of war limit the application and operation of the perfidy prohibition in modern conflict and military operations. First, law-of-war perfidy prohibitions are limited to conduct during armed conflict. Only when the relevant conditions of material application exist do law-of-war prohibitions, such as that against perfidy, operate as a matter of law. The most widely used test for establishing conditions of armed conflict requires “resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.” Attacks conducted in a purely criminal context or lacking a sufficient nexus to armed conflict, no matter how egregiously they might betray a victim’s confidence, do not provoke law-of-war perfidy prohibitions.

A second limit on the operation of law-of-war perfidy prohibitions in the cyber context is the threshold of attack. Classically, jus in bello constraints on the conduct of targeting operations only apply to parties’ actions during attacks. Law-of-war principles such as distinction and proportionality

apply far less clearly, if at all, to actions short of attack such as reconnaissance or espionage. As the ICRC notes, perfidy is a rule peculiar to combat. Consequently, law-of-war perfidy only occurs during operations that qualify as attacks in a de jure sense. Although the discourse of emerging domains of conflict such as cyberspace uses the term ‘attack’ to refer to any number of malicious efforts or unauthorized actions, ‘attack’ remains a legal term of art in the law of war. Thus cyber-theft, cyber-espionage, cyber-exploitation, and mere disruptions of service, even if committed in connection with an armed conflict, fail to rise to the level of attack at all and therefore do not implicate the prohibition of perfidy.

A further structural feature of the law of war relating to protected classes reduces the potential for application of the perfidy prohibition to many contexts of conflict. A correct understanding of the elements of perfidy limits resort to the prohibition outside armed conflict by recalling that only feigned law-of-war protected status qualifies as perfidy. Some law-of-war protected classes involve extensive prerequisites and qualification criteria. Additionally, recall that law-of-war protected status is only available during armed conflict. Deceptive resort to a law-of-war protected status outside the context of an armed conflict would usually not have the desired effect or provoke the forbearance it would in the context of ongoing hostilities. Reprising the cyber context, imagine malware posing as an electronic communication to a prisoner of war. The message is arguably a form of communication protected by the law of war. Thus in theory, by resorting to a law-of-war protected class, the invitation to confidence, the offer, is the sort required to establish perfidy. Yet the message would only constitute an effective deception in a situation where prisoner-of-war status is recognized. No State involved in a situation short of international armed conflict, the only hostilities where POW status is available, would be induced to confidence by the feigned message.

237 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS COMMENTARY, supra note 115, ¶ 1484.
239 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 238, rule 30 and accompanying commentary.
240 See discussion, supra accompanying notes 143 - 149.
241 See e.g. 1949 Geneva Convention III, supra note 49, art. 4.
242 TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 238, rule 76 and accompanying commentary.
Whatever one’s conception of the perfidy prohibition, the overwhelming majority of conflicts, even armed conflicts as understood by the law of war, do not implicate perfidy because they do not satisfy the structural thresholds of the law of war. Thus only attacks that occur in the context of or which constitute armed conflict themselves and implicate a law-of-war protected class engage the perfidy prohibition at all.

VII. THE FUTURE OF LAW-OF-WAR PERFIDY

Despite a century of States’ efforts to codify a specific prohibition, a coherent account of law-of-war perfidy remains elusive and in some ways normatively unsatisfying. Codified examples and the AP I definition of perfidy in particular, removed a degree of subjective slack from the preterit law. However, the Hague Regulations’ and later the AP I conversion of the perfidy prohibition from a general principle into a specific law-of-war prohibition undoubtedly conditioned twentieth-century military lawyers to think of perfidy in far narrower terms than their predecessors. Commenting on AP I generally, Geoffrey Best observed, “it reads like the work of lawyers writing for lawyers . . . .”243 The narrowed perfidy prohibition is a case in point—of far greater utility and service to prosecutors and defense counsel than to the true end users and ideals of the law of war.

Despite this article’s somewhat formalistic analysis, ultimately it must be conceded that in spirit perfidy does capture a great deal of what’s so troubling about deceptive attacks. A battlefield on which civilian and other law-of-war protected classes are routinely feigned greatly depletes general confidence in the law of war. If the technical case for perfidy in such cases is sometimes weak, one wonders how long States will accept the fallout from that gap?

Fidelity to Positivist leanings prevents accepting a vision of universally prohibited perfidy that accepts effects short of killing and injury. Including in prohibited perfidy merely gains in military or tactical advantage strains both the literal, treaty-based expression of perfidy and marginalizes its plain twentieth century evolutionary path from broad principle to specific

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243 BEST, supra note 90, at 270. Adam Roberts echoes the thought observing, “Lawyers tend to think in terms of enforcement through legal processes after a violation, though implementation may take many other forms. Indeed, enforcement’s most important aspect is implementation through education and training in well-organized armed forces.” Adam Roberts, The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 16 (1995).
prohibition. At present, an approach that abandons or ignores States’ deliberate legislative work does not offer the law any real favors. Yet as a matter of *lex ferenda* there is work to be done in this area – a broadening, if you will, of the concept of what constitutes treacherous conduct in emerging forms of warfare.

A number of commentators have called for a revised expression of the perfidy prohibition.\(^{244}\) A functionalist examination of perfidy may reconcile some of the practical ruptures between what is perfidy and what is actually prohibited. The inspiration for the perfidy rule appears to come from traditional martial principles of honor and chivalry. Conduct not consistent with the traditions of the profession of arms yet short of true perfidy may be proscribed by a broader principle. Indeed, for those maintaining a legal distinction between treachery and perfidy, the former remains a broader rule enforcing notions of honorable combat. These early sources were understood to prohibit assassination, bounties, rewards against enemies, and criminalizing enemy status.

By the mid-late twentieth century, however, the grounding of the perfidy prohibition seems to have evolved toward vindicating more humanitarian purposes. Rather than protect combatant victims from dishonorable or unfair attacks, the purpose of prohibiting perfidy grew to guard the protected classes whose identity the perfidious attacker betrays. More importantly perhaps the perfidy prohibition serves humanity by guarding the integrity of the law of war as a whole. While one might still say that soldiers and combatants enjoy protection, it is, in a sense, a collateral form of protection. The true object of protection from perfidy is the class of persons that ordinarily or legitimately benefits from the rule of protection abused by the perfidious actor. Civilians, the wounded, and those offering surrender or truce enjoy more reliable protection when soldiers are confident that their forbearance in attacking these persons will not be betrayed or used against them. Perfidious conduct degrades the humanitarian protections of victims, objects, and emblems whose identities are abused.\(^{245}\) As the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq sadly confirmed, the battlefields on which civilian status is regularly feigned for purposes of attack becomes a profoundly dangerous place for all civilians and civilian objects.

\(^{244}\) Greene, *supra* note , at 45.; Brown, *supra* note 180, at 204-05; Dieter Fleck, *Ruses and Prohibition of Perfidy*, 13 MIL. L. L. WAR REV. 269, 270 (1974) (remarking, “Current international treaties deal with ruses of war in far too general terms which reflect the minor significance attached to the element of deception by the traditional ‘strategical’ school of thought.”)

A final rationale for the perfidy prohibition is to preserve the possibility of a return to peace. To prevent the degradation of trust and the bad faith between warring parties that would impede negotiation of peace terms. An effective perfidy prohibition preserves the good faith upon which ceasefires, armistices and conclusions of hostilities rely.\textsuperscript{246} To prove the point, it seems the most intractable, enduring armed conflicts have been those where belligerents have lacked reliable mediums of exchange and communication as the law of war surely is.

Thus perhaps reinvigoration of a principle of chivalry or honor is indeed in order. Or perhaps development of a broader concept of treachery, distinct from the post-AP I narrow and technical notions associated with perfidy, is appropriate. Suggestions to return to a law of war derived from purely moral principles reminiscent of early law-of-war theorists such as Halleck\textsuperscript{247} may even be persuasive.\textsuperscript{248} At present, a principled remedy to the shortcomings of prohibited perfidy exposed by very real prospect of cyber warfare seems to require a degree of methodological consensus that does not exist between States.\textsuperscript{249} Though addressing neither perfidy nor cyber warfare specifically, the thoughts of Professor Roberts clarify the doctrinal dilemma presented.

The experience of land war in two world wars must raise a question as to whether formal legal codification is necessarily superior to the notions of custom, honor, professional standards, and natural law which preceded it. Codification in treaty form has such compelling virtues – verbal clarity, equal standards, the securing of formal acceptance by states -- that it is bound to remain a central aspect of the laws of war. On the other hand, it risks being too rigid in face of changing situations and technologies; and it can make rules seem like artificial external impositions, rather than a natural outgrowth of the interests

\textsuperscript{246} See Childress, supra note , at 49-50 (relating Lieber’s concern that assassination, treachery and other violations of confidence between adversaries “make[] the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.”).

\textsuperscript{247} See discussion supra supported by note 72


\textsuperscript{249} For instance, disagreement whether to regulate Internet-based communications plagued the recent International Telephone and Telegraph Union treaty conference provoked the United States to decline signature.
and experiences of a state and its armed forces.\textsuperscript{250}

VIII. CONCLUSION

In many cases, the extant law of war proves adequate to the challenge of maintaining humanity in warfare. Law-of-war principles such as distinction and proportionality, military necessity and humanity go far toward civilizing hostilities and safeguarding civilians from the effects of destructive military operations. Additionally, specific prohibitions of the law of war such as restraints on attacking medical facilities or objects indispensible to the survival of civilian populations operate clearly in warfare.

While modern warfare surely raises new challenges to the regulation of hostilities, the principles and values at stake seem familiar. Despite their peculiarities, prevalent and emerging forms of warfare remain human behavioral realms far more than mere spatial dimensions.\textsuperscript{251} Consistent with its utility in regulating human relationships generally, the law-of-war prohibition on perfidious betrayal has been indispensible to regulated violence. More than a mere rule, the perfidy prohibition is one of only a few essential structural aspects of the law of war. The efficacy of nearly every other rule of war is compromised by violation of the perfidy prohibition. With the possible exception of deliberately indiscriminate attack, few law-of-war breaches signal contempt for humanity and respect in war as clearly as perfidy does.\textsuperscript{252} The breaking of faith reflected in perfidy manages to alienate belligerents to a degree that not even the systematic violence of war itself matches.

Yet codification has undoubtedly weakened the perfidy prohibition in some respects. In its current form and particularly in emerging contexts of armed conflict such as cyberspace, the perfidy prohibition is unable to fully vindicate the values that perhaps it should. Something of the gravity of perfidy, appreciated so well in common usage, appears to have been lost. The records of positive codification include evidence States may have reached the limits of consensus on international regulation of perfidy. Furthermore there are indications States’ appetites for regulating warfare

\textsuperscript{250} Roberts, \textit{supra} note 89, at 137.

\textsuperscript{251} SUSAN BRENNER, CYBERTHREATS 9 (2009).

through additional treaties or even specific prohibitions are meager.\footnote{253} States appear content, for now, with a relatively high degree of legal indeterminacy with respect to regulating emerging forms of warfare.

Despite strong intuitive and logical valence, the legal relationship between emerging deception-based forms of warfare and positive prohibitions of perfidy is strained and in some ways deficient. The structure of the existing law-of-war perfidy prohibition appears under-inclusive and addresses insufficiently both intuitive objections to demonstrated harms of cyber attack. States’ expression of perfidy as a narrowly-crafted, specific prohibition rather than as a general principle has greatly compromised the capacity of this critical law-of-war limit to regulate emerging, unforeseen technical developments in armed conflict such as cyber warfare.

As some commentators have noted, if technicalities of the currently expressed prohibition of perfidy prevent its application to all battlefield betrayals of confidence, resort to a broader notion of treachery or even a principle of chivalry may both preserve a measure of moderation in combat for the individual combatant and guard the integrity of the law of war as a means of humane exchange in war.\footnote{254} Support for such a general notion of chivalry may have more apparent in previous law-of-war eras. The sixteenth century law-of-war jurist Ayala observed, “They of olden time always held that there was no grander or more sacred matter in human life than good faith . . . .”\footnote{255} Yet presently, support for such a widely accepted and commonly shared notion of honesty and honor in combat appears wanting. It is hoped this article’s account and analysis of the mismatch between cyber warfare and the current state of law-of-war perfidy, will attract States’ attention to this important humanitarian dilemma.