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Formal existential ethics in the thought of Bernard Lonergan and Ignatius of Loyola

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FORMAL EXISTENTIAL ETHICS IN THE THOUGHT OF BERNARD LONERGAN
AND IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
PROGRAM IN THEOLOGY

BY
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...and hope does not disappoint, because the love of God has been poured out within our hearts through the Holy Spirit who was given to us.

(Rom 5:5)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS  v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT         viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction: Argument and Methodology 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART ONE: .................................................. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One: Self-appropriation in Lonergan’s thought 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Self-Appropriation as Foundational .......................... 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Desires of the Self ........................................... 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Obstacles to Self-appropriation ................................ 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Self-appropriation, Authenticity, and the Existential Subject .......... 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two: Transcendental Method 52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kant’s Influence on Roman Catholic Theology .......................... 53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcendental Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologie ....................... 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Lonergan’s Transcendental Method as Method .......................... 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lonergan’s Transcendental Method as Transcendental .................... 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three: Horizon in Lonergan’s Thought 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Functions of Horizon ............................................. 90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Eight: the Christocentric Horizon 284

1. Divine Will and Election ........................................ 285

2. Conversion and Christian Authenticity .......................... 297

Chapter Nine: Dorothy Day’s Long Loneliness 303

1. Dorothy Day’s Religious Autobiography ......................... 304

2. An Analysis of Day’s Election .................................... 319

3. Summary and Conclusion ........................................... 324

BIBLIOGRAPHY 328

VITA 335
ABSTRACT

The underlying, operative question of my entire project concerns the formal relationship of 'spirituality' to ethics. I contend that spiritual experience is normative for ethics: one's elected worldview orders feeling-values according to an appropriated scale of preference. To analyze the normative influence of spirituality on feeling-values, I begin by defining the term spirituality and then use an article written by Karl Rahner as a framework for identifying a particular form of ethics. I then examine the thought of Bernard Lonergan for an adequate account of subjectivity. With a viable anthropology in place, I examine Ignatius of Loyola's *Spiritual Exercises* to help understand the normative function of spiritual experience. I conclude with a case study from Dorothy Day's *The Long Loneliness* that illustrates the way spiritual experience is normative for moral-decision making.

A few important implications emerge. First, spirituality and spiritual experience are not a distinct, superfluous realm separate from the moral. To the contrary, spiritual experience is central to any discussion of values, and therefore, of ethics. Second, religious experience, like any other subjective data, must be understood, judged, and chosen if it is to be reliable. As data emerging from the realm of interiority, it should not be categorically dismissed as erratic, random, unintelligible, overly emotional, or exclusively subjective.
Third, since values attach to worldviews, it is important for the ethicist to examine the way particular worldviews assemble scales of preference with regard to feeling-values. Furthermore, it is also important for the ethicist to understand how worldviews relate to each other: genetically, complementarily, or dialectically. Fourth, given transcendental method and the criteria for authentic subjectivity, there is a means to address the dialectic relationship of worldviews.
Introduction: Argument and Methodology

Spirituality has drawn increasing attention in recent decades and can no longer be dismissed by those who prefer a less “emotional” approach to faith or by an academy that would prefer to protect its “intellectual precincts” from “subjectivism.” Although the notion of spirituality has a distinct history of interpretation, there still remains significant critical work to be done. In addition, the relationship of spirituality to other dimensions of the human person, especially moral decision-making, would benefit greatly from critical examination. On a variety of levels, the connection between spirituality and ethics remains ambiguous. Not only are there multiple interpretations of the normative sources for ethics, there are also multiple interpretations of what constitutes spiritual experience. Spiritual experience has often been viewed as overly emotional, exclusively subjective, erratic, and random. When understood in this way, it seems that spirituality has little to offer ethics. However, I will argue that when it is properly understood, spiritual experience is a normative source for moral decision-making: it establishes a scale of preference among feeling-values. For the authentic Christian subject, spiritual experience is the principle and foundation of moral behavior.

Although the term “spirituality” itself is ambiguous, like the term “psychology,” it has undergone an “astounding expansion” in recent decades. Sandra Schneiders notes that “Spirituality” may refer to (1) a dimension of the human being, (2) lived experience

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which actualizes that dimension, or (3) the academic discipline which studies it.\(^2\)

Referring to lived experience, spirituality’s “astounding expansion” has transcended its virtually exclusive Roman Catholic usage and has extended to other religions, both Christian and non-Christian, and even to secular movements such as feminism and Marxism.\(^3\) Connotations of the term have extended beyond traditional religious and social boundaries. It is now used to connote “the whole of the life of faith and even the life of the person as a whole, including its bodily, psychological, social, and political dimensions.”\(^4\)

The term “spirituality” has a long history of varied interpretation, occasionally pejorative, extending back to the writings of St. Paul. He first used the term “pneumatikos” in 1 Corinthians 2:14-15 to distinguish between those under the influence of the Holy Spirit from the “psychikos anthrōpos,” “the natural person.”\(^5\) In the 17\(^{th}\) century, the term referred to the interior life of the Christian and often carried pejorative connotations since it came to be associated with “questionable enthusiasm or even heretical forms of spiritual practice (such as quietism),” which stood in contrast to sober human achievement through “devotion.”\(^6\) In the 19\(^{th}\) and early 20\(^{th}\) centuries, spirituality was firmly established as “the practice of the interior life by those oriented to the life of perfection.”\(^7\) For ordinary Christians, however, it was superfluous to moral decision-making. From the 17\(^{th}\) onward, the term ‘spiritual experience’ has accumulated

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\(^2\) Ibid., 678.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) Ibid., 679.
\(^5\) Ibid., 681.
\(^6\) Ibid.
\(^7\) Ibid.
significant problematic baggage: it has suffered from pejorative connotations or from interpretations that make it superfluous to the moral lives of ordinary Christians.

However ambiguous or vague the term may be, Schneiders finds that it is “sufficiently connotative to enable people to communicate about the subject matter.”

Schneiders defines spirituality as “the experience of consciously striving to integrate one’s life in terms not of isolation and self-absorption but of self-transcendence toward the ultimate value one perceives.” For Schneiders, spirituality is a process of self-integration and self-transcendence in response to ultimate value. As lived experience, spirituality is determined by “the particular ultimate value within the horizon” of which one’s life project is pursued. Consequently, an examination of spiritual experience demands a coherent and viable account of human subjectivity in relation to an elected horizon of ultimate value.

As an area of academic study within the realm of theology, spirituality has had an ambiguous position. The precise relationship of ‘mystical theology’ to ‘systematic theology’ is often unclear. Schneiders clarifies that the historical distinction between “mystical theology” and “systematic theology” is not due to the difference between what is apprehended but between how it is apprehended: systematic theology remains discursive and categorical while mystical theology, according to Thomas Merton,

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8 Ibid., 683.
9 Ibid., 684.
10 Ibid.
11 I will use the terms “spiritual,” “spiritual experience,” “religious experience,” and “mystical experience” interchangeably. While each term has a particular contextual and historical denotation, I contend that the connotations of each are sufficiently similar: each term involves self-appropriation, self-transcendence, and feeling-values relative to an ultimate horizon. I will distinguish the particular denotations as I use the terms specifically. For my overall argument, however, the terms are interchangeable.
remains 'non-conceptual’ and ‘intuitive.'\textsuperscript{12} Considering the historical distinctions between systematic and mystical theology, it is essential to identify the objects that spirituality as an academic discipline examines: texts, persons, particular spiritual traditions, elements of spiritual experience, interrelations between activities such as prayer and social commitment, and concrete processes such as spiritual direction.\textsuperscript{13}

Therefore, an academic investigation of spirituality as lived experience will involve texts, persons, elements of spiritual experience, and particular spiritual traditions. For my argument, I am not concerned with spirituality as an academic discipline but as lived experience. I will confine my investigation of spirituality to the texts and tradition emerging from the thought of Ignatius of Loyola.

To delineate the precise relationship between spirituality and ethics, I will provide a more precise framework for ethics by using Karl Rahner’s notion of formal existential ethics from his article “On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics.”\textsuperscript{14} In the article, Karl Rahner assesses the situation of Catholic moral theology and broadly outlines its future. The notion of formal existential ethics offers a way of understanding the moral life in a contemporary Roman Catholic context that has a direct relationship to spiritual experience.

Rahner finds that formal existential ethics must navigate between two erroneous conceptions: extreme situation ethics on one side and the rational, deductive application of universal norms on the other. Both errors contradict one of Rahner’s greatest gifts to

\textsuperscript{12} Schneiders, 688-689.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 694.
theology, his theological anthropology. Theological ethics must take into account that the human person is fundamentally a "hearer of the message."\textsuperscript{15} To understand the broad outline of formal existential ethics, it is helpful to explore two mistaken trends in Catholic ethics.

Formal existential ethics contravenes extreme situation ethics.\textsuperscript{16} In its extreme form, situation ethics emerged in response to the growing complexity and sophistication of moral problems caused by great technological advances in the last century which challenge traditional sources of moral wisdom. In Rahner’s eyes, an extreme notion of existentialist philosophy and “a Protestant repugnance to the validity of a 'law' within a Christian way of human existence”\textsuperscript{17} have created the conditions for extreme situation ethics, a school of thought quite popular in Rahner’s milieu.\textsuperscript{18} Extreme situation ethics highlights the uniqueness of the individual and the situation, which rarely conforms to the general precepts found in law. The most significant problem with extreme situation ethics is that it denies the obligation derived from material universal norms applied to concrete individual cases.\textsuperscript{19} In many ways it mirrors the errors of nominalism, where naïve trust in the Divine Will, however it is manifest, downplays “the role of reason.”\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{15} I am using the phrase “hearer of the message” to denote Rahner’s theological anthropology in all of its nuance and complexity. For Rahner, the human as a “hearer of the message” is present to Absolute Mystery and disposes the self into finality in freedom and responsibility. For a thorough treatment of his theological anthropology, see Foundations of Christian Faith (New York: Crossroad, 2000), especially chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{16} For a concise and accessible treatment of situation ethics, see Linda Hogan, Confronting the truth: conscience in the Catholic tradition (New York: Paulist Press, 2000) 105-107.

\textsuperscript{17} Rahner, 218.

\textsuperscript{18} See footnote 1 in Formal Existential Ethics for a thorough listing of its German supporters.

\textsuperscript{19} Rahner notes that it doesn’t matter if “material universal norms” are interpreted as natural law or divine positive law in the Thomistic sense. For a detailed example of what Rahner is referring to, see Thomas Aquinas’ “Treatise on Law” in Summa Theologica I-II qq 90 – 114.

\textsuperscript{20} Hogan, 86.
Extreme situation ethics relies on a flawed theological anthropology. It presumes the moral person is an individual *absolutely*. On a variety of levels, emphasizing individuality to such an extent is problematic. On a material level, the person is not totally unique, sharing many of the same features, functions, capacities, and conditions as other human beings. In *The Responsible Self*, H. Richard Niebuhr uses George Herbert Mead’s work in psychology to show that the reflexive self emerges with language, a fundamentally socio-cultural phenomenon. Anthropologically speaking, Niebuhr finds that *individual* and *unique* can be misleading and problematic notions for human agency. From a Roman Catholic perspective, extreme situation ethics denies the import of the “divine revelations as given in the Scriptures and magisterium of the Church.”

Formal existential ethics also resists what Rahner calls syllogistic deductive ethics. When the application of universal moral norms to a concrete situation operates in a syllogistic, deductive mode, it tends to overlook the way the self finds existential meaning in the moral act. This mode of moral decision-making is problematic because (1) it is insufficient for obtaining the subjective data necessary for making particular moral-decisions and (2) it relies on a truncated theological anthropology. As a norm for moral decision-making, syllogistic deductive ethics usually circumscribes what should not be done, often leaving several acceptable possibilities for what *can* be done. Rarely does this mode of decision-making suggest one and *only one* clear alternative.

Furthermore, analyzing any situation into precise categories is an extremely difficult task if not virtually impossible. In addition, the deontological framework underlying

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21 Rahner, 219.
22 I will also call this mode deontological since it concerns universal norms and uses deductive logic to find a concrete imperative.
syllogistic deductive ethics tends to be a minimal standard, ignoring further obligation and deeper meaning. As Rahner’s asks, “is it [moral obligation] not more that that? Is what is morally done only the realization of universal norms - is what ought morally to be done in the concrete case merely, as it were, the intersection of the law and the given situation?” Moral decision-making, in the deontological mode, functions as the logical application of universal principles to concrete situations; it is primarily a function of the discursive reason.

Syllogistic deductive ethics relies on a flawed theological anthropology. In the deontological mode, the human person acts as a citizen under the law. While the citizen analogy may be sufficient for individuals, it is not for persons who seek deeper sources of meaning. The deontological mode makes the relationship between God and the person one of lawmaker / king to citizen. In Rahner’s theology, the supernatural existential is largely incompatible with the king / citizen analogy. In moral terms, the ethical imperative must transcend the deontological mode if ethics is to be understood as the subject’s expression of a free and loving response to the Holy Mystery.

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23 While I am not concerned with civil law specifically here, John Courtney Murray has a very helpful illustration for my point in We Hold These Truths (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1960), chapter 7 “Should there be a law.” In it he argues that civil law is a minimal standard relying on consensus, which is slow to evolve. In the case of censorship particularly, he claims that moral obligation transcends mere adherence to existing civil law. He says it is foolish to think that everything immoral ought also to be illegal and knavish to think the whole of moral obligation can be found in the dictates of law. While his argument concerns civil law only, I think his point fits Rahner’s argument: namely, moral obligation must be more than what the law dictates minimally or prohibits negatively.

24 Rahner, 223.

25 I am borrowing H. Richard Niebuhr’s category of man-the-citizen from The Responsible Self, cited in footnote 8 above.

26 I am referring to Jacques Maritain’s distinction between individual and person in The Person and The Common Good (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), ch 1-3 especially.

27 For a cursory view of the basic components of Rahner’s “supernatural existential” that I am referring to, see Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations vol 1, “Concerning the Relationship Between Nature and Grace”; vol VI, “Theology and Freedom”; and vol IX “The Experiment with Man.”
If formal existential ethics is neither an extreme situation ethic nor a syllogistic deductive ethic, then what is it? The remaining part of the article constructs the broad outline of a formal existential ethic. In Rahner’s words, “there is an individual ethical reality of a positive kind which is untranslatable into a material universal ethics.”

Central to Rahner’s constructive project is an understanding of the function of conscience that does not merely apply norms to situations, but acts positively and creatively to establish what ought to be done by the person in a concrete situation. It is important to note, however, that Rahner’s notion of a formal existential ethic is quite nuanced. Rahner qualifies the broader notion of situation ethics with extreme. Is there an acceptable form of situation ethics that is not extreme? Is a formal existential ethic similar in some fashion to a situation ethic? Rahner’s notion of formal existential ethics is quite similar to situation ethics because he acknowledges the highly personal and therefore diverse nature of the moral life in its positive and constructive form. However, he also argues that situation ethics cannot slip into nominalism or it becomes extreme. A crucial question emerges, “how can an ethic be both universal and personal at the same time?”

I will argue that the transcendental method addresses this question sufficiently.

In broad terms, a formal existential ethic is existential: the act of choice is also an act of self-creation whereby the subject expresses her subjectivity through moral decisions.

In every case in which a man decides, within the ethical sphere of the universal norms, on one of several possibilities - in which he 'chooses' within the sphere of the universally and positively moral good - this (non-derivable) concretion of his moral 'being-thus', brought about by a decision,

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28 Rahner, 229.
29 Lonergan’s intentionality analysis answers this question explicitly, which I will address below.
is undoubtedly conceivable as the 'coming-to-light' of his ineffable moral individuality and not just as the merely arbitrary selection from among certain possibilities.30

Choosing is neither an arbitrary act nor an act of simple preference. The existential ethic central to Rahner’s understanding of “disposing the self into finality” has ontological meaning. As he argues,

the concrete moral act is more than just the realization of a universal idea happening here and now in the form of a case. The act is a reality which has a positive and substantial property which is basically and absolutely unique ... Man is destined to eternal life as an individual and someone in the concrete. His acts are, therefore, not merely of a spatio-temporal kind as is the case with material things; his acts have a meaning for eternity, not only morally but also ontologically.31

For Rahner, formal existential ethics has unique, ontological value.

Theologically, Rahner’s ethic is not exclusively anthropocentric, however. It is fundamentally theocentric. To maintain this claim from a theological standpoint, he presupposes that God can and does manifest His will in a direct fashion to the person in a concrete manner.32 Rahner argues that this presupposition is evident from a theological-anthropological perspective, because the person’s

spiritual individuality cannot be (at least not in his acts) merely the circumscription of an in itself universal nature through the negativity of the materia prima, understood as the mere repetition of the same thing at different points in space-time (226) ... At least in his actions, man is really also (not only) individuum ineffabile, whom God has called by his name, a name which is and can only be unique, so that it really is worthwhile for this unique being as such to exist for all eternity.33

Since God has called each individual by name, the Divine Will is manifest through the Holy Spirit, spoken to each person individually. To communicate with the person God offers

the gifts of the Holy Ghost, a supernatural instinct and an individual immediacy to the personal, living God far beyond anything merely in the nature of a norm or law, where there is an inexpressible groaning of the Spirit and an unction which teaches us everything, a secret

30 Rahner, 227.
31 Ibid., 225.
32 I use the term “direct fashion” to highlight Rahner’s point that God’s will does not necessarily have to be derived from a “universal norm.” See pg. 222 of the article.
33 Rahner, 226-227.
understanding between the spiritual man and the Spirit of God, so that this spiritual man judges everything but cannot himself be judged by anyone.34

In theological terms, Rahner suggests a theocentric model whereby the Divine Will is revealed (in part) through the Holy Spirit, functioning as a standard of judgment.

Elsewhere, Rahner claims that “the Christian of the future will be a mystic or he or she will not exist at all.”35 For the Christian of the future, spirituality is essential not only as the basis for being Christian but also as the basis for moral decision-making when it is considered as an act of ‘disposing oneself’ toward the Holy Mystery.

While Rahner’s theological understanding of moral decision-making is profound and compelling, it will serve merely as a broad outline for a formal existential ethic. As Rahner himself admits, an existential ethic would benefit from “a more exact ontology and theology of the ethical individual.”36 I will use the thought of Bernard Lonergan to provide ‘a more exact ontology of the ethical individual.’ From a theological perspective, I will use the thought of Ignatius of Loyola to illustrate the way formal existential ethics is an expression of feeling-values appropriated in a Christocentric horizon. Since Rahner valued the thought of St. Ignatius highly, claiming “theology and ethics has yet to catch up with the Exercises,” it would be a significant mistake to underestimate the importance of the Exercises themselves.37

To prove that spiritual experience is a normative source for ethics, I will proceed in three parts: part one will use the thought of Bernard Lonergan to provide the necessary anthropological foundation, part two will use the thought of Ignatius of Loyola to show

34 Ibid., 230.
37 Ibid., 232.
the way spiritual development occurs through the intentional appropriation of Christocentric feeling-values, and part three will argue that spiritual experience is the normative source for moral decision-making at a crucial juncture in Dorothy Day’s life.

In comparing the thought of Lonergan and Ignatius, I will use three central categories for constructing a formal existential ethic. The first category, self-appropriation, is foundational for both Lonergan and Ignatius. The second category, method, illustrates the way critical self-examination transcends the problem of “subjectivism”: there are norms that transcend the subject. The third category, horizon, illustrates the way subjectivity operates relative to an elected context and boundary.
PART ONE:
The Thought of Bernard Lonergan

Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.

*Insight, 22*
Chapter One: Self-appropriation in Lonergan’s thought

As Lonergan himself admits, Insight may be described “as a set of exercises in which, it is hoped, one attains self-appropriation.”¹ Self-appropriation may seem an odd place to start for someone concerned with the study of scientific discovery or mathematics; after all, what does the person have to do with the verifiable laws of nature? For many, the stubborn facts of math and science exist independently outside the thinker’s mind. Knowledge for them is like perception. Lonergan’s primary concern, to the contrary, is not with the “already out there now real” but rather the knowing subject.² In his words, “to say it all with the greatest brevity: one has not only to read Insight but also to discover oneself in oneself.”³ The phrase “discovering oneself in oneself” seems vague and could easily be dismissed. The critical realist will ask, “what does it mean and why bother?” Chapter one will answer the first question, so it is important to address the “why bother” question at the very outset. Lonergan’s entire project in Insight relies on the claim that self-appropriation is the basis for human knowing:

Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will you understand the broad lines of all there is to be understood but also you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding.⁴

² I am referring to what Lonergan calls the ‘cognitional myth.’ See Method pp 238-239.
Self-appropriation, however, is not an end in itself but rather a beginning.

To analyze Lonergan’s claim further, I will examine four elements: the way self-appropriation is foundational, the desires of the self, obstacles to self-appropriation, and the emergence of the ‘existential subject.’

1. Self-Appropriation as Foundational

The category of self-appropriation is easily misunderstood. It is important to note that Lonergan is very precise and explicit with what self-appropriation is and what it is not. Self-appropriation acts as a basis making further expansions possible.

A fruitful way to approach Lonergan’s understanding of self-appropriation is to identify the problem he is trying to solve or the question he is answering. Contextually, Lonergan saw modern culture in a cycle of decline. The human incapacity to respond to the challenges of the times was due to specialized knowledge that had become increasingly more restricted over time. At the core of the crisis, in Lonergan’s eyes, was a profound impoverishment of self-knowledge. Along with the collapse of classical culture and its sound structures of logic, method, and metaphysics came the increasing awareness that culture and humans themselves are historical entities shaped to a large extent by themselves.1 Lonergan does not want to abandon the wisdom of history to the modern mind. He seeks to augment and update the wisdom of the past with the discoveries of the

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1 Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Mark D. Morelli, and Elizabeth A. Morelli, The Lonergan Reader (Toronto: Buffalo, 1997), 17. For a more thorough account of the shift from classical culture, see “Natural Right and Historical Mindedness” in the same work.
modern mind. Lonergan’s investigations probed the current cycle of decline, finding much of the problem in the modern mind itself. He found that the core of the problem is a mistaken view of what constitutes knowledge. In his words, “in all one's questions, in all one's efforts to know, one is presupposing some ideal of knowledge, more or less unconsciously perhaps.”

The present confusion is concerned with “what counts as knowledge, what constitutes objectivity, what is meant by reality, and what is truly good.”

To resolve such a pervasive and fundamental problem, Lonergan sought to find the conditions underlying any instance of knowledge. In *Understanding and Being*, he admits “the solution offered in *Insight* to this problem is self-appropriation. Self-appropriation is being introduced in terms of a problem.” For a philosopher to avoid being a “plaster cast of a man,” it is essential to have an inner reference point and basis. Self-appropriation “provides one with an ultimate basis of reference in terms of which one can proceed to deal satisfactorily with other questions.” By attending to ourselves as subjects with interior operations who are both knowers and doers, we will find the “broad outline of all there is to know.”

Self-appropriation involves a shift of attention from objects “already out there now real” to oneself, the knowing subject. Attending to oneself involves self-presence. Lonergan notes distinctly different meanings of the word ‘presence.’ It can mean “presence in,” where chairs are present in a room, but not to a room or vice versa. It can

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5 Ibid., 38.
6 Ibid., 39.
mean "presence to," where only a person can be present to someone. Or, it can mean "presence to," where only a self-conscious subject can be present to herself. Self-appropriation is concerned with the last meaning of 'presence.' Objects are present when they are attended to, but subjects are present by attending. Lonergan uses a helpful analogy to illustrate his point.

As the parade marches by, spectators do not have to slip into the parade to become present to themselves; they have to be present to themselves for anything to be present to them; and they are present to themselves by the same watching that, as it were, as its other pole makes the parade present to them. While the notion of presence, especially self-presence, is helpful, it still begs further exploration.

First and foremost, self-appropriation is a process of "taking possession of oneself as a knower and a doer." It involves a deeper development of understanding oneself in the widest possible range of "cognitive and moral engagements." Self-development, however, does not occur all at once, but rather is "solid and fruitful only by being painstaking and slow." It inherently involves a process of self-criticism and self-correction:

To seek to take possession of oneself as intelligent and reasonable, free and responsible, is also to discover one's lack of openness, oversights, unreasonableness, irresponsibility, and incompleteness of development. Appropriation of the immanent criteria of objectivity, truth, reality, and value, therefore, involves ongoing self-correction within one's historical community.

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7 Ibid., 16.
8 Lonergan, Morelli, and Morelli, Reader, 384-385.
9 Ibid., 19.
10 Ibid.
11 Lonergan, Insight cW3, 17.
12 Lonergan, Morelli, and Morelli, Reader, 20.
Rational self-consciousness, another term for self-appropriation, transcends the many influences that might pervert its authenticity:

Rational self-consciousness is a peak above the clouds. Intelligent and reasonable, responsible and free, scientific and metaphysical, it stands above romantic spontaneity and the psychological depths, historical determinism and social engineering, the disconcerted existential subject and the undeciphered symbols of the artist and modernist.\(^13\)

It is rational self-consciousness that is able to avoid being drawn unintentionally by the gravity of history, culture, or symbol. Self-appropriation is a gradual process of understanding, judging, and affirming or denying one’s interior operations in a critical and corrective manner over a long period of time. Self-appropriation results in a deeper and fuller sense of self.

*Insight* explores mathematical and scientific method as models of a productive method since both have yielded cumulative and progressive results. Lonergan questions if philosophical inquiry is different from mathematical or scientific inquiry:

We began with a discussion of science as a pursuit of the ideal, where the ideal shifts in virtue of the pursuit. Consequently, we suggested self-appropriation as a means of going to the root of the ideal and its developments. Our hope was to find a fixed structure in virtue of which we could orientate ourselves. If science moves from pursuing a knowledge of things through ultimate causes to analysis and synthesis, and from analysis and synthesis to law and system, and from law and system to states and probabilities, then one may ask, What is philosophy? Is philosophy any of these? Or is it some new form? Self-appropriation may be seen as a way of orientating philosophical inquiry as well.\(^14\)

In any philosophy, it is important to distinguish between its cognitional theory and its subsequent pronouncements on issues of metaphysics or ethics. To differentiate the two, Lonergan names cognitional theory the *basis* and the subsequent pronouncements the

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 33.

\(^{14}\) *Lonergan, Understanding and Being,* 225.
expansions. A sufficient formulation of the basis necessarily involves a stance on basic philosophical issues.\textsuperscript{15}

Since self-appropriation is essential in identifying the features of the basis, it involves “taking reflective possession of oneself as constituted fundamentally by operative, preconceptual, prelinguistic criteria of knowledge, objectivity, truth, reality, and value.”\textsuperscript{16} Philosophical inquiry is confronted by three basic questions: what am I doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it?\textsuperscript{17} The answer to these will determine a cognitional theory, an epistemology, and a metaphysic.

The first question (what am I doing when I am knowing) cannot be answered by a list of abstract properties of human knowledge, but only by affecting “a personal appropriation of the concrete, dynamic structure immanent and recurrently operative”\textsuperscript{18} in one’s own cognitional activities. To do so, one must discover, identify, and become familiar with the activities of one’s own intelligence. In other words, self-appropriation involves three elements:

First of all, self-appropriation is advertance -- advertence to oneself as experiencing, understanding, and judging. Secondly, it is understanding oneself as experiencing, understanding, and judging. Thirdly, it is affirming oneself as experiencing, understanding, and judging.\textsuperscript{19}

Self-appropriation of oneself as a knower yields three elements: experience, understanding, and judging.

\textsuperscript{15} Lonergan, \textit{Insight} \textit{cv3}, 412.
\textsuperscript{17} Lonergan, \textit{Method}, 83. See also Joseph Flanagan’s \textit{Quest for Self-Knoweldge: An essay in Lonergan’s Philosophy}, especially section 2 of the introduction.
\textsuperscript{18} Lonergan, \textit{Insight} \textit{cv3}, 11.
\textsuperscript{19} Lonergan, \textit{Understanding and Being}, 37 [italics added].
LonerGAN’s approach to the question of knowledge is very different from the classical or scholastic approach. Taking the wisdom of modernity seriously, he also makes “the turn to the subject,” finding the basis of knowing in the subject. The focus of his first investigation is insight, or human understanding. Unlike the scholastic, however, he does not begin by assuming premises, but by “presuming readers.”20 He does not advance by deducing logically necessary conclusions from the truths of religion or the principles of philosophy. Rather, he issues an invitation to readers to turn the focus of their attention to their own acts of intelligence and reasonableness, which he calls insight.21

Taking the dramatic example of insight manifest in Archimedes’ elated “eureka,” LonerGAN found five characteristics. First, insight comes as a release to the tension of inquiry. Second, it comes suddenly and unexpectedly. Next, insight is a function not of exterior circumstance, but of inner conditions. Fourth, it pivots between the concrete and the abstract. Finally, insight passes into the habitual texture of one’s mind.22

Three features of LonerGAN’s observation are particularly relevant to my overall argument. First, insight is a function not of outer circumstances, but of inner conditions. As he says numerous times in *Insight* and *Method*, knowing is not like looking. There is a significant difference between an act of insight and sensation. In Archimedes’ case, not everyone that went to the baths that day in Syracuse was able to grasp the principles of hydrostatics. Since inner conditions are paramount, insight relies heavily on the accurate presentation of definite problems. Archimedes had his moment of insight because Hiero’s

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20 LonerGAN, Morelli, and Morelli, *Reader*, 34.
21 Ibid., 34.
problem was accurately portrayed. The solution to Hiero’s problem emerged in
Archimedes’ mind because the necessary interior conditions for insight were operative
and unobstructed. The second significant feature of insight is that it arises from concrete
problems and has concrete applications. Understanding does not emerge in a vacuum of
theory but emerges from experience. However, its value has relevance wider than the
original application. Therefore, it pivots between the concrete and the abstract. Thirdly,
the journey toward insight functions much like the cave-dwellers assent to the sun in
Plato’s famous allegory. The cave-dwellers grope through an initial period of darkness,
but are gradually more attentive to and interested in the process of insight. However, not
everyone chooses to leave the cave, so the desire to know is a foundational inner
condition of the journey itself. Inner conditions and concrete applications are two
foundational elements of insight: both are known through self-appropriation.

Lonergan’s notion that insight is conditioned by experiencing, understanding, and
judging is open to critique. However, any attempt to revise his theorem results in an
affirmation of it, “for any human reviser would appeal to experience, understanding, and
judgment.” Lonergan claims that experience, understanding, and judgment are an
invariant pattern of operations.

After an exploration of cognitional theory (what I am doing when I am knowing),
Lonergan focused on an explicit epistemology (“why is doing that knowing?” Or, more
specifically, “is knowing an act of self-transcendence?”). After the cognitional basis, he
examined its expansions. Modernity made the question of self-transcendence central to

23 see Plato’s Republic book 7
24 Lonergan, Insight cw3 , 757.
the exploration of human understanding. If a cognitional theory does not successfully navigate the question, it will spiral into solipsism. The knowing subject must know something beyond her own thought. Furthermore, a cognitional theory cannot be idealistic if it is to have any meaning for the modern mind. The possibility of self-transcendence involves the relationship of fact, truth, and judgment.

Fact, "the natural objective of human cognitional process," combines the 'concreteness' of experience, the determinate nature of accurate intelligence, and the absolute nature of rational judgment.²⁵ But, fact is not something independent of the cognitional process. It is conditioned by rational judgment. When the subject attempts to relate judgment to the general structure of cognitional process, he will a level of presentations given in experience, a level of intelligence given in understanding, and a level of judgment given in reflection. Judgment, however, is of two kinds. Judgments of fact answer the question "is it so?" Judgments of value answer the question "is it good?"²⁶ Facts, then, are the concrete and absolute pronouncement of rational judgment.

If facts are conditioned by rational judgment, then "what is truth?" To answer this question, Lonergan locates the notion of truth and falsity, certitude and probability, on the third level of his cognitional theory: judgment. On this third level, there exists a personal commitment, making one responsible for one's judgment.²⁷ While truth is intentionally independent of the subject, it resides ontologically only in the subject: veritas formaliter

²⁵ Ibid., 355.
²⁶ For Judgment in general and judgments of fact, see Insight Chapters IX and X. For judgments of value, see Method, 36-41.
²⁷ Lonergan, Insight cw 3 , 299.
est in solo judicio [truth is formally found only in judgment]. The subject is capable of intentional self-transcendence by getting beyond feeling and imagination and entering into a realm utterly different, a realm of what is so. Self-transcendence does not happen magically or suddenly, but only after a slow process of “conception, gestation, and parturition.” In his words, “the fruit of truth must grow and mature on the tree of the subject, before it can be plucked in the absolute realm.” Truth, for Lonergan, is “a relation of knowing to being.” Furthermore, ontological truth “is the intrinsic intelligibility of being. It is the conformity of being to the conditions of its being known through intelligent inquiry and critical reflection.” In other words, truth is a relation of knowing to being whereby the subject makes a personal commitment in concrete judgments of fact.

If truth, found in judgment, is a relation of knowing to being, then the critic will raise the question of objectivity. The question of objectivity is problematic only if one’s cognitional theory operates under the cognitional myth “that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there now to be looked at.” The cognitional myth has led even the scientists of nature astray at times because the data of consciousness is often excluded in favor of the “already out there now real” or verified possibility. The proper criteria of objectivity are not mere ocular vision, but the “compounded criteria of experiencing,

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29 Ibid., 69-86.
31 Ibid., 576.
understanding, judging, and believing.” Known reality is not just looked at, but “given in experience, organized and extrapolated by understanding, posited by judgment and belief.” Regarding the question of objectivity, Lonergan is a critical realist:

Only the critical realist can acknowledge the facts of human knowing and pronounce the world mediated by meaning to be the real world; and he can do so only inasmuch as he shows that the process of experiencing, understanding, judging is a process of self-transcendence.

The answer to the third critical question for philosophy (what do I know when I do this?) allows for an expansion of his cognitional theory. The rationally self-conscious subject knows the broad lines of all there is to be known, including metaphysics, reality, and being. If metaphysics is, as Lonergan claims, “the department of human knowledge that underlies, penetrates, transforms, and unifies all other departments,” it is necessarily an expansion of the basis, the invariant pattern of cognitional operations. Self-appropriation is foundational for metaphysics as well. Once knowing is conceived as understanding,

one ascertains that knowing mathematics is understanding and knowing science is understanding and the knowledge of common sense is understanding, one ends up not only with a detailed account of understanding but also with a plan of what there is to be known. The many sciences lose their isolation from one another; the chasm between science and common sense is bridged; the structure of the universe proportionate to man's intellect is revealed; and as that revealed structure provides an object for metaphysics, so the initial self-criticism provides a method for explaining how metaphysical and anti-metaphysical affirmations arise, for selecting those that are correct, and for eliminating those that patently spring from a lack of accurate self-knowledge.

Knowing knowing and understanding are two imperatives for anyone seeking a functional metaphysic attractive to the modern mind. Here, Lonergan makes the

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35 Ibid., 238.
36 Ibid., 239.
38 Ibid., 23.
claim that there is an “isomorphism that obtains between the structure of knowing and the structure of the known.” 39 While metaphysics for many moderns is a relic of classical culture, it is important for Lonergan since it is rooted in human subjectivity.

The modern critic, however, may be more concerned with “the real” than with the category of metaphysics. Once again, Lonergan roots the real in self-appropriation: “the beginning, then, not only is self-knowledge and self-appropriation but also a criterion of the real.” 40 Furthermore, since the real is being and being is what is known by intelligence, it follows that understanding understanding is foundational for both. The real and being are known, in part, through the rational appropriation of one’s understanding.

The human person is not only a “knower” but a “doer.” A comprehensive base must include a sufficient foundation for concerns that transcend knowledge. Expansions of the base must also include an account of the good, of ethics, and of religious experience. Through a thorough analysis of intentionality, Lonergan is able to identify successive levels of consciousness:

But as the many elementary objects are constructed into larger wholes, as the many operations are conjoined in a single compound knowing, so too the many levels of consciousness are just successive stages in the unfolding of a single thrust, the eros of the human spirit. To know the good, it must know the real; to know the real, it must know the true; to know the true, it must know the intelligible; to know the intelligible, it must attend to the data. 41

39 Ibid., 424. In Insight, Lonergan proves this point by observing that “the identification of being with the possible object of inquiry and reflection places a restriction on what being can be. From this restriction there followed the major premise of metaphysical method, namely, the isomorphism that obtains between the structure of our knowing and the structure of its proportionate known” (575-576). While this claim is central to Lonergan’s notion of metaphysics, I will not elaborate on his proof. For my argument, it is sufficient to note that self-appropriation of one’s cognitional activity is foundational for doing metaphysics. See Insight chapter 14.
40 Ibid., 22-23.
Knowledge of the good is conditioned by knowledge of the real, the true, and the intelligible. The intelligible is known not by looking at the "already out there now real" but by attending to the data of consciousness. Self-appropriation, therefore, is not only foundational for knowledge, but also for the good. Through the process of self-appropriation, "the good as value comes to light, for the value is the good as the possible object of rational choice." Once the good, the real, the true, and the intelligible are identified in relation to rational self-consciousness a notion of ethics follows:

Further, as a metaphysics is derived from the known structure of one's knowing, so an ethics results from knowledge of the compound structure of one's knowing and doing; and as the metaphysics, so too the ethics prolongs the initial self-criticism into an explanation of the origin of all ethical positions and into a criterion for passing judgment on each of them.  

Ethics is derived from the structure of one's knowing, which functions as a criteria for making judgments of fact and judgments of value. In this framework, the unethical is that which is either inconsistent or incongruent with one's interiority. Ethics, like the good, the real, the true, and the intelligible are all expansions of the basis, known through rational self-consciousness.

While understanding understanding provides the basis for knowing the broad outlines of all there is to be known, it is also foundational for religious experience. Religious experience in Lonergan's view in no different from experience in general. Both are conditioned by self-appropriation:

When these three realms of common sense, theory, and interiority are differentiated, the self-appropriation of the subject leads not only to the objectification of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding, but also of religious experience.  

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43 Ibid., 23.
44 Lonergan, *Method*, 266.
Religious experience as subjective data is of vital concern to formal existential ethics. But, like other forms of subjective data, religious experience cannot be plucked into the absolute realm until it has matured on the tree of subjectivity. For my argument, I will locate religious experience in the broader sphere of experience itself, seeking intelligible understanding, rational judgment, and responsible action.

The primary point of the first chapter has been to examine the notion of self-appropriation as a category for Lonergan. I began by identifying how it is often overlooked, a core concern facing the modern mind. While self-appropriation can often be a vague notion, I showed that it can best be understood as “a gradual process of taking ownership of one’s interior operations in a critical and corrective manner over a long period of time resulting in a deeper and fuller sense of self.” With a more precise definition of self-appropriation, I examined how it served as Lonergan’s basis, yielding a cognitional theory. Having established a fixed base and invariant pattern, I explored the way self-appropriation is foundational for fact, truth, judgment, and objectivity, which comprise the elements of self-transcendence. With these in place, I examined the expansions, the way self-appropriation provides the broad outlines of all there is to be known: reality, being, metaphysics, the good, ethics, and religious experience. Now, I will investigate what desires self-appropriation reveals.

2. Desires of the Self

For an ‘ice-breaker’ exercise on the first day of class, I once asked students about their favorite punctuation mark. The question is an odd one and often catches many by
surprise; few people ponder their favorite punctuation mark. My favorite used to be the colon until I began to read Lonergan. Now, the question mark is without a doubt my favorite punctuation mark. A good question is the root of conversation. A common question forms the basis of cooperation. A puzzling question seduces the investigator. Questions of ultimate meaning woo philosophers and theologians alike. The question mark itself reveals the human desire to know. Lonergan was deeply intrigued by questions.

Entering into Lonergan's world of thought is a little like walking in a dark labyrinth with a torch. As the darkness of each path begins to recede, the explorer gradually begins to know more of the labyrinth, storing its turns and dead ends in memory until he enjoys a hazy mental picture of the overall landscape. Often times, one path leads directly back to one already trodden. In fact, it is virtually impossible in Lonergan's world of thought not to return to some familiar path. I mention this analogy only because much of the next section will cover material previously put forth or will anticipate material to be returned to later from a different angle. At the end of the labyrinth, I will have identified certain routes relevant to my overall argument that Lonergan is an invaluable source for developing a more exact ontology of the ethical individual.

As one grows in the process of self-appropriation, one uncovers desire as a core component of one's way of being in the world. I use the term desire in a broad sense because it is also an important category for St. Ignatius. Lonergan himself, however, offers a more nuanced understanding of desire by focusing on operators, questions, the
desire to know, notions, and exigencies. These will serve as the categories for understanding desire in Lonergan's thought.

A fruitful way of entering Lonergan's world of thought is to identify those that influenced his thinking. While Jean Piaget uses a different vocabulary, many of his terms are helpful in understanding Lonergan. Piaget analyzed the way a human person acquired skill by dividing the skill into component parts. Each new element enables one to adapt to some new object or situation. Adaptation involves an assimilation of the new material followed by a period of adjustment. Using previously learned operations, one undergoes a process of trial and error until the operations are sufficient to include the new object or situation. Adaptation involves a process of assimilation and adjustment. In a similar way, Lonergan's notion of integration can be seen as adaptation.

Prior to integration comes the drive of the operator. The higher system of integration operates on the lower, effecting a transition from "one set of forms, laws, schemes to another set." In Lonergan's words, the operator is "the upwardly directed dynamism of proportionate being that we have named finality." Taken from an "above downward" perspective, the operator is the higher integration calling forth the lower. Taken from "below upwards," the operator is the drive toward higher integration. On the intellectual level, the operator is the pure, unrestricted, detached, disinterested desire to know.

The desire to know is the concrete operator of intellectual development. However, it also holds integrations radically open to change: "man by nature is oriented into

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46 Ibid., 490.
47 Ibid., 555.
mystery, and *naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret* [though you may drive out nature with a pitchfork, she will always come back].” In the nature of the operator is radical openness to ever further integrations. From the examination of knowledge as a skill comes the identification of operators and integrations, which will serve as a way of proceeding.\textsuperscript{49}

The primary operator of the intellect is manifest in questions. The question itself separates *homo sapiens sapiens* from other creatures:

> When an animal has nothing to do, it goes to sleep. When a man has nothing to do, he may ask questions. The first moment is an awakening to one's intelligence. It is release from the dominance of biological drive and from the routines of everyday living. It is the effective emergence of wonder, of the desire to understand.\textsuperscript{50}

Not only does the question itself serve a distinctive feature of human intelligence, so also does it serve a solid foundation for understanding that very intelligence. As Lonergan says, “I can question everything else, but to question questioning is self-destructive.”\textsuperscript{51}

The process of questioning, the operator of the intellect, is a condition for the possibility of further insight:

> Thus, unless one asks further questions, one remains with the insights one has already, and so intelligence does not develop; inversely, because one wants to develop, one can frequent the lectures and read the books that put the further questions and help one to learn.\textsuperscript{52}

The question itself is only a manifestation of the desire to know.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 570 [translation mine].
\textsuperscript{49} In *Insight* on p. 595 Lonergan claims that “determining the operators” is “the most significant element in the theory of types of expression.” To know a genre, one must analyze the operators.
\textsuperscript{50} Lonergan, *Insight* cw3, 34.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 354.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 495.
Prior to the emergence of the question lies primordial wonder. Underneath the articulation of this wonder lies the pure, unrestricted desire to know. Lonergan defines this desire as

the dynamic orientation manifested in questions for intelligence and for reflection ... It is the prior and enveloping drive that carries cognitional process from sense and imagination to understanding, from understanding to judgment, from judgment to the complete context of correct judgments that is named knowledge. The desire to know, then, is simply the inquiring and critical spirit of man. The critical and inquiring spirit operative in the human mind is pure because it is detached and disinterested, preferring something beyond the person’s own self-referential and immediate satisfaction. Like other desires, it too has its satisfaction. Unlike other desires, it is not content with mere satisfaction. It heads beyond the satisfaction of understanding and enters into an independent world of being. The pure desire is independent of individual preference, wishful thinking, and anxious meandering.

The desire is not only pure, it is unrestricted. The desire to know seeks not simply to understand but to understand correctly. To affirm its unrestricted nature is not to claim that man’s understanding is unrestricted or the correctness of that understanding is unrestricted. Since inquiry is a manifestation of the desire to know, it occurs prior to understanding. As an unrestricted desire, it has a normative function:

Man wants to understand completely ... Negatively, then, the unrestricted desire excludes the unintelligent and uncritical rejection of any question, and positively the unrestricted desire demands the intelligent and critical handling of every question.

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53 Ibid., 372.
54 Ibid., 661.
The intellect functions properly insofar as it allows the pure, unrestricted desire to rein freely and dominate cognitional operations. The desire itself grounds cognitional operations and rational self-consciousness.

On the cultural level, the upward dynamism of the pure, unrestricted desire to know is not the "product of cultural advance," but "the condition of its possibility."55 Centuries of inquiry and enormous libraries of answers have neither stifled nor inhibited the process of inquiry. The pure, unrestricted desire is one of the few historical constants.

The desire prevents the seeking subject from being content with the continual flow of inner and outer experience. It moves the subject through the learning process of self-correction where further questions yield subsequent insights. The desire penetrates the transparent stasis of hearsay, legend, and unverified or untested theory. It resists the inertia of complacency, because unanswered questions are motivation. However, one can stifle the questions, ignore them, or choose to be occupied with other things. The desire itself, then, is only one of the conditions of insight. It would be a mistake to assume that the road to understanding is broad and easy.

The pure, unrestricted desire is coupled with a limited capacity for attaining knowledge. The range of questions is larger than the range of possible answers. As such, the necessity of a critical survey of possible questions emerges. The mind must set aside questions that cannot be answered and limit attention to those for which there are possible answers. The satisfaction of this desire is not cognitional acts, but rather "cognitional contents, for what is to be known."56 The pure, unrestricted desire to know functions as

56 Lonergan, *Insight cw3*, 373.
the primary operator of the intellect, drives the subject to fuller insights, and seeks "what is to be known."

Another way of understanding desire in Lonergan's thought is to examine his use of notion. For Lonergan, a notion is an intelligent and reasonable desire. While there are a few notions worthy of exploration, I will examine the notion of being, the notion of truth, the notion of the good, and the transcendental notions in particular.

The notion of being can best be understood as the objective of the pure, unrestricted desire to know. Since being is "whatever can be grasped intelligently and affirmed reasonably," the notion of being grounds inquiry and reflection, leading eventually to understanding and affirmation. The desire to know always seeks something beyond the seeking subject. Hence, being is defined as (1) all that is known, and (2) all that remains to be known. Since the pure, unrestricted desire for knowledge of being is not merely solipsistic but in fact real, there also exists a notion of truth. Therefore, "truth is a relation of knowing to being." Since truth is formally found in judgment (veritas formaliter est in solo judicio), it is the connection between the process of understanding and being, an objective lying intentionally beyond the seeking subject. The notion of being and the notion of truth are quite revealing: both indicate an internal dynamism seeking not only to order its own internal operations, but to go beyond themselves to something that is, something transcendent.

The notion of the good is also revealing. Beyond the notion of being, the desire to understand intelligently and affirm reasonably, there is "the extension of intellectual

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57 Ibid., 663.
58 Ibid., 575.
activity that we name deliberation and decision, choice and will.”\textsuperscript{59} The seeking subject also deliberates, decides, and chooses, making an existential commitment and disposing of himself in a specific direction in the process. There are levels of good, however: on an elementary level, the good as a desire is experienced as pleasant and satisfying when attained. Conversely, the bad as an aversion is experienced as painful and unsatisfying. Beyond the good of desire, there is the good of order. Revealed in entities such as the polity, economy, and institutional family, the good of order has its own normative line of development due to its dynamic nature. However, the good of order does not satisfy the notion of the good completely. In the social order, desire and aversions create not only powerful allies but also egoistic and class deviation. Indifference to ultimate issues can give way to a common bias; therefore, value is a third aspect of the good. On the third level of reflection, judgment, deliberation, and choice, emerges the notion of value.\textsuperscript{60} The good is not a monolithic entity. It has at least three discernable features when one examines notions. There is the good of desire manifest in satisfaction, the good of order manifest in social groupings, and the good of value manifest in self-sacrificing behavior.

In addition to the specific notion of being and the notion of the true, there are the transcendental notions. Contained in questions prior to answers, transcendental notions are “the radical intending that moves us from ignorance to knowledge ... a priori, unrestricted, comprehensive.”\textsuperscript{61} These notions reveal the upward dynamism of the human spirit seeking that which lay beyond itself. While transcendance can often be misunderstood, Lonergan simply means “a development of man’s knowledge relevant to

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 619.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 619.
\textsuperscript{61} Lonergan, Method, 11.
a development of man’s being” manifest by raising further questions. Deep within the seeking subject, the immanent source of transcendence is the pure, unrestricted desire to know.

As it is the origin of all his questions, it is the origin of the radical, further questions that take him beyond the defined limits of particular issues. Nor is it solely the operator of his cognitional development. For its detachment and disinterestedness set it in opposition to his attached and interested sensitivity and intersubjectivity; and the knowledge it yields demands of his will the endeavour to develop in willingness and so make his doing consistent with his knowing.

The internal dynamism is the root of one’s development, of one’s self-transcendence. For Lonergan, the eros of the human spirit is the love of God poured forth in our hearts.

The operators, notions, and pure, unrestricted desire have different needs for different modes of operation. An exigency is a need or requirement. As Lonergan says, “different exigencies give rise to different modes of conscious and intentional operation, and different modes of such operation give rise to different realms of meaning.”

Having examined the desires of the self, it is important to note the temporary periods of stasis.

From the realm of common sense, which correlates exclusively to experience, emerges the systematic exigence. Experience demands a pattern of organization to handle the contradictory. The systematic exigence seeks to organize through classification, categorization, definition, and distinction. From it emerges the realm of theory. The systematic exigence is evident in Plato’s Republic where Socrates’ interlocutors were

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63 Ibid., 659.
64 From Romans 5:5. Lonergan claims numerous times in *Method* that “nihil amatum nisi praeconitum” (knowledge precedes love) is not necessarily the case because God’s gift of love is unmerited, i.e. not conditioned by man’s knowledge of God. As gift, God’s love precedes human love and may be the very cause of the seeking itself. For a fuller account, see *Method*, 340-341.
quite at home with a word like “justice” but failed to define it sufficiently. Socrates’
demand that a sufficient definition be omni et soli baffled and frustrated his dialogue
partners. Theory, not common sense, meets the systematic exigence.

Theory of itself, however, does not satisfy all exigencies. Further questions
emerge from satisfactory theory; they are critical in nature, challenging understanding to
accommodate experience. The basic, critical questions confronting the human person
(what am I doing when I am knowing? why is doing that knowing? what do I know when
I do it?) and their answers lead the seeking subject from the outer realms of common
sense and theory into the realm of interiority. These questions identify the invariant
structure of human knowing, allowing the subject to know the very foundation of her acts
of judgment. Without understanding understanding, the subject functions intelligently but
lacks the basis for making critical and progressive challenges to the realm of theory he
inherits. The critical exigence allows for human knowing to be cumulative and
progressive since it constantly challenges theory to conform to what truly is so.

The seeking subject not only seeks the true, but also the good. Hence, there is a
moral notion and resultant exigence whose fulfillment provides criteria for judgments of
value. The levels of the good noted above provide a framework for understanding the
way subjects dispose of themselves, de facto, towards a concrete good. The existence of
the moral exigence is obvious “in the efforts of men to dodge it."\textsuperscript{66} However, the moral
notion is also an existential notion, because the pure, unrestricted desire to know

extends its sphere of influence from the field of cognitional activities through the field of
knowledge into the field of deliberate human acts. So it is that the empirically,
intelligently, rationally conscious subject of self-affirmation becomes a morally self-

\textsuperscript{66} Lonergan, \textit{Insight cw3}, 622.
conscious subject. Man is not only a knower but also a doer; the same intelligent and rational consciousness grounds the doing as well as the knowing; and from that identity of consciousness there springs inevitably an exigence for self-consistency in knowing and doing.\textsuperscript{67}

The moral notion and the exigence for self-consistency make the seeking subject an organized whole, determined in part by concrete acts of choice.

The pure, unrestricted desire is ever operative. It constantly seeks and constantly fosters development when it is given sufficient freedom. The realm of interiority does not suffice as the fulfillment of the pure desire. If it did, the seeking subject would be hopelessly self-referential and could never achieve self-transcendence. The pure, unrestricted desire reveals a transcendent exigence where "man can reach basic fulfillment, peace, joy, only by moving beyond the realms of common sense, theory, and interiority and into the realm in which God is known and loved."\textsuperscript{68} The transcendent exigence reveals the love of God poured forth in the human heart.

The first condition for self-transcendence involves going beyond the realm of experience and entering the world of theory. From the realm of theory, the subject enters the realm of interiority where he judges critically the accuracy of inherited understanding. Beyond theory, the realm of interiority is not the telos of the journey, but only a condition for the possibility of self-transcendence. After interiority, the subject is able to enter into a transcendent realm where God is known and loved.

LonerGAN’s use of operators, notions, and exigencies reveals a rich understanding of the way desire shapes subjectivity. In this section, my aim was to make three points:

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 622.
\textsuperscript{68} LonerGAN, Method, 84 [italics added].
(1) the desire to know, manifest in questions, acts as an operator moving the subject through four different realms of meaning: common sense, theory, interiority, and transcendence; (2) the pure, unrestricted desire leads to development and a fuller, more complete subjectivity; and (3) critical examination of the self’s desires is a fruitful way of understanding human agency. Self-appropriation, as a prognosis to human ills, is challenging. It is important to note the elements that inhibit authenticity, lest Lonergan be considered a naïve optimist.

3. Obstacles to Self-appropriation

Self-appropriation is not a given; there are numerous obstacles plaguing the subject. In theological terms, Lonergan has a healthy appreciation for the influence of sin in human agency, especially human understanding. Four obstacles inhibit self-appropriation: neglect, truncation, immanentism, and alienation.

Lonergan identifies areas where the subject ignores his own agency, his own understanding, and ultimately his own being. The first regards a mistaken notion of “objectivity,” the second regards an incomplete notion of method, and the third regards a mistaken notion of the metaphysical, especially its relationship to soul. The resultant defects of these mistaken notions inevitably lead to erroneous modes of knowing, incomplete ways of being, and unfulfilling sources of meaning.

Lonergan’s study of insight addressed a significant problem that confronts any philosophy of human knowing. Simply put, the question “what do I know when I do this?” seeks to find the possibility of cognitive self-transcendence. In other words, “when
I know, do I know something beyond my thought?” The correct answer to the question has significant implications because the gravity of solipsism has unraveled many epistemologies. At the center of the question lie the notion of truth and the possibility of “objectivity.” Lonergan’s answer to the question relies on the same starting point throughout *Insight*, namely, self-appropriation. The objectivity of truth is intentionally independent of the subject, but resides ontologically in the subject: *veritas formaliter est in solo iudicio* [truth is formally found only in judgment]. The subject is capable of intentional self-transcendence, of getting beyond thought, imagination, and feeling and entering an utterly different realm of what is so. As Lonergan writes, “the fruit of truth must grow and mature on the tree of the subject, before it can be plucked and placed in the absolute realm.”

The avoidance of self-consciousness altogether is the most common obstacle to a correct understanding of truth and objectivity. Assuming that knowing is like looking, the subject neglects the operations of her own understanding and thereby overlooks self-appropriation as a condition for self-transcendence. The world to be known is always “already out there, now real.” The neglected subject is hopelessly dependent on the insight of others.

A second source of neglect can be found in the rationalist notion of pure reason. Evident in Aristotle’s notion of science found in the *Posterior Analytics*, the rationalist notion of pure reason prizes conclusions that follow necessarily from self-evident first principles. To understand, one need only a mastery of logic. In this way, “the road to

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science and to philosophy is not straight and narrow but broad and easy." Overlooked and discounted, a complete notion of subjectivity is reduced to one of its functions: the skillful manipulation of logic. Under the control of logic, conclusions deduced from first principles become more certain, more inclusive, and more static.

Lonergan also notes a third source of neglect, which is particularly relevant to my argument. The metaphysical account of the soul is a natural product of the classicist world view. The powers of the human soul are directly observable, as they are with other creatures. To know the essence of the soul, one need only to observe the objects, acts, habits, and potencies of any creature. Study of the soul is an "objective" procedure, unfolding in the same manner regardless of the object of observation and resulting in abstracted, universal principles. Such a metaphysical account of the soul is insufficient for understanding human agency. The study of human subjectivity proceeds in a radically different manner, yielding very different claims of human agency. Modernity's "turn to the subject" can be understood as a long overdue cry for attention in a time more concerned with the abstract functioning of the cosmos than with human operations within it.

Neglected subjectivity leads to truncation. Overlooked or dismissed completely, the neglected subject becomes truncated and thereby impoverishes his account of human knowledge. One cannot know what one ignores or overlooks. If self-appropriation is foundational for knowledge, as Lonergan claims, then self-neglect is foundational for misunderstanding and ignorance. Unaware of his own self-ignorance and concluding that what he does not know does not exist, the truncated subject lacks awareness of the

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foundational conditions for self-transcendence. The behaviorist, logical positivist, and pragmatist are concerned with actions, logic, and results exclusively, at the expense of a fuller sense of subjectivity.

A result of truncation is conceptualism: "a strong affirmation of concepts and a skeptical disregard of insights."\(^{71}\) Disregard of insight and its constitutive operations condemns human understanding to "anti-historical immobilism," "excessive abstractness," and a "mistaken notion of being."\(^ {72}\) A method yields cumulative and progressive results. Conceptualism yields neither since its conclusions tend to be static, closed, and immobile. Insight penetrates incomplete notions and partial understandings because it welcomes further questions. It is "open." Conceptualism, however, is threatened by penetrating questions, preferring stasis to growth. It is condemned to a realm of abstraction because it prefers the relation of the universal to the particular, overlooking the far more important relation of the intelligible to the sensible.\(^ {73}\) Lastly, conceptualism mistakes the notion of being as an abstraction, rather than "the objective of an intelligent and reasonable desire." Being for the conceptualist is far from the concreteness of the pure, unrestricted desire.

Neglect leads to truncation, a "shortening" of authentic subjectivity. However, neglected subjectivity and truncation are not the only obstacles to self-appropriation. The immanentist subject also suffers from impoverished rational self-consciousness, because "the subject is within but he does not remain totally within."\(^ {74}\) Doctrines of immanence

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 74.
\(^{72}\) Ibid.
\(^{73}\) Ibid.
\(^{74}\) Ibid., 75.
result in a mistaken notion of objectivity, since the immanentist subject’s effort at self-appropriation is not sufficiently critical or rational. The rationally self-conscious subject understands that her understanding is a compound of many different operations. Hence, objectivity in human knowing is not one single uniform property. The immanentist subject, however, suffers from picture-thinking, or thinking in visual images. Visual images are incapable of suggesting the normative exigencies that emerge in the realm of theory or the critical exigencies in the realm of interiority. Essentially, visual images fail to effect an intentional self-transcendence. The object for a picture-thinker is merely something one looks at, and knowing it is merely a matter of sensory experience. Hence, objectivity is simply a matter of seeing everything to be seen and nothing more. From picture-thinking, immanence is inevitable. The most significant flaw for the immanentist subject is that her understanding is confined to sensory experience; she is primarily concerned with the acquisition of sensory data, not intelligible understanding, rational judgment, or responsible decision.

Neglect, truncation, and immanentism are all manifestations of the way the subject is alienated from himself. The most common form of alienation occurs when the subject avoids self-consciousness altogether. Besides avoidance, however, there is also the escape of rationalization: the subject’s attempt to close the gap between his knowing and doing by conforming the former to the latter. Rationalization dismisses inconsistency in the two realms by essentially “reversing” the emergent order: rather than allowing the desire to know unrestricted operation, it confines understanding to willingness of action. Self-preservation becomes normative, thereby restricting the desire to know. Consistency
between knowing and doing is an exigence demanding attention. Alienation can occur when the subject avoids self-consciousness altogether or confines understanding by rationalization. The third escape from the exigence for consistency is moral renunciation. It curbs the exigence for consistency by hopelessly dismissing it as a fanciful desire:

...it [moral renunciation] is content with a speculative acknowledgment of the aspiration to make one's own living intelligent and reasonable. It is ready to confess its wrong doing, but it has given up any hope of amending its ways ... the demand for consistency between knowing and doing is dynamic; it asks to be operative; it seeks to extend detachment and disinterestedness into living, and it is not satisfied with a merely speculative acknowledgment of its existence.75

In examining the obstacles to self-appropriation, I have shifted from cognitive and epistemological obstacles on the second and third levels of consciousness (neglect, truncation, and immanence) to obstacles on the fourth level (rationalization and moral renunciation). As Lonergan proves in Insight, finding oneself in oneself reveals at least three levels of consciousness and Method identifies a fourth, perhaps even a fifth.76 Alienation, in the broadest of terms, is not only an obstacle to insight, but also to a fuller sense of human authenticity. The obstacles to self-appropriation operate on each of the levels of consciousness. Since the desire to know is unrestricted, it necessarily includes religious values, reaching satisfaction only in “ultimate meaning and value.”77

75 Lonergan, Insight cw3, 623.

76 While the debate whether there are four levels of consciousness or five still continues among Lonergan scholars, it will be sufficient to note that Lonergan himself notes at least four. For a more precise treatment of this topic, see Dunne, Tad “Being in Love” in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies, vol. 13 (1995), pgs. 161-175.

The point I have been making in this section is that self-appropriation is not a given. There are a variety of obstacles preventing the subject from a fuller, more authentic consciousness. As Lonergan notes,

The transition from the neglected and truncated subject to self-appropriation is not a simple matter. It is not just a matter of finding out and assenting to a number of true propositions. More basically, it is a matter of conversion, of a personal philosophic experience, of moving out of a world of sense and of arriving, dazed and disoriented for a while, into a universe of being.⁷⁸

While my argument so far has addressed the reasons for beginning with self-appropriation and what it reveals, I have yet to show its fruition. The next section will examine Lonergan’s notion of self-appropriation insofar as it leads to authenticity and existential subjectivity, where the subject discovers for herself what she is to make of herself.

4. Self-appropriation, Authenticity, and the Existential Subject

The dynamism of the human spirit manifest in the pure, unrestricted desire to know is also a drive for self-transcendence. Four cognitional operations (experiencing, understanding, judging, and choosing) reveal four levels of consciousness (empirical, intellectual, rational, and responsible). On the fourth level of consciousness, the existential subject emerges. It is the existential subject who determines to a large extent the way he will participate in the world around him. Through choice, the subject shapes her horizon. In this section, I will examine the fourth level in particular along with the existential subject and authenticity. The major point I will make is that self-appropriation is foundational for the authentic, existential subject to emerge. Since the neglected,

⁷⁸ Lonergan, Second Collection, 79.
truncated, and immanentist subjects all make decisions, Lonergan's notion of authenticity will serve as a vital corrective for aberrations.

By consciousness, Lonergan means an awareness immanent in cognitional acts. Self-appropriation is in part an understanding of understanding. Reflection on one's knowing reveals four recurrent and related operations: experiencing, understanding, judging, and choosing. The operations of experience, such as sensing, perceiving, and imagining, reveal empirical consciousness. From experience emerges the need to "put together" into a coherent whole, that is, an exigence for understanding. Such an operation reveals an intelligent consciousness. The operation of judgment affirms or negates the subject's understanding insofar as it coheres to what is so. The operation of judgment reveals a rational level of consciousness. However, the operation of judgment includes not only judgments of fact, of what is so, but also of value, of what is good. The internal dynamism is still operative.

Judgments of value necessarily involve the notion of freedom. From the empirical, intellectual, and rational consciousness emerges a fourth level: rational self-consciousness. At this level, the operative question is "what am I to do?" Judgments of value that do not culminate in decision are an aberration of the moral exigence. The self-consistency between knowing and doing is demanding. To avoid the moral exigence, a subject may (1) avoid self-consciousness altogether, (2) attempt rationalization, where knowing is revised to be in harmony with doing, or (3) cling hopelessly to a moral renunciation, where the subject acknowledges the faint possibility of consistency between knowing and doing but never strives to make it operative.

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In *Insight*, Lonergan divides the chapter on “the possibility of ethics” into three sections: the notion of the good, the notion of freedom, and the problem of liberation. Ethics concerns each of these categories. Within the notion of freedom, Lonergan explores the nature of decision. When compared, decision resembles judgment:

...both select one member of a pair of contradictories; as judgment either affirms or denies, so decision either consents or refuses. Again, both decision and judgment are concerned with actuality; but judgment is concerned to complete one's knowledge of an actuality that already exists; while decision is concerned to confer actuality upon a course of action that otherwise will not exist.\(^{80}\)

Decision confers actuality on a course of action in response to the moral exigence. It is through decision on the level of rational self-consciousness that the subject actualizes a judgment of value. The slippage between knowing and doing occurs through self-neglect, the distortion of reason, or moral renunciation. The fulfillment of the moral exigence comes on the fourth level of consciousness through the operation of decision, that is, responsible action in harmony with experiencing, understanding, and judging. Hence, one's decisions and choices are a highly creative and moral endeavor: the choosing subject shapes her sphere of knowledge and concern. The conscious subject mounts from empirical to intellectual, from intellectual to rational, and from rational to rational-self consciousness. The detached and disinterested desire to know controls the first three levels of consciousness. On the fourth, however, one's decisions are in control, setting the objective of one's activity and selecting the actions that are to lead to the goal.

We decide and choose a wide range of objects. We deliberate and decide what to do about a given problem, how much of our time to allocate, what is worthy of attention and what is not. From the perspective of one's narrative, autobiographical self, some

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80 Lonergan, *Insight* cv3 636.
decisions are more significant than others. The impact of some decisions has a greater influence over who we are and what we will become than others. Existentially, one’s chosen worldview has significant power in shaping the self.

A complete notion of freedom is dizzying. The power and influence of decision-making on human subjectivity can never be overlooked. The fourth level operator, “what am I to do,” can often be accompanied by a degree of bewilderment and existential angst:

Against the self-affirmation of a consciousness that at once is empirical, intellectual, and rational, there stands the native bewilderment of the existential subject, revolted by mere animality, unsure of his way through the maze of philosophies, trying to live without a known purpose, suffering despite an unmotivated will, threatened with inevitable death and, before death, with disease and even insanity.\(^\text{81}\)

The reflective consciousness is confronted by difficult yet demanding questions. The rationally self-conscious subject constantly chooses the world-views that will be allowed to become operative and the ones that will be dismissed as unworthy of attention. In a very real way, what one chooses will shape one’s experience, understanding, and judgment.

The existential subject is a subject irrevocably caught in a process of becoming. While one discrete choice has a determinative quality in a historical sense, the faculty of choice enjoys the quality of becoming. Choices are shapers of being consistently and constantly over the span of a lifetime: subjectivity is never determined once and for all. And so the human paradox is evident “that what man is by nature is so much less than what he can become; and it is the tragedy of man that the truth, which portrays him as actually he is, can descend like an iron curtain to frustrate what he would and might

\(^{81}\) Ibid., 410.
be. Regarding self-appropriation, the self is one that develops over time. The self is not some static essence, rather one that is chosen and one that develops. In *Understanding and Being*, Lonergan illustrates this point clearly, which is worth citing at length:

There are means to advance, but the means may also hinder and distort development. We may consider two means. First, religious background is a great help in bring Welt into harmony with the universe of being. It gives a reality to what otherwise would not be real-for-me. But, in the concrete, it can work out as a hindrance. The faith of the child requires the development of theology in the adult ... Secondly, a philosophic tradition can accelerate the development. One cannot get along without a tradition. It assigns what one has to measure up to, it provides a criterion, it provides a language. But, at the same time, one can become a plaster-cast of a man through a tradition, using it as a surrogate for personal self-development.

The existential subject that emerges on the fourth level of consciousness makes decisions that have onto-existential value. The rationally self-conscious, existential subject shapes his world of concern. What he chooses will shape what he will know and what will be of concern. Regarding religious background, the world-view he freely inhabits will in part shape his sphere of concern. Furthermore, the kind of person one is shapes one's ideals. Present ideals are a function of past experience, past study, past teachers, and "past courses in philosophy."

Since existential concerns and commitments exert such a tremendous influence on subjectivity, **authenticity** will serve as fundamental category for identifying and naming aberrations. Virtually all of the obstacles to full and complete notions of the self can be understood in terms of authentic and unauthentic subjectivity.

Certain features of authenticity assess the quality of self-appropriation obtaining in the subject. First, the human person achieves authenticity in **self-transcendence**. On an

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82 Lonergan, Morelli, and Morelli, *Reader*, 34.
84 Ibid., 20.
elementary level, self-transcendence begins with the sensitive faculties humans share with higher animals. Beyond elemental sensitivity, the human person asks questions for intelligence. Answers are intelligent insofar as they are able to “unify and relate, classify and construct, serialize and generalize.” Beyond the questions for intelligence there are questions for reflection. A hypothesis on the level of intelligence gives way to questions of verification, of what really is so. In both types of questions, self-transcendence is intentional: the subject seeks not only to understand but also to affirm the existence of what is so, a realm beyond understanding. Up to this point, self-transcendence is only cognitive, proceeding from what is understood to what is verified. Beyond the cognitive realm, however, the *eros of the human spirit* seeks to actualize what is positively affirmed as true and good: the subject is not only rational but also moral.

When we ask whether this or that is worthwhile, whether it is not just apparently good but truly good, then we are inquiring, not about pleasure or pain, not about comfort or illness, not about sensitive spontaneity, not about individual or group advantage, but about objective value. Because we can ask such questions, and answer them, and live by the answers, we can effect in our living a moral self-transcendence.

There is the cognitive self-transcendence obtained through judgments of fact. Beyond the cognitive, there is the self-transcendence obtained through judgments of value and decision to act. Self-transcendence is both cognitive and moral. With moral self-transcendence comes the possibility of benevolence, of being a human person living in a human society. In each instance, notions of the transcendent constitute the capacity for self-transcendence. Moral self-transcendence is not the fulfillment of the subjective dynamism. It is sublated by an even higher form of self-transcendence: being-in-love.

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86 Ibid., 104-105.
Such being-in-love has its antecedents, its causes, its conditions, its occasions. But once it has blossomed forth and as long as it lasts, it takes over. It is the first principle. From it flow one's desires and fears, one's joys and sorrows, one's discernment of values, one's decisions and deeds ... As the question of God is implicit in all our questioning, so being in love with God is the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality. That fulfilment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfilment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give.\textsuperscript{87}

As Lonergan proves, self-transcendence occurs on a variety of levels including the cognitive, moral, and existential. But, it is only religious being-in-love with God that fulfills the upward dynamism of the human spirit. At each level, the seeking subject extends beyond the known, the comfortable, and the easy and seeks something beyond: the real, the true, the good, and a being worthy of love.

The \textit{transcendental precepts} offer further insight into Lonergan's notion of authenticity: be attentive, be intelligent, be rational, be responsible, and be in love. A violation of any of the precepts results in a failure of self-transcendence, or what Lonergan calls living unauthentically. When one is inattentive to one's experience, one inhabits a remote world of concept and theory. When one is not sufficiently intelligent, one ignores or dismisses the relevant data. When one's judgment is not rational, one never knows truth. One becomes mired in half-truths and incomplete notions of what is so. When one's actions are not responsible, one escapes the moral exigence for self-consistency. Knowing and doing become separate, unrelated faculties. When one is not in love, subjectivity is not totally unified, ordered, or directed, preventing the subject from fully "disposing" of herself "into finality" to borrow some of Rahner's terms. At each level of consciousness, the transcendental precepts beckon the subject to a higher level of

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 104-105.
integration. Failure to heed the call of the transcendental precepts is to live unauthentically. 88

In short, authenticity is manifest when the eros of the human spirit is operative and unconditioned. Given free reign, the pure desire to know culminates in cognitive self-transcendence. Beyond knowing, there is doing. And so from experience, the authentic subject understands. From understanding, the authentic subject judges fact and value. From judgment, the authentic subject chooses accordingly, bringing knowing and doing into harmony. But beyond doing, being-in-love sublates choice, judgments of value and fact, intelligent understanding, and attentive experiencing.

Chapter one explored the way self-appropriation is a constitutive component of Lonergan’s thought. Having moved toward a definition of self-appropriation, I showed how it constitutes an invariant basis for human subjectivity. From the basis, the human subject is able to know and identify certain fundamental expansions: truth, reality, the good, and metaphysics. Part of self-appropriation involves a keen awareness of the self’s desires: operators, exigencies, notions, and the pure, unrestricted desire to know. Progress and development, however, are neither consistent nor constant, often thwarted by obstacles to self-appropriation: neglect, truncation, immanence, and alienation. When the pure, unrestricted desire is allowed to function in an unencumbered manner, the authentic, existential subject emerges. The authentic subject chooses for herself what she is to make of herself, disposing of herself into a finality that is experienced, partially understood, chosen freely, and loved absolutely. Lonergan’s project is a program for self-discovery with an underlying, concrete method. As Lonergan himself claims, “self-

88 Lonergan, Morelli, and Morelli, Reader, 22.
appropriation itself is a grasp of transcendental method." From self-appropriation in chapter one, I will now turn my attention to *transcendental method*, the focus of chapter two.

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Chapter Two: Transcendental Method

Rational self-appropriation is a structured and intentional process. It does not occur haphazardly, randomly, or accidentally, but unfolds methodically. As Elizabeth and Mark Morelli explain, rational self-appropriation necessarily engages the study of method:

Lonergan’s project of self-development in which his readers are invited to join, unfolds as a methodological study. If one is to rise to the level of one’s times intellectually, then one must involve oneself in the outstanding and successful intellectual endeavors of one’s time, attend to oneself in that engagement, and formulate for oneself the normative dynamic structure of interior operations constitutive of that engagement. To carry out this self-appropriative involvement, in Lonergan’s terms, is to engage in methodology, to study methods.¹

Lonergan himself claims self-appropriation is “a grasp of transcendental method” providing one with the tools for analysis of procedures and the differentiation of scientific methods.² Before I examine Lonergan’s notion of transcendental method in particular, I will locate his thought historically by examining Kant’s influence on Roman Catholic Theology and then I will examine Transcendental Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologie as subsequent responses.

¹ Lonergan, Morelli, and Morelli, Reader, 21.
² Lonergan, Method, 83.
Kant’s Influence on Roman Catholic Theology

After Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* and his significant challenge to metaphysics, there grew a divide between modern philosophy and Roman Catholic theology. In chapter seven of *Modern Christian Thought*, James Livingston and Francis Schüssler Fiorenza find that the growth of transcendental Thomism in the twentieth century emerged in response to its neo-scholastic predecessor.¹

In 1879, nearly a full century after the publication of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Practical Reason*, Pope Leo XIII wrote *Aeterni Patris*, “On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy according to the Mind of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor.” In an effort to combat “evil teaching about things, human and divine” coming forth “from the schools of philosophers,” Pope Leo XIII officially sanctioned the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas as a way to “update and perfect the old with the new.”² In 1910, all Roman Catholic philosophers and theologians had to swear the antimodernism oath and the thought of Thomas became the norm for all theology and philosophy. In 1917, Pope Benedict XV required that the study of philosophy and theology in all Roman Catholic institutes of higher education be aligned with the arguments and principles of St. Thomas.³ He was to be the antidote for curbing the spread of evil teaching rooted in modernity. Over and against Kant’s challenge to metaphysics, the Roman Catholic

Church adverted to one of its greatest minds.\textsuperscript{4} The hope was to defeat the errors of modernism. The historical outcome of this “antimodern” movement marginalized the non-Thomists. As Neo-Scholasticism emerged, it left no room for non-Thomistic philosophers and theologians, who were often “censured and removed” from their teaching posts. As a result, any dissent from the prevailing neo-scholastic ideas had to emerge within the context of Thomistic studies themselves.\textsuperscript{5}

The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed a number of prolific and dynamic Roman Catholic theologians, despite the pervasive antimodernism oath. Many Roman Catholic theologians at this time were engaged in historical and systematic studies that discriminated between neo-scholasticism as a movement and the historical Thomas Aquinas. A new movement, the \textit{Nouvelle Théologie}, inspired theological figures like Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, and Bernard Lonergan. All three began their careers with dissertations or studies interpreting Thomas Aquinas’s theology or philosophy.

The major figures of the revival found that the “historical” Thomas Aquinas was quite different from the Thomas of the neo-scholastics. For the neo-scholastics, Thomas was primarily an Aristotelian philosopher struggling against the neo-Platonism of Augustine. As such, they emphasized the separation of grace from nature into two orders by employing a non-idealist, empirical, and \textit{a posteriori} method. Conversely, the Thomas of the \textit{Nouvelle Théologie} was primarily a theologian heavily indebted to neo-Platonism

\textsuperscript{4} From here onward, I will occasionally use “Church” in place of “Roman Catholic Church” to eliminate unnecessary redundancy and wordiness. I am not making any theological claim by doing so. It is merely a stylistic decision I have made knowing full well that the Christian tradition extends well beyond the Roman Catholic Church.

\textsuperscript{5} Livingston and Schüessler Fiorenza, \textit{Modern Christian Thought} 198.
and Augustinianism. They emphasized the integration of nature and grace “through the dynamism of the human desire for God,” a profoundly Augustinian theme. Lastly, the Thomas of the *Nouvelle Théologie* was highly aware of the *a priori* elements in knowledge and faith.

**Transcendental Thomism and the Nouvelle Théologie**

As Livingston and Fiorenza explain, three important developments provide the background for understanding what eventually became known as transcendental Thomism. First, the “contours” of Neo-Scholasticism were heavily indebted to modernity and the Enlightenment, despite its attempt to serve as a corrective or critique. Essentially, neo-Scholasticism acquired features of the very philosophies it combated. Second, the thought of Joseph Maréchal and Pierre Rousselot strongly influenced the break from Neo-Scholasticism. Third, the movement known as the *Nouvelle Théologie* began to replace Neo-Scholasticism. Each of these three developments contributed to the emergence of transcendental Thomism. I will briefly explore three figures of this movement, since they share common features with Bernard Lonergan.

From an historical perspective, Joseph Maréchal’s work can be seen as the first critical engagement between twentieth-century French and German Roman Catholic thought with Kant’s philosophy. Maréchal sought to merge two seemingly opposed positions: Kant’s critique of metaphysics with Maurice Blondel’s “emphasis on the dynamism of the human intellect.” Maréchal makes the argument that the human spirit has an inherent dynamism toward the transcendent absolute. Such an intellectual
dynamism involves an *a priori* orientation to the most general and unlimited being, toward transcendence.

Karl Rahner also investigated the internal dynamism of the human spirit toward transcendence. In examining "analogous language" about God, Rahner found that it is not a halfway point between the equivocal and univocal, but rather that it is rooted in the openness of the human intellect toward infinity, a deep awareness of the world's limits and a ceaseless striving toward that which transcends it. His work *Spirit in the World* investigates the possibility of legitimate metaphysical knowledge in light of Kant's challenge to metaphysics, and whether the human intellect can know the transcendent God if human knowledge begins with sensation. *Hearers of the Word* handles the same investigation with regard to the possibility of knowledge of revelation. His solution to this question employs Maréchal's transcendental orientation of the human spirit. Rahner's interpretation of the religious dimension of human living is indebted to the experience of freedom and responsibility, a relationship he envisions as dialectic.

Karl Rahner's method of investigation is often called transcendental method. A major contribution is his theological "turn to the subject." But Rahner does not use "transcendental" in the same way Kant does. While Kant equates transcendental with *a priori*, Rahner takes human historicity into account: transcendental analysis relates to a consciousness as one that is grounded in history.

Lastly, Bernard Lonergan makes significant contributions to transcendental Thomism and the *Nouvelle Théologie*. There are a few features that place him alongside Rahner and Maréchal as thinkers who successfully combine the features of modern philosophy with the Roman Catholic commitment to the thought of Thomas Aquinas.
Lonergan’s first contribution is a thorough and explicit account of human knowledge. He sought to root all knowledge, despite its traditional divisions, in the concrete operations of the human subject. He finds a basic conflict between two accounts of human knowing: one which views knowing as looking and another which views knowing as a compound of experiencing, understanding, and judging. With the flawed account of knowing in mind, Lonergan is able to successfully levy a critique of Neo-Scholasticism, yet maintain a firm commitment to the mind of Aquinas.\(^6\) Lonergan stands in line with the *Nouvelle Theologie* because he is concerned with the “immanent source of transcendence in man,” which for him is the “detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know.”\(^7\)

Lonergan’s conception of knowledge, especially his understanding of scientific method, emphasizes “its procedural nature as a self-reflective and self-critical enterprise.” He emphasizes that scientific knowledge is not merely knowledge of a specific object and it doesn’t depend on a method particular to some discipline. Scientific knowledge accumulates through an ongoing procedure of openness to data followed by critical judgments. Lonergan finds a structural similarity underlying scientific method, theology, and other disciplines.\(^8\)

Lonergan was deeply faithful to the mind of Thomas Aquinas. In his own words,

> After spending years reaching up to the mind of Aquinas, I came to a twofold conclusion. On the one hand, that reaching had changed me profoundly. On the other hand, that change was the essential benefit. For not only did it make me capable of grasping what, in the light of my conclusions, the *vetera* really were, but also it opened challenging vistas on what the *nova* could be.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Lonergan, *Insight* 636.

\(^8\) Livingston and Schüssler Fiorenza, *Modern Christian Thought*, 220.

The shift that Lonergan and the *Nouvelle Theologie* represent is not an embrace of modern philosophy at the expense of Catholic theology. Rather, it is an updating of the old with the new, as Leo XIII commands ("vetera novis augere et perficere"). While Lonergan found classical Thomism deeply faithful to St. Thomas, he found that it relied on an outdated and flawed worldview.

[It met new questions by extending medieval solutions, and it could do so all the more confidently because of its classicist presuppositions. Truth is immutable. Human nature does not change. God has revealed Himself once and for all in Christ Jesus.]*¹⁰*

Thomism for tomorrow, as Lonergan proposes, involves a shift from the emphases of classical Thomism and a revision of the results obtained by medieval theology. In particular, Lonergan proposes a move from logic to method, from the Aristotelian notion of science found in *Posterior Analytics* to today’s model of science, from a metaphysical notion of the soul to the self-appropriation of the subject, from human nature to human history, and from first principles to transcendental method.

I locate Lonergan alongside Maréchal and Rahner as “transcendental Thomists” for two basic reasons: Lonergan, Maréchal, and Rahner are each faithfully committed to the mind, works, and study of St. Thomas Aquinas and can thus be called “Thomists” in a broad sense; secondly, each is concerned with transcendental method, despite their differences. The description “transcendental Thomist” has the same meaning as “Thomists concerned with or employing transcendental method.”

There are a few common features of transcendental method in general. In his book *The Transcendental Method*, Otto Muck surveys the historical development of

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transcendental method beginning with Kant and examines some of its most significant proponents: Joseph Maréchal, André Marc, Bernard Lonergan, and Emerich Coreth. Without delving deeply into the nuances of the movement or the distinctions between its proponents, it is helpful to note common points of convergence: (1) analysis of the conditions of possibility, (2) the transcendental turn, (3) noetic striving, and (4) retorsion.¹¹

First, an “analysis of the conditions of possibility” is a critical way of examining necessary prior conditions making possible some act or operation. In basic terms, analyzing the conditions of possibility means investigating “how this is possible.” When the focus of investigation becomes that act of questioning itself, the investigation explores the conditions present prior to the question itself. Second, what has been called the “transcendental turn” is a heightened awareness “of the fact that a reciprocal relation holds between the domain of objects and the object-oriented act.”¹² The transcendental turn highlights the fundamental relationship between the knower and the known. Third, “noetic striving” is a term for the “pure, unrestricted desire to know.” Fourth, noetic striving and the act of inquiry are beyond all doubt. To doubt the existence of questioning is a performative self-contradiction. When a claim denies the conditions of its very possibility, it is self-defeating. Such performative self-contradiction is brought to light when “a mistaken cognitional theory” is differentiated from “the actual performance of

¹¹ Otto Muck, *The Transcendental Method* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 294. Lonergan recognizes Muck’s contribution, but also explicitly states that he employs a different definition of method than Muck does. See footnote 4 on page 13 of *Method*. My point in grouping these thinkers together is to emphasize common points of convergence and not to prove that Lonergan uses transcendental method as Muck defines it.

¹² Ibid., 311.
the mistaken theorist."  Lonergan uses Hume as an example: "Hume thought the human mind to be a matter of impressions linked by custom. But Hume’s own mind was quite original. Therefore, Hume’s own mind was not what Hume considered the human mind to be." Muck calls this performative self-contradiction retorsion. Retorsion identifies which insights must be included

in the act of thinking because they are operative in it. It does this by indicating ...that the insight in question is so fundamental and evident that the very act which would deny it is impossible unless it acknowledges it.  

The four features I have mentioned here, although not an exhaustive list, will serve as instruments for highlighting certain elements in Lonergan’s thought. They also show the transcendental method is not only a viable way of proceeding, but also foundational for Lonergan. Now that I have located Lonergan contextually and historically, I will explore his version of transcendental method more thoroughly.

1. Lonergan’s Transcendental Method as Method

Regarding transcendental method, two significant insights reveal a foundational component of Lonergan’s thought. First, transcendental method is personal. It refers to a rationally self-conscious subject capable of understanding the conscious and intentional operations that comprise knowing. Second, transcendental method is non-categorical. It cannot be confined to a particular field of knowledge, but provides a solid foundation for human knowing itself.

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13 Lonergan, Method, 21.
14 Ibid., 21.
15 Muck, 167.
The term method needs further explanation. In Lonergan’s words, a method is “a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results.”\(^{16}\) The operations are distinct because they can be identified and defined. The operations form a pattern, which is “described as the right way of doing the job.”\(^{17}\) The pattern, indefinitely repeated, yields fruits that are not repetitious but cumulative and progressive.

Lonergan’s understanding of method was shaped by his exploration of scientific method operative in the natural sciences. Similar to the way Kant was inspired by the explosive growth in the realm of science, Lonergan sought to use scientific method as the model for understanding understanding. He found that in the natural sciences,

method inculcates a spirit of inquiry and inquiries recur. It insists on accurate observation and description: both observations and descriptions recur. It demands the formulation of discoveries in hypotheses, and hypotheses recur. It requires the deduction of the implications of hypotheses, and deductions recur. It keeps urging that experiments be devised and performed to check the implications of hypotheses against observable fact, and such processes of experimentation recur.\(^{18}\)

Lonergan understood that the operations specific to the natural sciences such as inquiry, observation, description, hypothesis, deduction, and experimentation were distinct, recurrent, and related forming a pattern of operations.

Inquiry transforms mere experiencing into the scrutiny of observation. What is observed, is pinned down by description. Contrasting descriptions give rise to problems, and problems are solved by discoveries. What is discovered is expressed in a hypothesis. From the hypothesis are deduced its implications, and these suggest experiments to be performed. So the many operations are related; the relations form a pattern; and the pattern defines the right way of going about scientific investigation.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{17}\) Ibid., 4.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 4-5.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 5.
And so scientific method in the natural sciences yields cumulative and progressive results. Unlike the stagnant, circular, or dialectic relationship of metaphysical claims in Kant’s day, the scientific method Lonergan explores actually progresses. The modern technological boom of the last century attests to the success of scientific method.

From the preliminary notion of method in the natural sciences, Lonergan understood that method itself has distinct features: first, it is not a set of rules but a prior, normative pattern of operations from which the rules may be derived. Secondly, the operations are not limited to strictly logical operations of propositions, terms, and relations. “The distinctive character of modern science” is its ability to group together logical and non-logical operations, where the logical consolidates “what has been achieved” and the non-logical keeps “all achievement open to further advance.”

However, the particular method Lonergan observed operated in the distinct sphere of the natural sciences. An important question emerges: namely, what elements are common to human understanding in non-categorical terms? To answer this question, Lonergan explored the conditions of the possibility of any instance of insight, starting with the pattern of conscious operations.

Lonergan makes the claim that self-appropriation is foundational for insight. The same principle is true for understanding understanding. As he claims,

[o]ur purpose is to bring to light the pattern within which these operations occur and, it happens, we cannot succeed without an exceptional amount of exertion and activity on the part of the reader. He will have to familiarize himself with our terminology. He will have to evoke the relevant operations in his own consciousness. He will have to discover in his own experience the dynamic relationships leading from one operation to the next. Otherwise he will find not merely this chapter but the whole book about as illuminating as a blind man finds a lecture on color.

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20 Ibid., 6.
21 Ibid., 7.
When one begins to examine one’s own consciousness, one will find certain operations such as “seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, formulating, reflecting, marshalling and weighing the evidence, judging, deliberating, evaluating, deciding, speaking, writing.” These operations are the operations “of an operator, named the subject.” The operator is subject not only grammatically but also psychologically since she operates consciously. The conscious operations make the subject present to herself. Presence to self, or “introspection,” can be misleading. Properly, it refers to the process of objectifying the contents of consciousness, since “we move from the data of consciousness through inquiry, understanding, reflection, judgment, to statements about conscious subjects and their operations.”

Heightening awareness of and objectifying the contents of one’s consciousness is not a simple process. One has to know precisely the meaning of each of the words, produce in oneself the corresponding operation, keep producing it until one gets beyond the object intended to the consciously operating subject, and do it all in an appropriate context, “which is a matter not of inward inspection but of inquiry, enlarged interest, discernment, comparison, distinction, identification, naming.” Ultimately, objectifying one’s consciousness is something that each one has to do in herself and for herself – it is not something achieved by reading books or listening to lectures. Albert Einstein makes the same point, “any man who reads too much and uses his own brain too little falls into

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22 Ibid., 6.
23 Ibid., 7-8.
24 Ibid., 8-9.
25 Ibid., 15.
lazy habits of thinking.” Furthermore, Einstein also finds that “the truth of a theory is in your mind, not in your eyes.”\(^{26}\) Knowing is not like looking.

The process of objectifying one’s consciousness “is a matter of applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious.”\(^{27}\) The various operations mentioned above cohere into four levels denoted by the principle occurrence on that level. The operations are fourfold: experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. “These operations are both conscious and intentional.”\(^{28}\)

The conscious operations are related in a dynamic and unified process. In Lonergan’s words,

> The operations, then, stand within a process that is formally dynamic, that calls forth and assembles its own components, that does so intelligently, rationally, responsibly. Such, then, is the unity and relatedness of the several operations. It is a unity and relatedness that exists and functions before we manage to advert to it explicitly, understand it, objectify it.\(^{29}\)

The unity of these related operations is presupposed before it is consciously objectified.

We do not experience these phenomena in isolation and then deduce a pattern of relationship linking them together.

> On the contrary, the unity of consciousness is itself given; the pattern of the operations is part of the experience of the operations; and inquiry and discovery are needed, not to effect the synthesis of a manifold that, as given, is unrelated, but to analyze a functional and functioning unity.\(^{30}\)

\(^{26}\) [http://www-gap.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Quotations/Einstein.html](http://www-gap.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Quotations/Einstein.html)
\(^{28}\) Ibid.
\(^{29}\) Ibid., 16.
\(^{30}\) Ibid., 18.
While it is true that we cannot distinguish or discern the operations without analysis or formulate their relations, the operations are a functioning unity prior to the moment of analysis.\textsuperscript{31}

The scientific method employed by natural scientists yields cumulative and progressive results. Experimentation yields new data, observations, and descriptions that either confirm or deny the hypothesis being tested. When they confirm the hypothesis, they confirm the investigation is on the right track. When they do not confirm the hypothesis, they lead to a modification, which will yield new discoveries, new data, new hypothesis, new deductions and further experiments: “the wheel of method not only turns but also rolls along.”\textsuperscript{32} Results, then, “are progressive only if there is a sustained succession of discoveries.”\textsuperscript{33} The same features apply to transcendental method. Insights accumulate, understanding expands and grows, and each instance presupposes prior conditions of possibility. Simply put, insight occurs in a continuum of operations and activity. It is the fruit of a slow, laborious process.

Avoiding retortion, or intentionally excluding ‘performative self-contradiction,’ is a common strategy for those employing transcendental method. For Lonergan, the existence of operations such as seeing, reflecting, deciding etc. is irrefutable. To deny the existence of the normative pattern of operations is to engage in performative self-contradiction: “anyone that cares to deny their existence is merely disqualifying himself

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 6.
as a non-responsible, non-reasonable, non-intelligent somnambulist. To revise the normative pattern of operations, certain conditions must be fulfilled.

For, in the first place, any possible revision will appeal to data which the opinion under review either overlooked or misapprehended, and so any possible revision must presuppose at least an empirical level of operations. Secondly, any possible revision will offer a better explanation of the data, and so any possible revision must presuppose an intellectual level of operations. Thirdly, any possible revision will claim that the better explanation is more probable, and so any possible revision must presuppose a rational level of operations. Fourthly, a revision is not a mere possibility but an accomplished fact only as the result of a judgment of value and a decision.

And so Lonergan’s insight regarding the immanent operations of understanding, the empirical, intellectual, rational, and responsible, obtains a universal quality. However, he does distinguish between the normative pattern and its objectifications of that pattern in concepts, words, and propositions. Revision can only affect the objectifications.

Any theory, description, account of our conscious and intentional operations is bound to be incomplete and to admit further clarifications and extensions. But all such clarifications and extensions are to be derived from the conscious and intentional operations themselves. They as given in consciousness are the rock; they confirm every exact account; they refute every inexact or incomplete account. The rock, then, is the subject in his conscious, unobjectified attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility.

Lonergan makes a significant contribution not only in resolving the conflicting claims regarding human understanding but also in attempting to answer the question of the way the personal relates to the universal. By identifying the conscious operations immanent in human knowing, Lonergan shows that there is a normative pattern that is both conscious and intentional working in the human subject. To deny the pattern of operations immanent in human knowing is to place a wedge between one’s knowing and one’s

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34 Ibid., 17.
35 Ibid., 19 [italics added].
36 Ibid., 19-20.
operating. Through rational self-appropriation, Lonergan was able not only to identify the contradictions in prior descriptions of understanding but also to identify the method operative in all human knowing.

2. Lonergan’s Transcendental Method as Transcendental

Transcendental method can be understood in two ways. It is transcendental because it is non-categorical and therefore universal to all knowing. Lonergan’s claim that transcendental method is conscious means that it is available to the rationally self-appropriated consciousness:

What we have been describing as the basic pattern of operations is transcendental method. It is a method, for it is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results. It is a transcendental method, for the results envisaged are not confined categorically to some particular field or subject.37

In this sense transcendental also means non-categorical.

Transcendental method identifies not only the conscious nature of the operations but also the intentional nature of the operations:

...one and the same operation not only intends an object but also reveals an intending subject ... That discovery, of course, is not a matter of looking, inspecting, gazing upon. It is an awareness, not of what is intended, but of the intending. It is finding in oneself the conscious occurrence, seeing, whenever an object is seen, the conscious occurrence, hearing, whenever an object is heard, and so forth.38

Furthermore,

[T]he operations in the list are transitive. They have objects. They are transitive not merely in the grammatical sense that they are denoted by transitive verbs but also in the psychological sense that by the operation one becomes aware of the object. This psychological sense is what is meant by the verb, intend, the adjective, intentional, the noun, intentionality. To say that the operations intend objects is to refer to such facts as that by seeing there becomes present what is seen, by hearing there becomes present what

37 Ibid., 14 [italics added].
38 Ibid., 15.
is heard, by imagining there becomes present what is imagined, and so on, where in each case the presence in question is a psychological event.\textsuperscript{39}

The rationally self-appropriated consciousness discovers a nuanced web of desires. The subject is a seeking, intending subject. The intentions and intending, however, seek something. Intending is not merely the haphazard expression of some primordial energy. Subjects intend ‘objects’. In this sense transcendental means the ‘object’ which lies intentionally beyond the subject. Therefore, transcendental method includes the process by which the subject \textit{intentionally} transcends herself by seeking an ‘object’. In Lonergan’s language, he uses the term “transcendental notion” to emphasize the second meaning.

In \textit{Method}, Lonergan claims that the transition from theoretical theology to methodological theology begins with intentionality analysis and transcendental method, not from a metaphysical psychology.\textsuperscript{40} In other words, an adequate, critical, and contemporary theology must be rooted in a conscious identification of intentional operations. To begin the task, he identifies different levels of intentional operation:

[D]ifferent levels of consciousness and intentionality have to be distinguished. In our dream states consciousness and intentionality commonly are fragmentary and incoherent. When we awake, they take on a different hue to expand on four successive, related, but qualitatively different levels. There is the \textit{empirical} level on which we sense, perceive, imagine, feel, speak, move. There is an \textit{intellectual} level on which we inquire, come to understand, express what we have understood, work out the presuppositions and implications of our expression. There is the \textit{rational} level on which we reflect, marshal the evidence, pass judgment on the truth or falsity, certainty or probability, of a statement. There is the \textit{responsible} level on which we are concerned with ourselves, our own operations, our goals, and so deliberate about possible courses of action, evaluate them, decide, and carry out our decisions.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 289.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 9 [italics added].
Lonergan is able to identify the different levels by first examining the intentions and then the resulting operations. On each level there is a different ‘mode of intending’: “as different operations yield qualitatively different modes of being conscious subjects, so too they yield qualitatively different modes of intending … the most fundamental difference in modes of intending lies between the categorical and the transcendental.”

Lonergan’s approach is one that is primarily concerned with intentionality and intending. In addition, the intentionality under investigation is less concerned with the categorical and more concerned with the ‘transcendental’ or ‘that which lies beyond.’ This conscious examination of intentionality yields a way of proceeding, namely intentionality analysis.

Intentionality analysis reveals another important function of the operations: namely, each successive level of consciousness sublates what came before.

From the very first chapter we have moved out of a faculty psychology with its options between intellectualism and voluntarism, and into an intentionality analysis that distinguishes four levels of conscious and intentional operations, where each successive level sublates previous levels by going beyond them, by setting up a higher principle, by introducing new operations, and by preserving the integrity of previous levels, while extending enormously their range and their significance.

Sublation for Lonergan is when the lower levels are “retained, preserved, yet transcended and completed by a higher.” Sublation is not a destruction of what preceded, but rather a “retaining, preserving, going beyond, perfecting.” Not only does intentionality analysis reveal different levels of conscious intentionality, it also reveals a way to identify the relationship between the levels themselves. For example, the fourth level of conscious intentionality goes beyond the prior levels, setting up “a new principle and type

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42 Ibid., 10.
43 Ibid., 340.
44 Lonergan, Second Collection, 80.
45 Ibid., 84.
of operations” directing them “to a new goal.” The fourth level does not dwarf the previous three, but rather “preserves them and brings them to a far fuller fruition.”

Minimally, humans are empirically conscious. In this regard, humans do not differ much from the higher animals. Both enjoy the data of sense. In humans, however, the data of sense provokes inquiry. Inquiry leads to understanding. Understanding expresses itself in language. From the empirical level of consciousness emerges the intellectual level where the subject seeks insight. From the intellectual emerges the rational level of consciousness where the subject “incarnates detachment and disinterestedness,” giving herself over “to the criteria of truth and certitude.” From the rational level emerges the responsible level where “we emerge as persons” and “replace competing egoisims” with the “responsible exercise of freedom.”

Lonergan identifies four levels of intentionality setting into motion particular operations on each level.

All of the operations on these four levels [empirical, intellectual, rational, responsible] are intentional and conscious. Still, intentionality and consciousness differ from level to level, and within each level the many operations involve further differences. Our consciousness expands in a new dimension when from mere experiencing we turn to the effort to understand what we have experienced. A third dimension of rationality emerges when the content of our acts of understanding is regarded as, of itself, a mere bright idea and we endeavor to settle what really is so. A fourth dimension comes to the fore when judgment on the facts is followed by deliberation on what we are to do about them. On all four levels, we are aware of ourselves but, as we mount from level to level, it is a fuller self of which we are aware and the awareness itself is different.

The levels of conscious intentionality are “fuller,” demanding a higher degree of engagement and revealing a greater degree of sophistication. On the empirical level, the subject need only to sense. On the intellectual level, understanding is not merely a matter

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46 Lonergan, Method, 316.
47 Ibid., 10.
48 Ibid., 9.
of looking, as Lonergan claims repeatedly. Not everyone who looks at the same data is able to understand the complex web of relations. And so each successive level not only sublates what came before, but also demands more of the subject. Each successive level presupposes and complements what came before. Intentionality analysis offers a distinctive and responsible way of avoiding metaphysical dead ends, so challenged by Kant.

Because its account of interiority was basically metaphysical, the older theology distinguished sensitive and intellectual, apprehensive and appetitive potencies. There followed complex questions on their mutual interactions. There were disputes about the priority of intellect over will or of will over intellect, of speculative over practical intellect or of practical over speculative. In contrast, we describe interiority in terms of intentional and conscious acts on the four levels of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. The lower levels are presupposed and complemented by the higher. The higher sublate the lower.49

Lonergan offers a rich and compelling account of interiority, known through an analysis of intentionality.

The fourth level of conscious intentionality is most directly related to formal existential ethics. Lonergan traces the gradual turn from the realm of theory to the realm of interiority, and from the intellectual to the moral.

...if there is to be any general science, its data will have to be the data of consciousness. So there is effected the turn to interiority ... The foregoing shift to interiority was essayed in various manners from Descartes through Kant to the nineteenth-century German idealists. But there followed a still more emphatic shift from knowledge to faith, will, conscience, decision, action in Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Newman, Nietzsche, Blondel, the personalists, and the existentialists. The direction of this shift is correct in the sense that the fourth level of intentional consciousness - the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision, action - sublates the prior levels of experiencing, understanding, judging.50

49 Ibid., 120.
50 Ibid., 316.
Regarding subjectivity, Lonergan claims that the fourth level of conscious intentionality - the level of deliberation, evaluation, decision, and action – sublates the prior levels. In other words, understanding is not the final term or fulfillment of intentionality. The claim that the responsible level of conscious intentionality sublates the rational, intellectual, and empirical has several significant consequences:

The fourth and highest level is that of deliberation, evaluation, decision. It follows that the priority of intellect is just the priority of the first three levels of experiencing, understanding, judging ... Secondly, it follows that the speculative intellect or pure reason is just an abstraction. Scientific or philosophic experiencing, understanding, and judging do not occur in a vacuum. They are the operations of an existential subject who has decided to devote himself to the pursuit of understanding and truth and, with greater or less success, is faithful to his commitment. Thirdly, there arises the possibility of an exception to the old adage *nihil amatum nisi praecognitum*. Specifically, it would seem that God's gift of his love (Rom 5:5) is not something that results from or is conditioned by man's knowledge of God. Far more plausibly it would seem that the gift may precede our knowledge of God and, indeed, may be the cause of our seeking knowledge of God. In that case the gift would be an orientation towards an unknown.  

The notion of "pure reason" is both an abstraction and a mistaken account of knowing. Reason does not operate outside of, beyond, despite, or in contrast to some prior intentionality. The human capacity for understanding itself is inextricably linked, even rooted, in the intentionality of the seeking subject who has made some prior commitment. The existential subject plays a determinative role in what is understood and judged. Prior to insight and commitment, however, is a deeply rooted desire. Critical to Lonergan's theological anthropology is the relationship between the known unknowns sought by the seeking subject, values that determine worth, and the concrete choices of the existential subject.

In chapter one my intent was not only to show that self-appropriation is foundational to Lonergan's project but also to identify the elements that self-

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51 Ibid., 340.
appropriation reveals. The subject, for Lonergan, is a seeking subject constituted by desire (exigencies, notions, the pure unrestricted desire to know and so on).

The transcendental notions are a manifestation of "the love of God poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit." Since a notion is an intelligent and reasonable desire, a transcendental notion is an intelligent and reasonable desire for the transcendents: the direction of intentionality relative to the four distinct levels lying beyond the seeking subject moving the subject from one level to the next.

In contrast, the transcendents are comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted in denotation, invariant over cultural change ... They are the radical intending that moves us from ignorance to knowledge. They are a priori ... unrestricted ... comprehensive.52

At each level of conscious intentionality, the seeking subject intends different things. As Lonergan writes,

if we objectify the contents of intelligent intending, we form the transcendental concept of the intelligible. If we objectify the content of reasonable intending, we form the transcendental concepts of the true and the real. If we objectify the content of responsible intending, we get the transcendental concept of value, of the truly good.53

But prior to the transcendental concepts are the "prior transcendental notions that constitute the very dynamism of our conscious intending,"54 which is not a product of cultural advance but its very condition. And so on the intellectual level, the subject seeks the intelligible. On the rational level, the subject seeks the true and the real. On the responsible level, the subject seeks the good. Since each level of operations sublates the prior, so too does each distinct transcendental notion sublate what came before:

So intelligence takes us beyond experiencing to ask what and why and how and what for. Reasonableness takes us beyond the answers of intelligence to ask whether the answers

52 Ibid., 11.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
are true and whether what they mean really is so. Responsibility goes beyond fact and desire and possibility to discern between what truly is good and what only apparently is good.\textsuperscript{55}

The transcendental notions then are the radical dynamism moving the subject from lower to higher levels of consciousness and intentionality:

The transcendental notions are the dynamism of conscious intentionality. They promote the subject from lower to higher levels of consciousness, from the experiential to the intellectual, from the intellectual to the rational, from the rational to the existential.\textsuperscript{56}

The transcendental notions also provide the criteria “that reveal whether the goals are being reached.” The drive to know is satisfied with understanding, the drive to truth terminates in judgment, and the drive to value “rewards success in self-transcendence with a happy conscience and saddens failures with an unhappy conscience.”\textsuperscript{57}

In sum, the transcendental notions are an internal dynamism of radical intending, seeking different ends relative to each level of consciousness, moving the subject from lower to higher levels of consciousness, and providing the criteria for determining the very satisfaction or fulfillment of the intending itself. In the most basic sense, the transcendental notions are a constitutive element of intelligent, rational, and responsible subjectivity.

While the desires of each of the levels of conscious intentionality and the proper functioning thereof are essential to authentic subjectivity, the transcendental notion of value in particular is immediately relevant to a formal existential ethic. Lonergan distinguishes the particular good, which satisfies appetites, from value, the transcendental notion of the good. Beyond the particular good of satisfaction, there is

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 34-35.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 35.
value. It provides the basis for judging the relative preference and ordering the matrix of
particular goods, which can often conflict.

I am suggesting that the transcendental notion of the good regards value. It is distinct
from the particular good that satisfies individual appetite, such as the appetite for food
and drink, the appetite for union and communion, the appetite for knowledge, or virtue,
or pleasure. Again, it is distinct from the good of order .... But beyond the particular good
and the good of order, there is the good of value. It is by appealing to value or values that
we satisfy some appetites and do not satisfy others, that we approve some systems for
achieving the good of order and disapprove of others, that we praise or blame human
persons as good or evil and their actions as right or wrong.58

The notion of value is different from value itself, however. Lonergan compares the notion
of value to the notion of being.

What, then, is value? I should say that it is a transcendental notion like the notion of
being. Just as the notion of being intends but, of itself, does not know being, so too the
notion of value intends but, of itself, does not know value. Again, as the notion of being
is a dynamic principle that keeps us moving toward ever fuller knowledge of being, so
the notion of value is the fuller flowering of the same dynamic principle that now keeps
up moving toward ever fuller realization of the good, of what is worthwhile.59

The distinction between value or values and the transcendental notion of value is an
important one. The notion of being is an evolving dynamism bringing the subject to a
fuller knowledge of being. Similarly, the notion of the good is an evolving dynamism
bringing the subject to fuller knowledge of the good. Through reflection and self-
appropriation one comes to know the notion of the good. The notion of the good results
in the limited achievement of the good:

the notion or intention of the good functions within one's human acting and it is by
reflection on that functioning that one comes to know what the notion of good is. Again,
just as the functioning of the notion of being brings about our limited knowledge of
being, so too the functioning of the notion of the good brings about our limited
achievement of the good.60

58 Lonergan, Second Collection 81-82.
59 Ibid., 82.
60 Ibid., 82-83.
Regarding knowledge of being, objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. Understanding is limited insofar as the subject does not give free reign to the pure unrestricted desire to know. There are a variety of the ways the subject can be biased, preventing him from objectivity. Regarding knowledge of value, the same principle is true. One’s moral living in response to the notion of value is also the fruit of authentic subjectivity. It too can be biased and limited when the subject does not rationally appropriate notions of the good. The appropriation of value given in feeling must also be conscious and intentional if it is to operate authentically. Therefore, there is also an intimate link between the notions, apprehensions, and appropriations of value and the existential subject.

The existential subject is free and responsible: “by his own acts the human subject makes himself what he is to be, and he does so freely and responsibly; indeed, he does so precisely because his acts are the free and responsible expressions of himself.” 61 Additionally, the existential subject is the fullest manifestation of human consciousness emerging when rational consciousness is sublated by rational self-consciousness. It is when the subject discovers for herself that it is up to her to decide for herself what she will make of herself. The discovery of this meaning of freedom and responsibility is both awesome and inspiring. For the existential subject, the crushing weight of being-in-the-universe gives way to a profound sense of concern and responsibility. The rationally self-conscious subject identifies an internal dynamism, the transcendental notions, functioning as principles for judgment and a foundation for higher levels of consciousness.

61 Ibid., 79.
So the paradox of the existential subject extends to the good existential subject. Just as the existential subject freely and responsibly makes himself what he is, so too he makes himself good or evil and his actions right or wrong. The good subject, the good choice, the good action are not found in isolation. For the subject is good by his good choices and good actions. Universally prior to any choice or action there is just the transcendental principle of all appraisal and criticism, the intention of the good ... However, do not ask me to determine them, for their determination in each case is the work of the free and responsible subject producing the first and only edition of himself.\textsuperscript{62}

On the highest level of consciousness, rational self-consciousness, the existential elements of subjectivity sublate what came before. In Lonergan’s words, there exists a primacy of the existential. Unlike others who have concerned themselves with ‘the existential subject’ [Sartre et al], Lonergan does not wish to claim that ‘the existential’ is primarily intellectual or voluntary.

Finally, let me say that the primacy of the existential does not mean the primacy of will ... practical intellect, or practical reason ... Results proceed from actions, actions from decisions, decisions from evaluations, evaluations from deliberations, and all from the existential subject, the subject as deliberating, evaluating, deciding, acting, bringing about results. That subject is not just an intellect or just a will. Though concerned with results, he or she more basically is concerned with himself or herself as becoming good or evil and so is to be named, not a practical subject, but an existential subject.\textsuperscript{63}

The existential subject, as rationally self-conscious, decides for himself what he is to make of himself. However, he does so in response to the apprehension of value given in feeling. He judges, chooses, orders, and prunes what values he will appropriate, what values will become operative in his doing, how those values will order and relate to particular goods, how those goods will inform his judgments, how those judgments will shape his understanding, and how his understanding will organize his experience. The existential subject pursues worthwhile activities, asks questions that intrigue her, and identifies what kind of being she wishes to become.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 83.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 84.
The existential subject is not an achievement of one concrete decision or action, but is an ongoing process of personal commitment emerging from rational self-appropriation and culminating in self-transcendence. However, one would be significantly misled in thinking that self-transcendence in itself is a given or is the final term of intentionality. Each transcendental notion has a corresponding fulfillment at each level of consciousness. For the notion of intelligibility there is understanding. For the notion of the true there is judgment of fact. For the notion of the good there is judgment of value followed by deliberation and decision. Beyond the good there is the finality of all conscious intentionality: religious love.

Self-transcendence is another of Lonergan’s terms that might be overlooked if not examined closely. For Lonergan self-transcendence on the intellectual level is the subject’s intentional pursuit of a “known unknown.”

The pursuit of knowledge is the pursuit of an unknown ... We have to acknowledge, then, the existence in man of something like a natural ideal that moves towards knowledge. Moreover, this ideal is not explicitly conceived by nature. While the tendency is innate, while it belongs to man by nature, while it is not something acquired like facility on the violin or the piano or the typewriter, still the exact goal of this tendency is not explicitly conceived by nature. Man has to work out his conception of this goal, and he does so insofar as he actually pursues knowledge. In the working out, this ideal becomes concrete or explicit in a series of different forms in the sciences and in philosophy.64

The tendency of the seeking subject to pursue a known unknown reveals that the human subject is a self-transcending subject. Conscious intentionality not only drives the corresponding operations on each level of consciousness but it also has a corresponding “telos” or fulfillment on each level of consciousness: subjects intend objects.

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64 Lonergan, Understanding and Being 14.
So the question emerges, what are the fulfillments of conscious intentionality and how do they relate to the seeking subject? To answer the question, I will return to Archimedes' dramatic instance of insight to which Lonergan adverts at the very outset of Insight. Archimedes’ insight reveals five elements:

What we have to grasp is that insight (1) comes as a release to the tension of inquiry, (2) comes suddenly and unexpectedly, (3) is a function not of outer circumstances but of inner conditions, (4) pivots between the concrete and the abstract, and (5) passes into the habitual texture of one's mind.

The first significant element of insight as it pertains to the intentionality on the intellectual level of consciousness is that insight fulfills "the tension of inquiry." As Lonergan explains later, the "release" or fulfillment to the tension of inquiry puts an end to "further pertinent questioning" in a mind that is "alert, familiar with the concrete situation, and intellectually master of it." Insight, as an achievement, is conditioned by one's openness to pursue further questions. In other words, the tension of inquiry can be stifled and dismissed, which is very different than "release" or "fulfillment" of the tension itself. The absence of further questions is no guarantee of insight. Suffice it to say that insight, as a release to the tension of inquiry, can and does occur if it is not impeded or inhibited by bias.

Secondly, insight occurs suddenly and expectedly. Archimedes cried "eureka" when his insight emerged, revealing the elation which came "in a flash, on a trivial occasion, in a moment of relaxation." To the behavioral observer, Archimedes' elation might mistakenly appear as a disproportionate or "uncaused" reaction (Eureka!) to a

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66 Ibid., 28.
67 Ibid., 312.
common and familiar experience (relaxing in a bath). Furthermore, the insight itself was not accidental but consciously sought, despite its sudden and unexpected quality in Archimedes' experience.

Thirdly, Archimedes' insight was not the product of outer circumstances but inner conditions. As Lonergan astutely observes, "many frequented the baths of Syracuse without coming to grasp the principles of hydrostatics." Lonergan goes to great lengths to show that insight cannot be sensation. While it sublates sensation, it is much more than "looking." Here, Lonergan encourages the subject to attend to the data of sense and consciousness. Simply put, interiority for Lonergan is not some mysterious, shadowy realm. It can be known, understood, judged, and chosen.

Fourthly, insight pivots between the concrete and the abstract. The problem Archimedes faced was concrete. But without the abstract formulations of "displacement" and "specific gravity," his insight would have been dubious, if not impossible. The realm of theory organizes experience in an intelligible fashion. Prior to Archimedes' elated cry, there was a heightened attention to a particular element of sensation. He may not have remembered every detail of his experience that day, but certainly the ones relevant to his elated cry. This feature of insight may only be hermeneutical, however, since no one has a detailed autobiographical record of all the elements of this particular dramatic instance. Insight not only pivots between the concrete and abstract, but also that the intelligible has an ordering and norming function with regard to the experiential.

Lastly, insight passes into "the habitual texture of one's mind." For Archimedes it took no great effort to report his insight to the king or to reproduce it thereafter. It did not slip into obscurity or fade away as do certain memories. Rather, it attained a normative
quality shaping and guiding further explorations. From the “foggy realms” in the mind of the beginner, insight fosters a level of self-confidence until the pupil becomes the teacher and complains “of the remarkable obtuseness of pupils that fail to see what, of course, is perfectly simple and obvious to those that understand.”

Insights have a cumulative and progressive nature, changing the way one attends to, understands, and judges the data of experience. Moments of insight, then, are also instances of self-transcendence because when they pass into the habitual texture of one’s mind, they enable the student to become the teacher.

Self-transcendence is not only achieved in moments of insight on the intellectual level of consciousness. Since the subject is intelligent, rational, and responsible, the notion of self-transcendence and fulfillment takes on new meaning. On the higher levels of conscious intentionality, self-transcendence means more than insight.

In his book *Into the Wild*, John Krakauer documents the life of Christopher Johnson McCandless, a wealthy young graduate of Emory University. After his graduation, McCandless donated his $24,000 inheritance to charity, burned the money in his wallet and wandered across North America “in search of raw, transcendent experience.” A party of moose hunters found his decomposed body in the Alaskan wilderness just four months after he arrived in April of 1992.

Krakauer makes it clear that McCandless was not just another wilderness eccentric in search of a pristine natural world untouched by the complexities of modern life. McCandless was an extremely bright, well-read, and thoughtful man in many

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68 Ibid., 31.  
regards; he was “long captivated by the writing of Leo Tolstoy” and “admired how the
great novelist had forsaken a life of wealth … to wander among the destitute.” He
exhibited signs of significant intellectual capacity and high moral character, “emulating
Tolstoy’s asceticism and moral rigor.” 70

A deep longing drove McCandless into the wilds of Alaska. There, he expressed
the awesome responsibility of freedom, writing his own declaration of independence:

Two years he walks the earth. No phone, no pool, no pets, no cigarettes. Ultimate
freedom. An extremist. An aesthetic voyager whose home is the road. Escaped from
Atlanta. Thou shalt not return, ‘cause “the west is the best.” And now after two rambling
years comes the final and greatest adventure. The climactic battle to kill the false being
within and victoriously conclude the spiritual revolution. Ten days and nights of freight
trains and hitchhiking bring him to the great white north. No longer to be poisoned by
civilization he flees, and walks alone upon the land to become lost in the wild.

Alexander Supertramp
May 1992
[Alex McCandless’s pen name]

Fascinated by McCandless and his story of searching, Krakauer does not write about the
peculiar longings of a young man; he writes about a longing and restlessness indicative of
the human search for transcendent meaning. Krakauer writes about the human search to
“victoriously conclude the spiritual revolution.”

The satisfaction of such a longing is not merely intellectual or merely moral. If I
applied Lonergan’s terms to McCandless’s condition, I would say that McCandless
revealed a need to “reach basic fulfillment, peace, joy … by moving beyond the realms of
common sense, theory, and interiority.” 72 Failing to critically understand the internal
dynamism at work within him, McCandless did not demonstrate a reasonable or rational
grasp of what could possibly fulfill his deepest desires. He had a deep and powerful

70 Ibid. “author’s note”
71 Ibid., 163.
72 Lonergan, Method 84.
desire without an intelligent notion of its potential source of fulfillment. Because he did not have a reasonable and intelligent notion of what might fulfill his existential angst, he died alone in an abandoned bus in the Alaskan wilds. One of the last notes he left expresses his desperate situation:

S.O.S. I need your help. I am injured, near death, and too weak to hike out of here. I am all alone, this is no joke. In the name of God, please remain to save me. I am out collecting berries close by and shall return this evening. Thank you.\textsuperscript{73}

Shortly after his return from collecting berries, "he crawled into the sleeping bag his mother had sewn for him and slipped into unconsciousness."\textsuperscript{74} There, he died alone. As Krakauer explains, the volume of mail that poured into the magazine \textit{Outside} after first printing of the story fell into one of two categories: those that understood his restlessness and those that thought he was a reckless, naïve, narcissist who died by his own stupidity.

The McCandless story illustrates well the way intentionality at the higher levels of consciousness, especially the fourth, sublate the lower. McCandless suffered from an existential restlessness operating at the height of his consciousness. Unfortunately, Krakauer’s story has no indication that McCandless was a “being-in-love with God.”

The transcendental notions constitute a subject’s capacity for self-transcendence. The intelligible, true, and good constitute a subject’s capacity for ever fuller realizations of subjectivity on the intellectual, rational, and responsible levels of consciousness. Love actualizes this capacity for self-transcendence:

The transcendental notions, that is, our questions for intelligence, for reflection, and for deliberation, constitute our capacity for self-transcendence. That capacity becomes an actuality when one falls in love. Then one’s being becomes being-in-love.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{73} Krakauer, 197.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 199.
\textsuperscript{75} Loner gan, \textit{Method} 105.
Love has ontological and existential value because it becomes a part of subjectivity, essentially establishing a new way of being. Lonergan explains the dynamic unfolding of self-transcendence emerging in five stages, beginning with the fragmentary form of a dream. After waking, the senses come to life, questions arise and are only satisfied by judgment. Having negotiated “the stages of morality and/or identity,” the fifth stage emerges:

But this fifth stage in self-transcendence becomes a successful way of life only when we really are pulled out of ourselves as, for example, when we fall in love, whether our love be the domestic love that unites husband and wife and children, or the love of our fellows whose well-being we promote and defend, or the love of God above all in whom we love our neighbor as ourselves.76

Being-in-love is the highest degree of self-transcendence. However, there are different kinds of being-in-love, such as “the love of intimacy, of husband and wife, of parents and children. There is the love of one’s fellow men with its fruit in the achievement of human welfare.”77

Being-in-love with God in particular is the fulfillment of conscious intentionality. It brings to term the eros of the human spirit.

So being in love with God is the basic fulfillment of our conscious intentionality. That fulfillment brings a deep-set joy that can remain despite humiliation, failure, privation, pain, betrayal, desertion. That fulfillment brings a radical peace, the peace that the world cannot give.78

The fulfillment of being-in-love with God is not the product of knowledge or choice. It is not mere insight or good will. Rather, “it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God

77 Lonergan, Method, 105.
78 Ibid., 105.
will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing. 79

Furthermore, being-in-love with God is conscious on the fourth level of intentional consciousness because

it is the type of consciousness that deliberates, makes judgments of value, decides, acts responsibly and freely. But it is this consciousness as brought to a fulfillment, as having undergone a conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and heightened and enriched but not superseded, as ready to deliberate and judge and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. So the gift of God’s love occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man’s intentional consciousness. 80

There are two crucial elements I would like to highlight. First, it is the existential subject on the fourth level of conscious intentionality that is fulfilled. Second, being-in-love with God is the source of a conversion that provides a basis incapable of being surpassed.

Being-in-love with God transforms knowing and transvalues valuing. Lonergan defines faith as “knowledge born of religious love.” 81 Using Pascal’s raison de coeur, the reasons of the heart which the mind cannot know, Lonergan understands “the heart’s reasons” to mean “feelings that are intentional responses to values,” which have an absolute aspect recognizing value and a relative aspect preferring one value over another. 82 Additionally, “the heart” means the subject on “the fourth, existential level of intentional consciousness and in the dynamic state of being in love.” 83 More concisely, Lonergan interprets Pascal to mean “besides the factual knowledge reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying” there is an additional kind of knowledge

79 Ibid., 106.
80 Ibid., 107.
81 Ibid., 115.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
“reached through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person in love.”

On the third level of conscious intentionality, the subject makes two types of judgments: judgments of fact and judgments of value. Between the two, there is an apprehension of value given in feeling. While the subject makes judgments of value, fulfilling the dynamism of *intentional* self-transcendence, it is only in doing that the subject attains *moral* self-transcendence. There are number of significant claims and implications: being-in-love is a qualitatively different kind of data operating in feelings beyond judgments of fact. Feelings *apprehend* value, culminating in judgment and ultimately in doing. Being-in-love transforms knowing because it determines the sphere of interest and therefore the sphere of knowledge itself.

Faith, as religious love, apprehends transcendent value in relative and absolute respects. Absolutely, faith places all other values in the light and the shadow of transcendent value. In the shadow, for transcendent value is supreme and incomparable. In the light, for transcendent value links itself to all other values to transform, magnify, glorify them.

Without faith the originating and terminal value is man and his achievements. By being-in-love with God the human person becomes absorbed in an “all-encompassing” good. Faith is the absolute determinant of value because it assigns relative weight, magnitude, and significance to the cluster of vital, social, cultural, and personal feeling-values. It transvalues value. It unifies being. “The power of God’s love” Lonergan writes, “brings forth a new energy and efficacy in all goodness, and the limit of human expectation

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84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., 37.
86 Ibid., 116.
87 I will use the term feeling-value to refer to Lonergan’s notion of “values apprehended in feeling.”
ceases to be the grave." Furthermore, "human development is not only in skills and virtues but also in holiness." For Lonergan, God’s love ‘poured forth in our hearts’ is an internal dynamism constitutive of human development.

Faith determines worldview and worldview brings progress or decline. Without faith, without the eye of love, the world cannot bear a good God. Faith recognizes man’s freedom in responding to God’s love and so makes man responsible to meet the challenges of human decline. Faith puts the human in a friendly universe, reveals ultimate significance in achievement, and strengthens undertakings with confidence. Decline disrupts culture with conflicting ideologies. It inflicts social, economic, and psychological determinism on human frailty. It multiplies the abuses and absurdities that breed resentment, hatred, anger, and violence. Religious faith liberates human reasonableness from ideological prisons and replaces human possessiveness and pride with self-sacrificing love, the “charity of the suffering servant.” Lonergan’s prognosis for subjectivity and social progress is being-in-love with God. Not only does it provide the absolute foundation for judgments of value and the fulfillment of conscious intentionality, it also has a critical social function by nurturing progress and reversing decline. In a worldview without faith, a worldview that sees the universe as hostile or indifferent, responsibility diminishes because a crippling indifference or rebellious anger become the primary feelings revealing corresponding value. Simply put, a subject that views the world as hostile or indifferent apprehends a very different value system because of qualitatively different feelings. While the conscious and intentional operations

89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 117.
are still transcendental, that is they still operate the same from subject to subject, they do so in an entirely different horizon yielding different values.

In this chapter I examined transcendental method. Historically, Kant had a significant impact on Roman Catholic theology. Partially in response to Kant, the Catholic Church renewed its commitment to the thought of Thomas Aquinas, and a movement called transcendental Thomism emerged. Next, I examined how Lonergan’s transcendental method is a pattern of conscious and intentional operations, both recurrent and related, yielding cumulative and progressive results. I then showed that conscious intentionality yields different levels of consciousness, the highest being the existential subject operating on the fourth level. I concluded by showing that being-in-love with God is the fulfillment of conscious intentionality on the fourth level and that faith is a constitutive element in human subjectivity. So far in my overall argument, I have covered two major elements of Lonergan’s thought: self-appropriation and transcendental method. Lonergan’s use of ‘horizon’ will be the focus of chapter three.
Chapter Three: Horizon in Lonergan’s Thought

Self-appropriation and the transcendental method are two vital elements of Lonergan’s thought. Self-appropriation is the stable basis for knowing and transcendental method identifies the levels of consciousness through intentionality analysis. To examine only these two elements of Lonergan’s thought would be misleading. It may appear that authentic subjectivity, following Lonergan’s precepts, is an unbounded, non-contextual self-transcendence. To the contrary, Lonergan is keenly aware of the historical nature of subjectivity: the subject is both constituted by and bounded by a wide variety of elements, some of which fail to be critically examined or understood let alone judged or chosen. To live as an authentic subject is also to know that one operates in a bounded world. To explain the bounded, contextual, and historical nature of subjectivity, Lonergan uses the term horizon:

"In its literal sense the word, horizon, denotes the bounding circle, the line at which earth and sky appear to meet. This line is the limit of one’s field of vision. As one moves about, it recedes in front and closes in behind so that, for different standpoints, there are different horizons."¹

Like the visual horizon determined by and determining one’s field of vision, so too is the subject bounded by a sphere of knowledge and interest. A subject lives in a world and has a horizon “in the measure that one is not locked up totally within oneself.”²

¹ Ibid., 235.
Since the subject *intends* self-transcendence by pursuing the transcendental notions, she is not totally "within herself," making the notion of horizon a logical and necessary consequent.

To continue with the visual metaphor, there are objects that lie beyond one's horizon which cannot be seen either for the time being or perhaps ever.¹ Beyond one's horizon are the objects about which one does not know or does not care. And so horizon functions both as a context and a boundary for subjectivity.

1. Functions of Horizon

Horizon provides a context for subjectivity in the personal, interpersonal, and social spheres of being. It determines and is determined by personhood, interpersonal relationship, and social interaction. I will explore each of these claims by proceeding in concentric circles outward from the subject herself.

A subject's horizon is a dynamic, moving target. It is neither fixed nor determined at any point, although some horizons remain more static in their development than others. The self develops over time, memories fade, new experience emerges. The self is a historical being with a past, a present, and hope for a future.² For Lonergan, "the self to be appropriated is a self that develops" and is "not some static essence."³

² For a concise view of Lonergan's notion of history, see Chapter 11 "Natural Right and Historical Mindedness" in Lonergan, *Third Collection* See also "The Transition From a Classicist World-View to Historical-Mindedness" and "The Future of Thomism" in Lonergan, *Second Collection*
³ Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, 225.
The transcendental notion of the good is closely linked to judgments of value and the apprehension of value given in feeling. And so feelings are a constitutive and vital component of subjectivity, operating in a "sphere of interest." The second important feature of horizon is that feelings are both determined by and a determining factor in one's horizon.

There are, of course, feelings that easily are aroused and easily pass away. There are too the feelings that have been snapped off by repression to lead thereafter an unhappy subterranean life. But there are in full consciousness feelings so deep and strong, especially when deliberately reinforced, that they channel attention, shape one's horizon, direct one's life. Here the supreme illustration is loving. 4

Modern neurology attests to the constitutive role of feelings. 5 Although Lonergan resists a wide variety of "determinisms," he sees that the emotional life, left unattended, can cause significant distortion in the apprehension of value. He uses Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Scheler to make his point:

As there is a development of feelings, so too there are aberrations. Perhaps the most notable is what has been named "resentment," a loan-word from the French that was introduced into philosophy by Friedrich Nietzsche and later in a revised form employed by Max Scheler. According to Scheler, resentment is a re-feeling of a specific clash with someone else's value-qualities. The someone else is one's superior physically or intellectually or morally or spiritually ... It is a feeling of hostility, anger, indignation that is neither repudiated nor directly expressed. What it attacks is the value-quality that the superior person possessed and the inferior not only lacked but also feels unequal to acquiring ... perhaps its worst feature is that its rejection of one value involves a distortion of the whole scale of values and that this distortion can spread through a whole social class, a whole people, a whole epoch. 6

Without rational self-appropriation the subject is vulnerable to significant distortion in the scale of values operating in the personal, interpersonal, and social levels of being.

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4 Lonergan, Method, 32.
5 The neurologist Antonio Damasio has done extensive research on the function of emotions. The following are three of his most popular works: Antonio R. Damasio, The feeling of what happens: body and emotion in the making of consciousness, 1st(Harcourt Brace, 1999, accessed); Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' error: emotion, reason, and the human brain (New York: Putnam, 1994); Antonio R. Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: joy, sorrow, and the feeling brain, 1st(Harcourt, 2003, accessed)
6 Lonergan, Method, 33.
Feelings are a constitutive component of subjectivity and are therefore constitutive of a subject's horizon.

In line with his general call for rational self-appropriation, Lonergan urges the subject to understand, judge, and choose the feelings that are experienced.

More generally, it is much better to take full cognizance of one's feelings, however deplorable they may be, than to brush them aside, overrule them, ignore them. To take cognizance of them makes it possible for one to know oneself, to uncover the inattention, obtuseness, silliness, irresponsibility that gave rise to the feeling one does not want, and to correct the aberrant attitude.\(^7\)

To ignore or dismiss feelings is to place them outside the realm of intentionality, which does not in any way mitigate their influence on subjectivity. It only forces them "underground" where they lurk, influencing subjectivity unintentionally and ultimately leading to alienation.

On the other hand, not to take cognizance of them is to leave them in the twilight of what is conscious but not objectified. In the long run there results a conflict between the self as conscious and, on the other hand, the self as objectified. This alienation from oneself leads to the adoption of misguided remedies, and they in their turn to still further mistakes until, in desperation, the neurotic turns to the analyst or counselor.\(^8\)

While the rational self-appropriation of feelings is essential to authentic subjectivity, it is not merely for the sake of self-mastery. Feelings reveal values and values shape one's sphere of interest. The rational self-appropriation of feelings is essential for self-transcendence.

Horizon is a sphere of knowledge and interest. Regarding insight, what a subject knows or doesn't know is determined by what questions a subject asks or what further questions a subject dismisses or ignores. The same is true for a subject's sphere of interest. Feeling-values are a constitutive element of horizon itself because they are

\(^7\)ibid., 34.
\(^8\)ibid.
intimately linked to interest. Furthermore, one’s horizon is shaped in part by an intentional response to feeling-value. Lonergan uses Dietrich von Hildebrand to distinguish between non-intentional states and trends and intentional responses. “States” such as fatigue, irritability, bad humor, and anxiety or “trends” such as hunger, thirst, and sexual discomfort are both examples of the non-intentional aspect of feelings. While states have causes and trends have goals, neither arises from perceiving, imagining, or representing the cause or goal. Intentional responses, on the other hand, respond to what is intended, apprehended, or represented. They relate us to an object. Without them, knowing and deciding would be “paper thin.” Because of feelings, we are oriented “massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning.” The world mediated by meaning is a world constructed over the years by the sum total of our conscious, intentional activities. Such a world is a matter not merely of details but also of basic options. Once such options are taken and built upon, they have to be maintained, or else one must go back, tear down, reconstruct... [a procedure] comparable to major surgery, and most of us grasp the knife gingerly and wield it clumsily.10

Both types of feelings, non-intentional states and intentional responses, are constitutive of horizon. However, intentional responses are more directly related to rational self-appropriation.

9Lonergan, Papers 14. Regarding feelings, Lonergan draws heavily from Dietrich von Hildebrand’s work, especially Christian Ethics (New York: David McKay, 1953). While the work is half a century old in a rapidly changing field, I find the distinction between non-intentional states from intentional responses very similar to Antonio Damasio’s distinction between feeling and emotion in the works listed in footnote 7 above. While there may be a number of significant qualifications distinguishing the two writers, I mention Damasio only to make the point that the discoveries in the last half century have clarified and affirmed much of von Hildebrand’s work. Lonergan is operating on a stable foundation insofar as feelings are concerned. Secondly, any new discoveries will only lend further insights and clarifications. Without attempting to confirm any of Lonergan’s claims regarding feelings, I am operating under the crude distinction between emotions that are largely beyond the subject’s direct control and feelings that are largely within the subject’s control.

10 Lonergan, Method, 221.
As intentional responses to objects, feelings respond to either (1) the agreeable or disagreeable, which Lonergan calls satisfactions or (2) to values: "the ontic value of persons and to the qualitative value of beauty, understanding, or truth, of noble deeds, of virtuous acts." In response to value, the subject moves toward self-transcendence. He does so by selecting an object for the sake of which he transcends himself. Feelings not only respond to values, but they do so in accord with a scale of preference. There are vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious values in ascending order. Religious love is the fulfillment of conscious intentionality. In this way, religious feeling-values sublate other values given in feeling.

Feelings operate in a developmental context. Like the development of skill "studied so painstakingly by Piaget," feelings also develop. While feelings are fundamentally spontaneous in that they are not under immediate or direct control as are motor functions, they may be reinforced or curtailed indirectly by advertence, approval, disapproval, or distraction. Through reinforcement and curtailment, some feelings are encouraged and others discouraged thereby modifying one's scale of preference:

... feelings are enriched and refined by attentive study of the wealth and variety of objects that arouse them, and so no small part of education lies in fostering and developing a climate of discernment and taste, of discriminating praise and carefully worded disapproval, that will conspire with the pupil's or student's own capacities and tendencies, enlarge and deepen his apprehension of values, and help him towards self-transcendence.

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11 Lonergan, Papers 14.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 15.
14 Ibid.
As Lonergan notes, development is also a process of formation, a fundamental insight of Jesuit education. No small part of rational self-appropriation involves the cultivation of feelings that are so intimately linked to value.

Lonergan’s notion of value is neither rationalistic nor voluntaristic: feelings are not merely selected, chosen, or “willed” into existence. Rather, they are “enriched,” “refined,” and “fostered.” Furthermore, Lonergan is concerned with the rational appropriation of feelings not merely for the sake of self-control or self-mastery but because feelings reveal values and values determine scales of preference. Concerned with the clash of social values, their clusters of related feelings, and the process of intentional appropriation, Lonergan does not operate under a model of achievement. Lonergan reveals a profound appreciation for the mysterious nature and “giftedness” of religious love.

A fourth important feature of the way horizon serves as a context for subjectivity is the impact of religious love on horizon. Religious love plays a crucial role in human subjectivity itself. While religious love is the fulfillment of conscious intentionality, it is not the product of knowledge or choice; it is not an achievement.

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16 Two phrases are helpful: first, what I call “the model of achievement” refers to Lonergan’s notion of development from below upward. With this term, I hope to emphasize the intentional development of subjects as a result of their own capability. Second, I will occasionally use “the model of gift” to refer to Lonergan’s notion of development from above downward. With this term, I intend to highlight a contrasting model of development that is not the result of a subject’s doing or achieving but rather to conditions that are beyond the subject’s control. In broad terms, religious experience falls under the model of gift while education tends to fall under the model of achievement. I will explain both types of development further below.

On the contrary, it dismantles and abolishes the horizon in which our knowing and choosing went on and it sets up a new horizon in which the love of God will transvalue our values and the eyes of that love will transform our knowing. Though not the product of our knowing and choosing, it is a conscious dynamic state of love, joy, peace, that manifests itself in acts of kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control.\textsuperscript{18}

When it comes to the religious terminology Lonergan employs, he is highly nuanced. There are a few important things to note. First, religious values involve intentional response. Second, religious values function like values in general: they are apprehended in feeling, create a scale of preference, and operate in a developmental context. However, Lonergan also claims that love of God is a conscious dynamic state. Assuming it functions like other states he mentions such as fatigue, irritability, bad humor, and anxiety, it is non-intentional, yet causal. He does not call religious love a trend, which would make it an unintentional dynamism seeking a goal. As a dynamic state, I understand Lonergan to mean that religious love is not static but constantly changing, growing, moving, evolving. As a conscious state, Lonergan means that it pertains only to experience, whether that experience becomes known, which is a compound of experience, understanding, and judging, is not necessarily the case.\textsuperscript{19} The conscious dynamic state of religious love may become knowledge or it may remain strictly on the level of experience. Curiously, love of God is both conscious and dynamic, but as a state it is not intentional or at least not directly so. From this phrase itself, it is fair to conclude that religious love is not the product of choice, since one cannot choose one’s states. But, religious love becomes knowledge in the same way other states become knowledge:

\textsuperscript{18} Lonergan, Method 106 [italics added].
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 106.
through understanding and judging. Lonergan makes a significant distinction between religious values and religious love.

There are two implications of Lonergan’s claim: (1) religious values are atop the hierarchy of values as *intentional responses* and (2) religious love is a *conscious dynamic state*. If Lonergan did not make this important distinction, his readers might be justified in believing that Lonergan only sees development “from below upwards” in the model of achievement. With this distinction in mind, however, it is clear that Lonergan also sees development “from above downwards” in the model of gift. “Openness” must necessarily operate in the cluster of religious terms, an essential category for religious conversion.

The human person for Lonergan is a deeply religious being. He would agree with Karen Armstrong that *homo sapiens* is more likely *homo religiosus*. In Lonergan’s words,

> the question of God, then, lies within man’s horizon. Man's transcendental subjectivity is mutilated or abolished, unless he is stretching forth towards the intelligible, the unconditioned, the good of value. The reach, not of his attainment, but of his intending is unrestricted. There lies within his horizon a region for the divine, a shrine for ultimate holiness. It cannot be ignored.

In the personal realm, horizon is shaped by feelings, values, and religious love operating in a developmental context. Simply put, horizon is a complex aggregate of knowledge and interest.

While horizon is shaped to a large extent by personal elements, it also operates in an interpersonal context, which is also highly influential. Lonergan exhibits a profound appreciation for the interpersonal:

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encounter is more. It is meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing one's living to be challenged at its very roots by their words and by their deeds. Moreover, such an encounter is not just an optional addition to interpretation and to history. Interpretation depends on one's self-understanding; the history one writes depends on one's horizon; and encounter is the one way in which self-understanding and horizon can be put to the test.22

Horizon is deeply and profoundly impacted through encounter with the other. Self-appropriation takes place in a horizon that necessarily involves the other. One's insights, one's judgments, one's decisions, and one's self-understanding must always be 'put to the test' through a continual process of submitting one's insights to others and receiving their potential objections. One's horizon is profoundly shaped by interpersonal encounter with the other. Horizon is by no means a solipsistic entity.

Furthermore, horizon is also constituted by the social milieu it inhabits. One's culture exerts a tremendous influence on one's subjectivity. To prove this claim, I turn to Lonergan’s treatment of hermeneutics as a division of the functional specialties in theology. He makes this point directly, so it is worth quoting at length:

This is the existential dimension of the problem of hermeneutics. It lies at the very root of the perennial divisions of mankind in their views on reality, morality, and religion ... From this existential dimension there follows another basic component in the task of hermeneutics. The classics ground a tradition. They create the milieu in which they are studied and interpreted. They produce in the reader through the cultural tradition the mentality ... from which they will be read, studied, interpreted. Now such a tradition may be genuine, authentic, a long accumulation of insights, adjustments, re-interpretations, that repeats the original message afresh for each age ... On the other hand, the tradition may be unauthentic. It may consist in a watering-down of the original message, in recasting it into terms and meanings that fit into the assumptions and convictions of those that have dodged the issue of radical conversion. In that case a genuine interpretation will be met with incredulity and ridicule, as was St. Paul when he preached in Rome and was led to quote Isaiah: "Go to this people and say: you will hear and hear but never understand; you will look and look, but never see" (Acts 28,26).23

22 Ibid., 247.
23 Ibid., 162 [italics added].
Note Lonergan's reference to milieu and cultural tradition. Both shape the reader and the reader's interpretation of a text. Just as one's own subjectivity can operate under the pull of self-transcendence or resist it, so too can one's social milieu. Many of the disagreements between historians are not fuelled by differing opinions about historical data but rather by the latent preconceptions the historian accumulates over time within a "climate of opinion":

historians have their preconceptions, if not about what must have happened, at least about what could not have happened. Such preconceptions are derived, not from the study of history, but from the climate of opinion in which the historian lives and from which he inadvertently acquires certain fixed convictions about the nature of man and of the world.\(^{24}\)

Just as the historian operates with the preconceptions accumulated over time within a climate of opinion, so too does the subject in more generalized terms. And so horizon functions as a social context for subjectivity. Subjectivity is intimately linked to culture.

Another important feature of horizon is the way it functions as a boundary, not just a context. It is constituted by both perspectival and temporal limitations in the same way the visual metaphor is bounded by standpoint.

As our field of vision, so too the scope of our knowledge, and the range of our interests are bounded. As fields of vision vary with one's standpoint, so too the scope of one's knowledge and the range of one's interests vary with the period in which one lives, one's social background and milieu, one's education and personal development. So there has arisen a metaphorical or perhaps analogous meaning of the word, horizon. In this sense what lies beyond one's horizon is simply outside the range of one's knowledge and interests: one neither knows nor cares. But what lies within one's horizon is in some measure, great or small, an object of interest and of knowledge.\(^{25}\)

In the visual metaphor, horizon is indelibly limited by one's standpoint, even though one's standpoint is not necessarily static.

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\(^{24}\) Ibid., 221.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 236.
I will use two examples from my own experience to illustrate Lonergan's point. About six months ago I bought a copy of Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*. I have heard a few of my peers make reference to the grand inquisitor scene, which sounds by their account something relevant to my interests. And so I bought the book but have yet to read it. Rare are the times when dissertation writers are able to read something not directly connected to their work. I still want to read it and look forward to the time, post-dissertation, when I can. And so it sits on my shelf in my "field of vision" and in my sphere of interest placed there intentionally. At this point in time, however, I have to rely on what I have heard of *The Brothers Karamazov* and have to yet to experience it directly myself. In this way, I consider it to exist on the edge of my horizon because I know about it and am interested in it enough to have it on my bookshelf. I have not yet read it because my other commitments and interests are more pressing *at the moment*. However, I fully intend to read it. While my horizon is a limited one, in this case, it is limited more by time than necessarily by degree of interest. I have *yet* to read it.

There are also things beyond my horizon that will most likely never enter directly into it. I lived in Tokyo, Japan for a year as an English teacher. For the first few months I lived there I had yet to clearly identify my purpose for being there, other than as a stop-over on my way home from a year in Pohnpei, Micronesia. I soon realized there was too much to do in the short hours of the day and in the short year I intended to stay. I remember distinctly deciding one week that I was there to save money for graduate school the following year. Having made this "existential" decision, I opted not to pursue formal study of the Japanese language but rather to spend my limited hours teaching English. I did learn enough spoken Japanese to function in Tokyo and picked up a few
characters of Katakana, Hiragana, and Kanji on the exit signs of the subway, the menu at McDonald’s, and some random leaflets. I even learned how to spell my name in Katakana. However, reading an original Japanese text was and is well beyond my capacity. I suspect it will always remain so not because of any malignant distaste for Japanese literature or some careless dismissal of Japanese culture, but simply because I can only do so much in a day, a week, a month, a year, a lifetime. The grand inquisitor scene beckons. While my horizon is expanding, it is an intentionally limited expansion bounded by interest, even though the limitation is neither an expression of disinterest or neglect. The ability to read Hiragana, Katakana, and Kanji currently lies outside my sphere of knowledge and interest and will most likely remain there. My interests lie elsewhere.

Both examples show that my horizon is bounded by my standpoint, my perspective as a doctoral student writing a dissertation in Christian Ethics. Beyond the immediate limitations of my current standpoint there are also potential future limitations determined by an “existential” standpoint. These perspectival limitations, however, are not necessarily the result of a bias or scotoma. They merely attest to the concrete reality that one can only do so much in a lifetime. However, perspectival boundaries can also be the product of bias or scotoma. To continue with my example, I may prefer The Brothers Karamazov over a Japanese text because of some deeply embedded but unknown preference for Occidental culture, some operative-but-unknown xenophobia, or perhaps even an intentionally racist bent. I consider the former case a benign limitation while the latter a malignant one. The limitations of horizon may or may not be the product of bias.
The bounded nature of horizon also has a temporal dimension. Horizons expand only insofar as they do so cumulatively and progressively, depending heavily on past achievement. They are the “structured resultant of past achievement and, as well, both the condition and the limitation of further development.”26 As structured, learning is an organic growth outlining, clarifying, amplifying, qualifying, and explaining new items of knowledge and new factors in one’s attitude. Horizons are the “sweep of our interests and of our knowledge … the fertile source of further knowledge and care” and function as a conditional boundary “for assimilating more than we already have attained.”27 Horizons are deeply indebted to past interest and achievement, while also functioning as a condition of future possibility. Horizons, then, are bounded not only by perspective but also by time, intentionally or unintentionally, in benign or malignant ways. Understanding and mediating the cause of difference between horizons is a crucial component for ethics. Horizontal difference emerges from concrete limitations, both by perspective and by time, that are a usual part of subjectivity. It is the horizontal difference caused by malignant limitations such as bias that is of particular interest to the ethicist.

2. Differences in Horizons

Horizons relate to each other in one of three ways: complementarily, genetically, or dialectically. Of primary concern for ethics is the dialectic relationship of horizons caused by a malignant limitation of horizon. Before I get to the dialectic relationship,

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26 Ibid., 237.
27 Ibid.
however, it is important to note the complementary and genetic relationship of horizons, which tend to be benign.

Different people have different spheres of knowledge and interest and different abilities. While I may have a deep desire to play professional football for the Chicago Bears, a wise mentor from my past used to tell me that my “talents lie elsewhere.” This fact is obvious. However, humans are more than their abilities. “Workers, foremen, supervisors, technicians, engineers, managers, doctors, lawyers, professors have different interests” and therefore “live in a sense in different worlds.” In this way, the difference in horizons is intentional but in a benign and necessary way. Such is the division of labor model of complex civilization. The term “interdependence” is a helpful way of describing the complementary relationship of horizons.

In a developmental sense, one horizon emerges genetically from a prior stage. And so,

[horizons] are related as successive stages in some process of development. Each later stage presupposes earlier stages, partly to include them, and partly to transform them. Precisely because the stages are earlier and later, no two are simultaneous. They are parts, not of a single communal world, but of a single biography or of a single history.

Lonergan borrowed from Jean Piaget by using assimilation and adjustment to describe the "ever greater multiplication of different combinations of differentiated operations."

\[28\] ibid., 236.  
\[29\] ibid.  
\[30\] ibid.
Lonergan uses child development to show how “the baby gradually develops oral, visual, manual, bodily skills, and he increasingly combines them in every varying manners.”\(^{31}\)

He uses the educational development from basic computational mathematics to algebra and beyond as another example of the genetic relationship.\(^{32}\) Piaget's categories of assimilation, adjustment, and development of skill help us understand what Lonergan means by the genetic relationship of horizons.\(^{33}\) Simply put, the genetic relationship of horizons is best understood in terms of development.

The third way horizons relate to each other is of particular interest to any investigation of ethics. Dialectic deals with conflict. Without it, lawyers, judges, and ethicists would be out of work; their jobs would become obsolete. But the high demand for all three in today’s world attests to the prevalence of dialectic. Lonergan sees dialectic as so important to the field of theology that he devotes a chapter of Method to it as an entirely separate functional specialty within the field of theology itself. The conflicts emerging from dialectic can be overt or latent, and can lie in a variety of sources.\(^{34}\)

When horizons are opposed dialectically, they are virtually incompatible since resolution is only possible through conversion.

What in one is found intelligible, in another is unintelligible. What for one is true, for another is false. What for one is good, for another is evil. Each may have some awareness of the other and so each in a manner may include the other. But such inclusion is also negation and rejection. For the other's horizon, at least in part, is attributed to wishful thinking, to an acceptance of myth, to ignorance or fallacy, to blindness or illusion, to backwardness or immaturity, to infidelity, to bad will, to a refusal of God's grace. Such a

\(^{31}\) Ibid., 27.

\(^{32}\) See the section titled “higher viewpoints” in Lonergan, Insight cw3, 37 – 43.

\(^{33}\) for a brief survey of Piaget’s thought see chapter 2 “A Conceptual Introduction to Kohlberg” in Joseph Reimer, Diana Pritchard Paolitto, and Richard H. Hersh, Promoting Moral Growth: from Piaget to Kohlberg, 2nd ed. (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1990)

\(^{34}\) Lonergan, Method, 235. Lonergan lists religious sources, religious tradition, the pronouncements of authority, or theological writings themselves as sources of potential conflict for theologians.
rejection of the other may be passionate, and then the suggestion that openness is
desirable will make one furious. But again rejection may have the firmness of ice without
any trace or passion or even any show of feeling, except perhaps a wan smile.\textsuperscript{35}

Dialectic involves more than a disagreement operating on the level of understanding. It
impacts many, if not all, of the operations of subjectivity. There are conflicts in
judgments of value stemming from differences in the scale of preference regarding
feeling-values. Furthermore, conflict may also arise from the implicit or explicit
affirmation or denial of feeling-values through repression or curtailment. For Lonergan,
much of the apprehension of feeling-values is determined by the existential subject
herself:

Now the apprehension of values and disvalues is the task not of understanding but of
intentional response. Such response is all the fuller, all the more discriminating, the better
a man one is, the more refined one's sensibility, the more delicate one's feelings. So
evaluative interpretation pertains to a speciality, not on the end of the second level of
intentional consciousness, but on the end of the fourth level.\textsuperscript{36}

The conflict of feeling-values also involves a difference in the capacity to apprehend
feeling-values. Adding more data to the interpretive process of history will not resolve
the gross differences between historians who assign relative weight to the data itself.
Such gross differences are not merely perspectival since they emerge from opposed or
even hostile classes of historians and not from the "individuality of the historian." The
first task of dialectic is to add an interpretive appreciation to an interpretive
understanding: "it [dialectic] has to add to the history that grasps what was going forward
a history that evaluates achievements, that discerns good and evil."\textsuperscript{37} A common

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 237.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 245-246.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 246.
standpoint among historian makes univocal results possible; however, gross differences in standpoint require "nothing less than a conversion." 38

The source of dialectically opposed horizons is the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, or religious conversion. Although complementary or genetic differences can be overcome or worked through, dialectical differences are virtually impossible to reconcile. Both sides engage in mutual repudiation and each side employs a philosophy or a method that buttresses "what are considered appropriation views on the intelligent, the reasonable, the responsible." 39

Dialectic makes the genuine dialogue that was once possible increasingly unlikely, if not virtually impossible. The opposition grows creating gross differences in value judgments, in accounts of historical movements, in interpretations of authors, in different selections of data for special research. With the advent of sophistication, dialectic opposition generates opposing philosophies, theologies, and methods to justify and defend various horizons. If these differing philosophies, theologies, methods, or worldviews have normative functions, they form differing clusters of feeling-values. Dialectic makes agreement virtually impossible.

Fortunately, Lonergan identifies a structure for dialectic. Since progress does occur there must necessarily be a means for handling the phenomenon. Structurally, Lonergan finds two levels of dialectic: an upper level of operators and a lower level of assemblies. The operators consist of two precepts: "develop positions; reverse counter-

38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 247.
positions.\textsuperscript{40} While positions are statements compatible with the three conversions (intellectual, moral, religious), counter-positions are incompatible. Positions are developed by successfully integrating new data, new insights, new discoveries. Here, it might be helpful to remember Lonergan’s earlier reference to Piaget: the organism both adapts to and assimilates new stimuli. Positions result from a self-transcending subject who has given herself freely to noetic striving. Counter-positions, on the other hand, must be reversed by removing the elements incompatible with the three conversions.

Within the functional specialty of dialectic, the successful theologian will explore human authenticity and appeal to it. Doing so is a powerful tool for the theologian because “man’s deepest need and most prized achievement is authenticity.”\textsuperscript{41} In order to appeal to human authenticity, a fuller, more accurate, and more differentiated horizon leads to more explanatory talk. And so there is a need for differentiation in consciousness, within which there are four realms of meaning: common sense, which operates in everyday or ordinary language; theory, which operates in technical and simple, object-referential language; interiority, which operates under experientially verifiable criteria; and transcendence, which relates the subject to divinity “in the language of prayer and of prayerful silence.” A fully differentiated consciousness is “the fruit of an extremely prolonged development.”\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 249.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 254.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 257. I have concentrated on language to highlight the four realms of meaning here. Regarding the realm of theory, the direct quote reads “simply objective in reference, and so refers to the subject and his operations only as objects.” I have used the term simple, ‘object-referential language’ for sake of brevity. Regarding the realm of interiority, I have used the term ‘experientially verifiable criteria’ to summarize “[t]here is the realm of interiority where language speaks indeed of the subject and his operations as objects, but, none the less, rests upon a self-appropriation that has verified in personal experience the
Resolving dialectic may be improbable or perhaps even virtually impossible at any given time. It may be improbable because of its infrequent occurrence. In other words, the path of dialectic is common and well-worn, while the road to its resolution is narrow. That the resolution of dialectic is virtually impossible means that the conditions for its possibility have yet to be fulfilled. But Lonergan is by no means a pessimist. He clearly offers a viable prognosis: authentic subjectivity achieved through rational self-appropriation leading to self-transcendence. Transcendence, as a distinctly differentiated realm of conscious intentionality, is fulfilled by religious love. The most significant dynamism for authenticity comes from the realm of religious experience, where “the gift of God’s love, spontaneously reveals itself in love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control.”43

A subject’s horizon is not static. To view the genetic, complementary, or dialectic relationship of horizons as a permanent diagnosis would fossilize relationship and therefore be extremely misleading. A horizon is a moving target; it involves change over time. Horizons are dynamic: therefore, understanding the way horizons change is of great importance.

3. Changes in Horizon

One’s horizon changes over time, but it does so in spurts and sputters. It may change as a result of one’s decisions, which will be the focus of “liberty” below, or it may change one’s way of being, which will be the focus of “conversion” below. To

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43 Ibid., 266.
understand changes in one’s horizon over time, it will be useful to examine the obstacles that prevent self-transcendence, all of which fall under the broader category of bias.

Bias for Lonergan is not a neutral term but a pejorative one. It does not connote the benign attractions or preferences one exhibits in small daily choices. It is not a bias towards one object or action over another. Conversely, a bias is a malignant breakdown or distortion preventing authenticity. All are subject to bias. It infects the conscious and intentional operations of human subjectivity from the unconscious to the conscious, from the neural to the religious. Bias, as a general term, includes a variety of more specific elements: intellectual bias, scotosis, egoism, the bias of common sense, and group bias.

Bias can infect intellectual operations. *Insight* shows its readers that to know anything, one must ask questions. They are a condition for the possibility of human understanding. Questions reveal noetic striving. But insight can also be unwanted. Its light can be eclipsed by a love of darkness:

If prepossessions and prejudices notoriously vitiate theoretical investigations, much more easily can elementary passions bias understanding in practical and personal matters. Nor has such a bias merely some single and isolated effect. To exclude an insight is also to exclude the further questions that would arise from it, and the complementary insights that would carry it towards a rounded and balanced viewpoint.44

Essentially, to exclude insight is to prefer the “inner drama of fantasy” over the “outer drama of human living.” The authentic subject is self-transcending. Intellectual bias prevents the free exercise of noetic striving, until

...finally, the incomprehension, isolation, and duality rob the development of one's common sense of some part, greater or less, of the corrections and the assurance that result from learning accurately the tested insight of others and from submitting one’s own insights to the criticism based on others' experience and development.45

Self-transcendence necessarily involves the submission of one’s insights to the wisdom of others. To fail to do so is to live an unauthentic life isolated from the sometimes painful drama of human living. No small part of insight involves the open-minded acceptance of the corrections and challenges of others. For now, my major point is that intellectual bias is best understood as a closing off, a movement toward solipsism.

Lonergan uses two important terms to convey the internal function of bias within human subjectivity: *scotosis* and *scotoma*. The former is “an aberration of understanding” while the latter denotes the resulting “blindspots,” to return to the visual metaphor. Scotosis is an unconscious process arising from the censorship governing the emergence of psychic contents. It is an inadvertent, uncritical dismissal of insights because of an emotional reaction of “distaste, pride, dread, horror, revulsion.” Scotosis can remain fundamentally unconscious, generating a fog of obscurity, bewilderment, suspicion, doubt, insecurity. Scotosis does not only impact the mind, but is also rooted in feeling through repression and inhibition. Unlike the way noetic striving can bring forth schematic images that give rise to insight, the dismissal of noetic striving represses from consciousness potentially fruitful schemes for insight itself.\(^{46}\)

Lonergan gives significant attention to the insights of depth psychology, showing deep appreciation for the intimate connection between feeling and intellectual operations. Bias penetrates deep into human subjectivity and is thus not easily identified, “diagnosed,” or corrected. To err is human.

Beyond depth psychology, bias also infects consciousness in its higher levels. When intelligence does not develop completely, *egoism* emerges. While it does transcend

\(^{46}\) Ibid., 215-217.
a merely inherited mentality and “strikes out” thinking for itself, it fails to embrace the
“self-abnegation” necessary for the free reign of intelligent inquiry. Egoism’s inquiry is
driven by spontaneous desires and fears and not the slow, deliberate muddling of noetic
striving.⁴⁷ The bias of egoism does not make human subjectivity any less “human.” The
egoist still employs the basic operations of subjectivity; however, the results of the
egoist’s normative pattern of recurrent and related operations are neither cumulative nor
progressive.

Beyond egoism, the bias of common sense is one of Lonergan’s most poignant
diagnoses for contemporary culture. Although the bias of common sense reveals an acute
familiarity in the particular and concrete, it errs in considering itself omnicompetent. Like
the other forms of bias, the bias of common sense intentionally closes itself off to the
drama and struggle of intellectual development. It does not aspire to reach the abstract or
universal laws prevalent in the realm of theory. It is mired in the concrete and particular
and too easily dismisses other forms of human knowledge. It does not seek to resolve the
contradictory insights of others, but dismisses them. Specialists are especially susceptible
to the bias of common sense because they frequently dismiss the insight of others. The
most devastating impact of the bias of common sense is the disregard of larger issues and
indifference to long-term results and long-term development. The path of intellectual
development is narrow and difficult:

   To err is human, and common sense is very human ... men are rational animals, but a full
development of their animality is both more common and more rapid than a full
development of their intelligence and reasonableness ... The lag of intellectual

⁴⁷ Ibid., 245-246.
development, its difficulty, and its apparently meager returns to bear in an especial manner on common sense.\textsuperscript{48}

Self-transcendence involves a successful navigation of the different levels of consciousness and intentionality. The bias of common sense is one of the many ways that subjectivity is closed off to rational self-appropriation and ultimately to self-transcendence.

The personal usually becomes social and so the bias of egoism and common sense all too easily become a \textit{group bias} with its own history and normative capacity. It rests on the interference with the development of practical common sense. Bias and counter-positions can grow and multiply to the same degree as insights and positions. Human subjectivity is formed to a large extent by culture, which can be authentic or unauthentic just like individuals. History includes progress as well as decline. Religious communities are also susceptible to group bias and so “there is always a great need to eye very critically any religious individual or group and to discern beyond the real charity they may well have been granted the various types of bias that may distort or block their exercise of it.”\textsuperscript{49} All are subject to bias and all are vulnerable to decline.

While bias is of vital concern to Lonergan and ethicists, it is not the total picture. Humans are by no means depraved, in Lonergan’s eyes, and have both the capacity and responsibility to decide for themselves what they are to make of themselves. Liberty is an essential part of human subjectivity.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 251.
\textsuperscript{49} Lonergan, \textit{Method}, 284.
The freedom of the subject is by no means absolute; therefore, Lonergan distinguishes between essential and effective freedom. The essential freedom of the will denotes the subject’s capacity of determination, revealed in the very structure of knowing in practical fields. It is manifest on the fourth level of conscious intentionality when the subject chooses a course of action. It attests to the lived experience of self-determination. But self-determination is not absolute. One is still bounded in spatio-temporal and historical contexts. One still has a horizon. Effective freedom denotes the contextual nature of one’s choosing.  

Lonergan borrows two terms from Joseph de Finance to further clarify his distinction between essential and effective freedom: horizontal and vertical exercises of freedom. The horizontal exercise of freedom is a decision occurring within an established horizon. A vertical exercise, to the contrary, denotes the movement from one horizon to another, which may be genetic or dialectic. Genetically, one horizon develops out of the potentialities of the previous one it sublated. Dialectically, one horizon may be an about face, a repudiation of previous characteristic features. The about-face change from one horizon to another is what Lonergan means by the term conversion.

Liberty, for Lonergan, is self-determination. The subject terminates the process of deliberation by settling on a possible course of action and executing it. The subject cannot exist in a state of indeterminism, even though he may be temporarily paralyzed by the muddling of deliberation. As one mountaineer recalls from his near-death catastrophe, “you can’t ever stop making decisions, whether they are right or wrong you still have to

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50 Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, 284.
make them ... to stop making decisions is to die."51 Even though Lonergan’s notion of liberty is a bounded and contextual form of self-determination, it is in direct contrast to all forms of determinism.

The telos of liberty is not merely self-determination for its own sake but for authenticity achieved through self-transcendence. When the self opts for the true good, as opposed to the apparent good, the self achieves moral self-transcendence by choosing in response to feeling-value. Conversely, when one decides and chooses in response to a calculus of pleasure and pain, one fails in self-transcendence, in authenticity. In this way, the power of liberty, the power of self-determination is essential for authenticity and therefore self-transcendence. One may choose to live “locked up in oneself” as an exercise of liberty, but in doing so one is choosing to live an unauthentic life. Man attains authenticity in self-transcendence, which is constituted by the transcendental notions.

What is the true good and how is it determined? To answer this question, Lonergan follows Aristotle’s lead.52 The true good, the objective value, is “what is judged to be good by a person achieving self-transcendence, being authentic” and the “merely apparent good is what is judged to be good by a person failing to transcend himself.”53 The true good is not some static, timeless set of values, but the judgment of a person achieving self-transcendence. Lonergan himself admits that his position with regard to liberty “parallels that of the existentialists, inasmuch as it can conceive man’s mere existing as his capacity for existing authentically or unauthentically” but differs

52 In book three of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle uses the actions of a courageous man on a battlefield to define courage. In a similar way, Lonergan defines the true good as that which is judged to be good by an authentic subject.
53 Lonergan, Papers, 12.
significantly in that "it discerns in self-transcendence both genuine subjectivity and the principle of genuine objectivity ... of intentional self-transcendence, to which existentialists have failed to advert."\textsuperscript{54}

The capacity for self-transcendence becomes an actuality when one falls in love. Being-in-love with God is the basic fulfillment of conscious intentionality, but is not the product of knowing and choosing. It is a conscious dynamic state of love, joy, and peace that manifests itself in acts of kindness, goodness, fidelity, gentleness, and self-control.

By deduction I have proceeded from liberty to the true good, from the true good to authenticity, from authenticity to self-transcendence, from self-transcendence to being-in-love, and from being-in-love to being-in-love with God as the origin of feeling-value. In Lonergan's words:

[being-in-love with God] is conscious on the fourth level of intentional consciousness ... the type of consciousness that deliberates, makes judgments of value, decides, acts responsibly and freely. But it is this consciousness as brought to a fulfillment, as having undergone a conversion, as possessing a basis that may be broadened and deepened and heightened and enriched but not superseded, as ready to deliberate and judge and decide and act with the easy freedom of those that do all good because they are in love. So the gift of God's love occupies the ground and root of the fourth and highest level of man's intentional consciousness. It takes over the peak of the soul, the \textit{apex animae}.\textsuperscript{55}

In order for religious love to become the normative source of feeling-value, operating as the \textit{apex animae}, religious emancipation becomes the key concern. For Lonergan, religious emancipation involves a threefold conversion.

Emancipation is rooted in a self-transcendence that includes intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.\textsuperscript{56} Briefly, intellectual conversion draws a distinction between

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{55} Lonergan, \textit{Method}, 105-107.
\textsuperscript{56} Lonergan uses the term 'religious' in \textit{Method} (e.g., p. 238), but 'affective' in 3rd collection (e.g., p. 179). I will use the terms 'affective conversion' and 'religious conversion' interchangeably, but prefer the latter.
the world of immediacy and the world mediated by meaning; moral conversion distinguishes between satisfactions and values; affective conversion commits to love in the home, loyalty in the community, and faith in the destiny of humankind. While the three conversions are interrelated, each one is different and should be considered in itself before its relation to the others.

Intellectual conversion is the elimination of the cognitional myth. Concerning reality, objectivity, and human knowledge, the cognitional myth is that knowing is like looking, that reality is "already out there now real," and that objectivity is "seeing all there is to be seen and not seeing what is not there." The critical realist eliminates this myth by distinguishing the world of immediacy from the world mediated by meaning and showing that the process of experiencing, understanding, and judging is actually a process of self-transcendence. Intellectual conversion is attained through rational self-appropriation, as Insight so laboriously proves.

Moral conversion changes the criteria for decision-making from satisfactions to values. In the process of human development, the subject's responses to human values

It is important to note that 'affective conversion' is a much more generalized term and occurs earlier in Lonergan's writing. It develops into 'religious conversion' in Method. Logically, affective conversion involves being-in-love in general terms and religious conversion involves being-in-love with God specifically, which is the apex animae of the soul. Therefore, it is fair to claim that 'religious conversion' at the very least sublates 'affective conversion' if they must be distinguished. To use the term affective and not religious might indicate that there is a fourth type of conversion if not a fifth or sixth and so on. In my opinion, Lonergan's use of affective and then religious indicates a development in his thought becoming more explicitly religious in orientation as is the case in Method when compared to Insight. While Lonergan scholars disagree as to the actual number of conversions, it is fair to conclude that Lonergan explicitly mentions only three and that the term 'religious' includes both affective and religious. For a deeper analysis of conversion see Bernard Tyrrell's "Affectional Conversion: A Distinct Conversion or Potential Differentiation in the Spheres of Sensitive Psychic and / or Affective Conversion" in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 14(1996); Joseph A. Komenchak's "Notes on Conversion and Objectivity" in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 14(1996); William Mathews' "A Biographical Perspective On Conversion and the Functional Specialties in Lonergan" in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 16(1998); and Bernard Tyrrell's "Passages and Conversions" in Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S.J. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1981).

57 Lonergan, Method, 239.
are strengthened and refined until the subject attains the existential moment. By
discovering that choosing is as determinative as the chosen, the subject makes an exercise
of freedom opting for the truly good and for value when value and satisfaction conflict.
Moral perfection, however, is something different since deciding and doing are two very
different things. Moral conversion is the process of uncovering and rooting out biases by
carefully scrutinizing one’s intentional responses to feeling-value and one’s implicit scale
of preference. In order to do so, one must listen attentively to the criticism of others while
protesting responsibly when appropriate.

Development occurs in two directions: from below upwards and from above
downwards. The former describes the genetic development of one’s horizon. One’s
mastery of basic mathematics can lead to a more complicated mastery of algebra and to
an even more complicated proficiency in the realm of calculus and so on up the
mathematical food chain. At each level, the skills are retained while new ones are added.
Subjectivity, in this way, develops in a cumulative and progressive fashion, so long as
bias does not impede the process. However, there is also development from above
downwards, the transformation of falling in love:

the domestic love of the family; the human love of one’s tribe, one’s city, one’s country,
mankind; the divine love that orientates man in his cosmos and expresses itself in his
worship. Where hatred only sees evil, love reveals values. At once it commands
commitment and joyfully carries it out, no matter what the sacrifice involved. Where
hatred reinforces bias, love dissolves it, whether it be the bias of unconscious motivation,
the bias of individual or group egoism, or the bias of omnicompetent, short-sighted
common sense. Where hatred plods around in ever narrower vicious circles, love breaks
the bonds of psychological and social determinisms with the conviction of faith and the
power of hope. 58

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Religious conversion is development from above downward. Unlike development from below upwards, it is not the product of knowing or choosing. It is not an achievement, but a gift.

Religious conversion is “being grasped by ultimate concern.” Other-worldly falling in love is a total and permanent self-surrender without conditions, reservations, or qualifications. It is not an act but a dynamic state prior to subsequent acts. Revealed in retrospect, other-worldly falling in love manifests itself in an increasing simplicity and passivity in prayer and is interpreted differently in different religious traditions. For Christians, it is God’s love flooding our hearts through the Holy Spirit. Like the other two conversions, religious conversion is a modality of self-transcendence because the total being-in-love is the efficacious ground of all self-transcendence in the pursuit of truth, the realization of human values, or in the orientation man adopts to the universe, its ground and goal.59

Since all three conversions have to do with self-transcendence, it is possible to conceive of their relations in terms of sublation. Religious conversion sublates the moral. While questions reveal the eros of the human spirit and its desire for self-transcendence, that capacity is fulfilled when religious conversion transforms the existential subject into a being-in-love, a subject “held, grasped, possessed, owned through a total and other-worldly love.”60 When religious conversion occurs there is a new basis for all valuing

59 Lonergan, *Method*, 241. At this point, I would like to clearly define what I do not mean by the term religious conversion. I am using the term to describe the dynamic change in horizon resulting from being-in-love with God. I am not using the term in the more common context describing the process of joining or leaving any particular religion. Religious conversion, as I will use the term, does not mean the transition from one religion, or lack thereof, to another. I am concerned with the term, philosophically, as Lonergan uses it.
60 Ibid., 242.
and all doing good, but in such a way that the fruits of intellectual and moral conversion are sublated and not destroyed or negated. The human pursuit of the true and the good is aided by a cosmic context and purpose that enables the subject to accept the suffering involved in undoing the process of decline. While holiness abounds in the truth and in moral goodness, it has its own distinct dimension. In Christian experience, it is the fruit of being-in-love with a mysterious and uncomprehended God.

Although religious conversion sublates the moral and the moral the intellectual, it does not mean that the religious precedes the moral or the moral precedes the intellectual. Causally, the gift of God’s love reveals values in their splendor, while the strength of this love brings about their realization. Development occurs from below upward and from above downward. The transcendental method supplies the basic anthropological component, but it does not supply the specifically religious component.⁶¹

Lonergan’s transcendental method supplies a necessary and fruitful *anthropological* component for understanding human subjectivity in the empirical, intellectual, rational, and responsible realms of meaning. Through intentionality analysis, Lonergan unfolds a compelling account of conscious intentionality operating on four distinct levels. However, Lonergan himself admits that while transcendental method supplies a necessary anthropological component, it does not supply a specifically *religious* component. Throughout *Method in Theology*, he consistently points to the presence of and need for religious conversion. Since religious conversion sublates the other two, and since conversion is the only way to resolve dialectic, it becomes a pivotal concern for formal existential ethics.

⁶¹ Ibid., 25.
Lonergan was profoundly influenced by his Ignatian heritage, much of which operates implicitly in his thought. Most directly, Lonergan’s description of being-in-love with God “corresponds to St. Ignatius Loyola’s consolation that has no cause, as expounded by Karl Rahner.”62 Since Rahner believes that ethics has yet to catch up to the Exercises, it is an essential element for understanding the explicit connection between a formal existential ethic and spiritual experience. If spiritual experience is to be a trustworthy source of subjective data, it must be intelligible.

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62 Ibid., 106.
PART TWO:
The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola

The human person is created to praise, reverence and serve God our Lord, and by so doing save his or her soul; and it is for the human person that the other things on the face of the earth are created, as helps to the pursuit of this end.

*Spiritual Exercises*, [23] Principle and Foundation
In *The Spiritual Exercises* Ignatius of Loyola presents a structured way for a retreatant, also called an exercitant, to grow in relation to God.\(^1\) It has been a normative practice forming minds and hearts in the Society of Jesus ever since it was first created. Ignatian spirituality has also inspired many beyond the Society of Jesus itself, inviting countless numbers of people to critically and faithfully examine their lives, its meaning and purpose, and to structure their lives accordingly. Part Two of my project will examine self-appropriation, method, and horizon in the Spiritual Exercises with the aim of identifying essential features for spirituality in an authentically Christocentric horizon. St. Ignatius shows how religious conversion and religious love can be the fruit of rational self-appropriation and therefore a reliable, normative source for ordering feeling-values. The danger of using mystical literature for a formal existential ethic is that ‘mysticism’ is “generally so vaguely and loosely used” that it is one of the most ambiguous terms in the vocabulary of religion.\(^2\) It is often employed to “describe a motley gallery of vaguely spiritual or psychical experiences” and is “linked in the popular imagination with the

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\(^1\) There is not one single text, but three official versions of *The Spiritual Exercises*. As Ivens explains, “tradition has not handed down a single text, but rather three official versions: the so-called ‘Autograph’ and two Latin versions (the Versio Prima and the Vulgate). The Autograph is a Spanish text corrected in Ignatius’ own hand; it is the text on which the present translation is based. Of the two Latin versions, the Versio Prima is a fairly literal translation, made probably by Ignatius himself, while the Vulgate is a rendering into classical Latin by a French Jesuit of the Autograph text. All three texts were used by Ignatius himself, and both the Vulgate and the Versio Prima were approved by Paul III in 1548. Each can therefore be described as ‘authoritative’, and hence clarifications and even significant shifts of emphasis or tone found in the Latin versions can be taken as indications of Ignatius’ own thought ... The term ‘Directories’ applies to a series of practical and interpretive documents beginning with five emanating from Ignatius himself, and culminating in the 1599 or Official Directory commissioned and approved by the Jesuit General, Claudio Aquaviva.” Cited from the introduction, page xii of Michael Ivens, *Understanding the Spiritual Exercises: text and commentary; a handbook for retreat directors*, Inigo texts series 4 (Leominster: Gracewing, 1998) See also pgs 8 – 10 of Ganss.

darker aspects and lunacies of the western esoteric tradition.”³ Rather than examining ‘spirituality’ in the broadest sense, which may refer to the religious and secular, I will examine the writing of St. Ignatius as a mystic, since mysticism is another name for the ‘spiritual life.’⁴

The Spiritual Exercises are a highly structured pattern of self-discovery. While religious experience itself is a complex phenomenon transcending human conceptions, it does not negate the notion of authentic subjectivity. Interpretations of religious experience can be misconstrued, misunderstood, and misappropriated. Identifying a structured pattern that encourages ‘spiritual self-appropriation’ and enflames religious love is an essential task for the ethicist if religious love is to be normative and if the life of prayer is to inform the life of action as it does for the mystic. Ignatius shares three categories with Lonergan: self-appropriation, method, and horizon. First, however, I will locate the Spiritual Exercises historically.

There are two significant contextual elements for the Exercises: early modern Catholicism and the Spanish Golden Age of Catholic Mysticism. The former will locate the Exercises in an historical milieu marked by concerns over papal authority, Christian authenticity, and a return to faithfulness. The latter will examine sixteenth-century

⁴ Underhill, , 10. In reference to Sandra Schneider’s article “Spirituality in the Academy” from the introduction, she argues spirituality has been used in non-religious capacities such as Marxism. I am intentionally limiting my use of the term spirituality to its religious usage and even more specifically to mysticism. My limited use of the term is only to provide sufficient textual content for addressing the relationship of religious feeling-values to moral decision-making. While it is plausible to argue that one could extend Lonergan’s definition of ‘religious values’ to include those inspired by a secular movement such as Marxism, I am intentionally limiting the use of religious values to include those that are expressed, in part, through worship. This limitation will most likely exclude the sort of values that emerge from Marxism. However, the limitation is mine and I acknowledge that there may be other interpretations.
Spanish mysticism to identify features common to the literary genre. While the Exercises are a product of their historical time period and literary genre, they also identify fundamental concerns and desires that transcend sixteenth-century Spain.

_Early Modern Catholicism_

Concerned with an accurate account of history, my first task is to name the period from 1450 to 1650 in Western Europe. I refer to the period loosely as the sixteenth-century, although the dates extend fifty years in both directions. It is a volatile and formative period for Western Europe whose effects can be seen over the ages and across the globe. Historians have used ‘Reformation’ to refer to the historical impact of Martin Luther and ‘Counter Reformation’ to refer to the subsequent Roman Catholic response. As Robert Bireley notes, “the phrase 'Counter Reformation' came into general use in the nineteenth century with the assistance of the great German Protestant historian Leopold von Ranke.” The term ‘Counter Reformation’ interprets the movements within the Roman Catholic Church, especially the Inquisition and the Index, as a reaction to Protestantism. The term even suggests that the political and military action which helped instigate the religious wars were also a reaction to Protestantism. Furthermore, the term is often associated with the judgment that the Catholic Church was in a period of progressive deterioration, growing increasingly decadent and irrelevant until something had to save Christendom. For Bireley, this is a one sided interpretation. ‘Counter Reformation’ was used to characterize Roman Catholicism for the rest of the early

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modern period, while recent scholars have suggested that even “Catholic Reformation” or “Catholic Reform” are insufficient for adequately doing justice to the complexities of Catholicism during that period.⁶ The term “Catholic Reformation” is also one-sided because it implies that the Catholic efforts at reform “would eventually have remedied the undoubted abuses within the church without provoking the division of Western Christendom, for which the Protestants consequently stood responsible.”⁷

In the introduction to Catholicism in Early Modern History, John O’Malley objects to both “Catholic Reform” and “Counter Reformation” for a number of reasons. First, both highlight “the military, diplomatic, and political actions of Catholics against the Reformation in Germany,” which sounds “too negative and restrictive to designate the full breadth of reality under consideration.”⁸ Much of sixteenth-century Catholicism, however, had little to do with the Reformation proper: the emergence of new religious orders devoted to the poor or to education, missionary endeavors overseas, and the renewed interest in the thought of Thomas Aquinas do not show any immediate connection to what has been called the Reformation. Secondly, to use the term ‘Reform’ implies that the sixteenth-century Catholic Church was uniquely in need of reform compared to other ages. Lastly, ‘Reform’ has a technical, canonical meaning designating the enforcement of church law vis-à-vis the residence, preaching, and celibacy of pastors and bishops. O’Malley also contends that the formation of the Society of Jesus, for

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⁶ Ibid., 2-3.
⁷ Ibid., 3-4.
⁸ Catholicism in Early Modern History: a guide to research, ed. John W. O’Malley, Reformation guides to research v. 2 (St. Louis, Mo.: Center for Reformation Research, 1988)
example, has little to do with such formal and institutional concerns but is focused almost exclusively on personal religious conversion.

What is an appropriate term for sixteenth-century Catholicism? O’Malley suggests that “early modern Catholicism” is the most appropriate term for this time period because it is both comprehensive and critical. It is comprehensive because it helps capture the realities not found in the other terms, and it is critical because it does not make the Protestant Reformation the defining event for the entire century, but allows sixteenth-century Catholicism to be seen in light of the broader influences of the sixteenth-century.\(^9\) As Bireley argues, “early modern Catholicism ... was essentially the response of the Catholic Church to the changing world of the long sixteenth century, that is, from 1450 to 1650.”\(^10\)

Early modern Catholicism, then, places the events of the sixteenth-century into a broader historical movement, namely, the arduous transition from medieval to early modern times. Bireley finds that the transition to early modern times was marked by five principle changes. First, political power was consolidated and centralized so that the sovereign state could emerge. Second, there were significant social and economic changes. After the Black Death in the middle of the fourteenth-century, a significant period of population growth occurred. In two centuries the European population doubled, swelling from 55 million in 1450 to nearly 100 million in 1650. Economically, Europe moved “rapidly in the direction” of capitalism, even though economic expansion did not benefit everyone. The expanding urban middle class coupled with relative social mobility

\(^9\) Bireley, , 2-6.
\(^10\) Ibid., 2.
served as the main lay vehicle for both Catholic and Protestant reform. Third, continental expansion into Asia, America, and Africa aided the gradual formation of European colonial empires. Fourth, the intellectual and cultural currents which have been called the “Renaissance” were in many ways a significant departure from the intellectual climate of the medieval world. The main intellectual current of the Renaissance was humanism, which encouraged study of Latin and Greek classics and emphasized what is today referred to as the humanities.

As a part of the larger transition from medieval to early modern times, the fifth principle change was the Reformation itself. Before the Reformation, the church had enjoyed a virtual monopoly over education from childhood up through the university. During the late Middle Ages, cities began to assume responsibility for schooling. Papal authority reached a low point under Alexander VI, having declined steadily since the High Middle Ages. The printing press made religious books increasingly more available, especially since the Bible began to appear in many European vernaculars. Access to the Bible fuelled a popular form of piety where devotion to the person of Jesus was emphasized, eclipsing the common liturgy. The New Testament and personal experience of practitioners began to receive significant attention. Lastly, the Inquisition beginning in 1478 threw a “long shadow over Spanish Catholicism.”11 Prior to the Inquisition, medieval Spanish society was surprisingly pluralist, having Muslim and Jewish elements. The original purpose of the Inquisition was to root out heretical practices and teachings among the Conversos (new Christians who had converted freely or under duress) and

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Moriscos (Muslims who had become Christians under compulsion). During its most brutal time around 1530, the Inquisition executed nearly 2000 Conversos. In many areas, it was unclear who was a Catholic and what constituted a Catholic.\textsuperscript{12}

Early modern Catholicism, then, is best understood when it is placed within the broader transition from medieval to early modern times and is not simplistically defined as a response to the Protestant Reformation. Within the broader context of political, socio-economic, geographical, religious, and spiritual change, early modern Catholicism produced some of the greatest spiritual literature of the entire Catholic Church.

Of particular historical relevance for contextualizing the Spiritual Exercises is what might be called “reformation spirituality.” As Evennet claims in The Spirit of the Counter-Reformation, “the counter-reformation doctrine of Christian struggle and effort ... announced that Man ... carried, to some extent, his own fate in his own hands.”\textsuperscript{13}

However, it was also believed that “God would respond to man if man responded to him.”\textsuperscript{14} One of the great influences of the Counter-Reformation was the emphasis that one ought to know oneself and order oneself in relation to God, even though it is God that does all and only God’s glory that matters. The leaders of “Counter-Reformation” spirituality returned to the “covenanted channels of God’s Grace,” making the confessional more of a regular resource and not an exceptional one. As a result, the science of confessors improved dramatically and the role of spiritual director became increasingly more important.

\textsuperscript{12} see also Henry Charles Lea, Chapters from the religious history of Spain connected with the Inquisition, Burt Franklin research & source work series, 245; Selected essays [in] history and social science, 31; (New York: Burt Franklin, 1967)
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 36.
Reform for both Catholics and Protestants was usually thought of as a “renewal” rather than as a “return” to the spirit of the Gospel and the early church.\textsuperscript{15} At work in the renewal were sixteenth-century attitudes and values: namely, the desire of lay people to find a more authentic sense of Christianity in their worldly and secular pursuits in addition to the pursuit of religious, political, social, and intellectual order in such a volatile period of transition. The notion of renewal and reform was often more associated with the reform of the individual, the personal. Even the vast institutional reforms that occurred during the period of early modern Catholicism cannot be conceived apart from the radical reform of the individual Christian. In fact, reform does not apply to an institution per se but only to its members.\textsuperscript{16} As Olin notes, there are two reforms at work: \textit{reformatio in capite}, which was often obstructed and denied, and \textit{reformatio in membris}, which had a spontaneous life largely beyond institutional control.\textsuperscript{17} The responsible historian will examine both in their mutual interaction. However, Olin argues that to understand early modern Catholicism, “[w]e must turn then to the reform of the members if we would observe the beginnings - and the wellspring in the immediate sense - of the Catholic Reformation of the sixteenth century.”\textsuperscript{18}

It is important to note that many of the leaders of this period of personal reform did not establish “ambitious programmes for the reform of the Church as a whole.” To the contrary, the “refertilising” and “modernizing” was done by individuals of “outstanding spiritual fibre” through the disciplines of prayer, self-control, and charitable

\textsuperscript{15} Bireley, , 2.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., xix.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., xix.
actions in pursuit of a personal search for the Kingdom of God and for the good of their neighbor.\(^{19}\) Institutional reform emerged when the Tridentine decrees wanted not only to set boundaries for the Protestant *sola fide*, which could potentially lead to “illuminism or quasi-mystical aberrations,” but mainly to tap into the revival coming from the spirituality of the Counter-Reformation. The Tridentine decrees reflected and affirmed the energy, bustle, and determination of the sixteenth-century Catholic who sought to establish some semblance of control for the greater glory of God. The striving for greater control is evident in the highly valued practices of self-control, the acquisition of virtues, zeal for good works, and labor for the salvation of souls.

Within the broader context of spiritual renewal, the *devotio moderna* became a common spiritual practice. It engendered a spirit of personal piety, a devoted following of Christ, and the cultivation of “a simple and fervent interior life.”\(^{20}\) The doctrines of the *devotio moderna* were centered in Christ and the Gospels, stressed meditation and method prayer, and aimed at a life of practical, Christian virtue. Its influence, Olin notes, spread widely throughout Europe from the end of the fourteenth century. St. Ignatius “came within its orbit.”\(^{21}\) Most of the authors of *devotio moderna* (including Padua Ludovico Barbo and Abbot Garcia Cisneros) wrote specifically for monks, since much of their work presupposes the monastic routine. However, “the self-control, attention to prayer, perseverance in virtue, and sense of dedication that are underlined in the religious life, apply in some degree to all Christians.”\(^{22}\) When the ordered movement of meditative

\(^{19}\) Evennett, , 28.
\(^{20}\) Olin, , xx.
\(^{21}\) Ibid., xx.
\(^{22}\) Evennett, , 35.
prayer was woven into the traditional stages of the spiritual life (the purgative, illuminative, and unitive) and was expounded by the recognized masters, the *devotio moderna* became “one of the most important spiritual arms” of the Counter-Reformation’s spiritual renewal of laity and clergy alike.\(^{23}\)

Within the larger sweep of “Counter-Reformation spirituality” and the *devotio moderna*, the Society of Jesus emerged. Olin finds the founding of the Society of Jesus “one of the most important events in the story of the Catholic Reformation,” which became “the most powerful instrument of Catholic revival and resurgence in this era of religious crisis.” Its founder, St. Ignatius of Loyola was “one of the towering figures of the sixteenth century.”\(^{24}\) As an agent of spiritual renewal, the teachings of the Society of Jesus “show almost all the characteristic counter-reformation marks to the highest degree.”\(^{25}\) According to Evennett, the Society of Jesus became the most powerful, active, modernising, humanistic, and flexible force in the Counter-Reformation, impressing, in the long run, so much of its outlook and even to some extent the principles of its structural form on the life and organisation of Catholicism as a whole.\(^{26}\)

However, neither Ignatius of Loyola nor the Society of Jesus emerged unmolested by the reach of the Spanish Inquisition:

The Society of Jesus encountered difficulties from the start of Philip II’s reign in the Hispanic kingdoms … Loyola's initial difficulties with the Inquisition in central Spain, and in the Castilian home of traditional and professional theology at Salamanca, lay in his years as a mature student, an abnormal transferee from the world of military service to that of clerical society. His habit of giving advice on private spiritual development to

\(^{23}\) Ibid., 35.  
\(^{24}\) Olin, , 198.  
\(^{25}\) Evennett, , 43.  
\(^{26}\) Ibid., 44.
other lay persons was automatically suspect, especially because alumbrado deviance from orthodox belief and practice was still feared.\footnote{27} Despite the difficulties, early Jesuits developed a unique theological school and continued to be highly influential for many decades.

The major tenets of the early Jesuit theological school were straightforward. Contrary to the Dominican position regarding the relationship of free will to Grace, the Jesuits swung to the “near verge of Pelagianism.” By constantly stressing various activities of the mind and intellect in prayer, especially pictorial meditation, the Jesuit school placed a great deal of responsibility on the individual to launch a “counter-attack” on various temptations. Purely passive resistance to temptation was insufficient. Furthermore, their development of casuistry, their respect for individual cases operating within the broader scope of spiritual direction, and their adverse reaction to excessive corporal mortifications made the Jesuits humane and accommodating. They believed in an active struggle against the self, action in service of others, frequent participation in the sacraments, and prayer emerging from active involvement in the world. The Jesuits sought to form what has come to be known as contemplatives in action.

The larger sweep of early modern Catholicism, with its unique elements of spirituality, provides a necessary historical context for the genesis of the Society of Jesus. However, it would be misleading not to examine a particularly relevant phenomenon embedded within the broader historical context: Spanish Mysticism.

The Spanish Golden Age of Catholic Mysticism

The Inquisition marked one Catholic response to apostasy during early modern Catholicism. However, there was another vital and vibrant response: mysticism. The Spanish Golden Age of mysticism emerged from a Catholic culture seeking to renew its core principles and recover its spiritual roots. It served as a powerful tool in the renewal of Catholicism during this period and has had a profound and lasting impression ever since.

Evelyn Underhill defines mysticism as “the direct intuition or experience of God” and the mystic as a “person who has … such a direct experience.” The life of the mystic is centered not merely on accepted belief or practice, but more so on “first-hand personal knowledge.” The ‘directness’ of the experience implies that it is generally unmediated by reason. For Adolf Deissmann, mysticism is “every religious tendency that discovers the way to God direct through inner experience without the mediation of reasoning” where “the constitutive element … is immediacy of contact with the deity.”

For William James, mysticism has four principle characteristics: ineffability, a noetic quality, transiency, and passivity. As ineffable, mystical experience defies expression. It transcends scientific verification and operates in a realm of meaning not easily made public. Despite an apparent lack of empirical verifiability, mystical

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28 Underhill, , 9. See also Cox, , 18-39, and Edward Cuthbert Butler, Western mysticism; the teachings of SS Augustine, Gregory, and Bernard on contemplation and the contemplative life; neglected chapters in the history of religion (New York: Dutton, 1924), 1-19.
29 Underhill, , 10.
experience should not be dismissed. The authentic mystic ought to enjoy the same trust as the great poet, artist, or musician. As noetic, mystical experience involves the life of the mind through a direct intuition that transcends the discursive intellect. As transient, mystical experience rarely lasts long. Lastly, the experience is 'passive' because it always brings the feeling of something given. While the experience itself lies beyond the immediate and direct control of the mystic, it can be made more readily available through certain disciplines. When they occur, however, they exert a disproportionate influence on subjectivity considering their relatively brief duration. Michael Cox finds that despite these quasi-erratic features, mystical experiences function as a normative source of feeling-value; even "for most ordinary believers" the consciousness of a Reality beyond space and time "appears and remains as a moral and spiritual principle."\(^\text{32}\)

Mysticism inspires religious thought and sustains religious communities. Not only does it have its font in "the raw material of all religion," but it also inspires "profound insights of religious truth" by those "who have led the spiritual progress of the human race."\(^\text{33}\) Christianity is no exception:

A survey of mystical Christianity illustrates the presence of the mystics throughout the two thousand years of Christian history when, for long periods, mysticism was exalted as the highest form of Christian life. While Christianity is commonly regarded as a religion based on the acceptance of an established theology or creed and the performance of certain external acts, at the same time it is also a living religion based on a personal experience of God. Over the past two millennia its mystics have proven that Christianity is indeed a mystical religion.\(^\text{34}\)

As Happold illustrates, Christianity itself is nourished and sustained by the influence of its mystics.

\(^{32}\) Cox, 25.


Mysticism, finally, is the basis of Christian living. Thomas Merton claims that
"real Christian living is stunted and frustrated if it remains content with the bare externals
of worship, with 'saying prayers' and 'going to church,' with fulfilling one's external
duties and merely being respectable."³⁵ Furthermore, it is a real possibility for all
Christians. As Underhill explains, mysticism is

Not only the act of contemplation, the vision or state of consciousness in which the soul
of the great mystic realized God, but many humbler and dimmer experiences of prayer, in
which the little human spirit truly feels the presence of the Divine Spirit and Love, must
be included in it. We cannot say that there is a separate "mystical sense," which some
men have and some have not, but rather that every human soul has a certain latent
capacity for God, and that in some this capacity is realized with an astonishing richness.³⁶

For Underhill and many others, the path of the mystic is the path for authentic Christian
living. If mysticism is understood as plausible for only a few, elect spiritual elite, then it
is meaningless as a potential normative source of feeling-value for the non-mystic
majority. Only when mystical experience becomes a plausible, concrete reality for
Christians can it continue to sustain religious insight and the community of the faithful. It
is within the broader context of mysticism that the "remarkable florescence of ascetic and
mystical literature in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spain" can be seen as "one of
the most striking phenomena in the history of Christian devotion."³⁷

The challenge facing sixteenth-century Spanish Catholicism was not that it lacked
mystics, but that it "swarmed with mystics of every variety, from the most sublime
mystics who sought the union of the soul in Spiritual Marriage to those given to receiving

³⁵ Thomas Merton, Contemplation in a world of action, Gethsemani studies in psychological and religious
anthropology; (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 160.
³⁶ Underhill, 11.
³⁷ E. Allison Peers, The mystics of Spain, Ethical and religious classics of the East and West, no. 5 (London:
visions, voices and prophecies. During this time period, Spain also suffered from obscure and peculiar versions of quasi-mysticism. Why did this period of Spanish history enjoy such a wealth of mystical literature? Alison Peers finds that the wealth of mystical literature during this time parallels the historical drama in Spain itself. From her perspective, “Spain has always possessed immense reserves of power, and her history has often been made by great bursts of energy manifested by individuals.” The Reformation and Counter-Reformation engendered strong emotions, making the high degree of intensity of mystical literature quite normal in Spanish religious experience. Fortunately, many writers in the Carmelite School were able to codify much of these experiences because “the brilliance and the force of the Spanish language...were at their height” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The printing press coupled with the firmly held belief that mysticism was for all, not just the spiritual elite, made the production of mystical literature particularly efflorescent.

Not all expressions of mystical experience were accepted by the Inquisition. By the 1520’s, “mysticism in the form of the Alumbrados collided with the Inquisition.” Meaning “illuminated,” Alumbrado was a term of derision used by the opponents of mysticism. While the early Alumbrados stressed the interior life and Detachment as the path to God, later Alumbrados were more enthusiastic with their mystical experiences because some claimed to have received visions from the devil while others faked levitations and even the stigmata. By the end of the sixteenth-century, the term was used

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38 Fanning, 149.
39 Peers, 27.
40 Ibid., 28.
41 Fanning, 150.
pejoratively "for all who were believed to be guilty of false, hypocritical or ostentatious religiosity or those given to trances and ecstasies."\(^{42}\)

Despite the watchful eyes of the Inquisition, mystical literature in the sixteenth-century flourished and has become known as the Spanish Golden Age. During this time period, mysticism flourished in Spain for a variety of reasons. First, it had little to do with philosophy. As Peers writes, "the Spaniard has always tended to turn from abstractions, subtleties, and even systems, to the concrete and substantial."\(^{43}\) The Spaniard prefers action to speculation, especially the Spanish mystics. Many of them were skilled practical psychologists, spiritual directors, and accessible writers. The greatest mystics of the time use little more than the Bible and some of the Church Fathers. The doctrines are permeated with their own experiences, making their lives simple, their faith spontaneous, and their conceptions free of potentially confusing subtleties. As a genre, Spanish mysticism is "a remarkable combination of idealism and realism."\(^{44}\) It is intensely personal and individualistic, making "knowledge of oneself ... an indispensable preliminary to a knowledge of God."\(^{45}\) The contemplative life is far from "the quietistic pseudo-mysticism" of the late seventeenth century. The mysticism of the Spanish Golden Age "is active, ardent, militant" aiming at "affirming, not at denying, the power of the human will."\(^{46}\)

Spanish mystics such as Francisco de Osuna, Teresa of Ávila, John of the Cross, and Ignatius of Loyola differ significantly from their pious, fanatical contemporaries in

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 150.
\(^{43}\) Peers, 33.
\(^{44}\) Ibid.
\(^{45}\) Ibid., 34.
\(^{46}\) Ibid., 35.
the quality, authenticity, and intensity of their spiritual lives. I have chosen the four
mentioned above to represent the authentic Spanish Mystics, those who live for God and
strive for a state that is pleasing to God. These mystics experienced an intense love for
God and a love from God, both of which nurtured an increase in love for all of creation.
For them, the ‘fire of love’ is not an empty figure of speech, but presents itself in visions,
ranging from the imaginary to the intellectual. The Spanish mystics are also acutely
aware of potential self-deception and offer sound advice on the ‘discernment of spirits’ so
that one can distinguish between authentic and unauthentic mystical experience.

As a Spanish Mystic writing in the Golden Age, Ignatius of Loyola has many
significant contemporaries. I will briefly examine the lives and writings of Francisco de
Osuna (c. 1497-1541), St. Teresa of Ávila (1515-1582), and St. John of the Cross (1542-
1591) as three writers during this period that share a few common features with Ignatius
of Loyola. My aim in doing so is to better locate St. Ignatius in the genre of Spanish
Mysticism.

Francisco de Osuna was the first great writer “to emerge out of this churning pool
of mysticism.” His works were highly esteemed by his colleagues and were repeatedly
reprinted. While his reputation is often overshadowed by his sixteenth-century
contemporaries and the events of his life are largely unknown, he was a prolific writer
composing over 500 works. He entered the Franciscan order in the town of Osuna and
engaged in university studies. His most famous works, the six Spiritual Alphabets, were a
collection of maxims on the spiritual life arranged alphabetically and accompanied by
lengthy commentaries. Of the six, his most influential was The Third Spiritual Alphabet,
which outlines the technique of Recollection: “an emphasis on an active focusing of the
mind and reformation of the vices ... [ending in] union with God.”47 It was the Third Spiritual Alphabet that “put Teresa of Ávila on the path of mysticism.”48 The technique of Recollection was contrasted with Detachment, the practice advocated by the original group of Alumbrados. While the end of Recollection was union with God, it was not attainable by short cuts; it demanded long years of effort. Although it was not for everyone, it was as available to his readers as to anyone else. Essentially, it required that one “single-mindedly set out for God.”49 Osuna offered practical direction for those seeking a deeper relationship with the Divine.

St. Teresa of Ávila was one of the greatest Spanish mystics of the time, equal in many regards to Ignatius. She was born in 1515 in a mixed Jewish-Christian and noble-mercantile household. At sixteen she entered a boarding school run by Augustinian nuns since her mother had died four years earlier. At twenty-one she joined the Carmelite convent against her father’s wishes. The daily regiment of the convent was such a significant challenge to her health that she was forced to return home for an entire year to recuperate. During this time at home, she read Osuna’s Third Spiritual Alphabet and learned how to practice Recollection, which eventually led to a brief experience of union that “left such an effect behind that ... I seemed to feel the world far below me.”50 She found the slow muddle of spiritual progress to be “laborious and painful” and had only fleeting mystical experiences for the first twenty years of her monastic life.

47 Fanning, 151.
48 Ibid., 150.
49 Ibid., 151.
In 1555, her mystical life became much more intense and her frequent conversations with Jesus led her to begin a reform of the Carmelites to return the order to a more original ascetic way of apostolic poverty and strict seclusion. Although the trials of the Alumbrados made her aware that voices and visions could easily be the product of her own imagination, she firmly believed it was possible to discern between false and genuine voices. One of the major distinctions she draws between authentic and unauthentic religious experiences is that the authentic ones are given while the unauthentic ones coming from the intellect could be achieved whenever the subject desired.

St. Teresa's autobiography reveals a sincere desire for self-mastery coupled with a religious love that increasingly becomes the normative, organizing principle of her life. As a child, Teresa was deeply influenced by her virtuous parents. However, she was exposed to "bad company," "began to wear finery, and to wish to charm by [her] appearance."\(^{51}\) Having joined the nunnery for year, she began to see "that all is nothing, and that the world is vanity which quickly passes away."\(^ {52}\) She discovers that there is nothing in herself that can be relied on and locates her source of feeling-value in God: "cursed be all loyalty that goes so far as to impinge on one's loyalty to God!"\(^ {53}\) Teresa often finds herself caught between two conflicting sources of feeling-value: "on one side God called me, and on the other I followed the world. All divine things gave me great pleasure; yet those of the world held me prisoner."\(^ {54}\) Through her commitment to prayer

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 26.
\(^{52}\) Ibid., 31.
\(^{53}\) Ibid., 41.
\(^{54}\) Ibid., 57.
and critical self-reflection, Teresa was able to advance in her faith life: “before that I had experienced a continual tenderness in devotion, which is partially attainable, I believe, by our own efforts; it is a gift not wholly of the senses, nor yet of the spirit, but entirely God-given.”55 As the soul progresses in its relationship with God, “the chief thing is joy.”56 Her own progress was marked by a devotion to prayer whereby her relationship with God became an increasingly viable foundation for her way of being, despite her difficulty in expressing “this spiritual language” that “is so difficult to use for those like myself who have no learning.”57

St. Teresa’s mystical experiences influenced her deeply: they made her profoundly aware of her sinfulness, helped her realize the “lack of reality of this world,” and yet helped her understand that God was “present in all things.”58 St. Teresa sought to return her community to a more authentic way of living out its vocation in a deeper spiritual union with God. For these reasons, she is among the greatest of the Catholic mystics.

St. Teresa was not alone in her desire to reform the Carmelite Order. Her partner was St. John of the Cross. As Fanning explains, he was born to Gonzalo, the son of a wealthy family of silk merchants. John’s mother, Catalina Alvarez, was the daughter of a poor family of weavers. Gonzalo’s family disowned him, cutting him off from the family’s wealth for choosing such a poor marriage partner. Gonzalo died when John was two years old, leaving Catalina and her three sons destitute. Fortunately, John was able to

55 Ibid., 71.
56 Ibid., 77.
57 Ibid.
58 Fanning, 156.
enroll in a newly-established Jesuit college, which thoroughly grounded his education in
the tradition of Ignatius. Despite opportunities to become a parish priest or a Jesuit, John
decided to enter the Carmelite Order in 1563. He studied both theology and philosophy at
Salamanca and was ordained in 1567. When he met Teresa of Ávila, she immediately
enlisted him in the Carmelite reform. They formed a close friendship that would last the
rest of their lives. John of the Cross was among the first group of Reformed Carmelite
friars and faced the hostility of many who opposed the reforms he suggested. He was
arrested twice by leaders of his own order and eventually imprisoned to solitary
confinement in a small cell. After floggings and a meager diet for a number of months, he
designed an escape.

Because of his escape, he was able to leave prison with an extraordinary testament
to mystical experience: *The Spiritual Canticle*. The prison was a perfect setting for John
to experience the essentials of mysticism: Recollection, Detachment, and Abandonment.
One of his major contributions to mysticism is the detailed account of purgation, given in
*The Dark Night* of the soul.\(^\text{59}\) His clearest blueprint for spiritual progress, however, is
found in *The Ascent of Mount Carmel*.

Two particular elements in *The Ascent of Mount Carmel* are helpful for locating
John of the Cross alongside Teresa of Ávila and Ignatius of Loyola as Spanish Mystics:
the requisite necessity of ‘purgation’ and a complete faith in Christ for a deeper union
describes the process of purgation as an ordering of appetites toward God, since appetites
are an obstacle to the further state of union. By appetites, John of the Cross does not
\(^\text{59}\) Ibid., 156-158.
mean "all the appetites that contribute to human experience apart from the will, but only to those that are voluntary (or willful) and inordinate, not directed at least in some way toward giving honor and glory to God." But even among the inordinate appetites, he is primarily concerned with the habitual appetites, "since a sporadic act would not amount to a hindrance to union." While John of the Cross believes in the principle that creatures are good in themselves, he also believes that inordinate willful appetites are the problem, especially when they become habitual. Love produces likeness and similitude between the lover and the one loved. In his own words, John of the Cross explains

an attachment to a creature makes a person equal to that creature; the stronger the attachment, the closer is the likeness to the creature and the greater the equality, for love effects a likeness between the lover and the loved. As a result Davis said of those who set their hearts on their idols: Similes illis fiant qui faciunt ea, et omnes qui confidunt in eis (Let all who set their hearts on them become like them) [Ps. 115:8].

The danger of such inordinate attachments is that when they become habitual they may also become normative, shaping the subject’s feeling-values and priorities.

The remedy for inordinate attachment is faith and Christian love. As Kavanaugh explains, "Christ is the entire content of the Father’s revelation, God’s definitive Word that leaves nothing else to be revealed." One begins to make significant spiritual progress when one studies the life of Jesus Christ and imitates Him, remaining empty of "any sensory satisfaction that is not purely for the honor and glory of God." It is only Christian love that can properly ordain the appetites to God:

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 124.
63 Ibid., 105.
64 Ibid.
When individuals place all activity under the rule of this love, they well then not search simply for personal satisfaction in the use of things but ardently seek only God's glory and honor. This love, necessary for the vanquishing of the disordered appetites, is enkindled by Christ, who becomes also the perfect model since love produces likeness in the lover.  

Christian love, then, not only orders one’s attachments but also shapes feeling-value, since “faith touches on the whole of life and draws the believer to embrace its values and demands, stirs one to seek assurance and confirmation in the community of the Church.”

As Spanish Mystics seeking spiritual renewal in an era marked by obedience and suspicion, John of the Cross, Teresa of Ávila, and Ignatius of Loyola share significant similarities. Each seeks to find the elements of authentic spiritual renewal so as to distinguish it from the quasii-erratic versions condemned by the Inquisition. All three agree that spiritual progress begins with a period of purgation, so that one may understand and order one’s interiority, liberating one from disordered attachment. All three reveal a profound love for Christ, known through the discipline of prayer, as the ordering principle of interiority. All three experience union with God as the fulfillment of their deepest desires, making such religious experience the normative source of feeling-value. Lastly, while all three acknowledge that one can significantly improve one’s “receptivity” to such experience, it remains largely beyond their control.

Having examined the historical context of early modern Catholicism and sixteenth-century Spanish Mysticism, I will now examine the way Ignatius employs a method operating within a structure to help the soul’s progress to union with God.

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65 Ibid., 104-105.
66 Ibid., 106.
Chapter Four: Self-appropriation in the Spiritual Exercises

St. Ignatius invites the exercitant to know, understand, and appropriate the complex movements of interiority. From the very outset, it is clear that St. Ignatius believes that not only is such knowledge possible but that it is essential for the primary purpose of the Exercises themselves: for the exercitant to praise, reverence and serve God. It is the obligation of the exercitant in collaboration with his director to make a life decision, referred to as election in the Exercises, in freedom from any kind of psychological, emotional, or spiritual determinism. To order one’s life in response to the principle and foundation, one must know and critically examine the movements of interiority.¹ In this chapter, I will examine the way self-appropriation is foundational for the Exercises, show that spiritual progress in the Exercises is enhanced by three particular desires, and explore the obstacles to spiritual progress. My primary goal in chapter four is not only to identify that self-appropriation is foundational, but more importantly to show how self-appropriation functions.

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¹ I will leave the term ‘movements of interiority’ intentionally open-ended, since I do not want to set definitive and limiting boundaries on what exactly these movements do or do not include. Loosely defined, movements of interiority refer mainly to feeling-values while interiority itself is a broader category. For a more precise analysis, see Lonergan’s description in “Realms of Meaning” in Method, pp 81-85.
1. Self-Appropriation as Foundational

To show the foundational nature of self-appropriation for the Exercises, I will examine annotation [1] followed by number [21] on Ends and Means, and numbers [87], [89], and [90] on Penance.¹ I will use Michael Ivens’ *Understanding the Spiritual Exercises* as a comprehensive, critical, and academic exposition of the Exercises. Ivens’ text provides a comprehensive exposition based both on years of experience as a spiritual director and careful academic research.

At the very beginning of the Exercises, the exercitant is given some of the explanatory notes, immediately creating a climate of responsibility and ownership. As Ivens notes, it was Ignatius’ own practice to give the exercitant annotations [1], [20], [5], and [4] at the beginning followed by [3], [11], [12], and [13] later on.² Annotation [1] is not only the textual starting point of the Exercises after the 1599 Directory, it is also a conceptual starting point. Annotation [1] in its entirety reads,

The term 'spiritual exercises' denotes every way of **examining one's conscience**, of meditating, contemplating, of praying vocally and mentally, and other spiritual **activities** as will be explained later. For just as strolling, walking and running are exercises for the body, so 'spiritual exercises' is the name given to every way of **preparing and making ourselves ready** to get rid of all disordered affections so that, once rid of them, one might **seek and find the divine will** in regard to the disposition of one's life for the salvation of the soul.³

I have added italics to note the elements I will examine more thoroughly.

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¹ The Exercises begin with twenty annotations, which the Directories explain as notes “to provide some explanation of the Spiritual Exercises which follow. They are intended to provide assistance both to the person giving the Exercises and to the person who is to receive them.” Ivens, l. Beyond annotation [1], I will also use brackets to denote numbers, the common division of all the different texts.
² Ivens, , l.
³ Ibid.
First, spiritual exercises are *activities*. Ivens notes that "spiritual exercises" were "once an ordinary term serving to designate any kind of personal religious practice." Ignatius' comparison to bodily exercises, to the contrary, highlights the deliberative and purposive nature of the endeavor itself. The dynamic of the Exercises is active intentionality. The very first "object" of such intentionality denoted in annotation [1] is "one's conscience." The 'spiritual exercises' can be understood as a method: a way of coming to know one's interiority. Self-understanding is a 'spiritual exercise' and a 'kind of personal religious practice' for Ignatius.

Secondly, spiritual exercises are a way of preparing oneself and making oneself ready to get rid of disordered affections. A condition for preparing and making oneself ready is not only to *understand* one's interiority, but also to provide some ordering framework and purpose. The "preparation" and "making ready" that Ignatius envisions involves identifying the movements of interiority and actively ordering them, so that one can find a direction in one's life. In short, it involves self-appropriation. However, the liberty resulting from self-appropriation and the "redirection of heart" is a "graced collaboration." Ordering one's interiority for the sake of a decision is not "achieved simply by performing 'exercises'." To the contrary, one's redirection of heart is a collaborative effort with the work of the Holy Spirit. The term *graced collaboration*

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4 Ibid., 2.
5 As I noted in footnote 8 above, the term 'interiority' refers to conscience, affections, feelings, spiritual movements etc. At this point, I am using the term in reference to the realm of observation when one observes oneself.
6 Ivens uses 'direction in life' to explain "the disposition of one's life." For Ivens, 'disposition in life' is "not necessarily the choice of a 'state in life'. Though the text envisages especially an excertant needing to choose a state in life, 'life' has a wider sense in the Exercises than 'state'. What is stressed here is that one makes the Exercises in order to find a direction in one's life." Ivens, 3.
7 Ibid., 2.
8 Ibid.
denotes the exercitant's limit-experience with regard to interiority and intentionality. In other words, one cannot simply choose to order one's disposition: it cannot be understood as an achievement of one's own doing. It resists any sort of simplistic self-determinism.

Thirdly, the Spiritual Exercises reveal "the Divine Will." The aim of the Exercises is to clearly identify the Divine Will operative in the exercitant's interiority. As Ivens explains,

> in the course of the Exercises, a variety of expressions are employed to denote the relationship to God which is the object of human life and the norm of human choice. In addition to 'seeking and finding God's will,' we find availability to be 'used by God' [5], 'honour' [16], 'glory' [16], 'service' [16], 'praise' [23], the 'pleasure' of God [151], and, of course, the triad 'praise, reverence and service' [23]. Expressing fundamentally the same idea, each of these expressions carries its own emphasis. In the Exercises, 'will of God' is used in connection with choices made in situations where objective criteria are not determinative.9

Self-appropriation is also a gradual clarification of religious love, where God is the 'object of human life.' Furthermore, by identifying the Divine Will operative in the exercitant's interiority, religious love becomes a norm for human choice where 'objective criteria are not determinative.' In this way, identifying the Divine Will is an aim of the Exercises, so that one may also identify valid subjective criteria for decision-making when objective criteria are insufficient. Ignatius' notion of the Divine Will operative in interiority is distinguished from the human faculty that makes choices using objective criteria exclusively. Discernment is the process of identifying the Divine Will operative in interiority. It relies on different evaluative criteria for choice than the 'objective' ones associated with the discursive reason. That is not to dismiss objective criteria as a valid

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9 Ibid., 2.
source for decision-making, but merely to claim that there are other, ‘subjective’ criteria that may be determinative when objective criteria are not.

Lastly, while self-appropriation is foundational for the liberty Ignatius envisions, that is freedom from any kind of determinism, it operates in an explicitly religious horizon. At the end of annotation [1], Ignatius presents the purpose for ordering one’s interiority and identifying the Divine Will: “the salvation of the soul.” Self-appropriation, for Ignatius, serves a higher purpose than mere psychological liberty or mere self-determination. The liberty Ignatius envisions is always for a higher, self-transcendent end. Annotation [1] is an insightful entrée into the overall structure of the Spiritual Exercises.

Number [21] emphasizes many of the same elements found in annotation [1]. Regarding ends and means, Ivens finds number [21] to offer an insightful summary of the Exercises overall: “Spiritual Exercises having as their purpose the overcoming of self and the ordering of one’s life on the basis of a decision made in freedom from any disordered attachment.” However, it offers two further clarifications of annotation [1]. First, number [21] emphasizes that the Exercises are essential for making an important life decision. Secondly, number [21] highlights the “ascetical / psychological implications” of making such a decision free from disordered affection. While Ignatius himself preferred to give the Exercises to a person having to choose “a state in life,” he also gave them to a few who had no such decision to make. From the very beginning there seems to be significant flexibility of usage. George Ganss notes two differing historical schools of interpretation regarding the purpose of the Exercises: ‘electionists’ believe the purpose is

\[\text{Ibid.}, 22.\]
to aid someone making an ‘election,’ that is, choosing “a state of life,” while ‘perfectionists’ believe the primary purpose above all else is union with God. Later writers have seen the two ends as complementary and not mutually exclusive.\textsuperscript{11}

Regardless of their historical differences, both schools of interpretation agree that “overcoming oneself” is an indispensable first step in spiritual progress. In addition to this preliminary ‘negative’ purpose, Ignatius immediately adds “the genuine, positive, and inspirational aim of the Exercises,” which is eternal salvation. For Ignatius, to “order one’s life” is to align it with the Principle and Foundation given in number [23].\textsuperscript{12} Ivens concurs with Ganss, finding that “to ‘order’ is to bring into line with the ‘end’ to be proposed in the Principle and Foundation.”\textsuperscript{13} In addition to the ‘positive’ orientation, there is also a ‘negative’ purpose: overcoming oneself and ordering one’s life to establish a way of life through a decision made in freedom. Put succinctly,

The connection between this ‘ordering’ and a decision of ‘election’ is made more explicit in the Vulgate: ‘Some spiritual exercises, by which a person is directed in order that he or she might overcome the self and establish a way of life by a decision free from harmful affections.’\textsuperscript{14}

\hspace{1em}\textsuperscript{11} Ganss writes: “Although Ignatius’ succinct statement in 21 seems clear at first reading, it has given rise to extensive discussions. With some oversimplification to get to the heart of the matter, the chief writers can be divided into two schools, "electionists" (e.g., L. de Grandmaison) and "perfectionists" (e.g., L. Peeters). De Grandmaison maintained in 1921: The end is to prepare a spiritually minded person to make a wise election of a state of life in which he or she can serve God best. The text as it stands is clearly directed to that end. Peeters objected in 1931: The end and culminating point of the Exercises can only be a union with God which is most intimate and total. An answer unifying both these extremes was written by Joseph de Guibert shortly before his death in 1942 and posthumously published in 1953: Those two ends are complementary, not mutually exclusive. If we consider Ignatius’ printed text of 1548 and his process in writing it while winning companions from 1534 onward, the end expressed in his text is to facilitate a good election; and that is the composition which best enables us to interpret the wording of Ignatius’ text itself. However, if we consider the uses which he himself made of his text, we see that he gave the exercises to persons whose election was already made (e.g., Xavier and Favre), and that his objective was to lead them to intensive union with God.” Ignatius Loyola, The spiritual exercises of Saint Ignatius: a translation and commentary, trans. George E. Ganss, Series I, Jesuit primary sources in English translations, no. 9 (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1992)147.
\hspace{1em}\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 146-147.
\hspace{1em}\textsuperscript{13} Ivens, Understanding the Spiritual Exercises 23.
\hspace{1em}\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
Ignatius enjoys a highly nuanced anthropology for his day. The negative purpose of the Exercises identifies an engaging account of subjectivity: first, the self is capable of self-appropriation. Not only is the subject able to know and identify the movements of interiority but also able to order them towards some end. Secondly, the self is capable of making decisions free from any type of determinism, fostering a heightened sense of personal responsibility. Thirdly, ‘affections’ can be ‘harmful’ or ‘helpful’ in the subject’s journey towards the ‘end’ it seeks. Overcoming implies that there are elements in subjectivity that resist or make self-appropriation a difficult task. In other words, there are problematic elements of interiority once ‘directionality’ is established. Ordering implies that there is the possibility of directionality towards a transcendent end lying beyond the subject herself. Ordering also implies the possibility of a principle or end which can ‘order’ or ‘organize’ one’s interiority. Lastly, ‘election’ or ‘establishing a way in life’ engages the entire subject, especially the emotional life.\textsuperscript{15}

Ignatius found penance to be an indispensable tool for self-appropriation.

Towards the end of the First Week, Ignatius gives four useful notes with regard to the practice of penance. The first note in [87] offers three purposes for the practice itself:

- Exterior penances are practiced chiefly for three purposes: first, to make reparation for past sins; second, to overcome self, so that one’s sensual nature may be obedient to reason, and all the lower parts of the self may become more submissive to the higher; third, to seek and find some grace or gift that a person wishes for and desires. For

\textsuperscript{15} In his work \textit{The Spiritual Exercises and the Ignatian Mystical Horizon}, Harvey Egan closely analyzes Ignatius’ anthropology. He includes sections on inordinate attachments, the role of the intellect, the role of the will, the role of emotions, the role of memory and imagination, the role of consolation and desolation, and the role of the application of senses. The entire chapter displays a highly nuanced anthropology that maintains a unified whole of desire, intellect, will, emotion, memory, imagination, and sense. While many of the terms Egan uses may warrant further exploration, they do prove the point that Ignatius’ anthropology was by no means simplistic. See chapter 3 of Harvey D. Egan, \textit{The spiritual exercises and the Ignatian mystical horizon}, Series IV: Study aids on Jesuit topics, no. 5 (St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1976)
instance, one may desire to have inner contrition for one's sins, or to weep abundantly, either over one's sins or over the pains and sorrows endured by Christ our Lord; or one may desire to resolve some present doubt.\footnote{16}

For Ivens, the three purposes of penance are ways in which "the body participates in conversion," which must include "the whole person" if is to be "authentic."\footnote{17} Ivens uses the notion of a bodily participation in conversion to describe the ordering of the "sensual nature" and "the lower parts" with the hope of "inner contrition," and weeping. In other words, the emotions are closely associated with the body and are able to be ordered or controlled to some extent.

Ivens acknowledges that Ignatius is operating under the faculty theology of his time. A contemporary reader may find the association between "lower," "sensual," and "bodily" problematic. However, the meaning of the Exercises is not wed to Ignatius' historical faculty theology. The point for Ivens is that the practice of penance can be a useful tool for 'ordering' interiority. Essentially, it is quite similar to many other forms of bodily self-discipline that aid in meditation and prayer. As the pastoral experience of many spiritual directors attests, body posture is an essential element for prayer. Fundamentally, Ignatius finds there is an intimate connection between 'bodily practices' and interiority.

Conversion, or overcoming of one’s self, is a “graced process of personal integration.” Although the process of conversion through penance has an ascetical dimension to it, it is not necessary to restore Ignatius’ faculty theology to find his notes on penance relevant to a more contemporary theological anthropology. The notion of

\footnote{16} Ivens, \textit{Understanding the Spiritual Exercises}, 72.  
\footnote{17} Ibid.
conversion, when seen as a process of personal integration engaging the whole person, does not depend on an historically remote notion of subjectivity where the lower, unruly sensitive parts are controlled by the higher powers of reason. To the contrary, conversion as a process of personal integration is perfectly viable with Lonergan’s notion of sublation regarding the levels of conscious intentionality. What is most pertinent is that Ignatius sees the possibility of authentic subjectivity in a holistic view of personal integration. While the corporal practice of penance may seem peculiar to the modern mind, its logic is quite sound: ‘the body’ and ‘the mind’ mutually influence each other.\textsuperscript{18} In addition, the third purpose of penance is to bring clarity, consistency, and sincerity to one’s intentionality, making recognition of the “graces” and “gifts” of interiority possible.\textsuperscript{19}

In number [89], the third note on penance, Ignatius prudently makes accommodations in the practice of penance relative to the unique experience of the exercitant. Allowing for alterations in the length, frequency, or intensity of the practice he demonstrates a profound respect for the differences among exercitants and for the different purpose of each week of the Exercises.

When the exercitant still does not find what he or she desires (for instance, tears, consolations, etc.), it is often very profitable to make some alteration in eating and sleeping, and in other penitential practices. Thus we can make changes in our practice, by doing penance for two or three days, and then for another two or three leaving it off, for it

\textsuperscript{18} My intention here is not to resolve the complexities of the “brain / body” connection, but only to indicate that Ignatius’ intuition is by no means outdated or false. While Antonio Damasio’s “somatic marker” hypothesis has caused some controversy among the community of neurologists, it is reasonable to claim that the limbic system, which receives neural data from “the body,” and the prefrontal cortex, which organizes data from the limbic system, mutually influence one another. That is not to claim that practices which could loosely be construed as “bodily” could actually determine sophisticated brain functions, but that (1) there is a complex connection between the two and that (2) there is strong likelihood that the “body” does in fact influence brain function significantly. For more on Damasio’s “somatic-marker” hypothesis, see chapter 8 of Damasio, \textit{Descartes’ error: emotion, reason, and the human brain}

\textsuperscript{19} Ivens, \textit{Understanding the Spiritual Exercises}, 72.
suits some people to do more penance, and others to do less. Moreover, we frequently give up penance through sensuality or because we judge falsely that the human constitution cannot bear it without serious illness. Sometimes on the other hand, thinking that the body can endure it, we practice excessive penance. As God our Lord knows our nature infinitely better than we do, he often allows us through such alterations to perceive what is suitable for each.\footnote{Ibid., 73.}

Ivens explains the third note as follows:

Ignatius assumes that penance of some kind is always called for in the First Week. (In the Second Week, there are times when penance is appropriate and times when it is not, cf [130].) Actual practice however is a highly personal matter; and indeed for some there may be days with penance and days without. But whatever the exercitant's penitential practices, they must be such as to fit in with the Exercises. Like postures in prayer they are changed or persisted in strictly in accordance with the criterion of 'help' or 'hindrance' in relation to the 'end sought'. Decisions about penance must be made in the light of an honest recognition of one's tendencies - to excess or self-indulgence. The statement that God himself gives individuals the graces to know what is suitable for them puts these decisions in the realm of 'discernment' properly so-called. Decisions in the matter of penance are made by the exercitant himself or herself.\footnote{Ibid.}

Here, Ignatius' theological anthropology is reinforced. The subject is capable of knowing her interiority and ordering it to an end. After critical reflection and discernment in consultation with the spiritual director, the exercitant is capable of identifying what practices are most fitting for the end sought. The exercitant is primarily responsible for her own spiritual progress. The director may offer helpful suggestions and insights or ask revealing questions, but it is the exercitant who must discover for herself the best practices for identifying and overcoming the movements of her own interiority.

The means of discovering the usefulness of a particular practice, such as penance, is through what Ignatius calls the “particular examen.” In number [90] Ignatius refers back to the centrality of the examen. As always, the means for identifying the best practice for each exercitant is self-discovery:
The particular examen should be made in order to remove faults and negligences in the practice of the exercises and additions. This holds for the Second, Third and Fourth Weeks as well.\textsuperscript{22}

Some of the recurrent themes operative throughout the Exercises are self-discovery, self-understanding, and self-ordering. Through a process of critical self examination, the exercitant comes to understand himself and his relation to God in increasingly clearer terms.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Numbers [1], [21], and [87] – [90] reveal that self-appropriation is comprised of self-knowledge, overcoming the self, and self-integration. It is foundational for liberty, for ordering one’s interiority, for identifying the Divine Will, and ultimately for the salvation of one’s soul. Since spiritual progress in the Exercises is not simply an achievement of the exercitant’s will, there exists a tension between spiritual progress as \textit{intended} by the exercitant and spiritual progress as \textit{unmerited gift}. It is a ‘graced collaboration.’ Self-appropriation is foundational for the Exercises, but it always operates under the theological notion that self-determination is a process of \textit{co-creation}.
\end{itemize}

2. Desires of the Self

For Ignatius, self-appropriation is intimately linked to one’s complex of desires. The diversity and multitude of desires operating in one’s subjectivity make self-appropriation a challenging endeavor. First, there are desires and corresponding dispositions that are vital for spiritual progress, which are identified in number [5]. Secondly, love of God is the dynamism moving the exercitant through the Exercises. It is a fundamental and requisite desire often eclipsed or overshadowed by other, more

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
immediate desires, which number [370] illustrates clearly. Thirdly, there are numerous impediments and obstacles to authenticity working in one’s interiority. Self-appropriation involves identifying and ridding oneself of attachments that prevent love of God from ordering one’s life; it is conditioned by an attitude of indifference towards that which causes such attachments, a disposition first identified in number [157].

Progress in the Exercises can be helped or hindered by the exercitant’s disposition, attitude, and willingness. While annotation [5] may seem obvious on first reading, it implies a great deal that might be easily overlooked. The Exercises are possible because of the exercitant’s sincere desire for spiritual growth and a profound trust that the Divine Will, operative in the exercitant’s interiority, can be known. Without a magnanimous spirit or great liberality, the exercitant may grow frustrated and give up the quest for self-appropriation:

It is highly profitable for the exercitant to begin the Exercises in a magnanimous spirit and with great liberality towards their Creator and Lord, and to offer him all their powers of desire and all their liberty, so that the Divine Majesty may avail himself of their person and of all they possess, according to his most holy will.23

Ivens finds the fifth annotation to contain “the quintessential spirit of the Exercises.” Anticipating the Contemplatio ad amorem in number [234] at the end of the Fourth Week where the exercitant offers all of her possessions to God, annotation [5] asks the exercitant to offer herself completely, bringing to God all of the resources she may have. While the exercitant’s disposition at the end of the Fourth Week may be marked by a certain quality of élan and spontaneous generosity, it need not be so at the beginning of the Exercises. Even before the Principle and Foundation is given in number [23] the

23 Ibid., 6 [italics mine].

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excipient makes an “incipient self-offering ... with trust in the generosity of God.” Such a generous disposition is “highly profitable” because it helps the excipient attain ‘what she wants’: spiritual freedom and discovery of the Divine Will.  

The phrases magnanimous spirit and liberality are important. Both denote a willingness and desire to overlook potential frustrations, pettiness, or injury. Both foster a climate of profound trust not only in the possibility of discovering the Divine Will but also in the counsel received in spiritual direction. The director and excipient share the same desire, namely for the excipient to discover the Divine Will. Through a process of detailed questioning, the director can help the excipient in achieving this end, as described in annotation [6]. The climate of trust is created by the excipient’s magnanimous spirit.

Liberality towards the Creator implies both a willingness to give or share freely and an absence of narrowness or prejudice in thinking. The “directionality” of such willingness and open-mindedness, towards the Creator, places the excipient in a state of openness and eagerness with regard to the complexities involved in spiritual growth. Discovering the Divine Will in one’s life and ordering one’s life accordingly is closely linked to openness regarding understanding and generosity regarding privately held thoughts, beliefs, and feeling-values.  

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24 Ibid., 7.
25 I use the term “feeling-value” in most instances to replace the term “value” for two reasons: (1) it is very difficult in the Exercises to examine values such as “liberality,” “humility,” or “praise, reverence and service” without a direct connection to certain feelings or ‘affections’ such as indifference or consolation. Values are not rational first principles, ideas, or concepts for Ignatius, but operate primarily in the affections. I use the term “feeling-value” to denote this direct connection, since it does not allow an exclusively rational interpretation of the term value. (2) On page 37 of Method, Lonergan makes the direct connection between feelings and values by writing “intermediate between judgments of fact and judgments of value lie apprehensions of value. Such apprehensions are given in feelings.” I assert that feeling-value is
nourishes the excitant’s proclivity for self-transparency and therefore self-correction.

Both magnanimity and liberality imply a radical openness to self-discovery so the obstacles operating on various levels of subjectivity can be identified and overcome. Both resist any kind of self-righteousness or premature certitude. For Ivens, “approaching God” from the excitant’s perspective involves “magnanimity and liberality, as well as service, praise, reverence, affection, humility, etc.”

While Ignatius envisions an important connection between servile fear, filial fear, and pure love, perfect love transcends all fear. The text of number [370] reveals an important connection between fear and love, both of which are important for the excitant’s spiritual growth.

[370] Given that the motive of pure love in the constant service of God our Lord is to be valued above all, nevertheless we ought also greatly to praise the fear of the Divine Majesty. For not only is filial fear a good and holy thing, but where a person can attain nothing better or more useful, even servile fear can be a great help in rising from mortal sin, and once having risen, one comes easily to filial fear, which is wholly acceptable and pleasing to God our Lord as it is all one with divine love.

For Ignatius, servile fear is a useful starting point. As Ivens explains,

Servile fear is defended (against Luther) as appropriate to a stage in the conversion process but at the end of the process pure love takes over, and in this love the only fear that has a place is the reverential or filial fear that is inseparable from love itself. Pure love, nevertheless, is not lightly to be presumed, and in the course of growth and conversion servile fear, not as a permanent situation but as a step on the way, has real though limited value.

Authentic spiritual progress begins with a profound respect for that which is radically other. In The Idea of the Holy, Rudolph Otto describes the numinous as tremendum et

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26 Ivens, Understanding the Spiritual Exercises, 7.
27 1 John 4:18
28 Ivens, Understanding the Spiritual Exercises, 264.
29 Ibid.
fascinans. Otto sees religious experiences as those that profoundly emphasize the transcendent nature of God and the limitedness of common human experience. Without such a “servile fear” religious experience might slip into the ordinary, something that would comprise the integrity of the experience itself. Without endorsing any particular theology, it is important to understand that fear is often associated with religious experience. It is an indispensable step in spiritual progress. Ivens finds that servile fear helps put ‘restraints on the will,’ bring about the ‘affective space’ for love to grow, and curb the uninhibited expression of ‘unconverted desires.’

Interiority for Ignatius is a complex web of desires. Servile fear is an elementary way of organizing and ordering them.

However, servile fear evolves into “reverential or filial fear” as the soul matures in its relationship with its Creator. Reverential fear sublates servile fear and is closely linked with the perfect love of 1 John 4:18. What begins in an elementary, servile state becomes a sincere, reverent, and deeply-rooted love.

The final phrase of the entire text stresses the centrality of a divine love that constantly seeks to express itself in service. As Ivens explains, “for Ignatius, love of its nature realizes itself in the actions of service. But the love that fully motivates service is a love which consists in the complete gift of self [234], transcending self-love, self-will and self-interest [189].”

Such a divine love is both the self-giving initiative of God and the creature’s free, self-giving response. This final phrase epitomizes a thread working throughout the Exercises: as gratuitously given, God’s love lies beyond the immediate

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.

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control of the exercitant, yet when understood and chosen, it inspires a response-love that expresses itself in service. What begins in gratitude accessed through a process of self-appropriation culminates in service.

While love of God is considered to be the primary or foundational “desire” of the exercitant’s interiority, it is made possible, paradoxically, by desire’s absence: indifference. Having identified the principle and foundation in number [23], the Exercises seek to remove all impediments to Divine love. Such impediments usually take the form of *disordered attachments*, or attachments that may diminish Divine love. The exercitant’s desires are extremely important, meriting both understanding and ordering. Good desires are those that help the exercitant discover God’s self-giving love and evil desires are those that hinder it. Spiritual progress involves strengthening holy desires and fostering indifference towards evil ones.

Number [157] reveals the difficulty of overcoming inordinate attachment:

It is to be noted that when we experience either an *attachment or a repugnance*, which are against actual poverty, when we are not indifferent towards poverty or riches, a great help towards extinguishing such a disordered attachment is to ask in the colloquies (even though it goes against carnal instinct) that Our Lord should choose us for actual poverty, and to desire, beg, and plead for this, provided it be for the service and praise of the Divine Majesty.\(^\text{32}\)

Given during the Second Week, the Three Colloquies are intended to turn the exercitant’s attention from story to self. With the aim of discovering and inspiring the exercitant’s commitment to the Divine Will, the Three Colloquies seek to identify potential impediments. Having reflected on each of the different “states,” the exercitant is to take a careful inventory of the attachments to “his or her own riches and to the fact that

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 119.
indifference in regard to these does not come easily.” Ignatius’ primary concern at this point in the Exercises “is with the degree of commitment that may be called for on our side in order to attain the affective freedom in which to find God’s will.” By identifying attachments that may contradict the Divine Will the exercitant progresses by ‘going against’ the strong desires operative in interiority. All desires are by no means Holy. The indifference mentioned for the first time in number [157] is the appropriate response to desires that are not in line with the overall intent of the Exercises. The foundation for making such judgment regarding one’s desires is always the Divine Will. The exercitant’s prayer for poverty is for the sake of freedom in service of the Divine Will.\textsuperscript{33}

Attachments are many and the road to indifference difficult. Much of the Second Week can be understood as increasing the exercitant’s skill at identifying disordered attachments and nurturing a deep sense of indifference towards anything that is not in line with the Divine Will or a response to Divine love. I examined number [157] in this section to indicate that the self’s desires need to be judged and chosen in light of some higher principle for ordering.

Spiritual progress for the exercitant is aided by three particular feeling-values. First, the exercitant begins from a magnanimous spirit of liberality towards the Creator, creating a radical openness and sincere desire to overcome oneself. Second, a deeply-rooted and profound love for God with an increased awareness of God’s love in the exercitant’s life is the principle, normative desire ordering all others. Thirdly, an adept and astute indifference towards all attachments that are not in line with the Divine Will

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 119-120.
and Divine love foster a profound liberation. All three mutually influence each other, creating a normative standard for authenticity operating in the realm of interiority.

Growth is not only a process of seeking; it is also a process of leaving behind and overcoming. It has a positive and a negative pole.

3. Obstacles to Authenticity

Self-appropriation for St. Ignatius is a combination of self-understanding, "overcoming self," and "ordering" one's life. An authentic person is one who understands herself and orders her life in accordance with what Ignatius calls the Principle and Foundation given in number [23]. Freedom has negative and positive dimensions. Negatively, it is freedom from any form of "disordered attachment," which may inhibit self-understanding or self-ordering. Positively, it is freedom for a more fulfilling way of being as set forth in the Principle and Foundation. Authenticity in theological terms is the capacity to respond freely and generously to God's self-communication. There are a number of obstacles challenging both authenticity and freedom: inordinate attachment, sin, the influence of Lucifer, and cultural biases.

Ridding oneself of disordered affections is the negative purpose of the Exercises. The text of annotation [1] reads: "so 'spiritual exercises' is the name given to every way of preparing and making ourselves ready to get rid of all disordered affections." The ridding of such affections is the aim of the entire First Week. The term 'affection' is central in the language of the Exercises. While affection may have fallen out of common usage when it refers to emotion, it had a particular meaning for Ignatius. Operating on a

34 Ibid., 1.
variety of levels, affections include "the many variants of love and desire, together with their antithesis, hate and fear." They may be "transient feelings" or they may be highly normative, impacting "a person's ways of perceiving reality, making judgments, choosing and acting." Affections have a highly constitutive role in shaping the self and influencing subjectivity. Their influence cannot be dismissed as "lower" or "subordinate" to the faculty of reason. The person for Ignatius is a person constituted by desires. Ivens further notes that a primary aim of the Exercises is for the "conversion of affectivity" so that the Spirit can act freely. The ordering principle with regard to affections is the transcendent end of the human person given in the Principle and Foundation.

In The Spiritual Exercises and the Ignatian Mystical Horizon, Harvey Egan sees disordered affections as inordinate attachments:

The obverse side of Ignatius' theocentric emphasis upon God's Will, therefore, is his implicit anthropocentric emphasis upon the exercitant's integrity and wholeness. This comes to light most clearly in Ignatius' abhorrence of "inordinate attachments." The Ignatian battle is scarcely against the person's God-given nature, nor even against his lower nature. It is against the wrong directions and subjective deformities introduced by the exercitant through his misuse of creatures, his own freedom and his faculties.35

'Ordinate attachments,' then, lead to integrity and wholeness. "Subjective deformities" inhibit the proper use of freedom, the proper functioning of subjectivity, and ultimately lead to the misuse of other 'creatures.' Not only do inordinate attachments inhibit authenticity, they also have a negative impact on interpersonal and social relationships. Subjective deformities have a dynamism of their own:

Ignatius realized that inordinate attachments produce false loves which often coax the exercitant into harmony with them. This vitiates an Election based upon reality, God's reality. God's true call, the vibrations from reality's deepest source, cannot be heard by the truncated, fractured, dissociated, "uncollected" person. The ability to hear God's word

35 Egan, Ignatian Mystical Horizon , 68.
of truth and the true demands of reality depend upon a whole, integral, recollected, unified subjectivity.\textsuperscript{36}

The truncated, fractured, dissociated, "uncollected" person is detached from God's reality. He cannot hear God's word to him or know the demands that word creates; therefore, defective subjectivity operates in a kind of "false reality." Such distortions do not allow the subject to arrive at truth. As a remedy, authenticity involves the ordering and regulating of affections and attachments. It brings integrity into subjectivity, making of it an ordered whole. Authenticity is by no means the mortification of affectivity or attachment, but rather an ordering, regulating, and organizing. To do so necessitates an ordering \textit{principle}.

Theologically, inordinate attachments produce a kind of "static" diminishing the subject's ability to receive God's communication:

Inordinate attachments, therefore, damage the anthropocentric moment of God's Self-communication, because true self-love in the form of subjective integrity is an essential moment in that communication. Inordinate attachments produce subjective "static" which interferes with the reception of God's Self-communication. This explains Ignatius' frequent warnings against inordinate affections, especially as the excercitant approaches the Election.\textsuperscript{37}

When static interferes with God's Self-communication, freedom is impaired; any "election," especially "the election" of the Second Week becomes impossible. Before any life-choice can be made, the subject must function authentically, unmolested by the chaos of inordinate attachments and affections. The aim of the Exercises is the excercitant's healing, unification, and integration. As integrated, the excercitant can be present to his true self, a condition for knowing the Divine Will:

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 68.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 68-69.
Communication with his true self is an essential moment of his reception of God's Self-communication. He cannot know God's Will unless he knows his true self. For this reason, Ignatius expects the exercitant to grow in an experiential ability to know, taste and deal with the slightest disorder in his person.38

Ignatius' theological anthropology necessitates the free and authentic operation of subjectivity. The Divine Will is neither adventitious nor extrinsic. Rather, God's Self-communication operates in the exercitant's interiority ordering it to the end "for which it was created." That is not to claim, theologically speaking, that the interpersonal or social spheres are in any way diminished. It is merely to identify that the Divine Will has a necessary, intimate, and direct relationship to the internal dynamism of the exercitant. The major obstacle impeding discovery of the Divine Will is subjective deformity, most importantly disordered affections and inordinate attachments.

In theological terms, sin is the primary obstacle to both authenticity and freedom. The eschatological, historical, social, and personal consequences of sin are all caused by the same basic violation of the Principle and Foundation. The aim of [50] – [52] during the First Week of the Exercises is for the exercitant to understand and feel the "shame and confusion" that are the consequences of sin operating on a variety of levels.

The first point [50] asks the exercitant to reflect on the first sin:

The first point will be to bring the memory to bear on the first sin, which was that of the angels ... so that by seeking to recall and to comprehend the whole matter I may feel all the more shame and confusion, comparing the one sin of the angels with my many sins. For while they went to Hell for one sin, how many times have I deserved Hell for so many ... When I say: 'bring to memory the sin of the angels', I mean recall how they were created in grace, but not wishing to avail themselves of liberty in order to give reverence and obedience to their Creator and Lord, and falling into pride, they were changed from grace to malice and were cast out of Heaven into Hell. One should next go over the subject in more detail with the understanding, and then arouse the affections of the heart with the will.39

38 ibid., 69.
39 Ivens, Understanding the Spiritual Exercises, 51.
There are a number of elements to note. First, the aim is to engage all of the exercitant’s ‘faculties’: understanding, will, and affections. Subjectively, sin operates on a variety of levels and cannot be relegated to any single ‘faculty.’ Sin is not merely disordered affections, misunderstanding, or poor choice. It has cumulative effects operating on each level of subjectivity. Second, comparing the sin of the angels to the exercitant’s “many sins” elevates and intensifies the concern of the exercitant to sincerely and openly rid herself of them because there is ultimate consequence in doing so. Sin is by no means a benign difficulty, but has a profoundly malicious and destructive character with eschatological consequences. Third, the sin of the angels follows the same pattern of sin in general terms: it is a violation of the organizing quality of the Principle and Foundation. As Ivens writes, “the essence of sin - ours and that of the angels - is, as Ignatius here defines it: the refusal to 'use' one's freedom to give reverence and obedience to one's Creator and Lord, in short the refusal to allow God to be God.”\textsuperscript{40} The “shame and confusion” sought in the prior prelude of [48] is to bring ‘inner knowledge’ of subjective deformity in the realm of the affections. Sin impedes authenticity in the realm of interiority because it scatters the affections and makes the inordinate “movements” normative for behavior. Fourth, reflecting on “the sin of the angels” allows the exercitant to discover that “sin can be committed by pure spirit … is not essentially tied to animal passions, the instability of the human make-up, or the dynamics of human society.”\textsuperscript{41} Sin has profoundly personal and existential elements. Theologically, sin cannot be dismissed

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
as merely a social, psychological, or cultural phenomenon. Sin also operates on the level of “pure spirit,” that is in the personal realm of existential subjectivity.

The second point [51] asks the exercitant to examine in the same way the sin of Adam and Eve. Like that of the angels, “the first human sin” is “the refusal to 'use' the gift of freedom to allow God to be effectively God in one's life.” The first human sin functions historically:

The sin is considered as the hinge of a tragic sequence with a 'before' (earthly paradise - total harmony) and an 'after' (total disharmony with effects for the subsequent history of the human race). 42

The aim of the second point is for the exercitant to appreciate the historical impact of human sin both as inherited and as continuing on into the future. Sin has its own cumulative effects rolling down through the ages. In the second point, the exercitant examines “the corruption that came upon the human race,” since the effects of sin “are never confined within the individual, but reach into the tissues of human society.” 43 Not only does sin have an eschatological component, it also has an historical component operating through the ages.

The third point [52] focuses the exercitant’s attention to personal culpability in the history of sin. It asks the exercitant to examine

the particular sin of any individual who has gone to Hell for a single mortal sin and also the numberless other people who have gone to Hell for fewer sins than I have committed. 'Do the same', I say , with regard to such a third sin, a particular one, calling to memory the gravity and malice of sin against one's Creator and Lord, reflecting with the understanding how someone who has sinned and acted against the infinite goodness has been justly condemned for ever. 44

42 Ibid., 52.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
While the meditation on Hell comes later in the Exercises, the exercitant is asked to
consider the real possibility that a human being could cut himself off from God “by a
single decisive act of rejection or through the erosion of love by a single capital sin
leading to such an act.” Furthermore, God’s just condemnation highlights the gratuitous,
gifted nature of God’s mercy and forgiveness. Escaping “traps and chains” is not merely
the achievement of self-determination. Rather, liberation has an unmerited quality to it.
Meditation on the particular sin of any individual completes the meditation on the three
sins by focusing attention on the exercitant’s own stance with regard to the larger
historical and eschatological function of the consequences of sin. In this way, the
exercitant is asked to locate her subjectivity eschatologically, historically, and socially so
that she may order it to the Principle and Foundation. Operating on a variety of levels, sin
is the primary obstacle to this task. To reveal the “gravitational pull” of sin, the Exercises
ask the exercitant to meditate on Lucifer, the ordering principle of sin itself.

The exercitant’s use of imagination in the Two Standards meditation during the
Second Week of the Exercises plays a crucial role in identifying real obstacles to spiritual
progress.45 Because of disordered attachments, sin prevents authentic Election in the
Second Week. Election is the exercitant’s existential commitment to one of Two
Standards. Having identified the attachments that prevent an authentic election, the
exercitant is to use her imagination to identify the worldview of Christ and Lucifer. To
choose a ‘Standard,’ the exercitant must know it intellectually, affectively, imaginatively,

45 The Two Standards exercise during the Second Week asks the exercitant to imagine two conflicting
standards, one of Christ and the other of Satan. Both standards employ the value-laden symbolism of a
“banner” or flag to inspire membership. It functions as an example of the Second Week’s illuminative
aims.
experientially. The Election of the Second Week involves a total and personal commitment to the Standard of Christ.

To know the Two Standards, the Exercises ask the exercitant to meditate on them. While the exercise *illumines* the Christocentric horizon, it does so, in part, by clearly portraying its antithesis: the Standard of Lucifer. Lucifer’s Standard is powerful, attractive, and one that cannot be easily dismissed or overlooked. When the attraction of Lucifer’s Standard is overlooked or dismissed, the Standard of Christ is obfuscated. Progress in the illumination of Christ’s Standard occurs in part because of its stark contrast to the Standard of Lucifer.

The meditation on the Two Standards begins with three preambles and three preparatory points. In the first preamble [137], the exercitant identifies the context of the meditation: how Christ “calls and desires all to place themselves under His standard, and how Lucifer on the contrary wants everyone under his.”46 One of the major insights of the entire section is that ‘standards’ compete for loyalty.47 Worldview, for Ignatius, does not exist neutrally or in a vacuum.48 Worldview shapes feeling-value, orders affections,

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47 On pages 105 -106, Ivens offers a detailed explanation of the Two Standards, how they fit into the overall sequence of the Exercises, and how one is to approach them. For my argument, I will borrow from Ivens the understanding that a ‘standard’ is a “faith-vision of reality in terms of two value-systems” shaped by “spiritual powers in radical opposition, yet present and at work throughout the world” and working in subtle ways. The power of evil “is shown as operating plausibly yet destructively, through the appeal of objectively legitimate *riches and honours.*” Conversely, life in Christ “is not just a morally correct life, but one that values the paradoxes of spiritual and actual poverty.” Furthermore, the “horizon (again as in the Kingdom Exercise) is that of the world: the minions of evil and the missionaries of Christ build respectively the worlds of Babylon and Jerusalem ... the emphasis is on the negative and positive individual qualities that place a person in one camp or the other, and on the desires that lead to those.” Ibid. 105.
48 I will use the terms “worldview,” “horizon,” and “standard” interchangeably. Each term refers to (1) a person’s chosen matrix of feeling-values, (2) its normative function regarding movements of interiority, and (3) correlative insights emerging from such a commitment. ‘Horizon’ is a term used by Lonergan that I consider synonymous with the Ignatian usage of ‘Standard.’ I use the term ‘Worldview’ occasionally to
and aids in the process of discovering insights that might not otherwise emerge. The process of self-appropriation and the struggle toward authenticity involve judging and choosing one's worldview. Self-appropriation is not only a process of liberating one from disordered attachment but also a process of electing a standard by which one will order one’s feeling-values, one’s affections, one’s life. Electing a Standard, to use Lonergan’s terms, is an exercise of essential freedom, of vertical liberty.

The third preamble [139] identifies a central aim of the entire meditation: to know concretely “the deceptions practiced by the evil leader.” Lucifer, the evil leader, is capable of great deception. Such deception is not merely the deception of the foolish masses or the ignorant, but includes a very real self-deception that is often overlooked.

Evil for Ignatius has a dynamism of its own, which is made clear in the three points comprising the meditation on Lucifer’s standard:

[140] The first point is to imagine the leader of all the enemy powers as if he were seated in the great plain of Babylon, as though on a throne of fire and smoke, a horrible fearsome figure.

[141] The second point is to consider how he summons forth countless demons, and disperses them, some to one city and others to another, thus covering the entire world, leaving out no region, no place, no state of life, nor any individual.

[142] The third point is to consider the speech he makes to them; how he orders them to lay traps and chains, and he tells them that first they must tempt people to covet wealth (this is his way in most cases), so that they might come more readily to the empty honours of the world, and in the end to unbounded pride.49

The use of imagination is an attempt to “unmask” a hidden power. Specific aspects of Lucifer’s hidden power and its corresponding influence on human behavior are

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49 Ivens, Understanding the Spiritual Exercises, 108 [italics added].
highly symbolized: Lucifer’s throne represents power, fire and smoke represent
destruction and obfuscation respectively, and Babylon represents the insight that Evil is
not confined to “Hell” but operates in “this world.”\textsuperscript{50} By making the symbolic association
between “earthly” power, destruction, confusion, and a concrete historical location, the
Exercises encourage the excitant to bring such highly charged theological elements into
the fabric of her own lived experience, making them relevant to the fabric of the
excitant’s life. They are not theological abstractions but imagery that exert a profound
influence on subjectivity, especially the ordering of feeling-values.

The demons of the second point \textsuperscript{141} are “malevolent preternatural influences,”
which are not to be dismissed as the mere “not-quite serious, almost pantomime,
associations that might be evoked in a modern reader.”\textsuperscript{51} One does not need to endorse
Ignatian cosmology to find meaning in the possibility of malevolent preternatural
influences. By malevolent, a contemporary reader might understand the term to mean
self-destructive. Without positing the ontological status of a transcendent evil, one might
just as easily interpret malevolent to mean that which is not ultimately meaningful or
fulfilling, but only deceptively so. To disagree with Ignatius’ sixteenth-century
cosmology is by no means to negate the value of this meditation or the Exercises
themselves. It is important for the excitant, at this point, to examine critically his own
‘cosmology’ and to determine what a malevolent force might be. The term
‘preternatural,’ similarly, does not necessitate a complicated or nuanced theology of the
“supernatural” operating in the “natural.” More basically, the integrity of the meditation

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
is not challenged with a simple understanding of ‘preternatural’ as that which is not categorically determined or exhaustively explained by ‘sciences’ of interiority. In other words, ‘preternatural’ can also mean transcending the causal explanations made available by contemporary scientific disciplines. The ‘preternatural’ has both a “hidden” quality and a “transcendent” quality, making human experience more than what can be causally explained or determined in a simplistic manner. The notion of “preternatural influence” reveals a genuine resistance to the easy temptations of psychological determinism. Lastly, the term “influence” suggests that such “malevolent preternatural” powers exert some pressure on an exercitant’s subjectivity. They are not merely extrinsic values to be “chosen” and made one’s own, but operate “actively” in one’s culture and in one’s own subjectivity, consciously and intentionally at times, unconsciously and unintentionally at others. My primary point is that the meaning and integrity of the Exercises is not contingent on Ignatius’s sixteenth-century cosmology. Of course, it is up to the exercitant to make such meaning relevant to her own lived experience.

Another important item to note about Lucifer’s influence is that it does not reveal any intelligible and constructive pattern or design. As Ivens writes, “Satan works also, of course, through people but without divulging his real purpose to them, while Christ’s friends know their master’s business (John 15:15).” Ignatius sees the true nature of Evil to be one that confuses and therefore destroys. Only God’s creative activity is ordered and constructive.

The preternatural malevolent influence of Lucifer is “cosmic.” No individual, place, or state of life is beyond the reach of evil and self-deception. Lucifer’s army of

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52 Ibid., 108.
demons is comprised of cities around the world. For Ignatius, the struggle between Christ and Lucifer, between good and evil, between authenticity and unauthenticity is a global one.

The third point [142] contains a number of important symbols. First, Lucifer makes a speech, or a ‘briefing,’ which Ivens understands to be an “Ignatian device to aid objectivity.” On an elementary level, the malevolent preternatural influences are closely linked with human speech, words, word usage, and persuasion. Evil is a coercive and persuasive force, not merely a passive “lack of.” Lucifer’s strategy is to win support and allegiance, but it is up to the exercitant to recognize that strategy without analyzing its “practical implications in any degree of detail” at this point in the Exercises. Meditating on Lucifer’s speech involves “a certain unpacking of the operative words.” The traps and chains denote a form of bondage caused by the apparently benign character of the harmless yet attractive. To covet is not the mere possession of, but the wanton craving for. It denotes an attitude that regards possession as an absolute right or of people who ‘put their trust in riches.’ The threefold connection between riches, honor, and pride denote a central obstacle throughout the Exercises. Literally the words refer to material possessions and social status. In a broader sense, they could also be understood as anything “that meets the inherent human need for identity, security, esteem, love.” The threefold connection between riches, honor, and pride create a possible “stance” or standard by which our desires and criteria for judgments of feeling-value are established. Such a stance determines “the kind of persons we are and want to be in relation to God and others.” The most significant of the three is pride. It is a stance in relation to God that

53 Ibid., 109.
refuses to give praise and reverence, "and hence a tendency, in however subtle a way, to try to establish oneself as absolute." In this way, pride is closely linked to a disordered desire for those things that build and affirm the self in an absolutized way.\textsuperscript{54} In Lucifer's standard, pride operates as a constant source of self-referential feeling-value.

The riches, honor, and pride of Lucifer's standard are a direct violation of the of [23]'s Principle and Foundation. Knowing precisely the elements of Lucifer's standard helps the exercitant make an election between the two opposing standards and commit more fully to the Standard of Christ. In my opinion, the value of the meditation on Lucifer's Standard is not to offer two plausible ways of living but to clearly recognize the path that leads to emptiness, demise, confusion, existential angst. In contrast to the meditation on Lucifer's Standard, the Exercises offer the Standard of Christ in the third point [146]: it begins with poverty, proceeds to humility over and against "worldly honour," and culminates in humility over and against pride. "From these three steps" writes Ivens "they can lead everyone to all the other virtues."\textsuperscript{55} The poverty espoused by Christ's Standard "uses and enjoys" the gifts of riches and honor for the sake of God's service and praise. The primary conflict is between Lucifer's Standard of pride and worldly power and Christ's Standard of "humility," the God-centered way of being that "acknowledges one's need for God and trusts God with one's life and happiness." For a humble person, "poverty" is of value because it creates "the space in which to live by trust."\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 110.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 111.
The meditation on Lucifer's Standard is intended to elicit an existential commitment toward a God-centered way of being: a stance. One's entire being is shaped by such an 'election' including one's feeling-values, one's desires, one's affections, and one's understanding. Ignatius demonstrates a deep appreciation for the way one elects a stance within a cultural context. One of the malevolent preternatural influences is cultural bias.

The final obstacle to self-appropriation and authenticity is what I will call cultural bias. While the Exercises may treat cultural bias in an oblique manner, I contend that Ignatius is deeply aware of and concerned with cultural bias as a malevolent preternatural influence. Without intending to claim that the threefold connection between riches, honor, and pride is necessarily universal or trans-historical, I will contend that Ignatius himself seems to take a critical stance towards the culture in which he was immersed. For proof, I will turn to his autobiography.\(^{57}\)

Reflecting back on his life, Ignatius found that "until the age of twenty-six he was a man given up to the vanities of the world, and his chief delight used to be in the exercise of arms, with a great and vain desire to gain honor."\(^{58}\) While his colleagues made the argument to surrender in a battle with the French at Pamplona, Ignatius courageously convinced them to continue fighting. He was wounded severely and was forced to surrender. He was returned to his home country where doctors treated him. His bones began to "knit one with another," although one leg was significantly deformed.

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\(^{58}\) Ibid., 13. Ignatius refers to himself in the third person and as the pilgrim throughout his autobiography.
The young Ignatius stubbornly refused to accept such a deformity, “for he was set on following the world and he considered this would disfigure him.” He asked surgeons if the leg could be cut. Reluctantly, the doctors agreed that it could be done, but that “the pain would be greater than all those he had undergone before, given it was now healed and it would need time to cut it.” Ignatius “decided to make a martyr of himself out of self-will.”

While he was recovering from such an invasive procedure, he was forced to remain in bed and read many ‘tales of chivalry’ and other ‘false books’ to pass the time. Of the many “vain things which had previously presented themselves to him,” one in particular stirred his affections: the thought of his noble service to a certain lady, which included “witty love poems,” romantic words, and “deeds of arms.” In Ignatius of Loyola: The Pilgrim Saint, José Idigoras finds Ignatius’ sentiment at the time similar to the chivalrous, knight-errantry of Don Quixote. As Don Quixote explains, he rides “beneath the banner of love and chivalry.” Idigoras finds Ignatius’ desire to read tales of chivalry very revealing:

We might consider his [Ignatius’] attraction to tales of chivalry in the light of what Rof Carballo has written concerning Don Quixote’s madness. He says that its origin was not so much in his having read fictional books of knight-errantry as it was his lack of an affective life. Why, he asks, did he [Ignatius] take refuge in reading such books ... he ascribed great importance to the typical wanderings of the knight.

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59 Ibid., 14.
60 Ibid., 15.
62 Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, The adventures of Don Quixote, trans. J. M. Cohen, Penguin classics (Harmondsworth, Eng.: New York, 1950), 202 [italics added]. It is useful to note the use of the term banner to describe Don Quixote’s allegiance to “the perfection of chivalry” (p 202) and Ivens use of ‘banners’ as a way of understanding the two “standards” of [137]. See Ivens, p. 107.
63 Tellechea Idigoras, Ignatius of Loyola: the pilgrim saint , 118.
Whatever the psychological implications may be, it is clear that Ignatius himself became rather “attached to what he found written there” and could spend hours “absorbed in thought ... imagining what he might do in service of a certain lady.” It wasn’t until he experienced consolation from reading the lives of the saints that he could compare the lingering “content and happy” feelings with the “dry and discontented” feelings lingering after he read tales of chivalry. He would later understand them to be “the difference in kind of spirits that were stirring: the one from the devil, and the other from God.”

The connection Idigoras makes between the common fancies of a recovering Ignatius and Don Quixote reveals a common cultural bias that both seem to have shared: the perfection of chivalry. For Ignatius this included adventurous travel, witty love poems, and deeds of arms all in the service of a woman whose favor he could never attain; her state was higher than that of ordinary nobility. Ignatius’ “chimerical dreams,” according to Idigoras, did not emerge from the hopeless affections of a “beaten, disheartened man” but from an active, fantastic imagination. That Ignatius could not put these dreams into action was of no concern to him: “he was aware that they had taken complete possession of him.” The “perfection of chivalry” that ordered Don Quixote’s interiority seems to have ordered Ignatius’ as well. It was not until a holy, graced desire “to imitate the saints” placed a journey to Jerusalem in his imagination that Ignatius began to forget his past thoughts. The tales of chivalry and the lives of the saints “battled” for Ignatius’ attention, parallel in many ways to the Two Standards meditation

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64 Loyola, *Reminiscences*, 14.
65 Ibid., 15.
67 Loyola, *Reminiscences*, 16.
of the Second Week. The perfection of chivalry functions as a standard with its own banner, its own set of feeling-values, and its own ordering of affections. It was nothing short of a conversion on a sickbed that allowed Ignatius to examine a completely new worldview: the Standard of Christ.
Chapter Five: Method, Structure, and the Transcendent in the Spiritual Exercises

Chapter four proved that self-appropriation is foundational for the Spiritual Exercises. Comprised of discovery, knowledge, liberation from disordered affections, and mastery, self-appropriation is essential for spiritual progress in the Exercises. However, self-appropriation is not an unstructured, haphazard, random process. To the contrary, the Spiritual Exercises employ a method that operates within a structure. There is a discernable pattern of operations that yield cumulative and progressive results. I will show in this chapter that the pattern operates heuristically, helping the excercitant discover a transcendent source of feeling-value.

1. The Method of the Spiritual Exercises

Regarding method, two fundamental sets of questions emerge: (1) do the Spiritual Exercises employ a method? If so, what is it? (2) Are the Exercises structured? If so, what is the structure? Both sets of questions have significant implications for my overall argument. If the Exercises do not employ a method or lack a discernable structure, they are not a viable resource for ethicists. If the Exercises were merely a collection of aphorisms, they risk being reduced to the extreme situation ethics that Rahner identifies as problematic. They would be superfluous to the structured pattern of moral decision-
making. If religious experience is to be a credible source for discriminating and ordering feeling-values, it must have a stable basis and a firm foundation.

Do the Exercises employ a method? To answer the question, I will focus on three items of Lonergan’s definition of method: operations, normative pattern, and cumulative and progressive results. I do not intend to prove conclusively that Lonergan did or did not have the Exercises in mind when he defined method in the opening pages of *Method in Theology*. I do intend to show that the activities of the Exercises operate in such a way that they fit many of the criteria of Lonergan’s definition.

Firstly, the operations that Lonergan describes in *Method* are intentional activities: inquiry, observation, description, discovery, formulation, deduction, and experimentation.¹ All of these operations / activities are done intentionally by an operator. In the same vein, annotation [1] of the Exercises lists examining one’s conscience, meditating, contemplating, and praying as “spiritual exercises.” In both cases, the activities are intentional activities of an acting subject.

The second relevant item is normative pattern. The intentional activities of the Exercises listed in annotation [1], which I will call *prayer* for sake of simplicity, form a normative pattern.² Pattern implies a diversity of intentional activities used in a recurrent and related fashion. The different intentional activities (such as the examination of conscience and contemplation) recur throughout the Exercises, while the particular

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² I use the term prayer as an umbrella term to include all of the activities listed in annotation [1]. While there are significant nuances that distinguish these activities, I use prayer in this way to avoid distinctions that will be a distraction to my overall argument. Ivins lists the traditional types of prayer (lectio, meditatio, oratio, contemplatio) on page 3 of *Understanding the Spiritual Exercises*.
effects of these activities are related to one another and form a pattern of operations. This pattern of operations is normative because it establishes a standard, a way of proceeding.

Thirdly, the normative pattern yields cumulative and progressive results. The effects of prayer move the Exercitant from one week to the next when the gifts particular to each week are identified. There exists an overall structure present in the Exercises. I will spend the rest of this section answering the two sets of questions above by showing that (1) prayer is the method of the Exercises and (2) the Four Weeks of the Exercises constitute its structure.

Prayer is foundational for the Exercises. Comprised of various intentional activities, prayer enables the exercitant to discover the God to be found in all things. The activities of the Exercises include slow, ruminative reading, meditation, imagined dialogue, and contemplation - known traditionally as lectio, meditatio, oratio, and contemplatio.  

As an intentional operation, prayer has different goals at different times throughout the Four Weeks. However, a common ‘end’ for prayer is to rouse the affections, since “the Exercises are ordered 'not so much to knowledge and speculation as to the affections and to the activity of the will’.” To assimilate the material of the Exercises, and therefore to progress through the Four Weeks, is not to exhaust the explanatory value of the discursive reason. To the contrary, the assimilation of material is to establish a ‘solid foundation’ by starting with some degree of discursive reason, but then to move “from the level of reason to that of the affections, from the ‘given’ to the

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3 Ivens, *Understanding the Spiritual Exercises*, 3.
4 Ibid.
personal, from the complex to the simple.” The material for Ignatius engages the entire subject: intellectually, affectively, and spiritually. Material is not merely something to be understood. The primary aim of prayer is often for ‘inner knowledge’ or to arouse the affections operating on many levels. They can be transient and fleeting fancies, yet they can also change one’s perception of reality. They influence and often make possible the subject’s capacity for judgment, decision, and action. Never to be taken lightly, affections for Ignatius are equivalent in many ways to Lonergan’s understanding of noetic striving. The affections are constitutive of human being.

The importance of the affections is evident in annotations [2] and [3]:

[2] For it is not much knowledge but the inner feeling and relish of things that fills and satisfies the soul.

[3] Throughout the following spiritual exercises we make use of the understanding in order to think things over, and of the will in order to rouse the affections. We should therefore note that in the activity of the will when we speak vocally or mentally with God our Lord or with his saints, greater reverence is required on our part than when we use the intellect to understand.

Unlike a cursory kind of knowledge, ‘inner feeling’ and ‘relish’ are the movements that both fill and satisfy the soul. With the distinction between “much knowledge” and “inner feeling and relish” in mind, Ivens explains that the distinction is not between the objective and the subjective, but rather between different levels of knowing:

the knowledge that exists solely or largely on the level of intellect, and the felt knowledge which involves the affections. The latter will be referred to in the Exercises as inner knowledge ... It can be called 'inner' in two senses: it belongs to the 'interior' (or heart) of the person knowing; and it penetrates beyond the immediately obvious to the 'inner' mystery of the person or truth known.

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 4 [italics added].
7 Ibid.
The 'higher' or 'more inner' levels of knowing do not negate the 'lower' or 'more external.' Inner knowledge completes and perfects outer knowledge.

Another important distinction with regard to the 'faculties' is between understanding and will. Prayer in the Exercises engages both the understanding (i.e., the 'faculty' of reason) and the will (i.e., the affective 'faculty'). The word 'heart' can often be substituted for will in the Exercises and in classical spiritual literature in general. While understanding is important, the affections are more reverent. The primary attitude of heart with regard to God is reverence [38], since the creature was made to praise, reverence, and serve the Creator [23]. Since loving reverence is the "essential stance of the creature before God," the soul seeks more than rational understanding.\(^8\)

Ignatius' nuanced understanding of prayer is evident in the three ways of prayer given in the Fourth Week [238] to [260]. In many respects, the three ways of prayer reveal Ignatius' understanding of spiritual progress: purging the subject of sin so that deeper understanding will lead to an increasingly more intimate relationship with God.

The First Way of praying measures the subject's interiority and actions against the communal norms of the Ten Commandments and the Seven Deadly Sins.

[238] The first way of praying is concerned with the Ten Commandments and the Seven Deadly Sins, the Three Powers of the Soul and the Five Senses of the Body. This way of praying aims more at providing a framework, a method and certain exercises through which to prepare oneself and to make progress in order that one's prayer may be acceptable to God, rather than by giving any framework and method for prayer properly so-called.\(^9\)

Here, Ignatius does not employ anything that is not well established in the confession manuals of the time used to foster self-examination in preparation for sacraments. He

\(^8\) Ibid., 5.
\(^9\) Ibid., 181.
uses the Ten Commandments and the Seven Deadly Sin in a general perspective not as an end but as a means to a deeper relationship with God. In the First Way of prayer, they are not meant to be used as an external source for judging behavior, but as a way to interiorize a vision of reality coming from spiritual progress. The exercitant reflects on each commandment, beginning with the first and asking ‘how have I kept it? How have I failed to keep it?’ When one is not in the habit of sinning against it, there is no need to spend a long time on it, “but according as one offends more against a Commandment or less, so one should spend more time or less in the consideration and examination of it.”

As the starting point for the First Way of prayer, the Ten Commandments are an objective, positive standard for the ongoing creation of a vision of reality.

In [244], the Seven Deadly Sins provided an objective, negative standard to be avoided in contrast to the positive standard of the Ten Commandments. Number [245] offers a further aid to “better knowledge of one’s fault’s [sic] in relation to the Seven Deadly Sins,” suggesting an examination of their contraries: “i.e., humility (pride); generosity (avarice); chastity (lust); patience (anger); temperance (gluttony); charity (envy); diligence (sloth).” Numbers [246] and [247] ask the exercitant to examine the powers of the soul (memory, will, and understanding) and the five bodily senses respectively. Both [246] and [247] show Ignatius’ notion of what it means to love God entirely: as a being with a soul and as a sensate being. The entire person was created to praise, reverence, and serve; therefore, there is no element in subjectivity that does not participate in some fashion in the overall purpose of human being.

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10 Ibid., 183. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 184.
The Second Way of praying aims at eliciting the felt, inner knowledge operating through the affections. As [249] states, “the second way of praying consists in contemplating the meaning of each word in a prayer.”\textsuperscript{13} As a being of language, the exercitant is to consider deeply the words used to convey meaning:

[252] The Second Way of praying is as follows. One either kneels or sits down, according as one feels better disposed and experiences more devotion. Keeping the eyes closed, or fixed on one spot, without allowing the gaze to wander, one says the word ‘Father’, staying with this word for as long as one finds meanings, comparisons, relish and consolation in considerations related to it. One should do this for each word of the Our Father, or for any other prayer which one may wish to take for praying in this way. ...

[254] Second rule. If in contemplating the Our Father one finds in one or two words rich matter for reflection and much relish and consolation, there should be no anxiety to go further, even though the whole hour is spent on what has been found. When the hour is up, the remainder of the Our Father should be said in the usual way. ...

[257] Second note. When a prayer is ended, one should turn to the person to whom the prayer has been addressed, and in a few words ask for the virtues or graces for which one feels greater need.\textsuperscript{14}

Focusing the attention on the meaning conveyed through words exclusively, the exercitant transcends the language itself and begins to grasp the referent of the words themselves. As with many items in the Exercises, the rules and notes are guidelines pertaining to the unique disposition of the exercitant and cannot be read as rigid rules operating irrespective of the exercitant’s experience. One may find relish and inner knowledge in one portion of a prayer while another finds nothing.

The aim for the Second Way is to rouse the affections through contemplation. Ivens explains that the word ‘contemplate’ indicates the overall character of the Second Way and is similar to other words, such as ‘devotion’ [252], ‘relish,’ ‘consolation’ [252, 254]. Authentic Christian contemplation presumes knowledge and love of Christ.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 186.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
developed through contemplation of the Gospels. A person is shown the Second Way only after having become experienced in the life and mysteries of Christ.\textsuperscript{15} For example, in the contemplation of [101],

the exercitant is introduced to the imaginative contemplation of the Gospel. As a method, this consists in entering imaginatively into the Church's faith memories of Jesus in such a way as to experience oneself as present to the situations and episodes of the Gospel, and in them to meet Jesus and other Gospel persons as real flesh and blood human beings ... Because of this the events contemplated belong not only to the past but to the present of every believer, whom they provide with the materials of an interpersonal relationship with the Christ of the now. In contemplating a Gospel narrative a believer truly in search of God and his will encounters the living Christ, who through his narrative reaches out to such persons, drawing them into union with himself, and sharing with them his own vision and desires.\textsuperscript{16}

Contemplation of the Gospels brings Christ into personal contact with the exercitant. In this way of reading, the exercitant goes beyond the text itself and encounters the Christ of relationship, making the given of the narrative a personal, inner perception [2] and inner knowledge [63] [118]. The Exercises identify such a gift as the fruit of meditation or contemplation.

The Third Way of praying is a somatic prayer of rhythm:

[258] \ldots The Third Way of praying consists in praying mentally with each intake or expulsion of breath, by saying one word of the Our Father \ldots so that only a single word is pronounced between one breath and the next. In the interval between each breath attention is especially paid to the meaning of that word, to the person to whom one is praying or to one's own lowliness or to the distance between the other's grandeur and one's own lowliness.\textsuperscript{17}

The Third Way is also concerned with meaning at the depth of the Second Way, but through a somatic integration into “one’s very consciousness and one’s very bodily rhythms.”\textsuperscript{18} Increasingly more ‘interior,’ prayer becomes part of the fabric of being from

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 187.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 90.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 189.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
the level of breathing to the level of understanding and felt, inner knowledge. Prayer in
the Exercises engages the entire subject. It is far more than mere petition or heightened
self-awareness; it is an intentional appropriation of Christocentric feeling-values.

For many mystics, the soul progresses through three distinct stages of increasing
intimacy with God: the purgative, the illuminative, and the unitive. As Ivens notes, the
three together form three aspects of Christian life, any one of which may predominate in
a particular situation or time. While the 'higher' stages can become increasingly more
habitual, they never eliminate the need of the lower. Conversion from sin, characterized
by the purgative First Week, is never completely transcended. Both Teresa of Ávila and
John of the Cross grew in awareness of their own sinfulness as they became more
intimate with God. Having become cognizant of and committed to combating the
influence of sin in one's life, the illuminative way brings a certain "lucidity of spirit" and
"spontaneity of response." The Second Week exercitant grows in her awareness of "the
Kingdom" and of its "King." Many leading commentators place the Fourth Week, and
perhaps the Third, under the 'unitive way,' although Ignatius makes few explicit
references to the three ways.19 Lonergan's notion of sublation is helpful in understanding
the relationship between the three ways.

The Exercises presuppose that spiritual progress happens in stages and is
conditioned, in part, by the activity and experience of the exercitant. The Exercises
operate under a number of rules relative to the subject that emerge from the exercitant's
life and prayer experience. In a climate of openness and trust, the director seeks to help
the exercitant find the Divine Will previously and presently at work in her life. Sound

19 Ibid., 10-11.
spiritual direction may recommend going against what the excitant feels at certain times while going with it at others. The Exercises do follow a structure, but it is a flexible structure relative to the needs and “graces” of the excitant at a particular time.

The rules of the Exercises emerge from experience. Annotation [8] makes this point explicitly:

[8] As the giver of the Exercises becomes aware of the excitant's particular needs in the matter of desolations and the tricks of the enemy, as well as in the matter of consolations, instructions can be given about the rules of the First and Second Weeks for recognizing various spirits [313-327], [328-336].

The rules of the Exercises are not a set, finite construction which the excitant acquires at a specified point of the program. To the contrary, they are intended “to speak directly to experience,” making explanation of them necessary only when they emerge. It was the practice of the early directors not to ‘give’ the rules to the excitant, but to ‘explain’ them. When the rules are grounded in experience, some are necessary while others are irrelevant. Not all of the rules apply to every excitant; therefore, the rules function as guidelines more than boundaries.

When the rules are given, they demand significant commitment and great discipline on the part of the excitant. Annotation [12] warns against curtailing the time spent in prayer, and encourages the excitant “to find contentment in the thought that a full hour has indeed been spent in that exercise - and more, if anything, rather than less.” While some of the rules spelled out in the annotations may not be applicable to an

\[20\] Ibid., 9.
\[21\] Ibid.
\[22\] Ibid., 12.
exercitant’s experience, there are others that remain constant regardless of experience. As always, the criteria for judgment is the Divine Will.

Such fluid, yet fixed rules rely on openness and transparency. The exercitant must be open and honest with his director if there is to be progress. Anything that is hidden might eventually harm the director’s ability to help the exercitant locate the Divine Will. Often, the exercitant is unaware of sinful influences and uncovering them is a significant grace. The exercitant must attain a certain degree of transparency both to himself through self-knowledge and to his director through openness and honesty. As annotation [17] explains,

There is much profit to be gained if the giver of the Exercises, without wishing to inquire about or know the exercitant’s personal thoughts or sins, is given a faithful account of the various agitations and thoughts brought about by the different spirits; for then depending on the greater or less profit to be gained, the giver can provide some spiritual exercises appropriate and suited to the needs of a soul agitated in this way.23

Ivens notes that agitations and thoughts are not mere “abstract ideas,” but rather “movements of the spirits” that involve imagination and feeling and tend towards interior or exterior actions. For the director to help the exercitant discern the spirits, the exercitant must be consciously aware of his own interiority and share it faithfully with his director. The rules, then, are not merely aimed at behavior; they touch on virtually every aspect of the exercitant’s experience from imagination to feeling to diet to body posture. The Exercises are concerned with the subject in a profoundly holistic way.

The rules of the Exercises not only emerge from experience, they are also relative to the exercitant. Rules of one week often run contrary to the rules of another, as is clear in annotation [9]:

23 Ibid., 17.
If the exercitant is a person versed in matters of the spirit, and experiences gross and manifest temptations - such as those in which hardships, human respect, or fear inspired by worldly honour are suggested as obstacles to progress in the service of God our Lord - the giver should not talk about the Second Week rules for various spirits. For just as the First Week rules will be very profitable to such a person, so will those of the Second Week do harm, as the matters they deal with will be too subtle and too elevated to be understood.\(^{24}\)

The premise of annotation [9] is quite simple. As the exercitant makes progress, there are more concerns and more subtleties that would make ‘exceptions’ detrimental if given too soon. A small anecdote supports the premise: multiplying numbers greater than 1 increases their value (rule). However, for numbers between 0 and 1, multiplying decreases their value (exception). As elementary school teachers know, it is essential to master the rule first before entertaining the possibility of the exception. The same premise applies to spiritual progress in the Exercises. Consolation, as a rule, needs to be examined in general terms before deceptions within consolation or temptations under the appearance of the good can be examined. As annotation [14] illustrates, even when the exercitant has experienced consolation and is “full of fervour,” it is still not advisable to make any “unthinking or precipitate promise or vow,” since “careful consideration must be given to the individual temperament and capabilities of the exercitant, as well as to the helps or hindrances that may be met with in fulfilling promises that such a person might want to make.”\(^{25}\) Ivens cautions against three factors: strong emotion, an unstable personality, and high chance of failure. Ignatius’ position was that “grace creates new capacities.”\(^{26}\) In determining the rules to be given to the exercitant [9] and identifying

\(^{24}\) Ibid., 10.
\(^{25}\) Ibid., 12.
\(^{26}\) Ibid., 13.
possible decisions rooted in consolation [14], the wise director is always making suggestions relative to the exercitant.

At times, the exercitant’s strongest feelings can be problematic. As annotation [13] illustrates, there are times when the exercitant ought to actively ‘go against’ them (agendo contra):

It should also be noted that whereas in time of consolation it is easy and undemanding to remain in contemplation for the full hour, in time of desolation it is very difficult to last out. Consequently, in order to act against desolation and to overcome temptation, the exercitant must always stay on a little more than the full hour, so as to get into the way not only of resisting the enemy, but even of defeating him completely.²⁷

Once a tendency, movement, or disposition is identified as disordered (in Ignatian usage), it ought to be handled by a “deliberate emphasis on its opposite, in order eventually to find the mean.” Agendo contra is found frequently in the Exercises (e.g. [16, 325, 350, 351]). The aim of ‘going against’ is to operate against excessive rigor and indulgence. The principle of agendo contra is to root out or overcome a disordered attachment, as is further explained in annotation [16]:

if the soul in question happens to be attached or inclined to something in an ill-ordered way, it is very useful for her to do all in her power to bring herself round to the contrary of that wrong attachment ... One must then set one’s heart on what is contrary to this. One should be instant in prayers and other spiritual exercises, and ask God our Lord for the contrary, namely, not to want the appointment or benefice or anything else, unless the Divine Majesty gives a right direction to one’s desires and changes the first attachment, so that the motive for desiring or keeping this thing or that be solely the service, honour and glory of the Divine Majesty.²⁸

As stated clearly in the Principle and Foundation of [23], all things aim at God’s greater glory. It is the organizing principle for everything, which includes the movements of interiority. Annotation [16] summarizes the way Creator and creature work together in

²⁷ Ibid., 11.
²⁸ Ibid., 15.
decision. As Ivens explains, “the key to the whole process is desire.” God’s action within the exercitant “consists primarily in giving the grace of desire for the service and glory of God … as the criterion for choice precisely in one’s present situation.”

The challenge, then, for exercitant and director is to locate the Divine Will in the complex of desires operating in interiority. The director should not encourage the exercitant in any direction, other than through clarifying how the Divine Will is at work:

[15] The one giving the Exercises must not encourage the exercitant more towards poverty or to the promise of it rather than to the contrary, nor to one state or way of life than to another ....during these Spiritual Exercises, it is more opportune and much better that in the search for the divine will the Creator and Lord communicate himself to the faithful soul, inflaming that soul in his love and praise, and disposing her towards the way in which she will be better able to serve him in the future.

When the exercitant experiences an authentic desire or an ‘inflamed soul,’ in Ignatius’ language, the disposition of love will transform “the affectivity” taking up “the whole person in the desire to do God’s will.” A distinction emerges between strong desire and strong desire to follow the Divine Will. The director’s role is to identify the normative source of judgment, the Divine Will, at work in the exercitant. As such, the primary role of the director “is to accompany the exercitant towards a relationship between God and creature” into which another ought not to intrude.

Since identifying the Divine Will depends, in part, on the relative ‘liberty’ of the exercitant from disordered attachments, there are levels of spiritual progress. Annotation [11] warns that “it will be an advantage that nothing should be known of what has to be

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29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 13-14.
31 Ibid., 14.
32 Ibid.
done in the Second Week"\footnote{Ibid., 11.} when the exercitant is still very much in the First. The aim of the First Week ought to be exclusive unless and until the exercitant experiences the graces relative to that week. As Ignatius wisely observes, temptations and challenges are relative to the progress of the exercitant. So, for example, “the enemy of human nature tempts more under the appearance of good when persons are exercising themselves in the illuminative life” than during “the purgative life, which corresponds to the exercises of the First Week.”\footnote{Ibid., 10.}

The Exercises are firmly grounded \textit{in the present}. They do not allow the exercitant to remain too long in the past, although one’s life story necessarily includes the past, or to escape into the future. The Exercises are radically centered in the present:

\footnote{Ibid., 11.} While the exercitant is in the First Week, it will be an advantage that nothing should be known of what has to be done in the Second Week. Rather, the exercitant should strive to obtain what is being sought in the First Week as though nothing good were to be hoped for in the Second.\footnote{Ibid., 11.}

Even though annotation [4] indicates the overall structure of the Exercises, many of the details are not given to the exercitant precisely because of the temptation to be overly concerned with what is coming up. The graces of the weeks presuppose a whole-hearted and total commitment to the task at hand.

The structure of the Exercises allows for certain \textit{flexibility}. Knowing that only some would be able to devote an entire month to the Exercises, Ignatius offers various adaptations that are suited to individuals in a variety of ways. While annotations [18] to [20] require the exercitant’s fidelity to the program of the Exercises in its entirety and its
sequence, there are certain principles of adaptation made for daily life or seclusion. They are a tremendous resource for meeting a "variety of situations and personal needs" and are not merely for those who are able to undergo the full thirty days.\textsuperscript{36}

Taken as a whole, the Exercises are profoundly personal yet highly structured. Beginning with experience, the Exercises demand a high degree of commitment and discipline to the program and openness to others coupled with transparency to the self. While the Divine Will, the normative source of feeling-value for decision-making, is located primarily in the affections and is centered in the present, there are rules relative to the spiritual progress of the exercitant that guard against self-deception. In all, the Exercises enjoy a universal structure and sequence that is also flexible.

2. The Four Week Structure of the Spiritual Exercises

Steven Fanning describes the Exercises as a month-long "series of meditations or contemplations for the purpose of discerning God's will for oneself." He also notes that the "pattern of the meditations corresponds to the stages of mystical union with God, the illuminative way, the purgative way and then the unitive way."\textsuperscript{37} The thirty days are divided into four separate weeks, each with its own "graces" or goals. As the exercitant progresses through the Four Weeks, she gradually undergoes a process of spiritual transformation, making her more aware of her own "disordered attachments," more understanding of the life, passion, and resurrection of Christ, and more able to find the Divine Will at work in her own desires. Beyond the Fourth Week, the exercitant is one

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{37} Fanning, 154.
who is committed to a new way of being, of finding God in all things. This does not happen instantly, immediately, or automatically.

First Week

After the first twenty annotations, which are largely for the spiritual director, the Exercises begin with a definition in [21]: “Spiritual Exercises having as their purpose the overcoming of self and the ordering of one’s life on the basis of a decision made in freedom from any disordered attachment.” The Exercises are structured to order the self in light of a decision made to follow Christ. The preliminary concern of the First Week is with cultivating a certain disposition that is open to such a demanding task. Once the necessary disposition is identified, the vision of Two Standards is articulated and becomes a normative source for self-transcending feeling-values. The excicitant must acquire an attitude of indifference so that she is capable of making such a profound decision free from attachment. To know her own disordered attachments, she must know how to examine her life as a whole and on a daily basis to uncover the complex movements of her interiority. The First Week ends with a series of meditations intended to nurture a certain disposition, making the excicitant capable of appropriating new feeling-values.

At the very start of the Exercises, there are certain conditions that apply to the excicitant’s overall attitude or disposition. The Exercises presume a climate of trust:

[22] So that the giver of the Exercises and the excicitant may the better help and benefit each other, it must be presupposed that every good Christian should be readier to justify than to condemn a neighbor’s statement. If no justification can be found, one should ask the other in what sense that statement is to be taken, and if that sense is wrong the other

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38 Ivens, Understanding the Spiritual Exercises, 22.
should be corrected with love. Should this not be sufficient, let every appropriate means be sought whereby to have the statement interpreted in a good sense and so to justify it.\textsuperscript{39}

The climate of trust and openness affords the exercitant an opportunity to critically examine the movements of interiority and to share them openly with the director. Progress presupposes such a climate. As Ivens notes frequently, the director and exercitant have a common project: "that the exercitant find God through the Spiritual Exercises."\textsuperscript{40} Givers of the Exercises today often spend a few ‘disposition days’ preparing for the Foundation in [23]. To grasp God’s loving activity, the exercitant must be “large-hearted” and show a certain “liberality towards to God.” Sometimes the exercitant’s generosity can be ‘blocked’ by distorted images of God, which may have impeded trust in God’s love and goodness. To ‘unblock’ this latent generosity, it is necessary to spend a few days of prayer precisely on these themes, so the Foundation “can be fruitfully considered.”\textsuperscript{41} It is important to note that for the exercitant’s ‘inner knowledge’ of [23]’s theocentric claims, certain dispositional conditions must be fulfilled.

The Principle and Foundation of [23] is the governing telos of the Exercises, \textit{articulating a vision} of the world:

\begin{center}
[23] Principle and Foundation

The human person is created to praise, reverence and serve God our Lord, and by so doing save his or her soul; and it is for the human person that the other things on the face of the earth are created, as helps to the pursuit of this end.

It follows from this that the person has to use these things in so far as they help towards this end, and to be free of them in so far as they stand in the way of it.

To attain this, we need to make ourselves indifferent towards all created things, provided the matter is subject to our free choice and there is no prohibition. Thus for our part we should not want health more than sickness, wealth more than poverty, fame more
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{39} ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{40} ibid., 25.
\textsuperscript{41} ibid., 28-29.
than disgrace, a long life more than a short one - and so with everything else; desiring and choosing only what conduces more to the end for which we are created.42

The ‘end’ for which the human person is created cannot simply be understood in ‘temporal’ terms where the end follows after a long sequence of events. The ‘end’ articulated in [23] is also a claim of present fulfillment available to the exercitant. Ivens warns that the meaning of [23] would be significantly impoverished if the exercitant were to pass too quickly beyond the ‘end’ in favor of more practical concerns or to treat it as a mere abstraction. The Principle and Foundation articulates a faith-vision that will order the exercitant’s worldview. Ignatius himself experienced this faith-vision in Manresa where he chose to leave behind his previous life “given up to the vanities of the world.”43 The practical demands of the latter portion of [23] are ordered to the primary ‘end’ of the human person: to praise, reverence, and serve God. ‘Ordered use of creatures’ and ‘indifference’ only make sense in light of the telos of the Foundation itself.44 Nothing in the Exercises can be taken outside the framework of their ultimate telos. The vision of [23] employs many highly charged terms; ‘creation,’ ‘praise, reverence and serve,’ ‘use,’ and ‘indifference.’ Without examining the nuances of each, it is sufficient to note that ‘creation’ implies an on-going, present process and that ‘praise, reverence and serve’ express a radical God-centeredness.45 God is praised not only through formal worship but throughout one’s entire being, including the appropriation of Christocentric feeling-values expressed through one’s labor. The faith-vision of [23] impacts the entire subject, not just certain capacities. Furthermore, the vision of [23] expresses Ignatius’ theology of

42 Ibid.
43 Loyola, Reminiscences , 13.
44 Ivens, Understanding the Spiritual Exercises , 27.
the world where God’s creative project is purposive for all of creation, within which the human person exists. The world, then, “is not a neutral backdrop” but “the raw material of our relationship with God,” forming the basis for our praise, reverence and service. 46 Within this ultimate vision of reality, the person must respond in one way or another to God’s creative project.

Such a profound vision of creation is normative individually and socially. For Ignatius, the human person is not meant to be understood only by individual reference, but also by collective reference. The Foundation “is the norm of every exercise of collective and individual power.” 47 With this normative faith-vision in mind, the exercitant makes constant choices of use and avoidance with regard to reality where the ‘end’ of praise, reverence and service becomes the criteria of particular choice. ‘Use’ does not apply only to things, but to “the entire gamut” of human response to this reality: “interest, love, every kind of creativity, enjoyment, together with inner responses such as the acceptance or not of situations, and the meanings we are free to confer on these.” 48

The last paragraph of the Principle and Foundation in [23] shows the extent to which the exercitant must be indifferent. Once the exercitant is committed to indifference as the means, she is able to appropriate self-transcending feeling-values. No longer will the exercitant’s decisions be based on the self-referential feeling-values of health, wealth, fame, or a long life. While it would be self-destructive for the exercitant to value sickness, poverty, disgrace, or a short life, the aim of [23] is not to value that which is self-destructive, but to value the praise, reverence, and service of God to the extent that it

46 Ibid., 30.
47 Ibid., 29.
48 Ibid., 30-31.
becomes the ordering principle of the exercitant’s feeling-values. Indifference to self-referential feeling-values creates the possibility of establishing self-transcending feeling-values. In light of the upcoming Second Week Election, indifference to self-referential feeling-values enables the exercitant to whole-heartedly embrace the telos articulated in [23]. As Ivens explains, “one might choose a course of action or way of life in the recognition that sickness or early death would be the likely or inevitable consequence.”

It was the radical commitment to the self-transcending feeling-values of the Principle and Foundation that made missionary life plausible for sixteenth-century Jesuits, since illness, poverty, and a short life were not an uncommon consequence for such life-choices.

After the Principle and Foundation of [23], the rest of the First Week is devoted to the tools that will help the exercitant uncover any disordered attachment, whether explicit or latent. One of the primary tools Ignatius gives to exercitants is the examination of conscience, or ‘Examen.’ It empowers the exercitant in her overall task of self-appropriation: to know and to order the complex movements of interiority. Ignatius and the early directors usually gave the material on the Examen after the Foundation and before the meditations at the end of the First Week. The Particular Examen “served to sustain fidelity to the method and to ‘uproot any weeds or thorns that might impede the good seed of the Exercises’.”

The General Examen, on the other hand, prepares the exercitant for the First Week meditation by placing her life into a larger trend of sins past and present. Well beyond the Exercises themselves, Ignatius saw the examen as a fundamental resource to keep one open to the action of the Spirit. Not only does it

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49 Ibid., 32.
50 Ibid., 33.
facilitate the process of liberation from disordered attachment, it also turns the subject’s attention to her own experience, the fertile ground of God’s activity. Both the daily Particular Examen and the General Examen are indispensable tools for self-appropriation.

More specifically, the daily Particular Examen creates the possibility of intentional being. Numbers [24] – [31] explain the Three Times and the Two Examens. In the morning “immediately on rising,” the exercitant makes a “firm resolve” to avoid a particular sin or defect. After lunch, the exercitant reflects back on his day, counting the number of times he “has fallen into that particular sin or defect, and to amend for the future.” After dinner, the exercitant reflects back on the time since the last examen, comparing them with the first to see if there is any improvement. The primary focus should be on a sin or defect that is a source of many others. In this way, the exercitant cultivates a “thread of awareness running through the day [27] and over longer sequences [29, 30].”

The daily Particular Examen is a discipline allowing the exercitant to grow in awareness of sin and to grow in commitment to ridding himself of it.

The General Examen is concerned with the over-arching trends of sin. It is also a tool for self-appropriation, helping the exercitant follow a way of being that he has chosen and continues to choose. The General Examen connects the discipline of self-appropriation with the existential commitments of the exercitant. As [32] states,

GENERAL EXAMEN OF CONSCIENCE IN ORDER TO PURIFY THE SOUL AND TO MAKE A BETTER CONFESSION

I presuppose that there are three kinds of thought processes in me, one sort which are properly mine and arise simply from liberty and will, and two other sorts which come from outside, one from the good spirit and the other from the bad.

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51 Ibid., 36.
52 Ibid.
Number [32] reveals one of Ignatius’ fundamental anthropological assumptions: thoughts can emerge intrinsically simply from ‘liberty and will’ or extrinsically from ‘outside’ the subject through the good spirit or the bad. Ivens uses a more contemporary approach to interpret Ignatius’ understanding of ‘liberty and will’ and ‘spirits.’ With regard to the emotional life, many have distinguished the voluntary types of feelings and/or thoughts from the non-voluntary types. For Ivens, the non-voluntary thoughts or feelings can be said to come from ‘outside ourselves’ in the sense that “their source is not in our own volition.”53 Locating precisely where a thought, emotion, or feeling begins is perhaps beyond the pale of scientific capacity. What is essential to the integrity of number [32] is not that the origin of thought, emotion, or feeling is ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’ but that these are voluntary and non-voluntary.

Thoughts, emotions, and feelings enter the moral dimension when there is a possibility of response. Ignatius does not advocate mortification but ordering. Sin is a measurement of the exercitant’s response to ‘bad thought.’ As [33] notes, “there are two ways of gaining merit when a bad thought comes from outside”: first, the thought emerges and the exercitant resists it promptly and immediately, overcoming it permanently; [34] second, “the same bad thought” comes to the exercitant and she resists it continually until it “goes away defeated.” Venial sin, then, is when a bad thought emerges and the exercitant “gives ear to it,” delays over it, takes “some enjoyment from it,” or is negligent in rejecting it, as Ignatius describes in [35]. Mortal sin comes when one consents to a sinful thought in order to put it into effect ([36]) or when the sin is actually committed ([37]). Enacting the sin is more serious because the time spent is

53 Ibid., 37.
longer, the intensity is greater, and more harm is done to both persons. Sin can be present in one’s thoughts [33]-[36], deeds [37], [42], and words [40]-[41]. In thought, deed, and word, the exercitant is to transform her way of being entirely, which includes purging the feeling-values that are incompatible with her elected horizon. ‘Liberating’ oneself from sin and ‘disordered affection’ involves virtually every aspect of the human person, especially thought, feeling, deed, and speech.

The General Examen is another tool to aid the exercitant’s continual effort at self-appropriation. In Ignatius’ words,

[43] WAY OF MAKING THE GENERAL EXAMEN CONTAINING FIVE POINTS
The first point is to give thanks to God for the benefits I have received. The second point is to ask for grace to know my sins and reject them. The third point is to ask an account of my soul from the hour of rising to the present examen, hour by hour or from one period to another, first with regard to thoughts, then words, and finally deeds, following the order given in the particular examen [25]. The fourth point is to ask God our Lord for pardon for my sins. The fifth point is to resolve to amend with his grace, ending with an Our Father.  

Often, there is a temptation for practitioners of the General Examen to neglect the first two points, which distorts the prayer itself. As with the Exercises overall, the starting point is always an attitude of thanksgiving for blessings. Epitomized in the Fourth Week’s Contemplation to Attain Love, the primary ‘spirit’ of the Exercises is one of gratitude. It is only through the grace of clarity, known through Christ, that the exercitant can discover her sins. While the intention of [43] is to uncover disorders, modern exponents of the Examen emphasize the response or failure of response to God rather than taking inventory of right or wrong action. In this approach, the exercitant is

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54 Ibid., 37-39.
55 Ibid., 40.
constantly engaging in the discernment of spirits, weighing, ordering, and discriminating in a matrix of feeling-values.

The General Examen is closely connected to the General Confession and Communion examined in [44]. The General Examen must not be taken exclusively in an individualistic sense since the Sacrament of Reconciliation is not only a commitment to a new way of being but also a way to participate more fully in the life of Christ, which is also social. The graces of General Confession are a deepening insight into what God has forgiven within one’s own history, so that one may be drawn more intimately into the life of Christ. Reception of the Blessed Sacrament at the end of the First Week expresses Ignatius’ general understanding of the importance of sacramental practice in the process of conversion and spiritual growth. Concerning the three ways of the mystic, the purgative way is sublated by the illuminative and the unitive successively. It is a means to a greater good.

Second Week

A significant portion of the First Week was devoted to self-awareness so that the exercitant could uncover the influence of sin. Once the exercitant has experienced the graces of self-knowledge, contrition, and the felt, inner knowledge of God’s mercy, she is ready for her Election: the aim of the Second Week. The Second Week begins with an articulation of the Christocentric horizon, preparing the exercitant for an election. By offering two radically different visions of reality, the Second Week places the weight of self-creation on the exercitant. Not only must the exercitant choose her ‘standard,’ she must also choose her ‘stance’ within that standard and the degree to which she will commit to its ongoing process of creation. While the exercitant is bestowed with
tremendous responsibility in choosing for herself what she is to make of herself in light of her election, there are important limitations as to the scope of the election itself and the times in which she is able to make the election authentically.

The material of the Second Week can be divided into four categories: (1) the mysteries of Christ’s life drawn from the Gospels; (2) the ‘Ignatian meditations’ made up of the Two Standards, the Three Classes, and the Three Kinds of Humility; (3) the Triple Colloquy; and (4) the material on Election. Through the material of the Second Week, the exercitant is drawn deeper into the true life taught by Christ [139] and is continuously asked to respond to God’s “here-and-now word, i.e., election.”56 While the Exercises are not reserved only for those with critical choices to make, they are focused on the commitment to appropriate an authentically Christocentric horizon: a sphere of knowledge and interest where Christ is the central figure. Whether the exercitant seeks to find the Divine Will for a specific ‘life choice’ or seeks to grow in ‘perfection,’ the Exercises are meant to make the Divine Will the normative source for the exercitant’s way of being.

True life in Christ is conditioned by a deeply personal, intense love for Christ that necessarily forms certain attitudes and life-stances. By focusing the mind and will on the attitudes and life-stances implicit in the personal love of Christ, the exercitant’s whole person is changed and re-oriented. The exercitant allows the love for Christ to take over, making it the normative source for her life’s ‘directionality’. The exercitant sees Christ not only as teacher, but also as model. Although conformity to the Christ-model can take a number of different forms, it serves as an organizing principle for the disciple who

56 Ibid., 74.
prefers to be more Christ-like in all activities and situations. Having made an explicit
election for the Standard of Christ and for ‘imitation’ of the Christ-model, the exercitant
comes to understand that there are certain qualities of the true life in Christ: humility
[146], [165] – [167]; “liberality towards God” identified in the Exercises by the word
‘more’; and a spiritual poverty or “trust-love” that leads to a radical “non-possessiveness”
or freedom from “any spirit of idolatry” coupled with a changed attitude toward
“insecurity, loss, diminishment.”57 The true life in Christ abolishes self-referential
feeling-values such as health, wealth, and glory and establishes the self-transcending
feeling-values of the Principle and Foundation: praise, reverence and service of God.

Ignatius begins the Second Week by articulating a faith-vision of reality. The
introductory parable prepares the exercitant to meet Christ in a new way, as “Lord of the
universe” responsible for “building the Kingdom of God in the world.” In addition, it
aims at eliciting all of the exercitant’s resources in responding to such a “noble but
exigent human enterprise,” especially the energy, love, ambition, and idealism necessary
for such a profound endeavor.58 To accomplish this task Ignatius employs the imagery of
Christ as ‘King’ building a ‘Kingdom,’ imagery carrying significant weight in his own
culture. While the King / Kingdom imagery may have lost some cultural appeal, the
exercise itself has been creatively modified in effective ways through new approaches
that accomplish the same goal. As with many features of the Exercises, the structure
allows for certain flexibility yet maintains the same goal. In this particular example, the

57 Ibid., 75, 76.
58 Ibid., 78.
'Kingdom’ imagery is intended to make the exercitant’s horizon exclusively and faithfully Christocentric.

Having noted the potential cultural qualifications of the ‘King / Kingdom’ imagery, I will employ Ignatius’ original imagery for sake of clarity. By seeing Christ as a King building a Kingdom, the exercitant’s horizon becomes increasingly and more clearly Christocentric. Numbers [92], [95], and [97] establish Christ as a King chosen by God to elicit the loyal response of laborers:

[92] The first point is to put before myself a human king chosen by the hand of God our Lord, to whom all Christian leaders and people pay homage and obedience.

[95] Regarding the first point, if such a call made by an earthly king to his subjects claims our consideration, how much more is it worthy of consideration to see Christ Our Lord, the eternal King. … Therefore all those who want to come with me will have to labour with me, so that by following me in my suffering they may also follow me into glory.

[97] The third point. Those who wish rather to respond in a spirit of love, and to be outstanding in every service of their commitment to their eternal King and universal Lord, will not only offer themselves for the labour, but even going against their own sensuality and their carnal and worldly love they will make offerings of greater moment and greater importance.\textsuperscript{59}

Christ’s call is made available to the exercitant through ‘contemplation,’ that is ‘seeing’ and ‘hearing’ and not through ‘analysis.’ The appeal is direct, simple and evocative. The exercitant’s ability to ‘see’ and ‘hear’ Christ’s call reveals some of Ignatius’ basic theological assumptions: union with Christ in laboring to bring about the Kingdom is an \textit{existential commitment} in response to the direct appeal made through an illumination of feeling-values.\textsuperscript{60} The call is to labor with Christ. Hence, ‘service’ is a fundamental part of the Ignatian trilogy to praise, reverence and serve. A whole-hearted response in love, as is

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 81-82.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 83.
clear in the prayer of oblation, includes a number of paradoxes that transcend the limited reach of judgment and reason.\textsuperscript{61}

Unlike the ‘disgraceful knight’ of [94] who responds miserly or for his own benefit, good and generous subjects respond freely and openly to the self-transcending feeling-value of love, going against “their own sensuality and their carnal and worldly love.” The Kingdom Exercise cannot be reduced to mere asceticism or to mortification. The exercise is analogous to a place “where electricity is generated to supply the whole town” by inspiring “enthusiasm and personal loyalty to Jesus Christ, cost what it may.”\textsuperscript{62}

The spirit ‘generated’ by the Exercises is one of intense and authentic love. As Ivens explains, Ignatius is concerned with the relationship between two elements of radical Christianity: “opposition to the ‘carnal’, ‘sensual’, and worldly, on the one hand, and on the other love for Christ.” By going against the inordinate, disordered, apparent, and false goods, one creates the conditions for the possibility of intense love’s abandon. Imitating Christ in poverty is a most effective way to undermine the self-referential, “carnal and worldly” loves.\textsuperscript{63}

To faithfully follow Christ the King, the exercitant must know Christ as human, both as an infant born of a mother and as an adolescent. To prevent potential slippage into an abstract or distant notion of Christ as King, the meditations of the Second Week necessarily include a very human appeal. Numbers [101] to [134] focus on the meaning and implications of the Incarnation, especially the humble origins of Christ’s infancy.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 84. The Contemplation to Attain Love illustrates ‘the paradoxical desires of the prayer of oblation’ in [234]: “Take Lord and receive all my liberty, my memory, my understanding and my entire will, all that I have and possess. You gave it all to me; to you I return it. All is yours, dispose of it entirely according to your will. Give me only the love of you, together with your grace for that is enough for me,” Ivens 174.

\textsuperscript{62} see footnote 22 on Ibid., 85.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
Through these circumstances, "the excitant is invited to see the first steps of a descending journey of love which begins in the heart of the Trinity and will conclude on the Cross (cf. [116])." Ignatius' Christ is fully human, nourishing the personal relationship intended throughout the Exercises.

On the fourth day of the Second Week, the excitant is introduced to the process of election, which includes the meditation on the Two Standards and the Three Classes together with the preamble of [135]. An election presupposes an openness to the Gospel and insight into the "paradoxical, at first sight 'scandalous', dimension of the ways of Christ." The preamble of [135] examines how Christ began with 'the way of the commandments' and progressed to the 'way of perfection':

[135] PREAMBLE FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF STATES OF LIFE
The example given us by Christ our Lord of the first state of life, the observance of the commandments, has been considered in the contemplation of his obedience to his parents. We have considered, too, his example of the second state, evangelical perfection, when he stayed in the Temple, leaving his adopted father and natural mother to devote himself to the exclusive service of his heavenly Father. Now while at the same time contemplating his life, we shall begin to investigate and ask in which life or state the Divine Majesty wishes to avail himself of us. By way of introduction to that, we shall see ... the intention of Christ our Lord and on the contrary that of the enemy of human nature, as well as the attitudes we need to acquire in order to reach perfection in whatever state of life God our Lord may grant us to choose.

Both the 'way of the commandments' and the 'way of perfection' imitate the life of Christ. As with other choices, it is the Divine Will that reveals God's plan for each individual.

The Two Standards meditation from [136] – [147] illustrates how the excitant's election of a faith-vision illuminates new feeling-values through contrast. Building on the

64 Ibid., 89.
65 Ibid., 103.
66 Ibid., 103-104.
Kingdom material, the Two Standards places two opposing, dialectical value-systems before the exercitant. One is the Standard of Christ and the other of Lucifer, the enemy of human nature. The faith-visions proposed are an extension of Ignatius’ own worldview: the reality of two spiritual powers in radical opposition, present and at work in the world. Ignatius is not concerned with the obvious manifestation of the two spirits but with their subtle attraction. Evil is not a repulsive force for Ignatius, but an alluring one operating in plausible but destructive ways by using the apparent goods of “objectively legitimate riches and honour.”

Life in Christ is not simply a morally correct life but one that embraces the paradoxes of spiritual and actual poverty. Using the imagery of Jerusalem and Babylon, Ignatius intends to make the battle ground of this spiritual struggle historical, real, and ongoing. Each leader of the Two Standards employs different qualities, as in [146]: Lucifer’s Standard values riches, honor, and pride while Christ’s Standard values poverty, contempt, and humility - values foreign in many ways to “instinct and convention.”

While Christ calls the human person to a fully human existence, characterized by integration with self and the world, Lucifer destroys freedom. The Two Standards are not two equal objects of choice.

At this point in the Exercises, it is clear that exercitant will by no means choose Lucifer’s Standard intentionally. The importance of the exercise is to uncover and identify the conflict of feeling-values that an increasing commitment to a Christocentric horizon will necessarily create. While feeling-values of “instinct and convention” may

\[67\text{ Ibid., x05.}\]
\[68\text{ Ibid., x07.}\]
coincide with those of a Christocentric horizon, there is also the distinct possibility that “instinct and convention” may be in direct opposition to it.

Having identified contrasting feeling-values and value-systems, the exercitant is to choose her stance relative to the Christocentric horizon. The final meditation of the fourth day on the Three Classes [149] – [155] is concerned with the freedom from disordered attachment mentioned in annotation [1]. Each of three ‘cases’ is put before the exercitant regarding a concrete situation of choice. The meditation builds on the Two Standards by moving from the level of a general faith-vision to demands of concrete commitment. The increasingly ‘higher’ or more ‘spiritual’ desires do not negate or destroy “the lower or instinctive desires,” but to the contrary “the burgeoning of the higher desires might well heighten the sense of higher and lower in tension.” The tension between the ‘higher’ and the ‘lower’ is likely to occur when one is faced with realizing a general aspiration to follow Christ’s poverty that brings with it a certain cost. Through the use of imagination, the exercitant is able to determine her stance. The primary concern is freedom. To employ Lonergan’s distinctions, The Three Classes meditation is concerned with effective freedom and the horizontal exercise of liberty in the already chosen Christocentric horizon. The meditation presupposes the vertical exercise of liberty vis-à-vis the Christocentric horizon itself.

The meditation proceeds as follows: three persons receive an amount of money. The first class [153] wants to be rid of the attachment so as to “meet God in peace and be saved, but they take no means to bring this about until the hour of their death.” Those of the second class [154] desire liberty from their attachment as well, but want to retain the

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69 Ibid., 113.
thing itself, "thus God is to come to what they themselves want, and there is no
determination to relinquish the acquired possession in order to go to God, even if that
were the better course for them." The third class [155], like the previous two, also wants
to rid themselves of the attachment, but in such a way that they have no inclination to
keep or not to keep the object of their desire. Their desire is "to want the thing or not to
want it only according as God our Lord shall move their will, and as might appear to
them personally to be more for the service and praise of the Divine Majesty."70 The Three
Classes can be seen in light of annotation [1] where horizontal liberty is the primary aim.
Disordered attachment to apparent goods such as riches runs deep. Riches in and of
themselves are morally neutral; it is one's stance towards them that can be problematic.

Within the Christocentric horizon there are different stances. While the Two
Standards meditation proposes humility as a goal, the Three Kinds of Humility proposes
it as a development, admitting various degrees. The first kind of humility, explained in
[165], is foundational for eternal salvation. It is a stance of openness and acceptance, so
that the exercitant obeys the laws of God. Ignatius defines the first kind of humility
positively as 'fidelity to the law of God' and negatively as 'not for anything would I
deliberately commit mortal sin.' It serves as criteria allowing one to judge one's real
sincerity. Although the first kind of humility is not to be disparaged, it is an insufficient
ground for election because it espouses fidelity to obligation and offers nothing where
obligations are not applicable. It does not enjoy the same creative, concrete, positive
energy found at the end of the Fourth Week. The second kind of humility in [166] "is
more perfect" and achieves an attitude of indifference towards riches, fame, or long life

70 Ibid., 116-117.
"provided it is all the same for the service of God and the good of my soul." The third kind of humility in [167] is "the most perfect." Desiring to be "actually more like him," the third kind of humility wants and chooses poverty, humiliations, and contempt so as to be with Christ poor and humiliated over and against the "wise and prudent in this world." The major distinction between the second and the third kinds of humility is positive preference. In the third kind, the exercitant wants and chooses. Since there is the real possibility of self-deception, preference for the third kind of humility "may need to be tested against other marks of the authentic disposition." More specifically:

(1) This kind of humility is the attitude of a person deeply in love with Christ. Poverty, contempt, a repudiation for foolishness are not preferred for themselves, or even as means of ascetical self-liberation, but as ways of following Christ and being like him ... (2) It includes everything that has already been specified in the preceding two modes. It respects the law of God. It seeks the service of the Kingdom and one's own salvation ... (3) Its characteristic desires fall within the larger and absolutely fundamental desire that in all things God be praised and glorified.

Humility is fundamental to the Christocentric horizon because the love of God is radically other-centered. In a climate of trust, one hands oneself over to God, allowing God to be the organizing principle of one's being. The meditation on the Three Kinds of Humility allows the exercitant to check his dispositions as they are, especially in light of the upcoming election.

The process of election represents a development from knowledge to commitment and eventually loving commitment. The Two Standards meditation aims at developing an inner knowledge of Christ's way. The Three Classes meditation develops a commitment

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71 Ibid., 124.
72 Ibid., 125.
73 Ibid., 126.
74 Ibid., 123.
to Christ by way of liberty, while the Three Kinds of Humility meditation develops a
loving commitment to the person of Christ where the exercitant responds from the
“affective quality of love.” Each meditation prepares the exercitant in important ways to
choose his faith-vision of reality, his worldview.

The Exercises also offer a particular doctrine for decision-making, or election in
Ignatian vocabulary. Ignatius’ understanding of election is fundamentally relational, that
is, it not only responds to the desire for “the right,” but more importantly to the desire for
the “course ... more pleasing to God.” The existential subject for Ignatius is not a person
that chooses absolutely in a vacuum, but a subject that chooses relative to the Divine
Will. He is ultimately concerned with the Creator / creature relationship. A ‘good and
sound’ decision (1) emerges from a disposition open to God’s word and (2) discerns what
is “more pleasing to God.” Regarding the development of sound decision-making
faculties, the Exercises have consisted so far in developing and nurturing “preliminary
dispositions”: “the desire to praise, reverence and serve God, indifference, affective
freedom and ... a general ‘Christification of outlook’.” With these preliminary
dispositions the exercitant is ready for the decision-making process itself.

The doctrine of Election is not limited to the Exercises proper, but form “a school
for Christian life,” preparing one to integrate life decisions into one’s personal
relationship with God. The principles and methods of the exercise can be applied
“within the stream of daily life” not just in the unique context of the Spiritual Exercises.
Ignatius demonstrates a profound appreciation for the normal context of decisions made

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75 Ibid., 127.
76 Ibid., 128-129.
77 Ibid.
in “haste, agitation, or a general attitude falling far short of the dispositions inculcated by the Exercises.”

While the subject is able to come to judgment regarding the Divine Will, it is not the kind of absolute, final certainty reminiscent of the Alumbrados. Ignatian certitude admits that it is God’s goodness and not the method itself that makes locating the Divine Will possible. Although the exercitant enjoys the certitude of having identified what is ‘more pleasing’ to God, there are certain limitations: it cannot confer knowledge of the future, it does not guarantee “ratification on the part of another or others,” and it does not mean that another in the same situation will reach the same conclusion. Ignatian certitude achieved through discernment is “the subjective certitude of having responded to God’s will here-and-now.”

In other words, certitude and the ‘yes’ to God’s will operates within a matrix of uncertain probabilities.

The Election material falls into four parts: an introductory statement in [169]; directives regarding the scope of election in [170 – 174]; proper times for making an election in [175-188]; and an amendment and reform of life in [189]. As introductory material, number [169] revisits the claim that all things are for God’s praise, that all else is a means to this end, and that God does not come to us, but that we go to God.

The process of election operates within a bounded scope. While the exercitant is able to choose for herself much of what she is to make of herself, there are a number of exceptions worthy of consideration. In other words, the existential dimension of subjectivity is not absolute for Ignatius. Most importantly, matters of election must be “morally indifferent or good in themselves” as [170] directs. One does not enjoy the

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78 Ibid., 131.
79 Ibid.
liberty to elect matters that are morally bad, i.e. outside the service of God. The exercitant may only consider matters that do not violate the end for which the human person was created. Morally bad matters are seen in the light of disordered attachment and not election made from liberty. Number [171] explains that certain elections are changeable, such as the “acquisition or renunciation of material goods,” while others are unchangeable, such as “priesthood, marriage, etc.” One does not enjoy the liberty to change one’s ‘state of life’ once an election has been made. Number [172] outlines certain rules pertaining to the unchangeable nature of divine vocation (authentic election) and election made from disordered attachment and bias (unauthentic election). Number [173] treats of the ‘finality’ of an authentic election, since “there is no reason for making it over again.” Lastly, number [174] advises that when a changeable election has been made unauthentically, it ought to be made again authentically. The process of election operates within the telos of [23]’s Principle and Foundation. It concerns decisions that are either changeable or unchangeable, establishes norms regarding authentic election, enjoys a degree of ‘finality,’ and proposes authentic election as the means to rectify prior unauthentic, changeable elections. The exercitant has a limited scope regarding the matters available to the process of election. However, the liberty Ignatius envisions is always a positive, creative capacity for the praise, reverence and service of God.

A central feature of Ignatius’ decision-making process is the ‘times of election.’ Numbers [175] to [189] handle the process of election for matters yet to be decided, not for rectifying or correcting prior decisions. In the ‘times of election,’ Ignatius distinguishes three ‘signs’ or moments when the Divine Will is best understood:

80 Ibid., 128.
Three times in any of which a sound and good election can be made
The First Time. When God our Lord so moves and attracts the will that without doubting or being able to doubt, the faithful soul follows what is shown ...

The Second Time. When sufficient light and knowledge is received through experience of consolations and desolations, and through experience of the discernment of different spirits.

The Third Time is one of tranquility. One considers first of all the purpose for which as a human being one is born, namely to praise God our Lord and to save one's soul. Desiring this, one chooses as a means some life or state within the bounds of the Church, in order to find in it a help to the service of one's Lord and the salvation of one's soul. I call this a 'tranquil' time in the sense that it is a situation when the soul is not moved by various spirits and has the free and tranquil use of her natural powers.81

The First Time when a good election can be made occurs when a direct experience or 'inner knowledge' moves the will in such a way that there is no doubt. However, the absence of doubt does not always indicate the work of the Divine Will or that the exercitant is free from disordered attachment or self-deception. The direct experience of the Divine Will must still pass through a time of reflection and still may require the director's discernment. Furthermore, such unambiguous experience need not be "of the dramatic quality of the Damascus road," but can occur through ordinary, discrete experience. The Exercises do not suggest that direct experience of God must be rare or dramatic. However the experience emerges, the first time for good election "is a situation in which the evidence consists in being shown, decisively and unambiguously, the course to follow, and the response is one of simple assent."82

The Second Time of election consists of a critical and reflective understanding emerging from the exercitant's experience of consolation and desolation. It is concerned with discerning various spirits to find the Divine Will. Having discerned various spirits, sufficient light and knowledge is reached to make an election. The exercitant's critical

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81 Ibid., 137-138 [italics added].
82 Ibid., 136.
discernment of feelings, thoughts, and imagination reveal the Divine Will in a way that might otherwise be unknown, unidentified, or misinterpreted. It is a time of clarification for the ambiguous or even contradictory movements of interiority.

The Third Time is marked by tranquility, ‘when the soul is not moved by various spirits and has the free and tranquil use of her natural powers,’ as [177] describes. There are two ways for the exercitant to proceed in the Third Time. The first way of [178] to [183] asks the exercitant to “recall the fundamental dispositions” [179], prayerfully [180] consider reasons for and against each alternative [181], evaluate these reasons and decisions [182], and seek confirmation [183]. Essentially, it is a method of rational, prayerful consideration weighing both alternatives and choosing the one best suited for the “praise of God our Lord and the good of my soul” [181]. The second way described in [184] to [188], asks the exercitant to imagine (1) the advice she would give to another in her situation [185], (2) what she might choose as if she were at the point of death [186], and (3) the situation on the Day of Judgment [187]. Essentially, the second way asks the exercitant to imagine her election in light of her own mortality and in light of her stance towards the faith-vision of reality already chosen. It places material for election in the context of a larger life story.

Number [189], the last exercise for the Second Week, is an “amendment and reform of one’s personal life and state.” It is a fitting conclusion for the Second Week material because it reinforces the point that an election must be made in light of the Principle and Foundation. The “praise and glory of God our Lord in and through
everything” is made possible “to the degree to which” one is able to divest oneself “of self-love, self-will, and self-interest.”

Third Week

A “genuinely Ignatian commentary” aligns the four weeks with the traditional ‘purgative-illuminaive-unitive’ stages of spiritual progress. While the First Week follows ‘the purgative way’ converting the exercitant from a life of sin, the Second Week follows ‘the illuminative way’ clarifying the Standard of Christ. The Third and Fourth Weeks follow ‘the unitive way,’ where the exercitant’s “contemplative development” transitions from the “more external graces” of “knowledge, love and committed discipleship” in the Second Week into a “spiritual climate” marked by graces of an “immediately participatory sort” in the Third and Fourth Weeks. In the Gospel scenes of both the Third and Fourth Weeks, the exercitant examines two “antithetical single mysteries … which form a unity of faith-meaning”: the Passion and Resurrection. The Third and Fourth Weeks handle each of these “antithetical single mysteries” respectively.

The Third Week focuses the exercitant’s attention on the life of Christ up to and including the Passion. The first day of the Third Week ([190] to [207]) asks the exercitant to contemplate (1) Christ’s journey from Bethany to Jerusalem, including the Last Supper and (2) from the Last Supper to the Garden. Virtually the rest of the Third Week (from

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83 Ibid., 144.
84 See footnote 13 on Ivens, 11. The four weeks of the Exercises do fit the classic three ways, but do not necessarily need to be interpreted in this way. I have chosen to follow the “many commentators” who “associate the final stage of the Exercises with the ‘unitive way’, putting into this category either both weeks, or … only the Fourth.” See footnote 1 on Ivens 146
85 Ivens, Understanding the Spiritual Exercises ,146.
86 Ibid.,146.
is spent in contemplation of the Passion. Numbers [210] to [217] are rules with regard to eating in light of the graces sought for the Third Week.

The “more intimate and participatory” grace of the Third Week is “commonly designated by the word compassion (literally, ‘suffering with’).” Consisting in a certain “spiritual empathy” where “the Passion is itself a passion for the one contemplating, a suffering which is ours but in and through which Christ makes us sharers in his own.” Existing only as a “mode of intense love … It transforms one’s perception of every meaning of the Passion and the quality of every response to it.” The transformative quality of this compassion is essential to the “contemplative union-in-action” by which Christ labors in the world. The grace of compassion, however, comes after a sequence of prior conditions: the First Week’s contemplation of the Cross as a sign of sin and mercy, the Second Week’s call of the King followed by an election for Christ against an opposing system of feeling-values. Each of the insights, conversions, and decisions have prepared the exorcitant for “the particular prayer of the Third Week,” which in turn “deepens and confirms.” While confirmation does not verify the choice, it strengthens the chooser.87

Number [203] represents the graces sought in the Third Week poignantly:

The third prelude is to ask for what I desire. What is proper to prayer on the Passion to ask for grief with Christ in grief, to be broken with Christ broken, for tears and interior suffering on account of the great suffering that Christ endured for me.88

The feeling of compassion becomes a normative standard for the Third Week itself, since the guidelines for the Third Week are by no means dogmatic. The extent to which an

87 Ibid., 147.
88 Ibid., 154.
exercitant ought to dwell on the physical suffering of the Passion is a matter for
discernment, although it cannot be dismissed altogether. While a “sense of sin,
recognition of God’s goodness and wisdom, confirmation of hope, enkindling of love,
imitation, zeal for souls” can be cultivated at the same time, the primary grace of the
Third Week is compassion and each of the Exercises contributes in some fashion to it.89

The grace of the Third Week is made possible by a sequence. Having identified
the disordered attachments in the purgative stage of the First Week and having made an
authentic election to appropriate the Christocentric Standard in the Second Week, the
exercitant is ready to receive the grace of compassion in the Third Week. Ignatius
respects the ‘affective space’ out of which the feeling-value of compassion emerges.
Such space is created (1) in freedom from the self-referential feeling-values associated
with disordered attachment and (2) through the exercitant’s authentic election to
appropriate the Christocentric Standard. The grace of compassion envisaged in the Third
Week through [195] “to grief, to feel sorrow and to weep” and through [203] “for grief
with Christ in grief, to be broken with Christ broken, for tears and interior suffering on
account of the great suffering that Christ endured for me” only emerges in light of the
liberty and election noted above.

Fourth Week

While the operative grace of the Third Week is compassion, the operative grace of
the Fourth Week is joy: the ‘paschal joy’ of the Resurrection proper to Easter. Such joy
becomes the “very core of the believer’s existence.” The object of ‘paschal joy’ is “the
here-and-now reality of the risen Christ,” which can be experienced at different levels. Of

89 See footnote 7, Ibid., 149.
primary importance is the grace of consolation, always moving a person to God’s service and marked by an élan “towards apostolic mission” that becomes a profound source of “strength, energy and courage to participate in the work of the Kingdom.”90 It becomes a normative disposition of the Exercises:

In its fullness, Fourth Week joy engages the whole person, penetrates everyday experience, enhances and is supported by the ordinary joys of life, but its authenticity must always be measured in terms of depth and strength rather than emotional exhilaration. Even in the Exercises themselves, it may function as it frequently does in daily life, as a leaven-like experience, subtly permeating a sorrow or heaviness for the moment has to be borne. Yet if even in the Exercises, the uncomplicated plenitude of paschal joy may be slow to come, one prays for it with confidence, and does everything on one’s own side to dispose oneself to receive it.91

The Fourth Week grace of joy emerges from the Third Week’s grace of compassion. Only by participating in the Passion can the exercitant know paschal joy. Numbers [218] to [229] are a series of contemplations intended to introduce the exercitant to the risen Christ.

A central component of the Fourth Week is the Contemplation to Attain to Love, also referred to as the Contemplatio, found in numbers [230] to [237]. It prepares the exercitant for a life beyond the Fourth Week of the Exercises by introducing one of the hallmarks of Ignatian Spirituality: “finding and loving God in all things.” It becomes the “lasting outcome” of the Exercises by working “its insights and attitudes into the texture of everyday life,” establishing a normative source of feeling-value for the exercitant after the Four Weeks of the Exercises themselves. The Contemplatio presents the “post-

90 Ibid., 162.
91 Ibid., 163.
Ascension Christ of the here and now” and not the Christ “met with in the Gospel narratives.”\textsuperscript{92}

The dynamic of the Contemplatio involves two meanings of the ‘love of God’: “God’s love for us and ours for God.” Recognizing God’s “absolute and unconditional love by which God loves us before we love him … is the subject of the four points.”\textsuperscript{93}

The excercitant seeks to attain love in [230] and [234]. The Principle and Foundation was concerned with ‘ordered use,’ but the Contemplatio is concerned with “the things, events, and situations of the excercitant’s everyday world” as a “medium within which the exchange of loves itself takes place.” The integration of a deeply-rooted love of God with immediate experience makes the world a ‘divine milieu.’ Although this faith-vision of the world emerges in the Fourth Week, it is still a grace and “not a change of consciousness inducible by technique.” The Exercises help the excercitant open to this faith-vision through a “process of development” and not through “a definitive achievement.”\textsuperscript{94}

The Contemplatio begins with two important notes: love ought to express itself in deeds rather than words [230] and love consists in mutual communication [231]. As Ivens explains, “the fundamental ‘act’ of love is the choice to give oneself to God” expressed concisely in [234]. Ivens describes the notion of ‘mutual communication’ as the non-coercive, generous “love of friendship” evident in [15].\textsuperscript{95}

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 169.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., 170.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 173.
The Contemplatio aims at engendering a profound sense of gratitude. With an
‘inner knowledge’ of all the gifts received, grace sought in [233] is a profound sense of
gratefulness. By bringing to memory all “the benefits received” in [234], the exercitant
comes to see that the Divine Will is “to give [the exercitant] himself.” With the inner
knowledge of gifts received, it is only fitting for the exercitant to respond in heartfelt
love:

Take Lord and receive all my liberty, my memory, my understanding and my entire will,
all that I have and possess. You gave it all to me; to you I return it. All is yours, dispose
of it entirely according to your will. Give me only the love of you, together with your
grace that is enough for me.  

To nurture the gratitude emerging from an ‘inner knowledge’ of benefits received,
number [235] asks the exercitant to contemplate “how God dwells in creatures: in the
elements giving being; in the plants giving growth; in the animals giving sensation; and
in humankind granting the gift of understanding.” Number [236] asks the exercitant to
contemplate “how God works and labours on my behalf in all created things” and “how
all that is good … descends from on high” in [237]. Furthermore, “as rays descend from
the sun and waters from a fountain” [237] emphasizes, so too do “justice, goodness, pity,
mercy, etc.” The Contemplatio makes the exercitant deeply aware of the Creator’s
loving activity in all of creation. It is in and through a profound sense of gratitude that the
Exercises conclude. The praise, reverence and service of the Principle and Foundation are
not an obligation imposed on one, the exercitant comes to know, but the appropriate
response to a God “that so loved the world He gave his only Son” (John 3:16). Love of

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96 ibid., 174.
97 ibid., 176, 177.
God attained through contemplation serves as a normative source of feeling-value in the post-Exercises milieu.

3. The Transcendent in the Spiritual Exercises

As it applies to the Spiritual Exercises, the term ‘transcendent’ can be used in one of two ways. In the first way, transcendent refers to that which lies intentionally beyond: for example, when the exceritant desires a “grace” beyond what she already has. In the second way, transcendent refers to those experiences in the exceritant’s life that are understood to be disproportionate to any possible cause. Both meanings of transcendent are essential to the Exercises. I will examine the first meaning of transcendent through the preludes and the second meaning in the rules Ignatius employs for the discernment of spirits.

Before any exercise during the Four Weeks, the exceritant must prepare herself. The graces particular to each exercise are the fruit of a process. While the graces cannot be “manufactured” by the exceritant, they are also not so spontaneous as to be unintelligible or random. In the preludes to each exercise, there is a discernable pattern: composition-desire-grace. The composition employs the imagination to create subjective ‘space’ out of which a grace may emerge. The preludes of desire, as I will call them, make the graces an object of intentionality. Grace in the Exercises is (1) sought intentionally and (2) closely connected to the faculty of imagination. In this way, graces may be understood as objects of attention and intention.

The first or second prelude, depending on the location within the Exercises, is a composition, “made by seeing the place.” In imaginatively composing a place or
situation, the exercitant first composes herself by ‘becoming recollected’ and then creates “a mental image of the place.” 98 The mental image directs the exercitant to use all of her senses in creating the Christian mystery at hand. Ignatius wants the exercitant to engage the “incarnational foundation of Christian salvation history and symbolism” and never to “bury everything beneath a cloud of forgetting to reach God beyond a cloud of darkness and unknowing.” 99 Ignatius finds the imagination to have an intimate connection to ‘inner knowledge.’ Through a composition of Christian mysteries, Ignatius hopes to orient and ‘Christianize’ the exercitant’s faculties by awakening her to what she really ought to desire. The Exercises aim at eliciting Holy desires. Since disordered attachment is such a complex and powerful motivator for choice and action, they need to be understood, judged, and affirmed or denied. The composition aims at purifying the exercitant of her inordinate affections by stirring the deepest desires of the true self, the self ordained to the praise, reverence and service of God. It is the clear, explicit, Christian desires that force the exercitant to “take conscious possession” of her life, even the unconscious direction of it in light of God’s truth. 100 Number [47] in the First Week explains the composition clearly:

The first prelude is the composition, made by seeing the place. It should be noted here that for contemplation or meditation about visible things, for example a contemplation on Christ our Lord (who is visible), the ‘composition’ will consist in seeing through the gaze of the imagination the material place where the object I want to contemplate is situated. By ‘material place’ I mean for example a temple or a mountain where Jesus Christ or our Lady is to be found - according to what I want to contemplate ... Where the object is an invisible one, as is the case in the present meditation on sins, the composition will be to see with the gaze of the imagination, and to consider, that my soul is imprisoned in this

99 Ibid., 73.
100 Ibid., 73-74.
body which will one day disintegrate, and also my whole composite self (by this I mean the soul joined with the body), as if exiled in this valley among brute beasts.\textsuperscript{101}

Composition applies both to visible and invisible objects. The imagination not only creates a mental ‘picture’ in the mind’s eye of persons or events but also engages metaphors and symbols for metaphysical objects such as ‘soul.’

Following the preludes of composition are the preludes of desire. The preludes petitioning God “for what I want and desire” are the backbone of the Exercises. The dynamism of “what I want and desire” begins the prayerful seeking by both identifying and directing the excipient’s deepest desires. Having identified and named these desires, the excipient also comes to know his inordinate attachments because they must create space for Holy desires and “God-given attachments.”\textsuperscript{102} In the words of the Exercises,

[48] The second prelude is to ask God our Lord for what I wish for and desire. The petition must be adapted to the matter under consideration; thus for example in contemplating the Resurrection one asks for joy with Christ joyful, while in contemplating the Passion one asks for grief, tears and great suffering with Christ suffering.\textsuperscript{103}

The preludes of desire are relative to the material under consideration. The excipient’s desires engage a wide range of feelings indicative of authentic Christian living: grief, tears, suffering, joy, gratitude. The composition of the Christian mysteries, the various desires of the excipient and the corresponding feelings place the excipient within a larger context of salvation history. Essentially, the composition-desire-grace dynamic helps the excipient know and nurture his deepest and most authentic yearnings. In doing so, he eliminates inordinate affections and subjective deformities while reducing

\textsuperscript{101} Ivins, \textit{Understanding the Spiritual Exercises}, 46-47.
\textsuperscript{102} Egan, \textit{Ignatian Mystical Horizon}, 74.
\textsuperscript{103} Ivins, \textit{Understanding the Spiritual Exercises}, 48.
“subjective static,” becoming a “fully recollected, integral person.”

Holy desires are necessary for a unified consciousness; authentic subjectivity demands an organizing dynamism and directionality. However, such authentic integration is not an easy task and involves a significant degree of struggle. Ignatius acknowledges a subjective ‘counter force’ constantly pulling toward disunity and disharmony.

Another important form of prayer in the Exercises is the colloquy. Like the composition-desire-grace dynamic of the preludes, the colloquy also employs the imagination to elicit a desire and a grace. Both can be considered as transcendent because the grace is sought, that is, it lies intentionally beyond. From the text of the Exercises,

[54] A colloquy, properly so called, means speaking as one friend speaks with another, or a servant with a master, at times asking for some favour, at other times accusing oneself of something badly done, or sharing personal concerns and asking for advice about them. And then I will say an Our Father.

The colloquy is a great example of Ignatian prayer, using the imagination to order the affections. As Ivens explains, the ‘points’ of the Exercises lead to a familiar exchange between the exercitant and another. It is not an appendage to prayer, but its culmination arising at any moment. Ignatius uses the colloquy in various ways: as a simple end to an exercise or a concluding context with specific content. In whatever its form, it is always marked as a conversation between friends.

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104 Egan, *Ignatian Mystical Horizon*, 75.
105 As Ivens writes on 48, “the value of these petitions can be obscured however by over-simple interpretations. The exercitant may not always express their desires precisely as Ignatius does, or their initial reaction to a petition in the Exercises might be at first a case of ‘desiring the desire’, rather than of instant identification.” Furthermore, as he notes in footnote 58, “the Jesuit Constitutions prescribe that an applicant to the order be presented with the values of the Third Mode of Humility [167] and asked if he himself experiences such desires. If he does not, he should be asked whether he desires to experience them.”
107 Ibid.
The first colloquy in [53] during the First Week asks the exercitant to imagine a conversation with Christ crucified, asking him why “the Creator made himself a human being” and later asking “what have I done for Christ,” “what am I doing for Christ,” and “what ought I to do for Christ?” The conversation model points to the quality of personal relationship maturing into “contemplative listening.” The Triple Colloquy first given in [63] asks the exercitant to make a colloquy to Mary, to the Son, and to the Father asking for “inner knowledge of my sins,” a feeling of “the disorder of my actions,” and “knowledge of the world.” Later in Week Two, the Triple Colloquy petitions Mary, the Son, and the Father for “spiritual poverty” and “humiliations and insults.” The third Triple Colloquy is during the meditation on the Three Classes. In each instance, the colloquy is a tool for the exercitant to engage the persons of the Christian narrative in a personal way ‘as one friend to another.’ As a practice, it emphasizes the close connection between imagination, desire, and grace.

The imagination-desire-grace dynamic at work in the preludes and the colloquy reveals essential elements of an Ignatian theological anthropology: grace has positive, ontological and existential value for the exercitant.

Ignatius has a deeply-rooted, scriptural vision of the world torn between good and evil. Human life in this world is marked by the constant cosmic conflict between good and evil, “light and darkness, spirit and flesh, Christ and Satan.” Both Christ and Satan are no mere personifications, but beings struggling “over the everlasting destiny of persons.” For this reason, Ignatius sees Holy Scripture as a profound revelation of what is

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108 Ibid., 54.
109 Ibid., 60, 111, 119.
really occurring underneath the moments of “turmoil and peace, the misery and exultation” operating in human history and in every individual life.  

Ignatius finds warfare the most apt Scriptural metaphor to highlight the conflict between good and evil. Although he employs metaphors of growth, harvest, and journey, military warfare best fits his theological understanding of the cosmic conflict. By employing metaphors of warfare, Ignatius makes “the conflict of opposing powers more obvious, dramatic, and above all personal.” Regarding human ‘faculties,’ the military metaphor highlights “the role of personal reason, free decision and responsibility, in being with Christ against the power of darkness.” It is within the context of two conflicting standards, that his teaching of election achieves its deepest meaning.

The struggle between good and evil is both individual and cosmic simultaneously. As Jules Toner explains, “each human person is divided within self... and the struggle within self is part of a larger struggle between the spiritual forces of Christ and Satan ... each having some hold within the person and each able to bring influence to bear on him.” Because of God’s delicate power and profound love for the human person, God can enter into and influence the human mind and heart, coming into direct, intimate contact with the creature. Although contact is direct and intimate, it is by no means determinative; it respects freedom, leaving the human person able to respond to God’s generous love through praise, reverence and service. Ignatius’ theological understanding makes the human person free yet responsible, loved yet able to love in return.

111 Ibid., 33.
112 Ibid.
The contact between Creator and creature, while intimate and direct, is neither
unusual nor reserved for an elect few. On the one hand, Ignatius does not want the
faithful to become like the Alumbrados or Illuminati of his day who think intimate and
direct contact must be in “a supernatural mode” in order to be trusted.\(^{113}\) On the other
hand, he does not want the faithful to dismiss the realm of ‘inner knowledge’ all together.
Since Ignatius maintains that God enters into direct contact with the creature, he must
provide some standard to evaluate and judge authentic experiences of contact from the
unauthentic ones as found in the Alumbrados. Within this spectrum, Ignatius finds that
God is constantly “attending to each of his children … through the ordinary motions of
their own minds and hearts … giving them power to discover when it is he who speaking
and what he is saying.”\(^{114}\) There are two major theological-anthropological assumptions:
(1) God works within the human person in a direct fashion, especially through the mind
and heart, and (2) such work is intelligible.

Ignatius believes that a personal force of evil works in opposition to God trying to
pervert the Divine Will. The “enemy of human nature,” or Satan of the New Testament,
attempts to frustrate God’s direct, intimate contact so that the human person either ‘turns
back’ or gives up “on a life totally open to the Holy Spirit.” The enemy force is anti-
spiritual and extrinsic, yet able to “instigate interior motions, thoughts, and affections”: all of which are intended to frustrate the edifying work of the Holy Spirit. The proper
response to this destructive influence is vigilant, direct, and energetic confrontation

\(^{113}\) Ibid.
\(^{114}\) Ibid., 34.
coupled with "courage, calm ... a sense of humor" and even "contempt." While the existence of a personal and cosmic evil influence is central to Ignatius' thought, the Exercises leave room for alternative interpretations.

Within the larger matrix of Ignatius' theological anthropology lies his most central claim: the Creator works through the interior motions of the creature. This inner life is marked by grace: the ebb and flow of consolation and desolation. Progress through the Exercises is conditioned by the exercitant's experience of the graces particular to each meditation and sought in the preludes of desire. The truths of salvation history operate through "various interior movements which Ignatius calls consolation (Ex 316)." In contrast to the progress made through consolation, the evil spirit guides and counsels through desolation. However, desolation also has significant didactic value by awakening a lax conscience [314], bringing tepidity and sloth to light [322], and teaching that consolation is strictly a gift from God [322]. Despite its didactic value, the exercitant is to fight against this state of soul [319].

Both consolations and desolations manifest hidden affections, which either aid or disrupt the exercitant's basic dynamism toward authenticity and surrender to the loving Mystery of God revealed in Christ. They constitute the positive and negative echoes "of his own being to the deepest demands of his true self." They are the "profound signs of

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115 Ibid., 34-35.
116 As Toner writes on p. 38 about avoiding the theological commitment to a personal and cosmic force of evil, "if I were not trying to adhere as closely as possible to Ignatius's own thought as found in his own writings, but were, without constant reference to the text of Ignatius, merely presenting some Ignatian principles, it could be done without grave problems." For more on the debate of Evil, see "Appendix One The Existence of Satan and His Demons Theological Opinions on Satan's Existence as an Object of Christian Belief," 261.
117 Egan, Ignatian Mystical Horizon, 75.
118 Ibid., 75.
his self-surrender to, or self-refusal of” the deepest demand of his own being, to return to itself and “so surrender itself to loving Mystery.” Desolation is the vehicle by which disorder and truncation are exposed.\textsuperscript{119}

While consolation and desolation are a normative source for authenticity, they can also be deceptive if they are misunderstood or not examined critically. The experience of consolation and desolation must not become operative in decision or action prematurely; they must first be understood.

As Jules Toner explains, ‘movements of the soul’ are a flux of thoughts, affective acts, and affective feelings. Toner distinguishes affective acts such as love, hate, desire, or fear from affective feelings such as peace, warmth, coldness, sweetness, bitterness, or depression.\textsuperscript{120} Ivens interprets ‘movements of the soul’ as the interactions of feelings, thoughts, and impulses of attraction and recoil, occurring “spontaneously in consciousness.”\textsuperscript{121} Spirits refer to the “positive or negative spiritual influences or dynamisms that we experience within ourselves.”\textsuperscript{122} Three anthropological principles are necessary: (1) ‘movements of interiority’ are possible objects of reflection; (2) their sources and ‘directionality’ are intelligible; and (3) they can be affirmed or denied. To remain faithful to a close reading of the Ignatian text, I will make the same theological assumptions regarding anthropology as Ignatius himself: namely, the movements of interiority are the work of spirits participating in this larger cosmic struggle between Good and Evil. In this way, discernment is “the wisdom which enables a person to

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 76.
\textsuperscript{120} Toner, \textit{Commentary}, 39.
\textsuperscript{121} Ivens, \textit{Understanding the Spiritual Exercises}, 210.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 211.
distinguish by inner sense ... between the spiritually authentic and its opposite, between what is and is not of the Spirit." The bad spirit denotes an influence which jeopardizes the life of the Spirit within the exercitant. The good spirit edifies, energizes, and brings a coherent and stable meaning to the exercitant's life. In a real way, then, the bad spirit is essentially destructive while the good spirit is essentially constructive and life-giving.

When identified and understood properly, the consolations and desolations operative in experience form "a school of spiritual wisdom" and follow certain guidelines and norms. The 'rules' themselves form a dynamic perspective, since they are deeply attentive to the exercitant's "direction in relation to God and his will," either towards it or away from it. Directionality is crucial for discernment. The good spirit employs feelings of harmony or conflict, depending on directionality. In addition, the rules also rely on the exercitant's habitual state of soul: "consolation and desolation mean different things to the sinner and to those striving to advance in God's service." Overall, the rules for the discernment of spirits have a threefold purpose: to notice, to understand, to accept or reject. Relative to the exercitant's directionality and state of soul, there are two sets of rules for discernment, the process of noticing, understanding, and accepting or rejecting.

The purpose of the rules explained in [313] is "to perceive and understand" the various movements of interiority, so that the good may be accepted and the bad may be rejected. There are two types of people in the First Week: those who are moving away from God, going "from one deadly sin to another" in [314], and those "who are making

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123 Ibid., 205.
124 Ibid., 211.
125 Ibid., 208.
126 Egan, Ignatian Mystical Horizon, 77.
serious progress in the purification of their sins” in [315]. For the first type, the good spirit uses “pricks of conscience and feelings of remorse by means of ... rational moral judgment” so that the bad spirit cannot entice them further by “sensual delights and satisfactions.”127 For those moving away from God, the good spirit uses desolation to change the exercitant’s direction, making him painfully aware that the good he seeks is a deceptive good. Essentially, desolation in this case works as disillusionment. For those progressing toward God, the opposite is true. Desolation works deceptively to frustrate the exercitant’s progress by holding out apparent pleasures, while the good spirit strengthens, consoles, inspires, and makes easy the removal of impediments. For the spiritual director, assessing the exercitant’s directionality in the First Week is a crucial task with major implications.

Ignatius defines spiritual consolation in the third rule of [316] and gives it three possible meanings. First, it is any interior movement in the soul that “leads her to become inflamed with the love of her Creator and Lord” so that the soul loves all things “in the Creator and Lord.” Secondly, it refers to the times when a person sheds tears “which lead to love of our Lord.” Thirdly, it refers to “every increase of hope, faith and charity, to all interior happiness ... leaving the soul quiet and at peace in her Creator and Lord.”128 All three experiences, while different in kind, have the same effect: increasing the exercitant’s ability to praise, reverence and serve. Spiritual consolation may be subtle and gentle or so significant as to bring tears. Spiritual consolation is not a uniform experience but admits of diversity.

127 Ivens, Understanding the Spiritual Exercises, 212.
128 Ibid., 214.
Spiritual desolation has a very different definition in the fourth rule of [317]. It refers to “everything contrary to what is described in Rule Three.” It refers to a number of different experiences, such as “darkness and disturbance in the soul, attraction to what is low and of the earth, disquiet arising from various agitations and temptations.” Essentially, it frustrates consolation by causing “a lack of confidence in which one feels oneself to be without hope and without love.” Ranging from feelings of laziness, sadness, lack of direction, or tepidity, desolation leads the excertant to feel cut off from the Creator, who sustains and inspires. Furthermore, feelings of desolation are accompanied by thoughts of desolation, both of which are contrary to the experiences described in the third rule. Desolation does not have a positive definition as consolation does, but is defined negatively as ‘a lack’. Its end is frustration, confusion, or even ennui. It is fitting to associate consolation with the true, constructive nature of the good and desolation with the deceptively good, or that which is ultimately destructive. In this way, discernment is an important tool not only for one’s stance vis-à-vis the cosmic struggle between good and evil but also the personal struggle towards an integrated, meaningful, and inspired way of living over and against a life marked by disintegration, confusion, or meaninglessness.

Despite its negative definition as a lack, desolation does have three principle functions, each revealing important data for spiritual progress. The ninth rule in [322] explains that the first function of desolation is to make the excertant aware of her “lukewarm, lazy or careless … practices” in the spiritual life, so that she may come to understand that savoring moments of spiritual consolation requires discipline and

129 Ibid., 216.
commitment.\textsuperscript{130} Secondly, spiritual desolation tests the exercitant’s quality, determining how far she will extend herself in God’s service and praise “without the generous remuneration of consolations and overflowing graces.” Thirdly, spiritual desolation gives true knowledge and understanding, so that the exercitant may understand that spiritual consolation is gift. One cannot “arouse or sustain overflowing devotion, intense love, tears or any other spiritual consolation” on one’s own: “all this is a gift and grace from God our Lord.” Desolation is an indicator that “we are not to build our nest where we do not belong.” It can make the exercitant aware of tepid or self-referential commitments or of misleading claims regarding God’s true nature. In this way, even desolation can help edify the good spirit and aid the exercitant’s progress.

Perhaps the most significant implication of Ignatius’ rules regards decision-making. The rules are not merely to \textit{understand} the various movements, but to help the exercitant \textit{respond} to them. The fifth through eighth rules from [318] to [321] outline the proper response to desolation. During a time of desolation, “one should never make any change but should stand firm and constant in the resolutions … by which one was guided the day before the desolation or during the preceding time of consolation.”\textsuperscript{131} In desolation, it is the bad spirit “who guides and counsels us.” By following the counsel of the bad spirit, “we can never find the right way forward.” Only the good spirit’s movement can lead to authentic decision-making. Although decision-making cannot always be suspended during times of desolation, any decision made during desolation

\textsuperscript{130} The ninth rule uses the term “principle causes,” which I have replaced with “functions.” Without examining the meaning of “causality,” I chose to focus more on the meaning derived from these experiences and think “function” is more fitting for this end. The actual text is on Ivens, 222.

\textsuperscript{131} Ivens, \textit{Understanding the Spiritual Exercises}, 218-219.
“cannot have the quality of an election in any of the Three Times.”132 If consolation brings love for God, a desire to hear and do his word, a vision influenced by the Gospel, and clarity of perception, then it is necessary for authentic decision-making. Since desolation does not enjoy any of these qualities, it can never lead to an authentic election. The most significant implication is that authentic decision-making is rooted in interiority. Desolation impacts the exercitant on a variety of levels, including even perception.

Although making decisions is to be avoided during desolation, the exercitant is to actively struggle against it. The sixth rule of [319] illustrates the way to go against the interior movements of desolation by an increase in prayer, meditation, examination, and suitable penance. While desolation is not a credible internal milieu for election, it is a valuable source of self knowledge. Perception may be obfuscated during desolation; however, self-awareness may be fruit of the experience itself. Desolation can turn the exercitant to a more healthy dependence on the Lord. As the seventh rule of [320] illustrates, “a person in desolation should consider how our Lord has placed them in a trial period ... [yet] has still left them the grace sufficient for eternal salvation.” [321] encourages the exercitant to remain in a climate of patience and hope for “consolation will not be long in coming.”133 Most significantly, the exercitant is to struggle against desolation but to retain the positive and hopeful mindset that desolation is only temporary. In this way, desolation never becomes the operative or dominant internal milieu of the exercitant’s subjectivity.

132 Ibid., 219.
133 Ibid., 220-221.
The tenth rule of [323] and eleventh rule of [324] direct the exercitant during times of consolation. In such an experience, the exercitant is to think how she will bear herself during the impending times of desolation, gathering strength and savoring the experience of consolation. In addition, it is wise for exercitants to “humble and lower” themselves “thinking how little they are worth in time desolation without grace of consolation.” In desolation, to the contrary, exercitants “can do much if they draw strength from their Creator and Lord, having the grace sufficient to resist every enemy.”

Neither experience is isolated in the present but is part of a longer time-sequence engaging both memory and anticipation. Consolation is a resource for the present and the future as it is retained in memory. It is memory of past consolation and hope for future consolation that allows the exercitant the positive disposition to combat the pull of desolation. In a time of consolation, exercitants are to turn to God in gratitude knowing that such an experience is not an achievement but is totally unmerited. Exercitants respond to both experiences, preferring one and knowing that neither is permanent.

Active resistance is a vital tool for combating the “enemy of human nature.” Exercitants can “do much to contain and even neutralize the involuntary effects of desolation” even though it is not “everything.”\textsuperscript{134} Ignatius completes the first set of rules with three analogies for the enemy of human nature: a cowardly opportunist shrinking when confronted but encouraged when not, a false lover hiding in the shadows, and a military leader looking for weak defenses.\textsuperscript{135} In all three cases, the enemy of human

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid., 224.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., 225-226. The twelfth rule of [325] uses the analogy of a woman quarrelling with a man, which is problematic for today’s sensibility. However, it is important to note the qualities of the enemy of human nature at work in this particular case without portraying Ignatius as a misogynist. To do so, I have used
nature seeks to destroy in subtle and hidden ways, ‘attacking’ the excertant in moments of weakness, confusion, and indifference.

The rules in their entirety admit that while experiences of consolation and desolation cannot be manufactured, they can be accepted or rejected, savored or curbed, allowing certain movements to become normative for subjectivity and others not. The excertant is free and responsible operating from a milieu of internal movements.

The second set from [328] to [336] is comprised of eight rules pertaining to a person “living the interiorized love-relationship, known as the ‘illuminative way’.” They are more applicable to the excertant in the Second Week. The second set of rules concerns what Ignatius calls consolation without previous cause, an essential element of the Spiritual Exercises. The first rule of [329] reiterates that the nature of consolation is to “give gladness and spiritual joy, whilst banishing all the sadness and distress brought on by the enemy,” whose aim is to “fight against this joy ... by bringing forward specious arguments, subtleties and one fallacy after another.” It is important to note that in Ignatius’ vision of human flourishing, the person is joyful, energized, and inspired.

The second rule of [330] introduces the qualification without previous cause to spiritual consolation, something “only God our Lord can give.” As the rule states, “it is the Creator’s prerogative to enter the soul and leave her, and to arouse movements which draw her entirely into love of his Divine Majesty.” Without previous cause means “without any previous perception or understanding of some object due to which such

“cowardly opportunist” to describe the rule rather than “a woman in a quarrel with a man.” Ivens notes in footnote 34 on page 225 that the words “in a quarrel with a man” were not in the original text but were added to complement the following rule, and that Ignatius has a very positive view of women throughout the Exercises.

136 Ibid., 226.
137 Ibid., 227.
consolation could come about through the mediation of the person’s own acts of understanding and will."\(^{138}\) Consolation without previous cause (hereafter CSCP\(^{139}\)) has traditionally been classified by Ignatian scholars as "a limit case" without much practical relevance. However, Karl Rahner believes CSCP to be "an element of ordinary Christian life."\(^{140}\) Consolation with cause is "a proportionate effect of considering, contemplating or reacting to an ‘object.’"\(^{141}\) As such, consolation with cause is indistinguishable from the term consolation as it is ordinarily understood in the Exercises. That is not to say that consolation with cause is therefore the direct or immediate effect of the exercitant’s activity since consolation still remains fundamentally a grace. It is disproportionate in the sense that consolation is said to be unmerited; otherwise, the preludes of desire become unintelligible. Why would the exercitant pray for something she could attain by her own activity? For my argument, I will define CSCP as a form of consolation that "does not depend on such an object or activity," "is gratuitous and impossible to induce," and is experienced as "breaking into" ordinary prayer, not "a natural development of it."

Fundamentally, "it is discontinuous and disproportionate."\(^{142}\)

\(^{138}\) Ibid., 229.

\(^{139}\) Egan uses CSCP in reference to the Latin abbreviation of Consolation Without Previous Cause on page 31. I will use Egan’s abbreviation for consistency.

\(^{140}\) Ivens, *Understanding the Spiritual Exercises*, 229. In footnote 39, Ivens points out that a majority of Ignatian specialists do not accept Rahner’s exegesis of the present rule. As far as I am concerned, if CSCP is a "limit case," then it has little value for my argument or for ethics at all for that matter. If this is the case, then spiritual consolation as described in the first set of rules would become the focal point of discernment, which does not detract from my overall argument that consolation can be understood as transcendent because it (1) lies intentionally beyond and (2) is often considered to be disproportionate. However, I will follow Rahner’s exegesis because it illustrates well the disproportionate quality of consolation, especially CSCP.

\(^{141}\) Ibid., 230.

\(^{142}\) Ibid.
Rahner interprets *without previous cause* to mean "without conceptual object." The preludes of desire, the "what I want and desire" preludes, are a specific request for and expectation of particular graces such as consolation, knowledge, joy, or sorrow relative to the specific meditations and contemplations of the Exercises. If the exercitant experiences grace "in such a way that it was not previously asked for," then it is *disproportionate* to her prelude of desire. When such an experience "transcends the grace expected from the meditation at hand and draws the exercitant wholly into God’s love," it may rightly be considered *without previous cause*. Therefore, the Ignatian 'without previous cause' means consolation which totally transcends the prelude of desire, "a disproportionate consolation which God alone can cause." Furthermore, the word 'previous' does not have a general antecedent, but rather it refers to the particular focus of a particular exercise (contemplation, meditation, etc.) immediately prior to the experience of grace itself. In other words, CSCP operates *in the context* of the Exercises as a whole. Whether this understanding of CSCP is the most popular or not among Ignatian scholars is beside the point: grace, *however it occurs*, is *always* disproportionate in some respect.

The third and fourth rules of [331] and [332] respectively concern consolation as it relates to the good or bad angel. Consolation with cause can be given by either. The good angel uses consolation with cause so the exercitant may rise from good to better, while the bad angel uses it to draw "the person into his own evil intention and

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143 As cited in Egan, *Ignatian Mystical Horizon*, 34.
144 Ibid., 35.
wickedness.” In [332], Ignatius illustrates the deception by which the bad angel can frustrate and confuse the exercitant:

> It is characteristic of the bad angel to assume the form of an angel of light, in order to enter the devoted soul by her own way and to leave with his own profit. That is to say, he proposes good and holy thoughts well adapted to such a just soul, and then succeeds little by little in getting his own way, drawing the soul into his hidden snares and his perverted purposes.  

Even the experience of consolation requires significant discernment and understanding. The exercitant still needs to discern what is truly good from what is only apparently good. Desire directed toward God, therefore, is not immune from the angel of darkness and can become fertile ground for temptation if not critically examined.

The fifth and sixth rules of [333] and [334] provide a general standard against which the exercitant can measure her experience. The fifth rule shows that by paying close attention to the “whole course” of a thought, the exercitant is able to identify the truly good. If the beginning, middle, and end of the thought are directed towards what is completely right, then it is a sign of the good angel. If, as the sixth rule points out, the “serpent’s tail” is discovered at any moment, the exercitant is to retrace the sequence looking for the starting-point.

Ignatius uses two descriptive metaphors in the seventh rule of [335] to illustrate the influence of the spirits on the soul. For the exercitant making progress, the good angel touches her soul “gently, lightly, and sweetly, like a drop of water going into a sponge.” The bad spirit touches her soul “sharply with noise and disturbance, as when a drop of water falls on a stone.” Conversely, when the exercitant is regressing, “these same spirits

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145 Ivens, *Understanding the Spiritual Exercises*, 231.
146 Ibid., 232.
touch the soul the opposite way.” There are different interpretations of experience relative to “the disposition of the person”: either contrary to or similar to the angels. When the soul progresses, the spirits “come in quietly, as one would enter one’s own house by an open door.” When the soul regresses, the spirits enter “with noise and disturbance, making their presence felt.”

Even when the exercitant experiences CSCP being drawn into love for God, there is still need for discernment. As the eighth rule of [336] states,

> When consolation is without cause, even though there is no deception in it ... nevertheless the spiritual person to whom God gives this consolation must scrutinize the experience carefully and attentively, so as to distinguish the precise time of the actual consolation from the period following it, during which the soul is still aglow and favoured with the benefits and after-effects of the consolation now passed. For during the second period ... we form various plans and opinions which are not directly given by God our Lord. These require, therefore, to be examined with very great care before being given complete credence and put into practice.

Discernment is essential not only for understanding the movements of interiority, but also for actualizing them through ‘various plans and opinions.’ There are at least two areas where the exercitant can go astray: by misinterpreting the movements or by hastily actualizing them. For Ignatius, the human person is always subject to the influence of the bad spirit and must constantly be on guard. The soul must not become proud.

However, the CSCP is both an objectively and subjectively certain criterion. Because of its exclusively divine nature, it is not deceptive. Because it comes from God alone, it is the “touchstone experience, the consolation par excellence against which all other experiences can be measured.” Because it enjoys a radical “openness of subjective transcendence” drawing the exercitant into God’s love, it has within itself evidence of

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147 Ibid., 235.
148 Ibid.
divine origin. The CSCP cannot in itself be measured or tested, but “provides in itself the basic measure against which all other consolations are to be measured.” It is a ‘supernatural first principle’ providing a foundation for decisions in the same way that the first principles of logic and metaphysics provide a foundation for other sciences.

Naturally, a number of questions arise. How frequent is CSCP? How available is it? How can one be aware of it psychologically? As Egan explains, “it is not surprising that some commentators consider the CSCP as a very rare experience, essentially mystical, and give only to those most advanced in the spiritual life.” If this is the case, it is available to the few mystics who have had the fortune of experiencing it. It would not, therefore, be of significant importance for the ordinary person. To the contrary, the CSCP can still enjoy a remarkable nature and remain in the realm of ‘ordinary’ spiritual experience. It can admit of “various degrees of purity and intensity” and need not “belong to peripheral phenomena such as visions, locutions, stimata, etc.” The interpretation of CSCP responds to fundamental theological questions: does God relate directly to the human person? If so, how? In one sense, these questions may serve as a theological-anthropological continental divide. If one assumes that God relates directly to the human person, then the question becomes how so and how often. If not, then how does the human person relate to God, if at all? Indirectly? Or, is God the vast silence into which one shouts concerns and worries? Is God an absentee landlord or a distant clockmaker? Ignatius believes that God relates directly to the human person through the ordinary movements of interiority, even though such movements must be interpreted and

149 Egan, Ignatian Mystical Horizon, 43-44.
150 Ibid., 56.
151 Ibid.
understood. Egan finds that the “CSCP falls well within the framework of the normal
course of events during the full 30 day Ignatian retreat.” Furthermore, it is “hardly more
extraordinary than the other expected consolations” and as Ignatius’ letter to Teresa
Rejadell confirms, “it frequently happens.”\textsuperscript{152}

Assuming God does relate to the exercitant directly through ordinary movements
of interiority, the question of ‘psychological awareness’ emerges: how is the exercitant
psychologically aware of CSCP? Egan maintains that when the exercitant discovers a
disproportion between the expectation of a particular prelude of desire and an actually
given consolation which enflames love of God, there is reason to believe it is CSCP. The
disproportion signals that the exercitant ought to pay close attention to the quality of
religious experience. For Egan, CSCP is a fundamental experience of every person. Once
it moves into awareness, it is experienced as disproportionate, yet somehow fitting and
appropriate. A person’s deepest desire for fulfillment anticipates and expects actual
fulfillment. In retrospect, CSCP can be recognized as when a person leaves a comfortable
room and experiences a temperature change for the worse. It inspires a profoundly
heightened sense of interior unity, simplicity, and presence, often followed by an
experience of ‘loss’ when the exercitant returns to a ‘normal state.’ For many, it is only
after the thirty day retreat that they realize just how rich and profound the entire
experience was. Since Ignatius values the memory of and reflection on past graces
received, it is not surprising that such an understanding occurs after the experience itself.

In this section, I have examined two meanings of the word ‘transcendent’ as they
pertain to the Spiritual Exercises. In one sense, the exercitant seeks ‘inner knowledge’

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
that lies intentionally beyond through the use of memory and imagination among other things. The Exercises in this way can be understood as a process of desiring a transcendent source of feeling-value. In another sense, the Exercises advert to a transcendent source of feeling-value that is disproportionate to the exercitant’s activity, yet is operative and intelligible.

Early modern Catholicism was highly suspicious of the Alumbrados, fearing a ‘mystical’ spirituality that was unstructured, haphazard and therefore untrustworthy. During the same period, mysticism flourished under the Spanish Golden Age with some of the Catholic Church’s most influential mystics: Teresa of Avila, John of the Cross, and Ignatius of Loyola. Because of its historical context, two central questions emerge concerning authentic spirituality: (1) ‘what experience(s) can be said to be from God?’ and (2) ‘how does one know?’ To answer these questions, I examined the method and structure of the Exercises. The overall aim of the fifth chapter was to critically examine the internal dynamism operative in the exercitant. The sixth chapter will examine the exercitant’s horizon, the freely-chosen yet bounded sphere of knowledge and interest.
Chapter Six: Horizon in the Spiritual Exercises

The Spiritual Exercises and Ignatius' own life operate in a horizon, a "non-theematic, but real and ultimate matrix." In *The Spiritual Exercises and the Ignatian Mystical Horizon*, Harvey Egan critically examines Ignatius' horizon as a matrix against which and in which he derives "ultimate meaning" and finds "core unity." Egan is interested in "not only what Ignatius explicitly experiences, knows and loves ... but more importantly, his implicit, non-verbal, non-conceptual and non-reflexive perspective."¹ Beginning with an "utterly basic experience" that became increasingly more explicit and more active over the course of his life, Ignatius grew to understand his own being was intrinsically linked to the mystery of God in Jesus Christ. His inner mystical standpoint, his horizon, is Christocentric and "mystagogical."²

In this chapter, I will first identify the elements of the Christocentric horizon that emerge from Egan's study of nine popular Ignatian scholars in light of the entire Ignatian tradition. Secondly, I will return to the Exercises to illustrate the way Ignatius' Christocentric horizon is also ecclesial. Thirdly, I will examine the tension caused by authentic and unauthentic differences of horizon within the Exercises. Lastly, I will show how the Exercises help facilitate a conversion of horizon.

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¹ Ibid., xviii.
² Ibid., 29.
1. The Christocentric Horizon

To say that the Ignatian horizon is “Christocentric” means that Christ is the focal point of the Exercises, but not to the exclusion of other notions. It is also explicitly and implicitly Trinitarian. Ignatius’ Christocentric horizon makes Ignatius more self-aware; therefore, it is also anthropocentric. Lastly, the Christocentric horizon is mystical, concerned primarily with “inner knowledge.” The Ignatian horizon is at once Christocentric, Trinitarian, anthropocentric, and mystical.

The term ‘Christocentric’ can be interpreted in different ways. From the exercitant’s perspective, the term means “Christ-directed.” Regarding the ‘object’ of such directedness, Christ is at once cosmic, historical, and resurrected. As Karl Rahner explains, the Ignatian mystical horizon is called ‘Christocentric’ because “it evokes the inner Christ-directedness of the person and leads it to an encounter with the historical Christ-event which comes from the outside.” Rahner continues, it is “especially a question of the inner Christocentric nature” made available “through that personal encounter with the historical, and … ‘cosmic’ Jesus Christ” during the course of the Exercises.¹

The Christ of the Exercises is both ‘cosmic’ and historical. The ‘cosmic’ Christ is a member of the Trinity looking down on the human condition [102] and is the “Earthly King” [91], “to whom all Christian leaders and people pay homage and obedience” [92]. The ‘cosmic’ Christ is the same being as the historical Jesus contemplated in the Nativity [110] - [112]. At a number of points throughout the Second and Third Weeks, the exercitant contemplates the historical reality of Jesus, as is clear in the accompanying

¹ Rahner as quoted in Ibid., xv.
material for contemplation [261] – [297]. For Ignatius, the Christ-directed horizon is both ‘cosmic’ and historical. In many ways, the cosmic-historical nature of the Christocentric horizon mirrors how the Ignatian ‘imagination-desire-grace’ dynamism expresses itself in action.

The cosmic-historical Christ is also the resurrected Christ of the Fourth Week. In [219], the exercitant is to contemplate the history, where Christ descended into hell, returned to the tomb, rose again, and appeared in body and soul to his blessed mother. [223] asks the exercitant to consider “how the divine nature, which in the Passion seemed to go into hiding, now in this holy Resurrection appears and reveals itself so miraculously.” [224] asks the exercitant to “look at the office of consooler, which Christ our Lord fulfils, and to compare it with the way friends are accustomed to console one another.” The Resurrected Christ is a source of gladness, rejoicing, and joy [221] who consoles [224] despite an apparent absence in times of suffering [223]. The cosmic-historical Christ is also the Resurrected One who consoles and nourishes hope in the face of suffering.

Ivens explains that the spirituality of the Second Week, indicative of the Exercises as a whole, is fundamentally Trinitarian. While the Christological focal point of the Second Week is especially obvious, beginning with the meditation on the Incarnation, the Trinitarian focal point is more subtle. The Trinity works for the salvation of the entire human race [107] deciding on the Incarnation [102]. From the moment of conception onward, Jesus exists for the mission given by the Trinity [104]. Christ’s work on earth is the work of the Father [95]. In the Triple Colloquy Christ is a mediator with the Father.

Contemplation on the life of Christ occurs in the awareness that the Trinitarian God is manifest. Sharing in Christ’s life means sharing in the life of the Trinity; sharing in Christ’s work is sharing in the work of the Trinity in the world. Sharing in this life and work is made possible ‘in the Spirit,’ who encourages and enlightens the exercitant through consolation. The doctrine on Election is possible only with the belief that God’s will is somehow at work in the movements of interiority.

The Trinity witnesses the state of human affairs [102] and begins a descent of love culminating on the Cross. While subsequent meditations do not contain any further specific references to the Trinity, the Second Week itself “is made in awareness of the world in its relationship to the Trinity.”\(^3\) The imaginative history of [102] draws the exercitant into an “apostolic mode” of contemplation on a Trinity that transcends the world but is also at work in the world. In this way, the exercitant personally participates in God’s activity in the world.\(^4\) The Colloquy to end the Incarnation meditation in [109] addresses the three Divine Persons directly. The Trinity does not function as a dogmatic explanation but as real Persons with whom the exercitant may converse. Although the Trinitarian context is not always obvious on first reading, it is a fundamental component of the Exercises, especially the Second Week.

Before I examine the mystical nature of the Christocentric horizon, it is vital to root it anthropologically. The cosmic-historical and resurrected nature of Christ might be in danger of slipping into an esoteric abstraction if it is not firmly grounded in the exercitant’s subjectivity. If the Christocentric horizon has no substantive connection to

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\(^3\) Ibid., 89.
\(^4\) Ibid., 93.
the excitant's subjectivity, it will become a pious dream of the Christian zealot. As Karl Rahner explains, the Christocentric horizon in the Ignatian vision is properly called 'anthropocentric' "because it intends to bring the person unconditionally and genuinely to radical self-acceptance in freedom." The Exercises are not a "moralistic manipulation of the person" but enable the person to embrace the "freedom to be himself" in the "non-suppressed totality of his existential reality."\(^5\) Essentially, the Christocentric horizon concerns human authenticity, that is, liberty from disorder and chaos culminating in the personal response to existential reality. The Christocentric and the anthropocentric aspects, Rahner explains, have an ultimate juncture: the exploration into one's humanity coincides with the Christ-directedness of one's interiority. Ignatius calls this highpoint and goal 'consolation without previous cause': "the clear awareness of man's free, grace-elevated transcendentality which has not been distorted by any categorical object." Such experience is not a "singular mystical phenomenon open only to a select few," but is the "foundation and highpoint of 'normal' Christian life."\(^6\)

The ultimate juncture between the anthropocentric and the Christocentric is mystical. As mystical, it allows the person to experience radical immediacy to God, which ultimately supports everything Christian and ecclesial. Ignatius is totally convinced that such mystical immediacy to God is possible and common to all who seek to prepare themselves to find the Divine Will.\(^7\) The Exercises, in this way, are not concerned with an "extrinsic indoctrination stemming from dogmatic, moral, and ascetical insights." Rather, they seek to "evoke and actualize the humanity and Christ-\(^8\)

\(^5\) Rahner as quoted in Egan, *Ignatian Mystical Horizon* xv.
\(^6\) Ibid.
\(^7\) Ibid., xiii.
directedness” given as the “intrinsic, total thrust of the one, whole person into ‘loving Mystery’.” As mystical, the Christocentric horizon engages the entire person, especially the movements of interiority. Essentially, it is “to have Christ as the instinct of our being.” For Ignatius, the Christocentric horizon is a concrete, universal, stable, mystical basis for both individual Christian authenticity and for the Christian community as a social body. Hence, it is also fundamentally ecclesial. At the end of the Exercises, Ignatius offers eighteen rules for nurturing one’s mind within the Church.


Ignatius’ rules for thinking with the Church reveal his fundamental trust in the work of the Holy Spirit. Ivens explains that they can be misunderstood and used mistakenly. The rules commend a general attitude and do not remove personal freedom or the importance of discernment when handling specific cases. Secondly, the rules do not exhaust the entire scope of Ignatius’ ecclesial vision and concern. The rules are meant to elicit a sentido, or general attitude, in the context of self-discovery.

Coming at the end of the Exercises, the rules must be read with a certain purpose in mind. The purpose of the rules is to elicit a sentido, a fundamental ecclesial attitude that will express itself in certain contentious issues (particularly the contentious ones of the Reformation). In the rules, Ignatius holds three dimensions of the Church in balance:

- the Church as transcendent reality of faith; the Church as an organic institution possessing authority in doctrine and discipline; the Church as a human society

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8 Ibid., xiv.
9 Ibid., 9.
subject, like any other human society, to challenge and threat from outside and to inner tensions, ambivalence and sinfulness.¹⁰

Being a transcendent reality of faith, an organic institution imbued with authority, and a human society subject to sin, the Church has many tasks, roles, and challenges. Taken from the perspective of a director concerned with forming a sentido in the excitant, the rules must also be viewed in light of the process of self-discovery occurring over the course of the Exercises. As a matter of practical concern, Ivens suggests approaching the rules “on the lines of the Second Annotation, as material in which the discerning individual makes his or her own discoveries.” In addition, the rules must also be considered “in relation to the interplay between the continuous and the new that constitutes development in the Church.”¹¹ To take the rules as dogmatic absolutes would be to contradict the fundamental spirit of the Exercises.

The rules themselves fall into three categories: the nature of the church, kinds of authority, and traditional piety. Robert Doran uses Lonergan to interpret the rules for thinking with the Church, especially with regard to points of disagreement. Doran adverts to the presupposition of [22] that “every good Christian … should be readier to justify than to condemn a neighbour’s statement.” Following Lonergan, Doran believes “the primary directive is always advance the positions.” The counterpart, “reversing counterpositions,” is secondary:

The basic Ignatian directive is, Love the church and love those who speak for it. Go for their insights. Find out what they are onto. The rest, in time, will drop away without a lot of bother ...Reversing counterpositions is always secondary to advancing positions.¹²

¹⁰ Ivens, Understanding the Spiritual Exercises 248.
¹¹ Ibid., 249.
That is not to say that the faithful are to silence their consciences. It is to say that development occurs *primarily* by developing positions and only *secondarily* by reversing counterpositions. In time, that which is not nourished will wither and fall away. I mention Doran’s interpretation because Ignatius’ rules may pose a problem to the modern reader who struggles with Ignatius’ metaphor of the “Church Militant” [352]. Doran’s view, in my opinion, represents a constructive, creative, and contemporary engagement with the actual rules.

The first rule for thinking with the Church describes the nature of the Church with three terms: bride, mother, hierarchical. As [353] directs, “laying aside all judgement of our own, we should keep our minds disposed and ready to obey in everything the true bride of Christ our Lord, which is our holy mother the hierarchical Church.” The bridal image stands for the Church’s relationship to Christ while the maternal image stands for the Church’s relationship to its members. Both express the ‘mystery’ of the Church. Ignatius found both images to have “strong affective overtones,” characterizing the ‘filial’ quality of ecclesial spirituality. It is within the Church that one develops the Holy dispositions necessary for authentic Christian living. Holy dispositions, however, operate in a matrix of various types of authority.

The tenth through twelfth rules deal with attitudes towards various kinds of authority: office, theological sources, and personal holiness or charisma. Each case draws attention to certain vulnerabilities which the right ecclesial attitude will avoid. A Spirit-guided praise avoids naiveté. The tenth rule of [362] warns against speaking out publicly against the decrees and regulations of those in authority, since it might cause harm the faith of others. Speaking of unworthy behavior should only be done to those who can
“bring about a remedy.” While the Church was in need of reform prior to the Council of Trent, Ignatius did not concur with the method of public denunciation employed by Girolamo Savonarola. Ignatius favored “criticism made behind closed doors,” because he was more concerned with “people prone to ill-considered zeal.” In his eyes, reform was achieved “by the positive witness of a de facto reformed manner of life, built on a visible repudiation of what he saw as the main roots of corruption, namely avarice and ambition.”

The eleventh rule of [363] is concerned with authority derived from both positive and scholastic theology. The “positive doctors,” as Ignatius calls them, refer to St Jerome, St Augustine and St Gregory. They “move the heart to love and serve God.” The scholastics, such as St Thomas, St Bonaventure, the Master of the Sentences, “define or explain for our times what is necessary for eternal salvation, and for the more effective refutation and exposure of every error and fallacy.” Ignatius values both “types” of theology. Ignatius sought to balance two erroneous movements of his time:

- evangelical humanism, characterized by zeal for the Church fathers and a dismissive view of scholasticism; and a conservative tendency, in which the scholastics continue to hold pride of place.

Ignatius advocates the ‘praise’ of both kinds of authority, explaining that the two are mutually complementary.

The twelfth rule of [364] is concerned with comparing the holy and charismatic of one generation to another. In Ignatius’ words, “these is no small error, in saying of someone, for example, ‘He knows more than St Augustine’, ‘He is another St Francis or

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13 Ivens, *Understanding the Spiritual Exercises* 257.
14 Ibid., 259.
greater', or 'He is another St Paul for virtue, sanctity, etc'." The kind of authority that is rooted in personal holiness or charisma, the kind that makes prophecy credible, the kind of spiritual leadership can be a powerful source of transformation. However, the rule does not warn as much against the charismatic individuals as against the exalted status conferred on them. It warns especially against the tendency to bestow a status on people that no living individual can appropriately be given, placing them beyond reproach.

The thirteenth rule of [365] is perhaps the most famous of the rules, but can easily be misunderstood. The actual rule is as follows:

To find the right way in everything, we must always hold the following: the white I see I shall believe to be black, if the hierarchical Church so decides the matter; for we believe that between Christ our Lord the bridegroom, and the Church, his bride, there is the same Spirit who governs and directs us for the good of our souls, because our holy Mother Church is directed and governed by that same Spirit and Lord of us all who gave the Ten Commandments.

Ivens summarizes the rule well. If it is true that the Church is capable, as guided by the Spirit, of declaring her belief on a specific point, then it follows that assent might require the abandonment of a contrary personal opinion. Furthermore, the black / white antithesis is most likely a direct riposte to a statement of Erasmus that black would not be white, even if the Pope declared it so. Erasmus' statement, Ivens notes in footnote 32, was distributed by pamphlet and eventually censured by the Paris theological faculty.

Essentially, the rule concerns the infrequent and unusual times when a final declaration of the Church stands in diametrical opposition to a member who is faithful, committed, and open to the Spirit. Ivens finds that the entire rule is best regarded as a limit case, not a rule pertaining to the usual experience of exercitants.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{15}\text{Ibid., 260.}\)
The rules regarding the kinds of authority cannot be taken outside the context of the rules for thinking with the Church as a whole or outside the context of the Exercises themselves. Both contexts are concerned with the exercitant’s sentido and disposition. With both contexts in mind, I will examine traditional piety last as a means to cultivate the proper sentido.

Traditional piety emerges from authentic praise. A true ecclesial attitude will act and feel positively towards the symbols which embody and promote faith and devotion in the ordinary believer. Positive acting and feeling express themselves through ‘praise,’ one of the key terms of the Ignatian praise, reverence and serve trilogy. As an action, praise consists in ‘speaking well of.’ As a feeling, praise consists “in a preference for approval against censure.” Both are the antithesis of habitual cynicism and suspicion. The highest form of praise comes from an integration of “our attitude towards a creature into the praise given to God himself.”¹⁶

There are a number of objects deserving the positive acting and feeling manifest through praise. The second through ninth rules concern the objects of praise: confession made to a priest at least once a year, preferably monthly or even weekly [354]; frequent attendance at Mass [355]; religious life, virginity and continence [356]; vows of religion – obedience, poverty and chastity – and other vows made voluntarily [357]; relics of saints and praying to the saints themselves [358]; decrees concerning fasts and abstinences, such as those of Lent [359]; church buildings and their decorations [360]; and the precepts of the Church, “keeping the mind ready to seek arguments in their defence [sic] and never in any way to attack them” [361]. In all, the second through ninth

¹⁶ Ibid., 254.
rules comprise a body of objects worthy of praise. Piety does not dismiss or disregard the symbolic importance of the elements of Catholic culture.

Traditional piety adopts a cautious attitude towards the language of theological doctrine, especially when it involves ‘the simple people’ who are “untaught.” The fourteenth through seventeenth rules concern the nuanced doctrines of predestination, faith, and grace: doctrines of particular importance, given Ignatius’ historical milieu. Regarding predestination, “language should be such that simple people do not fall into any error” so that “they neglect the works which lead to salvation and the spiritual progress of their souls” [367]. Regarding faith, language should not “give people the occasion to become indolent and lazy in works, either before they have a faith informed by charity or afterwards” [368]. Regarding grace, language should not “poison people’s attitude to free will” but should result “in the greater praise of his Divine Majesty” without undermining the value of good works and free will [369]. The fourteenth through seventeenth rules reveal Ignatius’ concerns. While he deeply respects theological doctrine, he is concerned with an authentic spirituality that respects free will, human activity, and grace. He does not want ‘simple people’ to sacrifice a vibrant and vital spirituality at the altar of doctrine.

Both fear and love are essential for traditional piety. The eighteenth rule, in some ways, can be seen as a microcosm of the exercitant’s progress through the Exercises as a whole. Beginning with the purgative way and culminating with the unitive, a similar progression concerns the movement from servile fear to love. As the rule of [370] states,

17 Ibid., 258.
18 Ibid., 262.
Given that the motive of pure love in the constant service of God our Lord is to be valued above all, nevertheless we ought also greatly to praise the fear of the Divine Majesty. For not only is filial fear a good and holy thing, but where a person can attain nothing better or more useful, even servile fear can be a great help in rising from mortal sin, and once having risen, one comes easily to filial fear, which is wholly acceptable and pleasing to God our Lord as it is all one with divine love.\textsuperscript{19}

While servile fear is by no means indicative of the potential relationship between creature and Creator, it does have an important role in the excercitant’s progress. It restrains the will and brings about “the affective space for the motivation of love to grow.” Although servile fear curbs the expression of inordinate attachments and “unconverted desires,” it does little to change them. The concluding rule of the Exercises treats of the legitimacy and place of fear in relation to the final aim of ‘divine love,’ the very last words of the Exercises. Such love is both “the self-giving initiative of God” and “the creature’s self-giving response.” The creature’s free, self-giving response realizes itself in the actions of service. The love that “fully motivates service is a love which consists in the complete gift of self, transcending self-love, self-will and self-interest.” The service oriented spirituality of the Exercises is rooted in ‘divine love.’\textsuperscript{20}

3. Horizon and Conversion in the Exercises

My focus in this chapter up to this point has been the Ignatian horizon, which is both Christocentric and ecclesial. I have used Ignatian terms and contemporary interpretations to remain faithful to the actual text of the Exercises. From here, however, I will use Lonergan’s thought to analyze the way horizon functions in the Exercises.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 264.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
Lonergan found that horizons relate to each other in one of three ways: genetically, complementarily, or dialectically. All three categories are helpful for examining the change, difference, and growth that the exercitant’s horizon undergoes over the course of the Exercises.

The genetic relationship of horizons describes the process where one horizon emerges out of another, usually in a developmental context. It often refers to the constructive change within a single biography or a single history. As Lonergan explains,

[horizons] are related as successive stages in some process of development. Each later stage presupposes earlier stages, partly to include them, and partly to transform them. Precisely because the stages are earlier and later, no two are simultaneous. They are parts, not of a single communal world, but of a single biography or of a single history.\(^{21}\)

Lonergan uses the analogy of educational development in mathematics for explanation: algebra is a genetic development out of basic computational mathematics. Algebra sublates basic math by taking the previous skills and operations acquired and adding more to them. Basic math is a condition for the possibility of algebra.

Horizons may also complement one another. Doctors and lawyers have very different spheres of knowledge, expertise, and interest. However, no individual is capable of knowing everything required to live in today’s complex society. The horizons of the doctor and lawyer, as professionals, complement each other and together form a larger, social whole. The term interdependent is helpful for understanding the complementary relationship of horizons.

Ethics is not particularly interested in the genetic or complementary relationship of horizons. The ethicist is concerned with difference that poses a problem, difference

\(^{21}\) Lonergan, Method 236.
that is fundamentally incompatible. Lonergan calls this type of difference ‘dialectic’.

What precisely dialectic is, what causes it, and how it is resolved is not easy to identify. As Frederick Crowe, a prominent Lonergan scholar, admits “for my own part I am still trying to clarify what dialectic is.”22 While it may be more difficult to understand than the genetic or complementary relationship, dialectic has characteristic features and an intelligible pattern. It is helpful here to use Lonergan’s own description of dialectic:

What in one is found intelligible, in another is unintelligible. What for one is true, for another is false. What for one is good, for another is evil. Each may have some awareness of the other and so each in a manner may include the other. But such inclusion is also negation and rejection. For the other’s horizon, at least in part, is attributed to wishful thinking, to an acceptance of myth, to ignorance or fallacy, to blindness or illusion, to backwardness or immaturity, to infidelity, to bad will, to a refusal of God’s grace. Such a rejection of the other may be passionate, and then the suggestion that openness is desirable will make one furious. But again rejection may have the firmness of ice without any trace or passion or even any show of feeling, except perhaps a wan smile.23

When horizons relate dialectically they are essentially incompatible. They have opposed feeling-values, opposed sources of feeling-value, opposed accounts of knowledge, or opposed worldviews. While dialectic does not mean that everything is incompatible between two horizons, it does mean that the essential elements of each horizon contradict the other. Lonergan also explains that the source of dialectically opposed horizons is the presence or absence of intellectual, moral, or religious conversion and that the resolution of dialectic can only come about through a “shift in horizons.”24

The difference between horizons can be good, neutral, or problematic. When horizons complement one another, difference contributes to a larger good. When one horizon emerges out of another, difference could be viewed as good or even neutral since

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23 Lonergan, Method 237.
development will resolve any possible conflict. When horizons relate dialectically, difference is posed as a problem and nothing short of conversion will resolve it. The dialectic contributes to what Lonergan calls the longer cycle of decline or of progress.

In one respect, the Exercises in their entirety might be viewed as a genetic development of the Christocentric horizon where the exercitant’s sincere desire to praise, reverence and serve God set forth at the very beginning in [23] emerges into the Contemplation to Attain Love in [230]. However, there are a few significant moments in the Exercises where dialectic and conversion better describe the function of difference and change. When a horizon is incompatible with an authentic Christocentric horizon, it is abolished, as in the Two Standards. The Second Week material is divided into five components: the Kingdom [92], personal encounter with the human Jesus [101], the Two Standards [136], the Three Classes [149], and Election [169]. While the Kingdom material articulates a faith-vision of the world, it does not specifically treat of horizontal difference. To analyze the function of difference I will focus on encounter, the Two Standards, the Three Classes, and Election.

The Second Week material prepares the exercitant for making an Election, a personal decision made within an authentic Christocentric horizon. To make such a personal decision in an authentic Christocentric horizon presupposes a personal encounter with the fully human Christ. Not only is the Election a response to the vision of “the good” as articulated in the Kingdom, the Two Standards, and the Three Classes, it is also a response to the personal encounter with Christ in the Gospel narratives. A fundamental component of resolution concerning the dialectic “adds not only response to
the good but the element of personal encounter.” Such a personal encounter is necessary preparation for the material on the Two Standards; otherwise, “the good” articulated in the Second Week material might slip into a form of “idealism.”

The Two Standards proposed in the Second Week relate to each other dialectically. While it may be assumed that no exercitant will freely or intentionally choose the Standard of Satan, it is essential for the exercitant to identify the horizon and its corresponding feeling-values that are fundamentally incompatible with an authentic Christocentric horizon. Lonergan’s method for handling dialectic involves comparison, reduction, classification, and selection of positions. The Two Standards are compared, reduced and classified as a set of constitutive feeling-values (riches, honor, and pride versus poverty, contempt, and humility) enabling the exercitant to select her stance to the two opposing positions. As Frederick Crowe explains,

> the exercise on the Two Standards can be taken as the counterpart in prayer of Method’s comparison, reduction, classification, and selection of positions. Christ and Satan are set in contrast; their ways of operating are reduced to fundamental patterns; the two conflicting patterns offer alternative horizons to enable me to locate myself accurately in regard to the horizon of Christ.

Although Lonergan’s analysis of dialectic is concerned primarily with doctrine, Crowe uses the term doctrine to describe “judgments of fact and of value, judgments of human ways.” The Two Standards can be viewed as a dialectic of doctrines. During this exercise, the exercitant seeks the grace to know the deceits of the evil one and knowledge of the true life of Christ in [149]. The doctrine that emerges from the Exercises is a “remarkable one” in Crowe’s eyes:

\[\text{25 Ibid., 13.} \]
\[\text{26 Ibid., 14.} \]
\[\text{27 Ibid.} \]
love of wealth leads to desire for honors, which in turn leads to pride and so to the whole gamut of sin, but that Christ's way follows the exactly opposite course, from love of poverty to desire for humble position and so to humility and the whole range of virtues (Nos 142, 146).

The dialectic of the Two Standards is a key exercise in the course of the Four Weeks. It reveals that the authentic Christocentric horizon is diametrically opposed to certain other Standards. If the exercitant were to leave the Exercises with only the genetic and complementary relations in mind, she might neglect or overlook the demands of totally embracing the Christocentric horizon. However, the dialectic relationship manifest in the Two Standards is only one of three possible relationships. The dialectic does not describe the Exercises in their entirety, only certain moments within it.

The Two Standards dialectic serves another purpose as well. Not only does it identify the feeling-values that are incompatible with an authentic Christian horizon but also serves as a tool for self-appropriation. During the exercise, the apprehension of feeling-values is real "if we have experienced the extraordinary light this exercise of the Two Standards throws on our past, revealing it, perhaps in its personal inauthenticity, but certainly in its profound conflict with the way of Christ." The exercise is another opportunity for the exercitant to examine past moments and feeling-values in his own narrative that might fit more under Satan’s Banner than under Christ’s. The exercise can become an opportunity for repentance, for development.

Crowe finds two moments or phases in the dialectical process of the Exercises. One moment appropriates the "way of Christ as a set of truths and values to be adopted by anyone who chooses," which I will call the 'Two Standard moment.' Another moment

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28 Ibid., 16.
29 Ibid., 17.
"regards the exercitant’s quite individual choice of a state of life in his own quite individual situation," which I will call the ‘Election moment.’ Anthropologically speaking, choosing and appropriating a horizon in the Two Standard moment is quite different from making concrete, personal decisions within a horizon during the Election moment.

Standards are realized in concrete, personal choices. The Two Standard moment expresses itself in the Election moment. If a person’s choices do not reflect her espoused worldview, she is said to be ‘unauthentic,’ ‘disingenuous,’ or ‘insincere.’ The seeking subject deliberates, decides, and chooses, making an existential commitment and disposing of herself in a specific direction. Transcendental Thomists use the concept of “retorsion” to describe the phenomenon of ‘performative self-contradiction.’ Lonergan uses this technique to show that Hume’s account of knowledge is a performative self-contradiction. The same principle applies here. If the exercitant espouses a Christocentric horizon yet fails to realize it in Election moments, she commits performative self-contradiction. Judgments of feeling-value for Lonergan manifest themselves in decision and action.

The Three Classes exercise of [149] to [157] identifies the more personal dialectic that emerges from the demands of existential subjectivity and the possibility of retorsion. As Crowe explains,

The route has been clarified, but I am not ready to follow it. I remain like a signpost, pointing in the right direction, but not taking a single step toward the goal. Or I cast about for an alternative route that will be less demanding than the one taught me by the Two Standards. If there is a knowledge involved in the exercise of the Three Pairs, it is not a

30 Ibid., 11 [italics added].

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knowledge of the objective routes laid out before us; rather, it is the self-knowledge that lays bare the dodges to which I resort in order to remain deaf to a clear call.  

The Three Classes exercise lies between the Two Standards exercise and the rules for Election. It offers various degrees of commitment to be considered, from which the excertant must choose. At this point during the Second Week, the Christocentric horizon begins to engage the excertant in her existential subjectivity. Christ’s Standard will become operative in her way of being, in her decisions. It is not merely a “good idea,” but something that beckons the existential subject. Difference between the Three Classes also functions dialectically. While one of the classes described in the exercise may ‘evolve’ developmentally into another given a span of time, it is unlikely considering the ‘static’ and definitive time frame: the three classes describe three existential commitments responding to Christ’s Standard. Ranging from tepidity to an ‘enflamed soul,’ the three classes also provide objects of choice. The degrees of commitment function dialectically because tepidity is fundamentally incompatible with the generous response Ignatius envisions in the “take Lord and receive” prayer of [234]. While the horizon of the Fourth Week excertant emerges genetically from the Second Week horizon, only one of the three classes provides the condition for the possibility of Fourth Week grace. To participate in the joy of the Fourth Week’s resurrection, the excertant must have ‘inner knowledge’ of the Passion: a movement of interiority incompatible with the tepidity of the first two classes.

Dialectic in the Exercises operates in two ways. Not only does it identify and classify the feeling-values of Lucifer’s Standard that stand in direct contrast to the

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31 Ibid., 6.
Christocentric Standard, it also identifies the degrees of commitment that stand in opposition to an authentically Christocentric Standard. The Second Week identifies two potential obstacles: problematic feeling-values and tepid commitment. Both challenge 'the Christ-life within,' that is, progress in the exercitant's interiority relative to the Christocentric horizon.

The Second Week culminates in Election, the exercitant's personal and concrete decision emerging from her unique life history in conjunction with the personal commitment to a Christocentric horizon. As Crowe explains, the Two Standard moment of the Second Week begins with an encounter with the way of Christ, both 'cosmic' and 'personal.' It is a "general," if not "universal" way that is "communicable" and belongs in the "realm of public discourse." The Election moment, on the other hand, is "a wrestling of the soul with God in the particular choice of a state of life." It is "utterly individual, not general or communicable, not a matter for public discourse." Because of these two different moments, Ignatius "develops his elaborate set of variables ... the rules for the discernment of spirits." The spirits referred to in the rules for discernment are "my spirits," the movements are "the movements of my soul ... not anyone else's, not even the director's." The Second Week, therefore, contains material that is public, universal, and communicable at certain moments and individual, private, and not communicable at others. The Election moment of the Second Week concerns "real decision" that necessarily engages the exercitant existentially. If decision is mere "practice," if it is a

\[32\] Ibid., 11-12.
mere "exercise ... chosen for the practice," then it is not real decision. Real decision engages the exercitant existentially.\textsuperscript{33}

Dialectic in the Exercises concerns both opposing horizons and obstacles to whole-hearted commitment. The authentic Christocentric horizon that Ignatius envisions is a total self-surrender engaging the exercitant existentially. It is not merely a collection of rational values to be applied generically to any situation; rather, the authentic Christocentric horizon is a dynamism operative within the exercitant that expresses itself existentially in decision and action. As such, the Exercises are a method for religious conversion.

Conversion is best understood in relation to freedom, expressed horizontally and vertically. In \textit{Method}, Lonergan differentiates a horizontal exercise of freedom, which refers to decision or choice \textit{within} an established horizon, from a vertical exercise of freedom, which refers to the "set of judgments and decisions by which we move from one horizon to another."\textsuperscript{34} Successive vertical exercises of freedom may be "consonant with the old and a development out of its potentialities." Or, vertical exercises of freedom may involve "an about-face," coming out of the old by "repudiating" its characteristic features, by beginning a new sequence. Conversion refers to such an about-face and new beginning.\textsuperscript{35} It transforms the subject and his world since it is existential, intensely personal, and utterly intimate. It results in a change of course and direction, affecting all of a man's conscious and intentional operations. It "directs his gaze, pervades his imagination, releases the symbols that penetrate to the depths of his psyche." It enriches

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{34} Lonergan, \textit{Method} 237.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 238.
understanding, guides judgments, and reinforces decision. Not all conversion is authentic; however, as authentic it is considered change for the better and flight from the unauthentic, changing scales of preference and creating the possibility of apprehending feeling-values that were once overlooked. Since man achieves authenticity in self-transcendence, conversion involves the change from self-referential to self-transcending.

As Harvey Egan explains, Ignatius never intended the Exercises to be a “theological treatise” nor “a summary of the spiritual life.” They are a method employed to find God’s Will for the individual. They are a method of conversion, making the exercitant’s “primordial horizon” more mystically present and active. For Crowe, the Exercises “head for a choice,” a “fundamental option involving a new religious horizon” emerging from critical self-searching and commitment. The change occurring in the exercitant’s horizon may flow ‘naturally’ from prior commitments and dispositions at times or it may emerge dialectically at others. Crowe finds the Thomistic end/means structure applicable only to moments of horizontal liberty. Moments of vertical liberty, to the contrary, are best described using Lonergan’s understanding of conversion, dialectic, and radical transformation. While genetic development applies to much of the Exercises, there are significant moments where conversion and dialectic are more fitting tools for analysis. With the dialectic of the Exercises in mind, Lonergan’s claim that religious development is dialectical makes perfect sense: “it is not a struggle between any

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36 Ibid., 130-131.
37 Egan, Ignatian Mystical Horizon 7.
opposites whatever but the very precise opposition between authenticity and unauthenticity, between the self as transcending and the self as transcended.”

The Exercises are concerned with authenticity in the Christocentric horizon, or Christian authenticity. The study of Christ himself “is our chief means of discovering our own unauthenticity and resolving our conflicts.” The flight from the unauthentic is a condition for the possibility of truly objective doctrines that proceed “from an authentic subject involving himself existentially.” Christian authenticity includes the characteristics of the Fourth Week exercitant: self-appropriated, integrated, directed, disciplined, hopeful, generous and humble. The Fourth Week exercitant is free from disordered attachment, able to encounter Christ personally in prayer, able to find God at work in all things, inspired to savor and to express moments of consolation in the service of others, able to discern the ‘lessons’ of desolation without allowing it to become a normative state of interiority, respectful of tradition, the saints, and legitimate authority. The Fourth Week exercitant is radically open to finding God in others yet is also aware of feeling-values that oppose ‘the Christ-life within.’ The Fourth Week exercitant is able to offer herself entirely in the praise, reverence and service of God. In this way, an authentic Christocentric horizon is intelligible and possible for the self-appropriated person who desires to grow in praise, reverence and service. The process employs a method operating in a structure yet is intimate, personal, and existential. The authentic Christocentric horizon is appropriated by the exercitant yet is not an “achievement,” since it relies on interior movements beyond the direct control of the exercitant. In short, an authentic

39 Lonergan, Method. 111.
40 Crowe, "Dialectic and the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises," 15.
41 Ibid., 19.
Christocentric horizon involves the Christian not as one attaining some final state once and for all, but as a "moving target" constantly growing in love and constantly expressing that love freely through the succession of concrete decisions that comprise a single narrative.

In Part Two, I examined three categories of the Spiritual Exercises: self-appropriation, method, and horizon. My aim was to use the Exercises as a model for religious conversion, involving both self-appropriation and the appropriation of a self-transcending horizon of feeling-values. As a model for religious conversion, the Exercises offer an explanation of what an authentic Christocentric horizon is and how it functions anthropologically and existentially. My aim in Part Three is to use both Lonergan and Ignatius to construct a formal existential ethic in a Christocentric horizon.
PART THREE:
Formal Existential Ethics in a Christocentric Horizon

Nothing is more practical than finding God, that is, than falling in love in a quite absolute, final way.

What you are in love with, what seizes your imagination, will affect everything. It will decide what will get you out of bed in the morning, what you will do with your evenings, how you will spend your weekends, what you read, who you know, what breaks your heart, and what amazes you with joy and gratitude.

Fall in love, stay in love and it will decide everything.

Attributed to Pedro Arrupe, S.J. (1907-1991)
Superior General of the Society of Jesus 1961-1984
Chapter Seven: Formal Existential Ethics

The thought of Bernard Lonergan and St. Ignatius of Loyola provide the tools necessary to better understand the ethic that Karl Rahner outlines in his article “On the Question of a Formal Existential Ethics.” As I noted in the introduction, Rahner identifies two problematic types of ethics: Extreme Situation Ethics and Syllogistic Deductive Ethics. Neither is sufficient for moral decisions and both rely on flawed theological anthropologies.

Rahner found that Extreme Situation Ethics (ESE) relies on a flawed existentialist philosophy and a repugnance to the validity of law. By highlighting the uniqueness of each individual and each situation, ESE denies obligation derived from transcendental norms. It is highly suspicious of terms like “human nature” and “unchanging.” Essentially, the suspicion is rooted epistemologically: what are the universal norms of human nature and how can one know them? Without universal norms of any kind, there is nothing to correct the self-deception, bias, and subjective static that constitute such a significant part of human experience. For Lonergan, the immanentist subject is not sufficiently self-critical. Authentic subjectivity is rooted in rational self-appropriation and self-transcendence; therefore, the mere act of choosing itself is not necessarily an expression of authentic subjectivity. ESE admits to or offers no transcendental criteria for
authentic subjectivity. It does not allow the subject to uncover and remove the bias preventing self-transcendence.

Conversely, Syllogistic Deductive Ethics (SDE) favors the objective, rational standard of law at the expense of both rational self-appropriation and self-transcendence. By applying universal principles to the categorization of a concrete situation, SDE logically determines a concrete imperative. Such reasoning is insufficient because it mistakenly assumes the expression of universal norms is always unambiguous and analysis of each situation is always clear. Rahner finds that since situations do not easily translate into ‘formulable propositions,’ they rarely fit into the logical pattern of syllogism and deduction. Furthermore, SDE is often overly “permissive” because it only identifies the options that are negatively circumscribed by law. It does not provide the concrete, subjective data required for the single choice that the moral chooser must make; therefore, it is insufficient. Secondly, SDE is flawed because it relies on a mistaken theological anthropology. Is the moral chooser merely the one who applies universal laws to concrete situations? Is the moral act merely an instantiation of the universal? Theologically, Rahner finds that the moral act has both ontological and existential meaning for the moral subject in the process of self-creation and self-transcendence. Anthropologically, Lonergan finds that a rationalist notion of pure reason, the operative notion underlying SDE, further exacerbates the subject’s alienation and ultimately truncation. Authentic subjectivity emerges from rational self-appropriation, not from logical conclusions that necessarily follow from self-evident first principles. To know the good, one must know oneself. SDE dismisses the centrality of rational self-appropriation,
the process of self-creation, and the thrust of self-transcendence toward the Holy Mystery. Therefore, it operates under a flawed theological anthropology.

Formal existential ethics avoids the errors of both SDE and ESE. As formal, it adheres to a **transcendental method** and has real criteria for **authenticity**. As existential, it locates the self in a larger process of "autobiography": how one authors the only edition of oneself that will ever exist. It engages the individual and the social through the notion of **horizon**. As ethics, it is conditioned by subjective operations, especially **feeling-values** and **election**. Formal existential ethics expands the operations relevant to moral decision-making to include intentional operations on each level: experience, understanding, judgment, decision, and love. It does not confine moral meaning to the realm of theory or limit the function of 'conscience' to rationality. Simply put, morally good decisions in a formal existential ethic are expressions of authentic subjectivity: they engage all of the levels of conscious intentionality.

Formal existential ethics is deeply rooted historically. It is a development of historical insights regarding the human person. As Rahner explains,

> Ignatius tacitly presupposes a philosophy of human existence in which a moral decision in its individuality is not merely an instance of general ethical normative principles. There is at least in the domain of moral decision an element which is **positively individual and unique**, not merely a negative contraction of the general, as in the ancient scholastic Thomistic conception the material individual contracts or limits the specific nature. ... Consequently in regard to that object, ethics cannot entirely consist of a syllogistic deduction in which the major premiss [sic] is a general moral principle and the minor premiss [sic] is a statement about the relevant situation as the case to which the general principle applies.¹

He goes on to say,

¹ Karl Rahner, *The dynamic element in the church*, Quaestiones disputatae,12; (Freiburg: Herder, 1964) 110 [italics added].
It would have to be shown, then, that there is, in this sense at least, in the domain of the human being and his personal moral decisions, an individual element which as such, that is, in what it involves over and above the general, has a positive content and originality, fundamentally and absolutely unique.\(^2\)

Ethics, therefore, includes positive, individual, original elements that are absolutely unique and do not translate into a material universal ethic. In other words, ethics is an expression of subjectivity. It cannot be reduced to a set of universal laws governing behavior, the classification of acts, or the objects of choice. In a similar fashion, it is only in a mechanical, Newtonian universe that general physical laws are determinative. As Lonergan points out, today’s science speaks of probability in an emergent, dynamic universe and not of general physical laws determining behavior in a static universe. However, the positive and original content of ethics does not mean that it must necessarily slip into relativism. Transcendental method provides intelligible, transcategorical criteria for authenticity. Ethics is both formal and existential simultaneously. My first task is to examine what is meant by existential ethics.

1. Existential Ethics: Horizon and Feeling-Values

Ethics presupposes freedom. Any philosophical or theological anthropology that diminishes the role of freedom also diminishes the possibility of ethics and therefore of responsibility. Without delving into a comprehensive investigation of the ontological necessity of human freedom, I must presuppose that some level of freedom is self-evident. Here, I will employ the logic of Lonergan’s argument against Hume’s theory of epistemology: if knowing is a manifold of “impressions linked by mere habits and

\(^2\) Ibid., 111 [italics added].

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beliefs,” then Hume’s theory does not sufficiently account for Hume’s unique and original thought. The same argument, retorsion, can be used against those denying the possibility of human freedom. With freedom in mind, Lonergan identifies four areas of investigation for the possibility of ethics: (1) the notion of the good, will, value, obligation; (2) freedom and responsibility; (3) effective and essential freedom; and (4) relevant prior questions.

Lonergan distinguishes two exercises of freedom: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal exercises are concerned with the decisions one makes within one’s horizon, that is, one’s sphere of knowledge and interest. They are conditioned by the subject’s effective ability to remove bias, allowing noetic striving free reign. Vertical exercises, on the other hand, concern the subject’s essential ability to elect her own horizon – to decide for herself what she is to make of herself. Since transcendental method makes existential ethics formal, it is mostly concerned with horizontal exercises of freedom. For my argument, I will focus primarily on the vertical exercises of freedom that makes formal existential ethics existential. I am concerned with the election of horizon as a way of being. In other words, authentic subjectivity still leaves significant room for differences between horizons. An authentic subject responds to different feeling-values in a Christocentric horizon than in another. While each subject may be attentive, intelligent, rational, and responsible, each horizon has a different set of corresponding feeling-values. Feeling-values provide a context and a boundary for the subject’s attention. Relevant questions emerge from the data to which one attends. The relevance of the questions and

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4 Ibid., 618.
the data are conditioned by horizon. Simply put, horizon directs the subject’s gaze. For my argument I am concerned with (a) the subject’s elected horizon as it is determined by authentic subjectivity and (b) the corresponding feeling-values accompanying such an election.

The existential subject emerging on the fourth level of consciousness makes decisions that have ontological and existential value. A rationally self-conscious subject co-determines her world of concern. The subject does not create the feeling-values that constitute a horizon, but rather appropriates them. Horizon is at once personal, interpersonal, and social: therefore, the subject co-determines her world of concern. She personally accepts or rejects the feeling-values of a horizon that others, past and present, have also elected. When the rationally self-conscious subject freely chooses her horizon, she determines a boundary for the things she can possibly know and the things with which she could possibly be concerned. Such is the nature of historical progress and historical decline. One cannot care about the unknown unknowns that lie beyond the pale of one’s horizon. The horizon that the subject elects and inhabits will shape, in part, her world of concern. Virtues, vices, and feeling-values attach to such world-views. As Lonergan explains, present ideals are a function of past experience, past study, past teachers.\(^5\) Hence, one does not create such values but appropriates them. Existential subjectivity is always contextualized and bounded by horizon.

Horizon and its corresponding feeling-values, therefore, cannot be dismissed from an investigation of existential ethics. As Lonergan defines, horizon is a sphere of knowledge and a sphere of concern: because of feelings, subjects are oriented massively

\(^5\) Lonergan, *Understanding and Being* 20.
and dynamically in a world ‘mediated by meaning.’ Concern, feelings, and meaning are therefore constitutive of horizon. One’s horizon assembles a scale of preference concerning vital, social, cultural, personal, and religious feeling-values. Lonergan’s intentionality analysis reveals that religious feeling-values are the fulfillment of conscious intentionality, the *summum bonum* of the transcendental notions. Feeling-values are not merely rational first principles, but the dynamic content operating in the realm of interiority that co-determines the world mediated by meaning. Feeling-values focus the direction of one’s gaze, determine the objects to which one will advert, allow one to make judgments of value according to an assembled scale of preference, and provide the emotive thrust converting espoused ideals into the fabric of one’s choosing. They are not merely rational principles for intelligibility, but make a fundamental contribution to the subject’s self-transcending dynamism. An investigation of existential ethics involves the connection between one’s horizon as elected, the appropriation of relevant feeling-values, and the assembled scale of preference organizing them. Existential ethics, understood as the expression of the subject’s self-transcending dynamism, is indistinguishable from spirituality when understood as “the experience of consciously striving to integrate one’s life in terms not of isolation and self-absorption but of self-transcendence toward the ultimate value one perceives.”

Both existential ethics and spirituality strive toward self-integration and express the self-transcending dynamism that emerges from the feeling-values appropriated within an elected horizon. The proper functioning of both depends on rational self-appropriation.

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*Schneiders, 684.*
Sometimes horizons emerge within a single narrative that are essentially incompatible. There are times in one's life when one changes course of direction completely, thereby abolishing the essential feeling-values of the previous horizon or re-assembling its scale of preference. Such change does not sublate what preceded. In the usual course of development feeling-values are sublated, that is, retained and "taken up into" another horizon. For example, vital feeling-values are sublated by the social and so on. The patriotic soldier may willfully place his life in danger, but he does not do so recklessly or in flagrant disregard of his own safety. Although he retains the vital feeling-values of survival, he allows other feeling-values higher on the scale of preference to become operative. However, when the soldier lays down his sword all together, he abolishes the essential feeling-values that were once operative. Courage, to continue with this example, is transformed and takes on an entirely new meaning.

When the feeling-values of one horizon abolish or re-assemble those of another, the result is conversion. Since religious feeling-values are atop the scale of preference, I will focus on the influence of religious conversion on feeling-values and scales of preference. Beyond religious feeling-values there is no greater apprehension of value. More precisely, I am not concerned with religious conversion as it applies to any religious horizon, but with religious conversion as it applies to a Christocentric horizon. First, however, it is important to identify the influence of method on authentic subjectivity.
2. Formal Existential Ethics: Authentic Subjectivity and Method

In Rahner's article, he qualifies the excess of situation ethics with the adjective extreme. By doing so, he implies that there is an acceptable form of situation ethics, so long as it is not extreme. A critical question emerges: is formal existential ethics similar in some fashion to situation ethics? Formal existential ethics does indeed resemble situation ethics because it is a unique expression of subjectivity in a particular situation. Since subjectivity cannot be reduced to mere 'nature,' there admits great diversity between subjects, their feeling-values, their spiritualities, and the scales of preference relative to the horizons they elect. The subjective operation of choosing, therefore, also admits of great diversity. The subject expresses herself in the situations that emerge within her unique narrative. Since no two subjects are identical, no two situations or choices are identical. While two subjects may choose the same object, they may do so for different reasons or in response to different feeling-values. If ethics is at all concerned with subjectivity it will also be concerned with situations. Formal existential ethics is a situation ethic since it considers the choosing subject and the unique situation, not merely the object chosen. However, formal existential ethics avoids the problem of being an extreme situation ethic because it is formal; that is, authentic subjectivity follows a transcendental method. Situation ethics becomes extreme when election is haphazard, when bias clouds understanding, when feelings respond to satisfactions rather than values, when subjectivity is not rationally self-conscious, or when choice is not the expression of existential subjectivity. ESE is problematic because it offers no standard for evaluating subjectivity or the subjective operations that constitute moral decision-making.
Not all decisions are expressions of authentic subjectivity; therefore, not all decisions are morally good.

Formal existential ethics emerges from authentic subjectivity. Through self-appropriation, the subject is able to identify the conscious and intentional operations that comprise knowing, valuing, choosing, and loving. Through intentionality analysis, the subject uncovers the internal dynamism of the transcendental method. Rational self-appropriation creates the possibility for authentic subjectivity. The authentic subject uncovers bias by attending to the data of sense and the data of consciousness. She allows further questions to emerge, she makes rational judgments of fact and value, and she actualizes judgments of value through her choices and her actions. In the on-going process of self-transcendence, the authentic subject will not allow herself to remain in the dark world of half-truths, remote or fantastic ideals, or the cold and joyless world of adventitiously imposed obligation. When she discovers that it is up to herself to decide for herself what she is to make of herself, she prefers one horizon over another. She refuses to dismiss or neglect the data that emerges from the realm of interiority and she refuses to espouse values she is unwilling to actualize in her choosing and doing. Most importantly, she will recognize the feeling-values that are the fulfillment of her conscious intentionality: she will organize her autobiography around them.

Formal existential ethics is a plausible prognosis for a significant portion of the problematic differences that create moral dialectic. Lonergan’s notion of authentic subjectivity in general anthropological terms uncovers the latent sources of moral dialectic. However, my concern is not simply with authentic subjectivity as it pertains to any subject in any horizon. I am concerned with authentic subjectivity as it pertains to a
Christocentric horizon. I will use Ignatius of Loyola to address the impact of religious love on formal existential ethics.
Chapter Eight: the Christocentric Horizon

Lonergan offers a compelling account of subjectivity. However, he leaves the meaning of authentic Christian subjectivity open for further investigation. Is there such thing as authentic Christian subjectivity? Ignatius believes there is. Like Lonergan, Ignatius was concerned with identifying the operations that make Christian faith alive, operative, normative, and responsible. Living in a time when proponents of mistaken accounts of subjectivity, faith, and religious experience were liable to the judgment of the Spanish Inquisition, Ignatius sought to identify the elements of authentic Christian subjectivity. Unlike the Alumbrados of his day, Ignatius believed that religious experience, especially in the realm of interiority, could be a reliable source of data if it passed through the sieve of critical reflection. Religious experience, while fundamental to authentic Christian subjectivity, is by no means an infallible source of subjective data. It is susceptible to bias and self-deception like any other source of subjective data. However, when properly discerned, it becomes the normative source of feeling-values, the *apex animae*. There are two particularly relevant items for my argument: (1) the Divine Will as it relates to election and (2) conversion in light of Christian authenticity.
1. Divine Will and Election

Ignatius relies on a major theological premise: the Divine Will is not only operative in the human person but is also intelligible. Assuming of course that (a) God exists and (b) has some relationship to humans, the nature of that relationship is of primary concern to believers. Historically, many have inquired about the relationship: is God an absentee landlord? Does God relate directly or indirectly to the faithful? Is religious experience mediated, unmediated, or both? Some have argued that religious experience is an infantile illusion or an opiate of the masses. The responses to these questions are essential for establishing a theocentric horizon. The Christocentric horizon also presupposes certain beliefs. As Rahner explains,

[a Catholic] believes in the possibility of a manifestation of the divine will (not derivable from the universe and its principles and facts) which may concern the individual as such and his individual decision. Without that conviction, belief in a free revelation by his Word, in the sacred history of redemption, of the living personal God, is impossible.¹ Ignatius' Christocentric horizon presupposes a living, personal God who communicates to the believer through the Divine Will and establishes a personal relationship with Christ. If the Divine Will is only expressed to an elite group of mystics or is expressed to individuals but operates in an erratic, mysterious fashion, then hope for an intelligible, mystical relationship with the living God will disappoint. But if Paul is correct, "hope does not disappoint, because the love of God has been poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us."² If Paul is correct, religious experience can be a trustworthy, intelligible source of subjective data.

¹ Rahner, Dynamic Element 92 [italics added].
² Romans 5:5 (New American Bible).
Ignatius believes that God communicates the Divine Will in an intelligible fashion to the faithful:

If one attends calmly and objectively and tries to learn from Ignatius ... one cannot but come to the conclusion that in the Exercises Ignatius candidly assumes that a man has to reckon, as a practical possibility of experience, that God may communicate his will to him. And the content of this will is not simply what can be known by the rational reflection of a believing mind employing general maxims of reason and faith on the one hand and their application to a definite situation that has also been analysed in a similar discursively rational way, on the other.³

That the Divine Will is available to the subject is one theological concern. Correctly identifying, understanding, and interpreting the Divine Will, however, is another. Ignatius believes interpreting the Divine Will is a plausible task, but one vulnerable to subjective static, inordinate attachment, and bias. All data emerging from consciousness, including religious experience, must pass through the sieve of understanding. One must critically examine the movements of one’s interiority. Religious experience does not trump the slow, muddling process of rational self-appropriation. Belief in the real presence of the Divine Will expressing itself in experience does not grant the subject immunity from self-deception. Ignatius is as concerned with the self-righteous stance of the Alumbrado as he is with the hollow expressions of faith emerging from ritualism and intellectualism. Discernment plays a vital role in the Spiritual Exercises.

As a young man recently inspired by reading the lives of the saints while he was recuperating from a significant injury, Ignatius elected to devote his life to Christ. Ignatius’ autobiography is the story of a young, idealistic man growing in the Christocentric horizon. However, he did not always understand the nature of the Divine Will as it operated in his interiority. Although Ignatius understood the qualitative

³ Rahner, Dynamic Element 94.
difference between the emotions he felt while imagining the lives saints compared to fantasies of chivalry, he did not always clearly understand the discernment of spirits.

Shortly after his ‘conversion on a sickbed,’ a young Ignatius embarked on a journey to Montserrat. On the way, he struck up a conversation with a Moor about the Virgin Mary and the Moor expressed genuine doubt that Mary was truly a virgin. When they parted company, an irate Ignatius contemplated following the Moor and stabbing him in defense of the Virgin Mary’s honor. Not knowing how to handle the impulse to stab the Moor or what his obligation was, he decided to release the reigns of the mule he was riding. If the mule followed the Moor, he would stab him. If the mule chose another path, he would allow the Moor to continue on his journey. Fortunately, the mule did not follow the Moor. Ignatius writes of this incident remorsefully. He did not yet understand how the Divine Will operated through his inner movements. The older Ignatius would never leave the fate of a man’s life up to a mule. Without critically examining the impulse to stab the Moor, young Ignatius left decision up to random chance, which he felt was being open to the Divine Will. He would later come to see such a notion as a total misunderstanding of the way the Divine Will operates in one’s life. Shortly after the incident on the way to Montserrat, Ignatius surrendered his sword and dagger at the altar of the Virgin Mary, a decision radically different from the one not to kill the Moor.

The Ignatian rules for discernment of spirits guide the subject through the seemingly mysterious realm of interiority. They provide a framework within which the subject can understand the complex movements of interiority. Most importantly, the rules for discernment are conditioned by the subject’s fundamental stance toward the all-loving

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4 Loyola, Reminiscences, 19
God revealed in Christ. Experiences of consolation and desolation are relative to the subject’s horizon; the subject must either go with or go against the movements of interiority depending on directionality.

The subject’s decision to appropriate Christocentric feeling-values is a condition for the possibility of discovering the Divine Will. Love precedes knowledge. For one to have the subjective data emerging from a personal relationship with Christ, one must first choose the Standard of Christ. Having chosen Christ’s Standard and having experienced its corresponding graces, the exercitant is able to discover the Divine Will as it pertains uniquely to her own life.

Uncovering the Divine Will and making a subsequent election does not contravene the principles of general abstract ethics, the natural law, or the moral precepts of the gospel. However, those principles in and of themselves are insufficient for making an election. As Rahner asks,

is it necessary to discover the will of God because it is not possible fully to know what is willed, here and now, by God, simply by way of a Christian use of reason (principles of reason and faith plus analysis of the situation), because a man must take into account … that God may make known to him some definite will of his over and above what is shown by the Christian use of reason within the framework of Christian principles applied to the particular situation?\(^5\)

Rahner continues to explain that each set of principles must not only be observed (or not infringed) but must somehow also offer positive, discriminating, and directive content.\(^6\) Rahner finds that only the Divine Will, operative in feeling-values, can offer the concrete, positive, and discriminating content sufficient for electing a singular option.\(^7\) While

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5 Rahner, Dynamic Element, 91.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 91 – 114.
general moral precepts may provide a negative boundary or a general direction, they
cannot offer the same precise direction as the Divine Will revealed in feeling-values.
Discerning the Divine Will, however, is not merely the fruit of critical self-examination.

As with all life in Christ, election of the Christocentric horizon is confirmed
positively through authentic consolation. Overall, life in the Christocentric horizon is
marked by gratitude and joy despite its significant moments of desolation; consolation is
a primary, organizing feeling-value of the Christocentric horizon. It is the grace sought in
the Contemplation to Attain Love at the end of the Fourth Week and an interior condition
necessary for progress throughout the Exercises as a whole. The subject makes no
progress towards the unitive way of the Third and Fourth Weeks without substantial,
concrete experiences of consolation.

Ignatius’ description of consolation is similar in many respects to Lonergan’s
description of insight. Examining Archimedes’ moment of insight, Lonergan found that
insight comes as a release to the tension of inquiry, comes suddenly and unexpectedly, is
a function not of outer circumstances but of inner conditions, pivots between the concrete
and the abstract, and passes into the habitual texture of one’s mind. Similarly, Ignatius
found that consolation comes as a grace sought in most of the preludes of desire, has a
sudden, unexpected, and disproportionate quality to it, is a function of inner movements
not outer circumstances, and becomes part of the subject’s habitual pattern of feeling-
value.

The similar features of insight and consolation reveal an important component for
theological anthropology: just as insight is the fruit of noetic striving so too is consolation

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the fruit of religious desire. Archimedes' insight experience was the fruit of intentionality, was experienced as unexpected, and emerged from a concrete situation. It is fair to assume that he spent significant time and energy asking a number of relevant questions prior to the moment of insight. Archimedes' insight came as a release to the tension of inquiry. However, the experience itself retained an unexpected quality to it: his ecstatic "eureka" expresses both surprise and accomplishment. The insight he sought was to resolve a specific problem of hydrostatics; therefore, the moment of insight was by no means random. It did not emerge mysteriously or unintentionally in the sub-conscious haze of a dream state. To the contrary, Archimedes' insight experience was directly related to a concrete problem of hydrostatics, a problem that emerged from the fabric of his ordinary life.

Similarly, the exercitant's experiences of consolation come as a grace sought intentionally in the preludes of desire. Ignatius shows his readers that consolation is not "uncontrollable mysticism" or "illuminism." To the contrary, consolation is a particular grace sought intentionally that does not emerge erratically. The exercitant asks for the specific feeling-value of consolation in certain preludes. To have 'inner knowledge,' the exercitant must identify and articulate an intended grace. In addition, the petitions for consolation pertain to specific events in the Christ life. For example, the consolation sought in the Fourth Week is of Christ resurrected, a feeling-value that only emerges from the desolation of "knowing" Christ crucified. Both experiences are intentionally sought and emerge from the contemplation of concrete events. Although intended, consolation still remains a grace: it is not the automatic result of a series of operations. Since it cannot be manufactured, it retains an unexpected quality and is therefore
described as gift. Anthropologically, consolation is similar to insight because it is
intentionally sought, is experienced as unexpected, and it emerges from the
contemplation of concrete events. Just as insight emerges from noetic striving expressed
through the subject’s question, so too does consolation emerge from the religious desires
of the seeking-subject expressed through prayer.

St. Augustine’s experience of consolation in book eight of the *Confessions* is
much like Archimedes’ experience of insight. Having read the passage from Romans
13:13, Augustine writes “it was as though a light of utter confidence shone in all my
heart, and all the darkness of uncertainty vanished away.”9 Augustine’s moment of “utter
confidence” did not emerge randomly, but was the fruit of a life ordered by religious
desire. His restless heart was not satisfied by the Manichean worldview or the method of
the Academic Skeptics: “surely a man is unhappy even if he knows all these things but
does not know You; and that man is happy who knows You even though he knows
nothing of them.”10 Augustine’s experience in Book VIII is quite revealing. While the
manner in which Augustine came across the passage from Romans, especially in light of
the child’s “tolle, lege” siren, may have been experienced as ‘sudden and unexpected,’ it
follows the pattern of grace emerging from the Spiritual Exercises: it came as a release to
the tension of religious desire, it was a function not merely of outer circumstances but
predominantly of inner conditions, and it became the organizing principle of his heart and
mind. In this particular moment of Augustine’s autobiography, consolation was
fulfillment of his religious desire. In many ways, Augustine’s “restless heart” parallels

10 Ibid., 72.
noetic striving. However, while noetic striving has its temporary fulfillment in moments of insight, religious desire has its temporary fulfillment in moments of consolation.

While consolation and insight may share a similar structure, a fundamental question remains: what influence do moments of consolation have on moral decision-making? Both Ivens and Lonergan offer excellent responses to this question. Ivens explains that in the Exercises ‘thoughts’ are equivalent to ‘movements of the spirits’: “they involve imagination and feeling, and they tend towards actions, either interior or exterior.”¹¹ I have been using the term feeling-values to describe the subject’s affective dynamism toward action, significantly influenced by the imagination. ‘Movements of spirits’ in the Exercises are equivalent to feeling-values. As a ‘movement of spirit,’ the experience of consolation is normative for other feeling-values. Since judgments of value emerge from the apprehension of value given in feeling, consolation plays a critical role. It reveals value, it establishes a scale of preference among other feeling-values, and it seeks to become operative in choice and action. For Ivens, consolation moments constitute the essence of the Christ life within, providing critical subjective data for any moral decision as it pertains to the process of self-creation.

Lonergan might answer the question in a different manner by interpreting Pascal’s famous line, “le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point” [the heart has reasons that reason cannot know]. Lonergan understands “the heart’s reasons” to mean “feelings that are intentional responses to values” [i.e. feeling-values]. He understands “the heart” to mean “the subject on the fourth, existential level of intentional consciousness and in the dynamic state of being in love.” Therefore, Lonergan understands Pascal’s phrase to

¹¹ Ivens, Understanding the Spiritual Exercises, 17.
mean that “besides the factual knowledge reached by experiencing, understanding, and verifying, there is another kind of knowledge reached through the discernment of value and the judgments of value of a person in love.” If consolation is a feeling-value experienced by a person in love, then it is different from the factual knowledge reached through ordinary noetic striving. It is, rather, an extraordinary “source of knowledge” emerging from a person in love. Love precedes knowledge, establishes feeling-values, and determines a scale of preference otherwise unknown to the ordinary “development from below upwards.” Consolation, therefore, reveals values that would otherwise be unknown.

Similarly, the Ignatian discernment of spirits parallels Lonergan’s notion of authenticity. The term “spirits” can also be understood as “feeling-values.” The phrase “discernment of spirits” also means “the rational self-appropriation of feeling-values.” The Spiritual Exercises have two goals: (a) liberation from inordinate attachments through a process of self-examination, and (b) the appropriation of self-transcending feeling-values relative to the Christocentric horizon. A morally good or morally right decision emerging from the discernment of spirits is the decision of a subject who has critically examined her feeling-values and ordered them according to a scale of preference. In this way, a decision emerging from a formal existential ethic is indistinguishable from a decision emerging from the discernment of spirits.

Subjectivity for Lonergan and Ivens is a process of consciously striving to integrate one’s life in terms of self-transcendence toward the ultimate value one perceives, and therefore parallels Schneider’s definition of spiritual experience. Both

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Lonergan and Ivens find that spiritual experience is foundational for human subjectivity, which necessarily includes moral decision-making.

Formal existential ethics is conditioned by the discernment of spirits. While rational self-appropriation begins the journey toward authenticity, it is acts of essential freedom that constitute the struggle for authenticity: the subject definitively chooses her horizon and its correlative feeling-values. The election material of the Second Week is an instantiation of the subject's capacity for essential (vertical) freedom. Here, Ignatius and Lonergan describe similar phenomenon: the subject's ability to elect her horizon and its correlative feeling-values.

The discernment of spirits in a Christocentric horizon establishes love as the primary feeling-value in the scale of preference. Lonergan claims that being-in-love is the fulfillment of conscious intentionality. Ignatius claims that Fourth Week consolation is a primary feeling-value which ought to inspire the exercitant's generous response. Being-in-love as Lonergan describes functions similarly to consolation as Ignatius describes: both constitute the normative source of feeling-values that eventually culminate in judgment and decision. "Right" decisions in both systems emerge from the subject's rational self-appropriation of feeling-values in an elected horizon where being-in-love is the ordering feeling-value.

The notion of authenticity, of rational self-appropriation, of scales of preference regarding feeling-values, is relative to horizon. From an anthropological perspective, decisions emerging from authentic subjectivity are indistinguishable from decisions emerging from the discernment of spirits. The subjective process of moral decision-making, of ordering feeling-values, is part of a larger process of existential subjectivity.
Feeling-values at the higher end of the scale of preference, i.e. religious feeling-values, are *appropriated* by the existential subject electing a horizon. One cannot examine the authenticity of feeling-values outside the context of horizon. Such an examination ought to be both critical and explicit.

Dialectic occurs not only between authentic and unauthentic subjects operating in compatible horizons but also between subjects operating in horizons whose essential feeling-values are incompatible. Formal existential ethics serves to correct the dialectic between authentic and unauthentic subjects assuming relatively compatible horizons. Authenticity serves as the criteria for morally good decisions. Formal existential ethics relative to a Christocentric horizon, however, has its own standards of authentic subjectivity relative to the Christocentric horizon.

Although consolation serves as an organizing principle for feeling-values in the Christocentric horizon, it is still vulnerable to misunderstanding. Taken out of the larger context of conversion and Christian authenticity, it would be highly misleading. As Ignatius carefully warns, consolation moments must still be discerned.

The discernment of spirits is a process of examining and ordering feeling-values, especially consolation and desolation, according to a scale of preference. Discernment means not merely discovering feeling-values and allowing them free reign, but moreso of ordering them. The rules for discernment are relative to the exercitant’s stance toward the self-transcending nature of the Christocentric Standard. The First Week exercitant has yet to elect the self-transcending Standard of Christ and therefore his feeling-values operate under a different scale of preference. During the First Week, his feeling-values are self-referential, whether they are consciously and intentionally so is irrelevant. Consolation
and desolation during this time have very different meanings than they do in the
illuminative and unitive times. As purgative, the rules for discernment of spirits in the
First Week may advise the excercitant to go against the self-referential nature of “First
Week” consolation. The different sets of rules point to a profound tension between self-
referential feeling-values and self-transcending feeling-values.

Once the excercitant has begun the illuminative and unitive times in the
Christocentric horizon, however, the feeling-values of consolation and desolation have
very different meanings. Discernment of consolation and desolation in the First Week
becomes discernment of the Holy Spirit’s activity in the Second. Anthropologically,
similar feelings (First Week consolation and Second Week consolation) have different
meanings relative to different horizons. Discernment of the Holy Spirit makes the
feeling-value of consolation a source of meaning relative to a Christocentric horizon.
Discernment of spirits becomes discernment of the Holy Spirit when it consciously and
intentionally draws the excercitant closer to God. As such, consolation moments are
deceptively good when they are self-referential but become truly good when they are self-
transcending. For example, the feeling-value of consolation emerging from a horizon of
wealth, honor, and glory is radically opposed to the feeling-value of consolation
emerging from a horizon of charity, hope, faith, humility, praise, and service. Although
the subjective experience may be similar, the horizons in which they emerge are radically
opposed.
2. Conversion and Christian Authenticity

Rahner claims that “the Christian of the future will be a mystic or he or she will not exist at all.” He understands mysticism to mean “a genuine experience of God emerging from the very heart of our existence” and not a “singular parapsychological phenomena.”\(^{13}\) His comment points to a simple truth: if Christians do not find meaning in the realm of interiority they will cease being Christians. Western history has made individuals increasingly suspicious and intolerant of dogma severed from experience and interiority.

Ignatius addressed a similar concern in the 16\(^{th}\) century. He had two problems to avoid: mechanical obedience to religious authority on one hand and mystical subjectivism on the other. Since the early writings in defense of the Exercises had to respond to charges of mystical subjectivism, it is easy to misunderstand Ignatius’ trust in the normative influence of the Divine Will:

The difficulties that Ignatius had with the Inquisition in Alcala and Salamanca must be investigated one day and described ... with sober inquiry into the very understandable root of the hesitation on the part of the Inquisition. The question could then be raised whether Ignatius himself in early days ... did not, in fact, externally very much have the look of an alumbrado, and whether perhaps the very reason he later added this or that to the Exercises was to prevent misunderstanding and misuse of the fundamental "mystical" idea of a divine inspiration in the making of the Election.\(^{14}\)

Rahner sees no grounds in the Exercises for fearing “an uncontrollable mysticism and Illuminism.”\(^{15}\)

The Exercises respect the traditional contexts and boundaries of the Christocentric horizon. As Rahner explains,

\(^{13}\) Rahner, Practice, 22.
\(^{14}\) Rahner, Dynamic Element, 93-94.
\(^{15}\) Ibid., 94.
If ... the meaning of the Election for Ignatius is correctly and attentively understood, there is no need to fear that a door has been thrown open to uncontrolled mysticism. In the first place it is provided for from the start in the meditations that precede the Election, that the objects of the choice must be indifferent or good in themselves and furthermore must remain within the realm of the teaching and practice of our holy mother the hierarchical Church.\textsuperscript{16}

First, the \textit{location} of the Election material in the Exercises is significant. It comes after the subject has established the Principle and Foundation and intentionally sought to rid herself of bias. Having (1) identified the Principle and Foundation, (2) having reflected on transgressions of basic foundational Christian precepts operative in thoughts, words, and deeds, (3) having learned the means to measure oneself against such standards through the examen prayer, (4) having chosen the Standard of Christ, and (5) having committed to it whole-heartedly, the Second Week exercitant is only then prepared to find the particular vocation of the Divine Will. Only then can the exercitant trust the feeling-values of consolation and desolation as truly good relative to the Christocentric Horizon. Even then, the Election material itself is qualified not only by the scope of material content to be chosen but also by the times, or conditions, for making the Election itself. Second, an election responds to and anticipates the feeling-value of genuine consolation examined critically in accordance with certain principles. Such an interpretation of consolation moments is a structured process. Third, an election is made in relation to the Church. It edifies the life of the subject \textit{and} the community of the faithful. An election responding to the Divine Will given as ‘inner knowledge’ does not contravene or abolish the Divine Will operative elsewhere. It is essentially constructive.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 101.
Ignatian mysticism is by no means the erratic, uncontrollable mysticism of the Illuminists or the fantastic mysticism of the Alumbrados.

The religious conversion elicited by the Exercises emerges from a structured pattern of related activities yielding cumulative and progressive results. It is the gradual, intentional appropriation of Christocentric feeling-values over a period of time. The Exercises employ memories of prior experience and prepare the exercitant for the continuation of certain experiences well afterward. Although the conversion process may contain dramatic moments, it must be considered within the context of longer patterns and trends. The graces of the Fourth Week do not emerge overnight.

Religious conversion incorporates the ways of traditional Christian mysticism: the purgative, illuminative, and unitive. First, religious conversion is purgative. It makes the subject critically aware of bias, self-deception, and participation in sin. It is repentant. As Lonergan explains, rational self-consciousness exists over time. If it develops and becomes better, then it has been less good in the past. By approving or disapproving its past, rational self-consciousness either continues its patterns or overcomes them. The self that develops over time deplores and regrets its past participation in bias.\textsuperscript{17} No small part of development, therefore, is devoted to the \textit{flight from bias}. The purgative way reveals that religious development does indeed have a dialectical character to it.\textsuperscript{18} One's religious development is conditioned by the reversal of obstructions. Nearly the entire First Week of the Exercises is devoted to this goal.

\textsuperscript{17} Lonergan, \textit{Insight cw} 3, 722.
\textsuperscript{18} Lonergan, \textit{Method}, 110.
Religious conversion is illuminative. It uncovers new feeling-values and determines a new scale of preference. What was previously unknown, dismissed, overlooked or ignored now becomes experienced, understood, judged, and chosen. The Second Week exercitant comes to know that true life in the Christocentric horizon is marked by certain feeling-values: humility, liberality towards God, spiritual poverty leading to a radical “non-possessiveness,” freedom from “any spirit of idolatry” or inordinate attachment, and a profound sense of security in the face of insecurity, loss, or diminishment. Authentic life in Christ abolishes self-referential feeling-values such as health, wealth, and glory and establishes the self-transcending feeling-values of the Principle and Foundation: praise, reverence, and service of God. Not only does religious conversion transform the subject’s feeling-values it also sows the seeds for participation in the life of the other.

Religious conversion is unitive. The feeling-values previously illumined become the subject’s feeling-values operative in the ordinary fabric of being. The unitive way makes the feeling-values of the Christocentric horizon operative and normative. Third and Fourth Week exercitants experience the felt, inner knowledge of participating in Christ crucified and Christ resurrected respectively. Not only are they able to identify, articulate, or espouse the values of the Christocentric horizon, but more importantly, the appropriated feeling-values have become a part of the fabric of their being. They are more able to participate in the life of the other and are less likely to act in response to inordinate attachments, bias, or self-deception.

The purgative, illuminative, unitive structure is made possible through prayer. While Ignatius illustrates a variety of prayer methods, all of them heighten the subject’s
capacity for self-appropriation. The Examen prayer especially turns the subject’s attention to her own experience, allowing her to grow in awareness of her own consciousness. Her task is to find the God revealed in Christ at work in her daily life, to identify the bias operative in her subjectivity, and to order her life according to its Principle and Foundation. Prayer throughout the Exercises heightens critical self-awareness, illuminates feeling-values that might otherwise remain unknown, and unifies the subject with Christ present in the other.

Without drawing exact boundaries around the notion of Christian authenticity, it is necessary to identify a few essential elements of authentic life in the Christocentric horizon. First, it is a life of prayer, a life of rational self-appropriation. It is not marked merely by competence in the rational application of first principles, but is marked more so by inner knowledge available to the one who prays. The life of prayer and critical self-examination has a purgative function, making the authentic Christian a person who develops over time relative to the Christocentric horizon. Second, life in the Christocentric horizon is authentic because it is elected. Authenticity is inherently linked to the intentional operations of the existential subject; it can never be accidental. Third, authentic life in the Christocentric horizon is a life of grace. Operating in the realm of interiority, grace establishes feeling-values. It reveals inner knowledge that differs from knowledge achieved by the discursive reason. Grace, while sought intentionally, is essentially considered a ‘gift’ since it cannot be manufactured. The interior life of grace establishes and orders normative feeling-values that would otherwise remain unknown, inoperative, or secondary. The Christocentric horizon is constituted by certain essential
feeling-values: love, consolation, joy, humility, openness, and generosity. As the
Contemplation to Attain Love expresses poignantly in [234]:

Take Lord and receive all my liberty, my memory, my understanding and my entire will,
all that I have and possess. You gave it all to me; to you I return it. All is yours, dispose
of it entirely according to your will. Give me only the love of you, together with your
grace that is enough for me.¹⁹

Fourth, authentic life in the Christocentric horizon is confirmed through moments of
consolation. Confirmation, however, does not verify the choice, but strengthens the
chooser.²⁰ Lastly, authentic life in the Christocentric horizon expresses itself in worship
and service. It does not remain silent, but praises, reverences and serves God. Joy and
gratitude manifest themselves through such activities.

Authentic life in the Christocentric horizon is marked by the subject’s free and
generous response to deep moments of gratitude for God’s unmerited gifts. It is not an
obligation imposed adventitiously on the subject, a distant promise of reward in exchange
for a life of servitude, or merely a code of law. The aim of authentic Christian life is not
simply purgation, but purgation as a condition for the possibility of illumination and
ultimately union. As far as real criteria for moral-decision making is concerned, only the
feeling-values established by the Holy Spirit can provide the necessary subjective data for
making a positive, concrete decision in the particularity of an individual life.

¹⁹ Ivens, Understanding the Spiritual Exercises, 174.
²⁰ Ibid., 147.
Chapter Nine: Dorothy Day’s *Long Loneliness*

Authentic subjectivity is the foundation for morally good decisions in a Christocentric horizon. Retrospectively, the authentic Christian subject is able to look back on her life and find the moments, genetic and dialectical, that express her unique narrative. Dorothy Day is an excellent case study for the ethic that I have been examining. Her life story as a whole, including the many life choices therein, attest to her religious feeling-values.

The term ‘autobiography’ is revealing on a variety of levels. First, it is the ‘I’ or the ‘self’ that writes. The first-person perspective allows access to the realm of interiority in a way that is largely inaccessible to the biographer, the third-person observer. Second, the ‘writing’ or ‘narrative’ of autobiography means that the writer’s life is organized into a coherent story: it has characters, a plot, a climax, conversions, and so on. Past experience is woven together so that the life story one writes about is an organized, purposive one. To write an autobiography is to organize one’s life around a central claim. For Dorothy Day, her autobiography is essentially a confession of religious conversion:

> When one writes the story of his life and the work he has been engaged in, it is a confession too, in a way. When I wrote the story of my conversion twelve years ago, I left out all my sins but told of all the things which had brought me to God, all the beautiful things, all the remembrances of God that had haunted me, pursued me over the years so that when my daughter was born, in grateful joy I turned to God and became a Catholic. I could worship, adore, praise and thank Him in the company of others. It is
difficult to do that without a ritual, without a body with which to love and move, love and praise. I found faith. I became a member of the Mystical Body of Christ.\textsuperscript{1} Day begins her narrative by quoting Kirilloff in \textit{The Possessed}, "all my life I have been haunted by God."\textsuperscript{2} Being haunted by God is a central motif for her life story.

Within the context of a longer life story, she made many decisions, some of which only make sense relative to her election of a Christocentric horizon. Her election to leave her common-law marriage partner, Forster, is a complicated decision that illustrates the problematic notions of moral decision-making Rahner identifies so clearly in his article. It is the notion of a formal existential ethic relative to a Christocentric horizon that best explains and justifies her decision. To understand her election, one must know the story of her conversion.

\textbf{1. Dorothy Day's Religious Autobiography}

Day's narrative is inescapably shaped by her religious conversion to Roman Catholicism. Her conversion organized her narrative:

My life has been divided into two parts. The first twenty-five years were floundering, years of joy and sorrow, it is true, but certainly with a sense of insecurity one hears so much about these days. I did not know in what I believed, though I tried to serve a cause.\textsuperscript{3}

Day's conversion was the fulfillment of her searching:

I have not always felt the richness of life, its sacredness. I do not see how people can, without a religious faith. Children have a sense of joy in life that soon wears away. One hears adolescents say, "I did not ask to be born." Rebellion has started.\textsuperscript{4}

It provided criteria to judge her past actions:

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
In my youthful arrogance, in my feeling that I was one of the strong, I felt then for the first time that religion was something that I must ruthlessly cut out of my life. Day's religious conversion is the turning point of her narrative. Her decision to leave Forster is relative to the Christocentric horizon she inhabits as a wise, faithful woman. Her story is neither random nor chaotic, despite moments of confusion, doubt, and uncertainty.

She begins Part One of her story, "Searching," with a description of her adolescent faith life. She admits that she heard very little of religion as a child, but that her "heart leaped" when she "heard the name of God," concluding that "every soul has a tendency toward God." Although she did not search for God as a child, she took God for granted by saying her ordinary prayers unless "a thunderstorm made us hide our heads under the covers and propitiate the Deity by promising to be good." Her adolescent faith was distinct from her adolescent morality:

Very early we had a sense of right and wrong, good and evil. My conscience was very active. There were ethical concepts and religious concepts... Morality lay in the realm of property and sex. Violence, murder, all had to do with our relations with one another over property.

It wasn't until a frightening, awesome experience that Day began to see God in a different way:

Even as I write this I am wondering if I had these nightmares before the San Francisco earthquake or afterward ... I remember these dreams only in connection with California and they were linked up with my idea of God as a tremendous Force, a frightening impersonal God, a Voice, a Hand stretched out to seize me, His child, and not in love. Christ was the Saviour, meek and humble of heart, Jesus, the Good Shepherd. But I did not think of Jesus as God. I had no one to teach me, as my parents had no one to teach them.

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5 Ibid., 43.
6 Ibid., 12.
7 Ibid., 17.
8 Ibid., 17-18.
9 Ibid., 20-21.
Her experience of God as “frightening” and “impersonal” was coupled with a profound experience of charity:

Another thing I remember about California was the joy of doing good, of sharing whatever we had with others after the earthquake, an event which threw us out of our complacent happiness into a world of catastrophe.  

Day’s adolescent life included many positive experiences which would become the foundation of a mature faith in her later life.

However, her adolescent faith also included beliefs that would radically oppose the faith of her later years:

I felt even at fifteen, that God meant man to be happy, that He meant to provide him with what he needed to maintain life in order to be happy, and that we did not need to have quite so much destitution and misery as I saw all around and read of in the daily press. ... From my earliest remembrance the destitute were always looked upon as the shiftless, the worthless, those without talent of any kind, let alone the ability to make a living for themselves.  

The kind and loving God of Day’s early faith life seemed unconcerned with the poverty and misery she encountered. Ironically, it was the direct encounter with the poor in her life that eventually led Day to reject religion altogether.

As a teenager and young adult, Day rebelled against the confines of her adolescent years. At sixteen, she left her home for the University of Illinois and reveled in the joy of autonomy and freedom:

Really I led a very shiftless life, doing for the first time exactly what I wanted to do, attending only those classes I wished to attend, coming and going at whatever hour of the night I pleased. My freedom intoxicated me.  

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10 Ibid., 21.
11 Ibid., 38.
12 Ibid., 44.
Her profound sense of freedom led her to question authority at its very core. She would not allow her life to be determined heteronomously and was infatuated by the anarchism of Prince Kropotkin, a proponent of loosely associated individuals pursuing a common aim. For her, anarchism meant autonomy, self-determination, and cooperation:

Kropotkin looked back to the guilds and cities of the Middle Ages, and thought of the new society as made up of federated associations, co-operating in the same way as the railway companies of Europe or the postal departments of various countries co-operate now ... but anarchism - the word, first used as a taunt by its Marxist opponents, best brings to mind the tension always existing between the concept of authority and freedom which torments man to this day.\textsuperscript{13}

Day’s sense of ‘constructive’ anarchism would later evolve into ‘subsidiarity,’ one of the principles shaping Houses of Hospitality later in her life. As a young woman, however, she was still “intoxicated by her freedom.”

Day’s sense of autonomy, freedom, and self-determination extended beyond the realm of social institutions to the very fabric of her faith life. She rejected her adolescent faith in favor of atheism:

But even as I talked about religion I rejected religion. I had read Wesley’s sermons and had been inspired by them. I had sung hymns from the Episcopalian hymnal to put little John to sleep. I had read the New Testament with fervor. But that time was past. I felt so intensely alive that the importance of the here and now absorbed me. The radicalism which I absorbed from The Day Book and Jack London, from Upton Sinclair and from the sight of poverty was in conflict with religion, which preached peace and meekness and joy. ... Youth, I felt, should not be in a state of peace, but of war.\textsuperscript{14}

Day realized that it was up to her to decide for herself what she was to make of herself:

I was tearing myself away from home, living my own life, and I had to choose the world to which I wanted to belong ... As a little child the happy peace of the Methodists who lived next door appealed to me deeply. Now the same happiness seemed to be a disregard of the misery of the world.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 55-56.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 42.
As a young woman, Day discovered that her adolescent faith was incompatible with a deeper, more pressing sense of responsibility to the poor. She rejected religion altogether for what she thought was a greater good:

Both Dostoevski and Tolstoi made me cling to a faith in God, and yet I could not endure feeling an alien in it. I felt that my faith had nothing in common with that of Christians around me ... In my youthful arrogance, in my feeling that I was one of the strong, I felt then for the first time that religion was something that I must ruthlessly cut out of my life ... I felt at the time that religion would only impede my work. I wanted to have nothing to do with the religion of those whom I saw all about me. I felt that I must turn from it as from a drug. I felt it indeed to be an opiate of the people and not a very attractive one, so I hardened my heart. It was a conscious and deliberate process.  

Religion itself became an impediment to social justice.

There was a great question in my mind. Why was so much done in remedying social evils instead of avoiding them in the first place? There were the day nurseries for children, for instance, but why didn't fathers get money enough to take care of their families so that mothers would not have to go out to work? ... Where were the saints to try to change the social order, not just to minister to the slaves but to do away with slavery?  

Christ represented a worldview that she intentionally rejected:

Jesus said, "Blessed are the meek," but I could not be meek at the thought of injustice. I wanted a Lord who would scourge the money-changers out of the temple, and I wanted to help all those who raised their hand against oppression.  

Her period of atheism was a period of rebellion, rejection, and autonomy.

Day lived as an anarchist, atheist, and social activist for a number of years until she realized the futility of her own efforts. Picketing the White House with a group of suffragettes in Washington, DC, she was arrested. She received a sentence of thirty days for her participation. In jail she came to realize the emptiness and futility of her efforts:

I had no sense as I lay there of the efficacy of what I was doing. I had instead a bitter awareness of the need of self-preservation, the need to escape, the need to endure somehow through the days of my imprisonment. I had an ugly sense of the futility of human effort, man's helpless misery, the triumph of might. Man's dignity was but a word.

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16 Ibid., 43.
17 Ibid., 45.
18 Ibid., 46.
and a lie. Evil triumphed. I was a petty creature, filled with self-deception, self-importance, unreal, false, and so, rightly scorned and punished. I was willing not only to say two and two were five, but to think it.\textsuperscript{19}

At night heavy dreams came to her, tearing her from her sleep, trembling and perspiring. Disconnected from the comfort of knowing that her social activism was fruitful, she turned, briefly, back to the comfort of the faith she knew as a young girl. However, her return to religion was brief; after she was released from prison, she would not allow her experience of humiliation to be the basis of faith. Faith, she believed at the time, was an expression of weakness, not strength. She was ashamed of her weakness and her brief return to religion.\textsuperscript{20} She continued for a number of years to lead a “wavering life,” where “nature warred against the life of grace.”\textsuperscript{21}

During her period as an anarchist, atheist, and social activist, Day fell in love with Forster, a man who shared much of her worldview at the time. As she explains,

The man I love, with whom I entered into a common-law marriage, was an anarchist, an Englishman by descent, and a biologist. ... His friends were mostly liberals and his sympathies were decentralist and anti-industrialist, though he loved the machine and the illusion of progress ... Forster and I shared the house on the beach in Staten Island.\textsuperscript{22}

Forster “had always rebelled against the institution of the family and the tyranny of love.” As she discovered later on, their relationship was not really a union of wills but a “comradeship,” to be entered and exited freely. He fundamentally disagreed with “all man-made institutions,” especially marriage, even though he loved his family. His worldview was filled with paradoxes but was defined mostly by his desire to “enclose himself into a shell,” to escape the troubles of the world “out on the bay with his fishing,”

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 79.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 83.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 85.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 113-114.
to "find comfort in digging for clams or bait," or to "seek refuge in tending a garden."²³

Fissures in their relationship started to surface. When they fought she wondered why they were together at all.

During her common-law marriage with Forster, Day became pregnant: an event that would create a dialectical conflict between the two. At the time of her pregnancy, Day was deeply influenced by the religious people she met on Staten Island and gradually began to enter a religious horizon:

From the time Tamar Teresa was born I was intent on having her baptized. There had been that young Catholic girl in the bed next to me at the hospital who gave me a medal of St. Therese of Lisieux. "I don't believe in these things," I told her, and it was another example of people saying what they do not mean. "If you love someone you like to have something around which reminds you of them," she told me. It was so obvious a truth that I was shamed. Reading William James' Varieties of Religious Experience had acquainted me with the saints, and I had read the life of St. Teresa of Avila and fallen in love with her.²⁴

Forster, upset from the beginning by the notion of bringing a child into the troubles of the world, was adamantly opposed to Tamar's baptism as a Catholic. He often left the two as a result:

he left me quite a number of times that coming winter and following summer, as he felt my increasing absorption in religion. The tension between us was terrible. Teresa had become a member of the mystical body of Christ. I didn't know anything of the Mystical Body or I might have felt disturbed at being separated from her. ... I had become convinced that I would become a Catholic; yet I felt I was betraying the class to which I belonged, the workers, the poor of the world, with whom Christ spent his life.²⁵

The inescapable tension between the two kept Day from worshipping.

Sometimes when I could leave the baby in trusted hands I could get to the village for Mass on Sunday. But usually the gloom that descended on the household, the scarcely voiced opposition, kept me from Mass.²⁶

²³ Ibid., 119-121.
²⁴ Ibid., 140.
²⁵ Ibid., 144.
²⁶ Ibid., 145.
Eventually, their horizontal differences became dialectical, to the point where neither could remain in the relationship without sacrificing a sense of authenticity:

The point of my bringing it up was that I could not become a Catholic and continue living with him, because he was averse to any ceremony before officials of either Church or state. He was an anarchist and an atheist, and he did not intend to be a liar or a hypocrite. ...By winter the tension had become so great that an explosion occurred and we separated again. When he returned, as he always had, I would not let him in the house; my heart was breaking with my own determination to make an end, once and for all, to the torture we were undergoing.  

Day had to make a decision of significant consequence: to remain with Forster or to leave him. She elected to leave.

Day's election to leave Forster is difficult to justify for a number of reasons. To do so, however, it is necessary to show that Dorothy Day fits the criteria of Christian authenticity: she led a life of prayer and rational self-appropriation that had a purgative function, was marked by significant moments of grace and consolation, culminated in a moment of election, illuminated feeling-values that would otherwise remain unknown or inoperative, and expressed itself in worship and service. Because of her authentic Christian subjectivity, she was able to make an election that is otherwise problematic.

Dorothy Day led a prayerful life of critical self-examination marked by moments of gratitude. Prayer became an increasingly important part of her daily life. Through prayer, she became critically aware of her inner movements and was able to discern different qualities of 'peace':

It was a peace, curiously enough, divided against itself. I was happy but my very happiness made me know that there was a greater happiness to be obtained from life than any I had ever known. I began to think, to weigh things, and it was at this time that I began consciously to pray more.  

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27 Ibid., 148.
28 Ibid., 116.
Her prayer life, constituted by rational self-appropriation, included moments of doubt:

I was surprised that I found myself beginning to pray daily. I could not get down on my knees, but I could pray while I was walking. If I got down on my knees I thought, "Do I really believe? Whom am I praying to?" A terrible doubt came over me, and a sense of shame, and I wondered if I was praying because I was lonely, because I was unhappy. But when I walked to the village for the mail, I found myself praying again, holding in my pocket the rosary that Mary Gordon gave me in New Orleans some years before. Maybe I did not say it correctly but I kept on saying it because it made me happy. Then I thought suddenly, scornfully, "Here you are in a stupor of content. You are biological. Like a cow. Prayer with you is like the opiate of the people." And over and over again in my mind that phrase was repeated jeeringly, "Religion is the opiate of the people."29

Her doubt, however, was eclipsed by moments of profound gratitude. She did not pray because of the misery in her life, but because she was surprised by joy:

"But," I reasoned with myself, "I am praying because I am happy, not because I am unhappy. I did not turn to God in unhappiness, in grief, in despair - to get consolation, to get something from Him." And encouraged that I was praying because I wanted to thank Him, I went on praying. No matter how dull the day, how long the walk seemed, if I felt sluggish at the beginning of the walk, the words I had been saying insinuated themselves into my heart before I had finished, so that on the trip back I neither prayed nor thought but was filled with exultation ... It is so hard to say how this delight in prayer grew on me ... I began to go to Mass regularly on Sunday mornings.30

Looking back on a moment from her childhood, she had always been deeply attracted to the life of prayer.

In the front bedroom Mrs. Barrett was down on her knees, saying her prayers. She turned to tell me that Kathryn and the children had all gone to the store and then went on with her praying. I felt a burst of love toward Mrs. Barrett that I have never forgotten, a feeling of gratitude and happiness that warmed my heart.31

Her prayer life became a primary vehicle for her authenticity. It is important to note that her decision to enter a common-law marriage with Forster occurred during a time when she did not pray.

29 Ibid., 132.
30 Ibid., 132-133.
31 Ibid., 25.
Her prayer life had a purgative function. It allowed her to recognize moments in her life of which she did not approve. Because of prayer, her life became one that developed over time. Because of prayer, she uncovered the bias in her own subjectivity. As she recalls, “I wanted to do penance for my own sins and for the sins of the whole world, for I had a keen sense of natural imperfections and earthiness.”32 She remembered her own inflated sense of self-righteousness when she discovered a letter she had written when she was fifteen, a letter “filled with pomp and vanity and piety.”33 She was able to identify past feeling-values that were incompatible with ones in her Christocentric horizon. She painfully remembers the hypocrisy of her pacifism:

Actually the only anarchist I knew was a young fellow by the name of Louis Kramer … He was young, an unbalanced youth, who often escorted me home at night … Every Friday night there were dances at Webster Hall on Twelfth Street to raise money for some radical group. One night there was an Anarchist ball … and Louis Kramer was at the dance waiting for me. When he saw me come in he rushed to embrace me and, taken aback, I pushed him, or slapped him, I don’t recall which. Thereupon he slapped me back. Altogether it was a childish affair that I was much ashamed of afterward … I was neither a Christian nor a pacifist, and I certainly acted like neither. Had I been a Christian I would not have rebuffed the boy, and certainly would not have struck him had I been a true pacifist.34

She was deeply troubled by the tension between her espoused values and the ones operative in her actions.

I was making no pretensions to being a Christian at the time, but I was professing to be a radical. But I was not a good one. I was following the "devices and desires of my own heart."... Mauriac, the great French novelist, talks a great deal of the subtler forms of hypocrisy: "There is a kind of hypocrisy which is worse than that of the Pharisees; it is to hide behind Christ's example in order to follow one's own lustful desires and to seek the company of the dissolute."35

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32 Ibid., 24.
33 Ibid., 34.
34 Ibid., 58.
35 Ibid., 59.
Day uncovered the source of her performative self-contradiction through the long, slow process of rational self-appropriation. She realized, in this process, that the values she espoused were not the feeling-values operative in her interiority.

Day’s prayer life also made her critically aware of significant moments of grace and consolation. As she explains, she “could not read Ippolyte's rejection of his ebbing life and defiance of God in The Idiot without being filled with an immense sense of gratitude to God for life and a desire to make some return.”36 Looking back to the time when she discovered she was pregnant with Tamar, she found “that this period of my life was so joyous and lovely, I want to write at length about it, giving the flavor, the atmosphere, the mood of those days.”37 Despite the significant moments of conflict with Forster and the inner turmoil it caused, she found her pregnancy to be a moment of fulfillment:

I will never forget my blissful joy when I was first sure that I was pregnant - I wanted a baby all the first year we were together ... I remember enjoying the root beer and popcorn later, and feeling so much in love, so settled, so secure that now I had found what I was looking for.38

It was the moments of joy that organized her feeling-values, not moments of desolation. Because of her consolation experiences, she wanted Tamar to have the order that emerges from a vibrant faith life.

What a driving power joy is! When I was unhappy and repentant in the past I turned to God, but it was my joy at having given birth to a child that made me do something definite. I wanted Tamar to have a way of life and instruction. We all crave order, and in the Book of Job, hell is described as a place where no order is. I felt that "belonging" to a Church would bring that order into her life which I felt my own had lacked. If I could have felt that communism was the answer to my desire for a cause, a motive, a way to

36 Ibid., 108.
37 Ibid., 116.
38 Ibid., 136
walk in, I would have remained as I was. But I felt that only faith in Christ could give the answer. 39

Essentially, the consolation moments became the primary, organizing source of her feeling-values. Despite the year when "there was little joy," she "never regretted for one minute" the step she had taken in becoming Catholic. 40

Her election to be baptized and to leave Forster did not eliminate feelings of desolation or isolation, but rather did not allow them to become the primary feeling-values that would orient her life in the Christocentric horizon. Her decision came at a price: because of her decision to become Catholic, she began to lose track of her friends. It had placed a felt barrier between her and others. 41 Although her election also included "the misery of leaving one love," she was more gripped by the "vast flood of love and joy" at the birth of her child 42: a love that would orient the rest of her life.

Day did not inhabit a Christocentric horizon unintentionally or accidently. She elected her horizon, especially in light of her dialectical conflict with Forster's. She began to see her conflict with Forster not as a mere difference of opinion or the result of bothersome character flaws, but as a conflict between two horizons that were fundamentally incompatible. She elected the Christocentric horizon, preferring it to Forster's atheistic horizon. In her words,

'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart and with thy whole soul and with they whole mind.' This is the first Commandment. The problem is, how to love God? We are only too conscious of the hardness of our hearts, and in spite of all that religious writers tell us about feeling not being necessary, we do want to feel and so know that we love God ... One of the disconcerting facts about the spiritual life is that God takes you at

39 Ibid., 141.
40 Ibid., 151.
41 Ibid., 162.
42 Ibid., 149,139.
your word. Sooner or later one is given a chance to prove his love. The very word ‘diligo,’ the Latin word used for ‘love,’ means ‘I prefer.’

Day’s preference was for a Christocentric horizon, a horizon Forster could not know, understand, or share.

I wanted to be poor, chaste and obedient. I wanted to die in order to live, to put off the old man and put on Christ. I loved, in other words, and like all women in love, I wanted to be united to my love. Why should not Forster be jealous? Any man who did not participate in this love would, of course, realize my infidelity, my adultery. In the eyes of God, any turning toward creatures to the exclusion of Him is adultery and so it is termed over and over again in Scripture.

Unlike the host of factors that lie beyond one’s control, vertical exercises of freedom are the expression of existential subjectivity. Day’s election, as she recounts, was between the love she enjoyed with Forster and being-in-love with God.

Day’s election had an illuminative function. Because she elected to inhabit a Christocentric horizon, she discovered new feeling-values. Shortly after her conversion to Catholicism, Day was disillusioned by her previous work as a secluded writer.

How little, how puny my work had been since becoming a Catholic, I thought. How self-centered, how ingrown, how lacking in sense of community! My summer of quiet reading and prayer, my self-absorption seemed sinful as I watched my brothers in their struggle, not for themselves but for others.

When she returned to New York City with Tamar, she met Peter Maurin. He was a central figure to her narrative, “whose spirit and ideas” would “dominate” the rest of her life. Although she does not write it explicitly, it is reasonable to conclude that he would not have had such an influence on her had she met him prior to her conversion. Her early

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43 Ibid., 138-139 [italics added].
44 Ibid., 149.
45 Ibid., 165.
46 Ibid., 166.
activism was "a time for war." It was only after her conversion that she would be able to see the quiet strength of Peter Maurin:

Peter rejoiced to see men do great things and dream great dreams ... Peter made you feel a sense of his mission as soon as you met him. He did not begin by tearing down, or by painting so intense a picture of misery and injustice that you burned to change the world. Instead, he aroused in you a sense of your own capacities for work, for accomplishment. He made you feel that you and all men had great and generous hearts with which to love God ... But it was seeing Christ in others, loving the Christ you saw in others. Greater than this, it was having faith in the Christ in others without being able to see Him. Blessed is he that believes without seeing. ⁴⁷

Day began to see the value of voluntary poverty, detachment from material goods, and a faith that works through love. ⁴⁸

The most radical change brought about by Day's religious conversion was in the practice of worship. Although she had previously dismissed the practice as an opiate for those who were too weak for the battle against injustice, she turned to God in worship in the stark confines of her jail cell:

I began asking for a Bible the second day I was imprisoned, and by the fourth day it was brought me. I read it with the same sense of coming back to something of my childhood that I had lost. My heart swelled with joy and thankfulness for the Psalms. The man who sang these songs knew sorrow and expected joy. ⁴⁹

Even though she found words of comfort in the Bible, she still resisted the notion of worship itself.

I clung to the words of comfort in the Bible and as long as the light held out, I read and pondered. Yet all the whole I read, my pride was fighting on. I did not want to go to God in defeat and sorrow. I did not want to depend on Him. I was like the child that wants to walk by itself, I kept brushing away the hand that held me up. I tried to persuade myself that I was reading for literary enjoyment. But the words kept echoing in my heart. I prayed and did not know that I prayed. ⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Ibid., 171.
⁴⁸ Ibid., 256.
⁴⁹ Ibid., 80.
⁵⁰ Ibid., 81.
It was not until she prayed from a deep sense of gratitude that worship began to make sense to her.

There was another beauty which came into my life at that time. Every Sunday morning Miss Adams went to early Mass and I dragged myself out of my heavy sleep and went with her ... One day, I told myself as I knelt there, I would have to stop to think, to question my own position: "What is man, that Thou art mindful of him, O Lord?" What were we here for, what were we doing, what was the meaning of our lives? One thing I was sure of, and that was that these fellow workers and I were performing an act of worship. I felt that it was necessary for man to worship, that he was most truly himself when engaged in that act.\textsuperscript{51}

The act of worship, the existential struggle to live an authentic life that included worship, the very posture of worship itself convinced Day that "worship, adoration, thanksgiving, supplication - these were the noblest acts of which men were capable in this life."\textsuperscript{52} Even though Day had learned to appreciate the natural beauty of the world from Forster, she did not have the desire to express this gratitude in communion with others until she had entered a Christocentric horizon:

> I had heard many say that they wanted to worship God in their own way and did not need a Church in which to praise Him, nor a body of people with whom to associate themselves. But I did not agree to this. My very experience as a radical, my whole make-up, led me to want to associate myself with others, with the masses, in loving and praising God.\textsuperscript{53}

Her experiences of grace, expressed through worship, were directly related to her Christocentric election. She \textit{learned} to see God at work in her life:

> Love is a commandment, Father Hugo said. It is a choice, a preference. If we love God with our whole hearts, how much heart have we left? If we love with our whole mind and soul and strength, how much mind and soul and strength have we left? We must live this life now. Death changes nothing. If we do not learn to enjoy God now we never will. If we do not learn to praise Him and thank Him and rejoice in Him now, we never will.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 93.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 107.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 139.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 256.
Another significant expression of Day's religious conversion was the Catholic Worker Movement. Although Day had been concerned with injustice virtually her entire adult life, she did not see the poor in relation to her own spiritual development. She admits that even though she had previously enjoyed "the natural virtue of voluntary poverty," she did not deprive herself "in order to help others." She had no philosophy of poverty. Although she loved the poor "in the mass" and was moved by their sufferings, she was "revolted at the idea of doled-out charity." Her religious conversion transformed her worldview, her view of poverty, and her view of the poor. After it, she saw the poor intimately connected to her own spiritual development. As she explains,

We felt a respect for the poor and destitute as those nearest to God, as those chosen by Christ for His compassion. Christ lived among men. The great mystery of the Incarnation, which meant that God became man that man might become God, was a joy that made us want to kiss the earth in worship.

The idealism of her days as social activist was transformed into genuine love for the poor. Spiritual work, she found, was harder than the mental or physical work.

2. An Analysis of Day's Election

Day's election to leave Forster illustrates the flaws of both Syllogistic Deductive Ethics and Extreme Situation Ethics. Furthermore, her election cannot be isolated from the context of her life narrative. Formal existential ethics relative to a Christocentric horizon places her election in the broader context of religious conversion and authentic Christian subjectivity. It is this context alone that offers moral justification.

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55 Ibid., 87.
56 Ibid., 204.
57 Ibid., 199.
Syllogistic Deductive Ethics (SDE) is insufficient for providing the necessary
material content regarding Day’s election. By applying (1) relevant universal principles
to (2) the categorization of a concrete situation, SDE determines a concrete imperative.
Concerning (1), a number of *practical* questions emerge immediately: what are the
relevant universal principles? How are they determined? How are they ordered? What
principles take priority if there are two or more relevant ones? Where does one go to find
such principles? Other factors complicate the relevant principle portion of the syllogism
even more. Day was not a Catholic at the time she entered a common-law marriage with
Forster. Was she obliged to follow Catholic law concerning marriage even before she
became a Catholic? Or, is New York State law the primary source of moral obligation
since the ‘marriage’ was ‘common-law’?

Assuming there were at least some relevant, identifiable, and ordering principles
regarding common-law marriage, divorce, and religious conversion, there still remains
significant *theoretical* concerns: are there instances that negate “spousal” obligations in a
common-law marriage? If so, what are they?

There are further ambiguities regarding categorization, the second element of the
syllogism. The classification of Day’s relationship to Forster is itself extremely
problematic. She called their relationship a common-law marriage, but Forster viewed it
as a “comradeship rather than a marriage.”58 He had “always rebelled against the
institution of marriage” and left Day and her daughter, Tamar, frequently.59 Can their

58 Ibid., 113, 120.
59 Ibid., 120, 144.
relationship be classified as a ‘marriage’ at all? Was it a marriage in the eyes of Day, of Forster, or of New York State?

Difficulties emerge on a third front. There were a number of competing, unequal, and even ambiguous obligations. Although there were moments of peace in Day’s relationship with Forster, “it was a peace, curiously enough, divided against itself.” 60 Day was obliged to follow the demands emerging from existential subjectivity. She was obliged to provide for Tamar’s well-being, spiritual and material. She was obliged by her love for Forster. She concluded it was in Tamar’s best interest to have her baptized Catholic, but Forster disagreed vehemently. 61 A conflict of feeling-values and obligations emerged. In Day’s case, SDE offers no clear imperative.

In Day’s case, SDE is silent in its ambiguity and perhaps overly ‘permissive’ in its prohibitions. At best, it could only identify the negative prohibitions circumscribed by law. It could not provide the positive, concrete direction that Day needed when she faced her moral dilemma. It has no access to or concern for her experiences of consolation, the feeling-value that actually provided the subjective data for her election.

Furthermore, Day’s election does not easily translate into “formulable propositions.” Her election to leave Forster, independent of her religious narrative, is not universalizable into a moral imperative. What universal moral obligation could be derived from her election to leave Forster? Does it apply to all women who have a child from a common-law marriage or only those who are also in the process of religious

60 Ibid., 116.
61 Ibid., 140,144.
conversion? If they apply only to Day, then what prevents the obligation from becoming an extreme situation ethic?

Lastly, SDE relies on an incomplete theological anthropology. Is Day merely the one who applies universal laws of common-law marriage commitment to her personal situation? Is her election to leave Forster merely an instantiation of the universal? Or, does her unique election have ontological and existential value that extends beyond the singular discrete decision itself? Rahner finds that the moral act has both ontological and existential meaning for subject in the process of self-creation. In Day’s case, her election to leave Forster was an instantiation of her ‘preference’ for God. Because of her election to leave Forster, she appropriated new feeling-values: the joy of communal worship, a spiritual connection to the poor, a sense of undivided peace. Day’s election had significant ontological and existential meaning: it was much more than the mere instantiation of a universal principle. Her election was, in fact, transformative.

ESE, on the other hand, is also problematic in Day’s case. Her election to leave Forster was not absolutely or exclusively unique. That her election expressed her existential subjectivity did not by itself make it a morally good election. Had she chosen to prefer Forster, to prefer “love of man,” over and against “love of God” (to use her words), she would not have made an authentic election relative to her Christocentric horizon. In other words, it was a morally good election, anthropologically speaking, because it was an expression of her authentic subjectivity relative to a Christocentric horizon. Naturally, the term authentic is pivotal for preventing a positive notion of situation ethics from slipping into an extreme, problematic form. ESE is problematic
because it has no criteria for authenticity, it follows no transcendental method, it does not critically evaluate itself: the chooser chooses.

To critically evaluate Day's election, one must first determine if it was an expression of authentic subjectivity. Since there is significant evidence that she was critically aware of the movements of her interiority, one could reasonably conclude that her election was authentic in a general, anthropological sense. The relevant data of the narrative is autobiographical: the story itself a product of rational self-appropriation. She was attentive to the data of her consciousness, intelligent in her understanding of it, rational in her judgments of fact and value, and responsible in her decision. She did not leave Forster without significant deliberation or because of an erratic, largely mysterious emotional life. She did not leave him because she was upset with him. Authentic subjectivity operates in an elected horizon. In Day's case, she elected a Christocentric horizon. Her decision to leave Forster was the result of her religious conversion to Christianity and the subsequent dialectic it created between them. Since religious feeling-values are atop the scale of preference, she acted accordingly: she preferred to act in response to her religious feeling-values when they conflicted with her feelings toward Forster. As she writes, "what a driving power joy is!"

Dorothy Day's autobiography is an excellent case study for a formal existential ethic relative to a Christocentric horizon. Her election to leave Forster was an expression of her existential subjectivity; however, it was neither erratic nor random but followed a discernable pattern of intentionality, appropriation, and spiritual growth. She did not arrive at the decision to leave Forster through a rational process of syllogistic deduction or in response to unknown, unidentified, inordinate movements of interiority. To the
contrary, it was her free response in gratitude to a profound, mystical experience of
giftedness that provided the subjective data necessary to navigate her moral, existential
dilemma.

3. Summary and Conclusion

In the introduction I used Rahner’s article “On the Question of a Formal
Existential Ethics” as a broad outline for identifying two basic conceptions of ethics:
SDE and ESE. Rahner asks if there is an alternative to both: formal existential ethics.
Although the article itself gives a broad outline for what is meant by formal existential
ethics, it does not provide the material content sufficient for addressing a number of
anthropological questions. Using the article as a broad outline, my aim has been to
provide the material content for formal existential ethics. To do so, I used three categories
for the critical analysis of authentic subjectivity: self-appropriation, method, and horizon.
I used the thought of Bernard Lonergan for an anthropological account of authentic
subjectivity and the thought of Ignatius Loyola for an account of the way authentic
subjectivity operates in a Christocentric horizon.

For Lonergan and Ignatius, rational self-appropriation is foundational for
authentic subjectivity. It reveals a matrix of desires, whose proper functioning is often
thwarted by a number of obstacles. Lonergan found that to know anything, one must
identify in oneself the operations that yield insight. Through analysis of intentionality,
Lonergan uncovered the operations that lead to self-transcendence, an essential element
of authentic subjectivity. It is only in and through the process of rational self-
appropriation that self-transcendence is possible. Similarly, Ignatius advises exercitants
to critically examen the movements of interiority to discern what is from God and what is not. Having discovered the Divine Will at work in interiority, the exercitant is able to live a life of generous response to God’s gifts: the internal dynamism of authentic subjectivity itself. However, there are a number of obstacles that prevent authentic subjectivity from emerging. Bias, inordinate attachment, and truncation make subjectivity less than authentic.

Authentic subjectivity for Lonergan and Ignatius unfolds methodically. For Lonergan, the operations that yield insight reveal a transcendental method: experience, understanding, judgment, and decision. He offers four corresponding transcendental precepts: be attentive, be intelligent, be rational, and be responsible. For Ignatius, the method of prayer is both a critical examination of one’s experience and the gradual appropriation of Christocentric feeling-values. Prayer in the Exercises unfolds in a purgative, illuminative, and unitive structure. For both, the process of rational self-appropriation is a structured process following a method. The internal operations of the authentic subject are not haphazard, erratic, or unintelligible.

Lonergan and Ignatius found horizon to be an essential element for examining authentic subjectivity. While Lonergan’s thought provided the anthropological foundation for understanding how existential subjectivity relates to horizon, Ignatius’ thought provided the foundational elements for authentic subjectivity relative to an explicitly Christocentric horizon. In both cases, formal existential ethics is relative to horizon.

Having examined the thought of Lonergan and Ignatius closely in Parts One and Two, I identified the elements of a formal existential ethic in Part Three: the influence of
horizon on feeling-values and the relationship of authentic subjectivity to a 
transcendental method. In doing so, my aim was to demonstrate how an existential ethic 
can avoid being an extreme situation ethic, that is, one that operates under criteria that 
transcend individuality. Simply put, existential ethics can also be formal. However, 
formal existential ethics is invariably shaped by the horizon in which it operates. I used 
the Exercises to examine its operation relative to a Christocentric horizon, showing how 
the Divine Will operates relative to the exercitant’s election in a process of conversion. 
Ignatius provides the foundational elements for authentic Christian subjectivity. I 
concluded Part Three by using an election moment from Dorothy Day’s autobiography as 
a case study. Her election to leave Forster, her common-law husband, can only be 
justified in light of a religious conversion relative to her Christocentric horizon. The 
decision in and of itself poses significant problems for SDE and ESE. However, if the 
decision is examined in the context of her subjective, spiritual experience, it fits the 
criteria of a morally good decision.

There are a number of important implications for the ethic I have put forth. 
Rahner claims that theology and ethics has yet to catch up to the Exercises. By “catching 
up,” it is fair to assume he means the Exercises are a vital resource for ethics and moral 
decision-making. The Exercises, however, are not a usual resource for the ethicist. They 
are often categorized, and perhaps dismissed, as “spiritual literature”: a resource relevant 
to the practice of pastoral counseling, but one with little, if any, relevance to the practice 
of ethics. The ethicist will rightfully ask “what is the proper relationship of ‘spirituality,’ 
‘religious experience,’ or ‘mysticism’ to moral decision-making?” I used the Spiritual 
Exercises as a way of understanding how the particulars of “mystical experience”
function subjectively, especially with regard to election. Ignatius found that a direct, inner experience of the Divine Will is not unusual, erratic, overly emotional, exclusively subjective, or superfluous. Like any other subjective data, it can be understood, judged, and chosen.

Mystical experience can be a normative source for ethics if two conditions are true: (1) moral decisions are made in response to values and (2) subjectively speaking, values are intimately linked with feelings; that is, values are best understood as feeling-values. If both conditions are true, then ethics must be concerned with the subjective operation of feeling-values and not merely the discursive reason.

If religious feeling-values are atop the scale of preference, as Lonergan claims, then Rahner is quite correct in saying that ethics has yet to catch up to the Exercises. Rahner also claims that the Christian of the future will either be a mystic or nothing at all. Considering both claims, it is clear that mystical experience, functioning as a normative source of feeling-values, is directly related to the process of moral decision-making. Furthermore, if mystical experience is to be a trustworthy source of subjective data, there must be a way to distinguish authentic mystical experience from its erratic counterparts, a concern Ignatius had in his time. I have used Lonergan and Ignatius to show that there is a direct, intelligible connection between mystical experience, feeling-values, and authentic subjectivity. Authentic mystical experience, understood properly, does not offer yet another contribution to the subjective process of moral-decision making; rather, it functions as the primary shaper of feeling-values. For the authentic Christian subject, mystical experience is the Principle and Foundation of moral behavior.
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VITA

My graduate academic life began with an intellectual curiosity that emerged when I lived as a volunteer in Pohnpei, Micronesia. I enrolled in the University of San Francisco when I returned from living abroad. I studied Private School Administration in the Institute for Catholic Educational Leadership and received a Master’s degree in Education. After teaching for two years at Brophy College Preparatory in Phoenix, I decided to continue with my formal education at Loyola University Chicago. I received a Master’s degree in Theological Ethics from Loyola and continued in the Doctoral program. Academically, I have a number of interests: the relationship between ethics and spirituality, the common good as an intentional endeavor, and the way religious values influence participation in a free market economy.
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The final copies have been examined by the directors of the dissertation and the signatures which appear below verify the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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