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Article
Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
  • Saule T. Omarova, Cornell Law School
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
4-1-2012
Keywords
  • Financial services regulation
Abstract
This Article advocates the statutory creation of a new form of tripartite regulatory regime aimed at the detection and prevention of systemic risk in the financial sector. Although it leaves many significant details blank and many important questions unanswered, this Article offers a radically new vision of the financial services regulation as a process involving three equal participants: bankers, bureaucrats, and guardians of the public interest. Admittedly, this vision is not likely to become reality in the near future. Nor is it meant as a comprehensive plan to solve the problem of effective systemic risk regulation in the financial sector. The main purpose of this Article is to expand the scope of the ongoing policy discussions beyond purely technocratic solutions and to encourage the debate on the future of the publicly minded financial services regulation.
Comments

This article predates the author's affiliation with Cornell Law School.

Publication Citation
Published in: Journal of Corporation Law, vol. 37, no. 3 (Spring 2012).
Citation Information
Saule T. Omarova. "Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation" (2012)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/saule_omarova/1/