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Article
MBO Financing Risks And Managers' Use Of Anti-Takeover Measures
Journal of Applied Business Research
  • Sarah Peck, Marquette University
Document Type
Article
Language
eng
Format of Original
20 p.
Publication Date
7-1-2004
Publisher
The Clute Institute
Abstract

In a management buyout (MBO) offer, managers have an incentive to offer stockholders a price low enough to compensate them for the risks of increasing their equity ownership in a highly leveraged buyout firm. As these risks increase, managers are more likely to combine their offer with an anti-takeover measure. These measures do not protect a low offer, but do result in a higher takeover price when managers are unwilling to match a competitive offer. Such measures, then, benefit shareholders.

Comments

Published version. Journal of Applied Business Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer 2004): 11-30. DOI. © 2004 Clute Institute. Used with permission.

Creative Commons License
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0
Citation Information
Sarah Peck. "MBO Financing Risks And Managers' Use Of Anti-Takeover Measures" Journal of Applied Business Research (2004) ISSN: 0892-7626
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/sarah_peck/8/