Local Rules and the False Value of Trans-territorial Procedure

Samuel P Jordan, Saint Louis University
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ABSTRACT

Local rules have been unfairly cast as procedural villains. Their qualifications for the role are purportedly numerous, but chief among them is that they violate a fundamental principle embedded in our post-1938 procedural regime: that the procedural rules applied in a federal case should not be sensitive to location. It must of course be conceded that local rules do produce territorial variations in procedure. But in practice, the principle of trans-territoriality is aspirational, and is undermined by an array of factors - ranging from competing interpretations of written rules to the supplementation of those rules through exercises of inherent power - that inevitably contribute to location-based variations in the actual procedural requirements imposed in federal cases. Properly situated, local rules are not an outlier, but are merely one form of territorial variation among many. To assess local rules, therefore, we should not ask whether they produce territorial variation, but instead whether a procedural regime that permits them produces a better mix of territorial variation than one that does not. When viewed this way, local rules emerge as attractive - if not quite heroic - because they are transparent, they reflect participation by non-judicial actors, and they promote intra-district equality in the treatment of cases.
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INTRODUCTION

On January 13, 2010, the Supreme Court stayed the broadcast of a pending federal trial that will decide the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8.\(^1\) In doing so, the Court took great pains to avoid discussing the underlying merits of either the case or the question whether federal trials should be broadcast.\(^2\) Instead, the stay was justified on fairly technical grounds: that the local rule used to support the broadcast order was invalid because it had been improperly amended.\(^3\) This marked only the fourth time since the introduction of the federal rules in 1938 that the Supreme Court has addressed local rules and local rulemaking authority.\(^4\) While much of the majority opinion focused narrowly on the details surrounding the promulgation of the particular rule in question,\(^5\) the opinion also bemoaned the “lack of a regular rule with proper standards.”\(^6\)

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\(^1\) Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. ____ (2010). It would perhaps be more accurate to say that the pending federal trial will temporarily decide the constitutionality of Proposition 8. Regardless of the trial outcome, the case will certainly be appealed and is indeed being structured - by the litigants and the district judge alike - for eventual Supreme Court review. See Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010 (describing the litigation strategy and the likelihood for eventual Supreme Court review); William C. Duncan, The Proposition 8 Trial: Understanding the Evidence, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Mar. 3, 2010 (arguing that the decision to seek - and permit - broadcast was “probably driven by the ultimate goal of the case - a hearing before the U.S. Supreme Court”).

\(^2\) Id. at *7 (“We do not here express any views on the propriety of broadcasting court proceedings more generally.”).

\(^3\) Id. Because the issue was decided in the context of an application for a stay, the Court’s opinion formally concluded that the amendment “likely did not” comply with federal law. But the remaining language of the opinion is not similarly restrained. See, e.g., id. at *14 (The District Court here attempted to revise its rules in haste, contrary to federal statutes and the policy of the Judicial Conference of the United States’’); id. at *16-17 (“If courts are to require that others follow regular procedures, courts must do so as well.”).

\(^4\) The three others are Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987); Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974); and Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). As Justice Breyer argued in dissent, the reason for the paucity of Supreme Court cases involving local rules may be due to an appropriate deference to the Circuit Judicial Councils in monitoring and policing local judicial administration. Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. ____ (Breyer, J., dissenting).

\(^5\) Specifically, the primary emphasis is on a rather convoluted timeline of amendments and proposed amendments, id. at *3-6, and on whether the notice and comment period associated with those amendments satisfied statutory
This latter concern is not limited to the amendment procedures, but is directed at local rules themselves. Thus, the case may reflect some unease with the status of local rules in the federal system. If so, the Supreme Court is late to the party. Hostility toward local rules is as old as the federal rules themselves. Over the past seventy years, a steady stream of commentators and committees has recommended that the role of local rules in the federal procedural structure be reduced or eliminated. The core complaint behind these recommendations is that local rules are a source of procedural disuniformity. As Part I explains, the adoption of a federal system of procedural rules reflected an embrace of two forms of procedural uniformity: trans-territoriality and trans-substantivity. Trans-territorial procedure requires the application of the same procedural rules regardless of geography; trans-substantive procedure requires the application of the same procedural rules regardless of substantive law. Local rules are potentially in tension with the norm of trans-substantivity if they are used to impose different procedural requirements for different types of cases. But as discussed in Part II, the larger problem with local rules is that they are almost unavoidably in tension with the norm of trans-territoriality. Local rules create variations in procedural requirements precisely on the basis of geography, and for that reason they have long been viewed as fundamentally inconsistent with the federal rules regime.

requirements, id. at *10-12 (concluding no), see also id. at *1-5 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding yes).

6 Id. at *14.

7 A brief note about nomenclature. The use of the label “trans-substantivity” to describe the idea that the same federal rules should apply regardless of the nature of the suit is well-accepted, and may be traced to Robert Cover. Robert M. Cover, For Win. James Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L. J. 718 (1975). But no similarly accepted phrase describes the parallel idea that the same federal rules should apply regardless of the location of the suit. Professor Rubenstein has referred to this idea as “trans-venue uniformity.” See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1885 n.75 (2002). I choose trans-territoriality instead, in part to avoid any unnecessary confusion with the concept of venue, but primarily because it more closely resembles trans-substantivity in form.

8 Then again, local rules of this sort would potentially be invalid. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a) requires local rules to be consistent with federal rules, see infra Part II.A, and the norm of trans-substantivity derives at least in spirit from Rule 1, which dictates that the rules apply to “all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.” See Cover, supra note 7, at 1886.
To this point, the defense of local rules has been sporadic and largely uninspired. One recurrent argument is that some rulemaking authority is necessary to deal with issues that are inescapably local. At its best, this is a narrow argument that stops well short of defending the current scope of local rulemaking power. Defenders of local rules have also tended to argue that critics improperly undervalue the benefits of disuniformity in general and local rules in particular. Examples of the unappreciated benefits cited include the potential for local rules to act as “experiments” leading to broader procedural reform.

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10 Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2017 (discussing the Knox Committee’s predictions that local rules would have great experimentation value because they would likely prove helpful in suggesting future amendments to the Federal Rules); Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 9, at 569 (describing the use of local rules as a means of experimenting with “innovative procedures for resolving litigation, especially mechanisms that promised to foster economical, prompt dispute disposition”); Steven Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation or Information?, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213, 219 (1981) (“Local rules . . . alert rulemakers to the need for changes in national rules and provide an empirical basis for making changes.”); Keeton, supra note 9, at 859 (noting that the very purpose of a national rule may be to generate and legitimze local experimentation).
lower barriers to local procedural change,\textsuperscript{11} and assistance with vital court administration functions.\textsuperscript{12} The suggested conclusion is that, if properly understood, these countervailing benefits may in some instances justify a departure from the ideal of uniform procedure.\textsuperscript{13} These arguments are useful because the identified benefits are real, but they remain susceptible to the response that the cost of deviating from the norm of trans-territoriality remains too great.

This article develops a more robust defense of local rules, one that is rooted in an acknowledgement that deviations from the norm of trans-territoriality are unavoidable and unrelated to the choice to permit local rules. Trans-territoriality has achieved a status as a fundamental procedural value, but Part III demonstrates that that value is largely aspirational in practice. The actual procedural requirements imposed on litigants are inevitably sensitive to the location of the suit - and the identity of the judge - and the sources of territorial variation include not just local rules, but standing orders, procedural interpretation, procedural discretion, inherent authority and procedural common law. Moreover, these forms of territorial variation often substitute for

\textsuperscript{11} See A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report From the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 707-08 (1995) (describing recent changes that have resulted in slower reform of the Federal Rules, including the increased opportunities for comment, increased length of report-and-wait periods, and the frenetic process resulting from the allowance of multiple proposed rule changes pending simultaneously). “It takes too long to amend a rule or create a new one, and delay not only perpetuates whatever problem occasioned the call for amendment but also invites congress and local courts to step in.” Id.

\textsuperscript{12} Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2017-19 (discussing how local rules can help the court manage routine tasks); Flanders, supra note 10, at 263, 268 (discussing the vital role of local rules in assisting local courts’ efforts to manage themselves and their dockets and describing local rules as a “powerful tool for rationalizing diverse court practices and imposing uniformity”); Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, The Role of Local Rules, 75-Jan. A.B.A.J. 62, 64-65 (1989) (observing that local rules can rid courts of certain routine tasks and can assist busy trial judges by providing them with more specificity on how to handle daily problems for which there is not a federal rule on point).

\textsuperscript{13} A related - but essentially unused - defense of local rules is that the value of territorial uniformity is itself overvalued. Amanda Frost has recently made this argument in the context of federal substantive law, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567 (2008), and the argument applies equally well (if not better) to federal procedural law.
one another, such that the presence of a local rule may displace the use of some competing form.

Thus, the debate about local rules needs to be resituated within the larger universe of territorial variation, and Part IV begins that process. The choice to permit local rules is not a choice to permit territorial variation, but a choice to permit territorial variation of a certain form. And the question of whether to retain local rules, and in what capacity, turns on how local rules interact with and compare to other forms of territorial variation. Relative to those other forms, local rules emerge as preferable along several dimensions. They are transparent in the sense that they are visible, easily discoverable, and knowable in advance. They are participatory in the sense that non-judicial actors are guaranteed a role in their creation. And they are stabilizing in the sense that they make the actual - as opposed to the formal - procedural requirements imposed within a judicial district more consistent.

I. TRANS-TERRITORIALITY AS A PROCEDURAL VALUE

Trans-territoriality, which involves the application of the same procedural rules regardless of the geographic location of the suit, was one of the guiding values in the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\textsuperscript{14} Now, some seventy years after that

\textsuperscript{14} It certainly was not the only guiding value, see Stephen N. Subrin, \textit{How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Context}, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 982 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, \textit{How Equity Conquered Common Law}] (discussing how the rule-makers created equity-based Federal Rules to permit “the participation of virtually unlimited numbers of people in trials” and “escape the confinement of the common law”); Brooke D. Coleman, \textit{Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking}, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 263-64 (2009) (“access” – meaning the expulsion of procedural barriers from the opportunity to reach the merits of a case – was an explicit target of the rule-makers).

There is an interesting and important connection between the procedural value of trans-territoriality and the doctrine associated with \textit{Erie Railroad v. Tompkins}, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which instructs federal courts sitting in diversity to apply federal procedural laws. This, too, was designed in part to promote federal uniformity - and to discourage variations created by the need to follow local rules. \textit{See, e.g.}, Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963) (“One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] is to bring about uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules.”); Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 1888. Indeed, the reason cited by the Supreme Court for granting review in \textit{Hanna v. Plumer}, 380 U.S. 460, 463 (1965), was a “threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure.”
creation, it is now firmly entrenched and rarely questioned. Civil procedure students learn very early that the primary source to be studied is the body of procedural rules that apply in every federal court, but that state procedural rules may—and often do—vary. The idea that procedure tracks the level of the court rather than its location is accepted, and indeed seems obvious. But it is worth remembering that trans-territoriality was an innovation, and a contested one. This Part defines what is meant by trans-territoriality, and describes why it was—and continues to be—perceived as valuable.

A. From Conformity to Uniformity

The introduction of the federal rules marked a departure from the prevailing stance of conformity to state procedural rules and an embrace of a competing stance of uniformity among all federal districts. The conformity regime was governed by the Conformity Act of 1872, although cruder forms of conformity had been in place since 1789. Under the Conformity Act, federal courts were required, subject to caveats discussed shortly, to apply the “practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding” of the states where they sat. This predictably resulted in a balkanized set of federal procedural rules that broke down along state lines, and therefore generated what at first blush looks like the allure of uniform federal procedure has generated hostility over time toward local variations of any kind, whether the result of federally-created local rules or an obligation to enforce state-created procedural rules.


16 See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1037. This cruder form required federal courts to use the “forms of writs, executions or other process” that were the “same as now used in . . . [state] courts respectively in pursuance of the [original Conformity Act of 1789].” Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. Unfortunately, that language was interpreted to define the applicable federal procedure as the state procedure that existed in 1789, with the result that subsequent modifications to state procedural rules were simply ignored. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, (1825). Professor Burbank has referred to this 1792 version of conformity as “static,” and the 1872 version that replaced it as “dynamic.” See also Burbank, supra note 15, at 1037-40.

17 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5 & 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197. As with the earlier forms of the conformity acts, equity and admiralty cases were excluded.
exact opposite of uniformity. But in fact, the conformity regime was designed to promote rather than destroy uniformity, although the particular uniformity that was envisioned was intrastate rather than interdistrict. That is, conformity had as its goal the creation of a single set of procedural rules that would apply within a given state, regardless of whether a given case were filed in federal or state court.

One problem with the conformity regime was that it did not serve its vision of uniformity particularly well. In part this was due to incomplete coverage. The Act applied only in the common law context, so that federal equity cases were governed by a different set of procedures – defined by federal common law and the Supreme Court, by way of their supervisory power – than state equity cases. In part it was due to the less-than-ironclad requirements even within the scope of coverage. The Act required only that federal courts approximate state procedures “as near as may be” and in “like causes,” and this left sufficient wiggle room for courts to deviate from true conformity and create variations on state procedures that confused and frustrated the bar. In the end,

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18 Indeed, in some respects the Conformity Act regime was even worse because it also created balkanization between procedure in federal common law cases, which were governed by the Conformity Acts, and procedure in federal equity and admiralty cases, which were governed by the Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority. See Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441 (1875) (explaining that the purpose of the Conformity Act was “to bring about uniformity in the law of procedure in the federal and state courts of the same locality”); Z. W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1464 (2008) (“The primary goal from the time of the original Conformity Act was to spare the bench and bar from having to work within two procedural systems.”); Mary Margaret Penrose and Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain Solution to the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct About Special Pleading and the Big Case, 39 Ga. L. Rev. 971, 1004 (2005) (“The purpose of the Conformity Act was to provide a uniform procedure for all courts in the same state.”).

19 See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1039; David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1969, 1974 (1989) (recognizing the lack of uniformity between federal and state courts within a single state even under the conformity regime). The Conformity Act also did not apply to admiralty cases. But this did not have the effect of creating disuniformity because the admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive.


21 See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1041 (concluding that the Conformity Act “afforded numerous opportunities for federal courts to decline conformity to state law”).
despite the goal of creating a uniform set of procedures applicable within a state, the result under the Conformity Act was the creation of a jumbled and complex procedural mess.\(^\text{23}\) Another more significant problem with the conformity regime was that its premise – its vision of uniformity – came under attack at the turn of the twentieth century. The complete story is a long one involving many characters, but a key figure for present purposes is Thomas W. Shelton, who in 1911 introduced the resolution that eventually led to the introduction of the rules and who chaired the initial 1912 ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure.\(^\text{24}\) Perhaps more than anyone else, Shelton is responsible for making national uniformity – as opposed to intrastate uniformity – the prevailing procedural vision. In doing so, Shelton ran headlong into Senator Thomas J. Walsh, who staunchly defended the conformity regime until his death in 1933. The battle between Shelton and Walsh was in large measure a battle between competing visions of uniformity. Shelton prioritized uniformity across the federal system, although he also assumed that intrastate uniformity would follow because states would willingly follow the federal example.\(^\text{25}\) Walsh, on the other hand, was deeply suspicious of that assumption, and feared that the real effect of uniform federal rules would be to create disuniformity between the state and federal courts. Walsh viewed true national uniformity as a practical impossibility, and would have selected to maintain intrastate uniformity as the most practical approach for the majority of practicing lawyers.\(^\text{26}\)

\(^{23}\) See 19 A.B.A. Report 411, 420 (1896) (suggesting that a federal practitioner, “even in his own state, feels no more certainty as to the proper procedure than if he were before a tribunal of a foreign country”); Burbank, supra note 15, at 1041-42 (“T]he potential complexity of an action drawing on so many sources of procedural law made the practitioner’s job difficult”).

\(^{24}\) See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1049 (“Shelton argued that uniformity of procedure was essential, along with uniformity of interpretation, to the goal of uniformity of law” and “saw a federal model, prepared by the Supreme Court, as the best hope for national uniformity”).


\(^{26}\) See Simplification of Judicial Procedure: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 552 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st
Of course, Shelton’s vision eventually carried the day,\(^27\) helped by the death of Walsh and the ascent of Homer Cummings as Attorney General.\(^28\) Uniformity across all federal districts became the aspirational standard with the passage of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, and was formally achieved with the promulgation of Rule 1, which specified that the rules were to apply “in the district courts of the United States.”\(^29\) But while it is accurate to say that the federal rules reflect the triumph of federal trans-territoriality over intrastate conformity, that does not go far enough. More must be said about precisely why trans-territoriality became so valued.\(^30\) Trans-territoriality triumphed because it was a means to desired ends, and it is to those ends that we now turn.

**B. The Ends of Trans-territoriality**

Over time, proponents of trans-territoriality have identified a variety of benefits associated with geographic procedural uniformity in the federal system. The primary original benefits were the facilitation of national legal practice the promotion of nationalized commerce. Later, benefits sounding in equality and efficiency were emphasized: uniform procedure can assist in generating like outcomes in like cases, and can do so with fewer resources being devoted to litigation and to the rulemaking process. Each of these benefits is enhanced substantially if uniformity exists not just across federal districts, but between the federal and state systems. Proponents of trans-territoriality identified this complete procedural uniformity as a separate end to be attained by the adoption of federal rules, and concluded that this end was not only possible but likely because state rulemakers would quickly and willingly mimic their federal counterparts.

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\(^{27}\) Although not until after Shelton himself had left the scene.

\(^{28}\) See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1095-96 (discussing Cummings’s role).

\(^{29}\) FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (1938). In 1948, the Rule was amended slightly to “in the United States district courts.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1. See also Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1960) (“The broad aim [of the Rules Enabling Act], especially in fields of practice, was to reverse the philosophy of conformity to local state procedure and establish . . . an approach of uniformity within the whole federal judicial trial system.”).

\(^{30}\) See Stephen N. Subrin, supra note 9, at 2000 (quoting Connor Hall’s complaint that uniformity was too often presented “as if it were some excellence in itself”).
1. Nationalization

The standardization of procedural rules across federal districts reflected a desire to promote, or at least to respond to, the nationalization of both commerce and legal practice. With respect to commerce, proponents of procedural uniformity emphasized economic nationalization and the associated decline in the relevance of state borders as justifications for pursuing a body of procedure that could be applied without reference to geography.\(^{31}\) Along those lines, Shelton urged uniformity in procedure as a predicate to the support of commerce because it “give[s] an assurance of interstate judicial relations as fixed, necessary and useful as fixed interstate commercial relations.”\(^{32}\)

The legal practice argument is related. Shelton lamented that lawyers representing national corporations could not easily navigate the numerous federal courts in which cases might be brought because of the barriers created by the conformity regime.\(^{33}\) To facilitate the national practice of law, then, it was necessary to remove those barriers and permit lawyers to cross state and district lines freely. As David Shapiro has described it, the rules were designed to permit “lawyers who went into any federal court . . . to know what to expect and not to have to undergo an initiation

\(^{31}\) Of course, this is connected to the idea that what we need is true universal uniformity because some cases involving commerce could not be brought in federal court. See infra Part I.B.4. There are also parallels here to arguments made in the domain of personal jurisdiction and choice of law during roughly the same period. Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 453-54 (2004) (discussing how the creation of the minimum contacts test in International Shoe demonstrated the decreasing importance of state boundaries); William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1963) (recognizing that choice of law doctrine was dramatically altered when “members of our society, in both their personal and business activities, increasingly disregard[ed] the existence of state boundaries”).

\(^{32}\) See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2003 (quoting Shelton); see also Thomas W. Shelton, An American Common Law in the Making – The Habit of Thinking Uniformity, 30 LAW NOTES 50, 52 (1926) (arguing that ‘there is no more excuse for differing judicial procedure than for differing language in the several states’).

\(^{33}\) See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2004-05 (quoting Shelton “these are what are called United States courts, but instead I call them New York City courts”); Burbank, supra note 15, at 1041 nn.111-12 (noting that lawyers face additional barriers resulting from judges applying “the common law or the code practice with their various modifications”).
period or to rely heavily on the wisdom of local practitioners.\textsuperscript{34} A final argument blends the economic nationalization and legal profession concerns: The complexity and unpredictability of the fragmented procedural system was leading many national corporations to pursue alternatives such as arbitration rather than litigation, and national rules would have the desirable effect of encouraging a return to the courtroom.\textsuperscript{35}

2. \textit{Equality and Fairness}

A second concern raised in the movement toward trans-territoriality relates to equality and fairness. Many proponents of federal rules worried that state procedural systems were inferior, and that the conformity regime operated in practice to bind federal courts to apply undesirable procedures.\textsuperscript{36} The inferiority of many state systems was attributed at least in part to the fact that most state procedural rules derived from a legislative process. The introduction of a national process driven instead by dedicated rulemakers was expected to lead to the development of rules that were not just uniform, but also better.

Even apart from any such qualitative improvements, the fact that the rules are applied uniformly across the federal system promotes two different forms of equality. First, trans-territoriality contributes to an appearance of neutrality in the sense that all cases - and all litigants - are governed by the same set of rules. These notions of equality and neutrality are admittedly quite formal, but even formal equality may enhance legitimacy and increase acceptance of the rules and the system of adjudication more generally. Ultimately, though, trans-territorial procedure is connected to a more substantive notion of equality, one that

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Shapiro, \textit{supra} note 21, at 2004-05; \textit{see also} Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, \textit{supra} note 12, at 64 (arguing that the Federal Rules were designed to allow a lawyer admitted in one federal jurisdiction to easily practice in any other).}
\footnote{Subrin, \textit{How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra} note 14, at 960 (noting the ability of non-litigation forums to apply clear, simple rules); Subrin, \textit{Federal Rules, supra} note 9, at 2005 (arguing that uniform, simple rules – which encourage corporate participation in court forums – imply centralized rulemaking).}
\footnote{Burbank, \textit{supra} note 15, at 1042 n.113. At some level, federal courts could avoid this result even under the conformity regime by taking advantage of the wiggle room that existed in the Conformity Act. \textit{See supra} notes 22-23 and accompanying text.}
\end{footnotes}
emphasizes the similar treatment of similar cases.\textsuperscript{37} The conformity regime meant that parallel cases were often subject to substantially different procedures, and these procedural variations could often lead directly to variations in case outcomes. The application of uniform procedural rules throughout the federal system promised to reduce such inequities. Thus, the trans-territoriality principle is intended not just to make the system neutral, but to make it fair.

This latter version of equality was implicit in the nationalization argument, although it was not often made explicitly during the development of the rules.\textsuperscript{38} In order for businesses increasingly engaged in interstate commerce to anticipate legal responsibilities, national legal uniformity looked ever more desirable. This line of thinking led to a movement for uniform substantive laws,\textsuperscript{39} which naturally grew to include procedures as well.\textsuperscript{40} Again, to the extent that states maintained different procedures, the attraction of federal rulemaking as a salve was diminished because like cases could still receive differing procedural treatment based on whether the case was filed in federal or state court. And again, the response was that federal-state disuniformity was more tolerable than intra-federal disuniformity,

\textsuperscript{37} For discussions of this substantive concept of procedural equality, see Rubenstein, \textit{supra} note 7, at 1893-98; Subrin, \textit{Federal Rules, supra} note 9, at 2047; Jerry Mashaw, \textit{The Supreme Court Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge; Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value}, 44 U. Chi. L. REV. 28, 52 (1976) (describing the desire to reach similar outcomes in similar cases as “intuitively obvious”).

\textsuperscript{38} See Subrin, \textit{Federal Rules, supra} note 9, at 2006 (“This ‘uniform federal rules’ theme ended up with four strands: interdistrict court uniformity, intrastate uniformity, trans-substantive uniformity, and, although this was not stressed, uniformity of result”).

\textsuperscript{39} See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 70-440, pt. 2, at 10 (1928) (“The development of the economic resources of the country has brought with it problems that know no boundaries, and a growing consciousness of the commercial necessity for national uniformity both in law and its administration.”)

\textsuperscript{40} To be sure, there was not a complete overlap between the movement for uniform laws and the federal rulemaking movement. In particular, many did not see the two as related because they did not view procedure as having a meaningful impact on substantive outcomes. See Robert G. Bone, \textit{Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory}, 61 OKLA L. REV. 319, 329 (2008) (“The 1938 Federal Rule drafters thought that substance had little, if any, role to play; in their view, most procedural rules could be justified by process values without referring to substance at all.”).
and also that full uniformity was the expected and inevitable end of the federal rulemaking movement.\textsuperscript{41}

3. Efficiency

A third claimed benefit of trans-territoriality is enhanced efficiency in the federal procedural system. To a large extent, efficiency claims are retreads of the claims already discussed, albeit with a different emphasis. So, for example, in addition to arguing that lawyers would benefit from uniform federal rules because they would be able to practice nationally, Shelton and others emphasized that uniform rules would save client resources by permitting them to retain a single firm to respond to federal liability that was national in scope.\textsuperscript{42} Another source of waste targeted by proponents of national uniformity was the time and effort devoted to sorting out whether the state rule or the federal rule should apply in a given situation, both at the trial and appellate levels.\textsuperscript{43} Trans-territoriality greatly reduced those resources by making the federal rules presumptively applicable.\textsuperscript{44} And if states were to follow the federal lead, then the efficiencies attributable to trans-territoriality would be much greater still, in part because lawyers would only have to master a single set of procedural rules and in part because time and energy would have to be devoted to only a single rulemaking process.

\textsuperscript{41} See Jay Tidmarsh, \textit{Pound’s Century, and Ours}, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 540 n.118 (2006) (quoting Thomas Shelton “a simple, scientific, correlated system of rules, such as would be prepared and promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, would prove a model that would, for reasons of convenience as well as of principle, be adopted by the states”).

\textsuperscript{42} 1915 \textit{Senate Hearings, supra} note 18, at 13-14 (statements of Thomas Shelton).

\textsuperscript{43} See S. Rep. No. 64-892, at 2-3 (1917) (“That cases should be delayed month after month, and sometimes year after year, should be reversed and tried and retried, upon mere matters of practice that in no way touch the essential merits, is one of the reproaches in the administration of the law which has had a greater tendency to bring the practices of the courts into disrepute than any other thing.”); Lile, \textit{Uniform Procedure at Law in the Federal Courts}, 76 CENT. L.J. 214, 214 (1913).

\textsuperscript{44} Again, there is a similarity to \textit{Erie} here. \textit{See supra} note 14. In \textit{Erie} itself, the Court arguably created inefficiency by requiring parties and judges to litigate the question of which procedures apply in diversity cases. \textit{Hanna v. Plumer} reduced much of that inefficiency by making the federal rules presumptively applicable when on point.
4. Complete uniformity

All of the previous benefits of trans-territorial procedure in the federal system were undermined at least to some extent by the fact that states remained free to create their own procedural systems. This meant that cases could be subject to competing procedural requirements, thus creating just the sort of complexity that Shelton and others sought to avoid. By itself, the imposition of federal uniformity did nothing to guarantee the “fixed” system that corporations apparently desired. And the confusion wrought by the project of federal trans-territoriality was arguably far worse for practicing lawyers because it affected those who practiced within the territorial boundaries of a single state. Rather than creating the complete uniformity that would produce meaningful benefits for the economy and the bar, the federal rules appeared to promise an exchange of one form of partial uniformity for another.

Proponents of the federal rules conceded that complete uniformity should be the goal, but they considered that goal to be not only attainable but likely under their approach. In their view, states were likely to follow the lead of the federal rules, and the eventual result would be not just the creation of federal uniformity but the restoration of intra-state uniformity as well. Early returns along these lines were promising, and some states continue to

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45 This was Walsh’s primary argument against trans-territoriality. He argued that most lawyers still practiced within a single state, and that uniform federal procedure would disrupt their practice for the proposed benefit of those few who practiced nationally. Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2008.

46 To borrow Professor Subrin’s phrase, “[t]he federal rules were to be an enlightened magnet.” Id. at 2026. See also Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1974-75 (describing the rulemakers as “sufficiently imbued with their mission to hope that their rules would set a model that the states themselves would want to follow”) (citing Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the Supreme Court of the United States, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 1116, 1128-29 (1934)); Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1170, 1179 (2005). The idea that a federal standard would be an “enlightened magnet” that states would find irresistible is reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s flawed assumption with respect to federal general common law in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). States in that context proved themselves willing to resist the allure of the federally created example. And they have done so here as well, see infra note 50.

47 Subrin, supra note 9, at 2028-29 (noting that four southwestern states were relatively quick to adopt the Federal Rules verbatim – Arizona (1940), Colorado (1941), New Mexico (1942), and Utah (1950) – with the goal of fostering procedure system easily navigated by practitioners); Chen, supra note 19, at
replicate the federal rules in the interest of preserving intra-state uniformity. But we have never come close to universal adoption of the federal rules, and indeed the most recent sustained study found that the gap between federal and state procedures is widening. Despite the failure in practical terms to achieve it, full procedural uniformity remains a goal that figured into the selection of the new system of federal rules over the existing conformity regime.

II. LOCAL RULES AS A PROCEDURAL SCOURGE

If trans-territoriality is one of the heroes of the federal procedural regime, then local rules have been steadily cast in the role of villain. This is because local rules are the most visible source of territorial variation in the federal procedural system, which makes them the most obvious deviation from the aspirational norm of trans-territoriality. This Part reviews the longstanding and ongoing debate over local rules. It first describes the current approach toward local rules in the federal system, and explains how that approach has changed over time, particularly with respect to promulgation and enforcement. It then reviews the numerous complaints that have been laid at the feet of local rules, most of which are rooted in a commitment to trans-territorial procedure and a parallel resistance to territorial variation.

A. A Primer on Local Rules

The authority for local rules is clear and unassailable: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(a), which has been part of the federal rules since their inception, permits district courts to “adopt

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1437 (discussing the development of “federal replica” states – a state that has adopted the Federal Rules – beginning with Arizona in 1940).


49 John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 358-59 (2002) (finding that sixty-two percent of United States population live in jurisdictions “governed by substantially nonfederal systems of procedure” and that state movements towards replicating the federal procedural system were “noticeably slackening”).
and amend rules governing its practice."\textsuperscript{50} The scope of the authority provided is not unlimited, however; local rules must “be consistent with – but not duplicate – federal statutes and rules.”\textsuperscript{51} While that limitation is not insignificant, it leaves substantial room for district courts to create a set of localized procedures, and every district court has done so.\textsuperscript{52} The resulting 94 sets of local rules are, like the federal rules, formal and fixed. Unlike the federal rules, however, local rules are not subject to the rulemaking process outlined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74, but are instead promulgated after notice and comment and upon a majority vote of district judges.\textsuperscript{53}

Local rules vary considerably in terms of both content and significance. Many local rules announce technical and relatively mundane requirements related to issues like filing and motions practice.\textsuperscript{54} Rules detailing paper size and method of binding are staples of local rules,\textsuperscript{55} designed primarily to facilitate the work of

\textsuperscript{50} FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1). Local rules must be issued after “notice and an opportunity for comment,” and must be supported by a majority of the district judges comprising a district court. \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{51} FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1). For a time, it looked as though another limitation, created not by the rules themselves but by the Supreme Court, might be imposed: local rules should not introduce “basic procedural innovations.” Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650 (1960) (favoring the formal rulemaking process and its “mature consideration of informed opinion”). But the Court has not appeared willing to police the limitation, and the experience with civil jury size seriously undermines its force. See Richard L. Marcus, \textit{Slouching Toward Discretion}, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1582-83 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1973), which upheld local rules changing the size of the civil jury).

\textsuperscript{52} See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/distr-localrules.html for a list of current local rules.

\textsuperscript{53} FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).

\textsuperscript{54} See, e.g., E.D. Cal. L.R. 77-121(b) (“The regular office hours of the Clerk at Sacramento and Fresno shall be from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. each day except Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, and such other times so ordered by the Chief Judge.”). More recently, local rules describing electronic filing requirements have become common. See, e.g., W.D.N.C. R. 5.2.1(B) (“All documents submitted for filing in this district shall be filed electronically unless expressly exempted from electronic filing either by the Administrative Procedures or by the assigned judge.”).

\textsuperscript{55} See, e.g., E.D. Cal. L.R. 7-130(b) (“All documents presented for conventional filing or lodging and the chambers courtesy copies shall be on white, unglazed opaque paper of good quality with numbered lines in the left margin, 8-1/2” x 11” in size, and shall be flat, unfolded (except where necessary for presentation of exhibits), firmly bound at the top left corner, pre-punched with two (2) holes (approximately 1/4” diameter) centered 2-3/4” apart, ½” to 5/8” from the top
the clerk’s office. But not all rules fit that description, and some impose substantial procedural requirements. For example, many districts now have local rules that structure the summary judgment process, including details relating to the form and the nature of the filings that must be submitted.\footnote{See, e.g., N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1; for a discussion of cases enforcing N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1, see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.}

Because local rules vary from district to district, lawyers who practice in multiple districts must master multiple sets of formal procedural packages.\footnote{See G.J.B. & Associates, Inc. v. Singleton, 913 F.2d 824, 831 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Counsel appearing before the district court are duty-bound to know the practice of the district court.”).} Thus far, the Advisory Committee has responded to the burdens imposed by inter-district variations in local rules not by removing or narrowing the authority to issue them,\footnote{In the 1985 amendments, the advisory committee did alter the rule to “enhance the local rulemaking process by requiring appropriate public notice of proposed rules and an opportunity to comment on them.” FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee notes. But this modification retained the scope of local rulemaking authority, and was explicitly made “without impairing the procedural validity of existing local rules.” Id. Several commentators have suggested that the authority for local rulemaking authority be narrowed. See, e.g., Linda J. Rusch, Separation of Powers Analysis as a Method for Determining the Validity of Federal Districts Courts’ Exercise of Local Rulemaking Power; Application to Local Rules Mandating Alternative Dispute Resolution, 23 CONN. L. REV. 483, 497 (1991) (arguing that the federal courts’ judgment about procedure should be subordinated to congressional judgment in order to “ensure that Congress makes the important decisions about procedure”).} but instead by instituting measures designed to facilitate
identification and compliance and to decrease sanctions for non-compliance in certain cases. 59 In particular, the 1995 amendments to Rule 83 included two notable new provisions. First, Rule 83(a)(1) was modified to require local rules to “conform to any uniform numbering system prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.” 60 This addition was intended to avoid “unnecessary traps for counsel and litigants” by “mak[ing] it easier for an increasingly national bar and for litigants to locate a local rule that applies to a particular procedural issue.” 61 Second, the same set of amendments added a provision – FRCP 83(a)(2) – that prevents the court from depriving a party of rights as a result of a “nonwillful failure to comply” with a “local rule imposing a requirement of form.” 62 Again, the advisory notes reflect an awareness that lawyers may be burdened by the complexities of local rules, and may therefore be unaware or forgetful of formal requirements contained there. 63

Although the addition of Rule 83(a)(2) limits the availability of sanctions, it simultaneously confirms that some local rules – namely, those that do not impose “a requirement of form” – may be enforced to deprive a party of rights. Local rules in that category essentially operate as functional equivalents to the federal rules; district courts demand compliance, and may strictly enforce the rules or impose sanctions when procedural requirements are not followed. Some districts include specific provisions highlighting the availability of sanctions for violations of local rules. 64 But even in the absence of such a provision, sanctions for failure to heed the requirements of local rules have

59 Congress has intervened, too. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1) (1988) (permitting the “judicial council of the relevant circuit” to modify or abrogate local rules).
61 Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee notes.
63 Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee notes. (“[A] party should not be deprived of a right to a jury trial because its attorney, unaware or – of forgetting – a local rule directing that jury demands be noted in the caption of the case, includes a jury demand only in the body of the pleading.”).
64 See, e.g., M.D. Ala. LR 1.2 (“The court may impose a sanction for the violation of any local rule. Imposition of sanctions will lie within the sound discretion of the judge whose case is affected.”).
been upheld when challenged in the appellate courts. For example, in a series of cases, the Seventh Circuit has affirmed the entry of summary judgment in cases where a non-movant fails to comply with the procedural requirements of N.D. Ill. LR 56.1. In doing so, the court has recognized that the rule “impose[s] a burden on the attorneys for the parties,” but has nevertheless emphasized that “strict, consistent, ‘bright-line’ enforcement is essential to obtaining compliance … and to ensuring that long-run aggregate benefits in efficiency inure to district courts.”

B. A Primer on Local Rules Critique

Notwithstanding their pedigree, local rules have faced consistent criticism since the federal rules were promulgated in 1938. This section undertakes a short review of that criticism, which has taken many forms ranging from claims that frequent deviations from trans-territoriality are inconsistent with the original intent of Rule 83 to claims that such deviations are undesirable for various functional reasons. Particulars aside, the core of the criticism about local rules is that they disrupt the trans-territoriality that is a central procedural value of the federal system.

An initial complaint is that the fundamental constraint that local rules be consistent with and not duplicative of existing federal rules has frequently been ignored. From the very

65 Not all efforts to impose sanctions for violations of local rules have been upheld. See, e.g., Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[W]e do not think that the imposition of financial sanctions for mere negligent violations of the local rules is consistent with the intent of Congress or with the restraint required of the federal courts in sanction cases.”). But in cases where the sanction has been viewed as an abuse of discretion, the basis for that finding has been that the sanction imposed was not proportional to the violation at issue, not that local rules are entitled to a lesser degree of enforcement than the federal rules.

66 See, e.g., Koszola v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 385 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2004); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases where strict enforcement of local summary judgment rules has been upheld). Implicit in Koszola and other cases decided after the 1995 addition of Rule 83(a)(2) is a determination that LR 56.1 does not merely impose a “requirement of form.”

67 Markham v. White, 172 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 1999).

68 Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1995).

69 See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2019 (1985 Judiciary Committee report “identified several problems concerning local rules, such as their promulgation without sufficient input, the tremendous numbers [sic] of such rules, and the frequent conflict between local rules and the Federal Rules”).
beginning, federal districts introduced local rules that were at least arguably inconsistent with the federal rules, and as early as 1940 a federal committee commented on the danger such rules imposed to the goal of national uniformity.\textsuperscript{70} Similarly, in the 1980s, the Judicial Conference sponsored a Local Rules Project, which found and catalogued a variety of local rules that seemed to contradict the consistency limitation in Rule 83.\textsuperscript{71} The existence of local rules that directly conflict with extant federal rules has the potential to undermine the supremacy of the federal rulemaking process.\textsuperscript{72} Not only is this theoretically troubling, but it also contributes to a practical problem: counsel will reasonably be uncertain about whether the federal rule or the local rule will ultimately be enforced.\textsuperscript{73}

Restricting local rules to those that comply with the consistency restraint would address these problems, of course, and indeed many critics have called for more rigorous enforcement of the clear language of Rule 83.\textsuperscript{74} But most criticisms of local rules go much further, and target even those rules that undeniably comply with that language. These broader critiques are based in part on a claim that the intended scope of Rule 83 was sufficiently narrow that local rules would be used only sparingly.\textsuperscript{75} Proposals

\textsuperscript{70} See Report on Local District Court Rules, 4 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 969 (1940) ("Knox Committee" Report).
\textsuperscript{72} Sisk, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing the destruction of procedural uniformity among the appellate system due to the promulgation of local rules which conflict with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).
\textsuperscript{73} Id.; Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2016-17 (noting that local rules “create inconsistencies in practice among the various districts and leave doubt and uncertainty in the minds of the bench and bar”).
\textsuperscript{75} Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 784 (1995) (“Absent some better reason, it is insufficient simply to argue in favor of local rules for no other reason than that locals like to do things a certain way”); Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 944 (1996) (discussing the intent of the rulemakers that Rule 83 be used only on the rare occasions which functionally demand localization); Tobias, supra note 9, at 538.
to permit and even encourage broad authority for localized rulemaking were considered but rejected, and ultimately national uniformity was embraced as the prevailing model. While Rule 83 was still included in the final product, its inclusion did not signify a desire to promote local rules as a means of filling any gaps that might have been left open by the federal rules. Rather, the Rule was intended to provide authority only for the rare occasions when the federal rulemakers deliberately left gaps to be filled by local needs. Thus, the use of Rule 83 for a broader gap-filling purpose is against the spirit of the federal design, even if the resulting local rules technically comply with the consistency restraint.

The preceding argument is not merely a technical one about intent. Critics also cite a functional reason to interpret and apply the authority conferred by Rule 83 narrowly: the proliferation of local rules creates a morass of applicable rules in the federal system that directly conflicts with the procedural goals served by trans-territoriality. Local rules run counter to the goal of nationalization because they disadvantage non-local counsel—often explicitly so. At the extreme, variations in local rules also threaten the equal treatment of like cases and may contribute to forum shopping. This result is especially troubling because

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76 See notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
77 Carrington, supra note 75, at 944 (recognizing the limit intentional imposed on the use of Rule 83 to matters “such as the setting of motion days”); Tobias, supra note 9, at 538 (discussing the Advisory Committee’s intent to have judges sparingly invoke Rule 83 for promulgation of local procedural rules).
78 Critics also complain that local rules undermine the procedural value of trans-substantivity. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 9, at 2025-26 (noting that the use of local rules to fashion different procedures for particular types of cases in different locations “reduces intrastate and interdistrict court procedural uniformity”).
79 Lauren Robel, Fracture Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1484 (1994) (“Local procedures typically favor local bars.”); Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 75 (“The premise of the federal courts is that they reflect one court system doing the nation’s business. Permitting a profusion of local rules for the simple reason that local practitioners [sic] are familiar with them inappropriately disadvantages litigants and their counsel coming from out of state.”).
80 Keeton, supra note 9, at 860 (noting that national uniformity serves the fundamental interest that disputes should be treated alike and resolved on the
districts often fail to explain the reasons for their adoption of a particular rule, which increases the likelihood that participants and observers of the legal system will perceive variations as random rather than well-considered.\footnote{Carrington, \textit{supra} note 75, at 945-46 (noting that “the primary task of each federal court is essentially the same in all districts, and the differences among them seldom suggest reasons for material differences in the procedure employed in different districts”); Tobias, \textit{Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra} note 9, at 577 (discussing the loss of respect for the civil litigation system that occurs when the public “believes that the procedures available or the character of justice can vary substantially across districts, that the nature of justice reflects lawsuits’ magnitude or subject matter, that attorneys' or clients' resources affect the quality of justice, or that complexities or technicalities preclude or restrict the vindication of rights”).}

Finally, local rules are viewed by many as a source of inefficiency in federal practice, both because lawyers must devote resources to mastering multiple sets of local rules and because clients may be forced to retain local counsel for each federal district involved in a complex case.\footnote{See, \textit{e.g.}, Sisk, \textit{supra} note 9, at 6 (arguing that local rule variations “complicate practice and increase the cost of compliance with procedural rules” while simultaneously requiring “inordinate expenditures of attorney time on relatively minor matters”); Tobias, \textit{Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra} note 9, at 575 (“The need to search for, understand, and comply with increasingly arcane local requirements may well have imposed greater expense and delay in federal civil litigation.”); Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, \textit{supra} note 12, at 62 (noting that the only safe course of action for a client whose case spills into multiple federal districts may be to “retain additional counsel in each federal district for the case”).}

A different strain of criticism focuses on perceived deficiencies in the way that local rules are promulgated and reviewed.\footnote{Some of these process concerns have been addressed by modifications to Rule 83. In particular, the 1985 rule amendments responded to criticisms regarding the lack of non-judicial input “by requiring appropriate public notice of proposed rules and an opportunity to comment on them.” See \textit{supra} note 54; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. ___, * 8-12 (emphasizing the role of notice and comment in the promulgation of local rules).}

Whereas federal rules are introduced only after a thorough process that includes a broad group of participants and several layers of review, the process leading to the introduction of local rules is relatively more truncated.\footnote{Keeton, \textit{supra} note 9 (suggesting that the safeguards of the federal rule-making process – widespread involvement of national actors and extensive deliberation by those actors – make it more desirable than the system of individualized promulgation for local rules); Flanders, \textit{supra} note 10, at 256-57 (describing the method by which local rules are promulgated as failing to meet merits, rather than being subject to manipulation based on judge shopping or forum shopping).} For one thing, fewer
participants are involved. Of course, it is precisely the narrower geographical scope of the participants that permits local rules to reflect local rather than national priorities. Even so, the lack of broader input has led to some concern that local rules are adopted on the basis of inadequate information. In addition, there are fewer steps in the process leading to the adoption of local rules. For many years, that process essentially consisted of deliberation involving only the judges of the relevant local district. Although Rule 83 has been amended to now require an opportunity for notice and comment, district judges remain the ultimate arbiters of whether local rules are adopted or abandoned. This has led to a concern that local rules are often a simple reflection of the temporary whims of the majority of a district’s judges, and that concern is exacerbated by the limited and ineffective review of local rules by the Judicial Conference and the appellate courts.

A final set of complaints emphasizes the relationship between local rules and the federal rulemaking process. For example, Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that the local rulemaking device permits federal rulemakers to avoid difficult questions that should properly be resolved at the national level. Conversely, local actors who perceive a need for a shift in the rules may focus their efforts at the local level rather than seeking desirable national

the “high standard set by the national process” and noting that the practice of consulting with a committee of local practitioners during the drafting of local rules is “the exception rather than the rule” (quoting 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3152, at 220 (1973))).

85 Subrin, Federal Rules supra note 9, at 2019-20 (identifying the “lack of sufficient input” during promulgation of local rules as one of the problems identified in the 1985 Judiciary Committee report on local rules).

86 See Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, supra note 12 (complaining about the lack of opportunity for notice and comment under the pre-1985 version of Rule 83).

87 Flanders, supra note 10, at 218 (noting that many critics of local rules believe that these rules are usually “developed with minimal consultation and often represent the whims and idiosyncrasies of temporary majorities of judges”); Keeton, supra note 9 (“[N]ationally uniform rules protect . . . against the tyranny of any unduly willful renegades among us trial judges.”); Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9 at 2042.

88 See Sisk, supra note 9, at 51 (discussing limited review by the Judicial Conference); Flanders, supra note 10, at 218 (describing the inadequacy of the appellate process for monitoring the validity of local rules).

89 Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 5, at 779 (explaining that local rules can politically benefit federal decision makers by allowing them to “duck deciding a hard question by leaving it to local rules to handle”, especially in highly controversial areas where proposed solutions are likely to produce intense disagreement).
Lauren Robel has similarly suggested that local rules undermine the federal rulemaking process because they are too often rooted in a sense that a national rule is incorrect rather than simply incomplete. Thus, local rules in practice may represent a form of disobedience, and one that deflects energy away from a valuable national conversation about the desirability of the federal rules.

III. The Universe of Territorial Variation

Local rules are the most obvious form of procedural disuniformity, and also the most frequently criticized. But they are certainly not the only form. This Part widens the lens to resituate local rules as one form of territorial variation in the federal system among many. Some varieties, like standing orders, are quite similar in nature and function to local rules. Others, like variations in interpretation or the exercise of judicial discretion, are structurally different. Whereas local rules create formal variations in the body of procedural rules, differences in interpretation create differences in the way that formally uniform rules are applied in practice. For that reason, it may be argued that these varieties do not create disuniformity at all, but that argument necessarily rests on a cramped and unrealistic view of uniformity. Finally, other varieties, like the use of inherent authority and the development of procedural common law, occur outside the domain of the federal rules themselves. Again, this might suggest that the formal uniformity of the rules is not threatened. But even if that is true, these varieties contribute to territorial variations in the procedural requirements that are imposed and enforced, whether as the result of a formal rule or not.

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90 Id. (finding that a sense of localism may contribute to the lack of uniformity in local rules because individuals may feel that local solutions will produce more satisfaction and are easier to implement).
91 Robel, supra note 79 (“Local court tinkering with the Federal Rules is rarely inspired by the disutility of a Rule under local conditions. Rather, it is inspired by a belief that the rulemakers got it wrong”).
92 See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2047-48 (arguing that uniformity should encompass uniformity of result, and not simply textual uniformity). For further discussion of this point, see infra Part IV.A.
A. **Standing Orders**

Unlike local rules, which operate at the level of the district court, standing orders operate more narrowly, at the level of the individual district judge. The present authority for standing orders is the same as that for local rules, and the permissible scope of standing orders is similarly limited by a consistency requirement. But requiring standing orders to be consistent with federal law, federal rules, and local rules still leaves room for variation, and so it is unsurprising that standing orders vary significantly in terms of their level of detail and the nature of their requirements.

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93 Rule 83(b) permits a judge to “regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and the district’s local rules.” FED. R. CV. P. 83(b). This language was originally added as a part of the 1985 amendments to Rule 83, and was moved to subsection b as part of the 1995 amendments. Prior to 1985, the authority of judges to issue and enforce standing orders was understood to be part of the court’s inherent authority. See *infra* Part I.C. For a general discussion of standing orders, see Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, *Individual Judges’ Practices: An Inadvertent Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure*, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (1994).

94 Many standing orders clarify the judge’s preference with respect to scheduling. So, for example, in the Northern District of Illinois, Judge Milton I. Shadur’s standing orders set cases for status conferences 49 days after filing of the complaint, while Judge Robert W. Gettleman sets cases for status 60 days after filing See *Northern District of Illinois Judges, United States District Court: Northern District of Illinois*, Feb. 22, 2010, [http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Judges.aspx](http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Judges.aspx) (available under the “Initial Status Conference” link for each judge). Other standing orders impose requirements that are fairly substantive in nature. For example, Judge Frank D. Whitney (W.D.N.C.) requires that “every preliminary motion shall . . . include, or be accompanied by, a brief statement of the factual and legal grounds on which the motion is based. A memorandum of law shall always state the “Bottom Line Up Front”—that is, the interlocutory paragraph(s) shall: (i) identify with particularity each issue in dispute; (ii) concisely (*i.e.*, in one or two sentences) state why the party should prevail on the issue, directing the Court’s attention to what the party believes to be the controlling legal authority or critical fact in contention; and (iii) if applicable, state the remedy or relief sought.” Initial Scheduling Order, Misc. No. 3:07-MC-47 (Doc. No. 2), section 3, subsection b, paragraph iii, available at [http://www.ncwd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Whitney/StandingOrderGoverningCivilCaseManagement.pdf](http://www.ncwd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Whitney/StandingOrderGoverningCivilCaseManagement.pdf). Finally, some standing orders impose requirements that directly contradict the parallel local rule. For example, Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater (N.D. Tex.) modifies local civil rule 16.4, which requires a pretrial order to be submitted at least 10 days before the scheduled date for trial, by forcing proposed orders to be submitted no later than 14 days prior to the date of the trial setting. Chief District Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater, *United States District Court: Northern District of Texas*, Feb. 22, 2010,
The requirements for creation and promulgation of standing orders are remarkably informal. Unlike federal rules, which must pass through the formal rulemaking procedures outlined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074, and unlike local rules, which must receive the support of a majority of the district judges after a notice and comment period dictated by Rule 83(a), standing orders can simply be issued by an individual district judge. At least in theory, this informality is counterbalanced by two restrictions on standing orders that go beyond the consistency requirement already discussed. First, the advisory notes express a “hope[] that each district will adopt procedures, perhaps by local rule, for promulgating and reviewing single-judge standing orders.” More importantly, the 1995 amendments acknowledge “that courts rely on multiple directives to control practice,” and that “the sheer volume of directives may pose an unreasonable barrier.” As with the amendments relating to local rules, Rule 83(b) responds to that barrier not by circumscribing the permissible scope of standing orders, but by requiring actual notice to litigants before standing orders may be enforced to impose a “sanction or other disadvantage.” Actual notice is often achieved by making standing orders publicly available on a court website and by referring parties to those orders.

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95 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) also requires notice and comment before a local rule may be issued.
96 Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 advisory committee’s note (1985 Amendment). See Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 359, 364 (1995) (“some circuit judicial councils initiated rigorous efforts, and others made laudable attempts, to comply with the requirements that Rule 83 and the 1988 JIA imposed on them”). But see Bromberg & Korn, supra note 93, at 9 (“Unfortunately, however, judicial councils have not taken an active role in reviewing the consistency of either local district court rules or individual judges’ standing orders and practices with the Federal Rules.”).
98 Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(b) (“No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the local rules unless the alleged violator has been furnished in the particular case with actual notice of the requirement.”).
99 See 1995 Advisory Notes (“Furnishing litigants with a copy outlining the judge’s practices . . . would suffice to give actual notice, as would an order in a case specifically adopting by reference a judge’s standing order and indicating how copies can be obtained.”). See also Tucker v. Colorado Dept. of Public Health and Environment, 104 Fed.Appx. 704, 707-08 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (finding “actual notice” satisfied where district judge issued a
Standing orders that meet the consistency and notice requirements may be enforced, and sanctions for noncompliance have withstood challenges on appeal. In Tucker v. Colorado Department of Health and Environment, for example, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment after the non-movant failed to comply with a standing order that required specific references to the record. In essence, the judge’s standing order in Tucker was treated as an equivalent to the local rules at issue in the Seventh Circuit cases described above, except that a finding of actual notice was required to justify enforcement. But some appellate courts have not been willing to put standing orders on an equal footing with local rules, and have expressed hesitation about the imposition of sanctions for nonwillful failures to comply. An example of this more restrained approach is found in United States v. Brown. There, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that violations of local rules may be sanctioned absent a finding of bad faith, but refused to apply the same standard to standing orders. Although both local rules and standing orders are explicitly authorized by Rule 83, the court recognized a distinction in treatment based on the fact that standing orders are issued without notice and comment. Accordingly, the district court’s sanctioning authority with respect to standing orders was deemed to derive from inherent rather than congressional authority.

Regardless of the precise standard necessary to sustain sanctions for noncompliance, standing orders may not simply be ignored. To the contrary, they represent an additional procedural layer that creates variations even within a given federal district.

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100 See, e.g., Tucker, 104 Fed.Appx. at 707 (“Pursuant to [Rule 83(b)], a district judge may establish personal ‘standing orders’ regulating practice before his court (and subsequently punish parties for violating those rules), so long as (1) those procedures are consistent with federal law and the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) the violating party had ‘actual notice’ of the rule.”).
101 Id. at 708.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 The Ninth Circuit had previously found that the sanctioning authority associated with violations of local rules derives from both inherent and congressional authority. See Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1989).
B. Procedural Interpretation

Local rules and standing orders create differences in the formal rules that apply to a given case. Properly understood, the overall procedural package consists not just of federal rules, but also of local rules and standing orders, and each of these latter components may vary from district to district, or from court to court. But actual differences in the formal procedural requirements are not the only source of procedural variation. Disuniformity may also result from differences in the interpretation and application of uniform rules. Put differently, federal rules are like statutes, regulations, and constitutional provisions; they are often ambiguous, and courts must resolve that ambiguity through interpretation.

Part of the Supreme Court’s self-definition of its role in the federal system is to resolve interpretive ambiguities, and the extent of disuniformity attributable to ambiguity is thus tempered by Supreme Court intervention and clarification. But the Court has certainly not resolved every ambiguity in the federal rules, and variations in interpretations persist. For example, the work-product protection in Rule 26(b)(3) shields from discovery many documents prepared “in anticipation of litigation.” Although this protection is not new, and can be directly traced to Supreme Court action, the Court has never resolved the meaning of the “in anticipation of litigation” requirement. Left to their own devices, the circuits have developed competing tests, one requiring that a document be “prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation,” and the other requiring that a document be prepared “primarily or exclusively to assist in litigation.”

\(^{106}\) And arguably also orders issued pursuant to the court’s inherent authority, see infra Part III.D.

\(^{107}\) See Frost, supra note 13.

\(^{108}\) FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).


\(^{110}\) United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998).

\(^{111}\) United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1981). For an extended discussion of these competing tests, see Claudine Pease-Wingenter, Prophetic or Misguided?: The Fifth Circuit's (Increasingly) Unpopular Approach to the Work Product Doctrine, 29 REV. LITIG. 121 (2009) (complaining that the “because of” standard results in “an abbreviated scope” of work-product protection in the Fifth Circuit). There are numerous other examples of competing rule interpretations that have gone unresolved by the Supreme Court. For a sampling, see Kirin K. Gill, Comment, Depose and Expose: The Scope of Authorized Deposition Changes Under Rule 30(e), 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357
Moreover, even where the Court has attempted to impose a uniform interpretation, disuniformity often remains because the Court’s rulings are themselves subject to variable interpretation. The evolving meaning of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires that a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim,” presents a recent illustration along these lines. The classic interpretation of that language in Conley v. Gibson emphasized that the pleading requirements under the rules are rooted in notice and perform only a very weak screening for legal sufficiency. In response to perceptions of frivolous lawsuits and caseload pressures, some appellate courts began to read the language of Rule 8(a)(2) to raise the pleading bar and require facts beyond those that would provide notice. In two cases a decade apart, the Supreme Court emphasized that the plain language of the rules

112 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (emphasizing that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted on legal insufficiency grounds only when “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”).

permit heightened pleading only for claims of fraud or mistake, and reaffirmed the *Conley* standard for all remaining claims.\(^{114}\)

That the Court felt the need to take and decide a second case on the same basic issue suggests that its initial effort failed to settle the interpretive instability that prompted the intervention. In 2007, the Court disrupted whatever stability it had secured in its prior efforts by revisiting the pleading question yet again, this time to undo much of what *Conley* had settled fifty years earlier and insert in its place a “plausibility” standard that is far from self-defining.\(^{115}\)

Most recently, in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the plausibility regime, confirmed the application of that regime to all federal civil cases,\(^{116}\) and characterized the determination of what constitutes plausibility as “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”\(^{117}\)

The first two of these arguably improve the clarity of pleading standards; the third all but assures that interpretive differences will linger in the lower courts indefinitely.\(^{118}\)

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Of course, it is questionable how much disruption *Twombly* actually created because it is unclear whether interpretive stability ever existed with respect to Rule 8(a)(2). See Posner article (suggesting that courts never really believed the *Conley* language).


C. Procedural Discretion

A third source of procedural disuniformity is discretion provided by the rules themselves. Many procedural rules establish fixed requirements that do not permit discretion; rules establishing time limitations are examples. But many other rules operate much differently, and instead direct the court to exercise case-specific discretion. To the extent that different judges exercise the discretion afforded them under the rules differently, the result stemming from rule-based discretion will be disuniformity in the procedures actually applied in a given case. In other words, uniform rules do not necessarily guarantee uniform procedures, even in the absence of interpretive ambiguity.

assumptions and judge’s experiences must inherently factor into determinations of plausibility); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 15 (2010) (arguing that the pleading standard after Iqbal makes the motion to dismiss equivalent in standard (and possibly in effect) to a motion for summary judgment).


Interpretation might also be viewed as a form of discretion provided by the rules. See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 1970 (2007) (referring to “interpretive discretion,” and arguing that some rules may be “purposefully written in vague language precisely so trial judges could adapt them to the circumstances of specific cases”). But for purposes of clarity, I treat the two distinctly, and refer here only to explicit delegations of discretionary authority contained within the rules.

FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (specifying 10 days after a jury verdict as the time limit for renewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a) (explaining how to measure a 10 day limitation); Rule 6(b)(2) (removing judicial authority to extend the 10 day limit under Rule 50(b)). But many rules establishing time limits may themselves be subject to judicial discretion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b) (generally permitting the court to extend time “for good cause”).

Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law, supra note 14, at 923 n.76 (identifying 36 distinct federal rules that explicitly delegate case-specific discretion). Indeed, rules fitting this description may be rules by name only.

See generally id. at 982-85 (arguing for stricter rules to reduce discretion and promote procedural consistency).
Without question, the most discussed area of procedural discretion in recent years has been the case management authority provided by Rule 16. The received wisdom regarding Rule 16 suggests that the 1983 amendments created space for judges to become much more aggressive during pretrial case management. What that account misses is that judges were already exercising significant discretion under the pre-amendment version of the rule, so much so that the “metamorphosis was virtually a fait accompli.” What led to the rise of managerial judging was not a formal change in Rule 16, but a change in the willingness of courts to exercise the authority they already possessed. This is not to say that the 1983 amendments were meaningless, but they certainly did not introduce the concept of judicial discretion to the area of case management.

The discretion provided in the current version of Rule 16 is also entirely consistent with the original design of the federal

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124 See Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 818, 823 (1988) (“Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to make specific what had probably been intended from the beginning – that the trial judge was indeed the ruler, not only of the pretrial conference, but of the entire pretrial process.”); Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 385, 407 n. 130 (1987) (“The focus on pretrial management is reflected in the total revision of rule 16 in 1983 providing specific authority for early judicial control of case scheduling”). The amendments to Rule 16 did more than just “create space,” of course; they also required early judicial involvement in all cases (subject to categorical exclusions created by district courts). By adding a requirement of judicial involvement, the amendments to Rule 16 signaled that judges not only had authority to manage cases, but were expected to use it. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 1588 (“Beginning in 1983, Rule 16 was amended to require case management activity by all judges in most cases, and to encourage more managerial activity than was required”) (emphasis added); Kent Sinclair & Patrick Hanes, Summary Judgment: A Proposal for Procedure Reform in the Core Motion Context, 36 WM. & MARY L. Rev. 1633, 1647 (1995).
125 Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1992.
126 A variety of factors contributed to this, from increasing caseload pressures to changes in how and when cases were assigned to judges. For full accounts of the managerial judging story, see, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 306 (1986); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 770 (1981); Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 123.
127 For a discussion of the actual changes wrought by the 1983 amendments, see Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1984-87.
rules, which contemplated case-based discretion exercised by judges from their very inception. Roscoe Pound, whose 1906 speech at the American Bar Association is often credited with triggering the American procedural revolution, was a “lifelong proponent of judicial discretion.” Charles Clark, who served as the chief drafter of the rules thirty years later, felt similarly. Reflecting those influences, the 1938 set of federal rules had an equitable orientation and authorized the exercise of judicial discretion at several points. For example, from the beginning, Rule 15 has instructed judges to permit amendments to pleadings “when justice so requires” and Rule 42 has permitted – but not required – judges to consolidate or sever issues for trial. Understood in this context, the story of Rule 16 – and of other areas of increased discretion in federal procedural practice – is one of adjustment rather than one of invention.

129 Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 Ala. L. Rev. 133, 201 (1997) (noting that the original federal rules were “founded on judicial discretion”).
131 Marcus, supra note 51, at 1576; see also Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 14, at 944-48 (recounting Pound’s efforts to promote judicial discretion).
132 See Subrin, Charles E. Clark, supra note 128 (“At the heart of Clark’s procedural outlook was his support of non-defining (what we now call “open-textured”) procedural rules; a corollary was his belief that judges should be granted broad discretion to interpret those rules. Clark distrusted lawyers and trusted judges.”).
133 See Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 14, at 922 (“The underlying philosophy of, and procedural choices embodied in, the Federal Rules were almost universally drawn from equity rather than common law.”); Marcus, supra note 51, at 1563 (“[The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] draw their essence more from the relaxed and discretionary background of equity than the confining orientation of the common law.”).
134 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
136 In other contexts, the exercise of judicial discretion is arguably cabined by the existence of specific factors that must be considered. Examples along these
Of course, adjustments can be meaningful, too, and many academic commentators have complained that the recent trend has been to increase discretion to undesirable levels. 137 To the extent that procedural discretion has indeed been expanding, it may be attributable to the increased involvement of judges in the rulemaking process. 138 But a precise account of that trend is not


138 See Bone, supra note 119, at 1974 (“[J]udges have come to dominate membership on the Civil Rules Advisory Committee in recent years and judges tend to favor broad discretion.”); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994) (using public choice analysis that assumes that judges will seek to enhance their latitude as a way of serving their self-interest); but see Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 647 (1994) (resisting the self-interest assumption).
essential here. What is clear is that judicial discretion now has a major role to play in procedure, and it was ever thus.

D. Inherent Authority

Beyond rules and standing orders, judges may also govern the behavior of litigants and parties during the course of litigation through the exercise of inherent authority. Inherent authority describes “incidental actions that federal judges take without a specific statutory grant as needed to exercise their primary ‘judicial power’ of deciding cases.” As that description suggests, the source of inherent authority is different from the more formal procedural mechanisms discussed thus far, both of which can be traced to statute. Despite the fact that neither statute nor rule directly authorizes it, the exercise of inherent power nevertheless has a long judicial pedigree, justified “by general references to Article III, traditional equitable or common law practices, efficiency, prudence, or separation of powers.”

Although inherent authority operates outside of the formal rules, it is not boundless, and its legitimate exercise is generally

139 See Stephen Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229, 240 (1998) (“At virtually every state of the process... the Rules grant judges enormous discretion in the conduct and resolution of disputes.”).

140 Marcus, supra note 51, at 1615 (“Taken in big picture terms, then, the Federal Rules construct has survived, and the current gravitation toward increased discretion does not threaten to dislodge it in a serious way.”); Shapiro, supra note 20 at 1994 (“The history of Rule 16 ... suggests both the inevitability and the desirability of significant discretion in areas such as pretrial management.”).

141 Robert Pushaw, Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 738 n. 4 (2001); see also Daniel Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (1995) (defining the term as “the authority of a trial court . . . to control and direct the conduct of civil litigation without any express authorization in a constitution, statute, or written rule of court”).

142 Local rules are authorized directly by 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a), and are further authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 83. Standing orders lack direct statutory authority, but are authorized by Rule 83 and therefore may claim indirect statutory authority through 28 U.S.C. § 2072. As discussed above, the power to impose sanctions for violations of local rules and standing orders has been viewed by some courts to stem from inherent authority rather than from the rules themselves. See, supra text accompanying note 32. See, e.g., U.S. v. Brown, Fed.Appx. 165, 165 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (defining inherent authority as the source of power to sanction noncompliance with standing orders).

143 See Pushaw, supra note 141, at 739; see also id. at 760-82 (extensively reviewing and criticizing these justifications).
limited to certain recognized areas. In the civil context, the most relevant domain for inherent authority is the management of litigation and control of case dispositions.\textsuperscript{144} But within that domain, the scope of a court’s inherent authority is quite broad; judicial recognition of authority to control litigation predates the introduction of the federal rules,\textsuperscript{145} and the rules have therefore been interpreted as being written against the backdrop of inherent power.\textsuperscript{146} As a result, courts have approved the use of inherent authority even in circumstances that appear to be inconsistent with the more formal requirements of the federal rules. For example, the Supreme Court cited inherent authority to approve a sua sponte dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute, even though Rule 41 by its clear terms refers only to dismissals upon motion by the defendant.\textsuperscript{147} More recently, an \textit{en banc} Seventh Circuit considered whether a district judge can require a represented party to attend a settlement conference.\textsuperscript{148} Rule 16(a) authorizes a judge to order “the attorneys and any unrepresented parties to appear,”\textsuperscript{149} and the traditional negative implication from that specification would suggest that represented may not be compelled to attend. Even so,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[144] This includes the related ability to impose sanctions for failure to comply with orders designed to facilitate case management. \textit{See} Pushaw, \textit{supra} note 141, at 764-79. An unrelated area where inherent authority has been regularly invoked – “supervising the administration of criminal justice” – is not relevant for present purposes. \textit{Id.} at 738, 779-82.
\item[145] \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.,} Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (recognizing “the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants”).
\item[146] \textit{See} Heileman v. Joseph Oat Brewing Co., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (“[T]he inherent power of a district judge - derived from the very nature and existence of his judicial office - is the broad field over which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applied. Inherent authority remains the means by which district judges deal with circumstances not proscribed or specifically addressed by rule or statute, . . .”); \textit{Link} v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-32 (1962) (“The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”); \textit{Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright}, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963) (“One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] is to bring about uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This is especially true of matters which relate to the administration of legal proceedings, an area in which federal courts have traditionally exerted strong inherent power, completely aside from the powers Congress expressly conferred in the Rules.”).
\item[147] \textit{Link}, 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
\item[149] \textit{FED. R. CIV. P.} 16(a).
\end{footnotes}
the court approved the judge’s order, citing inherent authority to fill in the “gap” left by the rule.\textsuperscript{150}

In sum, courts can issue orders and impose sanctions under the guise of inherent authority, and the exercise is relatively unchecked. From time to time, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls” and has urged “restraint and discretion.”\textsuperscript{151} But in practice, efforts to challenge the exercise of inherent powers are tricky, both because parties may rightfully worry about provoking sanctions or judicial ill will,\textsuperscript{152} and because challenges are reviewed on appeal under the very forgiving “abuse of discretion” standard.\textsuperscript{153} Thus, at the extreme, inherent authority permits the district judge to act as “a local chancellor,”\textsuperscript{154} and the written rules – whether federal, local, or standing orders – do not adequately define the body of procedures applicable in a given case. Orders entered under the guise of the court’s inherent authority are part of the overall procedural package, and variations in practice with respect to that authority will contribute to procedural disuniformity across cases.

E.  \textit{Procedural Common Law}

A final form of procedural disuniformity stems from areas not reached by the rules, but governed instead by procedural

\textsuperscript{150} Heileman, 871 F.2d at 652-53. For a discussion - and criticism - of how courts strategically create gaps in procedural rules to justify the use of inherent power, see Samuel P. Jordan, \textit{Situating Inherent Power Within a Rules Regime}, \textit{DENV. U. L. R.} ____ (forthcoming 2010).

\textsuperscript{151} Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). In the domain of sanctions, courts have been somewhat more aggressive about monitoring the exercise of inherent authority, and have generally required that a district judge make a finding of bad faith before imposing sanctions on that basis. See, e.g., Ross v. City of Waukegan, 5 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 1993); Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008); Schlaifer Nance & Co., Inc. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 338 (2d Cir. 1999); Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1995). \textit{But see} Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 433 (6th Cir. 2007); Hoffman v. Construction Protective Services, Inc., 541 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2008).

\textsuperscript{152} Resnik, \textit{supra} note 123, at 374, 402, 413, 425, 430 (1982).

\textsuperscript{153} See Pushaw, \textit{supra} note 141, at 764; Meador, \textit{supra} note 130, at 1805, 1816. Challenges may also be difficult for the additional reason that many exercises of inherent authority may occur off the record, and may therefore be essentially unreviewable. See Resnik, \textit{Managerial Judges, supra} note 123, at 411-13, 424-31.

\textsuperscript{154} Carrington, \textit{supra} note 75, at 943.
common law. Examples here include preclusion, abstention, and forum non conveniens. These relatively broad swaths of the procedural landscape have never been subject to formal rulemaking, but instead are governed by judicially-created doctrines. That initial feature is shared with inherent authority of the sort described just above; both exist completely outside of the rules themselves.\[155\] Indeed, Amy Coney Barrett has suggested that the similarities between the two are much greater, and that inherent power may be viewed as a partial source of the judicial authority to develop procedural common.\[156\] But even if there is some overlap in authority, it is useful to distinguish procedural common law from the exercises of inherent power discussed above. The primary functional distinction between the two involves the latter feature of procedural common law: it is subject to normal doctrinal development, and courts understand their role as creating a prospective and generally applicable set of common law rules.\[157\] Inherent power, by contrast, is often used to justify the imposition of case-specific procedural requirements.\[158\]

IV. RETHINKING TRANS-TERRITORIALITY – AND REFRAMING LOCAL RULES

Widening the lens on territorial variation ultimately leads to a richer understanding of trans-territoriality as a procedural value, and of the function of local rules within our procedural system. Trans-territoriality may be an aspirational goal, but it is not one that is realistically attainable. There will always be variations in procedural requirements that are sensitive to location. Moreover, the forms of territorial variation are numerous and overlapping, such that the use of one can often substitute for another. All of this

\[155\] Inherent power and procedural common law are also similar in the sense that they may be constrained - at least up to a point - by the introduction of formal rules or statutes. See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 Va. L. Rev. 813, 842-46 (2008).

\[156\] Id. at 842-46. But she does not conclude that inherent power is the only source of that authority; rather, “federal courts can exercise a common law authority over procedure analogous to their common law authority over substance.” Id. at 883.


\[158\] Put differently, the procedural requirements discussed in Part III.D are examples of inherent power being used “in the weak sense.” Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1677, 1686 (2004).
suggests that the question debate about local rules should be reframed. It is not a question simply of whether to permit territorial variation in any absolute sense, but whether to permit a certain form of territorial variation. The answer to that question turns on whether local rules have features that are desirable relative to other forms of territorial variation they may displace.

A. Inevitability and Exchangeability

Trans-territoriality is achievable if it requires nothing more than formal uniformity in the language of the written rules that are applied throughout the federal system. Viewed this way, local rules are problematic because they contribute to formal and explicit differences in written rules. Of the competing forms of territorial variation discussed in Part III, however, only standing orders raise similar concerns. Interpretations and exercises of discretion occur within the rules, but do not affect their formal language. Uses of inherent power and the creation of procedural common law are even less worrisome because they fall outside the domain of the written rules altogether. Thus, local rules emerge as the primary - and perhaps the only - deviation from the trans-territorial ideal, and the argument for their elimination appears straightforward and compelling: remove local rules, and the promise of trans-territoriality is fulfilled.

Unfortunately, this thin conception of trans-territoriality is inconsistent with the ends that the pursuit of trans-territorial procedure are intended to serve. Most obviously, a focus on the language of written rules serves only a very formalistic notion of equality. To further a more robust interest in equality, what is required is enough procedural consistency to ensure that similar cases are treated equally. Superficial uniformity is therefore insufficient, and the proper emphasis should instead be on the actual procedural requirements that are imposed. Given that emphasis, any source of territorial variation raises concerns. Formal uniformity also fails to meaningfully promote the nationalization of legal practice. A fixed set of rules means that lawyers need only memorize one set of words and numbers, but it

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159 And given the formalistic nature of this conception of trans-territoriality, even standing orders might be distinguished from local rules on the grounds that only the latter are denoted as “rules.”
160 See supra Part I.B.
161 See supra note __.
does not put them in a position to enter a federal courtroom in an unfamiliar district without having “to rely heavily on the wisdom of local practitioners.”

Again, a practicing lawyer is ultimately concerned with the actual procedural requirements that may be imposed, which requires more than a mere understanding of what the written rules say. In short, the value of trans-territoriality suggests something more than a formal uniformity of written rules. And given a more robust conception, local rules look much less like an outlier. To the contrary, each of the forms of variation discussed in Part III represent deviations from the trans-territorial ideal.

Of course, it should also be clear that trans-territoriality in this robust sense will always be aspirational rather than actual. It is not practical to create a procedural regime that imposes procedural requirements that are not sensitive to the location of the suit. Rather, the creation of a set of procedural rules that apply across the federal system will inevitably involve territorial variation in one form or another. Local rules should therefore be viewed as one potential component of an inevitable mix of territorial variation. So situated, the question of whether they should be retained - and in what role - becomes more complex. It is not enough simply to ask whether they disrupt territorial uniformity, for at some level of course they do. Instead, the appropriate question is whether a procedural regime that permits local rules produces a better mix of territorial variation than one that does not.

Reframing the question in this way does not necessarily entail a different conclusion. Even if trans-territoriality cannot be fully achieved, it still might support an effort to root out deviations

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162 Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1474.
163 To be sure, some of the forms discussed in Part III are not “territorial” in precisely the same way as local rules. Local rules create procedural differences that apply throughout a federal judicial district; thus, the relevant territory is defined along district lines. The territorial divisions associated with competing forms are occasionally broader. For example, when an appellate court has interpreted a rule in a particular way, the relevant territory is demarcated by circuit lines. More often, the divisions are narrower. When an individual judge chooses how to exercise procedural discretion, or whether to supplement the formal rules with a procedural requirement justified by inherent power, the relevant territory is limited to the individual courtroom. Despite these distinctions in the physical scope of the variation, each of the forms discussed contribute to differences in procedural requirements that are attributable to the location of the suit, and each therefore undermines the goal of uniformity embodied by the value of trans-territoriality.
wherever possible. Some competing forms - such as interpretation\textsuperscript{164} and the exercise of inherent power\textsuperscript{165} - may be impossible to eliminate, but local rules may remain an attractive target that would reduce the total amount of territorial variation in the procedural system. What this misses is that the forms of territorial variation are interrelated and transposable, at least to some extent. That is, the introduction of a local rule can often serve to displace a competing form of territorial variation. Many local rules define requirements that might otherwise be imposed through a standing order or an exercise of inherent power, while others channel the exercise of judicial discretion or fix meaning that might otherwise be selected through interpretation. In short, local rules do not exist in a vacuum, and their presence or absence will have ancillary effects on the overall level and composition of territorial variation in the procedural system.\textsuperscript{166} A proper understanding of their desirability and function thus requires a consideration of the way that they interact with - and compare to - competing forms of territorial variation. The next section engages in such a comparison, and concludes that local rules have some significant advantages that should lead to acceptance of, and perhaps even enthusiasm for, their role in the procedural framework.

\textbf{B. A Comparative Assessment of Local Rules}

When compared with competing forms of territorial variation, local rules emerge as desirable along several dimensions. They are transparent, which - contrary to common understanding - means that they facilitate national practice. They involve

\textsuperscript{164} Even Professor Struve concedes that some judicial interpretation will necessarily accompany the introduction and application of a set of procedural rules. See Struve, \textit{supra} note 118, at 1102.

\textsuperscript{165} Commentators and courts have long suggested that the legislative power to limit inherent power is limited, although uncertainty remains about the precise scope of the limitation. See, e.g., Burbank, \textit{Procedure, Politics and Power}, \textit{supra} note 158, at 1688.

\textsuperscript{166} Although local rules can substitute for other forms of territorial variation, they will not always do so. Therefore, the availability of local rules as a form of territorial variation may generate some overall increase in the level of disuniformity within the federal system. But that does not necessarily mean that we should seek to eliminate local rules. Ultimately, we should be concerned not just about the amount of territorial disuniformity, but also about its quality. Consideration of the overall mix of territorial variation in a system that permits local rules may lead us to tolerate the former to enhance the latter.
significant levels of participation and input from judges, but also from non-judicial actors. And they apply uniformly throughout a judicial district and across time, which promotes a desirable form of equal treatment among cases.

1. Transparency and Nationalization

Local rules are transparent in the sense that they are visible and easily discoverable. This is not altogether surprising, given that many of the recent amendments to Rule 83 have been explicitly designed to facilitate those qualities. For example, the current version of Rule 83(a)(1) requires district courts to “conform to any uniform numbering system prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United States.” Thus, local rules now track the numbering of the federal rules, which makes it easy for lawyers familiar with the latter to locate counterparts in the former. This task is made even simpler by the fact that local rules are now posted on court websites, often in a searchable format. As a result, a lawyer interested in discovering local rules relating to summary judgment in a particular district can do so either by looking at Local Rule 56 or by performing a basic search of the local rules. Local rules are also transparent in the sense that they are defined in advance. They are promulgated according to a set process, become enforceable on a set date, and are generally not applied retroactively. This means that they, like the federal local rules, are transparent in the sense that they are visible and easily discoverable.

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168 In some districts, the court website includes a search function. See, e.g., Northern District of Illinois, http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/LocalRules.aspx?rtab=localrule. In other districts, there is no search function, but the rules are available as a downloadable document that can be searched. See, e.g., District of Montana, http://www.mtd.uscourts.gov/rules.htm (providing a downloadable .pdf of the court’s rules).

169 See supra notes 155 and accompanying text.

170 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1) (“A local rule takes effect on the date specified by the district court and remains in effect unless amended by the court or abrogated by the judicial council of the circuit.”). See also Wash. Mobilization Comm. v. Cullinane, 400 F. Supp. 186, 190 n.2 (D.D.C. 1975) (finding that a local rule relating to requirements for class certification promulgated after the filing of the complaint would not apply retroactively to class certification determination) rev’d in part on other grounds by 566 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Boring v.
rules themselves, represent a set of procedural requirements that are not only discoverable, but discoverable prior to any interaction with the court.¹⁷¹

Most competing forms of territorial variation are relatively less transparent. Standing orders basically track local rules in the sense that they are available on court websites and are pre-defined, but they need not conform to any particular organizational structure, which at the margins makes them more difficult to navigate.¹⁷² If the governing appellate court has interpreted a particular rule provision, then that interpretation is like a local rule in the sense that it is discoverable and knowable in advance, although the method of discovery takes a different form. In the event that there is no binding interpretation by the appellate court, the diligent lawyer’s next move would be to research interpretations at the district court level, either by the presiding judge or her colleagues. But these earlier interpretations are merely predictive,¹⁷³ and for that reason they are not discoverable

¹⁷¹ Of course, there are downsides to pre-definition. Relative to some other forms of territorial variation such as discretion and inherent authority, local rules are more inflexible precisely because they involve pre-definition of procedural requirements rather than the development of requirements within the context of specific cases. So to the extent we prefer specific and contextual requirements, we may prefer to eschew local rules in favor of those other forms. Indeed, the choice to embed a discretionary standard within a generally applicable federal rule may reflect a conclusion that contextual judgment is needed. This suggests that we should not expect local rules to be capable of displacing other forms that permit contextual decision-making. But short of total displacement, there is still room for local rules to eliminate or narrow discretion in some instances, such as when the selection of a discretionary standard reflects a failure to reach a national consensus on a more fixed rule.

¹⁷² FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) specifies that standing orders may not be enforced absent “actual notice” in advance to the alleged violator. This requirement might be strictly enforced to ensure that non-uniform numbering or organization will not disadvantage lawyers and parties, but in practice the internet publication of a judge’s standing orders in toto has been viewed to satisfy the requirement of actual notice. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.

¹⁷³ This is true even of prior interpretations by the same district judge. A district judge who has interpreted a rule in a particular way in a previous case may be likely to adopt the same interpretation again, but that result is not compelled because traditional stare decisis principles do not apply to district judges. Amy
in the same way that local rules and binding interpretations are. Moreover, the task of compiling and reconciling competing interpretations by multiple district judges is not nearly as straightforward as the identification of a governing local rule. Areas governed by procedural common law function similarly to interpretation; in the absence of a binding appellate decision, lawyers will rely on uncertain predictions based on prior decisions at the district court level.

Areas governed by discretion and inherent authority are less transparent still. Although the discretionary standard may be knowable in advance, the way that any given judge will choose to implement that discretion is much more difficult to ascertain. Again, prior opinions may help, but their predictive value is arguably weaker because of the context-specific nature of discretionary decisions. A larger problem is that most exercises of discretion will not find their way into a published opinion at all, and so the informational cue provided by prior cases will be incomplete. Instead, the best predictive source with respect to discretion-based procedural requirements is prior experience with the judge. Lawyers seeking to know how the broad authority provided under Rule 16 will be exercised are likely to ask other lawyers who have experience practicing before the judge. As for inherent authority, it is used less frequently (and perhaps less predictably or consistently) and so the available predictive information is even more limited. Thus, while it is true that procedural requirements are transparent in the sense that they cannot generally be enforced without first being made explicit, it is also true that lawyers and parties will be hard pressed to know what those requirements might be at the outset of the case.

All of this turns one of the traditional arguments against local rules on its head. Critics of local rules have long argued that local rules discourage the nationalization of legal practice, and are therefore in tension with one of the original goals of trans-

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174 This point applies in the interpretive context, too. Not all interpretations will be reduced to a formal opinion, although perhaps actions based on interpretation are relatively more likely to trigger a written explanation than those based on discretion.
The basis for that complaint is that non-local counsel are burdened by the need to discover and master local rules. But regardless of whether local rules are permitted, a lawyer must familiarize herself with the local legal culture to practice effectively in a new geographic district (or even in front of a new judge within the same district). In practice, local rules may serve to level the playing field by formalizing that local legal culture and presenting it in a visible way. Put differently, if local rulemaking authority is removed, territorial variation will not disappear, but will become embedded in less visible forms, and the disadvantage presented to the outsider will be exacerbated rather than relieved.

2. Participation and Quality

Local rules also involve input from non-judicial actors. Again, this is the result of intentional changes to the local rulemaking process that have been designed to enhance participation rights. To begin, the current version of Rule 83 requires a period for notice and comment before local rules are promulgated, which gives an avenue for participation to anyone who might be affected by a proposed rule change. Moreover, many recent developments in local rules have their roots in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which requires the creation of an advisory committee which consists of a mix of judges and others “who must live with the civil justice system on a regular basis.” Taken together, these process reforms mean that local rules now reflect the input of non-judicial actors both at the stage of initial drafting, and at the stage of post-drafting consideration.

Admittedly, these participation rights remain weak. Non-judicial actors have no final role in the rulemaking process; the ultimate decision about whether adopt a local rule remains firmly in the hands of the district judges themselves. In other words,
non-judicial actors are granted a voice in the process, but denied a vote. Moreover, the rights that exist are imperfect. Although anyone may participate in the notice and comment process, in practice the voices raised are likely to be local. Consequently, the input generated may be skewed, and the resulting rules may favor local interests.179

But even if limited and imperfect, these participation rights distinguish local rules from competing forms of territorial variation. Standing orders, for example, involve no formal participation rights other than the standard right to appeal.180 As for the remaining forms of territorial variation, the ability of non-judicial actors to participate is generally limited to participation in the litigation process itself. That is, a lawyer involved in a particular case may have an opportunity to argue on behalf of his preferred interpretation, or on behalf of her preferred exercise of discretion, and that argument may contribute to the development of the procedural rules imposed in the case.181 But this case-specific participation is different in kind from the ability to contribute to the development of generally applicable rules that the local rulemaking process provides, especially since the number of participants in that latter process is potentially much greater and more diverse.

3. Scope and Equality

The scope of local rules differs from the scope of competing forms of territorial variation in two respects. First, the territorial scope of local rules is not the same as competing forms. Local rules apply throughout a federal district. Standing orders, as well as exercises of discretion and inherent power, operate more narrowly at the level of the individual district judge. Rule

179 See supra text accompanying notes 80. But of course, the presence of local input, even if disproportionate to non-local input, does not guarantee that the resulting rules will be skewed.

180 See supra text accompanying notes 93-97 (describing the process for promulgating standing orders).

181 And even this form of participation is not guaranteed. A court need not ask for input from lawyers before interpreting a rule or exercising rule-based discretion.
interpretations may operate at that level, too, although they can also be broader, as when the Supreme Court or the appellate court has issued an interpretation. The territorial scope of procedural common law may also range from the district level to the national level, depending on the status of doctrinal development. Second, the temporal scope of local rules is not the same as competing forms. Once promulgated, local rules apply prospectively to all cases, at least until amended. They share this stability with standing orders, appellate interpretations, and some procedural common law. But other competing forms are less stable. Interpretations made by district judges are governed by law of the case principles, but do not have any precedential value that extends beyond the judgment. Exercises of discretion and inherent power are similar; a district judge may exercise discretion to impose a procedural requirement in one case, and then decline to impose that requirement in the next case, even if the two cases are similar.

These differences in scope have effects in terms of how similar cases are treated. The notions of equality embedded in the design of our procedural system demand that similar cases reach similar outcomes, and this demand for equality is sensitive to both territory and time. Because they apply to every case throughout a federal district, local rules have the salutary effect of making the procedural requirements imposed by judges within that district more consistent. And because they are stable unless formally amended through an established process, they also make those requirements more consistent over time. In some circumstances, a different form of territorial variation may better promote equality, but local rules offer a mix of territorial and temporal consistency that is relatively attractive.

Of course, local rules do not serve the equality interest perfectly. Variations in procedural requirements will undoubtedly remain even in a regime that permits local rules, and variations in the treatment of similar cases may therefore result. But because these variations track district lines, they may be more acceptable than other variations which appear much more random. Put differently, differences in outcomes based on the district where the case is filed may be less damaging to our intuitions of fairness than differences in outcomes based on the judge within a district to whom a case is assigned.
CONCLUSION

The essence of the traditional complaint about local rules is that they create geographic variations in the federal system, and that those variations undermine the procedural value of trans-territoriality. Procedural uniformity is good; local rules disrupt uniformity; therefore, local rules must go. This argument is facially attractive, but ultimately unconvincing. It views local rules as an outlier, as an obstacle to the fulfillment of an ideal. But in practice, territorial variations in procedural requirements are common and inevitable, and the sources of those variations are numerous and transposable. If we broaden the lens on territorial variation, the debate about local rules looks much different. The choice is not between two procedural systems, one with territorial variation and one without. It is between two profiles of territorial variation, one that includes local rules and one that does not.