Explaining Adversarial Boilerplate Language in the Battle of the Forms: Are Consequential Damages in the U.C.C. Gap Fillers a Penalty Default Rule?

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EXPLAINING ADVERSARIAL BOILERPLATE LANGUAGE IN THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS: ARE CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN THE U.C.C. GAP FILLERS A PENALTY DEFAULT RULE?

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INTRODUCTION

There is a perception among some scholars that the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207 only adds mud to the already murky battle of the forms.\(^1\) Professor Daniel Keating undertook original research to explore the real world application of the battle of the forms under the U.C.C. by conducting interviews with business people, in-house corporate counsel, and outside counsel that represented various companies.\(^2\) Professor Keating’s excellent article, which resulted from these interviews, led to more questions than answers.\(^3\) Nevertheless it delivered some observations that suggest Section 2-207 is preferable to proposed alternatives. In this paper I seek to clarify why Section 2-207 is perfectly workable, and I assert that it should remain largely unaltered. To do this, I will apply game theory to create a model to explain the battle of the forms.\(^4\)

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\(^1\)'The “battle of the forms” merely refers to the situation that arises when parties exchange forms with non-matching terms.


\(^3\) *Id.* at 2714-15 (acknowledging that the data is preceding a theory: “Having spent many hours on the phone in interviews that enabled me to see only the tip of a very large iceberg, I am left not with radical suggestions for change but instead with a few modest observations.”).

\(^4\) For a broader approach applying game theory to offer and acceptance see Avery Katz, *The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation*, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 215 (1990). This article also furthers Avery Katz’s urge to promote “a particular research program; namely, the use of game theory to analyze the law of contract formation.” 89 Mich. L. Rev. 215, 216 (1990). See also DOUGLAS BAIRD, *GAME THEORY AND THE LAW*. Professor Baird wrote a comment on Keating’s battle-of-the-forms article. Baird discussed the portion of Keating’s article regarding the Baird-Weisberg Model (a suggestion for changing 2-207). Baird’s article explains, among other things, why boilerplate language is not meant to be sneaky, an important point, but one that is distinct from the ideas presented in this paper. Consider Baird’s statement: “A vision of commercial law that worries excessively about the ability of parties to sneak terms past each other distracts us from the things that matter.” Douglas G. Baird, *Commercial Norms and the Fine Art of the Small Con*, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2716, 2717 (2000). Baird asserts that parties would put less one-sided language in their boilerplate language under the Baird-Weisberg Model because reputation would be on the line, not because sneakiness would be more difficult (given incentives to read the boilerplate language). Baird was probably responding to Keating’s statement: “If a party persists in writing one-sided terms on its form, it will risk losing business since the other side is more likely to read a form that it knows it might be bound by.” Keating, *supra* note 2, at 2706. This statement could be understood to mean that one could not ‘get away with’ one-sided boilerplate language if only it were read. Baird explains that his theory does not suppose that boilerplate language is meant to be sneaky. For further information regarding the
Along the way, I will try to establish two ancillary points. The first is to explain why one-sided, or adversarial, boilerplate language should not be seen as unnecessarily creating ambiguity. This is important because courts have misinterpreted strategic language as an underhanded attempt at securing one-sided terms without taking on the costs of negotiation. The second is to show that, when participating in the battle of the forms, clients with forms containing strategic language will be better off than their counterparts who do not have such forms. Underlying this explanation is the idea that the observations reported by Keating would be expected by a game-theoretic approach to understanding and interpreting the battle of the forms under U.C.C. § 2-207. My model provides insight into the logical origins of the stated and implicit presumptions that Professor Keating says have been made by some academics.

Fortuitously, the model also allowed me to uncover an example of a contract law theory in action, the existence of which has been debated — a penalty default rule. A penalty default rule is a rule that courts apply ex post as a default, but unlike other default rules it is not set at what the parties would have wanted. Thus it is a penalty, the existence of which encourages

importance of reputation in this context see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 827, 827 (2006). See also infra Part IV Section 1, and Part V Section 2, on the take-it-or-leave-it game and reputation curve. For more information on the importance of virtues in capitalism see, e.g., JOHN MUELLER, CAPITALISM DEMOCRACY & RALPH’S PRETTY GOOD GROCERY 21-56 (1999). “As the Better Business Bureau puts it, ‘Honesty is the best policy. It’s also the most profitable.’” Id. at 23.

5 For a discussion of the courts’ understanding of the use of this language, see infra Part V Section 1, The Courts’.

6 Game theory is only one approach, and it makes imprecise assumptions:

Game theory highlights the problems of cooperation and explores specific strategies that alter the payoffs [of] players. But there is a vast gap between the relatively clean, precise, and simple world of game theory and the complex, imprecise, and fumbling way by which human beings have gone about structuring human interaction. Moreover, game theoretic models, like neoclassical models, assume wealth-maximizing players. But as some of the experimental economics literature demonstrates, human behavior is clearly more complicated than can be encompassed in such a simple behavioral assumption. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 15 (1991), 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 241, 304 n.196 (2001).
negotiation ex ante. Consequential damages in the U.C.C. constitute such a default rule. The model also alleviates the concerns of some scholars, such as Professor Craswell, that Keating did not address whether it should be easier for sellers to displace the U.C.C.’s standard default rules.\(^7\) In the end, Keating’s interviewees seem to have it correct—only minimal changes to Section 2-207, if any, would be desirable.\(^8\) Any changes should streamline the process of getting to the gap fillers, not displace them. Displacing them would be counterproductive for the operation of the consequential-damages gap filler,\(^9\) and its effect, as a penalty default rule,\(^10\) which encourages sellers to negotiate consequential damages ex ante, which parties otherwise would not.

Part I of this Article provides some basic background legal information. Part II discusses Professor Keating’s article and its findings. Part III lays out the assumptions underlying the model, and Part IV gives a quick lesson on game theory and normal-form games to prepare readers for the model that is presented in Part V. Part VI examines the results of applying the model, including a critique of the courts’ policy explanations for applying Section 2-207(3), a description of the role reasonableness has in take-it-or-leave-it forms, and an argument for the presence of a penalty default rule in contract law.

I. BACKGROUND

1. Contract Formation: Completeness, Boilerplate Language, and the Battle of the Forms

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7 Richard Craswell, The Sound of One Form Battling, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2727, 2728 (2000). This article mostly pertains to partially negotiated and take-it-or-leave-it contracts. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
8 Keating, supra note 2, at 2715.
9 See UCC § 2-715
10 A penalty default rule is one that is followed when parties do not negotiate a term when the default is purposefully set against the wants of the parties to encourage them to reveal information, i.e. negotiate that term.
A contract is never “complete,” because no contract can describe the obligations of parties for every potential state of the world. Where a more complete contract accounts for many future contingencies, a less complete contract might simply state the price and date of performance. Completeness does matter; courts seem to be more willing to aggressively interpret incomplete contracts than complete contracts. Although it may be desirable to create a complete contract, parties must consider the cost of negotiating and drafting such a contract. Many find it prudent to forgo negotiating some (or many) potentially pertinent terms of a contract. Those who deem it more efficient to be incomplete will only negotiate the “big” terms (e.g., date, price, quantity) and leave the rest to be settled later, if at all. Unless a contract is of substantial or unique worth to parties, they may not find it worthwhile to negotiate many of the smaller, non-immediate terms.

Non-immediate terms are often supplied by “small print” or boilerplate language, typically located on the back of forms. Boilerplate language often includes terms regarding warranty and liability. Since boilerplate language is not negotiated, it must be drafted with forethought. A lawyer must make assumptions about the future use of the forms when drafting

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11 Complete in the “real world” sense, rather than the legal sense of complete, as when a court denies introduction of evidence for new terms under the parole evidence rule because it assumes certain contracts are legally complete.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 92.
16 Eggleston, supra note 12, at 92.
17 For a discussion on shifting the costs of contracting ex post see Ayers 99 Yale L. J. 87, 127-128 (“When parties fail to contract because they want to shift the ex ante transaction cost to a subsidized ex post court determination, a penalty default of non-enforcement may be appropriate.”)
18 The relatively smaller terms may also be called the non-immediate terms.
19 Keating, supra note 2, at 2699-700.
boilerplate language to maximize the probable outcome of such use for a client. To do this, the lawyer will need to consider the worst-case scenario. If the client uses the form, without regard to what the form says and merely mails it off, the lawyer must consider what language would best serve such an “automaton” client. By recognizing that the boilerplate language will be used in contracts that are not fully negotiated, one can discover the assumptions a drafter must make and see how this informs the language that is used. In other words, one can see what strategy a drafter must employ to ensure clients are as well off as possible. First, however, it is necessary to understand the context in which issues regarding boilerplate language arise and are settled.

In the cases where parties do not negotiate every term of their agreement, they may end up sending one another forms, after which point, they believe there is a contract. When the boilerplate language of the exchanged forms conflict, and a problem arises, the terms of the forms may need reconciliation. Courts must decide which form’s terms will be controlling and interpret the results of this decision. This question has come to be known as the battle of the forms. Over time, these issues were resolved in different ways, some of which presented their own problems.

2. Transition to the U.C.C.

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20 Logically, if a contract were fully negotiated, no prefabricated language would be used.
21 For an argument that boilerplates can be strategic see Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boilerplate 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1033, 1036-37 (2006) (providing arguments that use of boilerplates can have signaling and coordination functions.).
22 “When I refer to the battle-of-the-forms situation or engaging in the battle of forms, I don’t mean to imply the existence of a dispute, but merely that forms were exchanged that had non-matching terms.” Keating, supra note 2, at 2681. Black’s Dictionary defines the battle of the forms as follows: “The conflict between the terms of standard forms exchanged between a buyer and a seller during contract negotiations.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (8th ed. 2004).
23 “The rules of offer and acceptance are difficult to apply in certain circumstances known as the ‘battle of the forms’ where parties want to ensure that the contract is on terms of their choosing.” Id. (quoting P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 54 (3d ed. 1981)). “[One] source of complaint about the common law approach was the arbitrariness of the all-or-nothing nature of the last-shot doctrine.” Keating, supra note 2, at 2684.
Under the common law, the “mirror image” rule\textsuperscript{24} and the “last-shot” doctrine applied.\textsuperscript{25} The Uniform Commercial Code’s Section 2-207,\textsuperscript{26} however, has done away with the mirror image rule and last shot doctrine.\textsuperscript{27} Black’s Dictionary explains that: “In its original version, U.C.C. § 2-207 attempted to resolve battles of the forms by abandoning the common law requirement of mirror-image acceptance and providing that a definite expression of acceptance may create a contract for the sale of goods even though it contains different or additional terms.”\textsuperscript{28} The section reads:

U.C.C. § 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.

(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is

\textsuperscript{24} Mirror-image rule:

[In contracts it is the] doctrine that the acceptance of a contractual offer must be positive, unconditional, unequivocal, and unambiguous, and must not change, add to, or qualify the terms of the offer; the common-law principle that for a contract to be formed, the terms of an acceptance must correspond exactly with those of the offer. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (8th ed. 2004).

Prior to the enactment of the U.C.C., the common law followed what became known as the mirror image and last shot doctrines, the former governing formation and the latter dictating terms. What the mirror-image rule says is that when an offer is made, a purported acceptance whose terms are not the mirror image of the offer will not count as an acceptance but instead will be treated as a counteroffer. Keating, \textit{supra} note 2, at 2683.

\textsuperscript{25} Last-shot doctrine:

This is where the last shot doctrine comes into play. Because a purported acceptance such as [a] seller’s is treated as a counteroffer that is then accepted by the buyer’s performance, the seller’s terms will govern by virtue of its having fired the last shot. Thus, under the common law approach, the contract would be formed upon the buyer’s payment, and the seller would get the benefit of its presumably more limited warranties and remedies when the machine malfunctioned in the buyer’s hands. Keating, \textit{supra} note 2, at 2684.

Some authors have argued that instead of Section 2-207, a “best-shot,” or “reasonable-shot” rule should be followed. \textit{See}, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, \textit{An Ex-Ante View of the Battle of the Forms: Inducing Parties to Draft Reasonable Terms}, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 350 (2005).

\textsuperscript{26} See infra p. 50, Appendix A § 2-207.

\textsuperscript{27} Keating, \textit{supra} note 2, at 2684-85. “[S]ubsection (1) of section 2-207 marked the end to the common law’s mirror-image rule.” Keating, \textit{supra} note 2, at 2684. Black’s adds a notice that: “In modern commercial contexts, the mirror-image rule has been replaced by a U.C.C. provision that allows parties to enforce their agreement despite minor discrepancies between the offer and the acceptance.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (8th ed. 2004).

\textsuperscript{28} BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (8th ed. 2004).
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.

(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
   a. the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
   b. they materially alter it; or
   c. notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.

(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.

For the purposes of this paper, Subsection 3 of Section 2-207 is the most pertinent.29

Subsection 3 comes into play when there are conflicting terms in the forms such that no contract is created thereby, but both parties still act as if there were a contract.30 Under Subsection 3, the terms that are in agreement between the forms make part of the contract, but the conflicting terms are knocked out (the knock-out rule). The knocked-out terms are supplied with “gap fillers” from elsewhere in the U.C.C., such as § 2-715. Notably, the gap fillers provide for consequential damages for the buyer and a good warranty.31 The former is significantly different from the latter in that it is not typically found in a fully negotiated contract.32

3. Case Law: 2-207(3)

Consider a common business scenario. In a business-to-business deal, Buyer sends a purchase order to Seller for widgets. Seller prints out the acknowledgement form that Seller’s

29 See supra note 26.
30 This scenario is not that uncommon. See infra Part I, Section 3.
31 See UCC § 2-715 (Buyer’s Incidental and Consequential Damages). See also POSNER supra note 194, at 126-27 (discussing consequential damages).
32 Keating, supra note 2, at 2689-90. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
lawyer drafted and sends it to Buyer. Without reading over the forms, or understanding the implications of the legalese contained thereon, the widgets are then shipped and paid for.

There is no problem here, even under the common law mirror-image rule, so long as the purchase order and acknowledgement form match term-for-term. But, if they do not match, and a dispute arises, courts must determine which terms, if any, are controlling. In jurisdictions that follow the UCC, courts apply Section 2-207. The following cases present the federal evolution of the application 2-207(3), including how it is reached and what the result of reaching it will be.

In 1977, the Seventh Circuit, in *C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v. Jordan International Co.*, laid out the analysis courts have subsequently performed under Section 2-207. A buyer, C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. (“Itoh”), submitted a purchase order for steel coils to a seller, Jordan International Company (“Jordan”), and Jordan responded by sending its acknowledgment form to Itoh. Jordan’s acknowledgment form contained the following statement: “Seller’s acceptance is . . . expressly conditional on Buyer’s assent to the additional or different terms and conditions set forth below and printed on the reverse side. If these terms and conditions are not acceptable, Buyer should notify Seller at once.” The pertinent additional-or-different term in the acknowledgment form was an arbitration provision that was printed on the reverse side of Jordan’s acknowledgment, which Itoh never expressly assented to nor objected to until the

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33 Of course it could be the buyer’s form that does not comport or conform.
34 In other words, these are automaton clients. *See supra* p.4.
35 Which, given the business choice to send boilerplate forms instead of negotiating every single term, could easily happen in a smaller sale. *See supra* notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
36 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977).
37 *Id.* at 1230.
38 *Id.* at 1232.
dispute arose.\textsuperscript{39} Despite this difference in form terms, “both parties proceeded to performance Jordan by delivering and Itoh by paying for the steel coils.”\textsuperscript{40} When a dispute arose, Jordan wanted to take it to arbitration, but Itoh did not.

The Seventh Circuit initially determined that a contract had not been formed under Section 2-207(1) as a result of the exchange of forms because ‘acceptance [was] expressly made conditional on assent to the additional . . . terms.’\textsuperscript{41} The Seventh Circuit determined that Jordan’s acknowledgment form language came within the Section 2-207(1) proviso: “Hence, the exchange of forms between Jordan and Itoh did not result in the formation of a contract under Section 2-207(1).”\textsuperscript{42}

The court stated that if a contract had been formed under Section 2-207(1), the question of whether a particular additional term would be included in the contract between the parties would have been answered under Section 2-207(2).\textsuperscript{43} But the Seventh Circuit found no contract formed under Section 2-207(1), so 2-207(2) was inapplicable. The court moved on to see if a contract had still been formed under Section 2-207(3) through conduct of the parties that

\textsuperscript{39} Id. at 1230.
\textsuperscript{40} Id. at 1236.
\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 1235. Subsection (1) reads: “A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.” (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{42} Id. at 1236. In Dorton, seller’s use of “subject to” was not enough to fall within 2-207(1) proviso; however, in Construction Aggregates it was held that an acceptance is able to come within the ambit of the Section 2-207(1) proviso even though the language did not precisely track that of the proviso. Id. at 1235.
\textsuperscript{43} Id. at 1236 n.7. Even under Section 2-207(2) it is possible that the knockout rule would be applied as to different terms, see, e.g., Diatom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579-80 (1984) (holding by the Tenth Circuit that a contract was formed by the swapping of forms under Section 2-207(1), but that the conflicting terms in the forms regarding a period of limitations and warranties were cancelled out and missing terms to be supplied by the U.C.C.’s gap filler provisions, thereby precluding summary judgment). Still, the drafting lawyer would probably prefer to skip 2-207(2) by simply inserting the explicit conditional acceptance language so as not to leave the outcome to chance. An astute drafter will know that the form bearing proviso-conforming language will ensure that the client will get the least-worst possible outcome, the U.C.C. gap-fillers. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
recognized the existence of a contract.\textsuperscript{44} The court determined that Section 2-207(3) did operate to create a contract through the subsequent performance by both parties (i.e., both parties recognized the existence of a contract through their actions).\textsuperscript{45}

As Subsection (3) operates to create a contract, it also defines which terms will constitute the formed contract.\textsuperscript{46} Subsection (3) defines “the terms of the particular contract [as] those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.” Applying Section 2-207(3) the court saw that it was clear the Jordan and Itoh forms did not “agree” on arbitration,\textsuperscript{47} and moved on to ask if the Code provided an arbitration supplementary term, and determined it did not.\textsuperscript{48}

In a similar scenario arising in 1986, the Ninth Circuit, in \textit{Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp.},\textsuperscript{49} explained that under Subsection (3), “the disputed additional items on which the parties do not agree simply ‘drop out’ and are trimmed from the contract.”\textsuperscript{50} For a contract to be formed under 2-207(1) with conflicting forms, the assent to the counteroffer must be “specific and unequivocal.”\textsuperscript{51}

Nevertheless, in 1992, the Seventh Circuit, in \textit{Dresser Industries, Inc., Waukesha Engine

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{C. Itoh}, 552 F.2d at 1236. Subsection (3) reads: \textit{“Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.”} (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Id.} at 1236.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Id.} at 1237. The Court goes on to explain why it is “convinced that this conclusion does not result in any unfair prejudice,” \textit{[id.]} but a discussion of court explanations is reserved for another section below, \textit{see infra} Part V Section 1.

\textsuperscript{49} 794 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986).

\textsuperscript{50} Textile Unlimited, Inc. v. A. BMH & Co., 240 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 2001).

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{C. Itoh}, 794 F.2d at 1445.
Division v. Gradall Co.,\textsuperscript{52} decided that “the district court acted appropriately in allowing the jury to consider the parties’ course of performance, course of dealing, and usage in the trade in deciding whether Dresser’s warranty became part of the contract under § 2-207(3)” thereby expanding the interpretation to the meaning of “supplementary terms” given in \textit{C. Itoh}.\textsuperscript{53}

Although the courts have properly followed Section 2-207 for resolving the battle-of-the-forms in U.C.C. jurisdictions, their explanation for the policy behind the section has been, understandably,\textsuperscript{54} off. As will be discussed below, most courts don’t really grasp what parties are doing when they deal via form contracts, as many judges erroneously believe that parties are doing something sloppy or nefarious when they are simply acting in an economically rational manner—and in a way that is actually dictated by 2-207’s legal framework. The source of the courts’ confusion may lay within the academic debates, since they share similar assumptions that Keating challenged in his interviews. \textcolor{red}{In the Implications Section, the court’s assumptions will be revisited, and it will be shown why they are inadequate.}

II. Keating’s Paper

Many articles have been written on 2-207. Professor Keating boiled down the concerns academics have with 2-207 into three issues: 1. The Current Section 2-207 Is Too Technical, Arbitrary, and Uncertain in Its Outcomes; 2. The Default Terms to Which Section 2-207 Directs the Parties Are Too Favorable to the Buyer and May Not Be Terms That Either Side Would Have Chosen in an Arms-Length Bargain; and 3. The Current Section 2-207 Encourages Parties

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Dresser}, 965 F.2d 1442 (7th Cir. 1992).
\textsuperscript{53} \textit{Id.} at 1452.
\textsuperscript{54} Even in 1963 it was acknowledged that 2-207 probably addresses “the most technical concept Article 2 assails;” namely, “the attack made upon” “the common law concept that the terms of an acceptance must match those of the offer exactly.” William B. Davenport, \textit{How to Handle Sales of Goods}, 19 BUS. LAW. 75 1963-1964.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{See} Part V IMPACT \textit{infra} p. 26.
to Draft Completely One-Sided Forms. My model will show that the first issue is wrong, 2-207 is not arbitrary nor uncertain in its outcomes; the second issue misses the purpose, there is a place for penalty default rules in the courts; and the third issue is not a bad thing, it is a reasonable strategy. This third issue will be directly addressed in the next section.

To test whether common academic assumptions about the section were held in common with those who worked with the issue in practice, Professor Keating conducted telephone interviews to gather information on the battle of the forms under 2-207. Although he sought people that he felt should have the most experience with the battle of the forms, he found that most of the people he talked to had surprisingly little experience dealing with the issue. This fact addressed the first assumption, that “The Battle-of-the-Forms Provision Is a Significant Issue for Companies That Buy and Sell Goods.” The second assumption, which was agreed to by the interviewees, is that “When Companies Do Engage in the Battle of the Forms, They Do So Because It Is Efficient.” The third assertion, that “Parties Uniformly Draft Their Forms to Be as One-Sided as Possible in Their Favor” is the most similar to one of the issues identified above by Keating, and will be addressed in next section and the model below. The fourth and final assumption is that “Nobody Reads the Forms.” The varied response to this final assumption will also play a role in the model below (perfect versus incomplete information).

Critically, the interviewees asserted three major points. First, one reason the battle of the forms is not very common is that some mega retailers (e.g. Wal-Mart) are so powerful that they

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56 Keating, supra note 2, at 2681.
57 For who Keating interviewed and why, see Id. at 2692-95.
58 Id. at 2696.
59 Id. at 2702, 2714. “What is interesting about . . . large companies is that [they] have a more or less take-it or leave it approach to their forms. Thus, the battle of the forms ends up being not very relevant to a company . . . that has the leverage to insist on the other side signing its form.” Id. at 2702. This is true, and Baird would probably agree, see supra note 5; however, the reason that these large companies use
A question raised by some scholars is: Why is there all this adversarial boilerplate language? A lot of boilerplate language requires that the other party accept their terms. This strategy gets forms automatically into the Subsection (1) proviso (and past Subsection [2]) of 2-
207, and ensures that a client is never “accepting” unfavorable terms. The process perpetuates the making of counter offers. In other words, parties are intentionally defaulting to Subsection (3) of Section 2-207 and the gap fillers, and not allowing their contracts to be interpreted under Subsection (2).

Parties are trying to act optimally under Section 2-207. Drafters of boilerplate language implement strategy to ensure that their clients do not “lose,” or are at least put in the least-worst position for all possible future outcomes. Keating has a pretty good notion of what it means to ‘win’ the battle of the forms.65

Any commercial lawyer who stepped back for a minute and assessed the practical impact of [Section 2-207] vis-à-vis the common law would quickly come to a number of conclusions. First, whether you represent the offeror or the offeree, you can (and arguably should) include the magic language [i.e., language matching the 2-207(1) proviso] in your form that will greatly limit the likelihood that you will get stuck with the other side’s boilerplate terms.66

By using the magic language, you put yourself in a position where the worst place you end up regarding the boilerplate terms, should you choose to perform, is with the U.C.C. gap-fillers. But that brings you to your second conclusion: this whole new approach, compared to the common law, raises the stakes on the U.C.C. gap-fillers, so you had better know what they are in order to determine whether you are truly comfortable with them. 67

The third practical conclusion that a thoughtful commercial lawyer would reach about the U.C.C.’s approach to the battle of the forms is that there is simply no way for either side to ensure victory in this fight, at least if victory is defined as getting the other

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65 “[D]efine ‘winning’ as making the other side be held to your nondickered terms. By the same token, it is easy with good drafting never to lose the battle of the forms, at least if ‘losing’ equals letting your side get stuck with the other party’s boilerplate terms.” Keating, supra note 2, at 2682. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.

66 Id. at 1686. “If you are the offeror, you can specifically limit the terms of your offer to the terms that are included therein, and while you are at it, you can object in advance to any additional or different terms that the offeree might include in its purported acceptance of your offer. If you are the offeree, you can mimic the language of Section 2-207(1) and expressly condition your acceptance on the offeror’s assent to any additional or different terms that you have included in your acceptance.” Id.

67 Id. “If you represent buyers, this is probably not a bad place to be since the U.C.C. gap-fillers include fairly broad warranty and remedy provisions, including implied warranty of merchantability, U.C.C. § 2-314, and generous consequential damages [Id. at § 2-715(2)].” Keating, supra note 2, at 2686.
Thus, the outcomes of this game can be thought of as follows: **Win,** have your preferential terms used; **Lose,** have the other party’s terms applied; or **Default,** using the Subsection (1) proviso to get to Subsection (3), so that matching boilerplate language forms the contract, and non-matching terms are knocked out and replaced with the U.C.C. gap fillers.69

Of course, no one can do worse than defaulting to the gap fillers, if the parties play their cards correctly. Backwards induction can be used to see the players’ payoffs, and infer from them how these players’ actions inform the results.70

In creating the model presented below, values were assigned to certain outcomes, which largely align with the win, lose, and default situations above. When one player uses adversarial terms and the other uses accommodating (or reasonable) terms, the player who used the adversarial terms will get the higher payoff and win, 1, and the other player will receive a lower payoff and lose, -1.71 When no contract is formed, both players receive a naught payoff, 0.

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68 Keating, *supra* note 2, at 2686. “You can, of course, try to ensure victory by refusing to perform your side of the contract until the other side signs on to the terms of your form. At that point, though, you would end up with a real negotiated contract and it would not longer be a true battle of the forms.” *Id.*

[N]either side is ultimately forced to play by the other side’s terms in this battle. . . . by insisting on a fully negotiated contract signed by both sides, or by [refusing to act]. . . . [N]ot playing the game has its own costs. Perhaps this is a sale that you really want to make, albeit not on the buyer’s terms. Or perhaps you feel that it would be too expensive, given the fairly small size of the deal or the limited risk involved, to sit down and negotiate about nonimmediate terms that are unlikely to matter in the end anyway. *Id.* at 2687.

69 Keating, *supra* note 2, at 2682-2685. Although Keating states that one may think of the battle of the forms as a game, and in so doing provides these as the win, lose, and default strategies, he does not, it would seem, mean a game in the same way that game theorists do, “If you think of the battle of the forms as a game, it is much more analogous to tic-tac-toe than it is to chess.” *Id.* at 2682. Nevertheless, chess, from a game theory perspective, is basically impossible to model, and although tic-tac-toe may be a good example of a game demonstrating a ‘default,’ it would be more accurate to compare the battle of the forms to the prisoner’s dilemma with a Nash Equilibrium and strategic behavior.

70 For an example of backward induction see POSNER supra note 194, at 19.

71 Assume that players only send forms when avoiding the costs of negotiation, see infra note 72, while forming a lower potential benefit contract. Since the players do not negotiate they do not need to subtract the costs of negotiating from the potential benefit. Assume that there is a conflict, the player with the
When the benefits of negotiation outweigh the costs of negotiation, the contract has the highest payoff of 2. But when the benefits of negotiation do not outweigh the costs of negotiation the player for whom that is true receives a payoff of -1 when negotiations result in a contract. A contract is only formed when both players negotiate or both players send forms. When one player negotiates and the other sends a form no contract is formed. Using these premises, the model described below was established.

IV. GAME THEORY

This section is intended to assist those with limited knowledge of game theory in following the model presented below. This will only provide a brief tour of the subject. My aim is to allow the reader to solve the games quickly and to find the outcomes so that the logic of the arguments presented in the subsequent sections of the paper can be better appreciated. Readers familiar with game theory, or who have an intermediate text on the subject readily available should move ahead to the model.

“Game theory is the study of multiperson decision problems.” When two or more people (“players”) face a decision problem (i.e., they must make a “move” in a “game”), we can classify the game as “static” (i.e., the game requires simultaneous decision making) or “dynamic” (consecutive decision making). Each game in this paper has “complete” information, which means that each player knows the possible outcomes for all the players. Information in a adversarial boilerplate language will win, W=1, and receive the full benefit, while the player with the non-adversarial language will bear the brunt of the adversarial terms, thus losing on the contract, L = -1. Assume that the some contracts have a high potential benefit of 4, \( B_H = 4 \), while others have a lower potential benefit of only 1, \( B_L = 1 \). Negotiations always cost 2, \( C_N = 2 \). If parties choose to negotiate when the potential benefit is high, considering that the cost of negotiating is the same in either situation, the outcome will provide a utility level of 2: \( B_H - C_N = 2 \). If the parties choose to negotiate a contract with a low worth potential, then taking away the cost of negotiating, leaves the parties with a utility level -1: \( B_L - C_N = -1 \).

\(^{72}\) Assume that the some contracts have a high potential benefit of 4, \( B_H = 4 \), while others have a lower potential benefit of only 1, \( B_L = 1 \). Negotiations always cost 2, \( C_N = 2 \). If parties choose to negotiate when the potential benefit is high, considering that the cost of negotiating is the same in either situation, the outcome will provide a utility level of 2: \( B_H - C_N = 2 \). If the parties choose to negotiate a contract with a low worth potential, then taking away the cost of negotiating, leaves the parties with a utility level -1: \( B_L - C_N = -1 \).

\(^{73}\) See supra note 72.

\(^{74}\) ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS at xi.
game is further characterized as either “perfect” or “imperfect”. Perfect information means that each player knows what moves have been made by all other players, whereas in an imperfect information type of game, this is not the case. One can depict games with “game trees” or rubrics. When one draws a game tree he is said to have drawn the game in its “extensive” form. When the game is presented in a rubric, it is said to be in its “normal” form. The model in this paper is presented in both forms. Unfortunately, there is no way to show the difference between perfect and imperfect information in a normal form representation, so I have only included extensive form representations in the text itself. Fortunately for these particular games it does not matter, in a practical sense, since one would come up with the same conclusions by solving either form. Some of the more advanced terminology I use in the next section of the paper (sub games, information sets, singleton information sets) is not necessary to follow the basic outcomes of the model, and therefore will be left to other dedicated texts. So, for this paper, one need only know how to solve a normal form game to discover the outcomes of the model.

Backwards induction is a method of solving games, which just means that one starts at the end, looking at payoffs, and works back to the beginning, the potential moves, to solve the game. I will turn now to solving a normal form representation of a game. Consider the following normal form game:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player 2</th>
<th>Player 1</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Up</td>
<td>2, 2</td>
<td>3, 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Down</td>
<td>0, 3</td>
<td>1, 1 (NE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In this game, Player 1’s payoff is always the first of the two numbers in each box, while the second number goes to Player 2. Player 1 can only choose between Left and Right, while Player 2 can only choose between moving up or down. Each player can only make one choice, and the players must make their move simultaneously. What will be the outcome of the game? Consider Player 1’s options. If Player 1 chooses Left, and Player 2 chooses Up, Player 1 will receive 2, but if Player 2 chooses down Player 1 will receive 0. If Player 1 chooses Right, and Player 2 chooses Up, Player 1 will receive 3, but if Player 2 chooses down Player 1 will receive 1. Keeping in mind that Player 1 does not get to tell Player 2 what to choose, compare the options of moving left versus moving right, regardless of what Player 2 does. You’ll notice that regardless of what Player 2 picks, Player 1 will be better off by choosing Right, 3 > 2 and 1 > 0. Similarly, for Player 2, If Player 2 chooses Up, and Player 1 chooses Left, Player 2 will receive 2, but if Player 1 chooses Right Player 2 will receive 0. If Player 2 chooses Down, and Player 1 chooses Left, Player 2 will receive 3, but if Player 1 chooses Right Player 2 will receive 1. Keeping in mind that Player 2 does not get to tell Player 1 what to choose, compare the options of moving Up versus moving Down, regardless of what Player 1 does. You’ll notice that regardless of what Player 1 picks, Player 2 will be better off by choosing Down, 3 > 2 and 1 > 0. Since we know that each player has a move in mind that, regardless of the other persons move, will give him the higher payoff, we call the congruence of these strategies the equilibrium solution to the game, or Nash Equilibrium. I have underlined the players’ best moves. Notice that only one box has both numbers underlined. Learning to circle or underline the correct numbers requires a little bit of practice as it is easy to get confused while you are still learning about game theoretic notation. Just keep in mind that player one gets to choose the column, and
player two gets to choose the row. Figure out what row is the best regardless of column choice, and you have Player two’s best strategy. Figure out what column is best regardless of row choice, and you have Player one’s best strategy. In the normal form game above notice that had the players been able to collude they would have been better off, receiving 2’s instead of 1’s. When the parties’ incentives conflict, as they do in the game above, we call this a collective action problem. You should try looking at the normal form representation of my model in the appendix and solve it and compare your answer to the equilibriums I solve in the next section.

V. Model

There are four sub-games, which are divided vertically by bargaining power and horizontally by the cost-benefit analysis of negotiation. Assume that Player 1 is a buyer, and Player 2 is a seller, of widgets. In the extensive form of the model (fully presented in the appendix) P1 > P2 means that the bargaining power of Player 1 exceeds that of Player 2; P1 = P2 means that the bargaining power of the players is comparable; P1 \( B_N > C_N \) means that for Player 1 the benefit of negotiation outweighs the cost of negotiation; P1 \( B_N < C_N \) means that for Player 1 the benefit of negotiation does not outweigh the cost of negotiation; \( B_N > C_N \) means that

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75 This short problem is closely related to prisoner’s dilemma, which is a story that goes along with the model. The prisoner’s dilemma is widely taught (sometimes only verbally) in undergraduate political science and economics classes to show the value of collusion. As an aside regarding the pedagogy of Collective Action Problems, a very common way of explaining collective action problems is through the example of the tragedy of the commons. This reference to a pasture-based lifestyle may be passing over the heads of introductory economics students across the country (consider the urban shift). That is not to say that the tragedy of the commons should not be taught at all; just that it might need to be supplemented. I think an excellent example of a collective action problem is a problem that faces the majority of college students at some point: dishes in collective housing. Whether living in an apartment, dorm, house, fraternity or sorority, college students find themselves with the perpetual battle of the bulge of dishes. “Why won't they clean up after themselves?”

76 See infra pp. 52-53 and accompanying illustrations.

77 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. “At least for some sales contracts, the costs of reviewing and then negotiating about nonimmediate terms are simply not worth the benefit, given the low likelihood of a future dispute about these terms and the relatively low cost of losing such a dispute if there is one. The overwhelming majority of company representatives with whom I spoke would agree with the academics on this one.” Keating, supra note 2, at 2699.
for both players, the benefit of negotiation outweighs the cost of negotiation; finally, $B_N < C_N$ means that for both players, the benefit of negotiation does not outweigh the cost of negotiation.  

78 Each player has limited actions: negotiate, N; send a form that is reasonable, R, or adversarial, A; take, T, or leave, L, the other player’s form; and each only gets one opportunity to move. If the players exchange forms, it will be assumed that they are sent simultaneously (or, equivalently, not read) and acted upon such that, if necessary, a court would apply Subsection (3) of 2-207 to determine what terms form the contract.  

79 1. Take it or leave it

In the take-it-or-leave-it game,80 Player 1 submits a form, as an offer, to Player 2, which Player 2 may then accept or reject, i.e., take or leave. The take-it-or-leave-it scenario occurs when Player 1 has greater bargaining power than Player 2, and the contract is not of a high enough value to make the benefit of negotiating outweigh the cost of negotiating, i.e., when $P_1 > P_2$, and $P_1 [B_N < C_N]$.81 The take-it-or-leave-it game is a dynamic game of complete and perfect information (so the strongest equilibrium concept that can be applied is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium).82 The game has three singleton information sets.

The game has two players with actions and payoffs: $G = \{A_1, A_2 ; u_1, u_2\}$

The set of possible actions for Player 1: $A_1 = \{N, R, A\}$

The set of possible actions for Player 2: $A_2 = \{N’, T’, L’\}$

The possible payoffs for are $u_1 (-1, 0, 1)$ for Player 1 and $u_2 (-1, 0, 1)$ for Player 2. And

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78 Where $B_N = \{B_H, B_L\}$; if $B_N > C_N$, $B_N = B_H$; if $B_N < C_N$, $B_N = B_L$. See also supra note 72.
79 A reasonable form will accept (or be agreeable to) the terms of its counterpart. An adversarial term will not. Therefore, the court will only have to apply the gap fillers when two adversarial terms are sent.  
80 See infra p. 52. The take-it-or-leave-it game is represented in quadrant III of the normal form illustration.  
81 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.  
82 See generally ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS, 57-71 (1992).
the game proceeds as follows:

1. Player 1 chooses an action \( a_1 \) from the feasible set \( A_1 = \{N, R, A\} \).

2. Player 2 observes \( a_1 \) and then P2 chooses \( a_2 \) from the feasible set \( A_2 = \{N', T', L'\} \).

To compute the backwards-induction outcome of the take-it-or-leave-it game, begin at the second stage (i.e., player 2’s move). Player 2 has three singleton information sets. Player 1 must anticipate what Player 2 will select to do upon reaching each of these information sets. If Player 1 chooses \( A \), Player 2 faces a choice between a payoff of 0 from \( N' \) and \( L' \), or a payoff of -1 from \( T' \), so \( N' \) or \( L' \) is optimal. If Player 1 plays \( A \), and Player 2 plays \( N' \) or \( L' \), Player 1 would yield a payoff of 0. If Player 1 chooses \( R \), Player 2 faces a choice between a payoff of 0 from \( N' \) and \( L' \), or 1 from \( T' \), so \( T' \) is optimal. If Player 1 chooses \( R \) and Player 2 plays \( T' \), Player 1 would yield a payoff of 1. If Player 1 chooses \( N \), Player 2 faces a choice between a payoff of 0 from \( T' \) and \( L' \), or 1 from \( N' \), so \( N' \) is optimal. If Player 1 chooses \( N \) and Player 2

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83 By reading the form P1 sends (or seeing that P1 is willing to negotiate, which P1 would not since that would only occur in a negotiating game), P2 can tell whether P1’s form is reasonable or adversarial. P2 can read P1’s form because only P1 can send a form in this game which P2 can take or leave, see supra notes 71-73; thus, simultaneity of form exchange is not an issue. See infra note 88.
plays \(N'\), Player 1 would yield a payoff of -1. The first-stage choice for Player 1 therefore is between payoffs of 0 from \(A\), 1 from \(R\), and -1 from \(N\), so \(R\) is optimal. (\(R, T'\); 1, 1) is the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium over (\(A, N'\); 0, 0) and (\(A, L'\); 0, 0) Nash equilibria.\(^{84}\)

Thus in the take-it-or-leave-it scenario, to maximize the value of a transaction, a powerful buyer, such as Wal-Mart, should offer a purchase order with reasonable terms to less-powerful sellers when the bargain is of insufficient value to carry the costs of negotiation.

2. **Negotiations**

Negotiations occur when Player 1 and Player 2 negotiate the terms of their contracts.\(^{85}\) The negotiation-based games are dynamic games of complete but imperfect information,\(^{86}\) which have one singleton and one nonsingleton information set, and occur when \(B_N > C_N\).\(^{87}\)

The game is: \(G= \{A_1, A_2 : u_1, u_2\}\).

The set of possible actions for Player 1: \(A_1 = \{N, R, A\}\).

The set of possible actions for Player 2: \(A_2 = \{N', R', A'\}\).

The possible payoffs for Player 1 are \(u_1 (-1, 0, 1, 2)\) and \(u_2 (-1, 0, 1, 2)\) for Player 2.

The strategies for Player 2 are:

1. Player 1 chooses an action \(a_1\) from the feasible set \(A_1 = \{N, R, A\}\).
2. Player 2 observes whether \((a_1) = (N)\) or not,\(^{88}\) and then chooses \(a_2\) from the feasible set \(A_2 = \{N', R', A'\}\).

\(^{84}\) For some readers, these three equilibria can be easily derived from the normal form representation of the game, see quadrant III of the normal form representation of the game, see infra p. 53.

\(^{85}\) See infra p. 52. The negotiations games occur in the first and second quadrants of the normal form illustration.

\(^{86}\) Therefore, the strongest equilibrium concept that can be applied to them is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. See generally Gibbons, supra note 82, at 115-29.

\(^{87}\) Because these games end in negotiated contracts, these contracts are functionally complete, see supra note 15.

\(^{88}\) Player 2 can tell if Player 1 wants to negotiate, but will not have an opportunity to read Player 1’s form if Player 1 sends a form. Form exchange is simultaneous. See supra note 83.
To compute the backwards-induction outcome for the negotiation games, begin at the second stage (i.e., player 2’s move). Player 2 has one singleton and one nonsingleton information set. There is only one subgame; it begins at Player 2’s decision node following N by Player 1. If Player 1 does not choose N, Player 2 will know that Player 1 has chosen either R or A, but will not know which was played. Player 2 then chooses between three actions: N’, R’, or A’, after which the game ends. If player 2 reaches the decision node following N by player 1, then 2’s best response is to play N’ (which yields payoffs of 2) rather than to play A’ or R’ (which yields a payoffs of 0). If player 1 does not play N, player 2 will need to make a decision without knowing whether player 1 chose A or R. For Player 2, when Player one chooses either A or R, choosing A’ strictly dominates picking R’ or N’. Since player 1 can anticipate player 2’s payoffs and can solve player 2’s problem just as well as player 2, player 1’s problem at the outset will be to decide between playing A (which would yield a payoff of 1, after player 2 plays A’), R (which would yield a payoff of -1, after player 2 plays A’), or N (which would yield a payoff of
2, after player 2 plays N’). Thus player 1’s best response to the anticipated behavior of player 2 is to play N, so the backwards-induction outcome of the game is (N, N’; 2, 2).

Accordingly, regardless of the relative bargaining powers of two parties, they should negotiate contracts rather than exchange forms when the benefits of the negotiation would outweigh the costs.

3. **Battle of the forms**

The battle of the forms arises when the parties exchange forms. For the purposes of the model, it is assumed that the forms themselves conflict when adversarial language is used, and thus would not form a contract under Subsection (1) of 2-207, so they fall within the Subsection (1) proviso, and the contract is formed by the court under Subsection (3). The battle-of-the-forms game is a *dynamic* game of *complete* but *imperfect* information (and so the strongest equilibrium concept that can be applied is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium), which has one singleton and one nonsingleton information set, and occurs when P1 = P2, and B_N < C_N.

The game is: \( G = (A_1, A_2; u_1, u_2) \).

The set of possible actions for Player 1: \( A_1 = \{N, R, A\} \).

The set of possible actions for Player 2: \( A_2 = \{N’, R’, A’\} \).

The possible payoffs for Player 1 are \( u_1 (-1, 0, 1, 2) \) and \( u_2 (-1, 0, 1, 2) \) for Player 2.

The strategies for Player 2 are:

1. Player 1 chooses an action \( a_1 \) from the feasible set \( A_1 = \{N, R, A\} \).

2. Player 2 observes whether \( (a_1) = (N) \) or not, and then chooses \( a_2 \) from the

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89 See infra p. 52. The battle of the forms occurs in quadrant IV of the normal form illustration, p. 53.

90 See generally Gibbons, supra note 82, at 115-29.

91 As in the negotiation game, Player 2 can tell whether Player 1 has played N, but, since form exchange is simultaneous, Player 2 cannot read Player 1’s form before sending the exchange form. See supra note 88.
feasible set $A_2 = \{N', R', A'\}$.

To compute the backwards-induction outcome of the **battle of the forms**, one begins at the second stage (i.e., player 2’s move). Player 2 has one singleton and one nonsingleton information set. There is only one subgame; it begins at Player 2’s decision node following N by Player 1. If Player 1 does not choose N, Player 2 will know that Player 1 has chosen either R or A, but will not know which was played. Player 2 then chooses between three actions: N’, R’, or A’, after which the game ends. If player 2 reaches the decision node following N by player 1, then 2’s best response is to play R’ or A’ (which yields payoffs of 0) rather than to play N’ (which yields a payoff of -1). If player 1 does not play N, player 2 will need to make a decision without knowing whether player 1 chose A or R. For Player 2, when Player one chooses either A or R, choosing A’ strictly dominates picking R’ or N’. Since player 1 can anticipate player 2’s payoffs and can solve player 2’s problem just as well as player 2, player 1’s problem at the outset will be to decide between playing A (which would yield a payoff of 1, after player 2 plays A’), R
(which would yield a payoff of -1, after player 2 plays A’), or N (which would yield a payoff of 0, after player 2 plays A’ or R’). Thus player 1’s best response to the anticipated behavior of player 2 is to play A, so the backwards-induction outcome of the game is (A, A’; 1, 1).

When the parties have relatively similar bargaining power, and the costs of negotiation outweigh the benefits, the parties should exchange forms containing adversarial, proviso-conforming language.

VI. IMPACT

1. The Courts’ Misunderstanding of Strategic Language

This section presents the argument that courts have mistaken the use of strategic language by parties in battle-of-the-form disputes as an attempt to gain an uneven advantage and push costs onto the courts. The language of the courts is examined to infer underlying assumptions, in part to see where those assumptions line up with assumptions made by academics, and in part to show that if the courts adopted the understanding presented in this paper, the application of Section 2-207 could be more predictable.

The Seventh Circuit, in C. Itoh, implies that the reader might find that its conclusion results in unfair prejudice to the seller.\(^92\) It begins to offer its position by pointing out that the seller “elects”\(^93\) to “insert into his standard sales acknowledgement form\(^94\) the statement that

\(^92\) C. Itoh, 552 F.2d at 1237.
\(^93\) Id. Use of the word “elects” points to the court’s belief that use of the proviso conforming language is a voluntary attempt to have one’s cake and eat it too, see infra note 98 and accompanying text. As has been shown, however, the use of the adversarial language is the best strategy, and not a choice for a drafter whose clients are partaking in lower value contracts that could result in the battle of the forms. That the court puts weight on the “voluntary” aspect of this matter is validated a few sentences down on the next page: “whether or not a seller will be disadvantaged under Subsection (3) as a consequence of inserting an ‘expressly conditional’ clause in his standard form is within his control.” Id. at 1238. (emphasis added).
\(^94\) One might wonder if this statement would be made if the court considered whether the party’s lawyer drafted the acknowledgment form under the assumption that the form would be inserted into battles of the forms. If the court assumed that a drafter must (due to the duty owed to the client) include the language
acceptance is expressly conditional on buyer’s assent to additional terms contained therein.”

The court asserts that the seller obtains a substantial benefit under Section 2-207(1) by including the clause. The court also states that: “If the seller does intend to close a deal irrespective of whether or not the buyer assents to the additional terms, he can hardly complain” when Subsection (3) is applied knocking out the conflicting terms. The court pointed out that “a seller . . . would undoubtedly appreciate the dual advantage” of falling under proviso of 2-207(1) and getting preferential treatment under Subsection (3). Finally, the court says that the seller may take “advantage of an ‘expressly conditional’ clause under Section 2-207(1) when he elects not to perform[; therefore,] he must accept the potential risk under Subsection (3) of not getting his additional terms when he elects to proceed with performance without first obtaining buyer’s assent to those terms.”

Using this line of argument the court determines that “[s]ince the seller injected ambiguity into the transaction by inserting the ‘expressly conditional’ clause in his form, (i.e., it is not voluntary, see supra note 93), as it is suggested the drafter must in this paper, the tenor of the statement would likely be different.

95 Id. at 1237. Keep in mind the end of including this language, it ensures that the drafter’s client, the seller, will have his form fall into the 2-207(1) proviso and get the least-worst available contract under Subsection (3).

96 Id. 1237-38. Of course, there is a benefit, however, the benefit they get is certitude not just a benefit of backing out. A good drafter must assume that his form will be used by the client without consideration of what it says or means, and so must make sure that an automaton client, that just sends forms off is put into a position with the most certain and least-worst outcome. See supra note 34.

97 This is something an automaton client with a drafter’s form would want to do. See supra note 96.

98 The court points out that a party should not expect to have its cake and eat it too. Again one wonders if the court would approach this differently if it considered that the drafter had Section 2-207 in mind when creating the boilerplate language. Such a party would not complain about this judgment. Perhaps as the courts and business parties (and their lawyers) learn about the Section and the strategies that are best under different business scenarios, (inferred and actual) complaints would be dropped.

99 C. Itoh, 552 F.2d at 1238. Of course this would be great for the seller, but again, the prudent drafter would know that this would not be the outcome, and would not change the strategic language.

100 C. Itoh, 552 F.2d at 1238. This argument mistakes Subsection (3) as a risk to the seller, when instead, it is a certain backstop. Subsection (3) provides the endpoint in the game from which the seller can use backwards induction to determine which “move” is best to make; send a friendly form or one that demands acceptance. The court did not see that a drafter could employ such language to ensure that other worse scenarios did not arise for the automaton client.
he, and not the buyer, should bear the consequence of that ambiguity under Subsection (3)."\footnote{Id.}

In short, the court believes that, by using a form with adversarial and proviso-conforming language the seller’s drafter is trying to have his cake and eat it too; therefore, the seller should bear the brunt of the gap fillers.

As has been shown, however, the use of the language is not an attempt to gain dual benefits; to the contrary, by using the clause, the drafter actually sought certainty in the contract. Application of Subsection (3) should not be seen as a punishment. There is no “consequence” to “bear”;\footnote{See discussion infra p.46 (arguing that consequential damages are a penalty default rule in contract law).} there is just a default result that is reached. The drafter has ensured that the Gap Fillers would be used, and that the client would do no worse than that. Had the drafter not used the language the parties could have ended up with an ambiguous contract and would have been at the mercy of the court to apply the knockout rule and subsequent gap fillers.\footnote{It is possible that the knockout rule will be applied even if Subsection (3) is not reached by the Subsection (1) proviso, see, e.g. Diatom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579-80 (10th Cir. 1984) (Holding that a contract was formed under 2-207(1) but that the conflicting terms in offer and acceptance regarding period of limitations and applicable warranties cancelled one another out, thereby precluding summary judgment), but that does not mean a good drafter would want to leave the client in this less-certain position.} So regardless of whether the outcome in \textit{Itoh} was correct, the argument that bias against the seller is appropriate because of the insertion of ambiguity is wrong. The seller’s drafter did just the opposite. The drafter ensured the outcome before the first move of the game had been made. Furthermore, the reason for ambiguity comes not from the drafting of the boilerplates, but rather the insufficient worth of the sale, which was not important enough to warrant a fully negotiated contract. The use of the boilerplate is a safety mechanism meant to protect the client. It does this by ensuring the least-worst outcome. This outcome is not ambiguous—it is specific.
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit, in *Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp.*,\(^{104}\) applied the reasoning in *C. Itoh* to another case in which it was necessary to determine whether a term was part of a contract formed under Section 2-207(3).\(^{105}\) The Ninth Circuit followed the U.C.C. drafters’ belief that “[b]ecause the [purchase order and acknowledgment] forms are oriented to the thinking of the respective drafting parties, the terms contained in them often do not correspond.”\(^{106}\) Although this statement may be true, it misses two fundamental issues. First, it is, arguably, the drafters’ duty to write the form for the benefit of the client. Drafting a form to be “one-sided” or oriented to one’s client is strategic, given the structure of 2-207, and not merely a foregone conclusion. This is not the simple case of narrow, self-centered drafting. This is a matter of understanding the ambiguity of the future and ensuring that the client is put in the least-worst possible situation. Second, that the terms do not coincide is just as attributable to the lack of term-by-term negotiation as it is to the absence of certainty (about the future with regard to the parties with whom forms would be exchanged and what terms would be contained on their boilerplates) when the forms were drafted.

The Ninth Circuit stated that “[g]enerally, this result is fair because both parties are responsible for the ambiguity in their contract.”\(^{107}\) As mentioned in the discussion of the *C. Itoh* justification, the parties are not injecting ambiguity into the transaction by drafting one-sided contracts, they are, rather, covering their losses by making certain that the end game result is the least-worst default scenario. The Ninth Circuit continued: “The parties could have negotiated a contract and agreed on its terms, but for whatever reason, they failed to do so. Therefore, neither

\(^{104}\) 794 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986).
\(^{105}\) *Id.* at 1442.
\(^{106}\) *Id.* at 1442-43. *See also*, U.C.C. § 2-207 Comment 1, *infra* p. 50.
\(^{107}\) *Id.* at 1444.
party should get its terms.” As to this proposition, there are three issues.

First, the Court presupposes that the reason for not negotiating is unimportant and that form exchanging is the reason for the supposed ambiguity. If the courts wish to encourage economically efficient transactions, then they must recognize that for many transactions the cost of negotiating term-by-term will outweigh the benefits of having a “clear” contract. It is evidenced by the language that the court saw the outcome of Subsection (3) as a “penalty”. This is mistaken from the strategic, game-theoretic point of view. Under the automaton-client theory of drafting, the court is actually doing the drafters’ bidding, and is merely effectuating the true purpose of the drafter’s one-sided language.

The court should find it a relief that it does not need to justify its application of the law as being the fair thing to do, when, in reality, it is simply applying a working rule that parties draft under. The parties, or at least their lawyers, should know that this outcome is the logical end. Reaching that end has no significant moral implication—it is merely a matter of fact for business conducted in U.C.C. jurisdictions. There is no reason to say, ‘you should have negotiated, but since you did not, neither of you gets what you wanted.’ Instead, the courts should assert that the parties’ drafters should know that there would be times when their clients could not economically justify term-by-term negotiations, and when that happens the U.C.C. supplies the background workings for a strategic game. If the drafters have done their job, then that end game will be reached, and the court will merely facilitate the end game.

Second, the Ninth Circuit explained that Subsection (3) “will often work to the disadvantage of the seller because he will ‘wish to undertake less responsibility for the quality of

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{108} Id.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{109} Transaction costs “can be reduced by using standard forms.” HIRSCH supra note 60, at 126.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{110} If you can’t share, then you won’t get any approach.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize\textsuperscript{111} Cf. This squares well with the (corporations law) presumption of the business judgment rule.}\]
his goods than the Code imposes or else wish to limit his damages liability more narrowly than
would the Code.” 112 Though it is true that the Code may be buyer biased, it is still the least
worst that a seller can do. 113 The Court goes on to say that the application of the section is more
equitable than the last-shot doctrine, and should be considered preferable given the statutory
imposition of them (as opposed to imposition arising in common law). 114 Common law versus
statutes aside, the equity of the matter again points to the courts’ apparent need to justify its
holding rather than just applying the law as it understands it. With the model presented above in
hand, courts can go forth confidently understanding that this is supposed to happen, that this is
what the parties expect to happen, and that the parties’ actions are predicated on the court
applying this law—no further rationale is needed.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit declared:

[I]n a case such as this one, requiring the seller to assume more liability than it intends is
not altogether inappropriate. The seller is most responsible for the ambiguity because it
inserts a term in its form that requires assent to additional terms and then does not enforce
that requirement. If the seller truly does not want to be bound unless the buyer assents
to its terms, it can protect itself by not shipping until it obtains that assent.” 115

This again illustrates the court’s confusion as to why a drafter would include the one-
sided language conforming to the Subsection (1) proviso in the automaton-client’s form. On its
face, it may appear the drafter wants to have his cake and eat it too, but in reality, the one-sided
language is the drafter’s mechanism for reaching Subsection (3) and ensuring that the endgame is

112 Diamond Fruit, 794 F.2d at 1444.
113 That the application of the gap fillers may be a disadvantage to sellers is important to the idea that
consequential damages are a penalty default rule, since the application is an incentive to change in itself
(but this conversation is reserved to Part V Section 4, below).
114 Interestingly, this presumption may not hold. The purpose of the statute may be to get more
information out of contracting parties ex ante to prevent costs in the court room, not just to be equitable as
between the parties, see discussion of Penalty Default rules, see infra Part VI. Perhaps this reasonable
(not taking either’s form solely or wholly) yet hard line (applying buyer biased gap fillers) rule is more
equitable than the common law, but that does not mean that equity was the sole impetus for in the rules
construction.
115 Diamond Fruit, 794 F.2d at 1445.
played out in the manner predicted, fulfilling the duty to the client keeping them in the least-worst position possible.

The Ninth Circuit got tantalizingly close to the nature of the issue when it said, “modern commercial transactions conducted under the U.C.C. are not a game of tag or musical chairs. Rather, if the parties exchange incompatible forms, ‘all of the terms on which the parties’ forms do not agree drop out, and the U.C.C. supplies the missing terms.” Modern commercial transactions are a game, but not a game of tag or musical chairs. They are a game of strategic positioning to ensure that the U.C.C. gap fillers are reliably reached on contracts that are not negotiated term by term.

2. The “reputation” curve in the Take-It-Or-Leave-It game: When it is reasonable to be reasonable.

The model includes two “curves” (provided to give a visual representation of the topics that follow, and are not part of the game-theoretic annotation). They were included to represent a loose continuum between certain endpoints, which it is important to understand the relationship between. The reputation curve applies only to the take-it-or-leave-it situation. In take it or leave it, Player 1 is uniquely situated to make an offer to Player 2 which is either accepted to form the contract or left on the table. This superior position, which Player 1 enjoys, provides the drafters of Player 1’s form with information, which would be lacking in any other situation. Knowing that Player 1 has the superior position allows the drafters of Player 1’s boilerplate language to take advantage of the long-term benefits that can come from using reasonable terms, namely a boost to reputation (or at least it will not contribute to a bad reputation, which may be

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116 Textile Unlimited, Inc., 240 F.3d at 788.
117 See infra p. 52 and illustration.
even more important). The model demonstrates the lose-lose situation that arises from Player 2 accepting adversarial boilerplate language from player one. This is shown through the payoffs, -1 to Player (because of a drop in reputation that results from imposing an unfair contract), and -1 to Player 2 (resulting from the acceptance of losing terms). This outcome is not the equilibrium, and those who ignore this will gain poor reputations for not providing for their customers, and they will learn that they will lose business as they move to the equilibrium of no contract formation. The reputation-leads-to-reasonableness argument is largely only applicable to the take-it-or-leave-it scenario. The other games do not lend themselves to this argument because in those games, as a strategy, sending a reasonable form does not make sense.

3. Are Penalty Default Rules at play here?

In their article Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts, Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner introduced the influential idea of penalty default rules. The existence of these rules was

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119 For commentary on the importance of fairness in capitalism See Generally, John Mueller, Capitalism Democracy & Ralph’s Pretty Good Grocery Ch. 2; “As [P.T.] Barnum puts it succinctly, ‘Men who drive sharp bargains with their customers, acting as if they never expected to see them again, will not be mistaken.’” Id. at 28.
122 Robert Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. n.9 (1989) (“‘default rules’ are the rules that a program follows in ‘default’ of an explicit choice by the user to have some other principle apply.”), see also Ayers, supra note 121, at 91 n.24; “Default rules have alternatively been termed background, backstop, enabling, fallback, gap-filling, off-the-rack, opt-in, opt-out, preformulated, preset, presumptive, standby, standard-form and suppletory rules.” (emphasis added) Ayers, supra note 121, at 91. With respect to 2-207(3) the application of the rule is slightly buyer-biased, putting a “penalty default” on the seller, ex post, encouraging him to negotiate more than he would if the penalty default were different (or differently applied), thus the seller is encouraged to take on more cost, ex ante, than he would but for the subsection and its application.
challenged by Eric Posner’s article *There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law*. This section will explain what penalty default rules are and why Eric Posner believes they do not exist in contract law. The next, and final, section of Part V will show that the U.C.C. gap fillers contain a penalty default rule for sellers in Section 2-715(2).

A. What is a penalty default?

The Ayres and Gertner article “provides a theory of how courts and legislatures should set default rules.” The authors introduced the default-rule concept of “penalty defaults.” Unlike other default rules, “penalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not want -- in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially the courts).”

Ayers and Gertner divided the legal rules of contracts and corporations into two classes. “The larger class consists of ‘default’ rules that parties can contract around by prior agreement, while the smaller, but important, class consists of ‘immutable’ rules that parties keep in mind that the seller in most cases would logically have more information about the product being sold than the buyer since the seller is typically also in possession of that which is being sold and so is positioned to know more about the object or service offered. This information asymmetry may make some wish to favor the buyer when considering an ideal default.

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124 Ayres, *supra* note 121, at 91 (emphasis added). Presumably they wrote the paper specifically because they believe that “academics have paid little attention about how to choose among possible default rules.” *Id.* at 89.

125 Especially with regard to consequential damages, the gap fillers are buyer-favoring/seller-disfavoring. This negotiation is probably a representation of a penalty default rule in action.
cannot change by contractual agreement.”

“Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them. Immutable rules cannot be contracted around; they govern even if the parties attempt to contract around them.” The authors point out that under the U.C.C. the “warranty of merchantability is simply a default rule that parties can waive by agreement.”

Reasonable people may disagree about specific rules, but “[c]ourts or legislatures are inevitably forced to set defaults, because contracts with gaps need to be interpreted.” Therefore, “[c]ourts must do something -- even if that something is non-enforcement [and, further,] defaults of non-enforcement can play an important role in efficient law.” To fill the gaps in a contract, some believe courts should look back to what the litigants “would have

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128 Id. Ayers and Gertner explain that “immutable rules are justifiable if society wants to protect (1) parties within the contract, or (2) parties outside the contract. The former justification turns on parentalism; the latter on externalities.” Id. at 88. Either way, these immutable rules are only justified “if unregulated contracting would be socially deleterious because parties internal or external to the contract cannot adequately protect themselves.” Id. It is not hard to imagine such situations. As to protecting people in the contract, not all people are fit to contract, and keeping them from joining an enforceable contract is presumably better for society. As to protecting those outside of a contract, people do not contract in a vacuum; their actions affect others (even if it is only through the butterfly effect). Economists call these effects “externalities,” because they affect parties external to the activity. By raising the cost of a transaction, a regulator forces transacting parties to internalize (i.e. take into account by paying for) some of those externalities (i.e., costs that third parties would otherwise bear). Disagreement over immutable rules usually concerns, “whether in particular contexts parentalistic concerns or externalities are sufficiently great to justify the use of immutable rules.” Id. at 88-89.

129 Id. at 87. For the purposes of the present paper, immutable rules will be largely set to the side. Nevertheless, to the extent that their analysis is profitably demonstrable, consider the following, regarding Legal Responses to Contracting Around Immutable Rules: “From an ex ante perspective the possibility of receiving this ex post penalty is just another expected cost of contracting around the default rule.” Id. at 126. “[C]ourts remove the clauses that transgress the immutable rule and then choose a default to fill the gap.” Id. “[C]ourts should choose the penalty that provide[s] ‘least cost deterrence.’” Id. at 127.

130 Id. at 87. When language is used “such as ‘[u]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated’ makes it easy to identify” that a default is being set out. Id. at 88. See also U.C.C. § 2-314 (Providing that “[u]nless excluded or modified [under § 2-316], a warranty that goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale” if Seller is a merchant of such goods.).

131 Id. at 89 n.14. It may not matter which default is chosen: “Economists seem to believe that, even if lawmakers choose the wrong default, at worst there will be increased transaction costs of a second order of magnitude.” Id. at 89.

132 Ayres, supra note 121, at 89 n.14.
wanted," but the authors argue, this “is analytically analogous to looking forward to what prospective contractors will want. It is to ask . . . ‘who are the prospective parties rooting for?’”

Either approach looks to the ex ante incentives:

While ex post each party will have economic incentives to shift costs to the other side, ex ante the parties have an incentive to place the risks on the least-cost avoider. If a court can identify that ex ante the parties to the contract had identical interest in allocating a certain risk or duty of performance, then it can, in a sense, pierce the ex post adversarial veil. (citation omitted).

To understand what default rules the authors suggest, it is informative to first look at their answer to the question: What are the causes of incompleteness? To that the authors said:

Scholars have primarily attributed incompleteness to costs of contracting. Contracts may be incomplete because the transaction costs of explicitly contracting for a given contingency are greater than the benefits. These transaction costs may include legal fees, negotiation costs, drafting and printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and probability of a contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifying whether a contingency occurred. Rational parties will weigh these costs against the benefits of contractually addressing a particular contingency. If either the magnitude or the probably of a contingency is sufficiently low, a contract may be insensitive to that contingency even if transaction costs are quite low.

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133 According to Ayers and Gertner, the literature “has failed to question whether the ‘would have wanted’ standard is conceptually sound.” Id. at 90. (referring to Charles Goetz and Robert Scott; Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261 (1985)). Ayers and Gertner bring others’ points of view into consideration, starting with Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, who suggest that “corporate law should contain the [defaults] people would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arms-length for every contingency sufficiently low.” Ayers, supra note 121, at 90. Richard Posner “argued that default rules should ‘economize on transaction costs by supplying standard contract terms that the parties would otherwise have to adopt by express agreement.’” Id. “Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson have argued that the default rules governing the debtor–creditor relationship ‘should provide all the parties with the type of contract that they would have agreed to if they had had the time and money to bargain over all the aspects of their deal.’” Id. “Charles Goetz and Robert Scott have proposed that courts should set untailored default rules by asking ‘what arrangements would most bargainers prefer?’” Id. at 92.

134 Ayers, supra note 121, at 89 n.18.

135 Id. at 89 n.18 (referring to Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1978)).

136 For that matter, when do courts know there is a gap? The “issue of whether a gap exists is identical to the issue of what is sufficient to contract around a particular default.” Ayers, supra note 121, at 95.

137 Id. at 92-93. Being sufficiently rationally “insensitive” to contingencies (following this through to its logical end) will lead to parties merely swapping boilerplate forms. For a discussion of exchanges and
Basically, “as transaction costs increase, so does the parties’ willingness to accept a default that is not exactly what they would have contracted for.” 138 So called “majoritarian defaults seem to minimize the costs of contracting.” 139 Nevertheless, Ayers and Gertner argue that the “majoritarian ‘would have wanted’ approach to default selection is . . . incomplete.” 140 “[I]f the majority is more likely to contract around the minority’s preferred default rule . . . then choosing the minority’s may lead to a larger set of efficient contracts.” 141

The very costs of ex ante bargaining may encourage parties to inefficiently shift the process of gap filling to ex post court determination. If it is costly for the courts to determine what the parties would have wanted, it may be efficient to choose a default rule that induces the parties to contract explicitly [, i.e.] penalty defaults are appropriate when it is cheaper for the parties to negotiate a term ex ante than for the courts to estimate ex post what the parties would have wanted. 142

The authors refer to “[a] second source of contractual incompleteness” as “strategic.” 143 Changing default rules may “reduce the opportunities for this rent-seeking, strategic behavior. In particular, the possibility of strategic incompleteness” led them “to suggest that efficiency-minded lawmakers would sometimes choose penalty defaults that induce knowledgeable parties to reveal information by contracting around the default penalty.” 144 After all, “[t]he strategic behavior of the parties in forming the contract can justify strategic contractual interpretations by transaction costs with regard to economic considerations of contract law see HIRSCH supra note 60, at 120-24.

138 Ayres, supra note 121, at 93.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. It might make sense, given the presumptive asymmetric information, to make the seller analogous to the majority (and compare the buyer to the minority).
142 Ayres, supra note 121, at 93. Nevertheless, “[p]arties who contract around a standard-form clause will face the prospect that courts will interpret their contract in a manner that is inconsistent with the parties; initial intentions. Thus, parties who prefer an alternative to the standard-form may accept the latter for fear of misinterpretation.” Id. at 90 n.23.
143 Id. at 94. They “argue that contractual gaps can also result from strategic behavior by relatively informed parties.” Id. This comports well with an idea furthered in this paper, that drafting boilerplate language is strategic.
144 Id.
Turning back to how default rules should be chosen, Ayers and Gertner explain that when “choosing among default rules, lawmakers should be sensitive to the costs of contracting around, and the costs of failing to contract around, particular defaults.”

In the variety of transactions that exist, different parties will find some terms more or less problematic; parties’ actions will differ under different defaults. By observing the actions parties take, information can be inferred about the parties, and the parties, in giving this information, can be described as falling into “different degrees of ‘separating’ and ‘pooling.’”

In ‘separating’ equilibria, the different types of contracting parties, by bearing the costs of contracting around unwanted defaults, separate themselves into distinct contractual relationships. In ‘pooling’ equilibria, different types of contracting parties fail to contract around defaults, thus avoiding transaction costs but bearing the inefficiencies of the substantive default provisions.

Ayers and Gertner then explained how a “Zero-Quantity Default” fits into the concept of penalty default rules: “If the parties leave out the quantity, the U.C.C. refuses to enforce the contract. In essence, the U.C.C. mandates that the default quantity should be zero.” The policy behind this, according to the authors, is that “[i]t is not systematically easier for parties to figure out the quantity than the price ex ante, but it is systematically harder for the courts to figure out the quantity than the price ex post.” To get the parties to agree on that term, a quantity they would not like is set as a default, i.e. the zero-quantity defaults are considered

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145 Id. Nevertheless, the courts have not been interpreting contractual incompleteness as strategic, see Part V Section 1 supra p. 26.
146 Ayres, supra note 121, at 94.
147 Id. at 94-95.
148 Where Ayers and Gertner are working toward an explanation for the zero-quantity default and they say that “a rationale can be found,” but one must be careful with such after the fact rationalizations since the Supreme Court has said that they “cannot accept . . . post hoc rationalizations” at 417 U.S. 380, 397; 371 U.S. at 168-69; 332 U.S. 194, 196.
149 Ayres, supra note 121, at 95-96.
150 Id. at 96
penalty defaults since neither party would have wanted such a contract.  

Ayers and Gertner consider non-enforcement of some contracts (as another default position) as a safeguard against opportunism, e.g. where a “non-penalized buyer [could] have incentives to induce sellers to enter indefinite contracts in order to extract [a] penalty rent. By taking each party back to her ex ante welfare, the non-enforcement default eliminates this potential for opportunism.”  

Therefore, when the default enactment or application rationale is to encourage or promote symmetric information, “the penalty default should be against the relatively informed party.”  

The policy behind this is that “revealing information might simultaneously increase the total size of the pie and decrease the share of the pie that the relatively informed party receives. If the ‘share-of-the-pie effect’ dominates the ‘size-of-the-pie effect,’ informed parties might rationally choose to withhold relevant information.”  

“The knowledgeable party may not wish to reveal her information in negotiations if the information would give a bargaining advantage to the other side.”  

Ayers and Gertner propose that lawmakers “should sometimes protect the private incentives to become informed. In some instances forcing parties to reveal information will undermine their incentives to obtain the information in the first place.”  

Indeed, one way to identify penalty defaults is to investigate the pervasiveness with which parties contract around

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151 Id. at 97
152 Id. at 98.
153 Id. Given that sellers usually have possession of goods before buyers, it would be expected that they would be considered the more knowledgeable party, and as such, were Section 2-207 an example of a penalty default rule, purposing to create more symmetric information, one would expect its ramifications to be buyer biased, which they are. see.
154 Id. at 99. “[E]fficiency corresponds to ‘the size of the pie,’ while equity has to do with how it is sliced.” A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (3d. ed. 2003).
155 Ayres, supra note 121, at 100.
156 Id. at 107.
them, as is done with the seemingly ubiquitous use of limited warranty disclaimers.”

As to the Section this paper is concerned with the authors wrote:

U.C.C. § 2-207 is also inconsistent with “would have wanted” default analysis. This section supplants the common-law mirror-image rule with the default that additional terms in an acceptance that do not materially alter the terms of the offer become part of a contract between merchants. This default cannot be reconciled with ‘what the parties would have contracted for’ analysis, because there is no reason to think that the merchants would have wanted to include the additional terms of their contract. Instead, the rule places an informational burden on the party with the last clear chance to come forward and notify the other side if the additional terms are objectionable.

Regardless of the reason for incompleteness, choices eventually have to be made. Ayers and Gertner instruct that “[a]s the number of different types of preferred contracts (and consequently the number of possible defaults) increases, any untailored default is likely to be disfavored by the majority of contractors.” “As the number of possible defaults expands, courts must choose between a penalty default that is efficient within the class of untailored defaults or a tailored default that requires the court to ascertain what individual parties would have wanted.”

In sum, finding the efficient default can involve a complicated inquiry. Knowledgeable parties can leave holes in contracts for strategic reasons -- they might prefer to remain in an undifferentiated pool than pay their full freight in an efficient but unsubsidized equilibrium. Efficiency-minded lawmakers must therefore be attuned to the sources of contractual incompleteness and to the attendant costs of pooling and separating associated with their default choice.

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157 Id. at 107 n.92.
158 Id. at 107 n.92. Although, on the surface, it may not seem that “would have wanted” analysis applies to 2-207, the drafters that draft in full knowledge of the workings of the section may actually want, ex ante, to reach the gap fillers. See Keating, supra note 2, at 2712 (Interviews with business lawyers asserting their wish that it be easier to reach the gap fillers).
159 “Prior analyses of incomplete contracts have suggested that parties fail to contract around inefficient defaults because of transaction costs.” Ayres, supra note 121, at 111. “[P]arties may fail to contract around defaults for strategic reasons.” Id. “A relatively informed party may strategically withhold information that would increase the joint gains from trade.” Id. Thus, there may be more reasons than just costs for not negotiating.
160 Id. at 116.
161 Ayres, supra note 121, at 117.
162 Id. at 118.
Ayers and Gertner continued:

If the academy has been remiss in developing a theory of default choice, then to an even greater degree it has failed to address what the necessary and sufficient conditions for contracting around defaults should be. In determining these conditions, courts are determining the costs of contracting around a given default. The received wisdom that transaction costs are responsible for contractual incompleteness implicitly suggests that lawmakers should minimize the costs of contracting around defaults so that if any contracting parties do not like the off-the-rack standard, they can inexpensively tailor their corporate or contractual structure to suit themselves.\textsuperscript{163}

The authors concluded that, although “[p]rior theorists have argued that parties leave gaps in contracts because the cost of writing additional terms outweighs the benefit,”\textsuperscript{164} a second cause of contractual incompleteness occurs “when one party to a contract knows more than another, the knowledgeable party may strategically decide not to contract around even an inefficient default. Because the process of contracting around a default can reveal information, the knowledgeable party may purposefully withhold information to get a larger piece of the small contractual pie. This possibility of strategic incompleteness leads us to embrace more diverse forms of default rules.”\textsuperscript{165} In other words:

[P]arties may fail to contract around inefficient defaults for strategic as well as transaction cost reasons. When parties fail to contract because they want to shift the ex ante transaction cost to a subsidized ex post court determination, a penalty default of non-enforcement may be appropriate. When strategic considerations cause a more knowledgeable party not to raise issues that could improve contractual efficiency, a default that penalizes the more informed party may encourage the revelation of information.\textsuperscript{166}

B. Why Does Posner Say They Don’t Exist?

In his paper, \textit{There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law}, Eric Posner argued that the examples provided by Ayers, Gertner, and other authors in subsequent papers have failed

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Id.} at 120. \\
\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Id.} \\
\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Id.} \\
\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Id.} at 127-28.
\end{flushleft}
to provide an example of an existing, clear penalty default rule, and suggests that penalty default rules simply do not exist or are not a distinctive doctrinal category from contract formation rules or interpretive presumptions.\footnote{167} Ayres and Gertner’s influential article, \textit{Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules}, introduced the concept of the “penalty default rule,” which is a rule that fills a gap in a contract with a term that would not be chosen by a majority of parties similarly situated to the parties to the contract in question.\footnote{168} The purpose of penalty default rules, Ayers and Gertner argued, is to force parties to reveal private information, which enables their counterparts to perform more efficiently than they would if left uninformed.\footnote{169}

Posner’s paper develops the following framework for the way in which a court must approach claims for damages for a breach of contract:\footnote{170} Both Posner and I focus on step four.\footnote{171} Posner asserts that courts determine the existence of

\begin{enumerate}
\item Determine whether contract formalities are satisfied.
\item If so, determine whether there was real consent (not fraud, duress, mistake).
\item If so, determine what the contract says.
\item If there is a gap, apply a default rule.
\item If an explicit or implied term was violated, award a remedy.
\end{enumerate}

\footnote{167} Posner, \textit{supra} note 123, at 2.
\footnote{168} The characterization of the definition of penalty default rules is telling. It emphasizes the difference between a majority would-have-wanted rule and imposed gap fillers. This emphasis takes the focus of the reader away from the “why” and puts it on the “how.” A why definition might read: Penalty default rules are those which encourage the sharing of information by imposing a less favorable term on the relatively informed party when that party does not negotiate said term effectively. This, of course, is only a rough guess at how such a definition could be written, and though some issues may exist with it, please allow it to suffice for the current discussion.
\footnote{169} Posner, \textit{supra} note 123 at 1. As to the first part, it is agreed that this is a viable purpose of the penalty default rules; however, as to the second part, it is not certain that this is the only reason for encouraging information disclosure. Consider, for instance, the ability of parties to shift costs from ex ante to ex post and to use up valuable court resources. A not-insignificant reason a penalty default rule may be imposed would be to shift information expression to the ex ante position, preventing the necessity of courts to discover such patent information ex post. \textit{See} Ayers, \textit{supra} note 121, at 126-27.
\footnote{170} Posner, \textit{supra} note 123, at 3.
\footnote{171} \textit{Id.}
gaps through interpretation.\textsuperscript{172} He also believes an issue with the Ayers and Gertner paper is the pooling concept. Posner believes it is more plausible that contracting parties will fall along a continuum.\textsuperscript{173} Posner breaks up the ideas in the Ayers-Gertner paper:

The first idea is that courts use legal doctrines to encourage contracting parties to provide sufficient detail in their contract, so that judicial interpretation in case of dispute will be guided by the ex ante intent of the parties, rather than by judicial guesswork. This idea was advanced [as acknowledged by A&G] by Lon Fuller,\textsuperscript{174} who argued that legal formalities serve this evidentiary function.\textsuperscript{175}

The second idea is [the judicial externalization problem]\textsuperscript{176} that penalty default rules (in addition to legal formalities) serve the function of encouraging parties to produce specific rather than vague contracts.\textsuperscript{177}

The first idea is plausible, but the second idea—that penalty default rules are the cure—is less persuasive. As to the diagnosis, there is no doubt that in a simple economic model, the parties have an incentive to externalize their costs on courts. One way of doing so may be to leave gaps in their contracts in the expectation that courts will fill them properly in case there is a dispute.\textsuperscript{178}

The problem here is that there is a misconception of what the parties are trying to accomplish. It may be in part a shift of costs toward the ex post position. Nevertheless, if the parties feel that there is a high likelihood that suits could follow a transaction, they are probably more likely to address a broader array of terms in their negotiations. One can imagine a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{172} Posner, supra note 123, at 6. However, when applying 2-207(3) the courts will actually create gaps in contracts through application of the knock-out rule.
  \item \textsuperscript{173} Posner, supra note123, at 8. Although it is true that different parties will attribute different values to different situations, it does not hold that these parties will not make decisions similarly, e.g. only negotiate terms when the expected benefit outweighs the expected costs of such negotiations.
  \item \textsuperscript{174} Ayers, supra note 121, at 124 (In Lon Fuller’s classic, Consideration and Form, “the evidentiary function of legal formalities is to provide information to courts in order to lower the costs of subsequent decision making.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{175} Posner, supra note 123, at 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{176} Id. at 11.
  \item \textsuperscript{177} Id. at 9. See also Part V Section 1 supra p. 26 (considering the courts acceptance of this argument).
  \item \textsuperscript{178} This argument differs from mine in that here a gap is created and the expectation is that the court will fill them in predictably.
\end{itemize}
probability tree where, the riskier a transaction is, i.e. the more likely that if it fails it will result in costly litigation, the more a party will be willing to mitigate that risk by taking on ex ante costs of negotiation to avoid such nodes. There would likely be some equilibria that the parties find acceptable that could result in litigation, but, if the risk of such litigation is sufficiently low, the parties could efficiently overlook fresh negotiation of certain terms ex ante (which if they had been negotiated, may have lowered the court’s ex post costs). As it is suggested,\textsuperscript{179} raising the fees for adjudication of contracts cases would lower the incentive to shift costs ex post. But this suggestion overlooks the marginal importance of fees compared to total litigation costs, which are often quite high. Courts would have to require an exorbitant fee to make a material difference in which terms are being fully negotiated ex ante, and the final result would likely be inefficient for society as a whole. “The only difference between [a majoritarian rule and a penalty default rule] is that more parties opt out of—or would prefer to opt out of—a penalty default rule than out of a majoritarian default rule, everything else held equal.”\textsuperscript{180} Even if a court misidentifies the justification for applying 2-207 as being the interpretive presumption, e.g., \textit{contra proferentem} (that a contract should be construed against the drafter), this does not mean that it is the true reason it should be applied.\textsuperscript{181} Knowing that the consequential damages gap filler is a penalty default, the courts can apply it as such, without looking for further justification. Application of the consequential damages gap filler only occurs when the gap is created, and so

\begin{footnotes}
\item[179] Posner, supra note 123, at 10.
\item[180] Posner, supra note 123, at 11. (Following this, most sellers would like to opt out of consequential damages, so the imposition of the consequential damages gap filler would be an example of a penalty default).
\item[181] Cf. Posner, supra note 123, at 17. The value or power of information, as inherently acknowledged in the rule of interpreting against the drafter, is an intuitive part of contract theory that pulls from our concept of fairness. Informational asymmetry has been developed in game theory and legal contexts in the economic literature.
\end{footnotes}
is unlike the interpretive presumptions that hold regardless of the existence of gaps.\footnote{Id. at 18.}

According to Enrico Baffi, Posner says that penalty default rules (1) are different from majoritarian information-forcing default rules,\footnote{Baffi, supra note 123, at 22.} and (2) are “inefficient rules that do not maximize the ex ante value of [a] contract and are destined to be contracted around in the majority of the cases.”\footnote{Id. But even if this is so, U.C.C. gap filler consequential damages may be a penalty default rule, since, according to Keating, many parties do decide to contract around them ex ante, which they would not but for the expected application of U.C.C. Section 2-207. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.} Baffi declares:

Lawmakers could significantly reduce the possibility for relatively more informed parties to engage in this strategic behavior that results in a gap in the contract: indeed, they could choose penalty default rules (like, for example, a rule that establishes no compensation for consequential damages) in order to induce the informed party to add an efficient overriding clause.\footnote{Baffi, supra note 123, at 7. Baffi’s suggestion is of interest because he suggests that a lack, rather than the inclusion of consequential damages, would constitute a penalty default rule. He chose this, presumably, for its subsequent use in the Hadley case, which Posner disagreed constitutes a penalty default in practice, see Posner, supra note 123, at 13-14. Nevertheless, consequential damages may constitute a penalty default rule in transactions for goods. See Part V Section 4 infra p. 46.}

The assertion that establishing a no-consequential-damages default would constitute a penalty default comes from academic discussion of the \textit{Hadley} case. In \textit{Hadley} the informed party was the buyer of the delivery service. The court held that the courier neither knew, nor had reason to know, that the company needed the broken crankshaft fixed immediately or would not be able to operate, and hence the courier was not liable for the resulting lost profits. Taking Ayers’ and Gertner’s assertion that informational asymmetry is an important (if not \textit{the}) reason for penalty default rules, and assuming that Posner’s argument that \textit{Hadley} rule was not an example of the application of a penalty default rule,\footnote{Posner asserted that the \textit{Hadley} rule was actually majoritarian because most carriers do not have an advantage over outsiders in the insurance business. Posner, supra note 123, at 13.} there is still room for distinction to establish that consequential damages—in the U.C.C.—may constitute a penalty default rule.
A no-consequential-damages default in a contract for services is different from consequential-damages default in a contract for goods. Even though, as in *Hadley*, a buyer of a delivery *service* (services, of course, are not covered by the U.C.C.) would be in a better position to know about consequential damages of late delivery, this is contrary to the normal informational asymmetry between buyers and sellers of *goods*.\(^\text{187}\) Article 2 of the U.C.C., which includes Section 2-207, applies to the sale of goods.\(^\text{188}\) Normally sellers have more information about what they are selling and are on the better side of the sale’s informational asymmetry. Therefore, it is the opposite informational asymmetry presumption that creates the penalty default with regards to the sale of goods; the application of consequential damages, as a gap-filler in contracts for goods, forces sellers to negotiate that term ex ante, since reaching it by default tends to be buyer biased. But for the default, sellers would probably not negotiate the term. It is not merely a majoritarian default rule because most parties would not include the term in their fully negotiated contracts.

4. **The Continuum of Negotiations Under Equal Bargaining Power: Consequential Damages are the Penalty Default Rule in Contract Law**

In the extensive game illustration,\(^\text{189}\) a curve is drawn connecting the battle of the forms equilibrium to the conjoining negotiation game equilibrium. This curve is meant as a depiction of the continuum of possibilities between the battle of the forms and a fully negotiated contract. Towards the equilibrium of the battle-of-the-forms game, consequential damages is included to express that along this continuum the first term which is negotiated tends to be consequential.

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\(^{187}\) Logically sellers know more, on average, about what they are selling than buyers, if for no other reason than that the seller is usually in possession of a good before the sale. The ex ante informational asymmetry which is pertinent is that of the sellers knowledge regarding the good (and its ability to perform as the buyer is expected to use it).

\(^{188}\) U.C.C. § 2-102 (“this Article applies to transactions in goods”).

\(^{189}\) See infra p. 52.
damages. The players exchange adversarial forms [i.e., they reach \((A, A')\)], in the battle of the forms as a result of strategy. Nevertheless, as benefit of the bargain increases and off sets the costs of negotiation [i.e., as \(B(N)\) becomes equal to \(C(N)\)], some terms become worthwhile to negotiate, and the players move on the continuum toward the equal bargaining power negotiations game and its equilibrium, \((N, N')\). In other words, all else being equal, when parties have relatively equal bargaining power the predictor of whether adversarial boilerplate language will be used, or terms negotiated, turns on the relative benefit of the bargain as compared to the costs of negotiation. Not all terms are equally valuable, and the U.C.C. has made this clear, since its gap fillers act as the Nash Equilibrium under the battle of the forms; it defines the least-worst position that any player could take on in that game. The least similar term, as between the negotiations and battle-of-the-forms equilibria, is the consequential-damages gap filler, and therefore this is the term that tends to be negotiated before all others when moving between these equilibria.

Since most sellers would not typically negotiate the consequential damages,\(^{190}\) it can be inferred that most of them prefer not to have that term. Therefore, the application of them by courts can be seen as a penalty for not negotiating consequential damages. According to Keating, parties are negotiating them when exchanging forms, but not when setting out a fully negotiated contract, and it is probably true that they are doing this to bypass this part of the default gap-fillers. Thus, in action, the gap fillers are causing sellers to change their course of action ex ante. Courts that apply the consequential damages gap filler are applying a penalty default, which encourages sellers to negotiate that term ex ante. Thus, consequential damages are a penalty default rule, which the majority of sellers would not want in their contracts and

\(^{190}\) See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
which they will contract around ex ante, especially in contracts that they would otherwise leave
to ex post determinations.

**CONCLUSION**

Although legal and economic academicians reveal the conditions for maximizing the
value of contractual exchange, they do so in different ways. Legal scholars see the law, and its
interpretation, as malleable, and therefore tend to make observations and suggestions about laws
themselves. Economists, however, often take laws as given and seek the optimal behavior
under the law. Of course the law is malleable, but it is still advantageous for the legal
community to see that identifying the optimal behavior of parties working under a law is
important. If judges ignored the costs and benefits that different strategies provided parties
under laws, decisions could be biased against reasonable strategies that, at first glance, seem
unnecessarily mean, selfish, or ambiguous. Upon finding the reasons behind strategic
behavior, the behavior can be understood and thus judged more accurately and, in turn, more
predictably—two traits of legal analysis that any legal mind can appreciate.

Data and theories do not always arise contemporaneously. Regarding Professor
Keating’s article, the information he collected and the observations he made preceded and

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191 Eggleston, *surpa* note 12, at 93.
192 *Id.* “If you only have a hammer, every problem tends to become a nail.” GARETH MORGAN,
CREATIVE ORGANIZATION THEORY 14 (1989).
193 Eggleston, *surpa* note 12, at 93. In other words, the law is like a mathematical constraint, or condition,
under which the maximum value of a function can be found. *See, e.g.,* JAMES STEWART, CALCULUS 965,
969 (5th ed. 2003). The economists’ approach may be understood by analogy to astronomers, who can
only make observations of the cosmos, and then build theories and make predictions based on these;
rather than creating hypotheses and testing them in labs. CHARLES J. JONES, INTRODUCTION TO
ECONOMIC GROWTH 2-3 (2nd ed. 2002).
194 Strategic behavior occurs when “a rational person in deciding how to act . . . consider[s] the probable
195 E.g., Tycho Brahe accumulated data for which Johannes Kepler later supplied theories.
excluded any theory to explain his findings.\textsuperscript{196} Professor Keating wrote that drafters arguably should include proviso-conforming language in their boilerplates. The game theoretic approach of this paper supports that position. Professor Eric Posner asserted that penalty default rules do not exist in contract law. The Keating interviewees’ responses, and the manner in which courts justify their application of consequential damages (as an ex post penalty for injecting ambiguity, by not negotiating ex ante), suggest, however, that consequential damages are the penalty default rule of contracts law. Drafting boilerplate language is a strategic act. Keating wrote that “those who [drafted one sided forms] generally justified it on the grounds that this was probably what the other side was going to do, so it was as much a defensive move as anything else.”\textsuperscript{197}

When parties are in the battle of the forms, there is no belief that a drafter could hold about the strategies other parties’ drafters could choose such that it would be optimal to draft less one-sided boilerplate language.\textsuperscript{198} Therefore the use of adversarial language by boilerplate drafters is strategic when the parties involved have relatively equal bargaining power. Judges and others should consider this when they are confronted by the battle of the forms. That parties choose to negotiate consequential damages and not other terms in their boilerplates before exchanging forms is evidence that this gap filler is a penalty default rule, with respect to the sale of goods. Understanding these things should help courts to more adequately explain the policy behind the application of the gap fillers under Section 2-207, which in turn should lead to a more predictable application of the law.

\textsuperscript{196}See Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2678, 2714-15 (2000) (acknowledging that the data is preceding a theory: “Having spent many hours on the phone in interviews that enabled me to see only the tip of a very large iceberg, I am left not with radical suggestions for change but instead with a few modest observations.”).

\textsuperscript{197}Keating, supra note 2, at 2701.

\textsuperscript{198}GIBBONS, supra note 82, “Rational players do not play strictly dominated strategies, because there is no belief that a player could hold (about the strategies the other players will choose) such that it would be optimal to play such a strategy.” Id. at 5.
A. § 2-207

U.C.C. § 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation

(4) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.

(5) The additional [and different (?)] terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
   a. the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
   b. they materially alter it; or
   c. notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.

(6) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.

Comment 1:

This section is intended to deal with two typical situations. The one is the written confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally or by informal correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or both of the parties sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and adding terms not discussed. The other situation is offer and acceptance, in which a wire or letter expressed and intended as an acceptance or the closing of an agreement adds further minor suggestions or proposals. . . . A frequent example of the second situation is the exchange of printed purchase order and acceptance (sometimes called ‘acknowledgment’) forms. Because the forms are oriented to the thinking of the respective drafting parties, the terms contained in them often do not correspond. Often the seller’s form contains terms different from or additional to those set forth in the buyer’s form. Nevertheless, the parties proceed with the transaction. (emphasis added).

Comment 7:

In many cases, as where goods are shipped, accepted and paid for before any dispute arises, there is no question whether a contract has been made. In such cases, where the writings of the parties do not establish a contract, it is not necessary to determine which act or document constituted the offer and which the acceptance. . . . The only question is what terms are included in the contract, and subsection (3) furnishes the governing rule. (emphasis added).
B. § 2-715(2)

Sec. 2-715. Buyer’s Incidental and Consequential Damages
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller’s breach include
   (a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which
       the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not
       reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
   (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
       warranty.

Comment 2.
Subsection (2) operates to allow the buyer, in an appropriate case, any consequential
damages which are the result of the seller’s breach. The “tacit agreement” test for the
recovery of consequential damages is rejected. Although the older rule at common law
which made the seller liable for all consequential damages of which he had “reason to
know” in advance is followed, the liberality of that rule is modified by refusing to permit
recovery unless the buyer could not reasonably have prevented the loss by cover or
otherwise.
C. **Extensive Form**
### D. Normal Form

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