Generating a convincing model of radicalisation has defied scholars and policy-makers alike. No satisfactory theory exists. Nevertheless, drawing from existing social work literature, this paper seeks to outline the first steps towards a more comprehensive model, asking what drives radicals to join a transnational jihadist organisation?

There are many theories concerning the varieties of Islamic radicalisation, which lead to acts of terrorism or political violence. For the purposes of this paper, we define violent radicalisation as a process that involves embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism. To date, theoretical frameworks as diverse as rational choice theory, strategic choice theory, relational frame theory and social network theory have failed to explain satisfactorily the motivations and mechanics of violent radicalisation, despite contributing to the debate. Indeed, no single theory, especially in studies of transnational or global jihad, has yet proved explanatory. In recent years, even largely accepted suppositions about poverty, poor education and relative deprivation fuelling violent radicalisation have been provocatively challenged. As a result, there is a growing consensus that no one pathway exists but rather that radicalisation is a phased process through which the individual undergoes a severe, if sometimes gradual, attitudinal shift because of his exposure to multiple social, psychological and ecological variables. The sheer complexity of the radicalisation equation is perhaps why, as a percentage of the total population, there are in fact so few individuals willing and able to commit acts of terrorism. The necessary confluence of so many contributing factors in the individual — ‘a perfect storm’, so to speak — simply makes engagement in transnational jihad uncommon.

Drawing in part on the literature of American social work practice, our model (Figure 1) seeks to outline possible pathways toward violent radicalisation among Muslims in the Middle East. And while there may indeed be many synergies, our model nevertheless excludes groups like Hamas and Hizbullah which, even though their rhetoric is Islamist and their capabilities are global, still largely frame their grievances and objectives within a nationalist narrative. In many ways, these groups resemble religiously inspired versions of ethno-political military movements such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which maintain that their violent actions are the only means to resist occupation or acquire political rights and/or self-determination. Most importantly, groups like Hamas and Hizbullah, despite their great animosity for the West and their frequent declarations of solidarity with other persecuted Muslim groups, do not currently mobilise their followers through the single narrative of global jihad. Ultimately, the transnational jihadist subset of violent extremists is the subject of this model. We seek to discern what drives one to join a transnational jihadist organisation instead of a religio-nationalist group and what role the presence of the latter has on the recruitment to and functioning of the former.

We have adopted from social work practice the person-in-environment perspective (PIE) on social functioning problems. We also utilise in this model some of the existing scientific knowledge on criminal gangs, religious sects, youth street gangs, as well as the
processes of group dynamics influencing decisions towards violence, as recommended by the European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation. We believe that widening the scope of literature in such a way adds nuance to ongoing debates on the nature of this threatening phenomenon.

Social theory and research methods such as these enable one to envision radicalisation as a process of socialisation in which individuals progressively adopt complicit attitudes towards radical, violent behaviour. We believe that radicalisation, like any other process of socialisation, varies according to geography and is necessarily localised to a considerable degree by culture. This remains so even if many of the radicalised – be they American, European, Middle Eastern, or Central Asian – share similar ideas of transnational jihad, interpretations of scripture and feelings of injustice mediated through the global community of believers (ummah).

In this sense, we find Fatah Al-Islam prototypical of global jihadist groups operating within the Middle East. Given what we know of members of this group, best known for its three-month clash with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr Al-Bared in 2007, there is good reason to believe that individual Fatah Al-Islam members’ experiences of radicalisation were significantly different from the radicalisation of jihadists in Europe or America. While publicly self-identifying with the core tenets of Al-Qa’ida’s ideology, Fatah Al-Islam nevertheless seems to have pursued a highly region-specific agenda through its actions in northern Lebanon. Its members, though diverse in national origin, might be considered transnational by virtue of their shared regional experience and their endorsement of a particular transnational ideology. However, they were not truly global like the perpetrators of the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington DC, or the 7 July 2005 London bombings. Radicalised by their experience within predominantly Muslim countries, they chose to attack the LAF, comprised of a large Sunni Muslim contingent, rather than aim their violence directly toward the West. Jihadists of Al-Qa’ida

Widening the scope of literature in such a way adds nuance to ongoing debates on the Arabian Peninsula as well have predominantly carried out their attacks against Muslim targets in Saudi Arabia, justifying such attacks with declarations of takfir and by levelling accusations at the Saudi monarchy of illegitimacy, corruption and collaboration with America. Our work is predicated upon this: the assumption that we must seek to understand the socialisation and radicalisation
of individuals like Fatah Al-Islam jihadists through a regional model rather than a global or European one.

The Model
The person-in-environment perspective is a conceptualisation in the practice of social work best described as an amalgamation of systems theory with an ecological perspective. Where PIE differs from these theoretical frameworks, however, is in its focus on the intersection and interaction of the person with his or her environment. Similar to the ecological perspective, PIE conceptualises the social world as having micro-, meso-, and macro-levels. The person is both an influencer and is influenced by the larger environment. The intersections and effects that elements of these various social levels have on the individual and vice-versa are taken in part from systems theory. With this underlying framework, practitioners of social work prevention and intervention often seek to improve the interaction of the person with the environment, especially in cases in which some environmental conditions are relatively intractable like global poverty (or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). However, this is not to say that modern social work practice does not seek to address the various macro-elements, which may contribute to poor social outcomes. Rather, conceptualisations utilising PIE are forward looking in that they seek to create a testable theoretical model, which, once tested, can then be used to design effective interventions on multiple levels.

Using PIE as an organising perspective in a pathways model like our own entails mapping out ecological nodes such as media or institutional socialisation side-by-side with personal nodes such as one’s history of human rights victimisation or one’s psychological or developmental factors. The reason for this is that, while carrying out acts of terrorism or political violence is a behavioural outcome, the process of radicalisation which leads to this behaviour is de facto greater than the individual. We believe that ecology alone does not produce terrorists, nor does one’s psychological makeup alone induce one to commit acts of terrorism. Rather, the two must be considered in tandem with one another; violent radicalisation must be understood as a critical dynamic in the everyday interactions between a person and his environment.

At its core, our diagrammatic representation of violent radicalisation consists of three dynamics and the many linkages between them. These include (1) the religious dynamic, (2) the socio-economic dynamic, and (3) the personal dynamic. Just as surely as no two people have the same genetic makeup, no two people experience the intersection of these three dynamics in precisely the same way. For this reason, our model is fundamentally one of individual difference. Keeping in mind that there are in fact few terrorists, even in so-called ‘hotbeds of fundamentalism’, the question we must ask is this: what sorts of interactions between these domains are most likely to predispose one to violent radicalisation? Our hypothesis is that violent radicalisation follows differing but discernible patterns in its developmental trajectory. Furthermore, we believe that we can identify and empirically test these patterns, investigating whether or not an individual or grouping of individuals’ trajectory is contingent upon specific life (turning point) events, ideologies, community ties, socio-economic status or developmental factors.

That said, there are four key features of our model that must briefly be noted. Firstly, the arrows between each node indicate a dynamic process that defines the nature of relations between them. That process may be either unidirectional or bidirectional. For example, as depicted, the relationship between formal education and socio-economic status is marked by a bidirectional arrow. This means that one’s socio-economic status largely determines the level of formal education one attains and vice-versa; in other words, one’s formal education likely affects one’s socio-economic status. Secondly, in order to represent the simultaneous nature of each node’s interactions with other nodes and in order to acknowledge the myriad possible pathways to radicalisation, our model must necessarily be free of the chronological markers one usually finds in path models (models of substance abuse, for instance). Thirdly, we focus on the individual but intentionally blur distinctions between micro-, meso- and macro-level processes with the conviction that doing so better enables us to understand an individual’s interface with family, tribe, religious community or other larger group as well as to understand better an individual’s social functioning within a wider cultural milieu.

Finally, we do not include politics simply as one node among others; instead, we believe that it deserves special consideration as an ecological variable. The project at hand entails detailing possible pathways for individual radicalisation, and so we must remember that geopolitics is more or less intractable on the micro-level. Therefore, we have opted to keep politics abstract and in the background, noting of course that regional politics as well as the politics of global jihad do in fact move our model in profound ways as they are mediated in the individual through micro- and meso-level nodes. The node of internal political disenfranchisement, for example, is about highly localised politics; it concerns not just politics on a personal level but on a level at which the individual has personal, political agency. Palestinians in Lebanon’s refugee camps, for example, are affected by nearly every facet of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nevertheless, it is unclear to what extent these greater political processes drive some, but not others, to join radically violent groups like Fatah Al-Islam or Usbat Al-Ansar (the latter a radical militant Islamist group based in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain el-Hilweh in southern Lebanon and suspected of sending dozens of fighters to Iraq to aid the insurgency).

Religious Dynamic
For many of the radicalised, the historical recasting of contemporary Muslim politics by Al-Qa’ida as an epic battle against
Radicalisation is greater than the individual

cal prism through which Islam legitimates violence for many jihadists; even violence against other Muslims. We call this the 'single narrative of global jihad' and observe that Al-Qaeda continues to use this framework to mobilise its audience, including Muslims who have not been directly affected by Western aggression. We call this adoption of another's victimisation 'tertiary victimisation through the ummah' (TVU), and we argue that it has been propagated not only through Al-Qaeda's internet presence (for example, As-Sahab) but also through Arab satellite channels, whose focus on Palestinian suffering, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and other conflicts in the Muslim world reinforces feelings of group victimisation. We locate the media in our religious dynamic, because it has been instrumental in shaping the views of Middle Easterners through a narrative that emphasises, even unconsciously, a powerful collective Muslim identity. Furthered by various forms of media, tertiary victimisation through the ummah can lead to self-perceptions of victimisation and function as a catalyst for radicalisation.

The religious dynamic also includes our concept of institutionalisation. We define this as the institutions, whether formal or informal, which shape an individual's attitudes, values, motivations, social roles, language and worldview. In the context of our religious dynamic, literature on radicalisation has pointed to a phenomenon in which a number of individuals have been radicalised through informal Qur'anic study groups (halaqa) centred on the mosque or a particular member of the ulama. Institutionalisation, we maintain, incorporates the important notion of physical space in the radicalisation process, with some locations or places of origin impacting heavily on radicalisation trajectories.

Socio-Economic Dynamic

Radical Islamist movements in the Middle East have traditionally not materialised within an urban ecology of city slums but rather within the frustrated lower-middle class excluded by a state's governmental and business elite. Therefore, while imagining radicalisation as a process that can be grafted wholesale onto other social phenomena such as crime or gang violence may be tempting, it is nonetheless incorrect. Yet, to dismiss absolutely socio-economic status as a contributing factor is also problematic. For example, in the poverty-stricken Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, an attraction to radical Islam has appeared that has not surfaced within the better-integrated Palestinian community outside the camps. The camps, unable to participate in major facets of Lebanese life, suffer from a 'poverty of opportunity' in which individuals have little incentive or ability to achieve their economic, social and educational goals. The Lebanese camps are also 'zones of unlaw', in which Lebanese governmental and PLO authority is weak and Islamic militants continue to use them as a safe haven from the state's security forces.

In our model, socio-economic status plays a role in determining the relationships an individual is able to build, as well as the level of formal education and social services that one receives. Formal education and social services are both factors in producing an individual's social networks. Islamic charity groups and organisations acting as vehicles for recruitment for militant groups have also been noted. In the Palestinian camp of Ain El-Hilweh, militant Islamic organisations such as Usbat Al-Ansar have exploited these social networks in order not only to raise funds for charity organisations but also to act as 'a travel agency and YMCA for jihad'. Our model, therefore, separates the formal education one receives in the classroom from institutional socialisation.

Numerous studies on Islamist violence have also indicated that displaced persons and individuals disconnected from their cultural origins make up a large percentage of known international terrorists. Like migrants, refugees suffer from a high level of internal political disenfranchisement. This disenfranchisement can instil frustration and pessimism in an individual who might lose faith in non-violent mechanisms of redress as they wait in a seemingly eternal exile. It is axiomatic that internal political disenfranchisement affects some degree large swaths of the Arab world under autocratic rule. Naturally, the politically disenfranchised who wish to violently enact change are more likely to do so if they are able to form relationships with similarly like-minded individuals.

Personal Dynamic

We formulate the personal dynamic upon compelling evidence that the majority of terrorists and violently radicalised individuals who have been studied thus far share an exposure to certain developmental and psychological factors. Some of the most basic and indisputable of these include biological factors like an individual's age and sex. Not only does the wider literature on criminology and social behaviour inform us that young males are more likely to engage in criminal or delinquent behaviour, but investigations into the so-called 'terrorist profile' have reached the same conclusion. Muslim males between the ages of 15–25 are more likely than any other demographic group to engage in terrorism or political violence in the Middle East. The United Nations Economic and
the last few decades, school enrolment rates have risen markedly throughout the region for both young men and women", observed a recent report on the UN Millennium Development Goals in the Arab Region. "The numbers, however, have not translated into higher rates of employment and wages. Too many Arabs unemployed'.23 It is likely that this mental health.25 a proven and adverse a from unemployment, furthermore, have a proven and adverse affect on one's mental health.25

Psychological factors play a vital role in our model. Early investigations into the root causes of terrorism and political violence began with the assumption that such behaviour was psychopathological, that terrorists were somehow mentally unbalanced rather than rational actors.26 Contemporary psychological studies, however, have convincingly argued against this, without however discrediting the necessary role that an individual's psychological profile must play in driving one toward terrorism or violent radicalisation.27 There is indeed good reason to believe that certain psychological factors or tendencies might increase one's susceptibility to the rhetoric of the single narrative of global jihad or otherwise contribute to one's violent radicalisation. So while it must be stressed again that no single psychological factor or mental health model can, or should, be construed as causative or primary in the process of violent radicalisation, we have nevertheless marked out several psychological factors we believe merit further study in our investigation.

Foremost among these factors is Julian Rotter's conceptualisation of a personal "locus of control"28 taken together in consideration with Martin Seligman's theory of 'learned helplessness"29 and Albert Bandura's analyses of self-efficacy.30 Each of these concepts has been used with great effect to understand individual and group behaviour within a matrix of other social, political and economic forces. Locus of control refers to the extent to which individuals believe that they can control events that affect them. Individuals with a high internal locus of control believe that events result primarily from their own behaviour and actions. Those with a high external locus of control believe that powerful others, fate or chance primarily determine events.31 Criminological research informs us that violent offenders tend to have a higher external locus of control than non-violent offenders.32 This initially suggests that individuals with an external locus of control will be more likely to join a terrorist group. But on the other hand, an internal locus of control is associated with political activity, as individuals with an internal locus of control are more active in seeking information about their environment and of learned helplessness and self-efficacy have found that individuals with a self-perception of helplessness will be less likely to engage in productive behaviour and therefore more likely to engage in counterproductive behaviour, including violent action. On a collective level, Bandura notes, 'The psychological barriers created by beliefs of collective powerlessness are especially pernicious because they are more demoralising and debilitating than external impediments'.33 Such communities will be more vulnerable to the rhetoric espoused by radical groups and charismatic individuals promoting violence as a means of redress and therefore more likely to harbour terrorists within their midst.

Lebanese camps are ‘zones of unlawful’ young people have a hard time finding work, leaving one in each three young Arabs unemployed'.23 It is likely that this 'poverty of opportunity' will drive some young people to seek redress in radical ways; literature on underemployment in the region, for example, certainly seems to suggest that this might lead to radicalisation.24 The stress and feelings of guilt and frustration that one derives from unemployment, furthermore, have a proven and adverse effect on one's mental health.25

Disenfranchisement can instil frustration and pessimism in an individual situation.23 Linked with arguments about relative deprivation being a factor in violent radicalisation, this then forms the basis for the argument that it is actually people with an internal locus of control who are more likely to become involved in terrorism than people with an external locus.24 However inconclusive this may sound, based on investigations of young people and motivation in the region, we believe that the locus of control, when considered in its relation to other nodes will reveal something significant about an individual's likelihood of engaging in terrorism.25

Learned helplessness broadly refers to an individual's 'conviction that even carefully planned and executed actions will fail to produce desired outcomes';26 this belief is also highly correlated with depression. Studies of conflict utilising Seligman and Bandura's concepts of learned helplessness and self-efficacy have found that individuals with a self-perception of helplessness will be less likely to engage in productive behaviour and therefore more likely to engage in counterproductive behaviour, including violent action. On a collective level, Bandura notes, 'The psychological barriers created by beliefs of collective powerlessness are especially pernicious because they are more demoralising and debilitating than external impediments'.33 Such communities will be more vulnerable to the rhetoric espoused by radical groups and charismatic individuals promoting violence as a means of redress and therefore more likely to harbour terrorists within their midst.

**PATHWAYS TO VIOLENT RADICALISATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST**

© RUSI JOURNAL APRIL 2009
ology must be fortified in the interrelationships between like-minded individuals or within a primary social network. Identity in the social sciences is a highly complex term. The use of it and its definitions necessarily vary across several disciplines – notably social work, social anthropology, sociology and psychology – which we have drawn upon in the construction of this model. So while acknowledging some imprecision in the triangle of identity formation, we nevertheless posit that identity as a concept can still be contained within our model.

Unlike other factors contributing to one’s likelihood of engaging in transnational jihad, however, identity defies being contained in just one node. To account for this, we have opted to locate identity within the intersection of other nodes and have done so by utilising a processable definition of self-identity. One’s identity is always in flux, susceptible to countless outside influences, and highly determined by one’s interactions with the environment.

Security, Justice and Victimization
Victimation plays a pivotal, connecting role between our three proposed dynamics. The wider literature suggests that victims, on a micro-level, respond to crime in diverse ways. One overarching tendency among victims, however, is to target for either reform or retribution those persons or structures they hold responsible for their victimisation. This holds especially true for individuals who believe they were victimised because of their ethnicity, religion or other primary feature of their identity. If an individual believes he has been victimised on account of being Muslim, for example, then Islam is likely to play a role in that individual’s response – radical, violent toward outsiders, especially if those outsiders are construed as agents of state or social repression. Victimisation, therefore, also tends to heighten perceptions of marginalisation and encourage distrust towards state agencies like the criminal justice system, the police or the army.

As nodes, security and access to justice, human rights victimisation, and perceptions of victimisation are sites of interconnectedness where individual processes intersect with group processes in sometimes volatile ways. The victimisation of communities in the Middle East (as has been the case for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon) is often collective, which can highlight synergies between one’s own sense of victimisation and one’s experience of community cohesiveness. Beyond that, one’s faith, mediated through a lens like Al-Qaeda’s single narrative of global jihad, can heighten one’s perception of victimisation. And finally, one’s personal history of victimisation, coupled with the threat of future victimisation – a threat determined largely by one’s age, sex, and socio-economic status – often inflicts severe and lasting psychological damage.

Limitations
The proposed model does not purport to be an all-inclusive understanding of how individuals become radicalised. Indeed, we believe that this is but one more beginning in understanding the complex social and interpersonal pathways that lead individuals to radicalisation and, ultimately, to violent action. The model is constructed with an eye towards testing the various pathways and the model as a whole. To accomplish this, we believe that we must first start with the elements that have most strongly demonstrated an impact on radicalisation. The elements are subject to multiple interpretations, and the operationalisation of these concepts will present a challenge to those who attempt to verify the pathway’s applicability and veracity in individual contexts. The definition of ‘radicalisation’, for example, elicits much debate, and definitions are not consistent even within disciplines. The testing and modelling of the various elements that make up the latent constructs (for
example, religious dynamic) will also take considerable effort.

With regards to the unidirectional paths modelled here, it could be argued that many of them are bidirectional. We have modelled them as unidirectional, however, because we believe that these processes are largely unilateral with regards to the process of radicalisation.

The process of how radicalised individuals become violent actors is not fully covered in this model. It will be necessary to construct a separate path model to describe that process. It may very well be that many of the factors presented here will also feed into the process of moving from radicalisation to violent action. We have started with attempting to understand the process of radicalisation as a process preceeding violence.

Regional Limitations
The model as presented is to be considered in the context of the Middle East. The process of radicalisation in Europe or elsewhere is not covered here. Those processes, in all likelihood, have idiosyncratic elements that may only be minor features of the process of radicalisation.

‘Poverty of opportunity’ will drive some young people to seek redress in radical ways

In the Middle East. However, we do believe constructing and testing models using PIE as a framework will elucidate many commonalities between various regions. Testing of this proposed model, with adaptations to reflect regional dynamics, might illuminate some such commonalities.

Temporal Issues
Temporality is a core feature missing from this model. Outside of the developmental factors modelled here, we have not attempted to model a timeline for radicalisation. All factors in the model are assumed to occur simultaneously. There are conceptual and pragmatic reasons for taking temporal features out of our model. Establishing causation is particularly challenging in any social science endeavour. While we believe that there are temporal processes involved with radicalisation, establishing the evidence for this phenomenon would require a level of measurement and analysis not yet seen in radicalisation studies (that is, quantitative longitudinal trajectory analysis with an eye towards radicalisation prevention). The model is designed to be tested using a population-based cross-sectional survey. Once paths have been empirically validated in a simultaneous model, we suggest that studies then move to establishing temporal relationships and testing causality via longitudinal studies (for example, cohort studies in areas where radicalisation is prevalent).

Reductionist Psychological Viewpoint
Myriad elements contribute to the psychological makeup of individuals. We have only chosen a few here that have been empirically demonstrated to be associated with either radicalisation or violent behaviour. There are assuredly more psychological and personal elements that contribute to radicalisation. It also bears repeating that the literature does not support a poor mental health explanation for radicalised violence.

Recommendations and Conclusion
Application
We believe our model has applicability to much of the greater Middle East, especially for the study of populations forcibly displaced and living in refugee camps. Areas that might be relevant to our model include the Afghan-Pakistani border; the Arabian Peninsula; Somalia; Sudan; Palestinian refugee camps in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan; and possibly Iraqi refugee populations in Jordan and Syria. The combination of a conservative Islamic enabling environment, the victimisation and marginalisation of communities clustered in camps or in other disadvantaged ecologies, the propagation of the single narrative of global jihad, and active recruitment by organisations adhering to the ideology of Al-Qa’ida are all critical components in the process of radicalisation. However, there are perhaps additional nodes which might be added to our model (regionally variant and culturally specific ones, for example, like clan or tribe).

Several psychological factors merit further study

A key feature of this model which we find particularly appealing is its interdisciplinary perspective; this model has borrowed concepts and research from several disciplines, including some, like social work practice, that have thus far had little representation in the literature on radicalisation. If we are to begin to develop effective radicalisation prevention programming, given the complexity of the process, it will be imperative that we include multiple disciplinary viewpoints.

Testability
This model, though somewhat vague in its definitions, is mathematically testable, either in parts or as a whole. Requirements for testing this model mathematically would initially entail the use of large population-based surveys. Surveys could be developed that operationalise the various elements of the model and then used to test the hypothesised associations. Though access to areas in which radicalisation flourishes may make survey research difficult, multiple large-scale surveys in challenging research areas have been conducted safely by the authors and others in the past. With regards to statistical modelling, utilising structural equation modelling or other path analysis techniques would be particularly well suited for this type of investigation.

Practice and Intervention
Once established, the validated model will also allow for the development of a prevention logic model with the goal of creating empirically driven programming in the geographic area of interest. The prevention logic model will in all likelihood look to influence critical paths which have been shown to be linked to
radicalisation. By tackling a few critical pathways, given the ‘perfect storm’ that is necessary for a person to engage in radicalised violence, a disruption of only a few should undermine the process of radicalisation. We should therefore be able to develop cost-effective prevention programmes. In the near term, given current efforts to prevent radicalisation or deradicalise, we will be able to evaluate existing programmes on key indicators related to validated associations in the process of radicalisation. Programmes that show promise in ameliorating the mediating factors that lead to radicalisation can be built upon, while programmes that show little efficacy can be improved or eliminated.

---

**NOTES**


7. Sageman, op. cit.; Edwin Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in which They Joined the Jihad* (Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006).


9. Takﬁr is an Arabic term referring to the declaration of someone as being a nonbeliever (kafir). The person being declared takﬁr must be Muslim.


23. Ibid.


25. Oksana Yakushko, Megan Watson and Sarah Thompson, ‘Stress and Coping


31 Rotter, op. cit.


33 Rotter, op. cit.

34 Andrew Silke, personal communication, 29 February 2009.


37 Ibid.; Bandura, op. cit.


40 Basia Spalek, personal communication, 29 February 2009.


42 Spalek, op cit.
