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Market Therapy? On Intervention in the Consociation with Non-members

Steffen Roth

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While the majority of market interventions is concerned with market interventions that are good for particular market participants, this article is interested in interventions that are good for markets. We draw on observations of historical markets as presented by Hamilton Grierson and Max Weber to rediscover markets as forms of communication that systematically transcend the ambitions and influence of the individual market participants. We show that this non-possessive concept of markets cancels established definitions of market failure and corresponding justifications of market interventions. We then imagine market intervention strategies that account for rather than problematize the double-contingent nature of markets and outline systemic intervention strategies that emerge if we observe markets in the medium of the health system rather than in the medium of the economy. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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INTRODUCTION

The goal of any intervention is change,1 and the good about change is that it can make things better. As things could always be better in a civil market society (de Tocqueville, 1838),2 the civic duty to engage in continuous improvement processes does not spare the market itself. Consequently, markets have been popular targets of interventions throughout the history of the concept. The dominant view is that market interventions correct market failures (McKee, 1984; Finn, 2003; Valentinov, 2012a; Valentinov, 2012b; Cohen, 2014; Valentinov et al., 2015). The definition of market failures, however, implies the idea of an ideal market (Grit and Dolfsma, 2002; MacKenzie, 2004; Esposito, 2012; Chester, 2013). Market interventions therefore involve assumptions as to which forms of markets and market regulations are best for society. Yet canonical knowledge on markets has it that the origins of markets are in the encounter of societies in plural: Max Weber (1978, p. 639) defines early markets as forms of the consociation with enemies, and P. J. Hamilton Grierson (1903, p. 41ff) suggests that markets emerged through the silent trade between strangers. In both cases, market action
is not subject to the control of individuals but rather an interaction of all participants involved. These interactive market definitions hence baulk at unilateral definitions of perfect markets, thus undermining attempts to give perfect reasons for interventions in imperfect markets.

The integration of interactive market concepts and interventionist ambitions therefore appears as worthy goal, the achievement of which, however, is complicated by the apparent contradiction between the idea that markets inevitably transcend the societies involved and the once again urgent need to address popular demands for market interventions that are beneficial for individual societies or even the entire globe (Knox-Hayes, 2010). Moreover, the idea of a market that is not properly controlled by the concerned societies is easily confounded with the neoliberal ideal of a free market. In looking at the underlying assumptions of the concepts, however, we find that the neoliberal free market ideology has more in common with interventionist ambitions to embed, frame, meta-govern or perform markets (Callon, 1998a; Krippner, 2002; Jessop, 2006; Fourcade, 2007) than with an interactive concept of markets. First, both neoliberal and interventionist approaches promote an instrumentalization of the market insofar as a market ‘is determined by its purpose. This is teleological cause. This purpose or function is in regard to an environment, which is’ (Lash, 2007, p. 14) the economy in the one case and a particular society in the other. Second, the dispute whether a society should engage in market deregulation or market regulation, respectively, is based on the hidden consensus that markets can, in principle, be regulated and that the only controversy is which scales and scopes of interventions are more beneficial for a given society.

The present article is concerned with a different set of questions on market intervention. In thinking out the aforementioned interactive market definition, we insist that markets are not meant to be particularly beneficial for particular market participants. We do therefore not engage in debates on which markets or market interventions are good for particular persons, organizations or societies. Rather, we are interested in market interventions that are good for markets. Our approach to markets is non-instrumental insofar as we do not have any hidden contract with particular market participants or stakeholders and as our only interest is in the well-being of our client: the market. This shift of perspective may seem counter-intuitive at first sight. We hence take the time to spot the train of cases in which interventions seek to improve the situation of the intervened upon, with these cases including change management consulting where the intervention is almost naturally expected to be beneficial for the intervenee rather than any third party. Once established, this new perspective allows for the observation that the majority of market interventions is concerned with what is good for the market environment rather than with what is good for the market. Instead of speculating about the reasons for this forensic or clinical approach to markets, in the following, we aim to explore intervention strategies that are actually concerned with markets rather than about their environment. Our main challenge is hence to imagine market intervention strategies that account for rather than problematize the double-contingent nature of the market, against the background of which any form of intervention naturally appears as contingent.

In the subsequent section of this article, we draw on form theory to imagine an unmarked social space, in the context of which markets can be observed as social forms that can be observed in an almost unlimited choice of ‘social media’. We then focus the most popular media of market observation and find that markets are most often observed in the medium of the economy. Rather than focusing the reasons for this contingent

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3 The diction is revealing in this context: by choice of the word enemy, Weber implicitly embeds the market into a political context, whereas Priester’s market of stranger does imply reference to any function system but only the distinction of different segments of society. As we found the common aspect of both approaches to be in their idea of markets as forms of interaction, we use are referring to participants in this interaction.

4 Because indirect interventions who serve third parties rather than the intervened upon are normally unique to forensic or clinical contexts, one has to ask if markets positively turn criminal or fall ill as soon as they fail, or if the problem of market failure is rather in ill-defined expectations fostered by particular market participants and stakeholders.
economy bias, we disclose that the observation of the economy implies the observation of \textit{functional differentiation} \cite{Luhmann1977, Luhmann1990, Andersen2011}. In observing markets in the expanded medium of functional differentiation, however, we find that the majority of contemporary market intervention strategies features a bias to the political and the legal system. Here again, we do not dwell too much on the reasons for this bias and are rather interested in the new prospects for market interventions that open up if we observe the market not only through a political, economic or legal lens but also in the medium of further, so far neglected function systems. True to our aim to identify market interventions that are helpful for markets, we finally outline intervention strategies that emerge if we observe markets in the medium of the health system.

MARKETS AND UNMARKED SPACES

True to P. J. Hamilton Grierson, markets originated from silent trade. The principle which underlies this early form of trade is that tribesmen of one tribe

Chose a spot on the border-land between their own country and that of the tribe with which they wished to traffic; and there they set out their wares in the hope of disposing of them and obtaining what they wanted in exchange. And all the while they secured their own safety by keeping out of sight. Having once succeeded in opening a trade, they would naturally endeavor to renew it from time to time. And, if those with whom they traded were desirous that the trade should continue, they would refrain from either carrying off the articles offered without leaving a return, or attempting to capture or maltreat those who made the offer. \cite[p. 65f]{Grierson1903}

Grierson insists that the observation of such ‘primitive markets’ is not limited to early history and provides the reader with dense descriptions of cases in which the emerging European nations encountered and engaged in silent trade in the early stages of colonialism. Consequently, he suggests understanding primitive markets not as outdated but rather as early stage markets \cite[p. 2]{Grierson1903}. In other words, primitive markets are markets in the making, which emerge whenever spatial or cultural gaps are large enough to allow for the indirect encounter of strangers on neutral ground.

Grierson’s observation of the making of markets hence starts from the observation of an unmarked space \cite{SpencerBrown1979, Luhmann1993, Luhmann1995a}, against the background of which a situation of double contingency is unfolded:

Two black boxes, by what accident, come to have dealings with one another. Each determines its own behavior by complex self-referential operations within its own boundaries. What can be seen of each is therefore necessarily a reduction. Each assumes the same about the other. Therefore, however many efforts they exert and however much time they spend (…), the black boxes remain opaque to each other. \cite[p. 109]{Luhmann1995b}.

Because the point of silent trade is in its silent nature, that is in the fact that the silent traders are perfect strangers and avoid direct contact, silent trade represents a real-life case of how double contingency triggers communication: The participants are black-boxes to each other. The first sequence of gift and counter-gift appears as set of perfectly contingent behaviour. The behaviours displayed in subsequent sequences, however, can already be understood as messages. Both changes and continuities in form and quantity of gift and counter-gift can be considered an affordance now: Does a new item mean to say that the participant is short of the old item or is interested in a new item, too? The more iteration, the more experiences are gained, and the more expectations are built. Soon, each participant has expectations of the other and learns that the other also has expectations on themselves. Each participant’s expectations therefore depend on what the other expects of themselves, which is why the participants eventually cultivate expectations on which expectations to expect from themselves. In such a constellation, neither of the participants is master
of neither their own behaviour nor the behaviour of the other participant(s) just because the strategic limitation of the own behavioural margins allows for the limitation of the margins of the other participant(s), thus increasing the likelihood of stimulating expected behaviours. In this sense, primitive markets are already what all forms of markets are: entwined architectures of expectations that mutually influence the behaviours of participants who do not belong to the same community of values. As a necessary condition, however, expectations can fail and so can expectations on expectations. Market failures in terms of disappointed expectations in markets are hence a necessary condition for markets. The problem of market failure is therefore a problem of particular market actors rather than a problem of the market, which is maybe why most market interventions are ultimately concerned with improving the situation of individual market actors rather than the situation of markets.5

In drawing our attention to the market actors, we realize that we know something about these black boxes that challenges a commonplace on the commonplace. While it is true that Max Weber defines markets as ‘a consociation of persons (own emphasis) who are not members of the same group and who are, therefore, “enemies”’ (Weber, 1978, p. 639), he also stresses the ‘absolute depersonalization’ (p. 637) that characterizes market action. Thus, the observation of market actors is not about the observation of individual persons. This is particularly obvious in the case of Grierson’s (1903, p. 7) primitive markets, because the one thing that even the strangest strangers have always known for sure about each other is that man does not live alone. The black boxes in primitive market communication are hence societies.6 Consequently, markets are consociations of societies and, as such, new societies in the making.

MARKETS AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Because markets are about the consociation of societies, they represent a very special case of social system formation. While society can be defined as nexus of all accessible communication (Luhmann, 1987, p. 114), markets are experiments in the expansion of this realm of communication. Markets resemble interactions rather than societies insofar as ‘they must recognize that their environment contains communications that cannot be controlled by’ (ibid.) themselves. Yet, unlike interaction, market communication is not based on the presence of persons, but rather on the co-presence of societies. In doing so, the Autopoiesis of markets (see Valentino, 2012a, p. 260) both depends on the pre-existence of social systems and forms a social system of its own kind.7 We may also say: Markets emerge both in the medium of society and as an independent social form.

Form theory also starts from the imagination of an unmarked space (Spencer Brown, 1979; Luhmann, 1993; Luhmann, 1995a), in which investigated systems appear as differences that make a difference (Bateson, 1972). Like a blank sheet of paper becomes the present article (and not a love letter) only after the first lines have been drawn, it is the distinctions drawn (Spencer Brown, 1979; Andersen and Born, 2000) that create the world in which they exist. Since the observation of markets implies the observation of societies, however, it inevitably refers to the distinctions drawn by societies to define and distinguish themselves. Explorations in markets are therefore explorations in social differentiation.

Talking of social differentiation, we draw the distinction of similar and dissimilar social systems and add the distinction of equal and unequal systems. The cross-tabling8 of these two

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5 The more the early communities depended on their market expectations, the more ‘the market which is not bound by ethical norms (…) is an abomination to every system of fraternal ethics. In sharp contrast to all other groups which always pre-suppose some of personal fraternization or even blood kinship, the market is fundamentally alien to any type of fraternal relationship. (…) Free exchange does not occur but with the world outside of the neighborhood or the personal association. The market is a relationship which transcends the boundaries of neighborhood, kinship group, or tribe.’ (Weber, 1978, p. 637)

6 The plural indicates sub-systems of the overall society (Luhmann, 1982).

7 “The market is a relationship which transcends the boundaries of neighbourhood, kinship group, or tribe.” (Weber, 1978, p. 637).

8 The more the early communities depended on their market expectations, the more ‘the market which is not bound by ethical norms (…) is an abomination to every system of fraternal ethics. In sharp contrast to all other groups which always pre-suppose some of personal fraternization or even blood kinship, the market is fundamentally alien to any type of fraternal relationship. (…) Free exchange does not occur but with the world outside of the neighborhood or the personal association. The market is a relationship which transcends the boundaries of neighborhood, kinship group, or tribe.’ (Weber, 1978, p. 637)
distinctions already unfolds the core concepts of classic works on social differentiation (Marx, 1867; Tönnies, 1887; Spencer, 1895; Durkheim, 1933). In fact, all trend statements on mechanic versus organic solidarity, association versus organization, homogeneity versus heterogeneity, natural state versus alienation, or community versus society, follow and cross lines of arguments drawn by the distinction of dissimilarity and similarity. In this common sense, identity followed similarity in archaic societies. Dissent, however, occurs if it comes to the second distinction (Cattacin, 2001, p. 7; 14; Giddens, 1973, p. 230): On the one hand, the Durkheimian tradition of sociology considers inequalities avoidable side effects of social evolution, the latter of which is deemed a basically positive process of increasing specialization. On the other hand, the Marxist tradition takes inequality for the inevitable outcome of specialization and calls for a fundamental reengineering of an essentially misrouted development of human history.

In following Niklas Luhmann (1977), we can combine both lines of arguments and, accordingly, the respective distinctions. As such, a cross-table of the two distinctions dis-/similar and in-/equal already allows for one of the briefest possible mapping of historical and present forms of society (cf. Table 1):

Similar and equal segments such as families, clans, or tribes were the fundamental units of archaic societies. In the course of the Neolithic revolution, however, some units started to have larger influence on the surrounding units than others. Although centralization is not necessarily an advantage for the centre, in many cases centrality has been the basis for the stratification of societies. Stratification is characterized by the differentiation of a society in neither similar nor equal subsystems like castes, estates, or classes. These shifts from one form of differentiation to another, however, do not imply that the latter form eliminates the first. Rather, it is assumed that the newer form superposes the older: In segmental societies, the elder members might punish the younger. This rule might still apply to stratified societies, however, now only within the margins of the new rules imposed by stratification: It has become unthinkable that an elder farmer punishes a younger nobleman. In a similar way, we find that in modern societies it is considered inappropriate to consider a noble analphabet a better scientist as compared to a scholar of humble beginnings. In spite of the still strong presence of hierarchies, functional differentiation—which refers to the distinction of eigen-logic function systems such as the political system, the economy, science, or art—is therefore said to be the current primary form of social differentiation.

Depending on our choice among the above forms of differentiation, the term society refers to quite different forms of society. As interfaces of these different forms of society, markets can therefore appear as quite different forms of markets, too. If we observe markets against the background of centralization, we find that markets seem to move away from the neutral spheres between the early segments of society (Grierson, 1903, p. 65f; Simmel, 1907, p. 788) to the gates of the centers (Polanyi, 1963), which they eventually pass to appear to be the markets of the centre. Labour markets have been extensively

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<th>Table 1 Social differentiation (Roth 2015, p. 113)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Similar</td>
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<td>Segmentation (families, tribes, nations, etc.)</td>
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<td>Functional differentiation (economy, science, art, etc.)</td>
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8 From a form-theoretical point of view, the fact that these two distinctions are called and not crossed (Spencer Brown, 1979; Kauffman, 1987) can be criticized because, according to Luhmann (1977, p. 31), we need to “conceive of system differentiation as the reduplication of the difference between system and environment within system”. With a particular focus on the deduction of categories of social differentiation, however, Luhmann (1977, p. 33) cross-tables two distinctions himself: system/environment and equality/inequality. This represents a theoretically more elaborate combination of distinctions, which is, however, less connective with the everyday language of sociology. For the sake of readability, this text hence opts for the calling of the two more familiar distinctions.

9 In this way, families may still be considered basic units of society (McKie and Callan, 2011), however, no longer the dominant forms of differentiation, today.
discussed as interfaces of the ranks of stratified societies (Willis, 1977), as have been combined observations such as in the case of the international division of labour, in the context of which we find that international labour markets fail to serve the common good of developing countries right because they serve the common good of these countries’ upper classes.

Observations of markets and market failures are therefore highly dependent on our particular concept of society, and the downside of the fact that functional differentiation is the most recent form of social differentiation is that we have hardly any experience with observing markets against the background of functional differentiation.

MARKETS AND FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION

Markets are commonly considered the central economic phenomena (Zafirovski, 2003, p. 88) or central institutions of modern economies (Beckert, 2009, p. 245). The expansion of markets to non-economic spheres of society is, therefore, easily considered economic imperialism (Stigler, 1984; Swedberg, 1990), and the market principle is indeed considered the prime reason for the lamentable economization of society (Alexander, 1985; Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Çalışkan and Callon, 2009; Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; Chomsky, 1999; Fourrier, 2008; Habermas and McCarthy, 1985; Lash, 2007; Latouche, 2012; Polanyi, 1957; Smart, 2003; Urry, 2010; Wallerstein, 2004; Weber, 1978). The corresponding moralization of markets (Zelizer, 1988; Stehr, 2006; Fourcade, 2007; Fourcade and Healy, 2007; Beckert, 2009) seems to be a necessary logical consequence. Yet the truth is that the observation of economic markets does not necessarily call for markets to be observed in the medium of the moral. Because there is no way of observing economic markets without distinguishing the economy from other function systems, however, as a matter of implication, the observation of economic markets calls for the observation of markets in the medium of functional differentiation (cf. Figure 1).

If we observe markets against the background of a fully developed view of functional differentiation, then the idea that markets are essentially economic phenomena appears not so self-evident anymore. If markets appear at the interface of the segments of early societies, of the centers and peripheries, and of the ranks of stratified societies, then why should markets be confined to only one of the function system rather than appearing again at the interfaces of the function systems? In fact, at a closer look, we find that even proponents of the new economic sociology stress that ‘markets are as much political arenas as they are economic realms’ (Beckert, 2009, p. 259), however, not without conceding that this ‘aspect of the embeddedness of markets has found scant attention in the new economic sociology so far’. If it comes to markets and functional differentiation, up until now, we continue in fact to be confronted with ambiguous definitions according to which ‘(m)arkets, and the economy itself, are and always have been political constructs, engineered and supported by political decision-makers (though markets also exert influence over these)’ (Arnoldi, 2007, p. 91); and we continue to encounter phenomena such as economic market power (White, 1981), market laws (Callon, 1998b) or markets as systems of social contracts (Choudhury, 1996). Even if markets are not
always considered essentially economic, then the function systemic observation of markets remains predominantly occupied with the observation of political and the legal dimensions of markets, and the same is true if it comes to the discussion of market intervention strategies. However, considering that further cultural factors can be so central in markets that any market analysis is inadequate without them (Weik, 2015, p. 18), the bias to these three dimensions of market and intervention is as contingent as would be market observation against only aesthetic, religious and sportive backgrounds.

As the identification of market intervention strategies that are good for markets is still at the heart of our agenda, we hence take the liberty to make a contingent choice ourselves. Thus, in the following, we will be observing markets through the lens of the health system, which is even more legitimate as we find that market intervention discourses often deploy ‘the dialectic of “shock and therapy” ’ (Hartz, 2012, p. 152) themselves.

INTERVENTIONS FOR HEALTHY MARKETS

Triangles are popular forms in family therapy. They are often observed when members seek out substitutes for relating to another member with whom they have difficulties. With regard to markets, we can observe triangles whenever disappointed expectations motivate market participants to bypass or call for bypasses of the market principle. This is preferably performed by invocation of the political systems either as legislator or as source of mere force. In fact, most claims for market interventions are claims for political market interventions. The problem with this indirect strategy is maybe less in its indirect nature than more in the fact that has not proofed too successful in limiting the supposedly destructive outcomes of market communication. Rather, we observe a more than century-old double-bind relationship of the political system and the supposedly economic market, in the context of which it appears that most national political systems seem to be incapable of doing either with or without the market. Some may even say that capitalist political systems depend on never-ending discussions on market regulation and deregulation to justify Leviathan (Smith and Smith, 1994; Castree, 1996).

Against the background of the previously sketched multi-functional approach to markets, however, political market observations are as important or unimportant as market observations through the lens of any other function system. Yet in the context of a quest for helpful market intervention strategies, the present text suggests focusing a function system devoted to help and healing, that is the health system.

Through a therapeutic lens, we see that the situation of the market could not be worse: According to its enemies, the market is the main reason for almost any problem in the world including international terrorism, climate change or the breakdown of the European Union and even faces public incitements to collective murder (Miller and Philo, 2001). The fact that its friends consider the market the solution to almost any problem in the world, however, does not make things much better. Confined by a panoptic context of death threats and excessive demands, the behavioural margins of the market are reduced to the maximum. If the market were a family, this family would be likely to feature a siege mentality, hence, an extremely rigid family structure, which lowered the family’s resilience. Resilience refers to the ability to cope with adverse environmental conditions (Masten, 2007), and it is a well-established observation that this coping competence is lowered by negative emotions, expectations or feedback (Tugade et al., 2004; Tugade, 2010). Members of low-resilience families under external stress might easily be prone to schizophrenia (Bateson, 1972, p. 268), and it is not uncommon to observe that market participants feature such forms of schizophrenia, with this schizophrenia, however, being attributed to the respective market rather than the respective market environment (Barber, 2008, p. 128ff). This attribution is wrong insofar as the schizophrenia is not a consequence of market failure but rather of the failure to accept market failure as a necessary condition of markets. As market failure is not defined by markets, the failure is indeed created by observers.
who observe markets as if they themselves were not part of the market observation, that is by observers who treat their expectations on markets as if they were independent of these markets. Even the supposedly most distanced communication of disappointed expectations on markets, however, can be understood as market communication and therefore contributes to the autopoiesis of market communication. Yet if we communicate expectations in terms of disappointed expectations, then this communication of disappointment is likely to create further communication of disappointment.

Market failure discourses do therefore clearly not lead to the often desired utility and resilience of markets. If we are interested in markets that work fairly well even under adverse environmental conditions, then we may find inspiration again in family therapy and research that suggests that a rose-coloured glasses attitude (Tugade et al., 2004) or a culture of constructive emotion monitoring and design (Reivich et al., 2011) actually aid in coping with a stressful environment. We therefore may take popular advice from positive or systemic psychology (Bilson, 1997; Mingers, 1997; Roy-Chowdhury, 1997; Carr, 2012; Maslow, 2013), according to which the way out of negatively biased observations is not in yet another problematization of individual or collective failures. This is true because even the smartest focus on problems cannot but sharpen the problem rather than the solution. As the solution is always in the defocus of the original problem, the prime solution to the observation of market failures is to dislocate the failure out of the market and into the (own) market observation. As it is evident that we must not and cannot expect markets to follow our will as much as we must not and cannot have full control of any form of interaction, the solution indeed is to realize that it is our control ambitions, and only these control ambitions, that actually create market failures. Once this desire for control is cured, we could proceed to a redesign/design of our expectations and thus of our markets, which could be easily achieved by less strategic and more direct forms of communication of expectations. If it is true that we are only as sick as our secrets (Ralph, 2002; Temm, 2010), then a reflexive observation and transparent signalization of our expectations on markets can in fact turn out to be the key to the observation of better functioning markets. In the future, academic market observers might therefore communicate their expectations on markets in a more transparent way, which also includes more reflection and transparence on their own (hidden) contracts which particular segments (e.g. nations or regions), strata (e.g. classes or castes) or function systems of society (e.g. political system, science, economy or religion). In fact, a clearer expression of our own psychological contracts and market expectations would make an excellent context for consistency checks and mutual supervisions of our own research in markets and market interventions.

The more straightforward or playful and the less strategic our attitude to markets, the less markets are likely to fail. Again, we find that if we observe market failure, then it is always our market observation strategies rather than markets that actually fail. We might therefore consider a little break from the communication of or on market failures and rather review and maybe also redesign our own expectations. In fact, this is critical because identities are generated through communication, and the stories we tell about markets co-create their identities. In this sense, it is not only economists who perform markets (Callon, 1998a). It is actually all of us who speak and write about markets. Texts can either heal or cripple the concepts we describe, and the question we need to ask ourselves is whether our texts are a part of the solution or the problem of market failure.

The most constructive attitude to market failures we can cultivate is that we accept (our) market failures as necessary conditions for the existence of markets. Even if we started from the instrumental assumption that markets have a purpose and that the purpose of economic markets is to solve problems of scarcity, then we may realize that the idea of a perfectly instrumental, ideal market ultimately implies the idea of the (self-)annihilation of that market. In fact, markets can only be sustained if attempts to solve scarcity problems ultimately create new scarcity problems. An ideal market that does not eventually fail to fulfil whatever its supposed purpose may
therefore cease existence. In that sense, we may either embrace market failure or engage in the destruction of markets. A positive attitude to market failure therefore is the only constructive attitude to markets.

TOWARDS A RE-GAMIFICATION OF MARKETS

The majority of proposed or attempted market interventions deal with markets as if these interventions were to take place in a forensic or clinical context. Yet there is no evidence that markets positively turn criminal or fall ill as soon as they fail to meet the expectations of their environment. Quite the contrary, in drawing on reports from early forms of markets or markets in the making, respectively, we showed that markets are architectures of expectations and that market failure in terms of disappointed expectations is not a market imperfection but rather a necessary condition of markets. We suggested hence the problem of market failure to be in ill-defined expectations fostered by particular market participants and observers rather than in the market principle itself. As the observation of disappointed expectations remains an observation of expectations, we observed that even the most critical observation of market failures does not challenge but rather reinforce the observation that markets fail.

One way out of situations in which observations of market failure prevail was therefore presented in terms of an increased self-observation, with the suggested focus of this self-observation being on our own hidden expectations on markets. In order to develop the space for the exploration of our market expectations, we started from the observation of an unmarked space, in the context of which we contextualized markets as discrete forms of interaction of societies. We then insisted that our observations and, thus, our expectations on markets strongly depend on what we define as society. In drawing on social differentiation theory, we hence showed that markets appear as very different forms of markets depending on whether we observe them as interactions of segments, strata or function systems of society. We hence suggested that researchers in markets, market failures and market interventions express more clearly against the background of which forms of society they measure the performance of markets.

In observing the performance of markets against the background of a particular function system, notably the health system, we found that the market failure perspective exposes our patient called market to excessive pressure by its environment, which leads to even more rigid and therefore less stress resistant forms of market action than most of us would hope.

In order to support a shift from interventions motivated by the observation of the market failure problems to more solution-oriented approaches, we suggest that researchers in markets and markets interventions not only recall that markets originate(d) in neutral spheres at the interfaces of societies but also experimentally reflect this neutrality in their own approach to markets. One concrete means to this end is to focus less on the outcome of market relations and become more fascinated with the market relations themselves. This also requires the imagination of higher degrees of freedom towards or even strategic ignorance of the economic market, on whom modern societies are said to be existentially dependent. The invitation to a renunciation from the economic market, however, must not be confounded with proposals to return to an autarchic or subsistence economy. Rather, against the background of the previously illustrated multifunctional nature of markets, we insist that the form we commonly observe as the market is only its economic dimension, to which, however, at least nine further dimensions can be added (see Figure 1). This invitation to increasingly explore abandoned non-economic bridges between societies hence amounts to a more relaxed and playful attitude to markets, that is to a stance which can even be reflected back to economic markets. In observing the market through the lens of the health system, we can indeed imagine to use psychotherapeutic tools in the context of the observation of markets and market failure. Even if we insist that market failure is a problem which needs to be addressed, then we still may want to consider alternative ways of addressing it. Maybe
it is time now to let the market out of the Tocqueville-paradoxical continuous improvement trap. Maybe we should indeed start to accept its supposed or real faults in character (see Valentinov, 2014 for a positive example of this attitude) and continue on this basis.

In family therapy, it is common to write letters to the client family and to take time to celebrate. As soon as we imagine ourselves writing ‘Well-done’ letters to the market whenever it met our expectations, we are positively already halfway out of the crisis and halfway into a future research agenda that systematically includes the market observers, including their expectations, into their own market observations (Esposito, 2012) and embraces uncertainty as a resource (Esposito, 2015).

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