Lost Convictions: Debating Both Sides and the Ethical Self Fashioning of Liberal Subjects

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This paper takes as its point of departure the ethical problematization of debating both sides — having students argue both affirmative and negative on a debate resolution — in order to highlight the role of communication as a cultural technology of liberalism. It argues that debating both sides contributed to the cultural governance of cold war liberalism by separating speech from conviction to cultivate the value of debate as a method of democratic decision-making. The valorization of free and full expression as a pre-requisite for ‘decision by debate’ prepared the ground for dis-articulating debate from cold war liberalism and re-articulating it as a game of freedom that contributes to the moral education of liberal citizens. In so doing, debate becomes a global technology of liberalism creating exceptional subjects by circulating the communicative norms of deliberative democracy.

Keywords conviction; free speech; cold war; debate; American exceptionalism; deliberative democracy

In 1954, the US military academies, and a host of other colleges, refused to affirm the national debate resolution: ‘Resolved: The United States should diplomatically recognize the People’s Republic of China’. The problem of speaking in favour of the diplomatic recognition of ‘Red China’ came amidst an acute moment in the US containment strategy of domestic and international communism (Ross 1989). This, in turn, sparked a national controversy that included discussion in the New York Times (Burns 1954). Due to the growing prevalence of ‘switch-side debating’, a procedure that required teams to debate both sides of the resolution in consecutive debate rounds at intercollegiate debate tournaments, the controversy manifested itself as an ethical concern about the relationship between public speaking and the moral attributes of good citizenship. At the heart of the ‘debate about debate’ (Ehninger 1958) was the idea of conviction and how it should guide the moral economy of liberal citizenship.
But why dredge up this event from the archive of communication education? First, since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been a vigorous trade in debate as a tool for democratic education, often with the hope of inculcating students with the norms necessary for deliberative democracy. For example, since 1994, the International Debate Education Association ‘has introduced debate to secondary schools and universities throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union, Central Asia and Haiti and continues to grow throughout the world’ (idebate.org 2004). The promotion and circulation of debate as a technique of democratic decision-making suggests a need to explore the history of its ethical problematization. As a cultural technology, the value of debate rests on its claim to cultivate the ethical attributes required for democratic citizenship. Therefore, those challenges to debate’s civic function require special consideration in order to assess the role of communication in the self-fashioning of liberal citizens.¹ In Foucauldian fashion, we are interested in the ethical problematization of debating both sides so that we might learn how this pedagogical technique organizes forms of democratic subjectification available in the present (Foucault 2001).

The second reason to write about the debating both sides controversy is because it highlights how communication becomes an object, instrument and field of cultural governance. The emphasis on the linguistic dimension of communication tends to privilege a methodological and political commitment to read the circulation of power as an ideological phenomenon mediated by the process of generating and controlling the meaning of contested values, identities, and symbols (Nelson & Gaonkar 1998, Rosteck 1999). As an alternative to this vision of a ‘communicational cultural studies’ (Grossberg 1997) this paper highlights the ‘technical dimension’ of speech, that is, its circulation as an object and instrument for regulating the conduct of citizen-subjects.² Therefore, we approach the debating both sides controversy in terms of what Michel Foucault (2001) calls a ‘history of thought’ — a ‘history of how people become anxious about this or that’ (p. 74). Moreover, to write a history of debate as a cultural technology reveals how power works productively by augmenting the human capacity for speech/communication. For us, an under-appreciated aspect of the productive power of cultural governance resides in the generation of subjects who come to understand themselves as speaking subjects willing to regulate and transform their communicative behaviours for the purpose of improving their political, economic, cultural and affective relationships.³

This paper argues that the strong liberal defence of debating both sides separates speech from conviction. Debating both sides does so by de-coupling the sincerity principle from the arguments presented by a debater. In place of the assumption that a debater believes in what he or she argues, debating both sides grooms one to appreciate the process of debate as a method of
democratic decision-making. We argue the debating both sides controversy articulates debate to Cold War liberal discourses of ‘American exceptionalism’ by folding the norm of free and full expression onto the soul of the debater. In turn, a debater willing to debate both sides becomes a representative of the free world. Furthermore, we will demonstrate how debating both sides as a technique of moral development works alongside specific aesthetic modes of class subjectivity increasingly associated with the efforts of the knowledge class to legitimize the process of judgment. Debating both sides reveals how the globalization of liberalism is less about a set of universal norms and more about the circulation and uptake of cultural technologies.

In the first part of this essay, we will offer a thick description of how the relationship between speech and conviction led to the ethical problematization of debating both sides. In the second part of the essay, we contextualize this history through an encounter with Cold War liberalism and the importance of debating both sides as a technology capable of generating a commitment to free speech. The third section of the paper will describe how debate re-invents itself as a game of freedom that instils the ethical attributes of deliberative democracy by re-coding debating both sides as necessary to the moral development of students.

Debate and the problem of conviction

In the United States, the 1920s and 1930s saw a veritable explosion in the popularity of intercollegiate debate. To accommodate the growing numbers of students wishing to debate and the rising costs of hosting and travelling to debates, the model of annual contests between rival schools gave way to triangular and quadrilateral debating leagues and eventually to the debate tournament. Intercollegiate debating underwent major transformations during this period, many of them brought on by tournament competition. Perhaps the most significant – and certainly the most controversial – transformation resulting from tournament debating was the practice of having participants debate both sides of the proposition. Debating both sides, its proponents argued, had the pragmatic benefit of allowing more teams to participate in more debates and to make scheduling tournaments much more efficient. There was, as well, the pedagogical benefit of rewarding those students with the most refined skills in marshalling evidence and formulating arguments in support of their respective positions. By the 1950s, debating both sides had become so prevalent that the West Point National Debate Tournament, the largest and most prestigious tournament of the day, mandated it as a condition of participation.

The growing professionalization of tournament debating carried out in extra-curricular competitive spaces increasingly relied on debating both sides.
As a tournament progresses, a student moves from one side of the resolution to the next, a switch in sides, demarcated by the next ‘round’ of debate. The technique of debating both sides increases the efficiency of debate to train students in critical thinking and argumentative advocacy by modifying the side of the resolution the debater advocates. Since each debate is a situated rhetorical event with changing interlocutors and different individual judges, each debate round allows a unique pedagogical opportunity to learn and evaluate behaviour. The relationship between debate as a competitive activity amenable to pedagogical intervention and debating both sides as a specific technique of debate pedagogy and tournament administration, however, did not appear naturally, but was the effect of intellectual struggle.

While the opposition to debating both sides probably reaches back to the challenges against the ancient practice of dissoi logoi, we want to turn our attention to the unique cultural history of debate during the Cold War. In the midst of Joseph McCarthy’s impending censure by the US Senate, the US Military Academy, the US Naval Academy and, subsequently, all of the teacher colleges in the state of Nebraska refused to affirm the resolution – ‘Resolved: The United States should diplomatically recognize the People’s Republic of China’. Yet, switch-side debating remained the national standard, and, by the fall of 1955, the military academies and the teacher colleges of Nebraska were debating in favour of the next resolution. Richard Murphy (1957), however, was not content to let the controversy pass without comment. Murphy launched a series of criticisms that would sustain the debate about debate for the next ten years. Murphy held that debating both sides of the question was unethical because it divorced conviction from advocacy and that it was a dangerous practice because it threatened the integrity of public debate by divorcing it from a genuine search for truth.

Murphy’s case against the ethics of debating both sides rested on what he thought to be a simple and irrefutable rhetorical principle: A public utterance is a public commitment. In Murphy’s opinion, debate was best imagined as a species of public speaking akin to public advocacy on the affairs of the day. If debate is a form of public speaking, Murphy reasoned, and a public utterance entails a public commitment, then speakers have an ethical obligation to study the question, discuss it with others until they know their position, take a stand and then – and only then – engage in public advocacy in favour of their viewpoint. Murphy had no doubt that intercollegiate debate was a form of public advocacy and was, hence, rhetorical, although this point would be severely attacked by proponents of switch-side debating. Modern debating, Murphy claimed, ‘is geared to the public platform and to rhetorical, rather than dialectical principles’ (p. 7). Intercollegiate debate was rhetorical, not dialectical, because its propositions were specific and timely rather than speculative and universal. Debaters evidenced their claims by appeals to authority and opinion rather than formal logic, and debaters appealed to an
audience, even if that audience was a single person sitting in the back of a room at a relatively isolated debate tournament. As such, debate as a species of public argument should be held to the ethics of the platform. We would surely hold in contempt any public actor who spoke with equal force, and without genuine conviction, for both sides of a public policy question. Why, asked Murphy, would we exempt students from the same ethical obligation?

Murphy’s master ethic — that a public utterance entails a public commitment — rested on a classical rhetorical theory that refuses the modern distinctions between cognitive claims of truth (referring to the objective world), normative claims of right (referring to the intersubjective world), and expressive claims of sincerity (referring to the subjective state of the speaker), although this distinction, and Murphy’s refusal to make it, would surface as a major point of contention in the 1960s for the proponents of debating both sides. Murphy is avoiding the idea that the words spoken by a debater can be divorced from what the speaker actually believes to be true, right, or good (expressive claims of sincerity). For Murphy, to stand and publicly proclaim that one affirmed the resolution entailed both a claim that the policy being advocated was indeed the best possible choice, given extant social conditions, and that one sincerely believed that her or his arguments were true and right. In other words, a judge should not make a distinction between the merits of the case presented and the sincerity of the advocates presenting it; rather, the reasons supporting a policy and the ethos of the speakers are mutually constitutive forms of proof.

The interdependency of logos and ethos was not only a matter of rhetorical principle for Murphy but also a foundational premise of public reason in a democratic society. Although he never explicitly states why this is true, most likely because he assumed it to be self-evident, a charitable interpretation of Murphy’s position, certainly a more generous interpretation than his detractors were willing to give, would show that his axiom rests on the following argument: If public reason is to have any legitimate force, auditors must believe that advocates are arguing from conviction and not from greed, desire or naked self-interest. If auditors believe that advocates are insincere, they will not afford legitimacy to their claims and will opt to settle disputes through force or some seemingly neutral *modus vivendi* such as voting or arbitration. Hence, sincerity is a necessary element of public reason and, therefore, a necessary condition of critical deliberation in a democratic society. For Murphy, the assumption of sincerity is intimately articulated to the notion of ethical argumentation in a democratic political culture. If a speaker were to repudiate this assumption by advocating contradictory positions in a public forum, it would completely undermine her or his ethos and result in the loss of the means of identification with an audience. The real danger of undermining the assumption of sincerity was not that individual speakers would be rendered ineffective — although this certainly did make training students to debate both
sides bad rhetorical pedagogy. The ultimate danger of switch-side debating was that it would engender a distrust of public advocates. The public would come to see the debaters who would come to occupy public offices as ‘public liars’ more interested in politics as vocation than as a calling. Debate would be seen as a game of power rather than the method of democracy.

The nation’s leading debate coaches, taking Murphy’s condemnation as an accusation that they had failed in their ethical responsibility as educators, quickly and forcefully responded to his charges. They had four primary rejoinders to Murphy: that he had misunderstood the nature of tournament debate; that switch-side debating was a sound educational procedure; that intercollegiate debate should be held accountable to a different ethic than those of the platform; and that switch-side debating was necessary to the maintenance of intercollegiate debate. Proponents of switch-side debating, such as A. Craig Baird (1955), Nicholas Cripe (1957), and George Dell (1958) agreed that Murphy’s ethic applied ‘to argument in the pulpit, in the legislative halls, in the courtroom, and the marketplace’ (Cripe 1957, p. 209). This ethic, that a public utterance entails a public commitment, should not, however, apply to the forms of advocacy performed in tournament debating. For the proponents of switch-side debating, there was a sharp distinction between school and public debate. School debate, in particular tournament debating, was not a species of public argument geared towards gaining the consent of an audience to the rightness of the speaker’s stand on a public issue, but, rather, a pedagogical tool designed to help students develop their critical thinking skills. Not only did tournament debating differ in purpose, but it also differed in method from public debate. Tournament debate was defined as a dialectical method of disputation, a method suitable for adjudication by an expert judge on technical criteria rather than by a public audience. Hence, the sincerity principle simply did not apply to intercollegiate debate.

The description of debate as a dialectical method did not mean that the proponents of switch-side debating rejected the importance of conviction for public argument. They did, however, claim that sound conviction, as opposed to dogmatism, was a product of debate, not its prerequisite. Baird (1955), arguing that debate should be understood less as public advocacy and more as a dialectical method of inquiry, claimed that sound conviction was a product of a rigorous analysis of all aspects of a question and that this analysis was best conducted through a method which had students practice defending and rejecting the major arguments on both sides. Thus, debating both sides should be understood as an educational procedure designed to generate ‘sound’ convictions prior to public advocacy. Baird urged that the critics of switch-side debating should understand the practice as a pedagogical device and to judge it accordingly. ‘These student exercises’, he told debaters and their coaches, ‘are to be sharply distinguished from the later ‘practical life’ situations in which you are preachers, lawyers, business men and women, politicians and community
leaders. Debate and discussion training is essentially training in reflective thinking, in the defence of different sides (‘role playing’ as some call it), and in the revelation of strength and weakness of each position (p. 6). It was Baird’s recognition that debating both sides was equivalent to role-playing that warranted re-thinking the fit between the speaker and the words spoken. Furthermore, if a debater did in fact appear to be shallow, insincere and prone to manipulate public opinion for her or his own ends, this was certainly not, argued Wayne Thompson (1944) and Nicholas Cripe, the fault of switch-side debating, but the ‘result of other causes – weakness in the character of the offender or a misunderstanding of the proper functioning of debate’ (Thompson 1944, p. 296). The proper way to deal with any ethical shortcomings in debaters, the proponents argued, was for the national forensics associations to develop a code of ethics that would stress the ethical responsibility of intercollegiate debaters (to present the best possible case according to facts as the debater understood them) and to forcefully condemn individual acts of malfeasance such as misconstruing evidence, falsifying sources, and misrepresenting their opponents’ positions. For Robert Newman (1963), the controversy over debating both sides was simple to resolve: as long as a good case could be made on each side of the resolution and individual debaters did not lie or cheat, there simply was no ethical dilemma and certainly no need for a disciplinary-based ethic to guide debate practice. Finally, debate coaches justified switch-side debate on the pragmatic grounds that it was a necessary component of tournament debating and that abandoning the practice would mean the end of intercollegiate debating. ‘In fact, if the proponents of ethical debate are correct’, Cripe warned, ‘and it is immoral for a team to debate both sides, then many schools would have to discontinue debate as we practice today’ (1957, p. 209).

Baird’s defence of debating both sides — in which he defined it as an educational procedure designed to generate sound conviction — was the most formidable of the defences of switch-side debating. However, it was defeated, according to Murphy (1957), once educators understood that there were many ways of teaching students to see both sides of an issue. He or she could prepare briefs on both sides of the question, form roundtable discussions where students would play devil’s advocate to test the strength of each other’s positions, and even have informal practice rounds in a closed club setting where students debated both sides to test and strengthen their convictions. It was not the fact that students explored all sides of an issue that worried Murphy. Rather, Baird’s defence, and any defence that claimed debating both sides was ethical because it was a pedagogical tool, ignored ‘a basic rhetorical principle that the speaker should read and discuss, and inquire, and test his [sic] position before he [sic] takes the platform to present it’ (Murphy 1957, p. 5). Of course, at this point, Murphy refuses to allow the professionalization of tournament debating to disconnect the educational value of debate from the
ethics associated with public life. In other words, Murphy refuses to allow the tournament to be understood as a pedagogical space distinct from the platform. For Murphy, the other defences of debating both sides — that there was a fundamental distinction between school and public debate and that school debate should be judged by its own ethical standard — were easily dispatched once the educational soundness of debating both sides was called into question. For, if it was understood that debating both sides was not necessary to generate sound conviction and that it was not a necessary practice for the continuance of intercollegiate debate, then why would anyone continue to claim that there should be a split between the platform and the classroom? Once the practice was exposed as a mere convenience and there was unanimous agreement that genuine conviction should guide public advocacy, there was no justifiable reason, for Murphy, to train students in a method that not only was inapplicable to public life, but wholly unethical.

What emerged from this disagreement are two very different images of the performance space of debate: the platform or the school/lab. In the case of the former, the principles of sound public advocacy should guide debate and debating both sides should be used, rarely, if ever, and then, only behind closed doors as a practice exercise to experiment without public commitment. Yet, for Baird, and the other advocates of debating both sides, the laboratory emerged as the guiding vision of the performance space of debate. As such, the pedagogical and dialectical value of debate could be extended to include research, practice and tournament competition without the demands of the platform distorting the pedagogical purpose of the activity. To be sure, debate was, and continues to be, an effective way to channel and form competitive instincts to improve critical thinking skills by helping students learn to analyse a case. It may also be true that debating both sides is an important part of the value of debate to help students analyse a case. The ethical status of the technique, however, is not guaranteed by its success. Instead, the ethical status of debating both sides increasingly depended on how tournament debating was envisioned: namely, as a pedagogical technique or as public speaking.

In the end, Murphy was unable to persuade his colleagues of the ethical problems of debating both sides. Citing survey research that 95 percent of debate coaches believed debating both sides to be ethical, Donald Klopf and James McCrosky (1964) declared the debate over debating both sides closed. The controversy also seemed to come to an end when a host of ethical codes governing debate practice declared that debaters do not argue from personal conviction nor should his/her advocacy be imagined as a public commitment. For example, Robert P. Newman (1963), writing in the Pittsburgh Code for Academic Debate, argued ‘a debater is required to present the best case possible on the side which he [sic] represents. His [sic] personal beliefs on the proposition are irrelevant. His [sic] advocacy of one side or the other is in no sense a public commitment to that side and he [sic] should be thoroughly
prepared to uphold either side of a given proposition if required by his [sic] coach’ (Murphy 1963, p. 246.) The code of ethics formulated in the early 1960s stipulated that the ethics of debate were not grounded in the platform, thus divorcing the embodied speech performance of debate from the sincerity principle. Thus, pedagogical factors, the administration of competitive events, and institutionalization support brought about a strong consensus about the ethics of debating both sides. Yet, this consensus brought with it the idea that tournament debate was an extension of the school/laboratory space and imagined this space as separate from public life. To heal the split between the ethics of the debating both sides and ethics of public life required a different imagination about the role of conviction and the purpose of debate as a pedagogical technique.

Dennis Day (1966) provided a peculiar solution to the de-coupling of the ethics of debating both sides and the ethics of public life. In so doing, he would change the terrain of the controversy by supplying the practice of debating both sides with an ethical substance. Up to this point, either conviction was to be formed before public advocacy (according to Murphy) or conviction would be the result of participating in a rigorous dialectical pedagogy (according to Baird). The competing performance spaces, the platform or the school/lab determined how one would assign ethical meaning to debating both sides: if the former, then debating both sides would violate the sincerity principle of public argumentation; if the latter, then debating both sides was an ethical technique for helping students to develop a conviction and commitment to guide their future roles in public life. For Day, however, conviction was no longer the cause (Murphy) or the effect of debate (Baird), but was reassigned to the process of debate as a method of democratic decision-making. In other words, to demonstrate one’s conviction and commitment to debate as a democratic mode of decision making required more than the willingness to debate one’s convictions, but instead, required one to debate both sides in order to embody one’s commitment to debate. To paraphrase Pascal, for Dennis Day, debating both sides was the necessary ritual (like kneeling and praying) that secures the belief in the democratic authority of debate. Debating both sides, partakes then, in a political morality in which the habit of debate is invested with a democratic ethos (full and free expression) and that ethos is formed through the repetition of debating both sides. For Day, the value of debating both sides is that it generates an inclination in the hearts and minds of students to favour full and free expression.

Day found the split between pedagogy and public life, entailed in the support of debating both sides, politically and pedagogically irresponsible. The ethics of debate, according to Day, inhere in the nature of debate as the method of decision-making in democratic societies whether applied in public forums or intercollegiate tournaments (1966, p. 5). Thus, tournament debating, if it is to be the training ground for citizenship, must conform to
the ethical standards inherent in public debate. ‘To suggest that pedagogy should deliberately deviate from these ethics’ was for Day, ‘to deny our ethical responsibilities to our discipline, our students, and our society’ (1966 p. 13).

Day’s rejection of the administrative logic underwriting the defences of switchside debating was in no way, however, an endorsement of the ethics of the platform as a performance space. He argued that the ‘rhetoric of commitment’ (Eubanks & Baker 1962) animating Murphy’s attacks not only misunderstood the method of democratic decision-making but also could engender anti-democratic prejudices. While the sincerity criterion posited by Murphy is appropriate for judgments regarding the relationship of candidates to the issues they advocate, Day contended that it is wholly inappropriate for decisions concerning questions of social policy and value facing participants in deliberative forums. The only ethical norm intrinsic to deliberation over substantive issues, according to Day, is the full and free expression of ideas. Moreover, Day suspected that privileging an ethic of conviction and commitment would result in the covert suppression of minority views. Debaters required to argue from their personal convictions would have no duty to present views that differed from their own; in fact, they would be prohibited from doing so. Given the ego involvement accompanying personal conviction, Day feared that one-sided debating would further entrench the recalcitrance towards expressing unpopular opinions. Furthermore, a forensics pedagogy modeled after the rhetoric of personal conviction, a pedagogy that would give an individual’s commitment to a particular vision of the good ethical priority over the procedures of democratic decision making, would inculcate a conception of citizenship grounded in either the pursuit of self-interest or an authoritative tradition, conceptions which perceive opposing views as a threat and, therefore, the suppression of those views as an advantage.

The ethics of democratic debate, therefore, according to Day, should be divorced from conviction. Heretofore, both the proponents and opponents of switch-side debating had accepted Murphy’s claim that conviction is the ethical criterion of public advocacy. They simply disagreed on whether the ethics of the platform were applicable to tournament debating. Not only did Day reject the distinction between school and public debate (a claim in line with Murphy), he also downplayed the ethical status of personal conviction (a challenge to Murphy): ‘Essentially for the person who accepts decision by debate, the ethics of the decision-making [sic] process are superior to the ethics of personal conviction on particular subjects for debate’ (Day 1966, p. 7). For Day, this conclusion followed from a proceduralist interpretation of liberalism that holds the right to be prior to the good and therefore understands democracy as ‘a commitment to means, not ends’ (p. 7). What is crucial to note is that the reason why it was possible to de-couple the sincerity principle from debate was, according to Day, because ‘the ethics of debate are inherent
in debate as the technology of decision-making [sic] in a democratic society’ (p. 5). That is, debate as a technology of decision-making and, we would add, as a technology of citizen-formation, is itself invested with an ethical substance. What we would like to argue here is that Day’s support for switch-side debating is more than a procedure/substance dichotomy, a dichotomy favouring means over ends, but an attempt to bypass this binary by embedding an ethical substance (free and full expression) within the process/procedure itself.

Free speech had already emerged as a point of stasis organizing the interaction between A. Craig Baird and Richard Murphy. For Baird, debating both sides contributed to the promotion of debate as a relay point in promoting free speech as imagined by John Stuart Mill (1859) in *On Liberty*. For Murphy, to defend the practice of switch-side debating as the embodiment of the marketplace of ideas was to seriously misrepresent John Stuart Mill’s thesis. Mill, Murphy (1957) suggested, found the morality of public discussion to rest in sound argument, a faithful rendering of the facts, and an honest representation of the opponent’s case. Yet, Murphy contended, Mill never argued that persons should go as far as to advocate views that they did not believe. According to Murphy, because debate propositions are deliberately worded so good arguments can be made on both sides, there should never be a shortage of speakers on both sides of the issue, speakers who really believe in what they were arguing. The real benefit of hearing both sides of an issue, Murphy claimed, is that it encourages individuals to open their minds to other perspectives and to modify their beliefs if so warranted. Yet, alternative views will not be taken seriously, unless we ‘hear them from persons who actually believe them, who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them’ (Murphy 1957, p. 4). Switch-side debating, Murphy argued, is not justified by the principles of free speech; rather, those principles support revoking the practice.

For Day, in contrast, the re-coding of free speech as the ethical substance of debate, a substance that was internal to its procedures, allowed for an ethical re-description of debate as a deliberative technique. For instance, as Day argues, the ‘prime requisite which must be met if debate is to provide sound decisions is that it be thorough and complete, that all arguments and information relevant to a decision be known and understood’ (1966, p. 6). Day’s commitment to free speech is based on a radical reading of Mill: Freedom of expression entails more than lifting prior restraints on argumentation; it necessitates the construction of avenues of access for minority views within dominant media outlets and, if necessary, the restructuring of deliberative forums so minority views will not be rejected outright because they challenge hegemonic methods of interpretation. ‘Free speech is the necessary prerequisite of full debate’, Day argues, because ‘it guarantees that full debate can take place’ (p. 6). Yet, freedom of speech does
not guarantee that full debate will take place. It is in this gap between opportunity and outcome that Day discovers the ethical demand for debating both sides: ‘A commitment to debate as the method of democratic decision-making demands an overriding ethical responsibility to promote the full confrontation of opposing opinions, arguments, and information relevant to decision. Without the confrontation of opposing ideas debate does not exist, and to the extent that that confrontation is incomplete so is debate incomplete’ (p. 6). To promote debate as a democratic mode of decision-making required full and free expression so as to maximize the confrontation of opposing ideas. Debating both sides emerged as a specific pedagogical technique to inculcate and encourage students to embrace the norm of full and free expression.

Two practical obligations are entailed in the acceptance of this ethic: First, the forums for public deliberation must be fully inclusive; encouragement and incentive must be provided to those who hold unpopular views to express themselves. Second, and more important, ‘all must recognize and accept personal responsibility to present, when necessary, as forcefully as possible, opinions and arguments with which they may personally disagree’ (p. 7). Few are likely to challenge the first entailment, but the second provided Day with a radical redefinition of the ethics of conviction. Day argues that persuasively presenting a position that contradicts one’s personal conviction is the ‘highest ethical act in democratic debate’ (p. 7). Moreover, to argue forcefully for a position one abhors is the hallmark of democratic citizenship. To set aside one’s convictions and present the argument for the other side demonstrates that the citizen has forsaken her or his personal interests and particular vision of the good for the benefit of the commonweal. That is, the citizen recognizes the moral priority of democratic debate when she or he agrees to be bound by its results regardless of personal conviction. Debating both sides, then, is necessitated by the ethical obligations intrinsic to the technology of democratic debate. Both of Murphy’s charges that debating both sides is unethical — that requiring students to debate both sides is a form of blackmail and that the separation of speech and conviction courts sophistry — are answered by this position. On the one hand, if debating both sides of a question is an ethical duty, requiring students to do so as a condition of participation is not an immoral imposition but rather an ethical and pedagogical duty. On the other hand, given the political dangers that privileging personal conviction over democratic process courts, divorcing speech from conviction is a prerequisite to democratic legitimacy. In so doing, one’s convictions should be reassigned so as to promote a commitment to debate as the fundamental process of a democratic form of public deliberation.

The practice of debating both sides does not warrant support simply because it is ethical; it does so because it is an effective pedagogical technique for inculcating the communicative ethics necessary for democratic citizenship. According to Day, ‘Debating both sides teaches students to discover, analyze,
and test all the arguments, opinions, and evidence relevant to a decision. In addition, it provides an opportunity for students to substantiate for themselves the assumption that “truthful” positions may be taken on both sides of controversial questions’ (1966, p. 13). In response to the critics of switch-side debating, who claimed that a process of inquiry and discussion could reap these benefits of an ‘enlarged mentality’ without requiring students to speak out against their convictions, Day claimed that it is only through the publication of others’ views — by virtue of speech — that the habits of mind necessary to attend equally and impartially to all sides of a controversy are formed. In other words, by debating both sides of a question, by giving a forceful presentation of views that contradict her or his commitments, the student learns how to convert her or his personal convictions into a conviction for the political morality of debate itself. By learning how to abstract from her or his particular viewpoint, a skill necessitated by the demands of debating both sides, the student is made amenable to the democratic authority of debate and the norm of full and free expression. In this way, debate emerges as a way of knowing how to embody a general norm that, ironically, disguises how the norm emerges from the particular histories and interests of the body (race, nation, gender, class) that speaks.

**Cold war liberalism and free speech**

In the hands of Dennis Day, the goal of debate was to reassign the convictions of students to the process of debate as a democratic form of decision-making. In this way debate training was no longer simply a mechanism for developing critical thinking or advocacy skills, but instead, debate was now a performance technique that made possible the self-fashioning of a new form of liberal citizen. The citizen’s commitments were to be redirected to the process of debate. This redirection entails a procedural notion of liberal citizenship that asks the student to invest in debate as a method of deliberation. Our argument here rests on Day’s attempt to ethnically defend debating both sides by linking the pedagogical rationale of debate to a public ethic, in this case, full and free expression. We are not claiming that debate actually creates a situation in which students who participate in the activity abandon their convictions and commitments on the issues of the day nor are we claiming that debate asks students to embrace an ungrounded relativism. For us, what is important here is that when faced with an ethical criticism of debating both sides, Day sets out a deliberative-oriented vision of democracy whereby the liberal citizen materializes by divorcing his/her speech from the sincerity principle. To embody one’s commitment to the democratic norm of free and full expression required students to argumentatively perform positions they might personally oppose in order to instantiate the circulation of free and full expression and to
secure a commitment toward debate as a democratic form of decision-making. Thus, the debate over debate was a struggle over the ethical attributes required for liberal citizenship.

The argument that we will develop in this section begins with the premise that a key element of Cold War liberalism was the attempt to re-position the United States as the leader of the Free World (Greene 1999). One way Cold War liberalism made possible the emergence of US world leadership was by pulling together a national and international commitment to ‘American exceptionalism’. According to Nikhil Pal Singh (1998), American exceptionalism is a product of the attempt to conceptualize the United States as a concrete representative of the universal norms of democracy. In so doing, the US is granted a status and history that is deemed unique from other nations at the same time as that uniqueness qualifies the US to be the leader and judge of democratic attributes, characteristics and norms. In the aftermath of World War II, the proliferation of free speech as a characteristic of the US helped to warrant Cold War liberal claims to American exceptionalism. As Paul Passavant (1996) suggests, the ‘Millian paradigm’ of free speech has been appropriated by U.S. constitutional theorists to grant ‘America’ the status of a nation whereby ‘one legitimately claims the right to free speech’ (pp. 301–2). For Passavant, the process by which the US emerged as a nation whereby citizens claim the right to free speech creates a moral geography in which other nations are not granted the ‘maturity’ necessary for free speech and/or simultaneously must conform to the U.S. vision of free speech. It is our argument that during the cold war, the debate-free speech assemblage helped to make possible the emergence of ‘America’s’ status as an exemplar of democracy.

The Cold War supported two reasons not to debate, or at least participate in affirming the ‘Red China’ resolution. First, the military academies maintained that they could not argue against established US foreign policy, in particular while donning a military uniform, without committing what Habermas (1979a) calls a ‘performative contradiction’. Moreover, they feared that a cadet arguing for diplomatic recognition of Communist China would send a message of indecisiveness, division, and weakness to the nation’s international enemies (Burns 1954, p. 12). Furthermore, given the on-going hearings to expose communist infiltration in the Army, one might legitimately fear that he might not be granted the privilege to suspend the sincerity principle nor to abstract from the particularity of the uniform he might be wearing at the time of the debate. Second, the teacher colleges of Nebraska, as well as many editorialists, claimed that by defending diplomatic recognition of ‘Red China’, students would fall victim to Communist propaganda (Baird 1955, p. 6) Impressionable students, critics feared, would not have the cognitive skills or experience to recognize propaganda and would, thus, be susceptible to indoctrination and brainwashing. As hysterical as this argument
sounds—and it certainly was a product of the anti-Communist hysteria wrought by McCarthyism—it was not without academic support.

A hallmark of the Cold War liberalism of the late forties and fifties was the steadfast belief in—and fear of—the seductive appeal of totalitarianism for American youth. In 1949, in his Cold War liberal manifesto The Vital Center, the influential historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr, argued that the lack of political commitment and moral conviction among the US citizenry, in particular American youth, posed a considerable threat to the continued existence of democracy. Schlesinger (1949) and other Cold War liberals (and conservatives) feared that an alienated youth was especially vulnerable to the promises of certitude and solidarity contained in Communist propaganda. Communism held a genuine appeal for those stricken with anxiety because it offered both new social forms and a new social creed. US political culture, in contrast, was simply too thin to provide a defense against the persistent neuroses of postindustrial modernity and, therefore, was in grave danger of Communist infiltration. Because ‘[t]here is a Hitler and Stalin in the breast of every man [sic]’, Schlesinger proclaimed, the fate of free society hinged upon the prospects for cultivating a youth dedicated to keeping constant vigil over the strength of their own and their fellow citizens convictions (p. 250).

Concurrently, the Army Information and Education Group, which would become the core of the Hovland-Yale Communication and Persuasion Group, led by Carl Hovland, was conducting experiments testing the relationship between inducement and internalized attitude change. In 1953, Hovland, Janis, and Kelley published their highly influential book Communication and Persuasion, which established a positive relation between verbalization and the intensification of belief and predicted that being forced to overtly defend a position discrepant from one’s own private beliefs would result in the internalization of the overtly defended position. This prediction was further supported by the forced-compliance and cognitive dissonance studies of Festinger (1957) and his colleagues at Stanford. For decades, the ability to understand the merits of opposing arguments had been championed as one of the prime pedagogical benefits of intercollegiate debate training. However, in the fall of 1954, Hovland’s and Festinger’s studies coupled with the anti-Communist rhetoric of Schlesinger, which would, much to Schlesinger’s dismay, come to underwrite McCarthy’s witch hunts, would be articulated in such a way that debate’s ability to train students to take the other’s perspective might be framed as a threat to national security.

The fear that defending the diplomatic recognition of ‘Red China’ would turn American youth into Communist sympathizers saturated the debating both sides controversy with an anxiety over the virility of ‘democratic faith’. Those choosing to defend the virtues of intercollegiate debate and the practice of debating both sides were careful not to question the basic tenets of the anti-Communism that constituted the ideological core of Cold War liberalism.
Democracy, if it were to survive the seductive appeal of totalitarianism, had to become a fighting faith, a faith born out of and tested in social and political conflict. Debate, in particular the format of debating both sides of controversial issues embodied the sort of political conflict that could engender sound conviction, rational decisions, and a committed youth impervious to Communist propaganda. Moreover, debate provided the antidote to communist propaganda. Baird concluded, ‘college debate teams are the last groups in this nation where Communist propaganda has any chance of making headway’ (1955, p. 7). No student wishing to win the debate, Burns argued, ‘would take the affirmative on the grounds that we must love the Chinese or that they are merely agrarian radicals’ (p. 7). Burns, so confident in the anti-Communist sentiment of the majority of students, contended that no student would dare argue in favour of Communism but ‘pitch his [sic] case on the argument that recognition might help pull China out of the Moscow orbit, that it might help build a firmer anti-Communist alliance, that it might make peaceful coexistence possible. He [sic] would, in short, be directing our attention to the very questions that all American’s might well be debating’ (p. 7). For Schlesinger, however, the ground of the anti-Communist consensus Baird believed to be evident in ‘the majority of students’ was unstable.

Schlesinger performed a delicate balancing act in The Vital Center, disavowing the ‘guilt by association’ reasoning of the House Un-American Activities Committee while advocating that the Communist Party represented a ‘clear and present danger’ to the national security of the United States. One way to create the necessary faith in democracy was, for Schlesinger, to defend free expression as a democratic norm worth fighting for because ‘free discussion [is the] climate … democracy requires for responsible decision’ (1949, p. 203). For Schlesinger, the democratic faith necessitated full and free discussion, a fundamental civil liberty that provided, in his words, a ‘technique of freedom’ (p. 189). It was ‘the climate of freedom’ preserved by the democratic method of free speech that authorized his ‘conviction that a free people will never vote for totalitarianism’ (p. 199).

Nikhil Pal Singh (1998) argues that to understand the stark opposition between liberal democracy and totalitarianism permeating Cold War discourse requires an appreciation of how the US asserted its moral claim to be the ‘leader of the free world’. Of particular importance in this process was, according to Singh, ‘the widely held argument that the United States is the world’s exemplary nation-state, already the bearer of universality within itself’ (p. 490). The discourse of American exceptionalism is advanced in and through this description of the US as the concrete representative of the universal norms of democracy. Singh supports his claim and discusses its implications by focusing on the historical intersection between the Cold War and Jim Crow. To defend the United States as the exemplar of universality required the fight against Jim Crow in order to better project Cold War
liberalism’s moral claim to world leadership in the battle with Communism. From this perspective, the fight against Jim Crow, as Manning Marable (1984) argues, was inextricably linked to the global requirements of US world power. For Singh, Marable’s insight becomes the starting point for supporting his claim that Cold War liberalism’s promotion of democratic norms both domestically and globally was held together by the construction of ‘America’ as the container and advocate of universal democratic norms. This concept of American exceptionalism was made possible by the transformation of the United States into the ‘concrete universal’ embodiment of democracy.

Singh’s reading of how civil rights worked to promote American exceptionalism suggests a model for thinking about the the norm of free speech during the Cold War. For Schlesinger, civil liberties and civil rights emerged as the two techniques of freedom. Schlesinger writes ‘in the world under the shadow of the police state, we only strengthen our claim to moral leadership by creating here an environment for free and responsible discussion’ (1949, p. 218). It is Schlesinger’s ability to use the domestic need of free speech in the United States as a moral claim to world leadership that gives the United States the ability to embrace a faith in its role as the telos and exemplar of democracy. Singh’s revisionist history and Schlesinger’s Cold War liberal advocacy of free speech suggest that we consider the debating both sides controversy during the 1950s and 1960s beyond its parochial frame as debate pedagogy and, instead, as a full-fledged element in a complex transformation in liberal citizenship necessitated by the emergence of the US as a global super power.

In Baird’s hands, the interaction between the Cold War and debating both sides offers a close correspondence between the function of rhetorical education and the needs of Cold War liberalism to generate an anti-Communist consensus. It does so in two ways: First, it gives students the reasoning skills necessary to make the shadowy propaganda of Communism transparent. Second, due to the competitive character of the activity, students are not likely to argue for Communism, and, therefore, they are not opening themselves up to the risks of being captured by its dangerous seductions. Ten years later, Day (1966) would argue that ‘the ethics of democratic debate do not allow for a pre-judgment of the reasonableness of discourse’ (p. 12) and he demonstrated a deep faith in the power of debate to serve as a means of democratic decision making by promoting speech against the grain of the reigning consensus. Day expressed a more radical possibility of debate and argument as providing the ethical resources for rooting out error, generating consensus, and providing a universal norm of democracy.

Day also demonstrated his commitment to free speech more radically than Schlesinger by abandoning Schlesinger’s deployment of ‘clear and present danger’ as an external value to regulate the reasonableness of speech. Yet, Day’s defence of debating both sides elides the national particularity of how
free speech was being put to work in the global struggle between liberal democracy and totalitarianism. One way that Cold War liberalism helped to transform the national particularity of the United States into a universal form of liberalism was through the constitution of free speech as a democratic norm. As a cultural technology debating both sides contributed to American exceptionalism by transforming students into the concrete embodied performers of the universal norms of free speech. In other words, by instantiating a desire for full and free expression, the pedagogical technique of debating both sides became a mechanism by which the student-debater-citizen becomes an exceptional ‘American’ — the bearer of universal norms of liberal democracy.

**Freedom games: debating both sides and deliberative democracy**

On the scale of a debate tournament, the relationship between the students’ convictions and the arguments actually advocated was organized to free students from the sincerity principle. In this gap between personal conviction and the practice of advocacy, a new norm of full and free expression emerged to guide the ethical self — fashioning of the student-debater-citizen. However, the only restriction on a tournament debater — a restriction under-appreciated by Day — was the desire to win or lose a judge’s ballot. Notwithstanding the grand claims about democracy, a particular interest of many students who debate is simple: they want to win. The competitive nature of the activity generated a concern that debating both sides contributed to transforming debate into a ‘game’ increasingly divorced from the ‘real-life’ consequences of the arguments advocated by the participants. In other words, if we divorce the argumentative performance from the sincerity principle, then debate moves further away from the ‘real world’. Recall that Day believed that if the ethics of school debate and public life were de-coupled, then debate would lose its authority as a democratic procedure. While Day advocated the reassignment of conviction to full and free expression as a solution to the school-public split, the possibility that debate was turning into a mere game haunted the activity. It will be our argument in this section that the defense of the game of debate, separated from the real world and transformed into a technique of moral development dis-articulates the debating-both-sides controversy from the terrain of Cold War liberalism and makes it amenable to contemporary revisions of liberalism as a deliberative democracy.

In the context of the original controversy, Douglas Ehninger (1958) feared that debating both sides isolates and separates debate from the real world, making ‘little or no direct contribution to the solving of mankind’s present and future problems’ (p. 128). Ehninger hoped to use debate as a substantive
method for seeking truth in hopes that this truth might be useful in solving real-world problems. Ehninger feared that absent this commitment to the search for truth, competitive debate was rendered an empty technique open to the ethical abuses of distorting the truth, fostering a separation between speaking as form and speaking as content. Moreover, Ehninger claimed that debating both sides contributed to this game mentality and rendered debate an esoteric activity, transforming the spoken word into ‘mere rhetoric’. Ehninger’s flight from mere rhetoric, however, was attenuated by the shifting terrain of Day’s reassignment of the democratic ethos to full and free expression as a pre-requisite for locating truth. It was Day’s investment in the norm of free speech that provided the link between argument pedagogy and the real world deemed necessary for debate to promote the democratic subjectification of the student.

Nearly forty years after the debating-both-sides controversy erupted in the mid 1950s, Star Muir (1993) defended the ‘game’ of debate on a new moral terrain. Muir would do so not on the ground of Day’s reconstructed public ethic of free and full expression but on the internal terrain of a student’s moral and cognitive development. For Muir, one need not fear speaking in a way divorced from the sincerity principle because the argumentative demands of tournament debate promoted the moral development suggested by Kohlberg and his allies in moral education. Debating both sides promoted moral development because it produced the necessary respect for a plurality of voices without being seduced by a moral relativism. Muir writes, ‘cognitive development progresses from individualism to social conformity to social contract theory to universal ethical principles’. Moral development requires a respect for pluralism and universal ethical principles and, according to Muir, debating both sides, as a ‘tool of moral pedagogy’ promotes tolerance, pluralism and a means for acquiring universal norms. In other words, having students voice an argument different from their own conviction distances students from their own ego-centrism and instills them with a sympathetic attachment to the viewpoint of the other. In this way, debating both sides promotes dialogical and dialectical forms of reasoning educating the student away from his/her tendency to reason ‘egocentrically and sociocentrically’ (p. 287).

Muir concludes his argument this way: ‘[M] oral education is not a guaranteed formula for rectitude, but the central tendencies of switch side debating are in line with convictions built on empathic appreciation for alternative points of view . . . in a framework of equal access to ideas and equal opportunities for expression, the truth that emerges is more defensible and more justifiable’ (p. 292). For Muir, debate retains its epistemic value while also taking on a new role in the moral development of students. At the same time, like Day, debating both sides performs internally on the mind and soul of the student. In the language of moral development, Day’s defence of free and
full expression circulates as a universal norm to guide the interaction between concrete interlocutors. For Muir, Day’s defence is curiously absent, but it is important to note how Muir reassigns conviction to the process of generating morally sound judgments. According to Muir, the game of debate is redeemed on the terrain of moral development because it gives students the distance from acting on their arguments, helping to secure the possibility of respecting pluralism without risking moral relativism.

It is the distance from the world engendered by debate as a cultural technology of moral development that requires closer investigation. Writing at roughly the same time as the original debating both sides controversy appeared in the late 1950s, Raymond Williams (1958) feared that ‘any practical denial of the relation between conviction and communication, between experience and expression, is morally damaging alike to the individual and the common language’ (p. 304). Williams expressed concern that the very idea of the masses and the new jobs made possible by the expansion of the industries of communication relied on separating speech from conviction. In this way, the new symbolic workers of the cultural industry turn into sources of communication while losing their status as moral agents. Might these new jobs offered by the expansion of the post-war cultural apparatus offer us a clue about the effectivity of splitting speech from conviction? Pierre Bourdieu (1984) argues that an important part of aesthetic education is the creation of a ‘distance from the world’, a distance that allows the subject to separate form and function. This distance from the world, according to Bourdieu, marks the effect of educational capital on the bourgeoisie and helps to reproduce class distinctions between the bourgeoisie and its others. John Frow (1995) adjusts Bourdieu’s insight to argue that the specific fraction of the bourgeoisie made possible by this distance from the world is the knowledge class. This is so because the ability to distance one’s judgment from one’s first order convictions secures the knowledge class’s professionalization. Bourdieu and Frow demonstrate how a class interest finds its constitution in the ability to distance one’s self from the world; a class interest that authorizes a class’s judgment as worthy of recognition and authority. From this perspective, debating both sides is part of the history of educational efforts to provide a specific class with the cultural legitimacy necessary to valorize their judgments about the world. The link between moral development and the game of debate to train students into their class roles as expert judges makes room for the re-assignment of debating both sides to the globalization of liberalism as deliberative democracy.

In the contemporary field of political and social theory, Day’s universal norm of free and full expression and Muir’s investment in moral education work in tandem. When we read Muir and Day alongside one another, debating both sides transforms itself into a mechanism to generate the moral subject akin to the demands of a communicative ethics and a deliberative democracy.
Debating both sides generates an ethical stance that allows debate to best secure the political norms of tolerance and pluralism while authorizing and legitimating moral and political judgments from the foundation of a dialogic encounter with other perspectives. Muir’s defence of the ‘game status’ of debate emerging in the aftermath of the Cold War re-codes debating both sides as a game of freedom instantiating the moral education required for liberal citizenship. Reading Muir alongside Dennis Day, we can appreciate the explicit transformation of debate into an ethical pedagogy. Debate training, without the requirement to debate both sides, locates the act of public argument too closely to the personal convictions of the speaker. The gap created by debating both sides between the embodied speech act and his/her convictions makes possible the emergence of debate as the proper method of adjudicating disputes in a democratic culture. Debating both sides transforms the student-debater by developing a post-conventional morality – one capable of making moral judgments based on reason and not authority or personal convictions. In this way, the debating both sides controversy pre-figures how a deliberative theory of democracy requires a moral theory of the subject to prepare that subject for the transformational potential associated with the ‘gentle force of the better argument’.14

Conclusion

If we appreciate the claim that moral development is manufactured and the creation of a post-conventional morality requires specific techniques for generating the discursive citizen of liberalism, then it would be reasonable to suggest that deliberative democracy may not have operative force outside of the specific histories of its moral techniques and the uptake of these techniques in programmes of cultural governance. The universal force of the norms embedded in discursive theories of citizenship require an appreciation of how the techniques invented for their internalization have particular national and economic histories which disrupt their universal pretensions. Our investigation of debating both sides controversy demonstrates the blind spots associated with the technical efforts to inculcate students with liberal norms of democratic decision making.

The ethical problematization of debating both sides suggests that the globalization of liberalism is not so much registered by universal norms of interaction as the circulation of techniques required for internalizing a series of ethical attributes conducive to democratic citizenship. Surely debate is not alone in the circulation of liberal attributes, one might suggest that teaching professional journalistic norms of objectivity and balance – norms operationalized by the attempt to offer ‘two-sides’ to every political issue – offers a functional equivalent to debating both sides. Increasingly, journalistic norms
find uptake as a spectacle of partisan spin and the rhetoric of commitment, far away from the ethical pedagogy of debating both sides. A unique value of debating both sides is that it works as a technique of embodied speech performance. To produce a liberal citizen requires more than the presentation of different points of view to a third party, it requires the empathetic advocacy of views that are not one’s own. In a world increasingly dominated by fundamentalism (religious and otherwise) the development of a respect for pluralism, tolerance and free speech remains politically valuable. However, the technical history of cultivating these norms must be evaluated if we might hope to govern ourselves differently. What this paper demonstrates is that debating both sides helps liberalism to produce a governing field between a person’s first order convictions and his/her commitment to the process norms of debate, discussion and persuasion. This field is then managed in and through the alteration of different communicative practices. The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.

The ethical problematization of debating both sides pre-figures the transformation of liberalism into a deliberative theory of democracy, one by which, communication becomes the field, instrument and object of cultural governance. Yet, the complex determinations of instantiating an ethical substance into the deliberative process points to how liberalism attempts to purchase its claim to universality by displacing an investigation into the technical domains of ethical-self fashioning. As such, liberalism’s universal norms circulate in and through specific national and economic histories re-writing its moral geographies by separating those who need the universal norms of liberalism from those exceptional subjects that can embody those norms, judge how well others are inculcating those norms, and can govern the world.

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Notes

1 Reference to ethical self-fashioning as an aesthetic dimension of debate education gestures toward our Foucauldian commitment to a ‘the aesthetics of existence’ see Foucault (1984), Greenblatt (1980) and Battaglia (1995).

2 For a more detailed justification for emphasizing the technical dimension of culture as opposed to its linguistic dimensions, see Bennett (2004).

3 Much of the work on the relationship between governance and communication takes as its point of departure the interrogation of textualist protocols and/or an investigation into communication industries and media (Hunter 1988, Bennett 1990, Miller 1993, Miller 1998, Greene 1998, Packer 2002). In this paper, we are more interested in how the interactional and embodied elements of communication are transformed into a cultural technology.

4 See Hicks and Langsdorf (1999) for an assessment of how deliberative theories of democracy elide the technical interventions necessary for governing citizens discursively.

5 According to Nichols (1926) the very existence of speech departments in the US was due to the desire to hire coaches to run debate and oratory contests. As the travel schedule grew, the competition between colleges intensified and administrators began equating academic excellence with success in debate, and public speaking teachers were hired to run debate and oratory contests. The birth and growing influence of the national forensics organizations Delta Sigma Rho in 1906 and Pi Kappa Delta in 1908, along with the ensuing centralization of debate topics and formats, constituted a second major transformation concomitant with the rise of tournament debating. Intercollegiate debate became a burgeoning business marked by a flood of argumentation and debate manuals and professionally run camps and festivals. A third and closely related change in debate practice was the loss of the large and partisan audiences that had attended debates for the previous 130 years. With the advent of its professionalization, the debate tournament became a relatively isolated event as the lone expert judge replaced the public audience. Hence, the standards of judging debates shifted from the ability to persuade an audience to the rightness of one’s beliefs to the ability to present an effective case, a case that demonstrated a sound knowledge of argumentation and could withstand attacks on the assigned proposition.

6 It is difficult for us to provide a demographic profile of a ‘typical’ debater at the West Point tournament. The 1954–1955 tournament was won by a team from the University of Alabama (a large co-educational state supported school that excluded black folks in the 1950s). They defeated a team from Wilkes College, a small co-educational private school in Pennsylavania (Windes & Kruger 2004). Debate teams of the period, as they do today, tend to have more men than women. A more comprehensive history of the period would include the role of debate at historically black colleges in the US and a discussion of the status of historically black colleges in relation to
the regional distribution of invitations to the National Debate Tournament. This essay is primarily concerned with ‘tournament debating’ as an extra-curricular activity. Further research is needed on debate as a course of study, as an extra-curricular activity, and as a classroom activity in all types of educational venues. For a recent example of work discussing the value of contemporary US high school debate within the context of adolescent culture, see Fine (2001).

7 For a discussion of the role of argument in light of the modern domains of truth, see Habermas (1984, 1979a).

8 This sentence draws on the original insight of Louis Althusser (1971) concerning the ritual dimension of ideology and the materiality of interpellation. Recently, Judith Butler (1997) has commented on the interaction between Althusser’s appropriation of Pascal and the embodied relation between performance and belief (p. 25, p. 155). Our point is that, for Day, debating both sides becomes a ritual that instantiates a belief in the authority of debate by ‘citing’ the norm of free and full expression in and through a live action spoken performance.

9 On the idea of abstraction, a process by which speech is separated from the particularities of the body that speaks, see Warner’s Letters of the Republic (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990).

10 See also Hovland et al. (1949).

11 Schlesinger (1949). For a brief discussion of the masculinist and heteronormative tone of Schlesinger’s defence of cold war liberalism, see Alpers (2003, pp. 279–80).

12 See Burns (1954) and Baird (1955).

13 For a review of the problems and possibilities of deliberative democracy and discursive theories of citizenship, see Hicks (2002).

14 For the explicit link between the moral theory associated with Kohlberg and his critics and deliberative democracy, see Habermas (1979b) and Benhabib (1992). For a more recent explication of how argumentation theory and pedagogy might contribute to building a deliberative democracy, see William Rehg (2002). It is worth noting that Rehg worries that ‘the competitive ethos of debate... could work against the co-operation required for democratic deliberation’ (2002, p. 24).

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