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Article
A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games
Economic Theory (2008)
  • Roger Lagunoff, Georgetown University
  • Luca Anderlini, Georgetown University
  • Dino Gerardi, Yale University
Abstract

We analyze dynastic repeated games. These are repeated games in which the stage game is played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. Each individual has preferences that replicate those of the infinitely-lived players of a standard discounted infinitely-repeated game. Individuals live one period and do not observe the history of play that takes place before their birth, but instead create social memory through private messages received from their immediate predecessors. Under mild conditions, when players are sufficiently patient, all feasible payoff vectors (including those below the minmax of the stage game) can be sustained by Sequential Equilibria of the dynastic repeated game with private communication. The result applies to any stage game with n >= 4 players for which the standard Folk Theorem yields a payoff set with a non-empty interior. We are also able to characterize fully the conditions under which a Sequential Equilibrium of the dynastic repeated game can yield a payoff vector not sustainable as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the standard repeated game. For this to be the case it must be that the players’ equilibrium beliefs violate a condition that we term “Inter-Generational Agreement.”

Keywords
  • Dynastic Repeated Games,
  • Private Communication,
  • Social Memory,
  • Folk Theorem
Disciplines
Publication Date
2008
Citation Information
Roger Lagunoff, Luca Anderlini and Dino Gerardi. "A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games" Economic Theory Vol. 37 (2008)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/roger_lagunoff/2/