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Unpublished Paper
The Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives for False Convictions
ExpressO (2012)
  • Roger Koppl
  • Meghan Sacks
We examine the incentive structure of the various actors of the criminal justice system within an organization economics framework. Specifically, we examine the incentives of the police, forensic scientists, prosecutors and public defenders. We find that police, prosecutors and forensic scientists often have an incentive to garner convictions with little incentive to convict the right person, whereas public defenders often lack the resources and incentives to provide a vigorous defense for their clients. The “multitask problem” of organizational economics helps explain how this skewed incentive structure creates false convictions.
  • false convictions,
  • incentives,
  • multitask problem,
  • police,
  • forensic science,
  • prosecutors
Publication Date
April 25, 2012
Citation Information
Roger Koppl and Meghan Sacks. "The Criminal Justice System Creates Incentives for False Convictions" ExpressO (2012)
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