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Competitive and harmonized R&D policies for international R&D alliances involving asymmetric firms
Review of International Economics
  • Rodney Falvey, Bond University
  • Khemarat Talerngsri Teerasuwannajak, Chulalongkorn University
Date of this Version
1-1-2016
Document Type
Journal Article
Publication Details

Citation only

Falvey, R., Teerasuwannajak, K.T. (2016, in press). Competitive and harmonized R&D policies for international R&D alliances involving asymmetric firms. Review of International Economics.

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© Copyright 2016 Elsevier B.V.

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Abstract

We examine R&D policies when a national firm forms an R&D alliance with a foreign competitor. Firms differ in R&D capabilities, select among three forms of R&D alliance and adopt a profit-sharing rule if they coordinate their R&D decisions. When firms coordinate their R&D decisions and governments choose R&D policies independently, R&D taxes are chosen, but if governments harmonize their policies, they decide not to intervene. These policy outcomes affect the types of R&D alliance chosen. Agreements to share R&D information can outperform those with both coordination and sharing as a result of the R&D tax that coordination attracts.

Citation Information
Rodney Falvey and Khemarat Talerngsri Teerasuwannajak. "Competitive and harmonized R&D policies for international R&D alliances involving asymmetric firms" Review of International Economics (2016) ISSN: 0965-7576
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/rodney_falvey/14/