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A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust Doctrine: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Environmental Public Trust

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A COMPARATIVE GUIDE TO THE WESTERN STATES’ PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES: PUBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE RIGHTS, AND THE EVOLUTION TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL PUBLIC TRUST

BY ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG*

ABSTRACT

This companion article to the Fall 2007 A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines explores the state public trust doctrines – emphasis on the plural – in the 19 western states. In so doing, this Article seeks to make the larger point that, while the broad contours of the public trust doctrine, especially regarding state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters, have a federal law basis, the details of how public trust principles actually apply vary considerably from state to state. Public trust law, in other words, is very much a species of state common law. Moreover, as with other forms of common law, states have evolved their public trust doctrines in light of the particular histories, perceived needs, and perceived problems of each state.

This Article notes that, in the West, four factors have been most important in the evolution of state public trust doctrines: (1) the severing of water rights from real property ownership and the riparian rights doctrine; (2) subsequent state declarations of public ownership of fresh water; (3) clear and explicit perceptions of shortages of water, submerged lands, and environmental amenities; and (4) a willingness to raise water and other environmental issues to constitutional status and/or to incorporate broad public trust mandates into statutes. From these factors, two important trends in western states’ public trust doctrines have emerged: (1) the extension of public rights based on states’ ownership of the water itself; and (2) an increasing, and still cutting-edge, expansion of public trust concepts into ecological public trust doctrines that are increasingly protecting species, ecosystems and the public values that they provide.

The Article includes an extensive Appendix that summarizes each of the 19 states’ public trust doctrines. These summaries include relevant constitutional provisions, statutory provisions, and cases.

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INTRODUCTION

In the arid West, balancing private needs for fresh water to consume and use and the public values – recreational, aesthetic, and ecological – from leaving fresh water in situ has tended to favor the private use side. Evidence of this result is both massive and minor, ranging from California’s multi-billion-dollar water transportation system to the routine de-watering of the Colorado River so that little to no water reaches the Sea of Cortez to water-related Endangered Species Act lawsuits in dozens of watersheds.

One of the legal tools that can re-balance private and public rights in water in any particular state is the state’s public trust doctrine. In 1970, Professor Joseph Sax published his seminal article arguing for revitalization of the public trust doctrine, and, ever since, academics, politicians, voters, and judges have been exploring the potential value of the public trust doctrine for protecting public values in water, including recreational and ecological values.

This article is the second of two that sets out to explore what states actually are doing with their public trust doctrines – emphasis on the plural. As I argued in that first article, which covered the 31 eastern states’ public trust doctrines, the states have progressed and diverged in interesting ways beyond the precepts of the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal discussion of the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.

In some ways, what was true for the eastern states is also true for the western states:

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2 ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF IMMENSITY 34-41, 208-10 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79:3 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO L. REV. 826-27, 897-98 (Summer 2008).

3 Craig, supra note 2, at 875-78.


7 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
At its most basic, a state’s public trust doctrine outlines public and private rights in water and submerged lands by delineating five definitional components of those rights: (1) the beds and banks of waters that are subject to state/public ownership; (2) the line or lines dividing private from public title in those submerged lands; (3) the waters subject to public use rights; (4) the line or lines in those waters that mark the limit of public use rights; and (5) the public uses that the doctrine will protect in the waters where the public has use rights.8

In addition, prior discussions of western public trust doctrines are subject to the same two general limitations I discussed for the eastern public trust doctrines: “The first is a tendency to generalized all public trust law into a single doctrine. The second and opposite tendency is to view each state’s public trust doctrine as unique.”9

Nevertheless, public trust doctrine law in the western states can also be differentiated from that in the eastern states in several respects. First, in the eastern states, coastal access, coastal development, and coastal rights have been, generally, of more pressing concern than public trust rights in fresh waters. Because of the timing of their statehood, many eastern states’ public trust doctrines have been influenced in significant ways by the English “ebb-and-flow” tidal test of navigability for purposes of state title.10 In addition, many eastern states recognize different public/private title lines along the seacoasts and Great Lakes than they do in fresh water streams, rivers, and lakes and/or protect more extensive sets of public rights in the ocean and Great Lakes.11 In contrast, most western states became states after the U.S. Supreme Court had announced most of its core principles regarding navigable waters, and far fewer of them are coastal states – only Alaska, California, Hawai’i, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. Partially as a result of this timing and geographical reality, western states, in general, have paid far greater attention than eastern states to public rights in fresh waters.

In addition, western states are more arid than eastern states, promoting a consciousness of the importance of fresh water that pervades many of these state’s public trust doctrines. The 100th Meridian, which runs through North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, is generally considered the “water divide” of the United States – east of that line, there is generally enough rainfall to support farming without irrigation; west of the line, there generally is not.12 Survival in the west depends on access to water, and water is generally viewed as being in short supply. As will be discussion, this perception of shortage or potential shortage of fresh water has influenced the public trust doctrine in many western states.

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8 Craig, supra note 6, at 4.
9 Id. at 2-3.
10 Id. at 11-14.
11 Id. at 16-17.
12 HERBERT C. YOUNG, UNDERSTANDING WATER RIGHTS AND CONFLICTS 42 (2d Ed. 2003).
Finally, the western states use a different system of water law than the eastern states. Eastern states’ water laws are founded in common-law riparianism, although many states have transitioned to regulated riparian systems. Riparianism incorporates notions of adjustable, correlative rights to water among riparian property owners, with a general expectation – couched originally in terms of a “natural flow” doctrine, more recently in terms of “reasonable use” – that there is enough water to both serve human needs and leave water in the natural system. In contrast, western states (with the notable exception of Hawai‘i) base their water law in prior appropriation, even in states like California that retain limited riparian rights. Prior appropriation is based on the principle of “first in time, first in right” and acknowledges through it priority system that water supplies from a given source will sometimes – maybe often – be insufficient to meet all needs. Thus, prior appropriation as a legal system acknowledges that fresh water is in short supply. In practice, prior appropriation systems have also allowed appropriators to drain streams and rivers dry, making obvious the loss of public values such as navigation, fishing and other recreation, aesthetics, species, biodiversity, water quality, ecological health, and, more recently, ecosystem services. Finally, in almost all prior appropriation states, state water law includes a declaration, constitutional or statutory, that the state or the public owns the fresh water itself. All of these features of prior appropriation water law have become relevant to states’ public trust doctrines in the West, in conscious wrestlings, often lacking in the eastern states, regarding the legal relationship between private appropriative water rights, on the one hand, and public rights and values in and surrounding water, on the other.

This Article explores these and other features of western states’ public trust doctrines, identifying broad categories of how these 19 states have developed their common law regarding public rights in water. This Article is both classificatory and comparative, first identifying categories of trends among the western states and then comparing those approaches to give some sense of the different ways that their public trust doctrines have developed.

At the same time, this Article seeks to make the larger point that, while the broad contours of the public trust doctrine, especially regarding state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters, have a federal law basis, the details of how public trust principles apply vary considerably from state to state. Public trust law, in other words, is very much a species of state common law. Moreover, as with other forms of common law, states have evolved their public trust doctrines in light of the particular histories, perceived needs, and perceived problems of each state. As Robert Abrams and Noah Hall have observed more generally for all of water law, a given state’s public trust doctrine “evolves instrumentally in ways that support a society’s most pressing needs. The periods of greatest change in water law tend to be the ones where serious

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15 Gould, supra note 13, at 7.
and protracted shortage or unsatisfied demand is felt in one or more key economic sectors.”

Therefore, is it perhaps unsurprising that more robust public trust doctrines have become common in states such as Hawai‘i, California, and Montana where water- and environment-based tourism and recreation are important contributors to the state’s economy.

Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the public trust doctrine before the formation of the United States, emphasizing the public rights nature of the doctrine. Part II outlines the federal contours of state public trust doctrines, including the federal law of state title to navigable waters, the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncements regarding the public trust doctrine in *Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois*, and the Supreme Court’s further elaborations regarding states’ authorities in defining rights to and in water. Part III identifies and compares many of the trends in western states’ public trust doctrines, emphasizing moments when particular state’s courts and, less often, legislatures acknowledge the evolving nature of public trust principles and the need to protect public values recognized to be in short and decreasing supply. The Article concludes with a short examination of the implications of state public trust doctrines as a form of common law, arguing against the utility of continuing to describe and expect a single public trust “doctrine,” particularly as western states face the unprecedented water supply pressures that climate change now threatens.

**I. HISTORICAL VIEWS OF PUBLIC INTERESTS IN WATER**

As many writers have explained in varying degrees of detail, the public trust doctrine has an extensive history dating back to Roman law. A short review of this longer history is useful in underscoring the concern for the public interests in water that the public trust doctrine has always raised.

As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, “navigable waters uniquely implicate sovereign interests.” It has traced the protections for public rights in water to the Institutes of Justinian, which stated that “‘[r]ivers and ports are public; hence the right of fishing in a port,

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19 *Id.*
or in rivers are in common . . . .”

Such principles also have a long history in English common law, and “[t]he Magna Carta provided that the Crown would remove ‘all fish-weirs ... from the Thames and the Medway and throughout all England, except on the sea coast.'”

The recognition of public interests and rights in waters has led to the division of title in navigable waters between the *jus privatum* and *jus publicum*. The *jus privatum* is the naked legal title to submerged lands, which may in fact end up in private ownership. However, private title to such lands generally excludes the difficult-to-alienate *jus publicum*, which protects public access to and rights to use navigable waters. The *jus publicum* may be protected legally in a number of ways. For example, in 1838, the U.S Supreme Court concluded that because the Potomac river is a navigable stream, a part of the *jus publicum*, any obstruction to its navigation would, upon the most established principles, be what is declared by law to be a public nuisance. A public nuisance being the subject to criminal jurisdiction, the ordinary and regular proceeding at law is by indictment or information, by which the nuisance may be abated; and the person who caused it may be punished. If any particular individual shall have sustained special damage from the erection of it, he may maintain a private action for such special damage; because to that extent he has suffered beyond his portion of injury, in common with the community at large.

Thus, according to the Court, the quintessential protection of the *jus publicum* is a public nuisance lawsuit, preferably brought by the states themselves. Private individuals may protect the *jus publicum*, but only to the extent that they have suffered unusual private damages.

Building on this history, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1892 adopted the New York courts’ view that:

“The title to lands under tide waters, within the realm of England, were by the

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20 Id. (quoting *INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN*, Lib. II, Tit. I, § 2 (T. Cooper transl. 2d ed. 1841)).

21 The special treatment of navigable waters in English law was recognized in Bracton’s time. He stated that ‘[a]ll rivers and ports are public, so that the right to fish therein is common to all persons. The use of river banks, as of the river itself, is also public.’” Id. (quoting 2 H. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 40 (S. Thorne transl. 1968)).

22 Id. (quoting M. EVANS & R. JACK, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 53 (1984), and citing Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410-13 (1842) (“tracing tidelands trusteeship back to Magna Carta”)).


common law deemed to be vested in the king as a public trust, to subserve and protect the public right to use them as common highways for commerce, trade, and intercourse. The king, by virtue of his proprietary interest, could grant the soil so that it should become private property, but his grant was subject to the paramount right of public use of navigable waters, which he could neither destroy nor abridge. . . .

“The principle of the common law to which we have adverted is founded upon the most obvious principles of public policy. The sea and navigable rivers are natural highways, and any obstruction to the common right, or exclusive appropriation of their use, is injurious to commerce, and, if permitted at the will of the sovereign, would be very likely to end in materially crippling, if not destroying, it. The laws of most nations have sedulously guarded the public use of navigable waters within their limits against infringement, subjecting it only to such regulation by the state, in the interest of the public, as is deemed consistent with the preservation of the public right.”

26 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892) (quoting People v. New York & S.I. Ferry Co., 1877 WL 11834, at *3 (N.Y. 1877)). See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894) (“By the common law, both the title and the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the lands below high-water mark, within the jurisdiction of the crown of England, are in the king. Such waters, and the lands which they cover, either at all times, or at least when the tide is in, are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation, and improvement; and their natural and primary uses are public in their nature, for highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose of fishing by all the king's subjects. Therefore the title, jus privatum, in such lands, as of waste and unoccupied lands, belongs to the king, as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus publicum, is vested in him, as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit.”).

Thus, clearly, in the tidally influenced navigable waters, private landowners claiming from federal patents had no property rights sufficient to interfere with public rights of commerce and navigation. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court extended this rule to federal patents of land bordering navigable-in-fact waters.28

Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that protecting public rights in water, and limiting interfering private rights, promotes the overall well-being of the nation. These and other public policy considerations remain relevant to the western states’ implementation of their public trust doctrines.

II. FEDERAL LAW COMPONENTS OF STATE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES

As noted, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the submerged lands beneath navigable waters are subject to special considerations because of their connections to sovereignty, but the sovereignty that it usually has in mind, at least in the public trust context, is state sovereignty. Thus, in 1842, the Court declared that “when the [American] revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the constitution to the general government.”29

The Supreme Court most explicitly recognized the existence of the public trust doctrine in the 1892 case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.30 That decision had the effect of reifying the doctrine’s existence in American law while simultaneously adapting it to the particular conditions of the United States. Moreover, Illinois Central Railroad provided an apparent federal law basis for many later state pronouncements of their own public trust doctrines.

The legal basis – federal common law, federal constitutional law, or state law – for some aspects of the U.S. Supreme Court’s pronouncements regarding the public trust doctrine, such as the alienability of public trust lands, is questionable.31 Such haziness of source, however, did not prevent many western states – particularly Arizona – from adopting the Supreme Court’s statements as binding federal law. As Richard Lazarus has observed, “[s]tate courts have repeatedly turned to [federal pronouncements] in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries

28 See, e.g., Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876) (stating as a general rule that private title to lands under navigable-in-fact waters extends only to the high-water mark); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11. 49-50 (1894) (adopting the English common law rule that federal conveyances go to the high-water mark).
29 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842).
30 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
31 See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 639-40 (1986) (“It is far from clear what source of law the Court was drawing upon to reach its result.”); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926) (stating that the alienability ruling in Illinois Central was based on state law).
to justify rejecting or at least carefully scrutinizing shortsighted or even corrupt legislative attempts to convey into private hands critical coastal or inland waterway resources.\textsuperscript{32}

Moreover, state implementations of their public trust doctrines have their starting point in state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters. As between the federal and state governments, the question of title to these beds and banks is clearly a matter of federal law.\textsuperscript{33} Western states such as Oregon and Utah played pivotal roles in developing the jurisprudence of state title navigability, further evidencing the western states’ interests in controlling their fresh waters.

However, the U.S. Supreme Court has also made it clear that, once federal law has conferred title to the beds and banks of navigable waters on a particular state, that state has broad authority to redefine the property rights as between itself and private citizens.\textsuperscript{34} Similarly, the states have broad authority to define the public and private rights in navigable waters.\textsuperscript{35}

\section{A. State Ownership of Submerged Lands: The Basic Rules}

The original thirteen states acquired title to beds and banks underlying tidal and, as would later be confirmed, navigable-in-fact nontidal, waters as a matter of their conquest of England.\textsuperscript{36} All other states – including all of the western states – acquired ownership of the beds and banks of these waters upon their statehood as a result of the Equal Footing Doctrine, under which all subsequent states were admitted with the same rights as the original thirteen.\textsuperscript{37} A given state’s title to tidal and navigable waters is fixed as of the date of its admission to the United States.\textsuperscript{38}

Under federal law, the default rule and strong presumption is that the relevant state owns the beds of the navigable waters within its borders.\textsuperscript{39} Sovereign ownership of tidal waters –

\textsuperscript{32} Lazarus, \textit{supra} note 31, at 640.
\textsuperscript{33} Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
\textsuperscript{35} Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 176 (1918).
waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tide – arises as a direct adoption of English common
law:

“It is the settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion and
sovereignty over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the several
states, belong to the respective states within which they are found, with the
consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof, when that can be done
without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters, and
subject always to the paramount right of congress to control their navigation so
far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and
among the states. This doctrine has been often announced by this court, and is not
questioned by counsel of any of the parties.”

Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified in 1988 that states own the beds of all tidal waters,
whether or not those waters are navigable-in-fact.

In contrast, state ownership of non-tidal “navigable-in-fact” waters was a federal
adaptation of English law to American realities. Thus, for example:

[the] same doctrine is in this country held to be applicable to lands covered by
fresh water in the Great Lakes, over which is conducted an extended commerce
with different states and foreign nations. These lakes possess all the general
characteristics of open seas, except in the freshness of their waters, and in the
absence of the ebb and flow of the tide. In other respects they are inland seas, and
there is no reason or principle for the assertion of dominion and sovereignty over
and ownership by the state of lands covered by tide waters that is not equally
applicable to its ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over lands covered
by the fresh waters of these lakes.

Even earlier decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court had announced a “navigable-in-fact” test for
inland rivers and streams. However, waters must be navigable-in-fact as of the date of the
state’s admission into the union.

(1894).
40 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324,
336-38 (1876).
41 Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); see also Pollard’s Leesee v. Hagan, 44
U.S. 212, 223 (1845).
44 See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (holding that the English common law tidal
test has no applicability in the United States); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1892) (stating that, “[i]n
this country, as a general thing, all waters are deemed navigable which are really so.”).
45 Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1894); Martin v.
B. The Federal Test of Navigability for Navigable-in-Fact Waters

State title to the beds and banks of navigable-in-fact waters is a question of federal law, determined in accordance with the federal test of navigability for state title. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not been uniformly consistent in how it defines “navigable” waters for these purposes. Under the classic test of navigability from The Daniel Ball, waters are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.

The Daniel Ball test thus closely aligns navigability with usefulness in interstate commerce, suggesting that waterways must be navigable by fairly large boats and ships.

However, the Supreme Court has also found that a waterway is navigable when it is useful for trade, agriculture, or commerce by any kind of vessel. For example, in The Montello, the Court concluded:

It would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country, unless a river was capable of being navigated by steam or sail vessels, it could not be treated as a public highway. The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use. If it be capable in its natural state of being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law a public river or highway. Vessels of any kind that can float upon the water, whether propelled by animal power, by the wind, or by the agency of steam, are, or may become, the mode by which a vast commerce can be conducted, and it would be a mischievous rule that would exclude either in determining the navigability of a river. It is not, however, as Chief Justice Shaw said, “every small creek in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float at high water which is deemed navigable, but, in order

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46 Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)).
47 The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870); see also Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1971) (citing The Daniel Ball as the first important test of navigability for state title purposes and stating that that test applies to all waters, not just rivers).
to give it the character of a navigable stream, it must be generally and commonly useful to some purpose of trade or agriculture.”

Moreover, in the course of adjudicating the navigability of waterbodies in western states, the Court has emphasized that the water need not be “part of a navigable or interstate or international commercial highway” in order for the state to take title to its bed.

Thus, depending on where a state court wants to focus its attention, the U.S. Supreme Court’s statements regarding navigability for state title purposes allow for more liberal and more stringent approaches to claiming title and, as a consequence, asserting and protecting public rights. The Court itself, however, attempted to reconcile its various statements of navigability in two cases from the 1930s involving allegedly navigable waters in Utah and Oregon. The 1931 Utah case resolved Utah’s claims of title to the submerged lands beneath the Green, Grand, and Colorado Rivers in Utah’s favor. The Court first noted that states received title to the submerged lands of navigable waters, while the federal government retained title to those beneath non-navigable waters, with the question of title navigability to be resolved by federal law. It then set out a long definition of navigability that attempts to unify prior definitions from *The Daniel Ball*, *The Montello*, and *Holt State Bank*:

The test of navigability has frequently been stated by this Court. In *The Daniel Ball*, 10 Wall. 557, 563 . . . , the Court said: “Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.” In *The Montello*, 20 Wall. 430, 441 . . . , it was pointed out that “the true test of navigability of a stream does not depend on the mode by which commerce is, or may be, conducted, nor the difficulties attending navigation,” and that “it would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country, unless a river was capable of being navigated by steam or sail vessels, it could not be treated as a public highway.” The principles thus laid down have recently been restated in *United States v. Holt State Bank*, 270 U.S. 49, 56 . . . , where the Court said:

“The rule long since approved by this court in applying the Constitution and laws of the United States is that streams or lakes which are navigable in fact must be regarded as navigable in law; that they are navigable in fact when they are used, or susceptible of being used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for

49 Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935)).
50 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 89 (1931).
51 Id. at 75. Given the last point, the Utah legislature’s declaration that the three rivers were navigable was of no binding effect. Id. at 75 n.6.
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water; and further that navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which such use is or may be had – whether by steamboats, sailing vessels or flatboats – nor an absence of occasional difficulties in navigation; but on the fact, if it be a fact, that the stream in its natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for useful commerce.”

Moreover, the Utah Court emphasized that “[t]he extent of existing commerce is not the test. The evidence of actual use of streams, and especially of extensive and continued use for commercial purposes may be most persuasive, but, where conditions of exploration and settlement explain the infrequency or limited nature of such use, the susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be satisfactorily proved.” As a result, the presence of sandbars that occasionally impeded navigation did not make the three rivers non-navigable.

Four years later, applying the same test, the Supreme Court determined that Lake Malheur, Mud Lake, Harney Lake, the Narrows, and Sand Reef in Oregon were not navigable. According to the Court’s findings:

Neither trade nor travel did then [at statehood] or at any time since has or could or can move over said Divisions, or any of them, in their natural and or ordinary conditions according to the customary modes of trade and travel over water; nor was any of them on February 14, 1859 [Oregon’s date of statehood]’ nor has any of them since been used or susceptible of being used in the natural or ordinary condition of any of them as permanent or other highways or channels for useful or other commerce.

In contrast, the Great Salt Lake was navigable, and its beds owned by Utah, because of its use as a channel of commerce, despite its not being part of an interstate or international network.

C. Exceptions to State Title in the Western States

Although the presumption is that western states received title to the beds and banks of the navigable rivers within their borders, most western states existed as federal territories for some
time before achieving statehood. As a result, state title in the West, far more than in the East, is subject to prior federal conveyances and reservations of title to navigable waters.

For example, when the federal government reserved navigable waters to some federal purpose before the date of statehood, those navigable waters remain in federal ownership. Many such reservations in the West benefit Indian tribes. Thus, the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Nations own the bed under portions of the Arkansas River in Oklahoma, and the Osage Tribe owns the lands beneath the Arkansas River flowing along the Osage Indian Reservation. Similarly, the United States holds title to Coeur d’Alene Lake and the St. Joe River in Idaho in trust for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe.

Other such reservations, however, serve other federal purposes. Thus, the State of Alaska did not receive title to any of the submerged lands within the boundary of the National Petroleum Reserve or the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. In addition, Alaska does not have title to the submerged lands in the lower inlet of Cook Inlet.

Finally, federal patents to private individuals before the date of statehood can affect both a state’s title to submerged lands and the application of the state’s public trust doctrine. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that California cannot enforce any public trust easement over tidelands that the federal government conveyed to private individuals pursuant to the Act of 1851, if the federal patent makes no mention of a public easement.

D. The Supreme Court’s Statements Regarding Public Trust Doctrine

The U.S. Supreme Court most clearly announced the existence of a public trust doctrine in American law in *Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois*. According to that decision, the state holds title to lands under submerged lands:

> [b]ut it is a title different in character from that which the state holds in lands intended for sale. It is different from the title which the United States hold in the public lands which are open to pre-emption and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on

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58 Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1922).
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties.\textsuperscript{64}

Thus, the three public uses of waters that a public trust doctrine generally protects are navigation, commerce, and fishing.\textsuperscript{65}

In addition, according to the \textit{Illinois Central} Court, the doctrine acts as a restraint on the state’s ability to alienate the beds and banks of navigable waters or to abdicate regulatory control over those waters:

The interest of the people in the navigation of the waters and in commerce over them may be improved in many instances by the erection of wharves, docks, and piers therein, for which purpose the state may grant parcels of the submerged lands; and, so long as their disposition is made for such purpose, no valid objections can be made to the grants. . . . But that is a very different doctrine from the one which would sanction the abdication of the general control of the state over lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or bay, or of a sea or lake. Such abdication is not consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the government of the state to preserve such waters for the use of the public. The trust devolving upon the state for the public, and which can only be discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.\textsuperscript{66}

This restraint on alienation – and its perception as a federal law requirement – has been important in several western states, notably Arizona.\textsuperscript{67}

\section{The Paramount Federal Interest in Navigation}

Despite state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters, the federal government retains a paramount interest in maintaining navigation in the navigable waters. This interest is one of the most basic manifestations of the federal government’s Commerce Clause powers, but it can also serve to reinforce the public values in navigable waters protected by the public trust doctrine.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{Illinois Central R.R.}, 146 U.S. at 452.
  \item \textsuperscript{65} \textit{Id.} See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 13 (1894) (emphasizing the public rights of fishing and navigation).
  \item \textsuperscript{66} \textit{Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois}, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892).
  \item \textsuperscript{67} See, e.g., \textit{Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull}, 18 P.3d 722, 726-28 (Ariz. App. 2001) (relying on \textit{Illinois Central Railroad} to conclude that the restraint on alienation of submerged lands is a common-law rule grounded in the Constitution that invalidates the Arizona legislature’s attempts to disclaim or restrict state ownership of those lands).
\end{itemize}
One aspect of this paramount federal navigation interest is the federal navigation servitude. The main import of the federal navigation servitude is that government actions to maintain navigation do not require the government to compensate private persons and entities for injuries to private property rights.\textsuperscript{68} For example, as early as 1829 the U.S. Supreme Court noted that “[l]aws in relation to roads, bridges, rivers and other public highways, which do not take away private rights to property, may be passed at the discretion of the legislature, however much they may effect common rights; even private rights, if they are not those of property, may be taken away, if it be deemed necessary consequence of their construction, without making compensation.”\textsuperscript{69} Thus, with respect to navigation, public values can intrude upon private.

Another aspect is the federal government’s continuing right to regulate interstate commerce. This right, while distinguishable from regulating navigation \textit{per se}, nevertheless has substantial overlaps with navigation concerns.\textsuperscript{70} Moreover, under the Supremacy Clause, Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce in navigable waters will trump any conflicting state regulation.\textsuperscript{71}

Finally, in the context of water law, the federal government’s paramount interest in navigation may, in extreme cases, limit the rights of western appropriators to destroy public values in any waters that become navigable, even if they are not so at the point of diversion. In an 1899 case, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the propriety of the complete diversion of the Rio Grande River in New Mexico, where it is not navigable. The Court concluded that such upstream diversions could not interfere with the federal government’s downstream interest in maintaining navigability, for two reasons:

First, . . . in the absence of specific authority from congress, a state cannot, by its legislation, destroy the right of the United States, as the owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters, so far, at least, as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property; second, . . . it is limited by the superior power of the general government to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all navigable streams within the limits of the United States. In other words, the jurisdiction of the general government over interstate commerce and its natural highways vests in that government the right to take all needed measures to preserve the navigability of the navigable water courses of the country, even against any state action.\textsuperscript{72}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[70] Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 11-20, 64-69, 71-79 (1824).
\item[71] \textit{Id.} at 71-79, 89-96.
\item[72] United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899).
\end{footnotes}
The Court also has acknowledged these potential federal limitations on the destruction of downstream navigability in later cases. 73

F. A Note on Federal Law, Prior Appropriation, and Non-Navigable Waters in the West

Both the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress have recognized that western states adopted prior appropriation as their dominant water law. In the Act of July 26, 1866, Congress began to formally recognize prior appropriation’s ascendancy over riparian rights in the West. 74 However, in the Desert Land Act of 1877, 75 as interpreted by the Supreme Court, it both subjected non-navigable waters to prior appropriation and gave western states control over those waters.

The Desert Land Act applies to then-public lands in California, Oregon, Nevada, Colorado, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota 76 – that is, to all states discussed in this article except Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Hawai‘i, and Alaska. In the Act, Congress recognized that reclamation and large-scale development and movement of fresh water would be necessary in order to settle the arid western lands. 77 As a result, according to the Supreme Court, Congress both severed non-navigable waters from the public lands, ending common-law riparian rights, 78 and gave control over water rights in those waters to the states. 79

Thus, through the Desert Land Act and statutes like it, Congress allowed western states to assert ownership and control over non-navigable waters as well as navigable, even though the states did not own the beds and banks beneath those waters. As will be discussed in more detail, this ability to declare state ownership of all water has been an important component of many western states’ public trust doctrines.

III. Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Trends and Approaches to Public Rights in Water

A. Adaptations of the Public Trust Doctrines to Particular State Circumstances and Public Policies

74 Act of July 26, 1866, c. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 251.  
77 Id. at 155-56.  
78 Id. at 157-58.  
79 Id. at 163-64. See also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 n.5 (1976); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 612 (1945); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95-96 (1937) (all confirming the import of the Desert Land Act).
Courts and, to a lesser extent, legislatures in western states often clearly connect the state’s public trust doctrine to larger issues of state public policy. In states where these larger public policies include recognition of actual or potential loss of the public values of fresh water, more robust public trust doctrines are often the result. In contrast, in states where public policies favor private rights, more restricted public policies have been the norm.

Arizona, for example, is an example of the latter kind of state – so much so that legislative attempts to restrict the state’s public trust doctrine have prompted repeated interventions from the Arizona courts.\(^{80}\) By statute, Arizona limits “navigable waters” – and its public trust doctrine – to those waters subject to the federal equal footing doctrine.\(^{81}\) In contrast, Hawai’i courts are acutely aware of the scarcity of fresh water in the state and have subordinated private water rights to the public interest in preserving the state’s “natural bounty.”\(^{82}\)

States that seek to preserve the public interest in waters have used a variety of legal techniques for doing so. For example, North Dakota has adapted its law regarding shifting rivers to protect the public rights in those rivers:

The Territorial Legislative Assembly recognized that our state would receive title to the beds of navigable waters at statehood. Accordingly, by 1877, it had enacted a code that would secure title of the state to such lands and modify common law so that the state’s title would follow the movement of the bed of the river. This accords with underlying public policy, since the purpose of a state holding title to a navigable riverbed is to foster the public’s right of navigation, traditionally the most important feature of the public trust doctrine. Moreover, it seems to use that other important aspects of the state’s public interest, such as bathing, swimming, recreation, and fishing, as well as irrigation, industrial and other water supplies, are most closely associated with where the water is in the new riverbed, not the old.\(^{83}\)

To address a different threat to public rights in waters, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has distinguished navigability for title purposes from navigability for public use purposes. Using a pleasure boat test of navigability, it protects its smaller rivers and the recreational and aesthetic amenities that they provide. It found, for instance, “that the Kiamichi River is one of the beautiful streams of southeastern Oklahoma that it has for many years been known as one of the


\(^{81}\) As such, a “navigable watercourse for purposes of both state title and the application of the public trust doctrine is “a watercourse that was in existence on February 14, 1912, and at that time was used or was susceptible to being used, in its ordinary and natural condition, as a highway for commerce, over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 37-1130(5). “Public trust lands” are limited to the beds of these navigable watercourses. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 37-1130(8).

\(^{82}\) Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 311-12 (Haw. 1982).

\(^{83}\) J.P. Furlong Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 140 (N.D. 1988).
best fishing streams in the State and used by the public for fishing, recreation, and pleasure” and extended legal protections to those public uses and values.84

More extensively, courts in California have explicitly and repeatedly emphasized that lands beneath nontidal navigable waters “constitute a resource which is fast disappearing in California; they are of great importance for the ecology, and for the recreational needs of the residents of the state.”85 Moreover, the California Supreme Court considers the public trust doctrine to be adaptable and evolving, noting that “[t]he objective of the public trust has evolved in tandem with the changing public perception of the values and uses of waterways.”86 It recognizes that the trust traditionally protects navigation, commerce, and fishing, but also has expansively announced that public trust rights “have been held to include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating, and general recreation purposes the navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes.”87

The Texas courts, similarly, have noted that “[t]he purpose of the State maintaining title to the beds and waters of all navigable bodies is to protect the public’s interest in those scarce natural resources.”88 As such, “the State, as trustee, is entitled to regulate those waters and submerged lands to protect its citizens’ health and safety and to conserve natural resources.”89

Oregon has applied a variety of legal mechanisms to acknowledge and protect the public interests in tidal and navigable-in-fact waters. Like California, Oregon views its waters as a limited and precious resource:

The severe restriction on the power of the state as trustee to modify water resources is predicated not only upon the importance of the public use of such waters and lands, but upon the exhaustible and irreplaceable nature of the resources and its fundamental important to our society and our environment. These resources, after all, can only be spent once. Therefore, the law has historically and consistently recognized that rivers and estuaries once destroyed or

86 National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (citing Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971)); see also Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Board of Supervisors, 100 Cal. App. 4th 129, 145 (1st Dist. 2002) (repeating that the doctrine is “sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs” (citations omitted)).
88 Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement District No. 17, 175 S.W.2d 34, 49 (Tex. App. 2005).
89 Id. (citing Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)); see also Carruthers v. Terramar Beach Community Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Texas 1983) (“The waters of public navigable streams are held by the State in trust for the public, primarily for navigation purposes.” (citing Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458 (1926))).
diminished may never be restored to the public and, accordingly, has required the highest degree of protection from the public trustee.\(^90\)

Thus, in applying the public trust doctrine, the Oregon courts have noted that “lands underlying navigable waters have been recognized as unique and limited resources and have been accorded special protection to insure their preservation for public water-related uses such as navigation, fishery and recreation. Under the common law public trust doctrine, the public use of such waters could not be substantially modified except for water-related purposes.”\(^91\)

Moreover, like Oklahoma, Oregon has refined its definition of navigability to reflect the physical realities and public policy priorities of the state. Thus, Oregon early on adopted a log floatation test for navigability because that rule “best accords with common sense and public convenience, for these rapid streams, penetrating deep into the mountains, are the only means by which timber can be brought from these rugged sections, without great labor and expense; and by their use large tracks of timber, otherwise too remote or difficult of access, can be rendered of great value, as the country shall grow and timber become scarce.”\(^92\)

Finally, unusually (but not uniquely\(^93\)) among states, Oregon has employed the doctrine of custom to ensure public access to dry sand beaches not protected by the public trust doctrine.\(^94\) As a result, there was no taking of private property when the state denied landowners permits to build sea walls.\(^95\)

Other states have also used some of these mechanisms to adapt the public trust doctrine to the particular public interests and policies of that state. For example, by statute, and for purposes of establishing public rights in waters, Alaska defines a “navigable water” to be:

any water of the state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek, bay, sound, estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other body of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful public purpose, including but not limited to water suitable for commercial navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes . . . .\(^96\)

\(^90\) Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 524 (Or. App. 1978), aff’d, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979).
\(^91\) Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 523 (Or. App. 1978), aff’d, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979).
\(^92\) Felger v. Robinson, 3 Or. 455, 458 (1869).
\(^93\) Because the public has long used the beaches of Hawai‘i, that use “has ripened into a customary right. Public policy, as interpreted by this court, favors extending to public use and ownership as much of Hawai‘i’s shoreline as is reasonably possible.” Hawaii County v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 61-62 (Haw. 1973) (citing Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (1969)).
\(^95\) Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach. 854 P.2d 449, 451 (Or. 1993).
\(^96\) ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.05.965(13).
In addition, the public has rights in “public waters,” which by statute include not only navigable waters but also “all other water, whether inland or coastal, fresh or salt, that is reasonably suitable for public use and utility, habitat for fish and wildlife in which there is a public interest, or migration and spawning of fish in which there is a public interest . . . .” These definitions and public rights protected reflect Alaska’s unique environmental and cultural circumstances. Alaska, for example, is the only western state that explicitly identifies use of waters by seaplanes as an important public use to be protected by law.

In addition, Alaska is a prime fishing state, and its statutory declarations of what constitute public waters give special consideration to the use of waters not just for fishing but also for spawning and migration, reflecting most obviously the peculiarities of salmon life cycles; salmon in Alaska are important to commercial fishermen, recreational fishers and the recreation industry, and Native Alaskans. Oregon’s and Washington’s public trust doctrines similarly reflect the importance of salmon and shellfish, respectively, to those state’s citizens.

B. Public Ownership of Submerged Lands, Public Ownership of Water, and Public Rights in Water

As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has most explicitly connected public trust rights to navigable waters – that is, the waters in which the state owns the beds and banks. Thus, in what might be called the state-property-based view of public trust doctrines, public rights follow state title to submerged lands.

However, in the West, as noted, federal and state law both allow for – and most states have declared – state or public ownership of the fresh waters themselves, independent of

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97 ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.05.965(18).
98 For example, in Oregon, the state’s public trust responsibilities have been applied to fishing regulation. As a result, statutes purporting to convey exclusive rights to fish in navigable waters violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Oregon Constitution. Hume v. Rogue River Packing Co., 92 P. 1065, 1072-73 (Or. 1907); see also Johnson v. Hoy, 47 P.2d 252, 252 (Or. 1935) (holding that the Legislature cannot grant an exclusive right to fish for salmon). Nevertheless, because the state has jurisdiction over navigable waters, it can regulate fishing. Oregon v. Nielsen, 95 P. 720, 722 (Or. 1908); Antony v. Veatch, 220 P.2d 493, 498-99 (Or. 1950). Specifically, fishing methods can be enjoined if they interfere with the public’s common right of fishing. Radich v. Frederckson, 10 P.2d 352, 355 (Or. 1932); Johnson v. Hoy, 47 P.2d 252, 252 (Or. 1935).
100 ALAS. CONST., art. VIII, § 13; ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 46.15.030; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-141(A); CAL. WATER C. § 1201; COLO. CONST., art. XVI, § 5; HAW. CONST., art. XI, §§ 1, 7; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702; MONT. CONST., art. IX, § 3(3); NEB. CONST., art. XV, § 5; NEV. REV. STAT. § 533,025; N.M. CONST., art. XVI, § 2; N.M. STAT.
ownership of submerged lands. This public aqualine property right provides these states with another property law basis upon which to recognize and expand public rights in water beyond those recognized in traditional concepts of the public trust doctrine, as articulated in *Illinois Central Railroad*. Thus, as was true for the eastern states, most western states have divorced public rights in waters from state or public ownership of the relevant submerged lands, although the western states generally rely on different legal mechanisms – such as state ownership of water – to do so.

Among the western states, Colorado and Idaho have most clearly adhered to the strict and limited traditional view of public rights in their public trust doctrines. Relying on the federal test of navigability, the Colorado Supreme Court has declared almost streams in Colorado to be non-navigable: “the natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable within its territorial limits, and practically all of them have their sources within its own boundaries, and . . . no stream of any importance whose source is without those boundaries, flows into or through this state.” It then explicitly refused to follow the “modern trend” and allow public rights in non-navigable rivers based on state ownership of the water itself, concluding that the Colorado Constitution does not preserve public recreation rights in such waters. Instead, “[w]ithout permission, the public cannot use such waters for recreation.”

In contrast, the Idaho courts until 1996 were following the western “modern trend,” indicating that water and “proprietary rights to use water . . . are held subject to the public trust.” In 1996, however, Idaho’s legislature invalidated this line of cases, instead defining (and confining) the state’s public trust doctrine by statute. These provisions declare that “[t]he public trust doctrine as it is applied in the state of Idaho is solely a limitation on the power of the state to alienate or encumber the title to the beds of navigable waters as defined in this

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ANN. § 72-1-1; N.D. CONST., art. XI, § 3; N.D. CENT. C. § 61-01-01; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 537.010, 537.525; S.D.C.L. § 46-1-3; VERNON’S TEX. STAT. & C. ANN. § 11.021(a); UTAH C. ANN. § 73-1-1; REV. C. WASH. § 90.03.010; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-115(a).
101 Craig, supra note 6, at 14-16.
102 Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other grounds, Denver Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School District No. 1 in the City & County of Denver, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975). See also United States v. District Court in and for Eagle County, 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1969) (holding that even though the Eagle River is a tributary of the Colorado River, it is non-navigable).
104 Id. at 1029. See also Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686-87 (Colo. 1905) (holding that public ownership of the water itself, as stated in the Colorado Constitution, does not create a public fishery in non-navigable streams; instead, the private landowner owns the right of fishery, and only appropriative rights can trump this common-law rule). Kansas takes the same approach. “Owners of the bed of a nonnavigable stream have the exclusive right of control of everything above the stream bed, subject only to constitutional and statutory limitations, restrictions, and regulations. Where the legislature refuses to create a public trust for recreational purposes in navigable streams, courts should not alter the legislature’s statement of public policy by judicial legislation.” Kansas ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1350, 1364-65 (Kan. 1990). As a result, “[t]he public has no right to the use of nonnavigable water overlying private lands for recreational purposes without the consent of the landowner.” Id. at 1365.
106 IDAHO CODE §§ 58-1201 to 58-1203.
The public trust doctrine shall not be applied to any purpose other than as provided in this chapter,” especially not to “[t]he appropriation or use of water, or the granting, transfer, administration, or adjudication of water or water rights . . . or any other procedure or law applicable to water rights in the state of Idaho” or to “[t]he protection or exercise of private property rights within the state of Idaho.”

Most other western states, however, have now followed the “modern trend” that the Colorado Supreme Court decried. For example, according to the Montana Supreme Court, “[t]he public trust doctrine in Montana’s Constitution grants public ownership in water not in beds and banks of streams,” and “[a]ll waters are owned by the State for the use of its people.” As a result, “the public has the right to use the water for recreational purposes and minimal use of underlying and adjoining real estate essential to enjoyment of its ownership in water,” even if the bed and banks are privately owned. Nevertheless, Montana statutes make it clear that appropriated water rights trump any other public interest in the waters, including environmental protections and public use rights.

New Mexico and North Dakota, similarly, have found the fact that their constitution and statutes, respectively, declare waters to be publicly owned is relevant to their public trust doctrines. Thus, in 1947, the New Mexico Supreme Court declared that all waters are public waters until beneficially appropriated, and hence that the public can use all waters for outside recreation, sports, and fishing. In 1976, North Dakota declared that the public trust doctrine extends broadly to management of the state’s water resources, requiring the State Engineer to determine “the potential effect of [a proposed] allocation of water on the present water supply and future needs of this State,” necessitating water resources planning.

More recently, the South Dakota Supreme Court has decided to follow “modern trend” decisions in Idaho (now overruled in Idaho by statute), Montana, New Mexico, Wyoming, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Iowa to open all waters in the state to public use. As one result, the South Dakota Water Resources Act must now work in tandem with the public trust doctrine:

107 IDAHO CODE § 58-1203(1).
108 IDAHO CODE § 58-1203(2)(b), (c). These statutes define “Navigable waters” as “those waters that were susceptible to being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce on the date of statehood, under the federal test of navigability;” and identify the line of “natural or ordinary high water mark” as the boundary of the beds of navigable waters, in complete agreement with federal law. IDAHO CODE § 58-1202(1).
109 Galt v. Montana by and through Department of Fish, Wildlife, & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 915 (Mont. 1987) (emphasis added).
110 Id.; Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that underlying ownership of the bed does not matter for the public’s recreational use right); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that “under the public trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for nonrecreational purposes.”).
111 MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED §§ 75-5-705, 75-7-104, 85-1-111.
While we regard the public trust doctrine and Water Resources Act as having shared principles, the Act does not supplant the scope of the public trust doctrine. The Water Resources Act evinces a legislative intent both to allocate and regulate water resources. In part, this Act codifies public trust principles. The first three sections of the Act embody the core principles of the public trust doctrine—“the people of the state have a paramount interest in the use of all the water of the state,” SDCL 46-1-1; “the state shall determine in what way the water of the state, both surface and underground, should be developed for the greatest public benefit,” SDCL 46-1-2; and “all water within the state is the property of the people of the state.” SDCL 46-1-3.\(^\text{115}\)

Moreover, when increased precipitation created new lakes over private property, “the State of South Dakota retains the right to use, control, and develop the water in these lakes as a separate asset in trust for the public,” and the public trust doctrine applies independently of bed ownership.\(^\text{116}\) In summary, “all waters within South Dakota, not just those waters considered navigable under the federal test, are held in trust by the State for the public.\(^\text{117}\)

Under Utah’s statutes, waters are owned by the public,\(^\text{118}\) and the Utah Supreme Court has tied the need for public rights to water scarcity: “Public ownership is founded on the principle that water, a scarce and essential resource in this area of the country, is indispensable to the welfare of all people; and the State must therefore assume the responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the people of the State as a whole.”\(^\text{119}\) Thus:

Under this “doctrine of public ownership,” the public owns state waters and has “an easement over the water regardless of who owns the water bed beneath.” In granting this public this easement, “state policy recognizes an interest of the public in the use of state waters for recreational purposes.” This court has enumerated the specific recreational rights that are within the easement’s scope. They include “the right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water.”\(^\text{120}\)

Thus, bed ownership is irrelevant for the public’s rights to use waters in the state.\(^\text{121}\) Moreover, “the scope of the public’s easement in state waters provides the public the right to engage in all recreational activities that utilize the water and does not limit the public to activities that can be

\(^{115}\) Id. at 838.

\(^{116}\) Id.

\(^{117}\) Id. at 838-39.

\(^{118}\) Utah C. Ann. § 73-1-1.

\(^{119}\) JJNP Co. v. Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982).

\(^{120}\) Conater v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899-900 (Utah 2008) (quoting JJNP Co. v. Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982)).

\(^{121}\) Id.
performed upon the water."\textsuperscript{122} As a result, "the public has the right to touch privately owned beds of state waters in ways incidental to all recreational rights provided for in the easement."\textsuperscript{123}

Finally, Wyoming has also extended public use rights to all waters based on its ownership of the water itself. According to the Wyoming Supreme Court, "the actual usability of the waters is alone the limit of the public’s right to employ them."\textsuperscript{124} Except in federally navigable waters, "the exclusive control of waters is vested in the state," and hence "[i]t follows that the state may lay down and follow such criteria for cataloguing waters as navigable or nonnavigable, as it sees fit, and the state may also decide the ownership of submerged lands, irrespective of the navigable or nonnavigable character of the waters above them."\textsuperscript{125} As a result, state ownership of the waters themselves impresses those waters with a public trust.\textsuperscript{126} The public can float craft down any waters so usable, regardless of bed ownership, and can scrape bottom, disembark, and pull the craft over shoals.\textsuperscript{127} Moreover, members of the public can hunt or fish while floating.\textsuperscript{128} However, public use rights do not give the public the right to wade or walk on privately owned streambeds.\textsuperscript{129}

C. The Emergence of Ecological Public Trust Doctrines in the West

As in eastern states,\textsuperscript{130} most western states have expanded the protected public rights in waters beyond the three acknowledged in \textit{Illinois Central Railroad} – navigation, fishing, and commerce – to recreation and other public uses, including in some states aesthetics.\textsuperscript{131} Only

\textsuperscript{122} Id. at 901.
\textsuperscript{123} Id. at 901-02 (limiting criminal trespass liability for water users).
\textsuperscript{125} Id. at 143.
\textsuperscript{126} Id. at 145.
\textsuperscript{127} Id. at 145-46.
\textsuperscript{128} Id. at 147.
\textsuperscript{129} Id. at 146.
\textsuperscript{130} Craig, supra note 6, at 17-19.
\textsuperscript{131} See, e.g., ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.05.965(13) (defining “navigable waters” to include waters that are usable for “floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes”); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (noting that public trust rights “have been held to include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating, and general recreation purposes the navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes.”); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 448 (Haw. 2000) (recognizing broad public rights in its waters, noting that “the trust has traditionally preserved public rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing” but also mentioning “a wide range of recreational uses, including bathing, swimming, boating, and scenic viewing, as protected trust purposes.”); Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Idaho 1983) (acknowledging recreation as a public trust right); Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637, 640 (Kan. 1914) (protecting “the purposes for which [submerged land] has been used from time immemorial, viz; the common right of passage, of fishing, of the use of the waters for domestic, agricultural, and commercial purposes”); MONT. C. ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to 23-2-322, 85-1-111, 85-1-112, 85-16-102, 87-2-305 (codifying public rights of recreation, fishing, and navigation); New Mexico ex rel. State Game Commission v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 429-32 (N.M. 1947) (recognizing public rights of recreation, sports, and fishing); J.P. Furlong Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 140 (N.D. 1988) (recognizing bathing, swimming, fishing, and irrigation as protected public interests); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935-36 (Okla.
Arizona (by statute\textsuperscript{132}) and Colorado (by case law\textsuperscript{133}) have intentionally limited public rights in waters, although neither Nebraska nor Nevada has yet fully developed its public trust law in this respect.

Such expanded public rights, however, still remain focused on public uses of waters – not on the ecological and ecosystem services values of aquatic and other ecosystems. Indeed, with the emergence of pervasive statutory environmental and natural resources law in the 1970s and 1980s, both federal and state, the need for broader public trust principles to protect ecological values seemed highly questionable. Thus, Richard Lazarus concluded in 1986 that the day of “final reckoning” for the doctrine is here, or soon will be, and reliance upon it is no longer in order. As shown in the following sections, the law of standing, tort law, property law, administrative law, and the police power have all evolved in response to increased societal concern for and awareness of environmental and natural resources problems and are weaving a new and unified fabric for natural resources law. Whether these developments are viewed as totally independent of the doctrine or, alternatively, as somehow having subsumed the doctrine's principles does not matter. The conclusion is the same from either perspective: much of what the public trust doctrine offered in the past is now, at best, superfluous and, at worst, distracting and theoretically inconsistent with new notions of property and sovereignty developing in the current reworking of natural resources law.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{132} Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 37-1130(9).

\textsuperscript{133} The Colorado Supreme Court has declared most streams in Colorado non-navigable. Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other grounds, Denver Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School District No. 1 in the City & County of Denver, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975). Moreover, in a non-navigable river, title to the bed and banks is in the private landowner, giving the landowner exclusive control over the water and the right to exclude recreational users who would like to use the water for floating or fishing. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (upholding a criminal trespass conviction for floating down a non-navigable river).

\textsuperscript{134} Lazarus, supra note 31, at 658.
Nevertheless, scholars continue to assert the need for expanded public trust doctrines. For example, in 1991, Alison Rieser summarized the drive to broaden public trust concepts as follows:

Due largely to recent decisions of the California courts, the notion that the public has a right to expect certain lands and natural areas to retain their natural characteristics is finding its way into American law. Through interpretation and expansion of the common law public trust doctrine, state courts are identifying governmental duties to redefine existing private property rights where such rights may threaten the ecological value of natural areas. Courts have subjected to this special duty primarily properties associated with navigable waters. Litigants and state agencies, however, appear poised and willing to invoke the public trust doctrine with respect to a number of other resources unrelated to navigation. Several public trust commentators – including Professor Joseph Sax, the modern doctrine’s earliest and most prominent proponent – either urge or foresee a continuing expansion in the doctrine’s scope. Some predict that courts will eventually apply public trust protections to all waterbodies, as well as to such diverse resources as old growth forests, mountains, and wildlife.135

More recently, Mary Christina Wood has argued for comprehensively expanded public trust concepts in American environmental and natural resources law to address emerging environmental crises and the impacts of climate change.136

These repeated returns by academic scholars to the public trust doctrine strongly indicates that the doctrine suggests remedies to perceived shortcomings in environmental law and policy. Indeed, two drivers for these revisitations are discernible in the literature. First, scholars often turn to the public trust doctrine when they conclude that statutory law has not, in fact, been sufficient to protect the full gamut of public interests in the environment.137 As one prominent example, an example with direct ties to the public trust doctrine’s connection to navigable water, in light of the acknowledged weaknesses in U.S. ocean and coastal law,138 scholars with interests

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137 “Under the system of environmental statutory laws enacted in the United States over the past three decades, agencies at every jurisdictional level have gained nearly unlimited authority to manage natural resources and allow their destruction by private interests through permit systems.” Id. at 44; see also id. at 54-61 (discussing the failed paradigm of environmental law).

138 See generally, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004); PEW OCEANS COMMISSION, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA CHANGE (May 2003).
in these areas have repeatedly suggested the public trust doctrine as a means of better protecting coastal and marine resources. Similarly, the public trust doctrine has been of interest to scholars promoting the relatively new – and hence statutorily slighted – conception of ecosystem services, acknowledging that ecosystems provide economically valuable services to human beings.

Second, and more importantly, the articulation of a “public trust” encapsulates a more general values system for the environment and its ecosystems – an environmental ethos, if you will, that is longer term in focus, more comprehensive in its considerations, and more willing to preserve purely public values than regulatory law. Mary Wood, for example, has recently argued that there is a need for a fundamental paradigm shift in environmental and natural resources law and has focused on the public trust doctrine as her model because it is “the most compelling beacon for a fundamental and rapid paradigm shift towards sustainability.” Moreover, the public trust doctrine provides one well-grounded legal mechanism for re-balancing private and public rights in the environment, and scholars are increasingly perceiving such a rebalancing to be necessary. Thus, the legal recognition of a “public trust” provides both a rhetorically

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140 See generally, e.g., Patrick J. Connolly, Note, Saving Fish to Save the Bay: Public Trust Doctrine Protection for Menhaden’s Foundational Ecosystem Services in the Chesapeake Bay, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 135 (2009); J.B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working Change from Within, 15 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 223 (Fall 2006).

141 Wood, supra note 136, at 45.

142 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 23, at 117 (arguing that “thirty years of statutory law has produced an imbalanced picture in which public property rights are simply not in the equation,” but that “public trust law springs from the property realm and forces an adjustment of private property rights and expectation to protect the people’s property rights in common, vital assets’); see also Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155, 1158-67 (Nov. 2007) (in the context of a nuisance law article, tracing the “supersizing” of private property rights and the demonization of public rights, interests, and
resonant articulation of the larger public interests in intact and functional ecosystems and a means of imposing broad duties on governments to act for the long-term preservation of ecosystems and other environmental values – what I have termed the ecological public trust.  

In many ways, however, the western states have anticipated these scholarly calls for the expansion of public trust concepts to the environment generally. While California is widely acknowledged to have evolved its public trust doctrine into an ecological public trust (at least when navigable waters are affected), it is not alone. Hawai‘i has, if anything, an even broader ecological public trust doctrine than California, and other western states are more cautiously using public trust principles to expand the legally cognizable public values in the environment.

The emergence of these ecological public trust doctrines represents the leading edge of public trust common law. However, the ecological public trust doctrines are also highly individualistic, underscoring the need for scholars to acknowledge public trust doctrines in the plural and to actively discern and compare the common law evolutions of those doctrines in and among particular states.

1. California

It is no accident that Alison Rieser tied the conception of an ecological public trust to California. In the 1971 case of Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme Court announced that:

There is growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands – a use encompassed within the tidelands trust – is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.

In connection with Lake Tahoe litigation, the court soon extended its recognition of ecological values to nontidal submerged lands as well, underscoring the human-created scarcity and fragility of these resources. It noted that “the [fresh water] shorezone has been reduced to a fraction of its original size in this state by the pressures of development. Such lands now cover less than one half of 1 percent of the state . . . .” Moreover:

The shorezone is a fragile and complex resource. It provides the environment necessary for the survival of numerous types of fish (including salmon, steelhead,

values in the environment in law, policy, and rhetoric to argue that public and private rights have become unbalanced in American culture and law).

Professor Mary Wood has called this “Nature’s Trust.” Wood, supra note 136, at 65-84. In the second of her two articles on this subject, she has discussed in detail the governmental obligations to protect natural resources that she would impose through this expanded public trust. See Wood, supra note 23, at 93-116.


and striped bass), birds (such as the endangered species: the bald eagle and the peregrine falcon), and many other species of wildlife and plants. These areas are ideally suited for scientific study, since they provide a gene pool for the preservation of biological diversity. In addition, the shorezone in its natural condition is essential to the maintenance of good water quality, and the vegetation acts as a buffer against floods and erosion.\(^{146}\)

Thus, the California public trust doctrine extends to “environmental . . . purposes.”\(^{147}\)

California courts have extended public trust concepts not just to aquatic wildlife habitat, but also to the wildlife itself,\(^{148}\) creating “two distinct public trust doctrines” in the state.\(^{149}\) Wildlife “are natural resources of inestimable value to the community as a whole. Their protection and preservation is a public interest that is now recognized in numerous state and federal statutory provisions,”\(^{150}\) and those statutes generally define the contours of the public trust obligation regarding wildlife.\(^{151}\) Nevertheless, members of the general public can sue to enforce the public trust as well as the navigable water trust, because the public trust doctrine “places a duty upon the government to protect those resources.”\(^{152}\)

Public trust interests also can extend California’s authority and duties beyond the navigable waters. For example, “[t]he state’s right to protect fish is not limited to navigable or otherwise public waters but extends to any waters where fish are habitated or accustomed to resort and through which the have the freedom of passage to and from the public fishing grounds

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\(^{146}\) Id.

\(^{147}\) City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 644 P.2d 792, 794 (Cal. 1982).


\(^{149}\) According to the California Supreme Court:

First is the common law doctrine, which involves the government’s “affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources . . . .” The second is a public trust duty derived from statute, specifically Fish and Game Code section 711.7, pertaining to fish and wildlife: “The fish and wildlife resources are held in trust for the people of the state by and through the department.” There is doubtless an overlap between the two public trust doctrines – the protection of water resources is intertwined with the protection of wildlife. . . . Nonetheless, the duty of government agencies to protect wildlife is primarily statutory.

Environmental Protection & Information Center v. California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection, 44 Cal. 4th 459, 515 (2008) (quoting and citing National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446, 447 (1983)); see also California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board, 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 630 (3rd Dist. 1989) (establishing that Fish and Game Code § 5946 establishes a public trust rule but noting “that it does not follow from the application of the term “public trust” to the state’s interest in fisheries of non-navigable streams that all of the consequences of the public trust doctrine as applicable to navigable waters also apply to non-navigable streams. For example, the beds of non-navigable streams are not owned by the state based upon a public trust fishery interest.”).

\(^{150}\) Id. at 1363.

\(^{151}\) Id. at 1364.

\(^{152}\) Id. at 1365-66.
of the state.”153 Similarly, in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (the “Mono Lake case”), 154 the California Supreme Court determined that the public trust doctrine could restrict or require modifications in established water rights even in non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters. Withdrawals of water from Mono Lake’s tributaries were imperiling “both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake . . . .”155 As a result, the public trust doctrine required modifications in the prior appropriation system.156 Specifically, “the public trust doctrine . . . protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of non-navigable tributaries,”157 and “when the public trust doctrine clashes with the rule of priority, the rule of priority must yield.”158

Nevertheless, despite its acclimation as the vanguard of the ecological public trust doctrine, California does limit that breadth of that doctrine. In particular, the National Audubon rule does not apply to water withdrawals from purely non-navigable waters in the absence of an effect on navigable waters.159 Thus, despite having recognized a second, largely statutory, wildlife public trust doctrine, California maintains a connection between its ecological public trust doctrine and the traditional American source of public trust rights: state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters.

2. Hawai‘i

Like California, Hawai‘i recognizes two different public trust doctrines – in Hawai‘i’s case, the navigable water public trust doctrine and a unique public trust growing out of Hawai‘i’s complex history and Native Hawaiian rights, known as the water resources public trust. Both have contributed to a broad ecological public trust perspective in the state, one that favors public rights over private.

The Hawai‘i water resources public trust doctrine has largely superseded the navigable waters public trust in the context of water rights and fresh waters. The Hawai‘i Supreme Court has noted that in the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, the right to water was reserved to the people for their

154 See also People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374, 399-400, 400-01 (Cal. 1897) (noting that “the right and power to protect and preserve [fish] for the common use and benefit is one of the recognized prerogatives of the sovereign, coming to us from the common law” and asserting that the state’s authority to protect fish for the public is not limited to fish in navigable waters; “[t]o the extent that waters are the common passageway for fish, although flowing over lands entirely subject to private ownership, they are deemed for such purposes public waters, and subject to all laws of the state regulating the right of fishery”); California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board, 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 630 (3d Dist. 1989) (concluding “that a public trust interest pertains to non-navigable streams which sustain a fishery”).
156 Id. at 711.
157 Id. at 712; see also id. at 727-28.
158 Id. at 721.
common good in all land grants, and ownership of the water remained at all times in the people.\footnote{In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw. 2000); see also Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310-11 (Haw. 1982) (giving the same history).} This sovereign reservation imposed a public trust on the water itself, similar to but different from the navigable waters public trust doctrine.\footnote{In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw. 2000); Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982) (noting that this sovereign interest was more than just a police power interest; “[t]he nature of this ownership is thus akin to the title held by all states in navigable waterways”).}

Given the limited availability of fresh water resources in Hawai‘i, reassertion of this traditional water resources trust has been deemed critical, both as against assertions of riparian rights and in light of the Hawai‘i Water Code and water use permits. With respect to riparian rights:

The reassertion of dormant public interests in the diversion and application of Hawaii’s waters has become essential with the increasing scarcity of the resource and recognition of the public’s interests in the utilization and flow of these waters. . . . While there indeed exist relative usufructory rights among landowners, these rights can no longer be treated as though they are absolute and exclusive interests in the waters of our state.\footnote{Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 311 (Haw. 1982).}

Instead, “underlying every private diversion and application there is, as there always has been, a superior public interest in this natural bounty.”\footnote{Id. at 312.} Thus, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has clearly re-balanced public and private interests in these scarce resources in favor of the public.

With respect to the Hawai‘i Water Code, “[t]he public trust in the water resources of this state, like the navigable waters trust, has its genesis in the common law. . . . The [State Water] Code does not evince any legislative intent to abolish the common law public trust doctrine. To the contrary, . . . the legislature appears to have engrafted the doctrine wholesale in the Code.”\footnote{In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 443 (Haw. 2000) (citations omitted).} As a result, the Hawai‘i Water Code “does not supplant the protections of the public trust doctrine,” and “the public trust doctrine applies to all water resources without exception or distinction,” including ground waters.\footnote{Id. at 445.}

As in California, in implementing its water law Hawai‘i may “revisit prior diversions and allocations, even those made with due consideration of their effect on the public trust.”\footnote{In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 452 (Haw. 2000) (citations omitted).} Moreover, “the constitutional requirements of ‘protection’ and ‘conservation,’ the historical and continuing understanding of the trust as a guarantee of public rights, and the common reality of the ‘zero-sum’ game between competing water uses demand that any balancing between public and private purposes begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment,” and the state water agency’s decisions in favor of private uses of water are subject to “higher
Finally, the state agency must consider the cumulative impacts of diversions and "implement reasonable measures to mitigate this impact, including the use of alternative sources." 

Importantly, according to the Hawai‘i Supreme Court, “the maintenance of waters in their natural state constitutes a distinct ‘use’ under the water resources trust.” Thus, this public trust doctrine encompasses ecological protection and preservation. To underscore that point, in expounding the water resources trust, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court explicitly has followed the California Supreme Court’s decision in National Audubon Society. 

Unlike in California, however, both of Hawaii’s two water-based public trusts are incorporated into the state’s much broader constitutional public trust doctrine. The Hawai‘i Constitution provides that:

For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.

The Hawai‘i Supreme Court has indicated that these more general constitutional public trust concepts extend to environmental and biodiversity protection, such as regulation of the Palila, an endangered bird. In 2006, moreover, it explicitly connected the constitutionally incorporated navigable waters public trust doctrine to environmental protection when it held that that doctrine applies to the Hawai‘i Department of Health’s implementation of the federal Clean Water Act. Thus, when environmental groups asserted that the Department violated the public trust doctrine by failing to prevent a developer from violating state water quality standards for coastal waters, the court concluding that state issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits pursuant to the Clean Water Act are subject to the public trust doctrine and that the Department must ensure that water quality measures are actually being implemented.

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167 Id. at 454; see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 93 P.3d 643, 650, 657 (Haw. 2004) (noting that "because water is a public trust resource and the public trust is a state constitutional doctrine, this court recognizes certain qualifications to the standard of review regarding the Water Commission’s decisions" and in effect imposes a burden on proposed users to justify their uses of water).

168 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000) (citations omitted).

169 Id. at 448.

170 Id. at 452 (adopting the reasoning of National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983)).

171 Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1009, 1011 (Haw. 2006).

172 HAW. CONST., art. XI, § 1.


174 Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1009, 1011 (Haw. 2006).
3. Other States

Other states besides California and Hawai‘i have incorporated public trust principles into resource management and ecological conservation, although not so extensively. For example, according to the Alaska Supreme Court, “[t]he public trust doctrine provides that the State holds certain resources (such as wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in trust for public use and that government owes a fiduciary duty to maintain such resources for the common good of the public as beneficiary.”\(^\text{175}\) Moreover, while that court has made it clear that the navigable waters public trust doctrine \textit{per se} does not extend to wildlife management, the state does have a duty under the Alaska Constitution to manage fish, wildlife, and water resources for the people’s benefit, “to guarantee the common citizen participation in wildlife harvest, and to divest the [government] of exclusive entitlement to those resources.”\(^\text{176}\) Thus, according to the Alaska Supreme Court:

We have frequently compared the state’s duties as set forth in Article VIII to a trust-like relationship in which the state holds natural resources such as fish, wildlife, and water in “trust” for the benefit of all Alaskans. Instead of recognizing the creation of a public trust in these clauses \textit{per se}, we have noted that “the common use clause was intended to engrain in our constitution certain trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish, wildlife, and water resources of the state.”\(^\text{177}\)

Nevertheless, in general, the State of Alaska cannot be liable in damages under the public trust doctrine for allowing the destruction of natural resources, as when beetles destroyed trees.\(^\text{178}\)

Less decisively, there are also indications from the Texas courts that fish and other aquatic life are subject to public trust principles. As far back as 1942, the Texas Civil Court of Appeals declared:

The waters of all natural streams of this State and all fish and other aquatic life contained in fresh water rivers, creeks, stream, and lakes or sloughs subject to overflow from rivers or other streams within the borders of this State, are declared to be the property of the State; and the Game, Fish ad Oyster Commission has jurisdiction over and control over such rivers and aquatic life. The ownership is in trust for the people . . ., and pollution of streams and water courses is

\(^\text{175}\) Baxley v. Alaska, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alas. 1998). Nevertheless, mining is not an activity protected by the public trust. Commercial uses protected under the \textit{Illinois Central} decision are “commerce in the sense of trade, traffic or transportation of goods over navigable waters, a meaning which does not include mining. Most importantly, a mining claim is not a ‘public use,’ but rather an exclusive, depleting use of a non-renewable resource for public profit. We believe that even the most expansive interpretation of the scope of public trust easements would not include private mining enterprises.” Hayes v. A.J. Assoc., Inc., 846 P.2d 131, 133 (Alas. 1993).

\(^\text{176}\) McDowell v. Alaska, 785 P.2d 1, 16 (Alas. 1989).

\(^\text{177}\) Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Alas. 1999) (citation omitted); \textit{but see} Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60 (Alas. 1996) (noting that the state has a trust responsibility to manage fish, wildlife, and water resources, including salmon).

condemned . . . . The Constitution of Texas, Art. 16, § 59(a) . . . designates rivers and streams as natural resources, declares that such belong to the State, and expressly invests the Legislature with the preservation and conservation of such resources.\textsuperscript{179}

In 2005, moreover, the court indicated that the public trust doctrine allows the state to “conserve natural resources.”\textsuperscript{180}

Washington has also flirted with applying some version of a public trust doctrine to wildlife, especially shellfish. For example, the Washington Court of Appeals has stated that the public trust doctrine applies to the Department of Natural Resources’ regulation of shellfish, such as geoducks.\textsuperscript{181} Nevertheless, the Department’s regulation of the commercial geoduck harvest did not violate the public trust doctrine despite the public right to fish, because: (1) the state must “balance the protection of the public’s right to use resources on public land with the protection of the resources that enable these activities”; (2) the Department had not given up its control over the state’s geoduck resources; and (3) the regulation facilitated sustainable geoduck harvesting and natural regeneration of the resource, serving the public interest.\textsuperscript{182} These conclusions thus fairly clearly suggest that Washington is beginning to connect public trust principles to sustainable development.

Similarly to Washington, North Dakota has considered the role of the public trust doctrine with regard to more general ecological considerations but has nevertheless continued to confine the doctrine’s application to water resources. The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged as early as 1976 that “[i]t is evident that the Public Trust Doctrine is assuming an expanding role in environmental law.”\textsuperscript{183} The public trust doctrine does not prohibit all development, and hence the State Engineer can grant permits to drain wetlands, especially when he studied the consequences, imposed conditions, and was subject to a public interest requirement.\textsuperscript{184} Nevertheless, the public trust doctrine does limit the state’s discretionary authority “to allocate vital state resources,” as enunciated in \textit{Illinois Central Railroad}.\textsuperscript{185} Nor is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{179} Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
\item \textsuperscript{180} Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement District No. 17, 175 S.W.2d 34, 49 (Tex. App. 2005).
\item \textsuperscript{181} Washington State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Washington State Department of Natural Resources, 101 P.3d 891, 895 (Wash. App. 2004); \textit{but see} Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Management v. Washington, 103 P.3d 203, 205 (Wash. App. 2004) (“No Washington case has applied the public trust doctrine to \textit{terrestrial} wildlife or resources. But we need not decide whether the public trust doctrine applies [to prohibitions on terrestrial hunting and trapping] because, even if it does, Citizens’ challenge fails.” (emphasis added)).
\item \textsuperscript{182} Washington State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Washington State Department of Natural Resources, 101 P.3d 891, 895, 896-97 (Wash. App. 2004).
\item \textsuperscript{183} United Plainsmen Ass’n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976).
\item \textsuperscript{185} United Plainsmen Ass’n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission, 247 N.W.2d 457, 460 (N.D. 1976).
\end{itemize}
the doctrine restricted to conveyances of submerged lands; “[t]he State holds the navigable waters, as well as the lands beneath them, in trust for the public,” as provided in the North Dakota Constitution and refined by statute. As a result, “protecting the integrity of the waters of the State is a valid exercise of the [North Dakota Water Commission’s] duties,” allowing it, for example, to control the drainage of a lake.

More general – but also more embryonic – discussions of an ecological public trust have also surfaced in South Dakota and Utah. The South Dakota Supreme Court has determined that South Dakota’s Environmental Protection Act embodies a broader public trust doctrine than the navigable waters public trust alone would allow. This Act “authoriz[es] legal action to protect ‘the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction.” Utah also appears to be extending its public trust doctrine to ecological protection, because, according to the Utah Supreme Court, “[t]he ‘public trust’ doctrine . . . protects the ecological integrity of public lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at large.”

**Conclusion**

In contrast to the many discussions over the years seeking to accurately describe “the” public trust doctrine, this Article concludes by arguing that the contemporary power of public trust concepts lies not in tracing their historical bases but rather in embracing their status as varying and evolving state common law. Like any other category of state common law – earlier landlord/tenant law, tort law, contract law – state public trust doctrines both reflect historic concerns and public policies – specifically, the particular public concerns regarding water in particular locations of the United States – and provide the states with an “ability to adapt to emerging societal needs.” State courts on both sides of the 100th Meridian have celebrated the flexible and evolutionary nature of their public trust doctrines, but scholars have been reluctant to embrace the rich mixture of approaches to balancing public and private rights in water and other natural resources that has emerged.

The western states, ranging from Hawaii and California on one end of a complex spectrum to Arizona and Colorado on the other, provide a particularly instructive diversity of approaches to the recognition (or not) of public rights in and the public values of water and other aspects of the environment. In comparing the public trust doctrines of the western states, moreover, four factors emerge as the most important in the evolution of state public trust
doctrines. First, the severing of water rights from real property ownership and the riparian rights doctrine freed these states from one set of potentially confining private property rights. Second, subsequent state declarations of public ownership of fresh water allow western states’ public trust doctrine to operate independently of state title to submerged lands and federal pronouncements regarding “the” public trust doctrine. Third, clear and explicit perceptions of shortages of fresh water, submerged lands, and environmental amenities have prompted increased interest, compared to the East, in preserving the public values in these resources. Finally, the willingness of most western states to raise water and other environmental issues to constitutional status and/or to incorporate broad public trust mandates into statutes has encouraged their courts to evolve water-based public trust principles into expanding ecological public trust doctrines.

As the most recent cases demonstrate, and despite occasional limiting interventions by states legislatures (as in Idaho), the evolution of western state public trust doctrines is not slowing. Instead, in true common law fashion, state courts are using state public trust doctrines to respond to particular and emerging state needs – the loss of native species and critical need to protect coastal waters in Hawai‘i; profound conflicts between appropriators, species, and ecological values in California; the perhaps climate-change driven appearance of new publicly usable water resources in South Dakota. While such evolutions and expansions complicate the identity – indeed, the very existence – of any unitary, national, perhaps-Constitution-based public trust doctrine, they also provide place-based balancings of public and private needs and values in that most basic of natural resources – fresh water – that may better serve the long-term interests of the nation as a whole.
APPENDIX: SUMMARIES OF INDIVIDUAL STATE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES

ALASKA

Date of Statehood: 1959


Alaska Constitution: Alaska constitutionalizes some of the access and use rights guaranteed by the public trust doctrine. Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution governs natural resources, including waters and submerged lands. Relevant provisions of this article include:

- § 1: “It is the policy of the State to encourage the settlement of its land and the development of its resources by making them available for maximum use consistent with the public interest.”
- § 2: “The legislature shall provide for the utilization, development, and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State, including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.”
- § 3: “Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use.”
- § 5: “The legislature may provide for facilities, impoundments, and services to assure greater utilization, development, reclamation, and settlement of lands, and to assure fuller utilization and development of fisheries, wildlife, and waters.”
- § 6: “Lands and interests therein, including submerged and tidal lands, possessed or acquired by the State, and not used or intended exclusively for governmental purposes, constitute the state public domain. The legislature shall provide for the selection of lands granted to the State by the United States, and for the administration of the state public domain.”
- § 8: “The legislature may provide for the leasing of, and the issuance of permits for exploration of, any part of the public domain or interest therein, subject to reasonable concurrent uses. Leases and permits shall provide, among other conditions, for payment by the party at fault for damage or injury arising from noncompliance with terms governing concurrent use, and for forfeiture in the event of breach of conditions.”
- § 9: “Subject to the provisions of this section, the legislature may provide for the sale or grant of state lands, or interests therein, and establish sales procedures. All sales or grants shall contain such reservations to the State of all resources as may be required by Congress of the State and shall provide for access to these resources. Reservation of access shall not unnecessarily impair the owners’ use, prevent the control of trespass, or preclude compensation for damages.”
- § 13: “All surface and subsurface waters reserved to the people for common use, except mineral and medicinal waters, are subject to appropriation. Priority of appropriation shall give prior right. Except for public water supply, an appropriation of water shall be
limited to stated purposes and subject to preferences among beneficial uses, concurrent or otherwise, as prescribed by law, and to the general reservation of fish and wildlife.”

- § 14: “Free access to the navigable or public waters of the State, as defined by the legislature, shall not be denied any citizen of the United States or resident of the State, except that the legislature may by general law regulate and limit such access for other beneficial uses or public purposes.”

- § 15: “No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section does not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the State.”

Alaska Statutes:

- **Alaska Statutes:§ 38.04.062:** In general, “the state owns all submerged land underlying navigable water to which title passed to the state at the time the state achieved statehood under the equal footing doctrine” or the federal Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315. § 38.04.062(a). The Commissioner must make a list of all waters deemed navigable or nonnavigable by state or federal agencies or courts, but “[w]ater not included on the lists . . . is not considered either navigable or nonnavigable until the commissioner has made a determination as to its navigability at the time the state achieved statehood. § 38.04.062(b), (c), (d). However, submerged lands that the state conveyed pursuant to state statute is not governed by this section. § 38.04.062(f). “Navigable water,” for purposes of this statute, is “water that, at the time the state achieved statehood, was used, or was susceptible of being used, in its ordinary condition as a highway for commerce over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water; the use or potential use does not need to have been without difficulty, extensive, or long and continuous . . . .” § 38.04.062(g).

- **Alaska Statutes:§ 38.05.126:** This statute recognizes the public trust doctrine in Alaska, declaring that: (a) “[t]he people of the state have a constitutional right to free access to and use of the navigable or public water of the state”; (b) “that state holds and controls all navigable or public water in trust for the use of the people of the state”; (c) “[o]wnership of land bordering navigable or public water does not grant an exclusive right to the use of the water and a right of title to the land below the ordinary high water mark is subject to the rights of the people of the state to use and have access to the water for recreational purposes or other public purposes for which the water is used or capable of being used consistent with the public trust”; and (d) nothing in this statute “affect[s] or abridge[s] valid existing rights or create a right or privilege of the public to cross or enter private land.”

- **Alaska Statutes:§ 38.05.127:** Before the state can sell, lease, grant, or otherwise dispose of lands adjacent to water, the Commissioner must determine whether the water is a navigable water, a public water, or neither. If the water is navigable or public, the...
state must “provide for the specific easements or rights-of-way necessary to ensure free access to and along the body of water, unless the commissioner finds that regulation or limiting access is necessary for other beneficial uses or public purposes.”

- **ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.05.128:** No person may not obstruct a navigable water or interfere with others’ use of that water unless authorized by state or federal law. “An unauthorized obstruction or interference is a public nuisance and is subject to abatement.” Moreover, “[f]ree passage or use of any navigable water includes the right to use land below the ordinary high water mark to the extent reasonably necessary to use the navigable water consistent with the public trust,” and “[f]ree passage or use of any navigable water includes the right to enter adjacent land above the ordinary high water mark as necessary to portage around obstacles or obstructions to travel on the water . . . .”

- **ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.05.825:** “Unless the commissioner finds that the public interest in retaining state ownership of the land clearly outweighs the municipality’s interest in obtaining the land, the commissioner shall convey to a municipality tide or submerged land requested by the municipality that is occupied or suitable for occupation and development,” so long as the land is within or contiguous to the municipality and “use of the land would not unreasonably interfere with navigation or public access.”

- **ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.05.965:** This statute defines “navigable water” for purposes other than state title and also distinguishes “navigable water” and “public water.” “Navigable water” is “any water of the state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek, bay, sound, estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other body of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful public purpose, including but not limited to water suitable for commercial navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes . . . .” § 38.05.965(13). “Public water” is “navigable water and all other water, whether inland or coastal, fresh or salt, that is reasonably suitable for public use and utility, habitat for fish and wildlife in which there is a public interest, or migration and spawning of fish in which there is a public interest . . . .” § 38.05.965(18).

Other definitions of relevance to the state public trust: “shoreland” is “land belonging to the state which is covered by nontidal water that is navigable under the laws of the United States up to ordinary high water mark”; “submerged land” is “land covered by tidal water between the line of mean low water and seaward to a distance of three geographical miles or further as may hereafter be properly claimed by the state”; and “tideland” is “land that is periodically covered by tidal water between the elevation of mean high water and mean low water . . . .” § 38.05.965(20), (22), (23).

- **ALAS. STAT. ANN. §§ 46.15.010-46.15.270:** Alaska Water Use Act. “Wherever occurring in a natural state, the water is reserved to the people for common use and is subject to appropriation and beneficial use and to reservation of instream flows and levels of water, as provided in this chapter.” § 46.15.030. Reservations are allowed for fish. § 46.15.035(c). Appropriations are subject to a public interest review, which includes “the effect on fish and game resources and on public recreational opportunities” and “the effect upon access to navigable or public water.” § 46.15.080(b)(3), (8). Moreover, the Act allows reservations of water or instream flows to “protect[] fish and wildlife habitat,
migration, and propagation,” for “recreation and park purposes,” for “navigation and transportation purposes,” and for “sanitary and water quality purposes.” § 46.15.145.

**Definition of “Navigable Waters”:**

By statute, Alaska has adopted the federal title definition of “navigable water” to identify the waters for which the state owns the bed and banks. Thus, “navigable water” for state title purposes is “water that, at the time the state achieved statehood, was used, or was susceptible of being used, in its ordinary condition as a highway for commerce over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water; the use or potential use does not need to have been without difficulty, extensive, or long and continuous . . . .” ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.04.062(g).

For other purposes, including public rights in waters, a “navigable water” is “any water of the state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek, bay, sound, estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other body of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful public purpose, including but not limited to water suitable for commercial navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes . . . .” ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.05.965(13). In addition, the public has rights in “public waters,” which by statute include not only navigable waters but also “all other water, whether inland or coastal, fresh or salt, that is reasonably suitable for public use and utility, habitat for fish and wildlife in which there is a public interest, or migration and spawning of fish in which there is a public interest . . . .” ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.05.965(18).


**Rights in “Navigable Waters”:**

In general, the state owns the beds of the navigable waters “up to the ordinary high-water mark.” Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources v. Pankratz, 538 P.2d 984, 988 (Alas. 1975); see also Pankratz v. Alaska Dept. of Highways, 652 P.2d 68, 73 (Alas. 1982) (noting that “it is clear that a state has title to land underlying navigable waters up to the mean high water mark.”). However, the public has rights of access and use to both state-defined navigable and public waters, even if the landowner owns below the high-water mark. ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.05.126.

In its case law regarding public uses, Alaska remains closely aligned with the principles set forth in Illinois Central. Thus, for example, tidelands “are subject to the public’s right to use tidelands for navigation, commerce, and fishing.” City of St. Paul v. Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources, 137 P.3d 261, 263 n.8 (Alas. 2006). However, by statute, Alaska deems state
“navigable waters” to include waters that are usable for “floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes,” ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.05.965(13), suggesting that these uses are also protected under the state public trust doctrine. No person may not obstruct a navigable water or interfere with others’ use of that water unless authorized by state or federal law, ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.05.128, and “[a]n unauthorized obstruction or interference is a public nuisance and is subject to abatement.” Id. Moreover, “[f]ree passage or use of any navigable water includes the right to use land below the ordinary high water mark to the extent reasonably necessary to use the navigable water consistent with the public trust,” and “[f]ree passage or use of any navigable water includes the right to enter adjacent land above the ordinary high water mark as necessary to portage around obstacles or obstructions to travel on the water . . . .” Id.

Also in line with Illinois Central Railroad, conveyances of tidelands to private owners generally convey only “naked title,” and the tidelands remain subject to the public trust unless the conveyance meets the Illinois Central criteria – “first, whether the conveyance was made in furtherance of some specific public trust purpose and, second, whether the conveyance can be made without substantial impairment of the public’s interest in state tidelands.” CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Alas. 1988). No such intent is present in ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 38.05.820, especially in light of Article VIII, § 3 of the Alaska Constitution, so those conveyed tidelands remain subject to the public trust. Moreover, even conveyances of tidelands to municipalities pursuant to Alaska Statutes Annotated § 38.05.825 remain subject to the public trust; “[t]he conveyance transfer to the municipality the state’s right to use and manage the tidelands, but does not confer the right to sell of dispose of the lands or exempt them from the public trust doctrine.” City of St. Paul v. Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources, 137 P.3d 261, 263 (Alas. 2006).

In terms of resource protection, “[t]he public trust doctrine provides that the State holds certain resources (such as wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in trust for public use and that government owes a fiduciary duty to maintain such resources for the common good of the public as beneficiary.” Baxley v. Alaska, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alas. 1998). Nevertheless, mining is not an activity protected by the public trust. Commercial uses protected under the Illinois Central decision are “commerce in the sense of trade, traffic or transportation of goods over navigable waters, a meaning which does not include mining. Most importantly, a mining claim is not a ‘public use,’ but rather an exclusive, depleting use of a non-renewable resource for public profit. We believe that even the most expansive interpretation of the scope of public trust easements would not include private mining enterprises.” Hayes v. A.J. Assocs., Inc., 846 P.2d 131, 133 (Alas. 1993).

Similarly, the public trust doctrine per se does not extend to wildlife management, although the state does have a duty under Article VIII, § 3 of the Alaska Constitution to manage fish, wildlife, and water resources for the people’s benefit, “to guarantee the common citizen participation in wildlife harvest, and to divest the [government] of exclusive entitlement to those resources.” McDowell v. Alaska, 785 P.2d 1m 16 (Alas. 1989). According to the Alaska Supreme Court:
We have frequently compared the state’s duties as set forth in Article VIII to a trust-like relationship in which the state holds natural resources such as fish, wildlife, and water in “trust” for the benefit of all Alaskans. Instead of recognizing the creation of a public trust in these clauses per se, we have noted that “the common use clause was intended to engraft in our constitution certain trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish, wildlife, and water resources of the state.”

Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Alas. 1999) (citation omitted); but see Pullen v. Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60 (Alas. 1996) (noting that the state has a trust responsibility to manage fish, wildlife, and water resources, including salmon). Access rights are equal for both personal and professional fishing. Owsichek v. Alaska Guide Licensing and Control Board, 763 P.2d 488, 497 (Alas. 1988). However, in general, the State cannot be liable in damages under the public trust doctrine for allowing the destruction of natural resources, as when beetles destroyed trees. Brady v. Alaska, 965 P.2d 1, 17 (Alas. 1998).

ARIZONA

Date of Statehood: 1912


Arizona Constitution: Article XVII of the Arizona Constitution governs water rights. Relevant provisions include:

- § 1: “The common law doctrine of riparian water rights shall not obtain or be of any force or effect in the State.”
- § 2: “All existing rights to the use of any of the waters in the State for all useful or beneficial purposes are hereby recognized and confirmed.”

Arizona Statutes:

- ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 37-1130 to 37-1156: State Claims to Streambeds. These provisions establish the Arizona Navigable Stream Adjudication Commission, which acts as an advocate for the public trust. § 37-1121. The Commission issues a determination of navigability after a public hearing, plus issues a report on the public trust values of any navigable stream or watercourse. § 37-1128. Its determinations are subject to judicial review. § 37-1129. A determination of non-navigability relinquishes the state’s claims to the bed and banks. § 37-1130. The state can appropriate water “to maintain and protect public trust values,” but only by complying with the normal requirements for an appropriation. Id. The statute also provides for refunds of taxes and purchase prices, and compensation for improvements to landowners who “lose” title to the beds of waters.
determined to be navigable. § 37-1132. Finally, the statutes provide a petition process to release public trust status. § 37-1151. In these provisions, “navigable watercourse” “means a watercourse that was in existence on February 14, 1912, and at that time was used or was susceptible to being used, in its ordinary and natural condition, as a highway for commerce, over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.” § 37-1130(5). The state generally owns the beds and banks of navigable watercourses to the ordinary high watermark. § 37-1130(6). “Public trust land” is “the portion of the bed of a watercourse that is located in this state and that is determined to have been a navigable watercourse as of February 14, 1912. Public trust land does not include land held by this state pursuant to any other trust.” § 37-1130(8). “Public trust purposes” and “public trust values” are “commerce, navigation, and fishing.” § 37-1130(9). “Watercourse” does not include man-made water conveyance systems. § 37-1130(11).

- ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 45-101 to 45-343: Department of Water Resources and Appropriation. “The waters of all sources, flowing in streams, canyons, ravines, or other natural channels, or in definite underground channels, whether perennial or intermittent, flood, waste or surplus water, and of lakes, ponds and springs on the surface, belong to the public and are subject to appropriation and beneficial use as provided in this chapter.” § 45-141(A). Arizona’s water law creates a hierarchy of the relative value of uses of water: (1) domestic and municipal; (2) irrigation and stock watering; (3) power and mining; (4) recreation and wildlife, including fish; and (5) nonrecoverable water storage. § 45-157(B). In the 1995 laws discussing these provisions, “the legislature declares that it does not intend to create an implication that the public trust doctrine applies to water rights in this state.” Laws 1995, ch. 9, § 25(B).

Definition of “Navigable Water”:

By statute, Arizona limits “navigable waters” – and its public trust doctrine – to those waters subject to the federal equal footing doctrine. As such, a “navigable watercourse for purposes of both state title and the application of the public trust doctrine is "a watercourse that was in existence on February 14, 1912, and at that time was used or was susceptible to being used, in its ordinary and natural condition, as a highway for commerce, over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 37-1130(5). “Public trust lands” are limited to the beds of these navigable watercourses. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 37-1130(8).

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that the Colorado River in Arizona is navigable, and that Arizona owns the beds and banks of that river. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313, 319 (1973) (noting that Arizona holds title to the bed of the Colorado River), overruled on other grounds, Oregon ex rel. State Lands Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370-72 (1977); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 452-54 (1931) (holding that the Colorado River below Black Canyon is navigable).

Rights in “Navigable Waters”:
The state’s title to the beds and banks of navigable waters like the Colorado River extends up to the ordinary high water mark. *Arizona v. Bonelli Cattle Co.*, 495 P.2d 1312, 1313 (Ariz. 1972). This line is defined by soil and vegetation, *id.* at 1314, but is *not* “the line reached by the water in unusual floods.” *Id.* at 1315.

By statute, Arizona limits “public trust purposes” and “public trust values” to the three uses recognized in *Illinois Central*: “commerce, navigation, and fishing.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 37-1130(9). Moreover, while the state can appropriate water to promote these uses, it must follow the normal appropriation requirements and does not receive any preference in priority. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 37-1130. However, recent case law indicates that the existence of the public trust is relevant to takings claims against the state. *South West Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Central Arizona Water Conservation Dist.*, --- P.3d ---, 2008 WL 4837693, at *3 (Ariz. App. 2008); *West Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Arizona Dept. of Water Resources*, 26 P.3d 1171, 1180 (Ariz. App. 2001).


Since 1987, Arizona’s legislature has engaged in repeated efforts to restrict the public trust doctrine’s application in Arizona, only to be thwarted consistently by the Arizona courts. The controversy began in 1985, when Arizona officials began asserting state ownership rights in the beds of the state’s navigable waters based on the federal equal footing doctrine; until that time, the Colorado River had been the state’s only equal footing/public trust claim. In 1987, the legislature responded with H.B. 2017, which attempted to relinquish most of Arizona’s title claims through an “uncompensated quitclaim of the state’s equal footing interest in all watercourses other than the Colorado, Gila, Salt, and Verde Rivers and in all lands formerly within those rivers but outside their current beds.” *Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell*, 837 P.2d 158, 162 (Ariz. App. 1991). The Arizona Court of Appeals held many of the relevant provisions unconstitutional. *Id.* at 173. It declared that every future land patent includes the equal footing interest, that the standard of navigability is federal, and that navigability is established as of the date of statehood. *Id.* at 163-65. Relying on *Illinois Central*, moreover, the court declared that “the state’s responsibility to administer its watercourse lands for the public benefit is an inabrogable attribute of statehood itself,” and “the state must administer its interest in lands subject to the public trust consistently with trust purposes.” *Id.* at 168.

In 1995, the legislature amended Arizona’s water law to include a provision that stated that “[t]he public trust is not an element of a water right in an adjudication proceeding held pursuant to this article. In adjudicating attributes of water rights pursuant to this article, the court shall not make a determination as to whether public trust values are associated with any or all of the river system or resource.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-263(B). The Arizona Supreme Court found

Finally, in 1998, after fact-finding by the Arizona Navigable Stream Adjudication Commission pursuant to 1994 amendments to Arizona’s water law, the Arizona legislature enacted S.B. 1126. This statute “disclaim[ed] the state’s ‘right, title, or interest based on navigability and the equal footing doctrine’ to the bedlands of the Agua Fria, New, Hassayampa, and Lower Salt Rivers, as well as Skunk Creek” and Verde River, based on an overly constricted definition of “navigable.” *Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull*, 18 P.3d 722, 727 (Ariz. App. 2001). The Arizona Court of Appeals found that S.B. 1126 violated both the gift clause in Arizona’s Constitution and the public trust doctrine. *Id.* at 729. Moreover, with respect to the public trust, the court held that the legislature had to apply the navigability test from *The Daniel Ball*, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870), with respect to what qualified as a “navigable water,” and that the legislature had constructed a much more constrained test for navigability than that *Daniel Ball* standard. *Id.* at 730-37. Because federal law under the equal footing doctrine presumes that the state has title, federal law preempted S.B. 1126. *Id.* at 737.

Out of this litigation, it became clear that the Arizona courts view the public trust doctrine as a federal constitutional issue, because the equal footing doctrine is grounded in the U.S. Constitution. *Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell*, 837 P.2d 158, 161-62 (Ariz. App. 1991).

The public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on legislative power to give away resources held by the state in trust for its people. The Legislature cannot order the courts to make the doctrine inapplicable to these or any other proceedings. . . . It is for the courts to decide whether the public trust doctrine is applicable to the facts. The Legislature cannot by legislation destroy the constitutional limits on its authority.

*San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa*, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999) (citing *Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell*, 837 P.2d 158, 166-68 (Ariz. App. 1991)). As such, the state has a duty to assert its ownership interest in navigable or potentially navigable waters, and the courts will remand cases where the state has not done so. *Calmat of Arizona v. Arizona ex rel. Miller*, 836 P.2d 1010, 1020-21 (Ariz. App. 1992). Nor may estoppel be asserted to defeat the public interest in navigable waters. *Id.* at 1021.

**CALIFORNIA**

**Date of Statehood:** 1850

**Water Law System:** California Doctrine – mostly prior appropriation, but with recognition of some riparian rights.
California Constitution: Several provisions of the California Constitution embody or are otherwise relevant to the state’s public trust doctrine. Article X, for example, governs water, Article XA governs water resources development, and Article XB contains the Marine Resources Protection Act of 1990. Especially relevant provisions of these and other articles include:

- Art. I, § 25: “The people shall have the right to fish upon and from the public lands of the State and in the waters thereof, excepting upon lands set aside for fish hatcheries, and no land owned by the State shall ever be sold or transferred without reserving in the people the absolute right to fish thereupon; and no law shall ever be passed making it a crime for the people to enter upon the public lands within this State for the purpose of fishing in any water containing fish that have been planted therein by the State; provided, that the Legislature may by statute, provide for the season when and the conditions under which the different species of fish may be taken.”

- Art. X, § 1: “The right of eminent domain is hereby declared to exist in the State to all frontages on the navigable waters of this State.”

- Art. X, § 2: “It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of diversion of water. Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach to, but to no more than so much of the flow thereof as may be required or used consistently with this section, for the purposes for which such lands are, or may be made adaptable, in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as depriving any riparian owner of the reasonable use of water of the stream to which the owner’s land is riparian under reasonable methods of diversion and use, or as depriving any appropriator of water to which the appropriator is lawfully entitled.”

- Art. X, § 3: “All tidelands within two miles of any incorporated city, city and county, or town in this State, and fronting on the water of any harbor, estuary, bay, or inlet used for the purposes of navigation, shall be withheld from grant or sale to private persons, partnerships, or corporations; provided, however, that any such tidelands, reserved to the State solely for street purposes, which the Legislature finds and declares are not used for navigation purposes and are not necessary for such purposes may by sold to any town, city, county, city and county, municipal corporations, private persons, partnerships or corporations subject to such conditions as the Legislature determines are necessary to be imposed in connection with any such sales in order to protect the public interest.”

- Art. X, § 4: “No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or possessing the frontage or tide lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable water in this
State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water; and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most liberal construction of this provisions, so that access to the navigable waters of this State shall always be attainable for the people thereof.”

- Art. X., § 5: “The use of all water now appropriated, or that may hereafter be appropriated, for sale, rental, or distribution, is hereby declared to be a public use, and subject to the regulation and control of the State, in the manner to be prescribed by law.”

- Art. XA, § 3: “No water shall be available for appropriation by storage in, or by direct diversion from, any of the components of the California Wild and Scenic River System, as such system exists on January 1, 1981, where such appropriation is for export of water into another major hydrologic basin of the state, . . . unless such export is expressly authorized prior to such appropriation be: (a) an initiative statute approved by the electors, or (b) the Legislature, by statute passed in each house by roll call vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring.”

- Art. XB, § 14: “Prior to January 1, 1994, the Fish and Game Commission shall establish four new ecological reserves in ocean waters along the mainland coast. Each ecological reserve shall have a surface area of at least two square miles. The commission shall restrict the use of these ecological reserves to scientific research relating to the management and enhancement of marine reserves.”

- Art. XB, § 15: “This article does not preempt or supersede any other closures to protect any other wildlife, including sea otters, whales, and shorebirds.”

**California Statutes:**

- **CAL. PUBLIC RESOURCE CODE §§ 6301-6369.3:** Administration and Control of Swamp, Overflowed, Tide, or Submerged Lands, and Structures Thereon. These provisions give “exclusive jurisdiction over all ungranted tidelands and submerged lands owned by the State” to the State Lands Commission. § 6303. Any exchanges of lands that are subject to the public trust must ensure that the lands acquired “will provide a significant benefit to the public trust” and that “the exchange does not substantially interfere with public rights of navigation and fishing.” § 6307.

- **CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200-1248:** Appropriation. “All water flowing in any natural channel, excepting so far as it has been or is being applied to useful and beneficial purposes upon, or in so far as it is or may be reasonably needed for useful and beneficial purposes upon lands riparian thereto, or otherwise appropriated, is hereby declared to be public water of the State and subject to appropriation in accordance with the provisions of this code.” § 1201. These provisions allow for protections of flows to “protected areas,” §§ 1215-1216, and “[t]he use of water for recreation and preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources is a beneficial use of water.” § 1243.

- **CAL. GOVERNMENT CODE § 39933:** “All navigable waters situated within or adjacent to a city shall remain open to the free and unobstructed navigation of the public. Such waters
and the water front of such waters shall remain open to free and unobstructed access by the people from the public streets and highways within the city.”

- CAL. GOVERNMENT CODE § 56740: “No tidelands or submerged lands . . . which are owned by the State or by its grantees in trust shall be incorporated into, or annexed to, a city, except lands which may be approved by the State Lands Commission.” For purposes of this provision, “‘submerged lands’ . . . includes, but is not limited to, lands underlying navigable waters which are in sovereign ownership of the State whether or not those waters are subject to tidal influence.”

- CAL. GOVERNMENT CODE §§ 66478.1-66478.14: Public Access to Public Resources. These public access provisions apply to navigable waters. § 66478.1. “The Legislature further finds and declares that it is essential to the health and well-being of all citizens of this state that public access to public natural resources be increased. It is the intent of the Legislature to increase public access to public natural resources.” § 66478.3.

- CAL. HARBOR & NAVIGATION CODE § 36: “‘Navigable waters’ means waters which come under this jurisdiction of the United States Army Corps of Engineers and any other waters with the state with the exception of those privately owned.”

- CAL. HARBOR & NAVIGATION CODE §§ 90-153: Navigable Waters. “Navigable waters and all streams of sufficient capacity to transport the products of this country are public ways for purposes of navigation and such transportation.” § 100. However, navigable waters do not include floodwaters. Id. These provisions also expressly list several watercourses as navigable waters and public ways, §§ 101-106, and they provide for the designation of coastline. § 107.

- CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 117510: “‘Navigable waters’ means all public waters of the state in any river, stream, lake, reservoir, or other body of water, including all salt water bays, inlets, and estuaries within the jurisdiction of the state.”

**Definition of “Navigable Water”:**

The California courts clearly understand the differences between various definitions of “navigable waters.” For example, in 1976 the California Court of Appeals acknowledged that there were two relevant federal definitions of navigability, the Commerce Clause definition and the state title definition, and that, as between the state and the federal government, the state title test from *Utah v. United States* determined the waters for which California holds title to the bed and banks as a result of its admission to the Union. *Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park District*, 55 Cal. App. 3d 560, 567 (1976). However, the court also recognized that for non-federal matters, the states are free to use different definitions of “navigable waters” to determine rights. *Id.* at 568.

Under these rules, “[w]aters which are subject to tidal influence are subject to the public trust regardless of whether they are navigable.” *Golden Feather Community Ass’n v. Thermalito Irrigation District*, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1276, 1283 n.3 (1989). Although the boundary between public and private ownership in littoral waters is the low-water mark, *County of Lake v. Smith*, 228 Cal. App. 3d 214, 229-30 (1st Dist. 1991), in tidal waters, the “lands between the mean high

In addition, California has explicitly rejected arguments based on traditional English common law that state ownership of submerged lands is limited to tidal waters. California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239, 242-45 (Cal. 1981). Instead, the California Supreme Court has emphasized that lands beneath nontidal navigable waters “constitute a resource which is fast disappearing in California; they are of great importance for the ecology, and for the recreational needs of the residents of the state.” Id. at 242. Upon its admission to the Union, California received title to the beds and banks of federally defined navigable waters “to the high-water mark.” Id. at 246. Nevertheless, an 1872 statute conveyed title to properties bordering these lands to the low-water mark. Id. at 245, 248; Bess v. County of Humboldt, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1546, 1549 (1st Dist. 1992). Even so, the public trust doctrine applies to the lands between the low- and high-water marks, although the landowner “may utilize them in any manner not incompatible with the public’s interest in the property.” California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239, 252 (Cal. 1981); Golden Feather Community Ass’n v. Thermalito Irrigation District, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1276, 1281 (1989).

For purposes of state-law public trust rights, a stream that can only float logs is not navigable. People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1044 (1971) (citing American River Water Co. v. Amsden, 6 Cal. 443, 443-46 (1856)). Landowners can obstruct non-navigable waters at will. Id.


The United States Supreme Court has declared that the Sacramento River in California is navigable and that private landowners along that river received title only to the high water mark. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 666-68, 672-73 (1891). In addition, and supported by the fact that California legislatively deemed the Klamath River in California non-navigable, the Supreme Court held that title to the Klamath River’s beds in California remained in the United States and

**Rights in “Navigable Waters”:**

“California acquired title to the navigable waterways and tidelands by virtue of her sovereignty when admitted to the Union in 1850. *Marks v. Whitney*, 491 P.2d 374, 379 n.5 (Cal. 1971) (citing *Borax Consolidated Ltd. v. Los Angeles*, 296 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1935)). The traditional uses that the trust protects are navigation, commerce, and fishing. *Id.* More expansively, public trust rights “have been held to include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating, and general recreation purposes the navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes.” *Id.* at 380 (citations omitted); *City of Berkeley v. Superior Court*, 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal. 1980); *Graf v. San Diego Unified Port District*, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1228-29 (4th Dist. 1992). Importantly, the California Supreme Court considers the public trust doctrine to be adaptable and evolving, noting that “[t]he objective of the public trust has evolved in tandem with the changing public perception of the values and uses of waterways.” *National Audubon Society v. Superior Court*, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (citing *Marks v. Whitney*, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971)); *see also Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Board of Supervisors*, 100 Cal. App. 4th 129, 145 (1st Dist. 2002) (repeating that the doctrine is “sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs” (citations omitted)). Moreover, Article X of the California Constitution constitutionalizes the public trust doctrine in California. *See, e.g.*, *People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado*, 96 Cal. App. 3d 403 (3d Dist. 1979) (holding that public access to the South Fork of the American River for whitewater rafting is protected by the California Constitution).

“The power of the state to control, regulate and utilize its navigable waterways and the lands lying beneath them, when acting within the terms of the trust, is absolute, except as limited by the paramount supervisory power of the federal government over navigable waters.” *Marks v. Whitney*, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (citations omitted); *Graf v. San Diego Unified Port District*, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1228-29, 1231-32 (4th Dist. 1992). Specifically, “[p]reservation of the public trust in the shorezone will allow the state flexibility in determining the appropriate use of such land so that, for example, areas which are endangered by overuse can be closed to certain activities,” because “[t]he exercise of the police power has proved insufficient to protect the shorezone.” *California v. Superior Court (Fogerty)*, 625 P.2d 256, 260 (Cal. 1981). Moreover, no estoppel is available against the government with respect to public trust interests, *California v. Superior Court (Fogerty)*, 625 P.2d 256, 258-59 (Cal. 1981), and exercise of the public trust doctrine is not an unconstitutional taking of private property. *National Audubon Society v. Superior Court*, 658 P.2d 709, 723 (Cal. 1983). However, “the public trust doctrine as codified in the California Constitution does not prevent the state from preferring one trust use over another” in particular situations. *Carstens v. California Coastal Commission*, 182 Cal. App. 3d 277, 289 (Cal. App. 1986). Moreover, the state can delegate its regulatory authority over particular public trust lands to other governmental bodies. *Graf v. San Diego Unified Port District*, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1231-32 (4th Dist. 1992).
In earlier parts of California’s history, the state extensively conveyed public trust lands to private individuals for a variety of purposes. For example, about one-quarter of the original San Francisco Bay was conveyed into private ownership and filled for development. As a result, as a practical matter, California recognizes different public trust rights in different public trust lands. Nevertheless, the public generally retains its public trust rights even when the state has conveyed tidelands and lands under navigable waters to private owners, unless the state conveyed the lands in furtherance of navigation or commerce. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363-67 (Cal. 1980); San Diego County Archeological Society, Inc. v. Compadres, 81 Cal. App. 3d 923, 925-26 (1978); People v. Sweetser, 72 Cal. App. 3d 278, 283 (1977); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 378-79 (Cal. 1971). Thus, the public trust applies to the “lands between high and low water in nontidal navigable lakes,” even if that band is in private ownership. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 644 P.2d 792, 793-94 (Cal. 1982) (citing California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239 (Cal. 1981); California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981)). Especially since the public trust amendments to the California Constitution in 1879, public trust lands “may be conveyed to private persons only to promote trust uses,” City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 644 P.2d 792, 793-94 (Cal. 1982), and “statutes purporting to abandon the public trust are to be strictly construed; the intent to abandon must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied; and if any interpretation of the statute is reasonably possible which would retain the public’s interest in the tidelands, the court must give the statute such an interpretation.” City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 369 (Cal. 1980).

When trust lands have been conveyed to private individuals, “the interests of the public are paramount in property that is still physically adaptable for trust uses, whereas the interests of the grantees and their successors should prevail insofar as the tidelands have been rendered substantially valueless for those purposes.” City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 373 (Cal. 1980). However, “there is no legal obligation on the part of a landowner subject to the public trust doctrine to inspect or warn of natural hazards in navigable waters subject to recreational use abutting the property, or to make such water safe for recreational uses by trespassers or those on the water by means other than access over abutting land.” Charpentier v. Von Geldern, 191 Cal. App. 3d 101, 111 (3rd Dist. 1987). As a result, landowners along navigable waters who do not alter those waters are entitled to tort liability protections in the California Civil Code. Id.

Under the public trust doctrine, owners of property along public trust waters are entitled to natural accretions, because “[t]he state has no control over nature; allowing private parties to gain by natural accretion does not harm to the public trust doctrine.” California ex rel. State Lands Commission v. Superior Court, 900 P.2d 648, 661-62 (Cal. 1995). In contrast, “to allow accretion caused by artificial means to deprive the state of trust lands would effectively alienate what may not be alienated.” Id.

Unlike most states, California has extended its public trust doctrine, beginning in 1971, to the preservation of the natural environment and ecosystems as well as to public uses of the
navigable waters and tidelands. In the 1971 case of *Marks v. Whitney*, the California Supreme Court announced:

> The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the state is not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization over another. There is growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands – a use encompassed within the tidelands trust – is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area. It is not necessary here to define precisely all the public uses which encumber tidelands.

*Marks v. Whitney*, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (citations omitted). The recognition of the ecological value of submerged lands extends to nontidal submerged lands as well. As the California Supreme Court stated in connection with Lake Tahoe:

> [T]he shorezone has been reduced to a fraction of its original size in this state by the pressures of development. Such lands now cover less than one half of 1 percent of the state; a further reduction by 15 percent was projected for 1980. Some authorities have warned that at the present rate of destruction nearly all riparian vegetation on the Sacramento River could be eliminated in the next 20 years.

> The shorezone is a fragile and complex resource. It provides the environment necessary for the survival of numerous types of fish (including salmon, steelhead, and striped bass), birds (such as the endangered species: the bald eagle and the peregrine falcon), and many other species of wildlife and plants. These areas are ideally suited for scientific study, since they provide a gene pool for the preservation of biological diversity. In addition, the shorezone in its natural condition is essential to the maintenance of good water quality, and the vegetation acts as a buffer against floods and erosion.

*California v. Superior Court (Fogerty)*, 625 P.2d 256, 258-59 (Cal. 1981). Thus, the California public trust doctrine extends to “environmental . . . purposes,” *City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties*, 644 P.2d 792, 794 (Cal. 1982), and encompasses “the right to preserve the tidelands in the natural state as ecological units for scientific study,” *City of Berkeley v. Superior Court*, 606 P.2d 362, 363 (Cal. 1980) (citing *Marks v. Whitney*, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971)).

California courts have also extended the public trust doctrine not just to aquatic wildlife habitat, but also to the wildlife itself. *Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc.*, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1349, 1361-62 (1st Dist. 2008) (citing *Golden Feather Community Ass’n v. Thermalito Irrigation District*, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1276 (1989)). “These are natural resources of
inestimable value to the community as a whole. Their protection and preservation is a public interest that is now recognized in numerous state and federal statutory provisions,” *id.* at 1363, and those statutes generally define the contours of the public trust obligation regarding wildlife. *Id.* at 1364. Nevertheless, members of the general public can sue to enforce the wildlife public trust as well as the navigable water public trust, because the public trust doctrine “places a *duty* upon the government to protect those resources.” *Id.* at 1365-66. In the same year, the California Supreme Court agreed and clarified that California has “two distinct public trust doctrines”:

First is the common law doctrine, which involves the government’s “affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources . . . .” The second is a public trust duty derived from statute, specifically Fish and Game Code section 711.7, pertaining to fish and wildlife: “The fish and wildlife resources are held in trust for the people of the state by and through the department.” There is doubtless an overlap between the two public trust doctrines – the protection of water resources is intertwined with the protection of wildlife. . . . Nonetheless, the duty of government agencies to protect wildlife is primarily statutory.

*Environmental Protection & Information Center v. California Department of Forestry & Fire Protection*, 44 Cal. 4th 459, 515 (2008) (quoting and citing *National Audubon Society v. Superior Court*, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 446. 447 (1983)); see also *California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board*, 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 630 (3rd Dist. 1989) (establishing that Fish and Game Code § 5946 establishes a public trust rule but noting “that it does not follow from the application of the term “public trust” to the state’s interest in fisheries of non-navigable streams that all of the consequences of the public trust doctrine as applicable to navigable waters also apply to non-navigable streams. For example, the beds of non-navigable streams are not owned by the state based upon a public trust fishery interest.”). Given this statutory focus, an incidental take permit did not violate the common-law public trust doctrine. *Id.* at 516.

Public trust interests can extend the state’s authority and duties beyond the navigable waters. For example, “[t]he state’s right to protect fish is not limited to navigable or otherwise public waters but extends to any waters where fish are habitated or accustomed to resort and through which the have the freedom of passage to and from the public fishing grounds of the state.” *Golden Feather Community Ass’n v. Thermalito Irrigation District*, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1276, 1282 (1989). *See also People v. Truckee Lumber Co.*, 48 P. 374, 399-400, 400-01 (Cal. 1897) (noting that “the right and power to protect and preserve [fish] for the common use and benefit is one of the recognized prerogatives of the sovereign, coming to us from the common law” and asserting that the state’s authority to protect fish for the public is not limited to fish in navigable waters; “[t]o the extent that waters are the common passageway for fish, although flowing over lands entirely subject to private ownership, they are deemed for such purposes public waters, and subject to all laws of the state regulating the right of fishery”); *California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Board*, 207 Cal. App. 3d 585, 630 (3rd Dist. 1989)
(concluding “that a public trust interest pertains to non-navigable streams which sustain a fishery”).

Similarly, in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (the “Mono Lake case”), the California Supreme Court determined that the public trust doctrine could restrict or require modifications in established water rights even in non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters. Withdrawals of water from Mono Lake’s tributaries were imperiling “both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake . . . .” Id. at 711. As a result, the public trust doctrine could require modifications in the prior appropriation system:

   In our opinions, the core of the public trust doctrine is the state’s authority as sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over the navigable waters of the state and the lands underlying those waters. This authority applies to the waters tributary to Mono Lake and bars DWP or any other party from claiming a vested right to divert waters once it becomes clear that such diversions harm the interests protected by the public trust . . . . Approval of such diversions with considering public trust values . . . may result in needless destruction of those values. Accordingly, we believe that before state courts and agencies approve water diversions, they should consider the effect of such diversion upon interests protected by the public trust, and attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any harm to these interests.

   Id. at 712; see also id. at 727-28. As such, “the public trust doctrine . . . protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of non-navigable tributaries.” Id. at 721. The state retains the authority to review and reconsider water rights when harm becomes evident, particularly if it did not consider public trust values in the original granting of a water right. Id. at 728. Moreover, “in determining whether it is ‘feasible’ to protect public trust values like fish and wildlife in a particular instance, the Board must determine whether protection of those values, or what level of protection, is ‘consistent with the public interest.’” State Water Resources Control Board Cases, 136 Cal. App. 4th 674, 778 (3rd Dist. 2006) (involving water rights and salmon protection in the Bay delta). “[W]hen the public trust doctrine clashes with the rule of priority, the rule of priority must yield. [Nevertheless,] every effort must be made to preserve water right priorities to the extent those priorities do not lead to violation of the public trust doctrine,” and “the subversion of water right priority is justified only if enforcing that priority will in fact lead to the unreasonable use of water or result in harm to values protected by the public trust.” El Dorado Irrigation District v. State Water Resources Control Board, 142 Cal. App. 4th 937, 966, 967 (3rd Dist. 2006).

   However, the National Audubon rule does not apply to water withdrawals from purely non-navigable waters in the absence of an effect on navigable waters. Golden Feather Community Ass’n v. Thermalito Irrigation District, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1276, 1280 (1989). “The public trust doctrine is based upon public access and usage of navigable waters and pursuant to that doctrine the public has an easement and servitude upon such waters. But the public has never had common access and usage of nonnavigable streams . . . .” Id. at 1284. Accord, Hi-
While the California public trust doctrine protects a variety of natural resources as well as public uses of water, it does not extend to everything. For example, as a result of California’s complicated history, California did not acquire title to – and the public trust doctrine does not apply to – “lands which were the subject of a prior Mexican land grant and later patented by the United States government in accordance with its obligations under the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.” City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1522, 1530 (2d Dist. 1988); Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n, 466 U.S. 198, 205-09 (1984). Less uniquely, “[t]he public trust doctrine applicable to beaches owned by the sovereign does not apply to hotels located on land which is privately owned. Although hotel owners have certain common law obligations to travelers, hotels are by no means owned in public trust like public beaches.” Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 73 Cal. App. 3d 152, 158 (1977). Similarly, “[t]he doctrine has been restricted to tidelands, navigable waters, and situations where the government or public in general own the property” – situations where “the state holds or held title because it was important the land be available to all. It does not involve private property except where the state has conveyed the land into private hands. It does not covered artifacts located on private property.” San Diego County Archeological Society, Inc. v. Compadres, 81 Cal. App. 3d 923, 925-26, 927 (1978); see also Pitt River Tribe v. Donaldson, 2007 WL 1874323, at *7 (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. 2007) (holding that a transfer of tribal remains to private parties, when “there is no allegation that the remains in question were located on navigable waters in in tidelands,” did not state a claim under the public trust doctrine). The public trust doctrine does not apply to public employment contracts, Lucas v. Santa Maria Public Airport District, 39 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1025 (2d Dist. 1995), or to formal trusts. Hardman v. Feinstein, 195 Cal. App. 3d 157, 162 n.3 (1st Dist. 1987).

COLORADO

Date of Statehood: 1876

Water Law System: Prior Appropriation

Colorado Constitution: Several provisions of Colorado’s constitution relate to water, but the state does not have a constitutionalized public trust doctrine, even though state ballot initiatives in the mid-1990s in Colorado repeatedly sought to amend Article XVI, § 5 of the COLORADO CONSTITUTION to require the state to “adopt and defend a strong public trust doctrine,” even for nonnavigable waters. See, e.g., Matter of Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, and Summary Adopted April 6, 1994, by Title Board Pertaining to a Proposed Initiative on Water Rights, 877.
P.2d 321, 326-29 (Colo. 1994) (en banc) (upholding the initiative); In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, and Summary Adopted April 5, 1995 by the Board Pertaining to a Proposed Initiative “Public Rights in Water II,” 898 P.2d 1076, 1078-80 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (holding the initiative invalid because it contained more than one subject); In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, and Summary Adopted March 20, 1996, by the Title Board Pertaining to Proposed Initiative “1996-6,” 917 P.2d 1277, 1279-82 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) (upholding the initiative). Important water-related and other relevant provisions include:

- Art. IX, § 10: Selection and Management of Public Trust Lands. This section identifies state school lands as public trust lands, to be managed in accordance with Colorado Revised Statutes § 36-1-101.5.
- Art. XVI, § 5: “The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the State of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.”
- Art. XVI, § 6: “The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between those using the water for the same purpose; but when waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the same, those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the same for manufacturing purposes.”
- Art. XXVII: Great Outdoors Colorado Program. In § 1 of this Article, the Colorado Constitution dedicates lottery money “to the preservation, protection, enhancement and management of the state’s wildlife, park, river, trail and space heritage . . . .” Section 2 establishes a trust fund. However, § 7 declares that “[n]othing in this article shall affect in any way whatsoever any of the provisions under Article XVI of the State Constitution of Colorado, including those provisions related to water, nor any of the statutory provisions related to the appropriation of water in Colorado.”

Colorado Statutes:

- COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-81-101 to 37-81-104: Diversion of Waters.
- COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-84-101 to 37-84-125: Responsibility of User or Owner.
- COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-87-101 to 37-87-125: Reservoirs. Section 37-87-102(1) defines “natural stream” and “ordinary high watermark.”


• **COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-6-201 to 38-6-216**: Condemnation of Water Rights.

### Definition of “Navigable Waters”:

Colorado retains a “commercial use” definition of “navigable waters.” *People v. Emmert*, 597 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Colo. 1979). However, the Colorado Supreme Court has declared most streams in Colorado non-navigable: “the natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable within its territorial limits, and practically all of them have their sources within its own boundaries, and . . . no stream of any importance whose source is without those boundaries, flows into or through this state.” *Stockman v. Leddy*, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), *overruled on other grounds, Denver Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School District No. 1 in the City & County of Denver*, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975). *See also United States v. District Court in and for Eagle County*, 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1969) (holding that even though the Eagle River is a tributary of the Colorado River, it is non-navigable). As a result, there is almost no case law further explicating the definition of “navigable water.”

### Rights in “Navigable Waters”:

Article XVI, § 5, of the Colorado Constitution establishes the state’s property right to the water in natural streams. *Stockman v. Leddy*, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), *overruled on other grounds, Denver Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School District No. 1 in the City & County of Denver*, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975). Nevertheless, in a non-navigable river, title to the bed and banks is in the private landowner, giving the landowner exclusive control over the water and the right to exclude recreational users who would like to use the water for floating or fishing. *People v. Emmert*, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (upholding a criminal trespass conviction for floating down a non-navigable river); see also *Heimbecher v. City & County of Denver*, 9 P.2d 280, 281 (Colo. 1932) (noting that the general presumption at common law is that title to land riparian to a non-navigable stream extends to the center of the river); *More v. Johnson*, 568 P.2d 437, 439 (Colo. 1977) (same).

The Colorado Supreme Court refused to follow the “modern trend” – as represented by Wyoming’s interpretation of similar provisions in its constitution – and allow public rights in non-navigable rivers, concluding that Art. XVI, § 5 of the Colorado Constitution does not preserve public recreation rights. *People v. Emmert*, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Colo. 1979). Instead, “[w]ithout permission, the public cannot use such waters for recreation.” Id. at 1029. *See also Hartman v. Tresise*, 84 P. 685, 686-87 (Colo. 1905) (holding that public ownership of the water itself, as stated in the Colorado Constitution, does not create a public fishery in non-navigable streams; instead, the private landowner owns the right of fishery, and only appropriative rights can trump this common-law rule).
One early case notes that in navigable waters, the riparian landowner owns to the thread of the stream. *Hanlon v. Hobson*, 51 P. 433, 435 (Colo. 1897).

**HAWAII’I**

**Date of Statehood:** 1959

**Water Law System:** Hawai‘i’s Own, blending Native Hawaiian rights with elements of both riparianism and prior appropriation.

**Hawai‘i Constitution:** “[T]he people of this state have elevated the public trust doctrine to the level of constitutional mandate.” *In re Water Use Permit Applications*, 9 P.3d 409, 443 (Haw. 2000). “We therefore hold that article XI, section 1, and article XI, section 7 adopt the public trust doctrine as a fundamental principle of constitutional law in Hawai‘i.” *Id.* at 443-44 (citations omitted); *see also Morgan v. Planning Department, County of Kauai*, 86 P.3d 982, 993 n.12 (Haw. 2004) (“The scope of Hawaii’s Public Trust Doctrine is set forth in article XI, section 1 of the Hawai‘i Constitution”). The HAWAI’I CONSTITUTION constitutionalizes many public trust rights, including the traditional public trust doctrine, a water rights public trust, and others. Relevant provisions include:

- **Art. IX, § 8:** “The State shall have the power to promote and maintain a healthful environment, including the prevention of any excessive demands upon the environment and the State’s resources.”
- **Art. XI, § 1:** “For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.”
- **Art. XI, § 2:** “The legislature shall vest in one or more executive boards or commissions powers for the management of natural resources owned or controlled by the State, and such powers of disposition thereof as may be provided by law; but land set aside for public use, other than for a reserve for conservation purposes, need not be placed under the jurisdiction of such a board or commission.”
- **Art. XI, § 6:** “The State shall have the power to manage and control the marine, seabed and other resources located within the boundaries of the State, including the archipelagic waters of the State, and reserves to itself all such rights outside state boundaries not specifically limited by federal or international law. All fisheries in the sea waters of the State not included in any fish pond, artificial enclosure or state-licensed mariculture operation shall be free to the public, subject to vested rights and the right of the State to regulate the same; provided that mariculture operations shall be established under
guidelines enacted by the legislature, which shall protect the public’s use and enjoyment of the reefs. The State may condemn such vested rights for public use.”

- Art. XI, § 7: “The State has an obligation to protect, control and regulate the use of Hawaii's water resources for the benefit of its people. The legislature shall provide for a water resources agency which, as provided by law, shall set overall water conservation, quality and use policies; define beneficial and reasonable uses; protect ground and surface water resources, watersheds and natural stream environments; establish criteria for water use priorities while assuring appurtenant rights and existing correlative and riparian uses and establish procedures for regulating all uses of Hawaii’s water resources.”

- Art. XI, § 9: “Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality, including control of pollution and conservation, protection and enhancement of natural resources. Any person may enforce this right against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.”

- Art. XI, § 11: “The State of Hawaii asserts and reserves its rights and interest in its exclusive economic zone for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources, both living and nonliving, of the seabed and subsoil, and superadjacent waters.”

- Art. XII, § 4: Public Trust: “The lands granted to the State of Hawaii by Section 5(b) of the Admission Act and pursuant to Article XVI, § 7 of the State Constitution . . . shall be held by the State as a public trust for native Hawaiians and the general public.”

- Art. XII, § 5: “There is hereby established an Office of Hawaiian Affairs. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs shall hold title to all the real and personal property now or hereafter set aside or conveyed to it which shall be held in trust for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians.”

- Art. XII, § 6: “The board of trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs shall exercise power as provided by law: to manage and administer the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of the lands, natural resources, minerals and income derived from whatever sources for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians, including all income and proceeds from that pro rata portion of the trust referred to in section 4 of this article for native Hawaiians; to formulate policy relating to affairs of native Hawaiians and Hawaiians; and to exercise control over real and personal property set aside by state, federal or private sources and transferred to the board for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians.”

- Art. XII, § 7: “The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by ahupua'a tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate such rights.”

- Art. XVI, § 7: Compliance with Trust: “Any trust provisions which the Congress shall impose, upon the admission of this State, in respect of the lands patented to the State by the United States or the proceeds and income therefrom, shall be complied with by appropriate legislation. Such legislation shall not diminish or limit the benefits of native Hawaiians under Section 4 of Article XII.”
Hawai’i Statutes:

- HAW. REV. STAT. § 7-1: “The people shall [] have a right to drinking water, and running water, and the right of way. The springs of water, running water, and roads shall be free to all, on lands granted in fee simple . . . .”
- HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-1(a): Incorporates the trust for Native Hawaiians into the Office of Hawaiian Affairs.
- HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-1: The public lands include submerged lands.
- HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-2: This provision defines the public lands.
- HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-3: The Department of Land and Natural Resources “shall manage, administer, and exercise control over public lands, the water resources, ocean waters, navigable streams, coastal areas, and minerals and all other interests therein . . . .”
- HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-36(a)(9): The public has the right to use piers.
- HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-53: Reclamation of submerged lands is prohibited without the State’s permission.
- HAW. REV. STAT. ch. 174C: State Water Code. Section 174C-2(a) “recognize[s] that the waters of the State are held for the benefit of the citizens of the State” and “declare[s] that the people of the State are beneficiaries and have a right to have the waters protected for their use.” In addition, the Code requires the “protection of traditional and customary Hawaiian rights, the protection and procreation of fish and wildlife, the maintenance of proper ecological balance and scenic beauty, and the preservation and enhancement of waters of the State for municipal uses, public recreation, public water supply, agriculture, and navigation. Such objectives are declared to be in the public interest.” § 174C-2(c).
- HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-31 to 174C-32: Hawaii Water Plan. The Commission must “[i]dentify rivers or streams, or a portion of a river or stream, which appropriately may be placed within a wild and scenic rivers system, to be preserved and protected as part of the public trust.” § 174C-31(c)(4).
- HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-41 to 174C-63: Regulation of Water Use. Before the State of Hawai’i can regulate water use in a given area, it needs to designate a water management area.
- HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-66 to 174C-71: Water Quality. These provisions include protection of instream uses. § 174C-71.
- HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 190D-1 to 190D-36: Oceans and Submerged Lands Leasings.
- HAW. REV. STAT. § 200-6: Permits are required for structures or moorings in ocean waters or navigable streams.
- HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 205A-1 to 205A-71: Coastal Zone Management.

Definition of “Navigable Waters”:

The Hawaiian courts are well aware of the convoluted nature of the “navigable waters.” Application of Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 776 n.6 (Haw. 1977). “Navigable waters” include all
waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, whether navigable or not, and waters that are navigable-in-fact, even if not tidal. *Id.* Hawai‘i clearly has long accepted the tidal test of navigability. *Bishop v. Mahiko*, 35 Haw. 608, 1940 WL 7582, at *18 (Haw. Terr. 1940).

Perhaps because of its water resources trust (see below) and its island nature, Hawai‘i does not have well developed law for non-tidal navigable-in-fact waters. Nevertheless, for public trust purposes, Hawai‘i appears to have adopted the pleasure boat test for navigability: “Navigable waters, including both those navigable by larger vessels and those navigable by rowboats and other small craft, are public highways. The right of navigation includes the right to travel on the waters not only for business purposes but also in pursuit of pleasure.” *Karamoto v. Hamada*, 30 Haw. 841, 1929 WL 3015, at *2 (Haw. Terr. 1929).

**Rights in “Navigable Waters”:**

Relying on *Illinois Central Railroad*, the Hawai‘i Court declared in 1899 that “[t]he people of Hawaii hold the absolute rights to all its navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use. The lands under the navigable waters in and around the territory of the Hawaiian Government are held in trust for the public uses of navigation.” *King v. Oahu Railway & Land Co.*, 11 Haw. 717, 1899 WL 1502, at *6 (Haw. 1899) (citations omitted). *See also Carter v. Territory*, 14 Haw. 465, 1902 WL 1419, at *3, *10 (Haw. Terr. 1902) (announcing a public trust for navigation and fishing but allowing that an exclusive right of sea fishery could be acquired by grant or prescription, although the presumption is against the claimant). Traditionally in Hawai‘i, the right of navigation supersedes the right of fishery. *Karamoto v. Hamada*, 30 Haw. 841, 1929 WL 3015, at *2 (Haw. Terr. 1929).

More recently, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has described the public trust as “a dual concept of sovereign right and responsibility.” *In re Water Use Permit Applications*, 9 P.3d 409, 447 (Haw. 2000). Hawai‘i recognizes broad public rights in its waters, noting that “the trust has traditionally preserved public rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing. Courts have further identified a wide range of recreational uses, including bathing, swimming, boating, and scenic viewing, as protected trust purposes.” *Id.* at 448. Moreover, given Hawai‘i’s history, “the exercise of Native Hawaiian and traditional and customary rights [is] a public trust purpose.” *Id.* at 449. In contrast, “the public trust has never been understood to safeguard rights of exclusive uses for private commercial gain. Such an interpretation, indeed, eviscerated the trust’s basic purpose – of reserving the resource for use and access by the general public without preference or restriction.” *Id.* at 450. Thus, “[a]s commonly understood, the trust protects public waters and submerged lands against irrevocable transfer to private parties, or ‘substantial impairment,’ whether for private or public purposes . . . .” *In re Waiola O Molokai, Inc.*, 83 P.3d 664, 692 (Haw. 2004) (citations omitted).

“[T]he ultimate authority to interpret and defend the public trust in Hawaii rests with the courts of this state,” and “[j]ust as private trustees are judicially accountable to their beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive branches are judicially accountable for dispositions of the public trust.” *In re Waiola O Molokai, Inc.*, 83 P.3d 664, 684-85 (Haw. 2004).
2004). Moreover, “[t]he beneficiaries of the public trust are not just present generations but those to come.” Id. at 685.

In general, “beachfront title lines run along the upper annual reaches of the waves, excluding storms and tidal waves.” Application of Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 773 (Haw. 1977). Similarly, although “Hawaii’s land laws are unique in that they are based on ancient tradition, custom, practice and usage,” the boundary designated “ma ke kai” “is along the upper reaches of the wash of waves, usually evidence by the edge of vegetation or by the line of debris left by the wash of waves . . . .” In re Application of Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (Haw. 1968) (citing Keelikolani v. Robinson, 2 Haw. 514); see also Territory v. Kerr, 16 Haw. 363, 1905 WL 1327, at *4 (Haw. Terr. 1905) (holding that grants of property “along the sea” go to the high water mark); Application of Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 776 n.6 (Haw. 1977) (noting that title to non-tidal navigable-in-fact waters goes to the high-water mark).

The public trust doctrine can invalidate any attempts to extend property boundaries beyond the high-water mark:

In Hawaii, the public trust doctrine, recognized in our case law prior to the enactment of our land court statute, can similarly be deemed to create an exception to our land court statutes, thus invalidating any purported registration of land below the high water mark. . . . [L]and below high water mark is held in public trust by the State, whose ownership may not be relinquished, except where relinquishment is consistent with certain trust purposes.

Application of Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 776 (Haw. 1977); see also Hawaii County v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 63 (Haw. 1973) (noting that, pursuant to the public trust doctrine, land below the high water mark belongs to the public). Moreover, because the public has long used the beaches of Hawai‘i, that use “has ripened into a customary right. Public policy, as interpreted by this court, favors extending to public use and ownership as much of Hawai‘i’s shoreline as is reasonably possible.” Hawaii County v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 61-62 (Haw. 1973) (citing Oregon ex rel. Thorton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (1969)). Finally, for similar public policy reasons, “lava extensions vest when created in the people of Hawaii, held in public trust by the government for the benefit, use, and enjoyment of all the people,” and therefore the State as trustee has the duty to protect and maintain [this] trust property, and regulate its use.” State by Kobayashi v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (Haw. 1977).

Most recently, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has suggested that the public trust doctrine extends to environmental and biodiversity protection. For example, in 2005, it suggested that the public trust doctrine applies, via Article XI, § 1 of the Hawai‘i Constitution, to regulation of the Palila, an endangered bird. Mortimoto v. Board of Land & Natural Resources, 113 P.3d 172, 184 (Haw. 2005). The next year, it explicitly held that the Department of Health and counties are bound by the public trust doctrine when implementing the federal Clean Water Act. Thus, when environmental groups sued the Department of Health asserting that the Department has violated the public trust doctrine by failing to prevent a developer from violating state water quality
standards for coastal waters, the court concluding that state issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits pursuant to the Clean Water Act are subject to the public trust doctrine and that the Department of Health must ensure that water quality measures are actually being implemented. *Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners*, 140 P.3d 985, 1009, 1011 (Haw. 2006). In addition, under Article XI, § 1 of the constitution, counties have public trust duties as well, and they “have an obligation to conserve and protect the state’s natural resources.” *Id.* at 1004-05.

Public trust principles in Hawai‘i extend to water rights through a Hawai‘i-specific water resources trust akin to, but of different origin from, the navigable waters public trust. Emphasizing the 1978 amendments to the Hawai‘i Constitution that constitutionalized the public trust doctrine, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has also noted that in the Kingdom of Hawai‘i, the right to water was reserved to the people for their common good in all land grants, and ownership of the water itself remained at all times in the people. *In re Water Use Permit Applications*, 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw. 2000); *see also Robinson v. Ariyoshi*, 658 P.2d 287, 310-11 (Haw. 1982) (giving the same history). This sovereign reservation imposed a public trust on the water itself, similar to but different from the public trust doctrine that arises as a result of state title to the beds and banks of navigable waters. *In re Water Use Permit Applications*, 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw. 2000); *Robinson v. Ariyoshi*, 658 P.2d 287, 310 (Haw. 1982) (noting that this sovereign interest was more than just a police power interest; “[t]he nature of this ownership is thus akin to the title held by all states in navigable waterways”).

Given Hawaii’s water situation, reassertion of this traditional water resources trust has been deemed critical, both as against assertions of riparian rights and in light of the State Water Code and water use permits. With respect to riparian rights:

The reassertion of dormant public interests in the diversion and application of Hawaii’s waters has become essential with the increasing scarcity of the resource and recognition of the public’s interests in the utilization and flow of these waters.

... *W*hile there indeed exist relative usufructory rights among landowners, these rights can no longer be treated as though they are absolute and exclusive interests in the waters of our state.

*Robinson v. Ariyoshi*, 658 P.2d 287, 311 (Haw. 1982). Instead, “underlying every private diversion and application there is, as there always has been, a superior public interest in this natural bounty.” *Id.* at 312.

With respect to the State Water Code, “[t]he public trust in the water resources of this state, like the navigable waters trust, has its genesis in the common law. ... The [State Water] Code does not evince any legislative intent to abolish the common law public trust doctrine. To the contrary, ... the legislature appears to have engrafted the doctrine wholesale in the Code.” *In re Water Use Permit Applications*, 9 P.3d 409, 443 (Haw. 2000) (citations omitted). As a result, the State Water Code “does not supplant the protections of the public trust doctrine,” and “the public trust doctrine applies to all water resources without exception or distinction,” including
ground waters. *Id.* at 445. In addition, “the maintenance of waters in their natural state constitutes a distinct ‘use’ under the water resources trust.” *Id.* at 448.

Similarly, “a reservation of water constitutes a public trust purpose.” *In re Waiola O Molokai, Inc.*, 83 P.3d 664, 694 (Haw. 2004). As a result, the Department of Hawaiian Home Land’s “reservations of water throughout the State are entitled to the full panoply of constitutional protections afforded other public trust purposes . . . . To hold otherwise would undermine the public trust doctrine, which is a state constitutional doctrine, and the relevant policy declarations set forth in the [State Water] Code.” *Id.* (citations omitted). See also *In re Matter of the Contested Case Hearing on the Water Use Permit Application Filed by Kukui (Molokai), Inc.*, 174 P.3d 320, 329, 330 (Haw. 2007) (affirming that the public trust doctrine is a constitutional doctrine and the Department of Hawaiian Home Land’s water reservations are public trust uses).

“The state water resources trust [] embodies a dual mandate of 1) protection and 2) maximum reasonable and beneficial use.” *In re Water Use Permit Applications*, 9 P.3d 409, 451 (Haw. 2000). Specifically, the State has a “duty to ensure the continued availability and existence of its water resources for present and future generations,” but also a “duty to promote the reasonable and beneficial use of water resources in order to maximize their social and economic benefits to the people of this state.” *Id.* With respect to the water resources trust, moreover, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court explicitly followed California’s decision in the Mono Lake case, suggesting that the water resources trust is more protective than the navigable waters public trust doctrine. *Id.* at 452. Indeed, the water resources trust “precludes any grant or assertion of vested rights to use water to the detriment of public trust purposes.” *Id.* at 453. As in California, moreover, the State may “revisit prior diversions and allocations, even those made with due consideration of their effect on the public trust.” *Id.* While the Commission may have to balance public and private interests in water, “the constitutional requirements of ‘protection’ and ‘conservation,’ the historical and continuing understanding of the trust as a guarantee of public rights, and the common reality of the ‘zero-sum’ game between competing water uses demand that any balancing between public and private purposes begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment,” and the Commission’s decisions in favor of private commercial uses are subject to “higher scrutiny.” *Id.* at 454; see also *In re Water Use Permit Applications*, 93 P.3d 643, 650, 657 (Haw. 2004) (noting that “because water is a public trust resource and the public trust is a state constitutional doctrine, this court recognizes certain qualifications to the standard of review regarding the Water Commission’s decisions” and in effect imposes a burden on proposed users to justify their uses of water). Moreover, the Commission must consider the cumulative impacts of diversions and “implement reasonable measures to mitigate this impact, including the use of alternative sources.” *In re Water Use Permit Applications*, 9 P.3d 409, 455 (Haw. 2000) (citations omitted).

**IDAHO**

**Date of Statehood:** 1890
**Water Law System:** Prior Appropriation.

**Idaho Constitution:** Idaho has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine. However, its constitution does provide for water rights. Relevant provisions of the Idaho Constitution include:

- Art. XV, § 1: “The use of all waters now appropriated, or that may hereafter be appropriated for sale, rental, or distribution; also of all water originally appropriated for private use, but which after such appropriation has heretofore been, or may hereafter be sold, rented, or distributed, is hereby declared to be a public use, and subject to the regulations and control of the state in the manner prescribed by law.

- Art. XV, § 3: “The right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall never be denied, except that the state may regulate and limit the use thereof for power purposes. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between those using the water . . . .”

- Art XV, § 7: “[T]he State Water Resource Agency shall have power to formulate and implement a state water plan for optimal development of water resources in the public interest.”

**Idaho Statutes:** Idaho has codified its public trust doctrine in Idaho Code §§ 58-1201 to 58-1203, which act most generally to limit the public trust doctrine and its potential impact on appropriated rights. In codifying the doctrine, the Idaho Legislature made the following findings:

1. Upon admission of the state of Idaho into the union, the title to the beds of navigable waters became state property, and subject to its jurisdiction and disposal under the equal footing doctrine. According to the United States supreme court’s decision in *Shively v. Bowlby*, the state has the right to dispose of the beds of navigable waters, “in such manner as [it] might deem proper, . . . subject only to the paramount right of navigation and commerce.” The state has the right to determine for itself “to what extent it will preserve its rights of ownership in them, or confer them on others.” *Shively v. Bowlby*, 152 U.S. 1, 56 (1893); and

2. Since the admission of the state of Idaho into the union, article XV of the constitution of the state of Idaho has governed the appropriation and use of the waters of Idaho. Pursuant to article XV of the constitution of the state of Idaho, the legislature of the state of Idaho has enacted a comprehensive systems of laws for the appropriation, transfer and use of the waters of Idaho, which addresses the public interest therein; and

3. Upon admission of the state of Idaho into the union, the state was granted certain lands by the United States government as an endowment for designated institutions. Article IX of the constitution of the state of Idaho,
and laws enacted pursuant thereto [related to public school lands], establish a comprehensive system of laws for the management of state endowment lands, which addresses the public interest therein; and

(4) The common law doctrine known as the public trust doctrine, adopted by inference in section 73-116, Idaho Code, had guided the alienation or encumbrance of the title to the beds of navigable waters held in trust by the state. The public trust doctrine has been used in court decisions and pleadings in ways that have created confusion in the administration and management of the waters and endowment lands; and

(5) The public’s interest in the environment is protected in other parts of Idaho’s constitution or statutory law; and

(6) The purpose of this act is to clarify the application of the public trust doctrine in the state of Idaho and to expressly declare the limits of this common law doctrine in accordance with the authority recognized in each state to define the extent of the common law.

**ID. CODE § 58-1201.** The statutes then go on to declare that “[t]he public trust doctrine as it is applied in the state of Idaho is solely a limitation on the power of the state to alienate or encumber the title to the beds of navigable waters as defined in this chapter.” **ID. CODE § 58-1203(1).** “The public trust doctrine shall not be applied to any purpose other than as provided in this chapter,” and the statutes explicitly declare that it does not apply to “[t]he appropriation or use of water, or the granting, transfer, administration, or adjudication of water or water rights . . . or any other procedure or law applicable to water rights in the state of Idaho” or to “[t]he protection or exercise of private property rights within the state of Idaho.” **ID. CODE § 58-1203(2)(b), (c).** Finally, these statutes define “navigable waters” as “those waters that were susceptible to being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce on the date of statehood, under the federal test of navigability;” and identify the line of “natural or ordinary high water mark” as the boundary of the beds of navigable waters. **ID. CODE § 58-1202(1), (3).**

Other statutes of relevance in Idaho include:

- **ID. CODE § 5-246:** No prescriptive easements for overflows are allowed in the beds of navigable waters.
- **ID. CODE § 36-1601:** This provision defines a “navigable stream” to be “[a]ny stream which, in its natural state, during normal high water, will float cut timber have a diameter in excess of six (6) inches or any other commercial or floatable commodity or is capable of being navigated by oar or motor propelled small craft for pleasure or commercial purposes . . . .” § 36-1601(a). It then provides for public use rights in these waters: “Navigable rivers, sloughs or streams within the meander line or, when not meandered, between the flow lines of ordinary high water thereof, and all rivers, sloughs and streams flowing through any public lands of the state shall be open to public use as a public
highway for travel and passage, up or downstream, for business or pleasure, and to
eexercise the incidents of navigation – boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, and all
recreational purposes. § 36-1601(b). However, this right of use does not include a right
of access over private property, except that the public can portage around irrigation dams
and other private obstructions. § 36-1601(c).

- ID. CODE §§ 42-601 to 42-620: Distribution of Water Among Appropiators.
- ID. CODE §§ 42-1201 to 42-1209: Maintenance and Repair of Ditches.
- ID. CODE § 42-3801: “The legislature of the state of Idaho hereby declares that the public
health, safety, and welfare requires that the stream channels of the state and their
environments be protected against alteration for the protection of fish and wildlife
habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, and water quality. No alteration of any
stream channel shall hereafter be made unless approval therefore has been given as
provided in this act.”
- ID. CODE § 58-1302: This provision defines a “navigable lake” to be “any permanent
body of relatively still or slack water, including man-made reservoirs, not privately
owned and not a mere marsh or stream eddy, and capable of accommodating boats or
canoes.”

Definition of “Navigable Waters”:

By 1916, the Idaho Supreme Court had rejected the English tidal test of navigability in
fishing purposes to include any stream supporting log or timber floatation during the high water
season. Ritter v. Standal, 566 P.2d 769, 770-71 & n.1 (Idaho 1977). This older statute codified
the holding of Mashburn v. St. Joe Improvement Co., 113 P. 92, 95 (Idaho 1911). Id. (citations
omitted). However, on January 1, 1977, Idaho Code § 36-1601 took effect, codifying the Idaho
Supreme Court’s decision in Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass’n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc. 528
P.2d 1295, 1297-98 & n.1 (Idaho 1974), which asserted a log floatation test for both
state title and public fishing purposes and recognized that this test was less restrictive than the federal
test for title as articulated in The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (1870), and Utah v. United States, 403

Currently, by statute, Idaho has adopted the standard federal title test of “navigable
waters” – that is, “those waters that were susceptible to being used, in their ordinary condition, as
highways for commerce on the date of statehood, under the federal test of navigability” – for its
public trust doctrine. ID. CODE § 58-1201(3). Under this test, the Salmon River is a navigable

However, as the discussion above suggests, the public retains a statutory right to use a broader category of “navigable streams” that are defined in terms of log floatation and pleasure boating. ID. CODE § 36-1601(a), (b). Finally, by statute, Idaho defines a “navigable lake” to be “any permanent body of relatively still or slack water, including man-made reservoirs, not privately owned and not a mere marsh or stream eddy, and capable of accommodating boats or canoes.” ID. CODE § 58-1302.

The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Snake River in Idaho is navigable. *Moss v. Ramey*, 239 U.S. 538, 544 (1916); *Scott v. Lattig*, 227 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1913). However, as a result of federal reservations, Idaho does not have title to the beds of Coeur d’Alene Lake or the St. Joe River; instead, the United States hold title to those two waters in trust for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe. *Idaho v. United States*, 533 U.S. 262, 274-75 (2001).

**Rights in “Navigable Waters”:**

Although some earlier cases suggested that a landowner owns the beds of non-tidal navigable-in-fact rivers, see *Moss v. Ramey*, 95 P. 513, 514 (Idaho 1908); *Ulbright v. Baslington*, 119 P. 292, 293-94 (Idaho 1911), currently, by case law and by statute, a riparian owner on a navigable stream or river or a littoral owner on a navigable lake takes title to the ordinary high water mark. *In re Sanders Beach*, 147 P.3d 75, 85 (Idaho 2006) (citing *West v. Smith*, 511 P.2d 1326, 1330 (1973)); ID. CODE § 58-1202(1). The ordinary high water mark is “the line which the water impresses on the soil by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive the soil of its vegetation and destroy its value for agricultural purposes.” ID. CODE § 58-104(9); *Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement District*, 17 P.3d 260, 264 (Idaho 2000).

“‘[T]he State owns in trust for the public title to the bed of a navigable water below the OHWM [ordinary high water mark] as it existed at the time the State was admitted into the Union.’” *In re Sanders Beach*, 147 P.3d 75, 85 (Idaho 2006) (quoting *Erickson v. Idaho*, 970 P.2d 1, 3 (Idaho 1998)). Landowners cannot exclude the public from using dry land below the OHWM, although they retain a concurrent right of access. *Id.* “Granting the Lakeshore Owners the right to exclude the public from this portion of state lands would be inconsistent with the public trust doctrine,” which preserves the beds of navigable waters for public use. *Id.* (citing *Callam v. Price*, 146 P. 732, 735 (Idaho 1915); *Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement District*, 733 P.2d 733, 737 (Idaho 1987)). Moreover, “[t]he public trust doctrine is based upon common law equitable principles,” and “[w]hile those equitable principles in certain circumstances may no longer apply to public trust property which has lost its navigable status naturally, it may well be that a loss of navigability resulting from a manmade dike or diversion may not, for equitable reasons, eliminate or destroy the public trust status of land which was once subject to that trust.” *Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement District*, 733 P.2d 733, 738 (Idaho 1987) (citing *Rutledge v. Idaho*, 482 P.2d 515

*Illinois Central Railroad* established the principle that the State may not abdicate its role as trustee of the lands beneath navigable waters to private parties. *Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc.*, 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983). In the statutory public trust doctrine enacted in 1996, the Idaho Legislature preserved this primary focus and principle of the public trust. Id. CODE § 58-1203(1). Public trust lands conveyed to private parties by the Department of State Lands are limited by that principle and remain subject to the public trust. *Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc.*, 671 P.2d 1085, 1095 (Idaho 1983). “The public trust doctrine at all times forms the outer boundaries of permissible government action with respect to public trust resources.” Id. As such, the public trust doctrine creates both procedural and judicial review requirements. Procedurally, “public trust resources may only be alienated or impaired through open and visible actions, where the public is in fact informed of the proposed action and has substantial opportunity to respond to the proposed action before a final decision is made thereon.” Id. at 1091. Judicially, the courts make the final determination as to whether a conveyance is valid, taking a close look at the agency’s decision, and:

> the court will examine, among other things, such factors as the degree of the effect of the project on public trust uses, navigation, fishing, recreation, and commerce; the impact of the individual project on the public trust resource; the impact of the individual project when examined cumulatively with existing impediments to full use of the public trust resource . . .; the impact of the project on the public trust resource when that resource is examined in light of the primary purpose for which the resources is suited, i.e., commerce, navigation, fishing, or recreation; and the degree to which broad public uses are set aside in favor of more limited or private ones.

Id. at 1092.

Nevertheless, the State has the burden to prove its title by clear and convincing evidence if the State is not the record title holder. *Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement District*, 17 P.3d 260, 264 (Idaho 2000). Moreover, “[t]here is no ’public trust doctrine’ relating to land which is wholly independent or unconnected with such navigable waters.” *Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement District*, 733 P.2d 733, 737 (Idaho 1987)). In addition, the public trust doctrine does not apply to private property traceable to an 1892 patent from the United States government. *Idaho ex rel. Haman v. Fox*, 594 P.2d 1093, 1102 (Idaho 1979).

Although public rights were initially limited to navigation and incidents of navigation, such rights have expanded in Idaho to include fish and wildlife habitat, recreation, aesthetic beauty, and water quality. *In re Sanders Beach*, 147 P.3d 75, 85 (Idaho 2006); *Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement District*, 733 P.2d 733, 737 (Idaho
Idaho’s statutory public trust doctrine, enacted in 1996, declares that the public trust doctrine does not apply to water rights.  


**KANSAS**

**Date of Statehood:** 1861

**Water Law Regime:** Prior Appropriation.

**Kansas Constitution:** Kansas has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine. Indeed, there are no provisions in the Kansas Constitution relevant to water.

**Kansas Statutes:**

- KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-201 to 82a-218: Navigable Waters. If there is a sudden change in a navigable river, the Secretary of State must buy or condemn the new channel. § 82a-201. The State will acquire ownership to the high water mark. § 82a-202. The State can also convey the old channel. § 82a-205.
- KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 to 82a-773: Kansas Water Appropriation Act. “All water within the State of Kansas is hereby dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to the control and regulation of the state in the manner herein prescribed.” § 82a-702. The act allows for minimum streamflows and a permit system. §§ 82a-703a to 82a-703c. The act also addresses conservation plans and practices, § 82a-733, and establishes a water bank. § 82a-763.

**Definition of “Navigable Waters”:**

Kansas courts have recognized that, under the English tidal test of navigability, three categories of waters existed: the non-navigable waters; intermediate waters, whose beds were in private ownership but whose waters are subject to public rights of use; and the navigable waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, whose beds belong to the Crown. Kansas ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Kan. 1990); Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682, 689 (1882). Nevertheless, in the United States, the American navigable-in-fact test governs, and the ancient tidal test was never part of Kansas common law. Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637, 645-49 (Kan. 1914); Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682, 689 (1882).
Thus, for state title and public trust doctrine purposes, the Kansas courts apply the federal title test of navigability. “Under this test, bodies of water are navigable and title to the beds under the water are vested in the State if: (1) the bodies of water were used, or were susceptible of being used, as a matter of fact, as highways for commerce; (2) such use for commerce was possible under the natural conditions of the body of water; (3) commerce was or could have been conducted in the customary modes of trade or travel on water; and (4) all of these conditions were satisfied at the time of statehood.” Kansas ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Kan. 1990) (citing United States v. Holt Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926)); see also Hurst v. Dana, 122 P. 1041, 1042 (Kan. 1911) (noting that “any water to be navigable should be susceptible of use for purposes of commerce or possess the capacity for valuable floatage in transportation to market of the products of the country through which it runs and should be of practical usefulness to the public as a public highway in its own state and without aid of artificial means; that a theoretical or potential navigation or one that is temporary, precarious, and unprofitable is not sufficient.”); Kregar v. Fogarty, 96 P. 845, 846-47 (Kan. 1908) (noting that navigability is a question of fact determined through the federal commerce test; meandering is not dispositive). Older cases, however, allowed the establishment of navigability by judicial notice, “at least so far as the great rivers are concerned.” Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682, 1882 WL 910, at *3 (Kan. 1882) (addressing the navigability of the Kansas River); Hurst v. Dana, 122 P. 1041, 1042 (Kan. 1911) (addressing the Arkansas River). Moreover, lack of use does not affect state title to a river that is navigable-in-fact. Hurst v. Dana, 122 P. 1041, 1043 (Kan. 1911). However, there is no state common-law test of navigability in Kansas. Siler v. Dreyer, 327 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Kan. 1958).

By 1990, three rivers in Kansas had been declared navigable for title purposes: the Kansas River, the Arkansas River, and the Missouri River. Id. at 1360 (citing Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637 (1914); Hurst v. Dana, 122 P. 1041 (1912); Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682 (1882)). Similarly, three rivers had been declared non-navigable: the Neosho River, the Delaware River, and the Smoky Hill River. Id. (citing Webb v. Neosho County Commissioners, 257 P. 966 (1927); Piazzek v. Drainage District, 237 P. 1059 (1925); Kreger v. Fogarty, 96 P. 845 (1908)).

Applying this test, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that Shoal Creek was non-navigable. Kansas ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1350, 1360 (Kan. 1990). The court emphasized that the creek did not allow for any valuable floatage, that it dries up, and that parts of the creek are not navigable even by canoes. Id. Similarly, the Neosho River was not navigable even though it could support log floatation and light boats over short distances; it was never used to transport the products of the country. Webb v. Board of Commissioners of Neosho County, 257 P. 966, 966 (Kan. 1927).

Rights in “Navigable Waters”:

For navigable streams, the riparian landowner owns “only to the banks.” Kansas ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Kan. 1990); Kregar v. Fogarty, 96 P. 845, 847 (Kan. 1908). In contrast, landowners along non-navigable streams own the bed of the stream and may put a fence across the stream to stop trespassing canoeists. Kansas ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d
1350, 1358 (Kan. 1990); Kregar v. Fogarty, 96 P. 845, 848 (Kan. 1908) (noting that title in non-navigable waters goes to the thread of the stream). “Navigable waters and public waters are synonymous terms. This state claims title to the beds of public streams only. The title to the beds of all other streams is in the riparian owner.” Piazzek v. Drainage District No. 1 of Jefferson Couty, 237 P. 1059, 1060 (Kan. 1925).

In navigable waters, both riparian owners and the general public have rights; “[t]he stream is a public highway, and no one can maintain an exclusive privilege to any part of the water.” Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682, 1882 WL 910, at *2 (Kan. 1882). Public rights include the right to take ice. Id. Moreover, “[t]he title of the state to the bed of a meandered stream is not an absolute fee, which the state can dispose of as it wishes; but such title is vested in it in trust for the benefit and common right of all the people, for the purposes for which such property has been used from time immemorial, viz; the common right of passage, of fishing, of the use of the waters for domestic, agricultural, and commercial purposes, and therefore the state has no proprietary right in the bed of the stream or in the water which it can sell.” Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637, 640 (Kan. 1914). In addition, private persons cannot acquire prescriptive rights in these assets against the public. Id. at 650.

In 1990, the Kansas Supreme Court refused to extend public trust concepts to non-navigable streams based on state ownership of the water and KANSAS STATUTES ANNOTATED § 82a-702. Kansas ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1350, 1364 (Kan. 1990). “Owners of the bed of a nonnavigable stream have the exclusive right of control of everything above the stream bed, subject only to constitutional and statutory limitations, restrictions, and regulations. Where the legislature refuses to create a public trust for recreational purposes in nonnavigable streams, courts should not alter the legislature’s statement of public policy by judicial legislation.” Id. at 1364-65. As a result, “[t]he public has no right to the use of nonnavigable water overlying private lands for recreational purposes without the consent of the landowner.” Id. at 1365.

MONTANA

Date of Statehood: 1889


Montana Constitution: The 1972 Montana Constitution has several provisions related to water, public access, and environmental protection that the Montana courts have deemed relevant to Montana’s public trust doctrine. See, e.g., In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to Use All the Water, 55 P.3d 396, 404 (Mont. 2002) (linking the Constitution to the public trust doctrine). These and other relevant provisions include:

- Preamble: “We the people of Montana grateful to God for the quiet beauty of our state, the grandeur of our mountains, the vastness of our rolling plains, and desiring to improve
the quality of life, equality of opportunity and to secure the blessings of liberty for this and future generations to ordain and establish this constitution.”

- Art. IX, § 1: “The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations.” § 1(1). “The legislature shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty.” § 1(2). “The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.” § 1(3).

- Art. IX, § 3: “All existing rights to the use of any waters for any useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and confirmed.” § 3(1). “The use of all water that is now or may hereafter be appropriated for sale, rent, distribution or other beneficial use, the right of way over the lands of others for all ditches, drains, flumes, canals, and aqueducts necessarily used in connection therewith, and the sites for reservoirs necessary for collection and storing water shall be held to be a public use.” § 3(2). “All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law.” § 3(3). “The legislature shall provide for the administration, control, and regulation of water rights and shall establish a system of centralized records, in addition to the present system of local records.” § 3(4).

- Art. IX, § 4: “The legislature shall provide for the identification, acquisition, restoration, enhancement, preservation, and administration of scenic, historic, archeologic, scientific, cultural, and recreational areas, sites, records, and objects, for their use and enjoyment by the people.”

- Art. IX, § 7: “The opportunity to harvest wild fish and wild game animals is a heritage that shall forever be preserved to the individual citizens of the state and does not create a right of trespass on private property or diminution of other private rights.”

**Montana Statutes:**

- **MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to 23-2-322: Recreational Use of Streams.** These provisions define “ordinary high-water mark” to be “the line that water impresses on land by covering it for sufficient periods to cause physical characteristics that distinguish the area below the line from the area above it. Characteristics of the area below the line include, when appropriate, but are not limited to deprivation of the soil of substantially all terrestrial vegetation and destruction of its agricultural vegetative value. A flood plain adjacent to surface waters is not considered to lie within the surface waters’ high-water marks.” § 23-2-301(9). Recreational uses in surface waters include “fishing, hunting, swimming, floating in small craft or other flotation devices, boating in motorized craft unless otherwise prohibited or regulated by law, or craft propelled by oar or paddle, other water-related pleasure activities, and related unavoidable or incidental uses.” § 23-2-301(10). “Surface waters, “for the purpose of determining the public’s access for recreational use, a natural water body, its bed, and its banks up to the ordinary high-water mark.” § 23-2-301(12). While codifying public recreational rights, these provisions ensure that title to land is not affected, § 23-2-309, and the public can acquire no
prescriptive easements as a result of its recreational use of surface waters. § 23-2-322. Moreover, the rights do not apply to lakes. § 23-2-310. These provisions also restrict riparian landowners’ liability. § 23-2-321. However, the provisions do allow the public rights to portage above the high-water mark. § 23-2-311.

- MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-705: Nothing in the state’s water quality laws and water quality assessment provisions “may be construed to divest, impair, or diminish any water right recognized pursuant to Title 85.”

- MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-7-104: Provisions for the protection of streambeds “shall not impair, diminish, divest or control any existing or vested water rights under the laws of the state of Montana or the United States.”

- MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-111: “Navigable waters and all streams of sufficient capacity to transport the products of the country are public ways for the purposes of navigation and such transportation. This section shall not be construed so as to affect or impair, in any manner, any rights acquired prior to July 1, 1901, by any person, association of persons, or corporation. The right of any person, association of persons, or corporation to take and use any water, as now provided by law, from any stream or streams for the purpose of irrigation or any beneficial or industrial pursuit shall not be abridged.”

- MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-112: “All lakes wholly or partly within this state which have been meandered and returned as navigable by the surveyors employed by the government of the United States and all lakes which are navigable in fact are hereby declared to be navigable and public waters, and all persons shall have the same rights therein and thereto that they have in and to any other navigable streams or public waters.” § 85-1-112(1). “All rivers and streams which have been meandered and returned as navigable by surveyors employed by the government of the United States and all rivers and streams which are navigable in fact are hereby declared navigable.” § 85-1-112(2).

- MONT. CODE ANN., Title 85, Chapter 2: Surface Water and Ground Water. This chapter provides for water rights adjudications; appropriations, permits, and certificates of water rights; utilization of water; and Indian and federal water rights.

- MONT. CODE ANN., Title 85, Chapter 7: Irrigation Districts.

- MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-102: “All docks and wharves built on any of the navigable waters of the state shall be public docks and wharves, and all boats, vessels, and steamboats plying such navigable waters shall have a right to land thereat and take on and discharge their cargoes and passengers thereon. The owner of such dock or wharf shall have the right to charge and collect from the owner or owners of such boat, steamboat, or vessel a reasonable compensation therefor.”

- MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-107: With respect to land under a navigable water, state ownership extends to the high water mark or meander line.

- MONT. CODE ANN., Title 85, Chapter 20: Water Compacts.

- MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305: “Navigable rivers, sloughs, or streams between the lines of ordinary high water thereof of the state of Montana and all rivers, sloughs, and streams flowing through any public lands of the state shall hereafter be public waters for the purpose of angling, and any rights of title to such streams and the land between high water flow lines or within the meander lines of navigable streams shall be subject to the
right of any person owning an angler’s license of this state who desires to angle therein or along their banks to go upon the same for such purpose.”

**Definition of “Navigable Waters”:**

Early on, the Montana Supreme Court rejected the common law “ebb and flow” tidal rule of navigability in favor of the navigable-in-fact test. *Gibson v. Kelly*, 39 P. 517, 519 (Mont. 1895). For purposes of state title to the beds and banks, Montana uses a federal test of navigability based on *The Daniel Ball* and *The Montello*. *Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran*, 682 P.2d 163, 166 (Mont. 1984). However, in the Montana Supreme Court’s interpretation, this is essentially a log floatation test. For example, evidence that the Dearborn River was used in 1887 to float approximately 100,000 railroad ties, and used in 1888 and 1889 to float log drives supported a finding that the river was navigable for state title purposes. *Id.*. See also *Edwards v. Severin*, 785 P.2d 1022, 1023-24 (Mont. 1990) (concluding that the Yellowstone River is a navigable river because it could float logs). State ownership of the bed also gives the state ownership of minerals. *Jackson v. Burlington Northern, Inc.*, 667 P.2d 406, 408 (Mont. 1983).

Nevertheless, “where title to the bed of [a river] rests within the State, the test of navigability for use and not for title, is a test to be determined under state law and not federal law.” *Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran*, 682 P.2d 163, 168 (Mont. 1984). In its case law, and relying on the Montana Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court has employed a broad “recreational use” definition of what waters are subject to public use. Specifically, “the capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes determined whether the waters can be so used. The Montana Constitution clearly provides that the State owns the waters for the benefit of its people. The Constitution does not limit the waters’ use. Consequently, this Court cannot limit their use by inventing some restrictive test.” *Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth*, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984) (rejecting both the federal navigability and “pleasure boat” tests for public rights); see also *Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran*, 682 P.2d 163, 169 (Mont. 1984) (recreational use and fishing can make a stream navigable for public use purposes, and “[s]treambed ownership by a private party is irrelevant”; overruling *Herrin v. Sutherland*, 241 P. 328 (Mont. 1925), which held that persons who waded a non-navigable creek had committed a trespass, on the grounds that that holding “is contrary to the public trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution).

By statute, for purposes of public use rights, streams and lakes in Montana are navigable if they are navigable in fact under a commerce definition or meandered and returned as navigable by federal surveyors. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1-111, 85-1-112. In addition, the public has a right to fish in any waters that flow through public lands. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305.


**Rights in “Navigable Waters”:**
The line between private and state ownership of the beds of navigable waters is the high-water mark or meander line. Montana Code Annotated § 85-16-107; Galt v. Montana by and through Department of Fish, Wildlife, & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 915 (Mont. 1987). However, under older statutes, riparian landowners on navigable streams took title to the low water mark, while landowners along non-navigable waters take title to the middle of the stream or lake. Montgomery v. Gehring, 400 P.2d 403, 405 (Mont. 1965) (citing Revised Code of Montana § 67-712 (1947)); see also Faucett v. Dewey Lumber Co., 266 P. 646, 648 (Mont. 1928) (noting that under Revised Code § 6771 (1921), landowners along navigable waters took title to the low-water mark); Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 331 (Mont. 1925) (same); Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517, 519 (Mont. 1895) (noting that the boundary between public and private ownership is the low water mark, based on Civil Code § 772 (1895)). However, even under these cases, public rights extended to the high water mark. Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517, 519-20 (Mont. 1895) (recognizing public rights of fishing and navigation to this mark).

“The public has the right to use the waters and the bed and banks up to the high water mark,” including portage “in the least intrusive manner possible.” Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984). Moreover, “[u]nder the Constitution and the public trust doctrine, the public has an instream, non-diversionary right to the recreational use of the State’s navigable surface waters. In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to Use All the Water, 55 P.3d 396, 404 (Mont. 2002). However, this right does not give the public access rights over private property. Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984). Early rights recognized included the rights to fish and to shoot wild ducks. Herrin v. Sutherland, 241 P. 328, 331 (Mont. 1925).

Montana is one of the western states that has used public ownership of water to extend public trust rights to non-navigable waters. Thus, the Montana Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he public trust doctrine in Montana’s Constitution grants public ownership in water not in beds and banks of streams.” Galt v. Montana by and through Department of Fish, Wildlife, & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 915 (Mont. 1987) (emphasis added). Moreover, “[t]he Montana Constitution makes no distinction between Class I and Class II waters. All waters are owned by the State for the use of its people.” Id. As a result, “the public has the right to use the water for recreational purposes and minimal use of underlying and adjoining real estate essential to enjoyment of its ownership in water,” even if the bed and banks are privately owned. Id.; Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Mont. 1984) (noting that underlying ownership of the bed does not matter for the public’s recreational use right); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that “under the public trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for nonrecreational purposes.”). “The public has a right of use up to the high water mark, but only such use as is necessary to utilization of the water itself. We hold that any use of the bed and banks must be of minimal impact.” Galt v. Montana by and through Department of Fish, Wildlife, & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 915 (Mont. 1987); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 172 (Mont. 1984). Nevertheless,
Montana statutes make it clear that appropriated water rights trump any other public interest in the waters, including environmental protections and public use rights. Montana Code Annotated §§ 75-5-705, 75-7-104, 85-1-111.


NEBRASKA

Date of Statehood: 1867


Nebraska Constitution: Nebraska’s 1920 constitution contains several provisions relating to water. These include:

- Art. XV, § 4: Water a Public Necessity. “The necessity of water for domestic use and for irrigation purposes in the State of Nebraska is hereby declared a natural want.”
- Art XV, § 5: “The use of the water of every natural stream within the State of Nebraska is hereby dedicated to the people of the state for beneficial purposes, subject to the provisions of the following section.”
- Art. XV, § 6: This section establishes the right to divert unappropriated waters, subject to a public interest limitation and a preference for domestic use, followed by a preference for agriculture.
- Art. XV, § 7: This section declares that the appropriation of water for power uses is a public purpose.

Nebraska Statutes:

• **NEB. REV. STAT. § A1-114**: Missouri-Nebraska Boundary Compact. Article VII(b) of the Compact prohibits the states from claiming the beds of the Missouri River against private landowners.

• **NEB. REV. STAT. § A1-115**: Blue River Basin Compact.

• **NEB. REV. STAT. § A1-123**: South Dakota-Nebraska Boundary Compact. Article VII(b) of the Compact prohibits the states from claiming the beds of the Missouri River against private landowners.

• **NEB. REV. STAT., Chapter 46**: Irrigation and Regulation of Water. This chapter provides for water rights adjudications and ground water regulation.

**Definition of “Navigable Waters”:**

In 1906, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted the variations among the states regarding what constituted “navigable waters” and blamed the “confusion” on a variety of factors. *Kinkead v. Turgeon*, 109 N.W. 744, 744 (Neb. 1906). Noting that Nebraska had adopted the English common law, it rejected the navigable-in-fact test for title as a mistake, instead adhering to the common-law ebb-and-flow tidal test – even for the Missouri River. *Id.* at 745-47. Nevertheless, despite the lack of state title, “[t]he public retains its easement of the right of passage along and over the waters of the river as a public highway. This is the interest of the public in connection with such rivers which is paramount, and which is, and should be, protected by the courts.” *Id.* at 747. *But see Clark v. Cambridge & Arapahoe Irrigation & Improvement Co.*, 64 N.W. 239, 240-41 (Neb. 1895) (accepting the navigable-in-fact test but nevertheless finding that the Republican River was not navigable).

**Rights in “Navigable Waters”:**

A landowner along navigable or non-navigable waters “owns to the thread of the stream, and his riparian rights extend to existing and subsequently formed islands.” *Monument Farms, Inc. v. Daggett*, 520 N.W.2d 556, 561-62 (Neb. App. 1994); *Krumwielde v. Rose*, 129 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Neb. 1964). “The only difference is that in the case of a navigable stream, such as the Missouri River, it is subject to the superior easement of navigation.” *Krumwielde v. Rose*, 129 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Neb. 1964) (citing *Kinkead v. Turgeon*, 109 N.W. 744 (Neb. 1906)).

The interest of the public in the waters and bed of a navigable river is analogous to that of the public in a public road. It has the right of passage over the stream as it had over the road. The owner of the land abutting upon a private road can do nothing in any way to interfere with the rights of the public in the same, nor can the riparian owner on the banks of a navigable stream exercise any dominion over its waters or over the bed thereof in any manner inconsistent with, or opposed to, the public easement.

NEVADA

Date of Statehood: 1864


Nevada Constitution: There are no provisions relevant to water in the Nevada Constitution.

Nevada Statutes:

- NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.450: Nuisance includes befouling, obstructing, or rendering dangerous for passage “a lake, navigable river, bay, stream, canal, ditch, millrace, or basin . . . .”
- NEV. REV. STAT. § 322.0052: This provision defines a littoral or riparian residential parcel.
- NEV. REV. STAT. § 455B.420: “‘Water access area’ includes, without limitation, a beach, river entry or exit point and land located at or below the ordinary high-water mark of a navigable body of water within this state.”
- NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 532: State Engineer.
- NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 533: Adjudication of Vested Water Rights and Appropriation of Public Waters. “The water of all sources of water supply within the boundaries of the state whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public.” § 533.025. These provisions also declare that recreational use of the waters is a beneficial use. § 533.030(2).
- NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 534: Underground Water and Wells.
- NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 535: Dams and Other Obstructions.
- NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 536: Ditches, Canals, Flumes, and Other Conduits.
- NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 537: Navigable Waters. This chapter lists specific waters that the State of Nevada considers navigable for title purposes. Thus, “[a]ll of the Colorado River within the State of Nevada, from the Arizona line on the north to the California line on the south, is hereby declared to be a navigable stream for purposes of fixing ownership on the banks on beds thereof, and title to the lands below the high water mark thereof is held by the State of Nevada, insofar as they be within the state.” § 537.101. Similarly, the Virgin River and Winnemucca Lake are navigable waters, with title to their beds and banks in the State of Nevada. §§ 537.020, 537.030.
- NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 538: Interstate Waters, Compacts, and Commissions. The Colorado River Compact is codified at § 538.010.
- NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 539: Irrigation Districts.
- NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 540: Planning and Development of Water Resources.
- NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 540A: Regional Planning and Management.
- NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 541: Water Conservancy Districts.
- NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 543: Control of Floods.
In Chapter 537, Nevada by statute has declared certain waters to be navigable for title purposes, including the Colorado River, the Virgin River, and Winnemucca Lake. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 537.010, 537.020, 537.030. These statutes are effectively treated as conclusive determinations of navigability for title purposes. See State Engineer v. Cowles Brothers, Inc., 478 P.2d 159, 160 (Nev. 1970) (concluding that, because Winnemucca Lake went dry naturally and gradually, the court would normally have declared it non-navigable for title purposes, but for the declaration of navigability in Nev. Rev. Stat. § 537.030).

However, Chapter 537 does not provide a complete list of the navigable waters in Nevada, and outside of these statutory declarations, the Nevada courts use the federal test for navigability and recognize that the U.S. Supreme Court has established different navigability tests for Commerce Clause and state title purposes. State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1233, 1235-36, 1238 (Nev. 1972). The water must be navigable as of the date of statehood. State Engineer v. Cowles Brothers, Inc., 478 P.2d 159, 160 (Nev. 1970). Moreover, “[a] body of water is navigable if it is used or is usable in its ordinary condition as a highway of commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted.” Id. at 160 (citing Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922)). However, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the federal title test to be a log floatation test, concluding that:

Although no Supreme Court case has expressly based its decision of title navigability on the capacity of a stream to float out logs, the emphasized portions of . . . The Montello and Appalachian Power leads use to believe that in the setting of this case navigability for title has been established. Log driving was the first and apparently only important commercial use of the Carson. The river was fortuitously and ideally located geographically for this use. The Carson River was and is navigable.

State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1236 (Nev. 1972); see also Shoemaker v. Hatch, 13 Nev. 261, 1878 WL 3830, at *4 (Nev. 1878) (concluding that the Truckee River is navigable because it is “a highway for the floatage of wood and timber, and has been treated by the officers of the government as a navigable stream”). Moreover, the Supreme Court allows states to use less stringent tests for navigability with respect to allowing public uses. State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1235 (Nev. 1972).

Rights in “Navigable Waters”:

“[T]he states hold title to the beds of navigable watercourses in trust for the people of their respective states. Title to navigable water beds are normally inalienable.” State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231, 1233, 1235-36, 1238 (Nev. 1972). As a result, in the absence on an
express legislative determination to convey these submerged lands, it is presumed that state land patents did not convey them. *Id.*

Early case law indicates that private landowners own to the low water mark of navigable waters. *Shoemaker v. Hatch*, 13 Nev. 261, 1878 WL 3830, at *4 (Nev. 1878). However, if the title describes a meander line, the land owner takes only to that meander line or high water line. *Michelsen v. Harvey*, 822 P.2d 660, 662 (Nev. 1991); *Reno Brewing Co. v. Paciard*, 103 P. 415 (Nev. 1909).

Nevada’s case law on its public trust doctrine is quite limited. Indeed, one writer has declared that “Nevada remains the only western state that has not addressed the public trust doctrine.” John P. Sande IV, *A River Runs to It: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save Walker Lake?*, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 831, 833 n.15 (2004).

Nevertheless, as in many western states, the issue of the relationship between appropriative water rights and the public trust doctrine has arisen in Nevada, although the state has largely side-stepped that issue. *See, e.g.*, *Mineral County v. Nevada Department of Conservation & Natural Resources*, 20 P.3d 800, 807 n.35 (Nev. 2001) (avoiding the issue of how the public trust doctrine would apply to water rights affecting Walker River on procedural grounds). Nevertheless, the Nevada Supreme Court has discussed the public trust doctrine in the water rights context, stating that “[u]nder the Public Trust Doctrine, the state government, as trustee of all public natural resources, owes a fiduciary obligation to the general public to maintain public uses unless an alternative use would achieve a countervailing public benefit. Thus, the Public Trust Doctrine serves to protect public expectations in natural resources held in common against destabilizing change.” *Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indiand v. Washoe County*, 918 P.2d 697, 709 n.7 (Nev. 1996) (citations omitted). Moreover, the State Engineer’s “refusal to consider alternatives to the [water] project is not consistent with the exercise of his functions as the trustee of water resources in Nevada and his responsibility to insure that ‘all sources of water supply within the . . . state whether above or beneath the surface of the ground’ is managed as an asset belonging to the public. In refusing to consider any of the alternatives presented by the protestants to the use proposed by the applicants, the State Engineer has violated his trust and has failed to consider adequately the public’s interest in its water resources.” *Id.* at 709 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025).

As in Montana, the statutory declaration of public ownership of Nevada’s water may yet influence its public trust doctrine. In 1997, the Nevada Supreme Court declared that “the most fundamental tenent of Nevada water law [is that] ‘[t]he water of sources of water supply within the boundaries of the state whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public.’” *Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State of Nevada*, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (Nev. 1997) (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025, with the court adding emphasis). In addition, at least one Justice of the Nevada Supreme Court, moreover, has expressed a willingness to consider “the existence and role of the public trust doctrine in the State of Nevada,” noting that in other states the doctrine has evolved to include recreational and ecological uses and emphasizing the public ownership of water in Nevada. *Mineral County v. Nevada Department of Conservation & Natural Resources*,
20 P.3d 800, 807-08 (Nev. 2001) (J. Rose, concurring). According to Justice Rose, “[t]his extension of the doctrine is natural and necessary where, as here, the navigable water’s existence is wholly dependent on tributaries that appear to be over-appropriated.” *Id.* at 808 (J. Rose, concurring) (connection the public trust doctrine to *Nev. Rev. Stat.* § 533.025, which declares public ownership of Nevada’s water).

**NEW MEXICO**

**Date of Statehood:** 1912

**Water Law System:** Prior Appropriation.

**New Mexico Constitution:** The New Mexico Constitution includes several provisions related to water, and the New Mexico courts have determined that the constitutional declaration of public ownership of the waters is relevant to public use rights. Relevant provisions of the Constitution include:

- Art. XVI, § 1: “All existing rights to the use of any waters in this state for any beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and affirmed.”
- Art. XVI, § 2: “The unappropriated water of every natural stream, perennial or torrential, within the state of New Mexico, is hereby declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of this state. Priority of appropriation shall give the better right.”
- Art. XVI, § 3: “Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to use water.”
- Art. XVI, § 6(A): “The ‘water trust fund’ is created in the state treasury to conserve and protect the water resources of New Mexico and to ensure that New Mexico has the water it needs for a strong and vibrant future. The purpose of the fund shall be to secure a supply of clean and safe water for New Mexico’s residents.”
- Art. XX, § 21: “The protection of the state’s beautiful and healthful environment is hereby declared to be of fundamental importance to the public interest, health, safety and the general welfare. The Legislature shall provide for control of pollution and control of despoilment of the air, water and other natural resources of this state, consistent with the use and development of these resources for the maximum benefit of the people.”

**New Mexico Statutes:**

- N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-17-7: “A municipality shall consider ordinances and codes to encourage water conservation and drought management planning . . . .”
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-14: This provision prohibits diversions or reductions of flows that are detrimental to game fish.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-13-2(C): This provision defines “state lands” to include “all land owned by the state, all land owned by school districts, beds of navigable rivers and lakes, submerged lands and lands in which mineral rights have been reserved to the state.”

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 1: Water Rights in General. “All natural waters flowing in streams and watercourses, whether such be perennial, or torrential, within the limits of the state of New Mexico, belong to the public and are subject to appropriation for beneficial use. A watercourse is hereby defined to be any river, creek, arroyo, canyon, draw, or wash, or any other channel having definite banks and bed with visible evidence of the occasional flow of water.” § 72-1-1. This article also contains provisions related to the Pecos River water shortage crisis and New Mexico’s obligations to deliver water to Texas, §§ 72-1-2.1 et seq., and Indian water rights settlements. §§ 72-1-11, 72-1-12.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 2: State Engineer.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 3: Water Districts and Water Masters.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 4: Surveys, Investigations and Adjudications of Water Rights.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 4A: Water Project Finance.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 5: Appropriation and Use of Surface Waters.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 5A: Groundwater Storage and Recovery.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 6: Water-Use Leasing.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 7: Appeals from State Engineer.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 8: Offenses and Penalties under the Water Act of 1907.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 9: Application of the Water Act of 1907.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 10: Community Uses.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 11: Salt Lakes. “All the salt lakes within this state, and the salt which has, or may accumulate on the shores thereof, is, and shall be free to the citizens, and each one shall have power to collect salt on any occasion free from molestation or disturbance.” § 72-11-1.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 12: Underground Waters. “The water of underground streams, channels, artesian basins, reservoirs or lakes, having reasonably ascertainable boundaries, is declared to belong to the public and is subject to appropriation for beneficial use.” § 72-12-1.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 12A: Mine Dewatering.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 13: Artesian Wells.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 14: Interstate Stream Commission; Protection of Interstate Streams.

N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 15: Interstate Compacts. The Colorado River Compact is codified within this chapter. § 72-15-5.

**Definition of “Navigable Waters”:**
New Mexico cases regarding title navigability are limited, and the most important resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court declaring the Rio Grande non-navigable. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court reversed the New Mexico Territorial Court to find that “the Rio Grande is not navigable within the limits of the territory of New Mexico. The mere fact that logs, poles, and rafts are floated down a stream occasionally and in times of high water does not make it a navigable river.” *United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.*, 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899) (citing *The Montello*, 20 Wall. 430, 439). “Obviously, the Rio Grande, within the limits of New Mexico, is not a stream over which, in its ordinary condition, trade and travel can be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. Its use for any purposes of transportation has been and is exceptional, and only in times of temporary high water. The ordinary flow is not sufficient.” *Id.* at 699.

More recently, the New Mexico Court of Appeals relied on the federal test of navigability from *The Daniel Ball* to declare Navajo Lake to be navigable. *Wreyford v. Arnold*, 477 P.2d 332, 336 (N.M. App. 1970) (citing *The Daniel Ball*, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870)). However, this question arose in the context of the applicability of maritime law, not state title.

However, state title to the beds and banks of navigable waters is less critical to New Mexico’s public trust doctrine than in other states, because the New Mexico Supreme Court fairly early found the New Mexico Constitution’s declaration of public ownership of waters – art. XVI, § 2 – relevant to the definition of “public waters” for public use purposes. Regarding this provision as a declaration of existing law, not a change, the court concluded that beneficial uses include recreation and fishing, unhampered by a doctrine of riparian rights. *New Mexico ex rel. State Game Commission v. Red River Valley Co.*, 182 P.2d 421, 427-28 (N.M. 1947). Moreover, federal law navigability is not the only test for determining whether waters are public – recreational use is enough. *Id.* at 430.

**Rights in “Navigable Waters”:**

“So far as non-navigable streams are concerned, the common law rule, seemingly without exception, is that the one owning both banks of a stream likewise owns the entire bed thereof, the waters are private waters, and the owner has the exclusive right to fish therein.” *New Mexico ex rel. State Game Commission v. Red River Valley Co.*, 182 P.2d 421, 426 (N.M. 1947). Although “[t]he same rule is sometimes applied to navigable streams,” “it is conceded that the weight of authority is, rather, that the bed and waters of a navigable stream are the property of the public with adjoining land owners having no exclusive right to fish therein.” *Id.* “Where there is no separation in ownership of soil and water, ‘the right to hunt and trap from boats on rivers, lakes, streams, etc., is analogous to the right to take fish from the water. As a general rule, the test as to the public right of fowling, hunting, and trapping is the public or private ownership of the soil beneath the waters.’” *Id.* (quoting 24 AM. JUR. 378).

As in many western states, the fact that the New Mexico Constitution declares waters to be public owned is relevant not just to state water law but also to the public’s rights to use those
waters. In 1947, the New Mexico Supreme Court declared that all waters are public waters until beneficially appropriated, and hence that the public can use all waters for outside recreation, sports, and fishing. *New Mexico ex rel. State Game Commission v. Red River Valley Co.*, 182 P.2d 421, 429-32 (N.M. 1947).

In addition, in 1899, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested with regard to the Rio Grande River that the federal government’s interest in downstream navigability may limit application of the prior appropriation doctrine. Thus, even though the Rio Grande is non-navigable in New Mexico, the Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Company could *not* divert the entire flow of the river and so destroy downstream navigability. *United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.*, 174 U.S. 690, 701-02 (1899). While the Court recognized that the western states were moving toward prior appropriation, it still held that appropriative rights under state law could not destroy the United States’ rights to downstream flow. *Id.* at 703. As a result, it remanded the case for a determination of the effects of irrigation company’s proposed dam and diversion on downstream navigability. *Id.* at 710. After another trip to the Supreme Court, *United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.*, 65 P. 276 (N.M. Terr. 1900), *rev’d and remanded*, 184 U.S. 416, 424-25 (1902), the New Mexico Territorial Court eventually concluded that the irrigation company had forfeited its right to build the dam. *United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co.*, 85 P. 393, 399 (N.M. Terr. 1906).

**NORTH DAKOTA**

**Date of Statehood:** 1889

**Water Law System:** Prior Appropriation.

**North Dakota Constitution:** The North Dakota Constitution has two provisions potentially relevant to public trust principles. These are:

- Art. XI, § 3: “All flowing streams and natural watercourses shall forever remain the property of the state for mining, irrigating and manufacturing purposes.”
- Art. XI, § 27: “Hunting, trapping, fishing and the taking of game area valued part of our heritage and will be forever preserved for the people and managed by law and regulation for the public good.”

**North Dakota Statutes:**

- N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-01-15: “Except when the grant under which the land is held involves a different intent, the owner of the upland, when it borders on a navigable lake or stream, takes to the edge of the lake or stream at low watermark. All navigable rivers shall remain and be deemed public highways. In all cases when the opposite banks of any stream not navigable belong to different persons, the stream and the bed thereof shall become common to both.”
• N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-08: “Islands and accumulations of land formed in the beds of streams which are navigable belong to the state, if there is no title or prescription to the contrary. The control and management, including the power to execute surface and mineral leases, of islands, relictions, and accumulations of land owned by the state of North Dakota in navigable streams and waters and the beds thereof, must be governed by chapter 61-33.”
• N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01: “All waters within the limits of the state from the following sources of water supply belong to the public and are subject to appropriation for beneficial use and the right to uses these waters must be acquired pursuant to chapter 61-04”: surface waters, “excluding diffuse surface waters,” and all waters underground.
• N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-08: “Every person who in any manner obstructs the free navigation of any navigable watercourse within this state is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
• N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-17: This provision allows the booming of logs on shores of navigable streams, but the owner must leave a channel for free passage.
• N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-26: State Water Resources Policy.
• N.D. CENT. CODE, Chapter 61-04: Appropriation of Water. Among other things, the proposed appropriation must be in the public interest, which includes consideration of “the effect on fish and game resources and public recreation opportunities.” § 61-04-06(4). North Dakota prioritizes uses of water, and fish, wildlife, and recreational uses are all in the sixth priority, after domestic, municipal, livestock, irrigation, and industrial uses. § 61-04-06.1.
• N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04.1-01: “[T]he state of North Dakota claims its sovereign right to use the moisture contained in the clouds and atmosphere within the state boundaries. All water derived as a result of weather modification operations shall be considered a part of North Dakota’s basic water supply and all statutes, rules, and regulations applying to natural precipitation shall also apply to precipitation resulting from cloud seeding.”
• N.D. CENT. CODE, Chapter 61-15: Water Conservation. A “navigable lake” is “any lake which shall have been meandered and its metes and bounds established by the government of the United States in the survey of public lands.” § 61-15-01. This section also defines “high water mark.” Under its police power, the state has control of navigable lakes “within the ordinary high water mark for the purposes of constructing, maintaining, and operating dams, dikes, ditches, fills, spillways, or other structures to promote the conservation, development, storage, distribution, and utilization of such waters and the propagation and preservation of wildlife.” § 61-15-02. These provisions also allow for water and wildlife conservation projects. § 61-15-03. “Any person who, without written consent of the state engineer, shall drain or cause to be drained, or who shall attempt to drain any lake or pond, which has been meandered by the government of the United States in the survey of public lands, shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor.” § 61-15-08.
• N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-33-01: “Sovereign lands” are “those areas, including beds and islands, lying within the ordinary high watermark of navigable lakes and streams.”

**Definition of “Navigable Waters”:**
Navigability for title purposes is a question of federal law, and a water is navigable if it is navigable-in-fact. *Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. North Dakota*, 37 N.W.2d 488, 490 (N.D. 1949). North Dakota does not employ the tidal navigability test. *Roberts v. Taylor*, 181 N.W. 622, 625 (N.D. 1921). Instead:

When a stream is not a tidewater . . ., it must be navigable in fact in its natural state, with the aid of or reference to artificial means, and be of sufficient capacity to render it capable of being used as a highway for commerce, either in the transportation of the products of the mines, forests, or of the soil of the country through which it runs, or of passengers. . . .

It must be capable of being used for such a purpose, that is, for a public highway, a considerable part of the year, and it is not sufficient that it have an adequate volume of water therefor only occasionally, as the result of freshets, for brief periods of uncertain recurrence and duration.


The North Dakota Supreme Court has noted, however, that “the test as to navigability applied in North Dakota is not as narrow as that in federal courts . . . .” *Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. North Dakota*, 37 N.W.2d 488, 491 (N.D. 1949). A water will be deemed navigable-in-fact for state title purposes if it supports rowing for pleasure and hunting, the cutting and selling of ice, or hunting from flat-bottomed boats. *North Dakota v. Brace*, 36 N.W.2d 330, 333 (N.D. 1949). Similarly, public uses supporting navigability do not have to be commercial or pecuniary; [a] use public in its character may exist when the waters may be used for the convenience and enjoyment of the public, whether traveling upon trade purpose or pleasure purposes. . . . Purposes of pleasure, public convenience, and enjoyment may be public as well as purposes of trade. Navigation may as surely exist in the former as in the latter.” *Roberts v. Taylor*, 181 N.W. 622, 626 (N.D. 1921). Moreover, it is the capacity for public use, not current use, that counts. *Id*.

Even so, under this test Fuller Lake was also non-navigable, because it was small and marshy and its only public use was hunting. *North Dakota v. Brace*, 36 N.W.2d 330, 334 (N.D. 1949). Similarly, Grenora Lake is also not navigable:

There is no evidence that any use has ever been or could be made of the waters of the lake either for pleasure or for profit, for travel, or for trade. No boats were used thereon. The water at all times has been of such a character that it was not habitable for fish. Neither the lake nor its surroundings are suitable for any purposes of pleasure. It is true that aquatic birds sometimes rested on its surface and there is evidence that hunters occasionally shot waterfowl that flew to or from the lake, but this was an infrequent occurrence.
Id. at 491.

The provision of the North Dakota Constitution declaring waters to be publicly owned does not give the state title to the beds and banks. North Dakota v. Brace, 36 N.W.2d 330, 335 (N.D. 1949); see also Roberts v. Taylor, 181 N.W. 622, 625 (N.D. 1921) (noting that this constitutional provision “is a declaration concerning public waters.”). The Legislature can declare waters navigable, but “[t]he Legislature may not adopt a retroactive definition of navigability which would destroy a title already vested under federal grant, or transfer to the state a property right in a body of water or the bed thereof that had previously been acquired by a private owner.” North Dakota v. Brace, 36 N.W.2d 330, 332 (N.D. 1949).

Unless a waterway is meandered or declared navigable by the state legislature, it is presumed to be non-navigable, and the burden of proof is on the party claiming navigability. Amoco Oil Co. v. North Dakota Highway Department, 262 N.W.2d 726, 728 (N.D. 1978). Thus, the Mouse River was presumed non-navigable, because the parties assumed that it was. Id. In contrast, Devil’s Lake was stipulated to be navigable-in-fact based on boats using the lake for commercial purposes. Rutten v. North Dakota, 93 N.W.2d 796, 797 (N.D. 1958).

“[I]t is clear from the undisputed testimony in this case and from prior holdings of this court that the Missouri River is a navigable stream in this state.” Hogue v. Bougois, 71 N.W.2s 47, 52 (N.D. 1955) (citing Gardner v. Green, 271 N.W. 775; North Dakota v. Loy, 720 N.W.2s 668). “North Dakota holds title to the bed of the Missouri River. . . . This title includes underlying oil and gas.” J.P. Furlong Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 132 (N.D. 1988).

North Dakota engaged in a long legal quiet title battle with the United States regarding title to the Little Missouri River. Despite original findings that the river was navigable, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed North Dakota’s quiet title claim on the grounds that North Dakota had failed to comply with the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year statute of limitations for claims against the federal government, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a. Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of University & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 284-93 (1983). In 1986, Congress amended the Act to exempt state claims to navigable rivers from the statute of limitations, and North Dakota re-filed its action. Nevertheless, despite evidence of use by Indians, ferries, and explorers, and modern use by recreational canoeists, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the Little Missouri River is not navigable and that title to its beds and banks remains in the United States. North Dakota ex rel. Board of University & School Lands v. United States, 972 F.2d 235, 240 (8th Cir. 1992). The court applied The Daniel Ball test of navigability. Id. at 237-38.

Rights in “Navigable Waters”:

Riparian landowners own to the center, or thread, of non-navigable streams. Amoco Oil Co. v. North Dakota Highway Department, 262 N.W.2d 726, 728 (N.D. 1978) (citing St. Paul & P.R.R. Co. v. Schurmeier, 72 U.S. 272, 287-89 (1868)). The federal equal footing doctrine gives
states title to the beds underlying navigable waterways to the high water mark, but states can then pick a different title line. Despite N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-01-15, “[w]hether North Dakota has limited its title to the area below the low water mark has not been decided.” J.P. Furlong Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 132 n.1 (N.D. 1988). But see Mills I, 523 N.W.2d 537, 540-42 (N.D. 1994) (acknowledging that the North Dakota Supreme Court “has said that ‘the owner of lands riparian to a navigable stream owns title to the low water mark’”; quoting Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 N.W.2d 47, 52 (N.D. 1955), and citing Gardner v. Green, 271 N.W. 775 (1937); North Dakota v. Loy. 20 N.W.2d 668 (1945)).

Regardless of title, however, the public trust doctrine extends to the high water mark, because under the equal footing doctrine and the public trust doctrine, the state could not totally abdicate its interest in that land. Mills I, 523 N.W.2d 537, 542-44 (N.D. 1994). Thus, the state and private landowners have co-existent, overlapping interest in the shore zone between the high and low water marks. North Dakota ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills, 592 N.W.2d 591, 592 (N.D. 1999). The ordinary high water mark is determined by the existing state of the river, even if Army Corps dams – as on the Missouri River – have raised the water level. Id. “[T]he state has rights in the property up to the ordinary high watermark. The ordinary high watermark is ambulatory, and is not determined as of a fixed date.” Id. (citing In re Ownership of the Bed of Devil’s Lake, 423 N.W.2d 141, 143-44 (N.D. 1988)). The public trust doctrine and its protection of the public’s right of navigable support this view. Id. at 593.

“The purpose of state title was to protect the public right of navigation.” J.P. Furlong Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 132 (N.D. 1988). Indeed, by statute, “[a]ll navigable rivers shall remain and be deemed public highways.” N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-01-15. Thus, the policy of protecting the public right of navigation is embodied in both the public trust doctrine and North Dakota statutes. J.P. Furlong Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 133-37 (N.D. 1988). State title and public rights shift to the new beds well navigable rivers change course:

The Territorial Legislative Assembly recognized that our state would receive title to the beds of navigable waters at statehood. Accordingly, by 1877, it had enacted a code that would secure title of the state to such lands and modify common law so that the state’s title would follow the movement of the bed of the river. This accords with underlying public policy, since the purpose of a state holding title to a navigable riverbed is to foster the public’s right of navigation, traditionally the most important feature of the public trust doctrine. Moreover, it seems to use that other important aspects of the state’s public interest, such as bathing, swimming, recreation, and fishing, as well as irrigation, industrial and other water supplies, are most closely associated with where the water is in the new riverbed, not the old.

Id. at 140.
The public trust doctrine does not prohibit all development, and hence the granting of a permit to drain wetlands did not violate the public trust doctrine – assuming that the doctrine even applied – when the State Engineer studied the consequences, imposed conditions, and was subject to a public interest requirement. In the Matter of the Application for Permits to Drain Related to Stone Creek Channel Improvements and White Spur Drain, 424 N.W.2s 894, 901 (N.D. 1988) (citing United Plainsmen v. North Dakota Water Conservation Commission, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976) (quoting Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Cmwlth 1973))). However, the public trust doctrine does limit the state’s discretionary authority “to allocate vital state resources,” as enunciated in Illinois Central Railroad. United Plainsmen Ass’n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission, 247 N.W.2d 457, 460 (N.D. 1976). Moreover, the doctrine is not restricted to conveyances of real property; “[t]he State holds the navigable waters, as well as the lands beneath them, in trust for the public,” as provided in the N.D. Const. and refined in N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-01. Id. at 461 (also noting that “[w]e believe that § 61-01-01, NDCC, expresses the Public Trust Doctrine.”).

Thus, North Dakota’s public trust doctrine applies to appropriations of water. When the State Engineer issues water permits, “the Public Trust Doctrine requires, at a minimum, a determination of the potential effect of the allocation of water on the present water supply and future needs of this State. This necessarily involves planning responsibility.” United Plainsmen Ass’n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission, 247 N.W.2d 457, 461 (N.D. 1976). While the North Dakota Supreme Court also acknowledged that “[i]t is evident that the Public Trust Doctrine is assuming an expanding role in environmental law,” it saw no need for such expansive declarations in the context of water rights permitting. Id. at 463. Instead, even as “[c]onfined to traditional concepts, the Doctrine confirms the State’s role as trustee of the public waters. It permits alienation and allocation of such precious state resources only after an analysis of present supply and future need.” Id. See also North Dakota State Water Commission v. Board of Managers, 332 N.W.2d 254, 258 (N.D. 1983) (holding that the State does not lose its authority over the waters of a lake merely because the bed is privately owned and determining that “[p]rotection of the integrity of the waters of the state is a valid exercise of the Commission’s duties pursuant to § 61-02-12, NDCC, as well as being part of the state’s affirmative duty under the ‘public trust’ doctrine”; as a result the Commission had authority to control the drainage of a non-navigable lake).

**OKLAHOMA**

**Date of Statehood:** 1907

**Water Law System:** Both prior appropriation and riparian rights. Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, 855 P.2d 568, 571-72 (Okla. 1990) (noting that while the 1963 amendments to Oklahoma’s water law modified riparian rights, Oklahoma riparian owners retain “a vested common-law right to the reasonable use of the stream,” and the legislature’s attempt to extinguish those riparian rights by giving ownership of
all water to the state was unconstitutional; however, appropriative rights for irrigation have existed since 1897, and riparian and appropriative rights are co-existent).

**Oklahoma Constitution:** Only one provision of the Oklahoma Constitution is relevant to water, which declares that “[t]he Legislature shall have power and shall provide for a system of levees, drains, and ditches and of irrigation in this state when deemed expedient . . . .” OKLA. CONST., art. XVI, § 3.

**Oklahoma Statutes:**

- 60 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 60: This section preserves riparian rights to use water for domestic use.
- 60 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 337: “Islands and accumulations of land formed in the beds of streams which are navigable, belong to the state, if there is no title or prescription to the contrary.”
- 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN., Chapter 1: Irrigation and Water Rights.
- 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN., Chapter 1A: Oklahoma Dam Safety Act.
- 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN., Chapter 2: Irrigation Districts.
- 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN., Chapter 4: Conservation in General.
- 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN., Chapter 8: Grand River Dam Authority.
- 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN., Chapter 14: Oklahoma Water Resources Board.
- 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN., Chapter 15: Port Authorities.
- 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN., Chapter 17: Regional Water Distribution Act.
- 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN., Chapter 18: Rural Water, Sewer, Gas and Solid Waste Management Districts Act.
- 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN., Chapter 20: Kansas-Oklahoma Arkansas River Basin Compact.
- 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN., Chapter 20B: Red River Compact.

**Definition of “Navigable Waters”:**

Navigability is a question of fact, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court has adopted and applied the federal test of navigability from *The Montello*, 20 Wall. 430, 439. *Hale v. Record*, 146 P. 587, 587 (Okla. 1915). Under this test, the South Canadian River is non-navigable, and
avulsive changes to the river did not change title. *Oklahoma ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v. Warder*, 198 P.2d 402, 406-07 (Okla. 1948). Similarly, no stipulation was allowed as to the navigability of the Grand River or the Neosho River, and both were found non-navigable under the federal test of navigability. *Hanes v. Oklahoma*, 973 P.2d 330, 333-34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998).

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has distinguished navigability for title purposes from navigable for public use purposes. Thus, it found that the Kiamichi River was navigable for fishing and pleasure but not for commerce:

[W]e find that the Kiamichi River is one of the beautiful streams of southeastern Oklahoma that it has for many years been known as one of the best fishing streams in the State and used by the public for fishing, recreation, and pleasure; that at one time the stream was used for commercial purposes in that logs were floated down its channel to be used for mill purposes; that at the site of the controversy herein the river was between 150 and 200 feet in width; that many small boats used the river.

*Curry v. Hill*, 460 P.2d 933, 935 (Okla. 1969). Thus, the river was not navigable for title purposes and private landowners owned the bed of the river. However, that ownership is “subject to the rights of the public to use the river as a public highway,” and the landowner “does not . . . have exclusive fishing rights therein.” *Id.* Thus, the Kiamichi River was “navigable” in the sense that the public could use the river, but not in the sense that the state owned the bed. *Id.* at 936.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has taken judicial notice that the Arkansas River is navigable; as a result, title to the bed vested in the state. *Oklahoma v. Nolegs*, 139 P. 943, 945 (Okla. 1914). However, eight years later, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that under the federal test of navigability, the Arkansas River along the Osage Indian Reservation in Oklahoma is non-navigable and belongs to the United States in trust for the Tribe. *Brewer Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States*, 260 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1922). The Oklahoma Supreme Court responded by declaring that the Osage Tribe only got title to the bed of the non-navigable portions. *Vickey v. Yahola Sand & Gravel Co.*, 12 P.2d 881, 885 (Okla. 1932); *but see Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office*, 191 P.2d 224, 229-30 (Okla. 1948) (applying the U.S. Supreme Court’s non-navigability analysis to the Arkansas River).

In 1953, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that the Arkansas River was navigable from its confluence with the Grand River, as federal courts had agreed, vesting title to the bed in the state. *Lynch v. Clements*, 263 P.2d 153, 156 (Okla. 1953). However, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the entire river below its confluence with the Grand River, while navigable, was reserved to the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw tribes by treaty. *Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma*, 397 U.S. 620, 630-32 (1970); *United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma*, 480 U.S. 700, 701 (1987).
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Red River is not navigable anywhere in Oklahoma and hence that Oklahoma does not own its beds. *Oklahoma v. Texas*, 259 U.S. 565, 566-67 (1922). *Accord, Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Commisioners of Land Office*, 191 P.2d 224, 228-29 (Okla. 1948); *contrast Hale v. Record*, 146 P. 587, 588 (Okla. 1915) (finding the Red River to be navigable).

**Rights in “Navigable Waters”:**

The state takes title to the beds of navigable rivers to the high water mark. *Oklahoma v. Nolegs*, 139 P. 943, 945-46 (Okla. 1914); *City of Tulsa v. Commissioners of Land Office*, 101 P.2d 246, 248 (Okla. 1940).

Pursuant to *Illinois Central Railroad Company*, the government has a right to regulation public wharves and piers in navigable waters, loading places along navigable waters, and rights in navigable waters. *Sublett v. City of Tulsa*, 405 P.2d 185, 196 (Okla. 1965). Otherwise, the Oklahoma courts have not extensively addressed the state public trust doctrine, except to allow that the public can have rights of boating, recreation, and fishing in waters that are not navigable under the federal title test. *Curry v. Hill*, 460 P.2d 933, 935-36 (Okla. 1969).

When the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared the co-existence of riparian and appropriative water rights in 1990, the dissent was “of the opinion that the majority confuses certain public rights in our streams as being exclusive private property rights of riparians.” *Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board*, 855 P.2d 568, 595 (Okla. 1990) (dissent). In contrast, the dissent was willing to establish an expansive public trust doctrine that would require minimum flows in Oklahoma’s rivers and supersede private rights. *Id.* at 595-96 (dissent).

**OREGON**

**Date of Statehood:** 1859

**Water Law System:** Prior Appropriation. *See in re Hood River*, 227 P. 1065, 1084-85 (Or. 1924) (upholding the state’s prior appropriation system).

**Oregon Constitution:** Oregon has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine. However, the Oregon Constitution contains several relevant provisions, including:

- Art. I, § 1: As part of its private property takings protections, the Oregon Constitution states that “the use of all roads, ways and waterways necessary to promote the transportation of the raw products of mine or farm or forest or water for beneficial use or drainage is necessary to the development and welfare of the state and is declared a public use.”
Art XI-D, § 1: “The rights, title and interest in and to all water for the development of water power and to water power sites, which the state of Oregon now owns or may hereafter acquire, shall be held by it in perpetuity.”

Art. XI-D, § 2: As part of its constitutional authority over water power, “[t]he state of Oregon is authorized and empowered,” inter alia: (1) “[t]o control and/or develop the water power within the state”; (2) “[t]o lease water and water power sites for the development of water power”; (3) “[t]o develop, separately or in conjunction with the United States, or in conjunction with the political subdivisions of this state, any water power within the state, and to acquire, construct, maintain and/or operate hydroelectric power plants, transmission and distribution lines”; (4) “[t]o develop, separately or in conjunction with the United States, with any state or states, or political subdivisions thereof, or with any political subdivision of this state, any water power in any interstate stream and to acquire, construct, maintain and/or operate hydroelectric power plants, transmission and distribution lines”; (5) “[t]o contract with the United States, with any state or states, or political subdivisions thereof, or with any political subdivision of this state, for the purchase or acquisition of water, water power and/or electric energy for use, transmission, distribution, sale and/or disposal thereof”; and (6) “[t]o do any and all things necessary or convenient to carry out the provisions of this article.”

Art XI-D, § 4: Nothing in the constitutional authority over water power “shall be construed to affect in any way the laws, and the administration thereof, now existing or hereafter enacted, relating to the appropriation and use of water for beneficial purposes, other than for the development of water power.”

Art. XI-H, § 1: This article provides for “loans and grants for the purpose of planning, acquisition, construction, alteration or improvement of facilities for or activities related to, the collection, treatment, dilution and disposal of all forms of waste in or upon the air, water and lands of this state.”

Article XI-I(1): This article covers water development projects and creates a Water Development Fund. “The fund shall be used to provide financing for loans for residents of this state for construction of water development projects for irrigation, drainage, fish protection, watershed restoration and municipal uses and for the acquisition of easements and rights of way for water development projects authorized by law.”

Art. XV, §§ 4, 4a: These two provisions allow state lottery funds to be used for “the public purpose of financing the protection, repair, operation, creation and development of state parks, ocean shores and public beach access areas, historic sites and recreation areas . . . .”

Art. XV, §§ 4, 4b: These two provisions allow state lottery funds to be used for salmonid and wildlife protection, including protection and restoration of watersheds, aquatic habitats, and water quality.

Oregon Statutes:

- OR. REV. STAT., Chapter 196: Columbia River Gorge; Ocean Resource Planning; Wetlands; Removal and Fill. “The protection, conservation and best use of the water
resources of this state are matters of the utmost public concern. Streams, lakes, bays, estuaries and other bodies of water in this state, including not only water and materials for domestic, agricultural and industrial use but also habitats and spawning areas for fish, avenues for transportation and sites for commerce and public recreation, are vital to the economy and well-being of this state and its people. Unregulated removal of material from the beds and banks of the waters of this state may create hazards to the health, safety and welfare of the people of this state. Unregulated filling in the waters of this state for any purpose, may result in interfering with or injuring public navigation, fishery and recreational uses of the waters. In order to provide for the best possible use of the water resources of this state, it is desirable to centralize authority in the Director of the Department of State Lands, and implement control of the removal of material from the beds and banks or filling of the waters of this state.” § 196.805. The Director of the Department of State Lands may issue permits for the fill or dredging of water resources only if the activity: “(a) [i]s consistent with the protection, conservation and best use of the water resources of this state . . .; and (b) [w]ould not unreasonably interfere with the paramount policy of this state to preserve the use of its waters for navigation, fishing and public recreation.” § 196.825(1). The Oregon courts have concluded that these two provisions (as formerly numbered) “are a codification of the public trust doctrine.” Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 527 (Or. App. 1978), aff’d, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979).

- Or. Rev. Stat., Chapter 274: Submersible and Submerged Lands. In general, “submerged lands” in Oregon are “lands lying below the line of ordinary low water of all navigable waters within the boundaries of this state as heretofore or hereafter established, whether such waters are tidal or nontidal.” § 274.005(7). “Submersible lands,” in contrast, are the “lands lying between the line of ordinary high water and the line of ordinary low water of all navigable waters and all islands, shore lands, and other such lands held by or granted to this state by virtue of her sovereignty, wherever applicable, within the boundaries of this state as heretofore or hereafter established, whether such waters or lands are tidal or nontidal.” § 274.005(8). The “line of ordinary high water” is “the line on the bank or shore to which the high water ordinarily rises in season,” while the “line of ordinary low water” is “the line on the bank or shore to which the low water ordinarily recedes annually in season.” § 274.005(3), (4). “Tidal submerged lands” are “lands lying below the line of mean low tide in the beds of all tidal waters within the boundaries of this state as heretofore or hereafter established.” § 274.025(1). “The title to the submersible and submerged lands of all navigable streams and lakes in this state now existing or which may have been in existence in 1859 when the state was admitted to the Union, or at any time since admission, and which has not become vested in any person, is vested in the State of Oregon. The State of Oregon is the owner of the submersible and submerged lands of such streams and lakes, and may use and dispose of the same as provided by law.” § 274.025(1). “The State Land Board has exclusive jurisdiction to assert title to submerged or submersible lands in navigable waterways on behalf of the State of Oregon,” § 274.402(1), and this chapter provides procedures for the administrative determination of navigability. §§ 274.404 to 274.412. Moreover, “all meandered lakes are declared to be navigable and public waters,” with title to their
submerged and submersible lands vested in the State of Oregon unless otherwise validly conveyed. § 274.430(1). “The Department of State Lands had exclusive jurisdiction over all ungranted tidal submerged lands owned by this state . . . .” § 274.710.

- OR. REV. STAT., Chapter 537: Water Rights Act. “All water within the state from all sources of water supply belongs to the public,” including ground water. §§ 537.010, 537.525. The Act allows for instream water rights for public uses, §§ 537.332 to 537.360, and public uses include but are not limited to recreation, “conservation, maintenance and enhancement of aquatic and fish life, wildlife, fish and wildlife habitat and any other ecological values,” pollution abatement, and navigation. § 537.332(5). In addition, “[p]ublic uses are beneficial uses,” but “[t]he recognition of an in-stream water right shall not diminish the public’s rights in the ownership and control of the waters of this state or the public trust therein.” § 537.334(1), (2). The Water Rights Act also allows for extensions of the irrigation season, § 537.385, and encourages conservation of water. § 537.460.

- OR. REV. STAT., Chapter 780: Improvement and Use of Navigable Streams: “All channels of rivers and watercourses made navigable or the navigation of is improved . . . shall be public highways, and shall be free to all crafts navigating them.” § 780.030.

**Definition of “Navigable Waters”:**

For title purposes, Oregon originally adhered to the ebb-and-flow tidal test of navigability. See Weiss v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 448-49 (Or. 1869) (recognizing that the navigable-in-fact test has largely replaced the ebb-and-flow tidal test in the United States); Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 411 (Or. 1877) (holding that “the tide lands – those uncovered by the ebb and flow of the sea – belong to the state of Oregon by virtue of its sovereignty.”); Hogg v. Davis, 30 P. 160, 160 (Or. 1892) (same); Bowlby v. Shively, 30 P. 154, 156 (Or. 1892), aff’d, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) (“Upon the admission of the state into the Union, the tide lands became the property of the state, and subject to its jurisdiction and disposal.”). Thus, because the Tualatin River was not subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, its bed and banks were privately owned. Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 376, 380-82 (1882). In contrast, the bed and banks of the Columbia River, which is subject to the ebb-and-flow of the tide, are owned by the State. Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 411-12 (Or. 1877); see also Atkinson v. Tax Commission of Oregon, 303 U.S. 20, 22 (1938) (determining that Oregon, not the United States, owns the bed of the Columbia River on Oregon’s side of the border with Washington). See also Hume v. Rogue River Packng Co., 92 P. 1065, 1067 (Or. 1907) (determining that the Rogue River is navigable, and its beds owned by the State, because it is influenced by the tide for at least four miles). Moreover, in tidal waters, state title advances with the rising of the sea. Wilson v. Shively, 4 P. 324, 325-26 (Or. 1884).

Nevertheless, in its early cases, the Oregon Supreme Court adopted a fairly liberal log floatation test of navigability that extended public use navigability to navigable-in-fact waters. It held in 1869 that:

any stream in this state is navigable, on whose waters logs, or timbers can be floated to market, and that they are public highways for that purpose; and that it is
not necessary that they be navigable the whole year for that purpose to constitute them as such. If at high water they can be used for floating timber, then they are navigable; and the question of navigability is a question of fact, to be determined as any other question of fact by a jury. Any stream in which logs will go by the force of water is navigable.

Felger v. Robinson, 3 Or. 455, 457-58 (1869). This rule, the court held, best served Oregon public policy:

And we think it the rule that best accords with common sense and public convenience, for these rapid streams, penetrating deep into the mountains, are the only means by which timber can be brought from these rugged sections, without great labor and expense; and by their use large tracks of timber, otherwise too remote or difficult of access, can be rendered of great value, as the country shall grow and timber become scarce.

Id. at 458. Thus, “[a] stream which, in its natural condition, is capable of being commonly and generally useful for floating boats, rafts or logs, for any useful purpose of agriculture or trade, though it be private property, and not strictly navigable, is subject to the public use as a passageway.” Weiss v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 449 (Or. 1869); see also Haines v. Hall, 20 P. 831, 835 (Or. 1888) (“Whether the creek in question is navigable or not . . . depends upon its capacity in a natural state to float logs and timber, and whether its use for that purpose will be an advantage to the public.”); Nutter v. Gallagher, 24 P. 250, 252-53 (Or. 1890) (same); Kamm v. Normand, 91 P. 448, 450-53 (Or. 1907) (same); Lebanon Lumber Co. v. Leonard, 136 P. 891, 892 (Or. 1913) (same); Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 440-42 (Or. 1918) (same).

As such, the Oregon courts early on distinguished three categories of waters:

First, such rivers, or arms of the sea, in which the tide ebbs and flows; and in these, which are technically called navigable, the sovereign is the owner of the subjacent soil, and all right in it belongs exclusively to the public. Second, Such streams as are navigable in fact for boats, vessels, or lighters; and in these, which are terms public highways, the public have an easement for the purposes of navigation and commerce, but the title of the subjacent soil to the middle of the stream, and the right to the use of the water flowing over it is in the riparian owner, subject to the superior rights of the public to use it for the purposes of transportation and trade. Third, Such streams as are so small or shallow as not to be navigable for any purpose; and in these the public have no rights of a highway or otherwise, and they are altogether private property.

Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 375-76 (1882). See also Haines v. Welch, 12 P. 502, 503 (noting that navigability “depends upon [the water’s] capacity, extent, and importance. If it is capable of serving an important public use as a channel for commerce, it should be considered public; but if it is only a brook, although it might carry down saw-logs for a few days, during a
freshet, it is not, therefore, a public highway. And, even if it were public in the sense that it is useful to float products to market, it can only be used with due regard to the rights of the owner of its banks through which it flows.”).

In 1935, however, the State of Oregon was involved in litigation in the U.S. Supreme Court that clearly applied the federal navigable-in-fact test to determine whether Oregon had title to the beds of Lake Malheur, Mud Lake, Harney Lake, the Narrows, and Sand Reef.  *United States v. Oregon*, 251 U.S. 1, 14 (1935). The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that navigability for purposes of title is a federal question, *id.* at 14, and applied the federal commerce-based test to determine that none of the waters in question was navigable in fact:

> Neither trade nor travel did then or at any time since has or could or can move over said Divisions, or any of them, in their natural or ordinary conditions according to the customary modes of trade or travel over water; nor has any of them since been used or susceptible of being used in the natural or ordinary condition of any of them as permanent or other highways of channels for useful or other commerce.


As a result, the Oregon courts now apply the federal navigable-in-fact test of navigability as well as the tidal test. Moreover, while acknowledging that this test derives from *The Daniel Ball*, *The Montello*, and *United States v. Utah*, they apply this title test broadly, emphasizing that the extent of commerce on a river is not the test. *Northwest Steelheaders Ass’n, Inc. v. Simantel*, 112 P.3d 383, 389-90 (Or. App. 2005). Timber use and log floatation are evidence of navigability, *id.* at 390, and the Oregon Court of Appeals declared the John Day River navigable on the basis of Native American use and log floatation for timber purposes. *Id.* at 391-95.

In addition, according to contemporary Oregon statutes, all meandered lakes are considered navigable and public, unless otherwise validly conveyed. OR. REV. STAT. § 274.430(1). Moreover, by statute, Oregon recognizes both the tidal and navigable-in-fact tests for navigability. OR. REV. STAT. § 274.005(7), (8). Thus, Oregon now asserts title by statute to a broader category of waters than the federal title navigability test would allow, because Oregon asserts title to the submerged and submersible lands of waters which became navigable after its admission to the United States in 1859, unless those lands have been validly conveyed to private persons. OR. REV. STAT. § 274.025(1).

**Rights in “Navigable Waters”:**

Oregon provided the occasion for the U.S. Supreme Court to determine that, once submerged lands passed from the federal government to the states, issues of title as between the
state and private landowners was to be determined by state law. Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370-72 (1977) (overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973)). This case involved the Willamette River, and Oregon eventually decided that, under Oregon law, the state retained ownership of the bed after an avulsive change to the river. Oregon by and through State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 582 P.2d 1352 (Or. 1978).

Oregon also provided the occasion for the U.S. Supreme Court to declare that, as a federal matter, states take title to the beds of navigable waters to the high-water mark. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-15, 26 (1897) (involving the Columbia River). Oregon has now codified this rule in its statutes. Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 274.025(1), 274.005; see also Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 412 (Or. 1877) (concluding that the high tide line is the property line for properties along the Columbia River, regardless of what the grant says); Parker v. West Coast Packing Co., 21 P. 822, 824 (Or. 1889) (holding that the state owns submerged lands on a navigable river to the high water mark); Oregon v. Portland General Electric Co., 95 P. 722, 728-29 (Or. 1908) (same). Moreover, no adverse possession of lands below the low water mark of navigable waters is allowed. Gatt v. Hurlburt, 284 P. 172, 174-75 (Or. 1930).

In Oregon, riparian owners retain riparian rights to use the water and submerged lands below the high-water mark, including the right to wharf out, the right to moor logs on the water, and a preference in leasing or purchasing tidelands, if the State decides to lease or sell them. Smith Tug & Barge Co. v. Columbia Pacific Towing Corp., 443 P.2d 205, 207-18 (Or. 1958) (reviewing the history of Oregon’s case law on the subject; citations omitted). However, these rights are subject to the public’s rights of use. Id. at 218.

The Oregon courts have clearly acknowledged that “lands underlying navigable waters have been recognized as unique and limited resources and have been accorded special protection to insure their preservation for public water-related uses such as navigation, fishery and recreation. Under the common law public trust doctrine, the public use of such waters could not be substantially modified except for water-related purposes.” Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 523 (Or. App. 1978), aff’d, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979). “The state, as trustee for the people, bears the responsibility of preserving and protecting the right of public use of the waters for those purposes.” Oregon Shores Conservation Coalition v. Oregon Fish & Wildlife Comm’n, 662 P.2d 356, 364 (Or. App. 1983); see also Wilson v. Welch, 7 P. 341, 344 (Or. 1885) (“The state does own the channel of the navigable river within its boundaries, and the shore of its bays, harbors, and inlets between high and low water, but its ownership is a trust for the public.”).

These trustee responsibilities have been applied to fishing regulation. As a result, statutes purporting to convey exclusive rights to fish in navigable waters violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the Oregon Constitution. Hume v. Rogue River Packing Co., 92 P. 1065, 1072-73 (Or. 1907); see also Johnson v. Hoy, 47 P.2d 252, 252 (Or. 1935) (holding that the Legislature cannot grant an exclusive right to fish for salmon). Nevertheless, because the state has jurisdiction over navigable waters, it can regulate fishing. Oregon v. Nielsen, 95 P. 720, 722

Under the public trust doctrine, “[w]hile certain of the state’s interests are alienable, its obligation as trustee of the public interest remains. . . . Thus, all submerged and submersible lands are subject to the paramount responsibility of the state to preserve and protect the public interest.” *Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands*, 581 P.2d 520, 524 (Or. App. 1978), aff’d, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979). Like California, Oregon views waters as a limited and precious resource:

The severe restriction on the power of the state as trustee to modify water resources is predicated not only upon the importance of the public use of such waters and lands, but upon the exhaustible and irreplaceable nature of the resources and its fundamental important to our society and our environment. These resources, after all, can only be spent once. Therefore, the law has historically and consistently recognized that rivers and estuaries once destroyed or diminished may never be restored to the public and, accordingly, has required the highest degree of protection from the public trustee.

*Id.*

As a result, the purpose of a private use of navigable waters is critical to whether it can be allowed under the public trust doctrine. Following *Illinois Central Railroad*, the Oregon courts have concluded “that water resources should be devoted to uses which are consistent with their nature and should be protected from inimical uses”: undertakings in furtherance of and consistent with the trust, “such as the construction of wharves, docks and piers,” are permitted, while “upland activities which consume water resources by adapting them to uncharacteristic uses” must be examined more closely, *Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands*, 581 P.2d 520, 525 (Or. App. 1978), but “the public trust doctrine does not prohibit other than water-related uses” in certain situations. *Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands*, 590 P.2d 709, 711 (Or. 1979). See also *Cook v. Dabney*, 139 P. 721, 722 (Or. 1914) (hold that the Oregon State Lands Board cannot convey submerged lands “in a manner and for a purpose which would act as a direct and permanent impediment to navigation,” because doing so would violate the public trust doctrine); *Hinman v. Warren*, 6 Or. 408, 412 (Or. 1877) (holding that the State “has no authority to dispose of its tidelands in such a manner as may interfere with the free and untrammeled navigation of its rivers, bays, inlets and the like. The grantees of the state [to properties along the Columbia River] took the land subject to every easement growing out of the right of navigation inherent in the public.”); *Bowlby v. Shively*, 30 P. 154, 160 (Or. 1892), aff’d, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) (holding that the state can dispose of tidelands, but only subject “to the paramount right of navigation and commerce,” and “the owner of the upland or tide water has certain rights, arising from his adjacency to such waters, subordinate, however, to their use by the public for navigation and fishing”); The State Lands Board does not give up the *jus publicum* in leasing submerged lands. *Brusco Tugboat Co. v. Oregon, by and through Straub*, 589 P.2d 712, 718 (Or. 1978).

Oregon statutes extend public rights to any waters made navigable by the State, Or. Rev. Stat. § 780.030, and to non-navigable, privately owned waters that can float boats, rafts or logs. Weiss v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 449 (Or. 1869). The private owner cannot deny the public its right of navigation, including the right to bypass obstructions by traveling over private land, but the public has only an “incidental right” to “meddle” with the privately owned banks. Id. at 450.

In addition, the public has acquired the right to use the dry sand portions of beaches through the doctrine of custom. Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673-78 (Or. 1969). As a result, there was no taking of private property when the State denied landowners permits to build sea walls. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach. 854 P.2d 449, 451 (Or. 1993).

SOUTH DAKOTA

Date of Statehood: 1889


South Dakota Constitution: The South Dakota Constitution has no relevant provisions.

South Dakota Statutes:

- S.D. Cod. L. § 1-2-8: South Dakota-Nebraska Boundary Compact.
- S.D. Cod. L. § 8-03: “The public has a right to use the strip of land 50 feet landward from all navigable waters provided the strip is between the ordinary high water mark and ordinary low water mark of public bodies of water.”
- S.D. Cod. L. Chapter 34A-10: Environmental Protection Act. This Act creates a private right of action “for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust therein” from pollution, impairment, or destruction.” § 34A-10-1 (emphasis added). Similarly, agencies can allow parties to intervene in agency proceedings if the proceeding in question “involves conduct which has the effect of polluting, impairing, or destroying the air, water, or other natural resources or the public trust therein.” § 34A-10-2 (emphasis added). The Act also allows the courts to “grant temporary equitable relief where necessary for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources or the public trust therein from pollution, impairment, or destruction,” § 34A-10-5 (emphasis added), and requires the courts to “adjudicate the impact of the defendant’s conduct on the air, water, or other natural resources and on the public trust therein in
accordance with this chapter.” § 34A-10-7 (emphasis added). In both administrative and judicial proceedings, “any alleged pollution, impairment, or destruction of the air, water, or other natural resources or the public trust therein shall be determined, and no conduct shall be authorized or approved which does, or is likely to have such effect so long as there is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable requirement of the public health, safety, and welfare.” § 34A-10-8. Courts may “grant temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may impose conditions on the defendant that are required to protect the air, water, and other natural resources or the public trust therein from pollution, impairment, or destruction.” § 34A-10-11.

- S.D. COD. L. Title 43, Chapter 17: Water Boundaries and Riparian Lands. “The ownership of land below ordinary high-water mark, and of land below the water of a navigable lake or stream, is regulated by the laws of the United States or by such laws of the state as the Legislature may enact.” § 43-17-1. “Unless the grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent, the owner of the upland, if it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, takes to the edge of the lake or stream at low water mark. All navigable rivers and lakes are public highways within fifty feet landward from the water's nearest edge, provided that the outer boundary of such public highway may not expand beyond the ordinary high water mark and may not contract within the ordinary low water mark, and subject to §§ 43-17-29, 43-17-31, 43-17-32, and 43-17-33.” § 43-17-2. “In all cases where the opposite banks of any streams not navigable belong to different persons, the stream and the bed thereof shall become common to both.” § 43-17-4. “The Water Management Board shall establish . . . the ordinary high water mark and install benchmarks and may establish the ordinary low water mark on public lakes which are used for public purposes including, but not limited to boating, fishing, swimming, hunting, skating, picnicking, and similar recreational pursuits.” § 43-17-21. “If any water level rises above the ordinary high water mark of a navigable lake, the right of the public to enjoyment of the entire lake may not be limited, except that access to the lake shall be by public right-of-way or by permission of the riparian landowner . . . .” § 43-17-29. “A stream, or portion of a stream, is navigable if it can support a vessel capable of carrying one or more persons throughout the period between the first of May to the thirtieth of September, inclusive, in two out of every ten years. A dry draw, as defined in § 46-1-6, is not navigable. This section does not apply to any stream or portion of a stream which is navigable pursuant to federal law. Any person may petition the Water Management Board for a declaratory ruling as to the navigability of any stream, or portion of a stream, in this state.” § 43-17-34. Under certain circumstances, riparian owners can fence navigable waters. § 43-17-35. However, the fence must be constructed so “that the right of the public to utilize the navigable stream is not prohibited or unduly restricted.” Id. Moreover, the right to fence “does not apply to any river or stream portion of any river or stream that has been determined to be navigable pursuant to federal law.” Id.

- S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 1: Water Resources Act: Definitions and General Provisions. Under these provisions, “the people of the state have a paramount interest in the use of all the water of the state and that the state shall determine what water of the state, surface and underground, can be converted to public use or controlled for public
protection.” § 46-1-1. Moreover, “all water within the state is the property of the people of the state, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation as provided by law.” § 46-1-3. “[B]ecause of conditions prevailing in this state the general welfare requires that the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such water is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or watercourse in this state is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of diversion of water.” § 46-1-4. Domestic use takes precedence. § 46-1-5.

- S.D. Cod. L. Title 46, Chapter 4: Water Resources Act: Dry-Draw and Nonnavigable Stream Dams.
- S.D. Cod. L. Title 46, Chapter 6: Water Resources Act: Groundwater and Wells.
- S.D. Cod. L. Title 46, Chapter 7: Water Resources Act: Storage, Diversion, and Irrigation Works.
- S.D. Cod. L. Title 46, Chapter 8: Water Resources Act: Eminent Domain.
- S.D. Cod. L. Title 46, Chapter 12: Water Resources Act: Irrigation Districts.

Definition of “Navigable Waters”:

South Dakota recognizes several categories of navigable waters. The test of navigability for title purposes under the equal footing doctrine is a federal test. *Parks v. Cooper*, 676 N.W.2d 823, 829-31 (S.D. 2004). According to the South Dakota Supreme Court, the ebb-and-flow tidal test of title navigability is not useful in South Dakota. *Flisrand v. Madson*, 152 N.W. 796, 799 (S.D. 1912). Instead, the state uses the navigable-in-fact test for other waters. *Id.* at 799-800. Under this test, Lake Albert was navigable. *Id.* In addition, by statute, South Dakota has identified the Missouri River, James River, Boise des Sioux River, and the lower five miles of the Big Sioux River as being federally navigable. S.D. Cod. L. § 43-17-38.

For purposes of determining whether the public has rights to use waters, at common law South Dakota uses the “pleasure boat” test for navigability. *Parks v. Cooper*, 676 N.W.2d 823, 830-31 (S.D. 2004) (citing *Hillebrand v. Knapp*, 274 N.W. 821 (1937)). For public use
purposes, “whether or not waters are navigable depends upon the natural availability of waters for public purposes taking into consideration the natural character and surroundings of a lake or stream. This division of lakes and streams into navigable and nonnavigable is the equivalent of classification of public and private waters.” Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (1937).

By statute, South Dakota defines “navigable water” for public use purposes to be “[a] stream, or portion of a stream [that] can support a vessel capable of carrying one or more persons throughout the period between the first of May to the thirtieth of September, inclusive, in two out of every ten years.” S.D. Cod. L. § 43-17-34. However, this definition “does not apply to any stream or portion of a stream which is navigable pursuant to federal law.” Id.

**Rights in “Navigable Waters”:**

Fairly continuously under South Dakota’s statutes, private landowners have owned navigable waters to the low-water mark. Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 799 (S.D. 1912) (citing Civil Code § 289); S.D. Cod. L. § 43-17-2. However, the landowner’s title is “absolute” only to the high water mark; title to lands between the high water and low water marks is subject to the rights of the public. Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 799, 801 (S.D. 1912). The public has access to and a right to use these lands for “navigating, boating, fishing, fowling, and like public uses.” Id.; see also Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (1937) (listing sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking water, and cutting ice as public uses). Nevertheless, the ordinary high water mark can migrate, and public rights follow natural changes in the waterway. South Dakota Wildlife Federation v. Water Management Board, 382 N.W.2d 26, 31-32 (S.D. 1986).

In contrast, at common law, landowners have “absolute ownership” of the beds of non-federally navigable waters. Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 799, 801 (S.D. 1912). However, under current statutes, if a river or lake is “navigable” under the statutory definition:

Unless the grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent, the owner of the upland, if it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, takes to the edge of the lake or stream at low water mark. All navigable rivers and lakes are public highways within fifty feet landward from the water’s nearest edge, provided that the outer boundary of such public highway may not expand beyond the ordinary high water mark and may not contract within the ordinary low water mark . . . .

S.D. Cod. L. § 43-17-2.

For federally navigable waters, “[o]nce the beds of the navigable waters are in state ownership, they are held subject to a public trust and cannot be conveyed unless it would promote a public trust purpose.” Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 829 (S.D. 2004) (declaring Illinois Central Railroad Co. to be the first definition of the public trust doctrine); Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796, 799-800 (S.D. 1912).
As in many western states, public ownership of water for prior appropriation purposes is becoming relevant to public rights in non-navigable waters in South Dakota. Recently, the South Dakota Supreme Court declared that “[n]ever in South Dakota has determining the navigability of a water body been a matter of deciding if the water itself is public or private.” *Parks v. Cooper*, 676 N.W.2d 823, 829 (S.D. 2004). Instead, under the Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323, non-navigable waters became subject to state control. *Id.* at 831-32 (citing *California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Cement Co.*, 295 U.S. 142, 162,64 (1935)). When the Legislature adopted the prior appropriation doctrine in 1905, it qualified riparian owners’ rights to the water, and several states have recognized public rights in water despite private ownership of the bed, including Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Wyoming, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Iowa. *Id.* at 833-36. Moreover, in 1955 the South Dakota Legislature confirmed that all water is public property. *Id.* at 837. As a result, the Water Resources Act works in tandem with the public trust doctrine:

While we regard the public trust doctrine and Water Resources Act as having shared principles, the Act does not supplant the scope of the public trust doctrine. The Water Resources Act evinces a legislative intent both to allocate and regulate water resources. In part, this Act codifies public trust principles. The first three sections of the Act embody the core principles of the public trust doctrine – “the people of the state have a paramount interest in the use of all the water of the state,” SDCL 46-1-1; “the state shall determine in what way the water of the state, both surface and underground, should be developed for the greatest public benefit,” SDCL 46-1-2; and “all water within the state is the property of the people of the state.” SDCL 46-1-3.

*Id.* at 838. Thus, even when increased precipitation creates new lakes over private property that had never really existed before, “the State of South Dakota retains the right to use, control, and develop the water in these lakes as a separate asset in trust for the public,” and the public trust doctrine applies independently of bed ownership. *Id.* “[A]ll waters within South Dakota, not just those waters considered navigable under the federal test, are held in trust by the State for the public. *Id.* at 838-39. The public purposes for which these lakes can be used potentially include, but are not limited to, “boating, fishing, swimming, hunting, skating, picnicking, and similar recreational pursuits.” *Id.* at 840 (citing SOUTH DAKOTA CODIFIED LAWS § 43-17-21). However, it would be better for the Department of Environment & Natural Resources to regulation public recreational use of new non-navigable lakes. *Id.* at 841.

South Dakota’s Environmental Protection Act also embodies the public trust doctrine. *Parks v. Cooper*, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838 (S.D. 2004). This Act “authoriz[es] legal action to protect ‘the air, water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction.’” *Id.* (quoting SOUTH DAKOTA CODIFIED LAWS § 34A-10-1).
**Date of Statehood:**  1845


**Texas Constitution:** The Texas Court of Appeals has recently indicated that Article XVI, § 59(a) of the Texas Constitution is relevant to the public trust doctrine.  *Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement District No. 17*, 175 S.W.2d 34, 49 (Tex. App. 2005).  That provision states that:

The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this State, and development of parks and recreational facilities, including the control, storing, preservation and distribution of its storm and flood waters, the waters of its rivers and streams, for irrigation, power and all other useful purposes, the reclamation and irrigation of its arid, semiarid and other lands needing irrigation, the reclamation and drainage of its overflowed lands, and other lands needing drainage, the conservation and development of its forests, water and hydro-electric power, the navigation of its inland and coastal waters, and the preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate thereto.”

*Tex. Const.*, art. XVI, § 59(a).  No other provisions of the Texas Constitution discuss rights in water.

**Texas Statutes:**

- *Vernon’s Tex. Stat. & Code Ann.*, Natural Resources Code § 21.001: This provision defines a “navigable stream” to be “a stream which retains an average width of 30 feet from the mouth up.”
- *Vernon’s Tex. Stat. & Code Ann.*, Natural Resources Code Chapter 33: Coastal Public Lands Management Act of 1973.  “The natural resources of the surface estate in coastal public land shall be preserved.  These resources include the natural aesthetic values of those areas and the value of the areas in their natural state for the protection and nurture of all types of marine life and wildlife.”  § 33.001(b).  “Uses which the public at large may enjoy and in which the public at large may participate shall take priority over those uses which are limited to fewer individuals.”  § 33.001(c).  “The public interest in navigation in the intracoastal water shall be protected.”  § 33.001(d).  “Coastal public land” is “all or any portion of state-owned submerged land, the water overlying that land, and all state-owned islands or portions of islands in the coastal area.”  § 33.004(6).  “Submerged land” is “any land extending from the boundary between the land of the state and the littoral owners seaward to the low-water mark on any saltwater lake, bay, inlet, estuary, or inland water within the tidewater limits, and any land lying beneath the body
of water, but for the purposes of this chapter only, shall exclude beaches bordering on and the water of the open Gulf of Mexico and the land lying beneath this water.” § 33.004(11). The Act provides for a Coastal Management Program. § 33.053. Although the Act allows for leasing of coastal public land, “[m]embers of the public may not be excluded from coastal public land leased for public recreational purposes or from an estuarine preserve.” § 33.108.

- **Vernon’s Tex. Stat. & Code Ann., Natural Resources Code §§ 61.001-61.26:** Texas Open Beaches Act. “It is declared and affirmed to be the public policy of this state that the public, individually and collectively, shall have the free and unrestricted right of ingress and egress to and from the state-owned beaches bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico, or if the public has acquired a right of use or easement to or over an area by prescription, dedication, or has retained a right by virtue of continuous right in the public, the public shall have the free and unrestricted right of ingress and egress to the larger area extending from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation bordering on the Gulf of Mexico.” § 61.011(a). “Beach” means “state-owned beaches to which the public has the right of ingress and egress bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico or any larger area extending from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation bordering on the Gulf of Mexico if the public has acquired a right of use or easement to or over the area by prescription, dedication, or has retained a right by virtue of continuous right in the public.” § 61.012. This Act was upheld in *Moody v. White*, 593 S.W.2d 372, 379-80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).

- **Vernon’s Tex. Stat. & Code Ann., Natural Resources Code § 134.006:** This provision of the Texas Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act ensures that the Act “does not affect the right of a person under other law to enforce or protect the person's interest in water resources affected by a surface coal mining operation.”

- **Vernon’s Tex. Stat. & Code Ann., Parks & Wildlife Code § 90.001:** This provision defines “navigable river or stream” to be “a river or stream that retains an average width of 30 or more feet from the mouth or confluence up.”

- **Vernon’s Tex. Stat. & Code Ann., Water Code, Chapter 11: Water Rights.** “The water of the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river, natural stream, and lake, and of every bay or arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and the storm water, floodwater, and rainwater of every river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in the state is the property of the state.” § 11.021(a). The right to appropriate can be subordinate to instream flow needs. § 11.023(a). “The waters of the state are held in trust for the public, and the right to use state water may be appropriated only as expressly authorized by law.” § 11.0235(a). Moreover, “[m]aintaining the biological soundness of the state's rivers, lakes, bays, and estuaries is of great importance to the public's economic health and general well-being. The legislature encourages voluntary water and land stewardship to benefit the water in the state,” § 11.0235(b), and “[t]he legislature has expressly required the commission while balancing all other public interests to consider and, to the extent practicable, provide for the freshwater inflows and instream flows necessary to maintain the viability of the state’s streams, rivers, and bay and estuary systems in the commission's regular granting of permits for the use of state waters.” § 11.0235(c). Water rights can be taken by eminent domain. § 11.033. The Water Code
provides for pro rate distribution of water during shortages. § 11.039. Obstruction of navigable streams is prohibited. § 11.096.

Definition of “Navigable Waters”:

Texas most obviously follows the tidal test of navigability for title purposes, and “[t]he bays, inlets, and other waters along the Gulf Coast which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide of the Gulf of Mexico are defined as ‘navigable waters.’” *Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co.*, 175 S.W.2d 410, 411 (Texas 1943) (citing *City of Galveston v. Mann*, 143 S.W.2d 1028, 1033; *Crary v. Port Arthur Channel & Dock Co.*, 47 S.W. 967, 970; *Butler v. Sadler*, 399 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). As a result, the Texas Supreme Court took judicial notice that Tres Palacios Bay was an arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and hence navigable for title purposes. *Id.* (citing *Texas v. Bradford*, 50 S.W.2d 1065, 1069).

However, Texas also follows the navigable-in-fact test. *TH Investments, Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, L.P.*, 218 S.W.2d 173, 182 n.7 (Tex. App. 2007) (citations omitted); *Diversion Lake Club v. Heath*, 86 S.W.2d 441, 443-44 (Texas 1935). “‘[S]treams or lakes . . . are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water . . . .’” *Hix v. Robertson*, 211 S.W.3d 423, 428 n.3 (Tex. App. 2006) (quoting *Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett*, 88 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (quoting *United States v. Holt State Bank*, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926))). Moreover, the courts consider the navigability test “broad.” *TH Investments, Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, L.P.*, 218 S.W.2d 173, 182 n.7 (Tex. App. 2007).

Nevertheless, “[e]very inland lake or pond that has the capacity to float a boat is not necessarily navigable. It must be of such size and so situated as to be generally and commonly useful as a highway for transportation of goods or passengers between the points connected thereby.” *Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett*, 88 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). Thus, even though boats could float on Stanmire Lake, the lake could not practically be used for commerce, and hence it was not navigable. *Id.* at 130. But see *Weider v. Texas*, 196 S.W. 868, 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (declaring Green Lake navigable because it could float boats for fishing, and discussing the “pleasure boat” and log floatation tests of navigability with approval); *Orange Lumber Co. v. Thompson*, 126 S.W. 604, 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) (holding that log floatation was enough to make a water navigable, citing *The Montello*, 20 Wall. 432). Conversely, under this test, as well as the tidal test, the Old River and San Jacinto River are navigable. *Id.* at 184. In addition, the Colorado River is navigable, and the state owns its bed. *National Resort Communities, Inc. v. Cain*, 479 S.W.2d 341, 349-50 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).

By statute, Texas has defined “navigable stream” to be a river or stream “which retains an average width of 30 feet from the mouth up.” VERNON’S TEX. STAT. & CODE ANN., Natural Resources Code § 21.001; see also VERNON’S TEX. STAT. & CODE ANN., Parks & Wildlife Code § 90.001. While the Texas Court of Appeals has referenced this definition in a recent case in connection with title navigability, *TH Investments, Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, L.P.*, 218 S.W.3d
173, 184 (Tex. App. 2007), the real “effect of this statute is to render all streams navigable in law that have an average width of 30 feet, regardless of ownership of the bed of the streams and regardless of whether they are actually navigable.” *Texas River Barges v. City of San Antonio*, 21 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex. App. 2000). Thus, creeks not navigable in fact can still be subject to public use under these statutes. *Hix v. Robertson*, 211 S.W.3d 423, 427-28 (Tex. App. 2006); see also *Port Acres Sportsman’s Club v. Mann*, 541 S.W.2d 847, 848-49 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (holding that the Big Hill Bayou, which was deemed nonnavigable in 1875, was navigable under the statute). This legislation dates back to 1929 and was enacted “because survey lines has incorrectly crossed navigable streams,” and the legislation “sought to rectify those errors by relinquishing title in the streambeds while reserving the public’s right to the waters of navigable streams,” *id.* at 428, but versions of the 30-foot rule have existed in Texas since 1837. *Diversion Lake Club v. Heath*, 86 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Texas 1935). Public rights in these waters include navigation, fishing, recreation, and commercial uses. *Texas River Barges v. City of San Antonio*, 21 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex. App. 2000). As one example, Hog Creek is a statutory navigable stream and the public has a right to enjoy its waters, including by fishing, and those rights extend to a lake formed by damming the creek. *Hix v. Robertson*, 211 S.W.3d 423, 428 (Tex. App. 2006). However, the lake itself was not navigable because § 21.001 does not apply to lakes. *Id.* at 428-29. Similarly, both the north and south forks of the Upper Guadalupe River are navigable under this statutory definition. *In re Adjudication of Upper Guadalupe River Segment of Guadalupe River Basin*, 625 S.W.2d 353, 362-63 (Tex. App. 1981).

**Rights in “Navigable Waters”:**

“Title to land covered by the bays, inlets, and arms of the Gulf of Mexico with tidewater limits is in the State, and those lands constitute public property that is held in trust for the use and benefit of the people.” *Natland Corp. v. Baker’s Port, Inc.*, 865 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tex. App. 1993); *City of Corpus Christi v. Davis*, 622 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. App. 1981). As such, submerged lands are different from ordinary public lands. *Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co.*, 175 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Texas 1943). The shore is the stretch of land between the high and low water marks, and as a “settled principle of English common law,” title to the shore belongs to the state. *City of Galveston v. Menard*, 23 Tex. 349, 1859 WL 6290, at *9 (1859). Until the shore is granted, the state “holds the right, both to the water and land under the water, for the public use; and the right of passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, etc., etc., are common to all the citizens, subject of course to such general regulations as may be imposed for the general benefit.” *Id.* at *11 (citations omitted). Public rights include hunting, fishing, navigation, “and other lawful purposes.” *Diversion Lake Club v. Heath*, 86 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Texas 1935).

In common law land grants after 1840, the boundary between state and private property in tidal lands is the mean high tide line. *City of Corpus Christi v. Davis*, 622 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. App. 1981) (citing *Rudder v. Ponder*, 293 S.W.2d 736 (1956)); *TH Investments, Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, L.P.*, 218 S.W.2d 173, 184 (Tex. App. 2007). For Spanish or Mexican grants, the boundary is the mean higher high tide line. *TH Investments, Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, L.P.*, 218 S.W.2d 173, 184 (Tex. App. 2007). “Mean high tide is measured by taking an average of all the daily highest readings over a long time. Mean high tide is the same as mean

The state’s ownership of water, see *Vernon’s Tex. Stat. & Code Ann.*, Water Code § 11.021(a), is relevant to the operation of the public trust doctrine in Texas. *Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement District No. 17*, 175 S.W.2d 34, 48 (Tex. App. 2005). “The purpose of the State maintaining title to the beds and waters of all navigable bodies is to protect the public’s interest in those scarce natural resources.” *Id.* at 49. As such, “the State, as trustee, is entitled to regulate those waters and submerged lands to protect its citizens’ health and safety and to conserve natural resources.” *Id.* (citing *Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas*, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)); see also *Carruthers v. Terramar Beach Community Improvement Ass’n, Inc.*, 645 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Texas 1983) (“The waters of public navigable streams are held by the State in trust for the public, primarily for navigation purposes.” (citing *Motl v. Boyd*, 286 S.W. 458 (1926))).

There are also indications from the Texas courts that fish and other aquatic life are subject to public trust principles. As far back as 1942, the Texas Civil Court of Appeals declared:

The waters of all natural streams of this State and all fish and other aquatic life contained in fresh water rivers, creeks, stream, and lakes or sloughs subject to overflow from rivers or other streams within the borders of this State, are declared to be the property of the State; and the Game, Fish and Oyster Commission has jurisdiction over and control over such rivers and aquatic life. The ownership is in trust for the people . . ., and pollution of streams and water courses is condemned . . . . The Constitution of Texas, Art. 16, § 59(a) . . . designates rivers and streams as natural resources, declares that such belong to the State, and expressly invests the Legislature with the preservation and conservation of such resources.

UTAH

Date of Statehood: 1890


Utah Constitution: Utah has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine. However, several provisions of the Utah Constitution are relevant. These include:

- Art. XI, § 6: “No municipal corporation, shall directly or indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose of any waterworks, water rights, or sources of water supply now, or hereafter to be owned or controlled by it; but all such waterworks, water rights and sources of water supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable charges: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent any such municipal corporation from exchanging water-rights, or sources of water supply, for other water-rights or sources of water supply of equal value, and to be devoted in like manner to the public supply of its inhabitants.”
- Art. XVII, § 1: “All existing rights to the use of any of the waters in the State for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed.”
- Art. XX, § 1: “All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any person or corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, are hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of the State; and shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they have been or may be granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired.”

Utah Statutes:

- UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-21-4(1): “[T]here is reserved to the public the right of access to all lands owned by the state, including those lands lying below the official government meander line of navigable waters, for the purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing.”
- UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-9-6(5): The Marketable Record Title Act does not apply to sovereign lands.
- UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-34-3.2: Wetlands Protection Account. “Funds in the Wetlands Protect Account may be used in accordance with the public trust doctrine.” § 63-34-3.2(3).
- UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-1-1: This provision defines “public trust assets” to be “those lands and resources, including sovereign lands, administered by the” Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands. § 65A-1-1(4). “Sovereign lands,” in turn, are “those lands lying below the ordinary high water mark of navigable bodies of water at the date of statehood and owned by the state by virtue of its sovereignty.” § 65A-1-1(5).
• **Utah Code Ann. § 65A-2-5:** The Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands can limit public use of leased parcels of sovereign lands to protect lessees from hunting, trapping, or fishing.

• **Utah Code Ann. § 65A-10-1:** “The division is the management authority for sovereign lands, and may exchange, sell, or lease sovereign lands but only in the quantities and for the purposes as serve the public interest and do not interfere with the public trust.” § 65A-10-1(1). “Nothing in this section shall be construed as asserting state ownership of the beds of nonnavigable lakes, bays, rivers, or streams.” § 65A-10-1(2).

• **Utah Code Ann. § 65A-10-2(1):** “The division, with the approval of the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources and the governor, may set aside for public or recreational use any part of the lands claimed by the state as the beds of lakes or streams.”

• **Utah Code Ann. § 65A-10-3:** This provision allows for agreements and establishes dispute resolution procedures to establish boundaries of sovereign lands.

• **Utah Code Ann. § 65A-10-8:** The provisions provides for management of the Great Salt Lake.

• **Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1:** “All waters in this state, whether above or under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof.”

• **Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-5:** “The use of water for beneficial purposes, as provided in this title, is hereby declared to be a public use.”

• **Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-1 to 73-3-31:** Appropriation of Water. “Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state may be acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of water may be made and no rights to the use thereof initiated and no notice of intent to appropriate shall be recognized except application for such appropriation first be made to the state engineer in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation must be for some useful and beneficial purpose, and, as between appropriators, the one first in time shall be first in rights; provided, that when a use designated by an application to appropriate any of the unappropriated waters of the state would materially interfere with a more beneficial use of such water, the application shall be dealt with as provided in Section 73-3-8. No right to the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use or adverse possession.” 73-3-1.

**Definition of “Navigable Waters”:**

Utah has provided the U.S. Supreme Court with several occasions to announce the definition of navigability that gives states title to the beds and banks of navigable waters. For example, in litigation regarding title to the Green River, the Grand River, and the Colorado River in Utah, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that states received title to the beds and banks of navigable waters at statehood, while the federal government retained title to the beds and banks of non-navigable waters. *United States v. Utah*, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931). The question of title navigability is a federal question, and hence the fact that the Utah Legislature in 1927 passed
legislation declaring these three rivers navigable was irrelevant. *Id.* at 75 & n.6. Summarizing its prior case law, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that:

The test of navigability has frequently been stated by this Court. In *The Daniel Ball*, 10 Wall. 557, 563 . . ., the Court said: “Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.” In *The Montello*, 20 Wall. 430, 441 . . ., it was pointed out that “the true test of navigability of a stream does not depend on the mode by which commerce is, or may be, conducted, nor the difficulties attending navigation,” and that “it would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country, unless a river was capable of being navigation by steam or sail vessels, it could not be treated as a public highway.” The principles thus laid down have recently been restated in *United States v. Holt State Bank*, 270 U.S. 49, 56 . . ., where the Court said:

‘The rule long since approved by this court in applying the Constitution and laws of the United States is that streams or lakes which are navigable in fact must be regarded as navigable in law; that they are navigable in fact when they are used, or susceptible of being used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water; and further that navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which such use is or may be had – whether by steamboats, sailing vessels or flatboats – nor an absence of occasional difficulties in navigation, but the fact, if it be a fact, that the stream in its natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for useful commerce.’

*Id.* at 76. Moreover, “[t]he extent of existing commerce is not the test.” *Id.* at 82.

Under this test, all three rivers were declared navigable, and Utah owns their beds and banks. *Id.* at 89. Similarly, the Great Salt Lake is navigable and owned by Utah. *Utah v. United States*, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); see also *Morton, International, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.*, 495 P.2d 31, 34 (Utah 1972) (“The Great Salt Lake is the property of Utah subject only to regulation of navigation by Congress.”); *Utah State Road Commission v. Hardy Salt Co.*, 486 P.2d 391, 392 (Utah 1971) (declaring the Great Salt Lake navigable under the Equal Footing Doctrine); *Deseret Livestock Co. v. Utah*, 171 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah 1946) (declaring the Great Salt Lake navigable under the principles of *United States v. Utah*, 283 U.S. 64, 89 (1931)). According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “the fact that the Great Salt Lake is not a part of a navigable interstate or international commercial highway in no way interferes with the principle of public ownership of its bed.” *Utah v. United States*, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (citations omitted). Finally, The State of Utah owns the bed of Utah Lake, another navigable lake. *Utah
Division of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 203-09 (1987); see also Utah v. Rollo, 262 P. 987, 989-90 (Utah 1927) (declaring Utah Lake navigable under the rules of United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926), and Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894)).

In 1927, the Utah Supreme Curt rejected the English ebb-and-flow tidal test of navigability. Utah v. Rollo, 262 P. 987, 991-92 (Utah 1927). According to the Utah Supreme Court’s most recent definition of navigability, a body of water is navigable for title purposes “if it is useful for commerce and has ‘practical usefulness to the public as a public highway’ . . . .” Conater v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899-900 (Utah 2008) (quoting Monroe v. Utah, 175 P.2d 759, 761 (Utah 1946) (quoting Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781, 784 (8th Cir. 1906))). In contrast, “[a] theoretical or potential navigability, or one that is temporary, precarious, and unprofitable, is not sufficient.” Monroe v. Utah, 175 P.2d 759, 761 (Utah 1946). Under this test, Scipio Lake was not navigable because the lake was not, and was not likely to become, “a valuable factor in commerce.” Id. at 762.

Rights in “Navigable Waters”:

In waters navigable for title purposes, private landowners own only to the high water mark, often deemed the equivalent of the meander line. Provo City v. Jacobsen, 217 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1950); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-21-4(1) (citing the meander line as the line for public rights); UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-1-1(5) (citing the high water mark as the boundary of sovereign lands); but see Knudsen v. Omanson, 37 P. 250, 251 (Utah 1894) (emphasizing that the border is the water line, not the meander line). The high water mark is “the mark on the land where valuable vegetation ceased to grow because the land was inundated by water for long periods of time.” Provo City v. Jacobsen, 217 P.2d 577, 578 (Utah 1950).

For navigable waters and sovereign lands in Utah, the essence of the public trust doctrine, as expressed in Illinois Central Railroad “is that navigable waters should not be given without restriction to private parties and should be preserved for the general public for uses such as commerce, navigation, and fishing.” Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 1990) (citing Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (1983)). Deciding whether a conveyance of sovereign lands to a private party was in the public interest is a question of fact for trial. Id. at 635-36.

However, public ownership of the water itself has expended the scope of Utah’s public trust doctrine by giving the public rights to use non-navigable waters. Under Utah Code Annotated § 73-1-1, waters are owned by the public. “Public ownership is founded on the principle that water, a scarce and essential resource in this area of the country, is indispensable to the welfare of all people; and the State must therefore assume the responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the people of the State as a whole.” JJNP Co. v. Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982). Thus:

Under this “doctrine of public ownership,” the public owns state waters and has “an easement over the water regardless of who owns the water bed beneath.” In
granting this public this easement, “state policy recognizes an interest of the public in the use of state waters for recreational purposes.” This court has enumerated the specific recreational rights that are within the easement’s scope. They include “the right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water.”

Conater v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899-900 (Utah 2008) (quoting JJNP Co. v. Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982)). Thus, bed ownership is irrelevant for the public’s rights to use waters in the state. *Id.* Moreover, “the scope of the public’s easement in state waters provides the public the right to engage in all recreational activities that utilize the water and does not limit the public to activities that can be performed upon the water.” *Id.* at 901. As a result, “the public has the right to touch privately owned beds of state waters in ways incidental to all recreational rights provided for in the easement.” *Id.* at 901-02 (limiting criminal trespass liability for water users).

Utah appears to have extended its public trust doctrine to ecological protection. “The ‘public trust’ doctrine . . . protects the ecological integrity of public lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at large. The public trust doctrine, however, is limited to sovereign lands and perhaps other state lands that are not subject to specific trusts, such as school trust lands.” National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 919 (Utah 1993).

**WASHINGTON**

**Date of Statehood:** 1889

**Water Law System:** Prior Appropriation. However, existing riparian rights have been protected, especially with respect to non-navigable waters. *City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co.*, 64 P. 735, 738 (Wash. 1901). With respect to navigable waters, “the state’s title to the beds and shores of navigable lakes and streams is paramount and absolute, and . . . an abutting owner has no riparian or littoral right in the waters or shores of the stream.” *Hill v. Newell*, 149 P. 951, 952 (Wash. 1915); *see also Eisenbach v. Hatfield*, 26 P. 539, 541-42 (Wash. 1891) (holding that there are no riparian rights on navigable waters).

**Washington Constitution:** Washington has constitutionalized some of its public trust doctrine, particularly with regard to state ownership of submerged lands and the *Illinois Central Railroad* limitation on conveyances of submerged lands. Moreover, several provisions of the Washington Constitution are relevant to water and submerged lands. These include:

- Art. XV, § 1: “The state shall never give, sell or lease to any private person, corporation, or association any rights whatever in the waters beyond such harbor lines, not shall any of the area lying between any harbor line and the line of ordinary high water, and within not less than fifty feet nor more than two thousand feet of such harbor line (as the
commission shall determine) be sold or granted by the state, nor its rights to control the same relinquished, but such area shall be forever reserved for landings, wharves, streets, and other conveniences of navigation and commerce.”

- Art. XV, § 2: Leases for wharves and docks in harbors and tidal waters are limited to 30 years.
- Art. XVII, § 1: “The state of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes: Provided, That this section shall not be construed so as to debar any person from asserting his claim to vested rights in the courts of the state.”
- Art. XVII, § 2: “The state of Washington disclaims all title in and claim to all tide, swam and overflowed lands, patented by the United States: Provided, the same is not impeached for fraud.”
- Art. XXI, § 1: “The use of the waters of this state for irrigation, mining or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed a public use.”

Washington Statutes:

- REV. CODE WASH. § 79.02.010(1): “Aquatic lands” are “all state-owned tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas and the beds of navigable waters as defined in chapter 79.90 RCW that are administered by the [D]epartment [of [N]atural [R]esources].”
- REV. CODE WASH. § 79.02.095: Normal public lands statutes do not apply to state tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of navigable waters.
- REV. CODE WASH. § 79.100.010(2): For purposes of dealing with derelict vessels, “aquatic lands” are “all tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of navigable waters, including lands owned by the state and lands owned by other public or private entities.”
- REV. CODE WASH. §§ 79.105.001 to 79.105.904: Aquatic Lands. “Aquatic lands” are “all tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of navigable waters.” § 79.105.060(1). “Beds of navigable waters” are “those lands lying below the line of navigability on rivers and lakes not subject to tidal flow, or extreme low tide mark in navigable tidal waters, or the outer harbor line where harbor area has been created.” § 79.105.060(2). “First-class shorelands” are “the shores of a navigable lake or river belonging to the state, not subject to tidal flow, lying between the line of ordinary high water and the line of navigability, or inner harbor line where established and within or in front of the corporate limits of any city or within two miles of either side.” § 79.105.060(3). “The legislature finds that state-owned aquatic lands are a finite natural resource of great value and an irreplaceable public heritage.” § 79.105.010. The state is to manage aquatic lands to encourage public use and access and to ensure environmental protection. § 79.105.030. Moreover, in managing aquatic lands, the state “shall preserve and enhance water-dependent uses,” which are favored over non-water dependent use; highest priority goes to “uses which enhance renewable resourcesm water-borne commerce, and the navigational and
biological capacity of the waters . . . .” § 79.105.210(1). Specifically, the Department must consider the value of aquatic lands “as wildlife habitat, natural area preserve, representative ecosystem, or spawning area” before leasing the lands or allowing changes in use. § 79.105.210(3). Sales and leases of these lands are allowed but require a permit. §§ 79.105.100 to 79.105.160. Similarly, land exchanges are allowed “if the exchange is in the public interest and will actively contribute to the public benefits . . . .” § 79.105.400.

- REV. CODE WASH. §§ 79.130.010 to 79.130.900: Beds of Navigable Waters. The legislative intent of these provisions is the same as in § 79.105.001, relating to aquatic lands. § 79.130.001. Leases of these beds are allowed. § 79.130.010.

- REV. CODE WASH. §§ 90.03.005 to 90.03.611: Water Code. “It is the policy of the state to promote the use of the public waters in a fashion which provides for obtaining maximum net benefits arising from both diversionary use of the state’s public waters and the retention of waters within streams and lakes in sufficient quantity and quality to protect instream and natural values and rights.” § 90.03.005. “Subject to existing rights all waters within the state belong to the public . . . .” § 90.03.010. The Water Code requires minimum flows and levels to be protected. § 90.03.247.


- REV. CODE WASH. §§ 90.16.010 to 90.16.120: Appropriation of Water for Public and Industrial Purposes.

- REV. CODE WASH. §§ 90.20.010 to 90.20.110: Appropriation Procedure.

- REV. CODE WASH. §§ 90.22.010 to 90.22.060: Minimum Water Flows and Levels

- REV. CODE WASH. §§ 90.40.010 to 90.40.100: Water Rights of the United States

- REV. CODE WASH. §§ 90.42.005 to 90.42.100: Water Resource Management. The legislature found that Washington was facing a water shortage. § 90.42.005(2)(a). These provisions establish a trust water rights program, § 90.42.030, and water banking. § 90.42.100.

- REV. CODE WASH. §§ 90.44.010 to 90.44.520: Regulation of Public Ground Waters.

**Definition of “Navigable Waters”:**

Washington recognizes both the “ebb and flow” tidal test and the navigable-in-fact test for title navigability. WASHINGTON CONST., art. XVII, § 1; *Brace & Hergert Mill Co. v. Washington*, 95 P. 278, 280 (Wash. 1908); *City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co.*, 64 P. 735, 737-38 (Wash. 1901). Thus, a slough was considered navigable when it was navigable during the ebbing and flowing of the tide “and has been and can be used as a public highway for boats, scows, and other ordinary modes of water transportation for general commercial purposes, and especially for rafting, booming, and floating and towing of logs up and down the same; that said slough has been so used for at least twenty years.” *Dawson v. McMillan*, 75 P. 807, 808-09 (Wash. 1904).

Washington has similarly used a log floatation test, in combination with the declaration in Article XVII, § 1, of the Washington constitution, to find the Cowlitz River navigable for
purposes of state ownership and control. *Robinson v. Silver Lake Railway & Lumber Co.*, 279 P.1109, 1113-14 (Wash. 1929). Similarly, Lake Union was declared navigable because it is capable of being navigated. *Brace & Hergert Mill Co. v. Washington*, 95 P. 278, 281 (Wash. 1908). However, “a stream which can only be made navigable or floatable by artificial means is not a public highway.” *East Hoquiam Boom & Logging Co. v. Neeson*, 54 P. 1001, 1002 (Wash. 1898) (citing *The Daniel Ball*). Moreover, the Washington Supreme Court has also applied the federal commerce test of navigability. *Lefevre v. Washington Monument & Cut Stone Co.*, 81 P.2d 819, 822 (Wash. 1938) (citing *Oklahoma v. Texas*, 258 U.S. 574; *Snively v. Washington*, 9 P.2d 773, 774 (Wash. 1932); *Smith v. Washington*, 50 P.2d 32, 32-33 (Wash. 1935); *Proctor v. Sim*, 236 P. 114, 116 (Wash. 1925)).

The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Columbia River is a navigable river under the federal test. *Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission of State of Washington*, 302 U.S. 186, 198 (1937). As a result, Washington, not the United States, owns the beds and banks of that river. *Id.*

**Rights in “Navigable Waters”:**

The ordinary high water marks is generally the boundary between state and private ownership in navigable waters. *Brace & Hergert Mill Co. v. Washington*, 95 P. 278, 280 (Wash. 1908). However, “the public has the right to go where the navigable waters go, even though the navigable waters lie over privately owned lands.” *Wilbour v. Gallagher*, 462 P.2d 232,238 (Wash. 1969).

Before Washington changed its policies in 1971 to limit sales and leases of aquatic lands, “the state had sold approximately 60 percent of its tidelands and 30 percent of its shorelands.” *Caminiti v. Boyle*, 732 P.2d 989, 992 (Wash. 1987). Despite the state’s power to engage in such sales and leases, however, “[t]he Legislature has never had the authority . . . to sell or otherwise abdicate state sovereignty or dominion over such tidelands and shorelands.” *Id*. The state cannot convey this *jus publicum*, “and the state hold such dominion in trust for the public. It is this principle which is referred to as the ‘public trust doctrine’. Although not always clearly labeled or articulated as such, our review of Washington law establishes that the doctrine has always existed in the State of Washington.” *Id.* at 994 (citations omitted). Moreover, in general, in every grant of submerged lands “there was an implied reservation of public rights.” *City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co.*, 64 P. 735, 737 (Wash. 1901). *See also Lake Union Drydock Co., Inc. v. Washington Department of Natural Resources*, 179 P.3d 844, 851=52 (Wash. App. 2008) (holding that the Department cannot lease shorelands for $1.93 per acre because, under the public trust doctrine, the state cannot give away the *jus publicum*).

Washington’s Shoreline Management Act of 1971, *Revised Code of Washington § 79.90.105*, fully meets the requirements of the public trust doctrine. *Caminiti v. Boyle*, 732 P.2d 989, 995 (Wash. 1987). As such, public recreational docks permitted under it do not violate the public trust doctrine. *Id.* at 997. Similarly, a county ordinance banning personal watercraft in navigable waters did not violate the public trust doctrine, because the doctrine is flexible, the
“county had not given up its right of control over its waters,” and “the Ordinance is consistent with the goals of statewide environmental protection statutes”; plus, “it would be an odd use of the public trust doctrine to sanction an activity that actually harms and damages the waters and wildlife of this state.” Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273, 280-84 (Wash. 1998). *But see Biggers v. City of Brainbridge Island*, 169 P.3d 14, 22 (Wash. 2007) (*en banc*) (holding that the Washington Constitution and the public trust doctrine limit local government authority to regulate the shoreline line, and police powers are limited there).

Because the public trust doctrine existed in Washington prior to the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, there could be no regulatory takings claims based on limitations on shoreland property’s use. *Orion Corp. v. Washington*, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072-73 (Wash. 1987). “The public trust doctrine resembles a ‘covenant running with the land (or lake or marsh or shore) for the benefit of the public and the land’s dependent wildlife.’” *Id.* (quoting Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, 1 ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 107, 118 (1986)). As a result, owners along shorelands “never had the right to dredge or fill [their] tidelands, either for a residential community or farmlands.” *Id.* at 1073.


Nevertheless, Washington’s public trust doctrine is limited to surface navigable waters, and the Washington Supreme Court has refused to apply it to either ground waters or non-navigable waters. *Rettowski v. Department of Ecology*, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993) (*en banc*). Moreover, absent specific statutory authorization, state agencies cannot “assume the State’s public trust duties and regulate in order to protect the public trust.” *Id.* As a result, the public trust doctrine does not apply to the Department of Ecology’s implementation of state water law. *Id.* at 239-40; *see also R.D. Merrill Co. v. Washington Pollution Control Hearings Board*, 969 P.2d 458, 467 (Wash. 1999) (holding that, in the water rights context, the public trust doctrine is not an independent source of regulatory authority for the Department of Ecology); *Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Board*, 11 P.3d 726, 744 (Wash. 2000) (*en banc*) (same).

In contrast, Washington has flirted with applying some version of a public trust doctrine to wildlife, especially shellfish. For example, the Washington Court of Appeals has stated that the public trust doctrine applies to the Department of Natural Resources’ regulation of shellfish...
such as geoducks. *Washington State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Washington State Department of Natural Resources*, 101 P.3d 891, 895 (Wash. App. 2004); *but see Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Management v. Washington*, 103 P.3d 203, 205 (Wash. App. 2004) (“No Washington case has applied the public trust doctrine to terrestrial wildlife or resources. But we need not decide whether the public trust doctrine applies [to prohibitions on terrestrial hunting and trapping] because, even if it does, Citizens’ challenge fails.” (emphasis added)). Nevertheless, the Department’s regulation of the commercial geoduck harvest pursuant to REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON § 79.96.080 did not violate the public trust doctrine despite the public right to fish, because the state must “balance the protection of the public’s right to use resources on public land with the protection of the resources that enable these activities,” the Department had not given up its control over the state’s geoduck resources, and the regulation facilitated sustainable geoduck harvesting and natural regeneration of the resource, serving the public interest. *Washington State Geoduck Harvest Ass’n v. Washington State Department of Natural Resources*, 101 P.3d 891, 895, 896-97 (Wash. App. 2004). Because the state owns the beds of navigable waters and because, under *Longshore*, shellfish are considered part of the beds under Washington law, the Department “has a continuing obligation under the public trust doctrine to manage the use of the resources on the land for the public interest. And *Longshore* is consistent with the conclusion that shellfish embedded on public property are resources that invoke a public right under the public trust doctrine.” *Id.* at 896. *See also Nelson Alaska Seafoods, Inc. v. Washington*, 177 P.3d 1161, 1164 (Wash. App. 2008) (upholding a tax on geoduck harvests on the first commercial owner and noting that the Department of Natural Resources merely regulated the harvest in accordance with the public trust doctrine).

**WYOMING**

**Date of Statehood:** 1890

**Water Law System:** Prior Appropriation. *See Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter*, 61 P. 258, 259 (Wyo. 1900) (noting that prior appropriation legislation had been in place since 1875 and holding that “[i]n this state the doctrine prevails that a right to the use of water may be acquired by priority of appropriation for beneficial uses, in contravention to the common law rule that every riparian owner is entitled to the continued natural flow of the waters of the stream running through or adjacent to his lands.”).

**Wyoming Constitution:** Wyoming has constitutionalized public rights in water through the constitutional declaration that waters belong to the state. Several other constitutional provisions are also relevant:

- Art. I, § 31: “Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of limited amount, and easy of diversion from its natural channels, its control must be in the state, which, in providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests involved.”
• Art. 8, § 1: Irrigation and Water Rights. “The water of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the state.”

• Art. 8, § 2: “There shall be constituted a board of control, to be composed of the state engineer and superintendents of the water divisions, which shall, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have the supervisions of the waters of the state and of their appropriation, distribution and diversion, and of the various officers connected therewith. Its decisions shall be subject to review by the courts of the state.”

• Art. 8, § 3: “Priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall give the better right. No appropriation shall be denied except when such denial is demanded by the public interest.”

• Art. 8, § 4: “The legislature shall by law divide the state into four (4) water divisions, and provide for the appointment of superintendents thereof.”

• Art. 8, § 5: This provision establishes the office of the state engineer.

• Art. 13, § 5: Municipal corporations have authority to acquire water rights.

• Art. 16, § 10: This provision governs the construction and improvement of works for the conservation and utilization of water.”

**Wyoming Statutes:**

- **Wyo. Stat. Ann.** § 35-10-401: This provisions establishes that obstructing a “public river or stream, declared navigable by law,” or polluting waters is an offense.
- **Wyo. Stat. Ann.** Title 41, Chapter 3: Water Rights. Wyoming law establishes preferences for domestic and transportation purposes, steam power plants, and industrial purposes. § 41-3-102. “The legislature finds, recognizes and declares that the transfer of water outside the boundaries of the state may have a significant impact on the water and other resources of the state. Further, this impact may differ substantially from that caused by uses of the water within the state. Therefore, all water being the property of the state and part of the natural resources of the state, it shall be controlled and managed by the state for the purposes of protecting, conserving and preserving to the state the maximum permanent beneficial use of the state's waters.” § 41-3-115(a). These statutes encompass reservoirs (Article 3); abandonment of water rights (Article 4); water divisions and superintendents (Article 5); water districts and commissioners (Article 6); water conservancy districts (Article 7); flood control districts (Article 8); underground water (Article 9); and instream flows (Article 10).

**Definition of “Navigable Waters”:**

The Wyoming Supreme Court is aware of the variety of definitions of “navigable waters,” including the federal commerce definition, which it apparently uses as the title definition of navigability. “We understand that ‘navigability in the Federal sense’ means the
capacity or susceptibility of waters, in their natural condition, of being used for navigation in interstate or international commerce, and navigability in any other sense may mean any one of a variety of definitions given navigability by either of the several states of the Union.” *Day v. Armstrong*, 362 P.2d 137, 143 (Wyo. 1961). Historical statutes in Wyoming referenced transportation and log floatation. *Id.*

Regarding public use rights in Wyoming, “the actual usability of the waters is alone the limit of the public’s right to employ them.” *Day v. Armstrong*, 362 P.2d 137, 143 (Wyo. 1961). Except in federally navigable waters, “the exclusive control of waters is vested in the state,” and hence “[i]t follows that the state may lay down and follow such criteria for cataloguing waters as navigable or nonnavigable, as it sees fit, and the state may also decide the ownership of submerged lands, irrespective of the navigable or nonnavigable character of the waters above them.” *Id.* at 143. As a result, because the Wyoming Constitution gives the waters to the state, fine distinctions of navigability are unimportant. *Id.* at 144. “The test of navigability does not determine the other uses to which the state may put its waters even though navigability would determine title to the land underlying them.” *Id.*

Rights in “Navigable Waters”:

“If a river is nonnavigable the bed and channel of the stream belong to the riparian owner.” *Day v. Armstrong*, 362 P.2d 137, 145 (Wyo. 1961).

Nevertheless, in Wyoming, the public has rights in the waters themselves, irrespective of bed ownership. “At the modern common law, public waters are generally confined to those which are navigable; and public rights therein to navigation and fishery, and privileges incident thereto. In the arid region of this country another public use has been recognized by custom and laws, and sanctioned by the courts – a public use sufficient to support the exercise of eminent domain.” *Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter*, 61 P. 258, 264 (Wyo. 1900). Thus, Wyoming waters are public, and the constitutional declaration of state ownership is valid. *Id.* at 264-65.

More expansively, “the Legislature was aware that, without regard to their being navigable or nonnavigable in the Federal sense or any other concept of navigability, [the state’s] waters are usable for purposes other than irrigation, consumption, power or mining and that the waters might be used for transportation by floatation.” *Day v. Armstrong*, 362 P.2d 137, 143 (Wyo. 1961). As a result, the public has a right to float in the North Platte River, which was also recognized in the 1959 State Laws of Wyoming. *Id.* at 139.

State ownership of the waters themselves impresses those waters with a public trust. *Day v. Armstrong*, 362 P.2d 137, 145 (Wyo. 1961). The public can float craft down any waters so usable, regardless of bed ownership, and can scrape bottom, disembark, and pull the craft over shoals. *Id.* at 145-46. Moreover, members of the public can hunt or fish while floating. *Id.* at 147. However, public use rights do not give the public the right to wade or walk on privately owned streambeds. *Id.* at 146.