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Anthropological archaeologists generally draw on two dominant themes to construct and account for the past. Cultural historians stress the weight of tradition; cultural ecologists seek to understand change in the relationship between society and nature. Recently a small group of researchers have advanced a third position, a political economic approach, that emphasizes the struggles among members of society over the exercise of social power. This latter strategy is applied to a variety of issues including the origins of agricultural production, megalithic constructions, the siting of urban capitals, and regional settlement dynamics. The studies in this volume consider US culture and history from the perspective of power relationships. They do so through a refinement of power analysis that stresses the interplay between those who use structural asymmetries of resources in exercising power, known as domination, and those who develop social and cultural opposition to this exercise, known as resistance.

**Power and Perspectives on the Past**

Archaeologists generally pay little attention to how people exercised social power. Both cultural historians and cultural ecologists define their problems and construct their explanations in ways that marginalize or ignore the role of social power. When considered at all, the exercise of social power is treated as epiphenomenal to presumably larger issues, such as adaptation, complexity, or efficiency.

The most familiar research agenda in cultural history describes cultural traditions, objects and assemblages exhibiting little variation over
reasonably large areas for reasonably long periods of time (Deetz 1977:40–1; Clark 1978), and enquires into the replacement and persistence of the various elements of the tradition. Archaeologists construct a culture history by describing the march of traditions through an area. The social processes of independent invention, diffusion, and migration are invoked to explain the culture histories.

Cultural historians identify an ever-present process of socialization which maintains traditions in all societies regardless of type. The material similarities of a tradition arise when numerous people make and use similar objects for several generations. Cultural historians believe these similarities result from shared cultural norms and values that include mental templates for behavior and material objects (Deetz 1967:45–9; Rouse 1939). This process of socialization is assumed to be a conservative one in which templates and objects are replicated with only minor modification (referred to as drift), unless powerful stimuli for innovation exist. They rarely consider the power relations implicit in the sharing of cultural norms and values. In fact, social power is relegated solely to the discussion of rapid and wholesale replacement of one tradition by another, through appeals to invasion, displacement, and/or conquest.

Research on contemporary society does find traditions and the replication of values, but these conditions are constantly created and recreated in power-laden situations. The apparent uniformity of tradition in the contemporary world results from experiences in highly structured institutions, such as schools, that only incompletely instill the next generation with the values of their elders (e.g., Henry 1963; Bowles and Gintis 1976; Graebner 1986). The academic disciplines charged with safeguarding the transmission of values result from the complex struggles within the wider society for control over the construction of meaning (e.g., Eagleton 1983:15–53; Foucault 1972, 1979, 1980). The essays in Hobbsawm and Ranger’s (1983) The Invention of Tradition discuss how the powerful create and cast off traditions.

In contrast, in more “egalitarian” societies socialization is known to be less harsh (e.g., Leacock 1980; Draper 1976) and these traditions in fact lack the coherence and uniformity that the cultural historians are wont to give them. For instance, Heider (1979:30) notes

the Dani have one word for “sweet potato,” but then have dozens of names for sweet potato varieties . . . around seventy, which seemed like a lot for any one person to remember. . . . [D]ifferent people would call the same tuber by different names. Then I looked at names for axe and adze stones and found the same thing: a huge vocabulary inconsistently used. . . . It is surprising to find these words being used inconsistently. . . . But it seems to me that it makes sense in the context of a general pattern of casualness . . . it is not surprising that [the words] are not structured into a single, elegant system.

These observations suggest that cultural uniformity should be considered a phenomenon to be explained, rather than given, in cultural history. Indeed, periods of cultural uniformity, as well as culture change, should suggest the existence of powerful integrative relations and ideologies.

Cultural ecological theories also minimize the investigation of social power. Their basic explanatory scheme for cultural change posits that changes in the environment, or in the technology for obtaining and/or consuming energy, will result in changes in the way of life. These changes directly affect the lives of most or all members of the society; they include the use of novel foods, new procedures for construction, and the relocation of large numbers of people to form new settlements. Cultural ecologists rarely ask why so many people accept such major changes in their everyday lives. Instead, these archaeologists assume that the environmental and technical change occur so slowly that the people do not notice the responses, or that the stress is so extreme that the group can only choose one solution to avoid extinction. Recent archaeological research suggests that these assumptions about change need closer attention. Archaeologically observed cultural change can occur rapidly, on a scale well within human consciousness (e.g. Renfrew 1979; Sanders et al. 1979). In addition significant changes, such as the emergence of early states, do not always happen in the context of ecological stress so extreme that it threatens the existence of societies (e.g., Brumfiel 1976; Wright and Johnson 1975).

A consideration of exogenous change is never adequate to explain why large numbers of people adopt radically different lifeways. We must also consider how some people manage to convince/coerce others to adopt these new practices. Studies of the contemporary world show that power relations shape the direction of cultural response to environmental shifts. For instance, the Green Revolution, proposed by many scientists as a response to the degradation of overpopulation, rapidly affected rural life in the tropics but did not meet with universal acceptance. The greatest resistance to the new technologies, crops, and practices often came from the more materially deprived portion of the population, the lower peasants. The non-uniform and even counter-intuitive adoption pattern was because the elements of the Green Revolution entered the local, village scene through pre-existing power networks. Those with power, the upper peasants, adapted the crops and technologies as means to enhance their economic position, precisely because those productive practices undercut traditional power bases of their work-force, the lower peasants (Scott 1985; Harris 1985:361–5). Innovation need not always
reinforce existing power relations, as in the case of the Green Revolution. However, this case makes clear that power relations play a significant role in determining the responses to changed environmental conditions.

Recent archaeological studies have broken the silence of the dominant paradigms of archaeology by considering social power. Archaeologists have added power to their discussions of the evolution of social ranking and the state (e.g., Flannery 1972; Blanton et al. 1981; Kus 1982; Friedman and Rowlands 1978; Wright and Johnson 1975; Haas 1982), the use of the material world to construct legitimacy (e.g., Leone 1984; Miller and Tilley 1984; Shanks and Tilley 1982; Miller 1986), and of the origins of food production (Bender 1981; Gilman 1981; Kristiansen 1984).

As diverse and useful as these studies are, only a few of them explicitly observe and contemplate resistance (e.g., Bender 1985a, 1985b; Miller 1986). They mainly provide us with insights into the concerns and understandings of the elite. Sometimes this is by design, as in Kus’s (1982) discussion of Imerina ideologies of legitimation and Leone’s (1984) consideration of eighteenth-century white merchant capitalists. Sometimes it is less clear whose position is being elaborated, as in Flannery’s (1972) analyses of systemic managerial crises or Pearson’s (1982) study of changes in mortuary imagery and the sanitation of death. In such cases we wonder if there might not have been some people who failed to be impressed by these ideologies of legitimation or considered the systemic crises to be desirable chaos. And, upon posing such a possibility, we wonder what, if anything Imerina serfs, African-American slaves, working-class immigrants to Britain, and Oaxacan peasants might have done.

How prevalent was resistance and domination? How did agents manipulate material culture in this interplay? How might we observe the material traces of these interplays in the archaeological record? The remainder of this introduction considers these issues at an abstract level. The following papers provide more detailed analyses of how both the dominant and the subordinate manipulated the material world to bring about, and resist, orders of social inequality.

Power as Domination and Resistance

We, and our contributors, are intrigued by the means people use to exercise power over one another and concomitantly resist and succumb to these entreaties and pressures. These topics have attracted the concern of a large number of social theorists, in and outside of anthropology.

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(Bowles and Gintis 1986; Mills 1956; R. N. Adams 1975; Skocpol 1979; Wolf 1982, 1990; Patterson and Gailey 1987; Gutman 1973; Braverman 1974; Genovese 1972; Wrong 1979; Fried 1967; Foucault 1979; Gramsci 1971). Many of these develop concepts that we find useful and we draw on them most freely in the delineation of these ideas. Few of these theories have commented on how people manipulate material objects in power relations.

Notions of power: the dyadic problematic

Most discussions of power pose the dyadic problematic: How does A manage to get B to do something? To the extent that A can accomplish this, A is said to have power over B. Social power is said to exist (1) when A and B take the form of individuals or groups, and (2) when the outcome, B complies with A’s wishes, happens fairly regularly. Much clever analysis has gone into dissecting this situation (e.g., Wrong 1979 for a thoroughgoing overview). Some of the key contributions involve distinguishing the bases for exercising power and considering the interplay between coercion and legitimation. Most of these considerations result in an understanding of the formal, socially sanctioned institutions that exercise power, institutions concerned with government and politics.

Critics of this traditional approach to power offer elaborations on the dyadic problematic as well as radical reconceptualizations of the exercise of power. One line of critique stems from considerations of contemporary Western political movements. It extends the question of power beyond the realms of state and citizen, lord and serf, to also consider parent–child, teacher–student, husband–wife, and owner–worker dyads, emphasizing the heterogeneous nature of power. A second critique investigates the creation of the subjectivities in the dyad by means of social disciplining. A third notes that B’s compliance is always at question, making power exercise the result of the interplay of domination and resistance. In the following we develop each of these themes: the heterogeneity of power, the creation of subjectivities through discipline, and the dialectic of domination and resistance.

The heterogeneity of power

Power is most often studied in formal, political institutions. This approach finds its foremost theoretical underpinning in the work of Weber (e.g., Weber 1978:926–40; Giddens and Held 1982:60–85). For Weber “power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of
the basis on which the probability rests” (Weber 1964:152). In this conceptualization, power is ultimately an ability to thwart another, an ability to engage in a negative action. Persons and social groups thwart others by capturing the culturally constituted, formal institutions of power. As a result, the state and other forms of government have been studied as the sources and arenas for struggle over power (e.g., Service 1975:11-15; Jessop 1982; Corrigan and Sayer 1985). This focus on formal institutions leads to a notion of power as something set apart from society as a whole, something found in some institutions and not others, hence something possessed by some but not by others.

A less socially restricted siting of power is the starting point for alternative investigations. As Giddens (1987:7; or Giddens 1984:14–16) puts it, “Power” in this highly generalized sense means ‘transformative capacity’, the capability to intervene in a given set of events so as in some way to alter them.” At a fundamental level all individuals possess the ability to intervene, and social action happens only through the action of these individuals. Thus, power permeates social life, acting “to power” relations in a constructive sense, as well as in the negative sense of thwart.

Miller and Tilley (1984:5–8) quite usefully relate these two notions of power through the ideas of “power to” and “power over.” The former refers to power as a transformative capacity, present in any social relation; the latter refers to a relationship of domination, one in which the “power to” involves a “power over.” This broader notion of power encompasses Weber’s notion of thwart as but one strategy among many by which the “power to” involves a “power over.”

Power as the “power to” is found in the traditional institutions of power, and in facets of life not usually analyzed as being power-laden. Bowles and Gintis (1986:23) capture this movement of power with the notion of the heterogeneity of power. “In opposition to the unitary conception of power we propose what we term the heterogeneity of power. Power is multifaceted and not reducible to a single source or structure . . . ” If power is heterogeneous in nature then it is not limited to a single area of society. It is not simply a quantity that an elite dole out to or exercise over an acquiescent subservient.

Agents exercise heterogeneous power from a multiplicity of bases. For instance, Bowles and Gintis (1986:92) add to the traditional institutions of power “the tools with which we produce our livelihood” and “the words that give our lives and loyalties their meanings.” Control of biological reproduction and sexual pleasure are particularly important bases that structure gender relations (e.g., Snitow et al. 1983; Caplan 1987; Coontz and Henderson 1986; Foucault 1978; Ortner and Whitehead 1981). The exercise of power through the reproduction of the material world, the construction of meaning, the giving pleasure, and the socialization of people enormously expands the social relations that are power-laden; they must now include husband–wife, parent–child, doctor–patient, owner–worker, all embedded in such institutional forms as “hospitals, prisons, schools . . . factories, state apparatuses, families, [and] interest groups” (Miller and Tilley 1984:6).

The analytical division of the bases of power into the state, family, workplace, etc. describe structures, not actions. People rarely, if ever, experience these structures separately. Further, these different domains of power are rarely integrated into a single functioning total society. The clash of the separate domains of power is most evident in colonial situations. In these cases, European forms of symbolic and material domination encounter indigenous power structures, creating complex fields with multiple bases for the exercise of power. These clashes result in highly contested redefinitions of race and gender, as well as new forms of production. For instance, Taussig (1980) investigates how Amazonian peoples reconceptualized the world to make sense of the arrival of market capitalism and the politics of racial terror. Silverblatt (1987) examines the changing gender line by studying the fate of Andean women, under the imperialism first of the Incas and then of the Spanish. Gailey (1987) studies how dramatic changes in the economic lives of Tongans transformed ideologies of kinship legitimation into ideologies of royal power.

The heterogeneity of power challenges archaeologists to extend their field of vision for interpreting power. Archaeologists have generally discussed power within the framework of the traditional, formal, Weberian model; as a result, we see power behind architectural splendors and material riches, mute testaments to the strength of centralized, formal leaders – chiefs, priests, and lords. Acquiring these accoutrements of power is tantamount to having power (e.g., Renfrew and Cherry 1986). Accepting the heterogeneity of power requires us to investigate the relations structuring a wide range of activity: for instance, we need to study the organization of work on rural farms as well as in palace work houses, to look for similarities in power exercise between kings and queens as well as peasant husbands and wives, and to consider how people in villages, nomadic camps, and isolated farms have, at times, consolidated their power to unseat the residents of urban palaces and temples. In short, the heterogeneity of power raises the issue of how A intersects with B throughout the regional settlement system, and not simply in the temples, palaces and sumptuous graves of the elite.
Creating subjectivities through discipline

The ideal situation for the As in the dyadic relationship of power is for the Bs to be inclined to follow the As’ requests, nay, even anticipate the needs of A and provide without request. One way for this to happen is when the Bs consider the As’ requests as legitimate. As Kus (1982) points out, no stratified system can operate long without being perceived as legitimate; it is simply too costly to continually run a stratified society with negative sanctions. The iron fist in the velvet glove, the veiled threat, the carrot rather than the stick are images about the exercise of power that point to the desirability of avoiding a regime run solely on force. The optimal order, from the point of view of the As, is one in which the Bs participate in their own oppression.

How is it that the Bs come to readily participate in their own oppression? The prevailing approach to this issue by archaeologists is to see the elites imposing a dominant ideology on the minds of the non-elites. We are all too familiar with the strong reading of the dominant ideology thesis in interpretations of pyramids, exotic goods, and fancy rituals as means to create an awestruck peasantry (Rathje 1971; Fletcher 1977). Recent analyses (e.g., Tilley 1984; Shanks and Tilley 1982, 1987; Root 1984) point out that effective messages sent by the elites to the non-elites can also deny the existence of power differences, despite their reality.

These arguments stress the explicit messages sent from elites to non-elites. Foucault (1979; 1980) investigates other means to create consciousness, particularly submissive consciousnesses, through the use of disciplinary technologies on a population. Disciplining a population begins with an elite notion of correct social behavior, proceeds to develop physical means to bring about this behavior in others, and ends with the original ideal being grounded into action. If this reciprocal relationship between an elite ideal and the population’s behavior happens often enough, the ideal may make an empirical sense to the population, and the people adopt the ideal as common sense. This process of forging common sense may create people willing to act on their own accord in ways equivalent to the compliance which elites seek to create. Discipline uses the “power over” to inject in the minds of individuals a sense of how they can experience their “power to” (Rabinow 1984:17).

Elites often manipulate material culture to create common sense through discipline. For instance, Foucault (1965; 1979) discusses the arrival on the landscape of Western Europe of new buildings associated with the disciplinary tactics of capitalism – the asylum, prison and school. The buildings themselves are based on a paradigmatic form, Bentham’s panopticon.

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The panopticon consists of a large courtyard, with a tower in the center, surrounded by a series of buildings divided into levels and cells. In each cell there are two windows: one brings in light and the other faces the tower, where large observatory windows allow for the surveillance of the cells. . . . The surveillant could as easily be observing a criminal, a schoolboy, or a wife. (Rabinow 1984:19, see also Foucault 1979:200–28)

The point of the panopticon is not that its pure form is widespread throughout Western Europe, for it is not. Rather, it is that the principle of discipline through control of people by surveillance, influences and reshapes city plans, factory architecture, and domestic structures (e.g. Handsman 1987), thereby exerting considerable influence on people’s everyday experiences.

Associating architecture with discipline may occur in the construction as well as the use of buildings. Johnson (ms) notes that early states have a proclivity for piling things up – stone, mud and/or rubble. Archaeologists often see the use of these monumental edifices as a means of inspiring awe, or of setting the elite off from the populace. Mendelssohn (1971; 1974), noting the relatively short time span during which such piling behavior occurred in Egypt, suggests that it was the construction, rather than the use, of such large edifices that was crucial: in the case of Egypt, Mendelssohn suggests that pyramid construction was a way to keep an as yet non-compliant population busy and out of “trouble” during the flood season. Johnson (ms), going beyond the notion of thwarting by diversion, argues that patterned large-scale construction has a disciplinary potential as a means of familiarizing a population with a given order of rule. Thus, the routine of work gave a common sense legitimacy to the new communal order of the state.

The structuring of domination into everyday activities, through architecture, town planning, and work rules, serves to mystify power relationships. The general populace complies because compliance does not differ from common sense. Analysts, measuring the tempo of everyday life, fail to see the dyadic confrontations of A seeking to exert power over B, and consider power to be absent from a particular setting. However, because power is exercised outside of the domains traditionally associated with it, the dyadic confrontations are often themselves highly structured and controlled encounters. Does this mean that everyday life for most people who have lived since 3000 BC has been wrapped in mystified compliance? Do the bases of power give the elite unlimited reach throughout society? If so, why do these social structures of domination require continual maintenance, and not infrequently break down in paroxysms of social violence? In short, is there a place for resistance in understanding the exercise of power?
Elites commonly express dominant ideologies in a material culture that is grand and lasting, and more likely to be found by archaeologists. We should be hesitant, however, to assume that BS readily accepted such dominant ideologies (McGuire 1988). The thesis of a dominant ideology created by elites has been roundly criticized. Abercrombie et al. (1980) reviewed this literature and noted that non-elites often do not share the dominant ideology of the elites, and in fact have ideologies of resistance. This suggests that the dominant ideologies, in which royal burials, pyramids, megaliths, and so on, participate, were better suited to securing the coherence of the dominant class than the submission of subordinates.

Abercrombie et al. (1980) effectively dismiss a strong reading of the dominant ideology thesis but their essay does not necessarily deny a weaker version of this thesis (Bottomore 1980:x). Dominant ideologies often inhibit and confuse the construction of ideologies of resistance. The efficacy of dominant ideologies to unify an elite and subvert their subordinates will vary from time to time and place to place.

What is there of the material world that created subjectivities of resistance? This undoubtedly involves looking at different objects and looking at old objects in new ways. Most importantly, it requires that we study domination and resistance as outcomes of human action and not as separable things.

**The dialectic of domination and resistance**

Domination is the exercise of power through control of resources. For Giddens (1981:50), “domination refers to structural asymmetries of resources drawn upon and reconstituted in such power relations.” In other words, if the rules of the game are such that some agents start with more strategic resources than others, specific power encounters are likely to favor those with the superior resources. In the long term these individual encounters create and reproduce structural domination.

A fair amount of social theory addresses the structures of domination in stratified societies. Sometimes researchers recognize that this perspective views the social world from the top (e.g., Kus 1982; Leone 1984; Patterson 1985; Wittfogel 1957), but more commonly they confuse this perspective with the totality of social life (e.g., Flannery 1972; Giddens 1984; Service 1975; Hindess and Hirst 1975; Althusser and Balibar 1970). The result is that social science usually assesses the control problems of those able to dominate others.

One point that emerges from most considerations of structures of domination, especially those of the formal institutions of power, is the heterogeneity of domination. Various authors propose to study the heterogeneity of power with such concepts as: intermediate, contadictory, subsumed or fractionated classes (e.g., Poulantzas 1975; Walker 1979; Wright 1978; Resnick and Wolf 1987); racial hierarchies and racial capitalism (e.g., Marable 1983; Reich 1981; Robinson 1983); gender hierarchies (e.g., Eisenstein 1979; Mies 1986; Moore 1988); or the mosaic of domination (Bowles and Gintis 1986). Empirical analyses are replete with individuals and groups seeking to consolidate incomplete power bases by subverting other power holders’ control (e.g., Gledhill 1986; Patterson 1985; Renfrew and Cherry 1986).

These studies of the fractioning of power, particularly those emphasizing the competition between elite power blocs, rarely investigate the limits to domination imposed by non-elite groups and individuals. Yet abstract and concrete indications of such resistance exists. Most abstractly, if all individuals have a “power to”, then the non-elite obviously have a power to fail to comply. When A strives to get B to do something A usually grants B access to strategic resources in order to accomplish the action of interest, albeit a constrained access: for instance, owners grant tools to workers, generals grant weapons to soldiers, ideologues tell stories to followers, and people sexually pleasure one another. Once the Bs possess these resources, the possibility exists that they will not do what is desired with them — e.g., they will not promptly turn out a product, not fight a battle, not believe an ideal, or not derive pleasure. They may even use these resources to socially resist the demands of A.

With the wider definition of “power to”, a much broader range of actions can be seen as responses to and attempts to circumvent the multifaceted bases by which elites exert domination. Malingering, sabotage, and strikes are resistances to domination that controls the means of livelihood; desertion, “draft dodging,” banditry, and guerrilla wars are forms of resisting force; ridicule, deceit, linguistic codes, and fully developed cultures of resistance suggest and validate resistance by beclouding and sometimes contradicting hegemonic power.

Studies that are sensitive to the potential for resistance confirm these theoretical possibilities for resistance. Rather than docile acquiescence, observers of slave quarters (e.g., Genovese 1972; Gutman 1976; Aptheker 1983), urban ghettos (e.g., Valentine 1978; Stack 1974), domestic spheres (e.g., Etienne and Leacock 1980; Rowbotham 1974; Tax 1980), peasant villages (e.g., Friedrich 1977; Scott 1985), and the “tribal world” (e.g., Fried 1975; Paynter and Cole 1980) report a social life that results from a subtle interplay between domination and resistance. Subordinates act in a compliant manner in those social spaces where they encounter dominators, but quickly become more defiant and critical when in their own social arena (i.e. homes, neighborhoods, barrios, clubs, etc.).
Since social scientists are most frequently associated with the dominators, they are implicated in the interweaving of domination and resistance, an implication that creates problems for the investigation of resistance. These problems result both from how elites structure access to data and from the social spaces we choose to search for power. Scott (1985:284–9) calls one such problem that of “the partial transcript.” Elites structure the social processes that provide the data for analyses—the documents, surveys, interviews. Resistance, often of a covert nature, is not likely to emerge in the presence of elites, and hence not become apparent in their documents. These documents, surveys, and interviews represent only a partial transcript of social life: absent from the data, resistance is absent in the social scientist’s study. A fuller transcript, one that presents domination and resistance, emerges only after researchers situate themselves in the backstage of the social theater.

An additional problem involves our traditional theoretical focus on formal institutions of power, especially the state. Researchers tend to recognize resistance only when it attacks the formal institutions of power and creates political revolutions. Empirical studies of such overt resistance, of revolutions (e.g., Moore 1966; Wolf 1969; Skocpol 1979; Friedrich 1977) and strikes (e.g., Gordon et al. 1982; Gutman 1973) provide important but incomplete insights into the realm of resistance. If power percolates throughout society, then resistance includes a wider range of actions than massive, confrontational, political resistance.

Studies that have seen power in all aspects of society have discovered a heterogeneity of resistance, just as there is a heterogeneity of domination. The heterogeneity of resistance emerges in such diverse practices as the malingering found in high-tech sweat shops (e.g., Juravich 1985; Bookman and Morgen 1988), the thievery and extortion of social bandits (e.g., Hobsbawm 1981; Blok 1974; Schneider and Schneider 1976), the alternative meaning systems articulated in pop music (Firth 1988), and the fully realized cultures of resistance described in studies of utopian experiments (e.g., Hayden 1981; Leone 1973) and ethnic and racial minorities (e.g., Genovese 1972; DuBois 1939). The Weberian perspective on power analyzes all of these forms as token or misguided resistance, but they exemplify the heterogeneity of resistance implicit in the notion of power as a transformative capacity.

Scott (1985:29) provides a useful distinction that alerts us to the heterogeneity of resistance and the problem of the partial transcript. He distinguishes between everyday resistance and open defiance. Everyday resistance involves “the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth. . . . They require little or no coordination or planning; they often represent a form of individual self-help; and they typically avoid any direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms” (Scott 1985:29). When subordinates add group organization and symbolic confrontations, everyday resistance becomes open defiance, most immediately visible in revolutions, strikes, and enclaves of cultures of resistance. Open defiance is what we traditionally study as resistance. Everyday resistance describes the field of social actions implicit in the recognition of the heterogeneity of power, actions in need of systematic discovery and analysis.

Further analysis of the heterogeneity of resistance is a difficult task, precisely because everyday resistance “covers its tracks” (Scott 1985:278–284). Archaeology, however, may have a special access to the resistance of day-to-day life. Wobst (1978) offers an interesting challenge to archaeologists, who, unlike ethnographers and historians, are not constrained by past elites in their walk across the theater of social power. We have access to the sanctuaries of the weak, the barrios and isolated villages. We, however, rarely enter these sanctuaries, preferring instead to dig in the temples, palaces, and tombs of the powerful. The challenge is to see the abodes of urban commoners, settlements distant from architectural splendors, and regions identified as cultural backwaters as quite possibly the realm of resistance.

In sum, traditional notions of power have been questioned. The Weberian notion of power as the ability to thwart by controlling public and formal institutions is but one way in which people exert power. More broadly, power exists in all human relations, as the capacity to alter events. This capacity rests on a number of bases, including the control of force, consciousness, tools, and the ability to create pleasure and a positive social sense of self. The structural orders of power are reproduced in their subtle interplays in daily life. However, this is not a perfect reproduction, because the power to resist is always possible, if not a completely realized one.

These explanations of the nature of power make the dyadic problematic of how A exerts power over B, much more complex. The existence of structures and social orders of domination necessarily entails structures and social orders of resistance. Resistance is most clear to ethnographers and historians when it takes place in the public space, rather than backstage. Scholars have often missed everyday resistance and, as a result, ignored this resistance in theories of social change. Archaeology provides access to the full theater of domination and resistance, and is beginning to develop the interpretive methods to understand the working of power at individual sites and in regional settlement patterns.
The Material Manifestations of Domination and Resistance

Elites have used numerous tactics to exercise power, ranging from persuasion to nuclear warheads. It is hard to imagine how even the most ethereal of these tactics could lack a material expression. Our study of the archaeological record may find some of these expressions more easily than others, but this record results as much from domination and resistance as from the material expressions of tradition and adaptation. In short, the failure of archaeologists to consider domination and resistance results from a lack of trying and is not a logical necessity.

A number of recent archaeological studies have examined ideologies of domination. Some of the most provocative analyses in the archaeological literature have studied landscape and legitimacy. Leone (1984) interpreted William Paca’s Annapolis garden as exemplifying how a crisis in the legitimacy of the colonial Maryland social order resulted in the construction of an ideology of precedence, and its associated spatial exhibition through perspective. Paca’s garden, replete with the visual tricks of perspective, conveyed a sense of time that solidified a notion of precedence and thereby legitimized the specialness of Paca’s own unprecedented behavior, signing the Declaration of Independence. Kus’s (1982) work on the Imerina Kingdom of Madagascar demonstrates how the ideologically sanctioned placement of cities and the particulars of urban design lent legitimacy to the social innovation of state formation. Marcus (1973) has shown us how the Mayan landscape made a sense, and had a legitimacy, in terms of the Mayan ideology of the sacred and the powerful. McGuire (1988) has discussed how cemeteries in upstate New York were constructed to create a landscape of death that sought to make eternal the social relations of power, family and gender that existed in life.

Tilley (1984), Shanks and Tilley (1982), and Pearson (1982) investigate how the powerful rationalize, reify, or mask social inequality by manipulating landscapes and mortuary practices.

Other studies relate the manipulation of the resources of force and tools for production to the exercise of power. The pre-Columbian military of the Aztecs and the Incas have received recent study (e.g., Hassig 1985). Wittfogel’s (1957) hypothesis about the control potential of irrigation systems, though not of universal value (Price 1973), does account for some imperial tactics (e.g., Adams 1981). Gilman (1981) argued that control over intensively prepared agricultural land was a key factor in the development of late Neolithic hierarchies in Western Europe. Root (1984) discusses how the decentralized distribution of key fixed resources in egalitarian societies contributes to limiting the development of social hierarchies.

Studies of resistance often focus on the conditions for success or failure in large-scale, violent confrontations such as revolutions. One of the most comprehensive of these studies is Wolf’s (1969) consideration of six peasant revolts. An important characteristic shared by all successful revolutions was the ability of the rebels to physically isolate themselves from the central power: thus Mao went on a Long March, Castro gathered strength in the Plano Central, and the Atlas forced a stronghold of the Algerian revolution. A geography of resistance, one stressing the construction of isolation and then strategic advances, may prove useful in addressing some of the cycles of civilization found in Mesoamerica, China, and Southwest Asia. For instance, Hamblin and Pitcher (1980), supporting Thompson’s hypothesis (1966), make a case for peasant revolutions as the cause of the lowland Maya collapse. The physical act of stopping the practice of stelae construction, along with evidence of stelae defacement, provide data for a study of the timing and prevalence of deposed Classic lords. The aggregate pattern fits models developed from contemporary peasant revolutions. Their study calls attention to the relationship between monument construction/destruction and the social conditions of hegemony and revolution.

The technology and sociology of monumental architecture involves processes of domination; less well understood are acts of defilement and destruction. The dismantling and destruction of monumental constructions poses formidable technological problems. The pyramids were intractable to Caliph Malek al Aziz Othman’s attempt to dismantle them (Mendelssohn 1974:85). The defacement of Olmec heads at La Venta and San Lorenzo (Drucker et al. 1959; Coe and Diehl 1980; Haas 1982:112) challenged even skilled stone knappers and masons (Cross, personal communication).

The material world of the capitalist world-system includes landscapes and objects used in domination and resistance. Discipline has a material dimension in the creation of the modern industrial working class. Industrial capitalists sought to habituate a populace, used to daily and seasonal rhythms of agricultural production, to the brutally regular 18-hour days of industrial work; they elaborated technologies involving clocks, bells, and belfries to create this time (Thompson 1967). Foucault (1979) considered the physical aspects of discipline associated with panoptic architecture, also a feature of Early Modern Europe. New England factory architecture complies with the principles of panopticism, as the owners of these structures sought to control their work-force through surveillance (Handsman 1987).

Instances of everyday resistance rarely figure in the analysis of material culture; and yet theoretical and empirical studies demonstrate how the battle between managers and workers over the pace of work
Orser identifies new strategies by which plantation landlords sought to restore their domain over African-American tenants, and just as clearly how new forms of African-American resistance made use of the material world to ward off the effects of racially oppressive “Jim Crow” legislation and capitalist agriculture.

As these papers indicate, considerable attention has been given to the under-documented lifeways of Southern African-Americans. The nineteenth-century presence of African-Americans in the Northern USA has also received the attention of archaeologists. However, still largely invisible in archaeological and historical studies are the African-Americans in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Northern colonies. Beth Ann Bower takes initial steps toward correcting this impaired vision by surveying the Black experience in colonial and early federal Boston. Her remarkable observation of free seventeenth-century African-Americans purchasing enslaved African-Americans to set them, in turn, free represents an act of resistance through the market place, an act that should give pause for thought to archaeologists who analyze their material assemblages with universal theories of consumer choice. What (or who) is on the market, who wants it (or them), and for what ends, can have no single answer in a race, gender, ethnic and class divided society.

The contribution by McDonald and others discusses how material culture, in the hands of archaeologists, plays an ongoing role in relations of domination and resistance in the contemporary world. Their study evaluates differing accounts of the escape route of Dull Knife’s band during the Cheyenne Outbreak of 1879. A rather dangerous and stupid escape route is posited by establishment histories, whereas an alternative route likely to be taken by people skilled at moving around the landscape to resist capture and confinement has been championed by Cheyenne descendants of the escape. The use of archaeology in resolving this dispute points more broadly to how the questions we ask, and the objects we pursue, figure in the discipline’s participation in orders of domination and resistance.

Change on the North American continent after the permanent arrival of Europeans has to reckon with the changes in these Europeans’ class relations, relations by which wealth was increasingly accumulated from wage labor in the production of increasing numbers and forms of commodities. Stephen Mrozowski examines the growth and change in urban society in New England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He argues that the urban landscapes of these periods were direct expressions of the spatial requirements of economic regimes and the inequalities inherent in those regimes. As the economy shifted from mercantile to industrial capitalism, new urban forms appeared on the
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The shifting characteristics of the gender line in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and its relation to the distinctions between the domain of men and women, between public and private space, and between the objects that adorned and marked these spaces is the subject of Anne Yentsch’s article. She studies the changes in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century foodways and ceramic assemblages, paying particular attention to the symbolic role of household objects in defining positions within the social structure. New activities associated with the ritual of dining, new physical spaces, and new ceramic forms all signaled and thereby helped create the emergence of the public man and private woman in colonial America.

Suzanne Spencer-Wood selected the domestic reform movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for archaeological research because these movements advocated material culture innovation as a primary means of culture change. Domestic reformers raised the status of women by raising aspects of housekeeping to the status of professional occupations; by doing so, they resisted male dominance and created female dominance in the public as well as in the domestic sphere. Spencer-Wood’s paper supplies historical background, possible research problems, methods for identifying sites, and hypotheses about what archaeologists can expect to learn from different types of materialistic domestic reform sites.

Conclusions

Our studies are drawn from the historic United States, a society with documents, and in particular, those documents associated with the expansion and development of European capitalism. This should not be surprising. We wish to suggest that an analysis, heretofore lacking in many archaeological studies, may prove useful for probing material assemblages. Elaborating this point solely with prehistoric assemblages does run the danger of a circular argument, that is, of assuming that some material culture participated in resistance and then using that material culture to interpret and verify the existence of resistance in the case. The ready availability of documents in our studies somewhat alleviate the danger of such circularity. Thus our collection follows a time-honored tradition in historical archaeology, a proving ground for methodological developments.

The reader may also presume that since we draw the bulk of our examples from stratified societies, and capitalist societies to boot, the dialectic of domination and resistance applies only to this subset of societies. We are not convinced of this. Archaeologists have completed
In urging the application of the dialectic of domination and resistance to a wide range of settings we are not attempting to establish a new key to the past. We admit the utility of studying tradition, meaning, the human—nature dialectic, and the competition between power wielders for understanding the past. We simply argue for additionally considering how humans create misery in the course of domination, and remember that these actions spur others to resist domination in the hopes of alleviating their social conditions.

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REFERENCES


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Such as adaptation, complexity, or efficiency.

The most familiar research agenda in cultural history describes cultural traditions, objects and assemblages exhibiting little variation over