International Parliamentary Institutions as Organizations

by Robert M. Cutler, Carleton University

International parliamentary institutions (IPIs) offer a particular promise for developing the study of international organizations (IOs) as organizations, because they strikingly manifest the phenomena of democratization and transgovernmentalism. Thanks to their specific nature as both sociological and political phenomena and their special communicative role in world society, IPIs are also good candidates for the application of complexity science to international studies. The article clarifies differing approaches to IPI studies, including definitional issues, and applies a particular framework (the “paradox of intentional emergent coherence”) to understand the emergence, autopoiesis, and coherence of IPIs through different phases of their epigenetic evolution. Analysis of the evolution of Baltic Assembly demonstrates the advantages of this second-order cybernetic framework over first-order cybernetic functionalism. In the process, a strategy is set out for assessing organizational performance by IPIs.

Introduction

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The first section of this article reviews what IPIs do and why and makes a few remarks about the specificity of parliaments. The second section, to provide an example for discussion, sets out a brief institutional history of the BA, discusses how its behavior would be analyzed from the structural-functional perspective, and explains why that is a partial and insufficient explanation. The third section of the article sets out an alternative framework based in the understanding that IPIs are “complex systems,” in the technical sense of the term, which is
briefly explained. It further sets out several key terms of the approach, including epigenesis and autopoiesis, which it also defines in general and explains in particular with reference to IPIs.

Section three also enumerates six learning capacities that are necessary for an organization to achieve defined phases of evolution that are denoted as emergence, autopoiesis, and coherence. For that purpose, extensive reference is made, with also some exegesis, to classic pertinent works by Etzioni (1963) and especially by Deutsch (1963).

The fourth section of the article retells the institutional history of the BA, using the framework and concepts set out in section three. It is shown how this approach asks and answers questions that the other cannot, and gives a deeper understanding and more thoroughgoing explanation of the BA’s evolution (including its evolutionary failures). The fifth section of the article concludes by summarizing the argument and exploring some of its implications.

**The Specificity of IPIs and the Task at Hand**

The proliferation of IPIs (Cutler 2001) is a relatively new phenomenon, but historical antecedents to the institution can be found. For example, the Landtage of the Holy Roman Empire in the Age of the Princes, from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, and the voting military-political assembly comitia centuriata under the Roman kings before the Servian reforms, from the eighth to the fifth centuries BCE, are arguably IPIs, if properly considered in the context of the international system of their respective epochs. Nevertheless, until very recently, no one would have disagreed strongly with the origin of modern IPIs as suggested by Schermers and Blokker (1995:381), who cogently write: “Since international organizations cannot be controlled effectively by national parliaments, the only conceivable solution is the establishment of international organs with the task of exercising political control over the executive.” The BA is a striking counterexample: It is not just an IPI without an international organization, properly speaking, but one that emerged directly from transnational, civil society. Nor is it alone in this; the Central American Parliament is another example.

Scientific research on IPIs is not well developed despite the phenomenon having been recognized as worthy of attention over a decade ago. One of the weaknesses in the literature, beyond definitional issues, is the tendency to regard IPIs as political phenomena, slighting their reality as sociological organizations. A fruitful perspective on IPIs, capable of accumulating and integrating a significant portion of existing disparate findings, is embedded in a world-society problématique, applied specifically using the concepts and categories of complexity science. (I mean by this the German tradition of Weltgesellschaft studies initiated by Luhmann 1971, rather than the English one, which tends to subsume it as a subcategory of the “international society” approach initiated by Bull 1977; or the American one, which uses the phrase in the context of a neo-Marxist “world-systems” approach. See also Ellis 2010, esp. pp. 22–25.)

Depending upon the definition adopted, the Socialist International, the Pan-African Parliament, and the UN General Assembly, as well as individual party groups within the European Parliament, may all be regarded as members of the category, despite their obvious differences. It is useful from an expository standpoint to postpone discussion and comparison with other definitions until the second half of the second section of the article, so that the historical experience of the BA’s organizational development will put some meat
on the skeleton of the frameworks of categories that are compared there. For the purposes of discussion until then, as well as after, this article adopts Cutler’s (2006:83) definition of an IPI, which nuances his earlier (2001:209) one. According to this, an IPI is “an international institution that 1) is a regular forum for multilateral deliberations on an established basis of an either legislative or consultative nature, 2) either attached to an international organization or itself constituting one, 3) in which at least three states or transgovernmental units are represented by parliamentarians, 4) who are either selected by national legislatures in a self-determined manner or popularly elected by electorates of the member states.”

The problem-oriented task here on which multiple theoretical issues converge is to evaluate the sources of growth and decline of IPIs. Why do some IPIs respond adequately, others more dynamically and still others with sickness unto death, to the demands of organizational life placed upon them by their (internal and external) environments? A particular approach emerging from complex-systems studies (complexity science) offers insights into this question that are unavailable from the perspective of other conceptual frameworks. Its specialized terminology is also accessible to political scientists through the more familiar if disused concept of “learning.”

Understanding the Baltic Assembly’s Evolution

The Baltic Assembly: A Brief Institutional History

Although the European Parliament perhaps justifiably draws the most attention when the evolution and activity of IPIs are the topic of discussion, nevertheless the development of the BA illustrates more concisely an application of the framework here outlined. This may be because the BA’s development is compressed into a shorter and more dynamic timeframe as well as involving a much smaller number of participants. Leaving aside the interwar Baltic Entente (for good historical and cultural background, see Zájedová 2008), the proto-history of the BA began while the Soviet Union still existed, when the Estonian Popular Front, the Latvian Popular Front, and the Lithuanian reform movement met together, in Tallinn in May 1989. From this meeting, there was established the Baltic Parliamentary Group (BPG). The BPG was in fact nothing other than what Kissling (2011:13) calls a government run/inspired NGO (GRINGO), a “more or less loosely structured entit[y] to associate parliamentarians at the regional, supra-regional or international level . . . set up under national law, and consequently lack[ing] international personality.” As it emerged from out of the aggregate social movement for Baltic independence, it was also a nascent form of what Cutler (2001:207) calls an “international parliamentary-societal institution” (IPSI).

The BPG quickly “graduated” to become what Kissling calls an “issue-related GRINGO.” It focused particularly on juridical independence and issues related to it, such as the acknowledgment of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from their territories, and also other cultural, politically symbolic demands. Created as the BA in November 1991 in Tallinn, the organization sought, throughout the early 1990s, to push forward the creation of more comprehensive regional governance structures. It did succeed in motivating the creation, at the intergovernmental level, of the Baltic States Council (BSC) in 1992; however, the BSC “ceased functioning in mid-1993, although there was no official act to this effect” (Vareikis and Zygelyte 1998:5).
Any institutional depth in the early to mid-1990s at all was achieved only thanks to the exchange of experience learnt from implementing the cooperation agreements with the Nordic Council (NC) on the one hand in 1992 and, on the other hand, the Benelux Interparliamentary Consultative Council (BICC) in 1994. There was no way organizationally for the BA to implement so ambitious one such cooperation program, much less two of them. The BA was holding only two sessions per year, and its members were already full-time parliamentarians in their own national assemblies.

These developments can be set into order by use of the schema depicted in Figure 1, which illustrates the familiar structural-functional political-systems approach (Almond and Powell 1966; Easton 1953, 1965) to analyzing IPI development. Structural-functionalism once dominated North American political science and still exerts significant sway over the assumptions, sometimes unspoken, that continue to underlie influential approaches, including a widespread refusal to entertain the category of organizational learning. Its complicatedness (not the same thing as complexity!) may appear at first glance confusing, but it is fairly straightforward and altogether standard. Using the categories of Figure 1, one could say this Baltic Popular Front had significant demands but insufficient support from member-states; and significant “internal” demands (from the national civil societies) but insufficient “internal” support and capabilities; despite almost no demands yet very significant support from the international environment. Likewise, the weak level of the BA’s institutionalization would factor into [III], while relations with the NC and the BICC, for example, would fall into [IV]. The remainder of the BA’s institutional history reveals this syndrome has afflicted it for its entire life.

Figure 1: A Functionalist General-Systems Inventory of Influences on IPI Behavior

Adapted from: Cutler 2006b:21.

Not until 1992 could the BA establish its own secretariat, which operated under provisional ad hoc rules for two years and adopted its own permanent procedural norms in 1994. Only then, it may be argued, did the BA become one of Kissling’s “international or regional parliamentary organizations” (IRPOs), i.e., an institution established by national legislatures cooperating together, not by national political executives, “whose members are
official in the sense that national or regional parliaments dispatched delegations to them” and in which parliamentarians can participate only as members of national delegations. IRPOs possess a “partial international personality [that] is *sui generis,*” but this is “a novelty in international law” derived from the empirical study of those that actually exist; unlike GRINGOs, however, they possess full legal autonomy (Kissling 2011:15). Due to the failure of comprehensive regional international organization to establish itself in the Baltic area, the BA remained a “stand-alone” organization that was not integrated into an “international governmental organization’s system.” As an IRPO, it nevertheless retained “a derived and partial international personality *sui generis* and the political leverage going along with it” (Kissling 2011:26, 20).

Although the BA had found it necessary to promote by itself the foundation of the Baltic Council of Ministers (BCM) in 1993, the latter did not hold its first meeting until 1994. After the BCM was finally launched in June of that year, the BA tried unsuccessfully to get it to participate in its own April 1995 meeting. Only the following year was a joint session between the BA and the BCM held. The two institutions adopted a cooperation agreement with a view toward an annual joint meeting. According to Kapustans (1998:33, details in Dekker 2004:73–86.), the BA and BCM were originally “established and functioned on the basis of the Nordic example, then later has showed signs of direction to the Benelux model.”

Even if the NC’s “external demands” for parliamentary cooperation with the Baltic States were sometimes met, they were not always met by the BA itself. For example, in the mid- and late 1990s, the national Baltic parliaments created standing committees, and even transgovernmental standing committees, in order to cooperate with the parliamentarians from the NC itself and with the NC’s member-states individually. At the time, this was seen as a success of the parliamentarization process in the Baltic States. However, even those transgovernmental all-Baltic parliamentary committees remained outside the BA framework. Eventually, the hopeful prospect of EU membership in the early twenty-first century resulted in Baltic parliamentary cooperation, which the BA once considered its own vocation, becoming placed into the framework of the EU’s regional external relations initiatives.

The BA, for its part, did in 1996 adopt a program to begin coordination of legislation of the three states in order to bring them closer to the *acquis communautaire* with a view toward EU membership. The BA’s contacts with the NC and the BICC provided information allowing the latter two to act as “lobbies” for the Baltic States in international organizations. It is difficult to say these inter-institutional links were themselves more important than interpersonal connections among individuals holding multiple roles in multiple institutions.

With the new century, there began within the BA a series of attempts at moderate institutional reforms designed to rationalize communications and facilitate the exchange of information. Strikingly, however, it was not until 2003 that the BA’s own work was formally coordinated with the BCM’s. In 2004, the BA and the BCM together adopted a protocol to
their cooperation agreement routinizing somewhat their cooperation in the framework of the Baltic Council, but the Baltic Council lacks a self-standing apparatus and is constituted by that very cooperation.

As of 2005, the BA was only one of four facets of Baltic parliamentary cooperation and not by any means the most important one. Other facets of Baltic parliamentary cooperation included meetings of the speakers of parliaments three to four times per year, contacts between the national parliaments’ standing committees outside the BA framework (including regular contacts among the Foreign Affairs and European Affairs committees), and contacts within the framework of other international organizations. Ribulis (2006) notes that from 1991 to 2005, the vast majority of the nearly two hundred documents adopted by the BA received no feedback from the BCM or anywhere else. In the three national parliaments, there was a low awareness of the BA, and those parliamentarians who were aware of it were inclined to rank its reputation as low. The BA’s activities were further impeded by a highly bureaucratic and cumbersome structure.

The BA confronted another uncertain period following the Baltic States’ successful integration into the EU and NATO. The years from 2002 through 2007 represent a period of finding the proper questions to answer in order to promote the BA’s organizational evolution, and then finding the answers to those questions. After much discussion, the three countries agreed on the need to consolidate and simplify the consultation mechanisms. Following from the EU and NATO integration experiences, they also recognized the need to direct efforts away from declaratory activities and toward the identification and solution of practical problems. A principal reform during this period was to rationalize the BA’s committee structure and coordinate its activities with those of the three national parliaments. It is in fact remarkable that this natural development took so long to be recognized and implemented. Standing committees were created in the following fields: 1) economics, energy, and innovations; 2) education, science, and culture; 3) natural resources and environment; 4) legal affairs and security; and 5) welfare. A sixth standing committee for budget and audit was also created, but it was then transformed into a session-specific committee with membership subject to greater scrutiny and review.

This new structure has permitted a certain issue-area-specific cooperation to deepen with the NC and later BICC, through joint committee meetings of the responsible bodies of the different IPIs. The BA was nevertheless frequently sidelined by the cooperation among the national political executives of the two organizations (Nordic Council of Ministers and BCM), the members of which then take matters directly to their own national parliaments. Thus, when the Baltic States acceded to the EU, the “Nordic-Baltic Six” (NB6) was established among them and Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, yet lacking any specific interparliamentary component.

After 2008, the BA appeared to have settled into its niche. In 2009, the BA signed a cooperation agreement with the GUAM Parliamentary Assembly, which was established in 2004, but this does not appear to have had practical effect. (GUAM is the on-and-off cooperation organization comprising Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova.) Then in 2010 came the so-called “NB8 Wise Men Report” (Birkavs and Gade, 2010; for a prescient
forerunner, see Moisio 2003), which recommended institutionalizing BA-NC meetings within a broader organizational framework. The NB8 project’s emphasis (NB8 is NB6 plus Iceland and Norway) on creating a wide-ranging and pragmatic policy-issue cooperation structure has not enhanced the BA’s profile. The Wise Men specified that meetings should be held among the speakers of parliament and among the chairmen of the foreign affairs committees, but it made no explicit reference to continuing the joint committee meetings. Work is still under way to implement the broad recommendations of the NB8 Wise Men Report, but these give greater attention to inter-executive branch cooperation and foreign-affairs coordination. During this period, BA cooperation with the BICC has also languished.

**The Baltic Assembly’s Institutional History: Its Analytical Significance**

From the preceding institutional history, there emerges the significant technical detail that despite some superficial appearances to the contrary, there is no general organization of Baltic cooperation. There is the Baltic Assembly and there is the Baltic Council of Ministers, and there is an agreement between them that regulates their relations. However, despite their cooperation being denoted as the Baltic Council, there is no comprehensive general-purpose Baltic cooperation organization of which it is part. (For example, there is no all-Baltic international court; also, individual citizens of the Baltic States do not have the right to petition the BA.) As a result, the BA has never “graduated” to Kissling’s (2011:26) category of International/Regional Parliamentary Specialized Agencies (IRPSAs), which resemble IRPOs “except for the fact that they are somehow integrated into an international governmental organization’s system.” The BA has always been, and remains, a “stand-alone” organization. Consequently, it has also never become a parliamentary organ of an international/regional organization (POIRO), since such assemblies are “set up or confirmed by an international treaty and/or embedded in an international treaty for the governmental organization as a whole” (Kissling 2011:38; for a comprehensive review of the entire spectrum of Baltic cooperation organizations at the time of the BA’s “reform period,” see Kasack 2005:135–53).

The difference between the BA’s character and capacities at the time when it was what Kissling calls a GRINGO, and its character and capacities at subsequent phases of its evolution, is sufficient to motivate a qualitative distinction between the two eras. In the taxonomy of complex world society, GRINGOs are not really IPIs but are hybrids of parliamentary formations with societal formations, which are called IPSIs (international parliamentary-societal institutions). Kissling points out that GRINGOs, whether of universal-purpose or specific-purpose kind, lack the specific sort of political influence that is possible only with an international juridical personality.

Kissling’s analysis points to the difficulties with the modification by Šabič (2008) of Klebes’s (1988:879–80) earlier typology. Klebes classified IPIs by enumerating their powers. His first category includes IPIs that engage in “the management of their internal affairs (within the limits of constitutional texts and budgetary means),” his second extends this to IPIs having “a passive consultative role (reaction to requests for opinion from governmental organs),” and his third is limited to IPIs having “an active consultative role (formulation of recommendations for governmental organs).” Šabič expands the extension of Klebes’s types while collapsing it atheoretically from three to two categories. As Cofelice (2012:8) observes, Šabič introduces
his own “slightly broader working definition of IPIs” because of his criticism that previous definitions capture “only what IPIs are, but not what they do.” However, to proceed in such a manner involves a significant category error (Ryle 1949:16).

No new definition is necessary if one wishes to study what IPIs “do” instead of what they “are.” This can be done operationally within the universe of institutions and under the established definition. Šabić’s atheoretical eclecticism ends up including IPSIs and other institutions that have no international juridical personality. These organizations are definitely worthy of study, but they should not be lumped together with IPIs, which do have such a personality, as Kissling explains. To cast a wider net for the sake of expanding the number of organizations in the universe to be studied is like ensnaring tuna and other fish in the trawl for the crustaceans that one really wishes to catch. Even if the BA gives an example of a GRINGO/IPSI evolving into an IPI, comparing the behavior of GRINGO/IPSIs with that of IPIs is strictly analogous to comparing the behavior of non-state national liberation organizations with the behavior of states, subjects of international law.

Although Kissling includes GRINGOs in her inventory of IPIs, her work in fact shows why they cannot be treated equivalently: “international juridical personality” whether de facto or de jure is the key distinction. GRINGOs are capable only of “morphostatic” or first-order changes, where either things “look different while remaining basically as they have always been” or “change occurs as a natural expression” of the organization’s development. For example, when a general-purpose GRINGO such as the BPG in 1989 becomes an issue-specific GRINGO. By contrast, the “morphogenetic” or second-order change “occur[s] in the very essence, in the core [of the organization], and nothing special needs to be done to keep the change changed” (Smith 1982:318; for background, see Prigogine & Allen 1982, and Hatt 2009; for one detailed analytical framework, see Wilden 1980:373–77; also compare Archer 1995 and Niiniluoto 1999).

Using the inventory provided in Kissling’s five appendices, this writer, reviewing the manuscript research notes of Cutler (2001), finds that his empirical work in that book chapter includes all IPIs existing at the time of its final redaction in 1999 that fall into Kissling’s non-GRINGO categories. (The sole exception is the Inter-Parliamentary Union or IPU, the unique universal-membership, general-purpose IPI.) Those categories are the categories that possess some kind of international juridical personality, even if this is (in Kissling’s words) “partial and is derived from empirical analysis of existing examples.” This coincidence with Kissling’s empirical work is aesthetically gratifying, since Cutler’s definition (2001:209; subsequently nuanced in Cutler 2006a:83) was in fact designed to capture institutions having some sort of international juridical personality in particular, yet without invoking international law explicitly.

There is a particularly notable correspondence between Cutler’s “ladder” of IPI organizational evolution (see Table 1: taken from Cutler 2006:90–91; in turn modified from Cutler 2001:220) and Kissling’s independently established typology. Only members of Kissling’s last two, most highly developed categories (International/Regional Parliamentary Specialized Agencies and Parliamentary Organs of International/Regional Organizations) can attain to Cutler’s levels of 3.0 or above, because only those categories of Kissling’s have
relations with international executive institutions (i.e., “traditional” IOs established by states under international law). GRINGOs can only attain to Cutler’s level 2.5 of “rule-supervisory (advisory oversight of self).” Finally, members of Kissing’s “middle” category (International/Regional Parliamentary Organization, IRPO) would generally also be limited to Cutler’s level 2.5; but because of their special characteristics, they could possibly attain to level 2.7, i.e., “rule-supervisory (advisory oversight of other institutions).” In the case of the BA, analysis shows that this is precisely what the BA has been unable to do and where its evolution has been blocked.

Table 1: Synthesis of Epigenetic and Functional Developmental Schemata with Specifications of Their Empirical Indicators for IPIs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational level and epigenetic category</th>
<th>Type of world-societal group</th>
<th>Requisite functions</th>
<th>Empirical characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Legislature</td>
<td>Institutionalized transnational-authoritative</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Compellent legislative authority over IO bodies/members with which the IPI may be affiliated, or similar “other-directed” authority if there is no IO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5. “Parliament” plus Spill-over</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operational (i.e., outside the IO)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Parliament</td>
<td>Institutionalized transnational-deliberative</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Deterrent oversight over IO bodies/members with which the IPI may be affiliated, or similar other-directed oversight if there is no such IO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7. “Assembly” plus Takeoff Stage 2b</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rule-supervisory (advisory oversight of other institutions)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. “Assembly” plus Takeoff Stage 2a</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rule-supervisory (advisory oversight of self)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. “Assembly” plus Takeoff Stage 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rule-creating</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Assembly</td>
<td>Associational</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>First regularized meeting following establishment of permanent/standing secretariat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Congress</td>
<td>Non-associational</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>First coming-together meeting to establish IPI, or organization later becoming IPI, whether meeting is affiliated with any antecedent IO or not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0. Pre-Congress</td>
<td>Atomic</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>First preliminary or preparatory meeting that generates the organization later evolving into IPI, or foundation of antecedent regional IO with which it may (eventually) be affiliated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The correspondence of Cutler’s approach with Kissling’s subsequent, separate work represents an independent validation of the former. Kissling’s exhaustive empirical work undergirds and independently strengthens, while also nuancing, Cutler’s earlier theory-based typology, of which he elaborated examples through idiographic reference to the more limited number of IPIs existing at the time of his research a decade earlier. For the sake of completing a review of previous typologies in order to make it comprehensive, it may be observed that Klebes’s (1988:879–80) still earlier enumeration of the powers of IPIs undergirds Cutler’s distinction among the levels 2.0–2.2, 2.5 and 2.7–3.0. The first corresponds to what Klebes called “the management [by IPIs] of their internal affairs (within the limits of constitutional texts and budgetary means),” the second to “a passive consultative role (reaction to requests for opinion from governmental organs),” and the third to “an active consultative role (formulation of recommendations for governmental organs).” Finally, Cutler’s levels 3.5–4.0 correspond to what Klebes called “the possibility [for an IPI] to intervene in the normative activity” of the “intergovernmental structure” with which it is integrated.

Epigenesis, Autopoiesis, and Learning

Epigenesis and the Autopoiesis of IPIs
Among IOs, there is arguably no better candidate than IPIs for the application of complexity science (adjective: “complex-scientific”) frameworks of analysis, some of which particularly complement certain strands of world-society theoretical orientations. A complex system is a system having multiple interacting components, of which the overall behavior cannot be inferred simply from the behavior of these components. Thus, its evolution cannot be understood or analyzed through the analysis of its constituent parts. The canonical example of a noncomplex system is an automobile factory, since by studying its inputs and how they are transformed inside the factory, the output can be accurately predicted. Complex-scientific approaches arose first in thermodynamics to explain how entropy could diminish on smaller scales even while necessarily increasing on bigger scales, then in biology when life was treated as an organized complexity that decreased entropy locally.

The biological cell and living organisms they compose are the canonical examples of complex systems (Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 1974). In this tradition, the key contrast is between epigenesis and preformationism (Hall 1999:112–13). According to the latter doctrine, the organism is already wholly present, or pre-formed, in the gamete. According to the doctrine of preformationism, every successive stage of development merely grows in increasing size from pre-existing structures. It may be argued that the state, invented as a (vertically) organized bureaucracy for the administration of a (horizontally) extended territory is determined in such a manner, and that this accounts for its difficulties in adapting to a networked, partially deterritorialized world-political agenda.

Epigenesis, on the other hand, signifies that every successive stage in the developmental process builds upon—more precisely, accretes around—the preceding stages of development. The main principle of complexity-based approaches that I invoke here is emergent coherence and its phases (Cutler 2006b). The three fundamental categories of emergent coherence are extensions of the three categories forming the basis for the structuralist epistemology that Piaget (1968) extracts from Lévi-Strauss. In particular,
the complex-scientific extension of the Piagetian structuralist category of “totality” is coherence; the complex-scientific extension of the Piagetian structuralist category of “self-regulation” is autopoiesis (literally “self-creation” or “self-production”); and the complex-scientific extension of the structuralist category of “transformation” is emergence.

The shorthand term “emergent coherence” captures this triad: autopoiesis intermediates from emergence to coherence. Autopoiesis in a complex-scientific social system is the capacity of complex systems to set its own goals through progressive interaction with their environment and through learning in response to this (Holland 1996; Luhmann 1984, 1995). As an analytical complex-scientific category, it points to the striving, by whatever organization, for autonomy of goal-definition and entelechy of goal-realization. It cannot be sufficiently stressed that the reference to “goals” is not teleological but teleonomic. This means that the goals are in a certain sense “programed” but only at the level of the particular phase of organizational evolution, in terms of response to the immediate environment; they are not in reference to some hypothetical “final cause” (see Mayr 2004:51–57). This teleonomy is a descriptive and analytical tool that “reveals the consistency in their operation within the domain of observation” (Maturana and Varela 1980:86).

As an organization grows, it progressively incorporates aspects of its environment into its own functioning, adapting to them. As it matures, it begins teleonomically to generate its own goals through its interactions with the environment. A complex organization acquires, through its successive stages of maturation (i.e., ‘epigenetically’) the capacity to evolve in response to its environment. This is a key feature that distinguishes second-order from first-order cybernetic approaches. Another distinction is to say the first-order cybernetics involves the study of observed systems, where second-order cybernetics involves the study of observing systems (Maruyama 1963; Geyer 1995).

A system’s adaptation to a changing environment for the purpose of survival involves the autonomous establishment of what evolutionarily appear to be self-generated goals, and this is a facet of autopoiesis. Here is a key analytical category for assessing the development of IPIs in general as well as most if not all international institutions in complex world society. Autopoiesis for an IPI, representing the foundation of autonomous motive, signifies the proactive undertaking of relations with other organizations, as opposed to remaining only a coordinating center for actions of its own component organizational elements. To achieve autopoiesis, for example, the requisite learning capacities are steering capacity and depth of memory. Whether a given IPI has the organizational resources to put these capacities into evidence, plus the normative basis upon which to exercise them, will go a long way toward determining the success or failure of those two key problem tasks, of more general institutional growth or decline, and eventual organizational life or death (or stagnation). It will be indicated later in this article exactly how the BA’s difficulties result from such failures.

Organization “inherently involves functions and their interrelations” (Rosen 1991:280), so the development of internal and external functions, posited by a structural-functional taxonomy, represents a set of potentials for the evolution of any given organization. The innovation and incorporation of procedures for accomplishing “internal functions” represent a response to developmental challenges in the life of the institution. The Table 1 “ladder”
for assessing IPI evolution illustrates how organizations must, as a rule, first evolve internal functions permitting them to exist stably in relation with their constituent parts, before engaging subsequently, pro-actively, with the external environment. The evolution from one phase to the next of its epigenetic development is a marker of organizational success in adapting to the requisite tasks.

The passage from one phase of evolution to another, in the epigenetic course that inheres in any type of international institution, represents successful institutional adaptation to a changing environment. The phases marked in Table 1 are not point discontinuities in the evolutionary ladder of an IPI qua institution but are transitions in the evolution and organization of its activity. In the more familiar structural-functional framework, these are called initiation, take-off, and spill-over. In the more appropriate complex-scientific framework, they are called (with differently nuanced meaning) emergence, autopoiesis, and coherence.

A second-order-cybernetic approach founded in the theory of complex systems is able to operationalize autopoiesis, better than any recitation of functional mechanisms. In particular, a complex-scientific approach motivates a framework for evaluating the growth and decline of organizations and other social systems, determining what leads some of them to respond adequately to demands imposed upon them by their environment and others not (Cutler 2006b). Such a framework synthesizes a functional taxonomy of how organizations maintain homeostasis in order to survive with an epigenetic taxonomy of how organizations develop and adapt in order to grow (Etzioni 1963; for details respecting IPIs, Cutler 2001; for application, Cutler and von Lingen 2003; for abstract theorization, Cutler 2006b). Such an epigenetic approach helps to reduce the complexity. The epistemological leap from first-order to second-order cybernetics consolidates the functional framework expressed in Figure 1 into an epigenetic expression, in Figure 2, which portrays a cycle schematizing the development or the failure to develop (of any organization) at any phase of evolution.

Figure 2: The Paradox of Intentional (Autopoietic) Emergent Coherence: A Cyclical Developmental Framework for Organizations and Social Systems, Unifying the Functional and Epigenetic Approaches

The epigenetic approach renders the structural-functional schema more parsimonious with no sacrifice of analytical rigor. This transformation reveals that the structural-functionalist loop (Figure 1) is embedded in the realization of an IPI’s own epigenetic development, that it indeed hides this, and that its own parameters are conditioned by the latter. Only two conceptual consolidations are required to transform the functionalist (first-order-cybernetic) schema in
Figure 1, so as to reveal its epigenetic (second-order-cybernetic) essence as in Figure 2 (for details, see Cutler 2006:21–22). From them, two insights emerge that are not evident from the purely functional framework. First, what the endogenous demands and supports actually are evolve with each stage of development through which an IPI passes. Second, conversion, decision, and implementation each represent a response to the challenge of self-transformation presented by the imperative to outgrow one stage of development and enter another.

What follows from the first of those two insights is that we may treat demands and supports together as a *single manifestation* of the epigenetic challenges proper to the stage of development reached by the IPI in question. What follows from the second is that conversion, decision, and implementation may be collapsed into a *single category* representing the IPI’s performance surmounting the given stage of development (i.e., its response to those epigenetic challenges).

**Table 2: How Deutschian “Capacities” Operationalize Performance Variables and Transform First-Order Cybernetics into Second-Order Cybernetics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance variables operationalized as “capacities”</th>
<th>Hierarchies</th>
<th>Goal definition and realization</th>
<th>Threat systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime capacity</td>
<td>1) Fundamental restructuring</td>
<td>1) Steering capacity</td>
<td>1) Power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary capacity</td>
<td>2) Inner rearrangement</td>
<td>2) Depth of memory</td>
<td>2) Intake channels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional behavior characteristic of the performance variable</th>
<th>Communication and information</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Spheres of competence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Evolution and Organizational Learning**

Table 2 maps the internal functions and the stages of epigenetic development onto a common domain. The evolutionary scheme in Table 2 illustrates the identity of the “normative-integrative” external function with Etzioni’s (1963) seminal “nature of emerging units” category of epigenetic sequences of integration. In particular, the evolutionary levels of the simple taxonomy—congress, assembly, parliament, and legislature—fall under the umbrella of external functions, specifically as the stages of the *normative integration* of the IPIs. As such, they have particular reference to their status and personality and competence under international law.
The connection here to Kissling’s typology has already been made clear.) That correspondence integrates the principal categories of the epigenetic framework (top two rows of Table 2) and the principal taxonomy of the functional framework (bottom two rows of Table 2).

Under the functionalist framework, there are three elements of “interactions with other organizations” (hierarchies, goal-definition, and goal-realization taken together, threat systems), and under the epigenetic framework there are three performance criteria. Table 2 sets these into a one-to-one correspondence and operationalizes the first-order-cybernetic categories in a necessarily second-order-cybernetic manner. There is, then, a one-to-one correspondence between the functional framework’s subcategories of interactions with other organizations and the epigenetic framework’s criteria of performance. Undergirding the logic is a synthesis of the two frameworks offered by Deutsch and by Etzioni. Their full synthesis, denoted the “paradox of intentional emergent coherence” (Cutler 2006b), lays stress on the complex-scientific category of autopoiesis and its associated phenomenon, learning. It may be summarized as follows.

The limitations of the conceptual apparatus available to Etzioni (1963) a half-century ago left him sometimes a prisoner of a functionalist and homeostatic framework. Studying phenomena of complex world society today requires the reconceptualization of his parameters for evaluating the “performance” of what he called the “epigenesis of political communities.” The limits upon the growth of knowledge that affected Etzioni also applied to Deutsch’s (1963) advanced cybernetic work of social science published the same year. It was a limitation of the era. Deutsch’s approach, however, may properly be called “one-and-a-half-order” cybernetic, akin to the “middle voice” of verbs in classical Greek, where the subject acts on or for itself, halfway between (passive, observed) first-order-cybernetic and the (active, observing) second-order-cybernetic frameworks (compare Juarrero 1999:109–25 passim; see also Geyer 1995). Introducing second-order cybernetic correctives to Etzioni’s original taxonomy of performance variables transforms the above-discussed functionalist framework, which treats organizations homeostatically. In particular, it transforms that framework into a fully epigenetic cycle of organic development (Cutler 2006b).

Deutsch (1963:133) is mainly concerned with capacities for learning and their loss. For this purpose, he considers “mind” to be “a self-preserving physical process of communicating and manipulating symbols” that he “provisionally define[s] as any self-sustaining physical process that includes the nine operations of 1) selecting, 2) abstracting, 3) communicating, 4) storing, 5) subdividing, 6) recalling, 7) recombining, 8) critically recognizing, and 9) reapplying items of information.” The two conditions sine qua non for learning, he calls “novelty” and “creativity.” Novelty is “produced” in the first three of those nine operations, through which “th[e] new combination of old elements [is] matched or abstracted in the mind.” Creativity is then “consummated” in the next four (storing, subdividing, recalling, and recombining), whereby “a new image or symbol must be stored, pertaining to the new pattern as a whole, regardless of its earlier combinatorial origin” (emphasis in the original). Unlike eclecticism, creativity “abstracts and reapplies new patterns from the combination.” When a “new pattern [is] applied [not only] to new recombinations within the mind [but moreover] to new patterns of action by the effectors of the net,” then this, “the beginning
of some new item of behavior, we may call initiative.” Initiative, then, consists in the eight and ninth operations that Deutsch attributes to the mind, “reapplying [the recombined then critically recognized] items of information” (1963:133, 133–34, 134).

For Deutsch, then, restated in complex-scientific terms, “novelty” is the taproot of emergence, “creativity” is the taproot of autopoiesis, and “initiative” is the taproot of coherence. The relations of Deutsch’s six learning capacities (middle row of Table 2) to the three phases of the paradox of intentional emergent coherence unfold from that insight. Deutsch’s taxonomy of six obstacles to learning (“losses” of capacity that impede it) provides the operationalization of IPI performance at each stage of epigenetic development. Although his language couches the explanation in terms of an individual person or consciousness, there is no anthropomorphism involved in conceiving the boundary of the “organism” to define an organization. One may therefore apply the discussion to social and political institutions composed of human beings, including IPIs.

Types of Learning Capacity and What They Enable
In this manner, Deutsch’s work helps to render Etzioni’s approach more epigenetic, drawing it closer to a second-order cybernetic perspective. Deutsch’s (1963) remarks on obstacles to learning in cybernetic systems are directly to this point. Specifically, he discusses “losses,” any of which can prevent effective learning. Since the inverse of such a loss is a capacity, he in fact enumerates six capacities that promote learning. It turns out that a different pair of these six capacities for learning are related to each of the three performance variances (hierarchies, goal-definition and goal-realization taken together, and threat systems). Three pairs of capacities are mutually exclusive, and, collectively, they exhaust the set of six, as follows:

1. Hierarchies are promoted primarily by the capacity for “fundamental restructuring” and secondarily by the capacity for “[partial] inner rearrangement.” For Deutsch, these have to do with commitment. Here his attempts to translate into modern cybernetic terms certain concepts of Enlightenment philosophy begin. (He subsequently addresses reverence, idolatry, love, curiosity, grace, and spirit in information-processing language.) “Faith,” he writes (emphasis in the original), as a “concept of commitment . . . may be faith in ‘fear and trembling’” that the proposition to which one is committed may be wrong or wrongly understood or wrongly enacted or impossible to enact; but what matters is commitment to the proposition. Faith he would balance by “humility [that] might advise us to distrust our judgments even in such cases.” Deutsch thus advises to “combine humility with faith” for this permits “rapid but thorough commitment” while maintaining openness “to alternative information and the capacity for rearrangement and possible recommitment to other goals” or to different understandings of goals previously sought (Deutsch 1963:232, emphases added).

Faith and humility, the two poles of the deliberative tension characterizing the Enlightenment’s philosophy of religion (Cassirer 1951:160–82) manifest, through action, as individual-psychologized attitudes of confidence and skepticism. They find socialized expression respectively as the striving for superiority on the one hand and, on the other hand, social interest (Gemeinschaftsgefühl: see Adler 1964). Of the three “operations” of the “mind” concerning hierarchies, “[partial] inner rearrangement”
involves 1) selecting, and it is a requisite preliminary to “fundamental restructuring,” which involves 2) abstracting and 3) communicating. That is the sense in which these two capacities, particularly the latter, are animated by novelty.

2. Goal-definition and goal-realization (in the teleonomic sense) are promoted primarily by “steering capacity” and secondarily by “depth of memory.” The latter is not just the “storage capacity” of memory “but particularly . . . the effectiveness” of “recall and recombination of data, and for the screening and identification” of their optimal combinations. Failures or loss of “steering capacity,” the primary one here, “may involve the overvaluation of structure over function” or “strong responses that come late [that] are characteristic of oversteering.” They are exacerbated if inner communication channels become more complicated, as this can lead to “loss of coordination between behavior and memory,” according to Deutsch (1963:222, 225, 226). Of the nine “operations” of the “mind” that he originally enumerated, the “depth of memory” capacity enabling goal definition and realization involves 4) storing and 5) subdividing; and it is a requisite preliminary to “steering capacity,” which involves 6) recalling and 7) recombining. That is the sense in which these two capacities, and particularly the latter, are animated by creativity.

3. Threat systems (i.e., for response to threat) are promoted primarily by “power” and secondarily by “intake channels.” The latter, which is the secondary capacity informing initiative, refer the application of “initiative to the widening of [the] range of intake of information” by way of a “mind [that is] capable of such creative learning” as to be “open . . . [to] more new kinds of information [through deployment of] its self-steering, abstracting, and combinatorial powers.” In play, therefore, is the “effectiveness of previously existing channels of information from the outside world, or the loss of entire channels, or the loss of the ability to rearrange such intake channels and to develop new ones.” Referring implicitly back to the first pair of learning capacities Deutsch esteems that the “combinatorial richness of possibilities for novelty may already be . . . vastest perhaps in a mind that is open, that is, applies initiative to the widening of its range of information from what we may still believe to be an infinite universe.” Referring implicitly the second pair of learning capacities, he adds that “the more capable a mind is of such creative learning, the more new kinds of information can be reached by its self-steering, abstracting, and combinatorial powers, the more properly it may considered inexhaustible” (Deutsch 1963:134, 222, 134, emphases added).

Power, the primary capacity informing initiative, refers to “resources and facilities required to make the behavior of the system prevail over obstacles in its environment.” Deutsch suggests developing the concept “in connection with [the philosophical categories of] will and character” by which he means “the more or less stable inner program . . . of an individual or organization, . . . the extent to which they can continue to . . . impose extrapolations or projections of their inner structure upon the environment.” Power is, then, “in this narrow sense [somewhat like] . . . the ability to afford not to learn.” Deutsch also attempts to differentiate “gross power,” a system has of “acting out its internal program by imposing a given amount of changes upon the environment”
from “net power,” which would be the difference between gross power and the chance “of another critical or relevant amount of changes occurring in the inner structure of the system” (Deutsch 1963:110, 110–11, 111). Of the nine “operations” of the “mind” that Deutsch originally enumerated, the “intake channels” capacity enabling threat systems involves 8) critically recognizing, and it is a requisite preliminary to “power,” which involves 9) reapplying. That is the sense in which these two capacities, and particularly the latter, are animated by creativity.

The Baltic Assembly’s Institutional History Retold

It is instructive to retell the brief history of the BA from the complex-scientific standpoint depicted in Table 1 and Figure 2. As an additional shorthand aid to the exposition, Table 3 recalls the three basic complex-scientific categories (emergence, autopoiesis, and coherence) in order to establish the correspondence among phases of IPI evolution (detailed in Table 1) and their corresponding epigenetic performance variables (related in Table 2 to organizational learning capacities). To begin with, it is helpful to recall that the BA could not formally become an IPI until independent states, subjects of international law, existed that were strong enough to underwrite its institutionalization in November 1991. This effectively signified the BA’s transition from phase 0 to 1 (pre-Congress to Congress) in Table 1.

Table 3: Phases of Evolution of an IPI and Their Correspondence with Complex-scientific Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evolutionary IPI phase</th>
<th>Complex-scientific category</th>
<th>Epigenetic performance variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress to Assembly</td>
<td>Emergence</td>
<td>Hierarchies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly to Parliament</td>
<td>Autopoiesis</td>
<td>Goal definition and realization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament to Legislature</td>
<td>Coherence</td>
<td>Threat systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The epigenetic performance variable at issue in the transition from phase 1 to phase 2 (Congress to Assembly) is the establishment of hierarchies (from Table 3), manifested through the organization of communication and information. The two capacities necessary for this (from Table 2) were, primarily, fundamental restructuring and, secondarily, inner rearrangement. The foundation of the BSC was an attempt to create an environment that would permit the BA to develop both these capacities, but, as noted above, the BSC failed quickly. In Deutsch’s terms the BA, starting from late 1991 onward, attempted (partial) “inner rearrangement.”

None of the BA’s activity was sufficient to reach a new stable equilibrium of organizational performance until a “fundamental rearrangement” of its internal structure, represented at a minimum by a permanent secretariat, could be achieved. Three years were required, from 1991 to 1994, for the BA to progress from phase one to phase two. During that whole time, the BA secretariat operated only on an ad hoc basis. Overcoming that obstacle to institutionalization was a prerequisite to any “fundamental restructuring.” Without it, there was little material from which to construct an institutional memory for which to develop any “depth of memory,”
which for Deutsch is the secondary learning capacity requisite for the next, autopoietic phase of IPI evolution (Table 2).

Here institutional memory does not refer to the oral tradition passed on by political leaders, even if they had remained in office throughout the whole period in question. Moreover, there were no such leaders whose activities were entirely, or even predominantly, dedicated to the BA so there could be no “institutional memory” in that sense. In general, the reminiscences of current or former individual members of any institution’s administrative elite could constitute some sort of memory for the organization, but it is not a commonly available or accessible or transparent sort of memory. In the case of the BA, even a permanent administrative elite was lacking. Institutional memory in the context employed here really refers to institutionalized memory, existing as organizational archives and departments of documentation and research along with the budgets and human resources to sustain them. Such administrative units, of which the creation and existence signify internal differentiation and organizational evolution, only become more necessary for efficient recall as the institution’s life becomes longer and longer. So long as there was no organized institutionalization of the BA, there could be no institutionalized memory.

The BA’s institutional history also appears to validate Deutsch’s (1963:227) observation that in the absence of “depth of memory” to undergird the development of a steering capacity, the “only answer . . . seems to be inner rearrangement, partial or comprehensive” of memory, search, and recall in order to enhance recombination: i.e., falling back upon the learning capacities associated with hierarchies. From the mid-1990s through the early years of the last decade, the EU encouraged the three Baltic States to cooperate in order to prepare for accession. However, the BA lacked financial resources as well as expertise in designing subregional market integration. Through the late 1990s, the Baltic States engaged in much significant interparliamentary cooperation among themselves, as well as externally outside the region, without reference to the BA, ignoring it.

The rationalization of communications inside the BA that was attempted during the years 2002–2007, including a streamlining of the BA committee structure and the coordination of the BA’s own work with that of the BCM, reinforced somewhat the BA’s chronically weak “steering capacity” and autopoiesis. Nevertheless, the BA remains unable to achieve real autopoiesis, because its steering capacity is still maimed by the recurring failure to be able to exploit any depth of memory. It was, and remains, stuck at Cutler’s level 2.5 (see Table 1), “rule-supervisory (advisory oversight of self).” Although it is able to accomplish what Klebes called an “active consultative role” vis-à-vis the BCM, it remains unable to translate this into Cutler’s level 2.7, “rule-supervisory (advisory oversight of other institutions),” because it can only make recommendations and cannot inspect or critically verify the activities of the BCM.

Today the BA remains a forum mainly for the exchange of views. Its recommendations may serve as the basis for decisions by the BCM, but even these “decisions” remain nevertheless purely declarative in character. Any implementation of them depends upon the proposal and passage of legislation in the individual national parliament and its approval by the national political executive. The BA is therefore unable to penetrate up to, let alone through, level 3.0 (“deterrent oversight”). This is why the BA, even though it has throughout its short life
engaged in “operational activities” (ostensible level 3.5) outside the Baltic transgovernmental and intergovernmental cooperation system, remains unable to institutionalize that cooperation as well.

The lack of a steering capacity means in both a literal and metaphorical sense that the BA does not drive (through power, a requisite of the still further next phase of evolution, see Table 2) its own activity. The sociological and political fact is that there is no general institution that organizes Baltic cooperation. Despite reference to them together as the “Baltic Council,” there is only the Baltic Assembly and the Baltic Council of Ministers, plus an agreement between them that regulates their relations. The BA has recently been subsumed under and wholly overtaken by the wide-ranging, pragmatic, and policy-issue oriented eight-member Nordic-Baltic (“NB8”) cooperation structure.

Measures of Organizational Evolution and the Future of IPIs
One may therefore speak of a syndrome that afflicts the BA’s organizational evolution, wherein past failures imprint future difficulties (compare Binder et al. 1971; Etzioni 1963, esp. pp. 416–20; Grew 1978). A measurement strategy, for lack of a better term, for this aspect of IPI evolution may be formalized from the fact, that at each of the three given phase transitions in the evolutionary development of the organization, one Deutschian “capacity” (which he expresses as “loss” of such capacity) is principal and another is auxiliary. Such a “measurement strategy” may be transformed into a notational logic that allows the successes and failures of learning and organizational development to be compared not only across the different phases of epigenetic evolution but also across multiple IPIs as well as over time. In particular, such a formal notation would present a uniform method of coding that is systematic, consistent, and universal, yet adapted to the idiosyncratic, indeed path-dependent, development of any individual IPI, and at any phase of its development.

The formal notation might follow the logic of institutional development, in which for an IPI to complete successfully the transition from Congress to Assembly, Assembly to Parliament, or from Parliament to Legislature, it must manifest both of the Deutschian capacities necessary at that level of transition (Table 2). We might suppose further, that it must develop the auxiliary capability first as a condition for the principal capability at any stage of transition; and also it must retain at least the principal capacity that was necessary during any previous transition. The mathematical expression of this principle is that the principal capacity at each level is coded as 2, the auxiliary capacity as 1.

We might suppose that for each capability the values of the learning may be 0, 1 (when only the minor capacity proper to the phase transition is present), 2 (when the major capacity proper to the phase transition is present), or 3 \[= 2+1\] (when both are present). The rule for success is that the major capacity must be in evidence; thus, a score of 0 or 1 is considered failure. For example, in order for the product to be 12, it is necessary to have \(3 \times 2 \times 2\) where the 3 and the first 2 produce the second 2, giving the product 12 (as illustrated in the third bullet-point below). A score of 9 cannot represent success at the spill-over level, because the only way of getting 9 are \(3 \times 1 \times 3\) and \(3 \times 3 \times 1\), both of which represent failure, because one of the scores is neither 2 nor 3. Additionally a score of 8 at the spill-over level is postulated to be failure, because we assert the necessity to have one of the secondary learning capacities as well as both
primary learning capabilities, in order to produce the possibility of successful performance in respect of the third set of capabilities (transition from Parliament to Legislature).

All of which is to say, that successful performance permitting transition to the next phase is possible:

- in the transition from phase 1 to phase 2 only with a score of 3 \(= (2+1)\);  
- in the transition from phase 2 to phase 3 only with a score of 6 \(= (2+1) \times (2+0)\) or 9 \(= (2+1) \times (2+1)\);  
- in the transition from phase 3 to phase 4 only with a score of 12 \(= (2+1) \times (2+0) \times (2+0)\), 18 \(= (2+1) \times (2+1) \times (2+0)\) or \((2+1) \times (2+0) \times (2+1)\), or 27 \(= (2+1) \times (2+1) \times (2+1)\).

For convenience, the mapping of the products given in Table 4 is expressed by a lower-case Greek letter, in order to remind that this is an ordinal and not an interval measure. This way of proceeding also permits the “sequencing” of an IPI’s epigenetic development in a more abstract way. Institutional history may be expressed formally by a combination of symbols representing the evolution over time, with other notation interpolated to signify how much time has passed. Such a formalized expression of an institutional history might allow easier comparison among IPIs at a slightly more abstract level that is nevertheless not too abstruse. Editorial constraints of length prevent this method, which is exploratory anyway, from being applied here to the BA, also lest it be supposed to be definitive.

Table 4: Coding Scheme for Success or Failure in Epigenetic Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initiation</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takeoff</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spill-over</td>
<td>0 or 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 or 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RESULT**  
F A I L U R E  
S U C C E S S

**ORDINAL CODE**  
\(\eta\) \(\zeta\) \(\varepsilon\) \(\delta\) \(\gamma\) \(\beta\) \(\alpha\)

The following, concluding remarks are nevertheless possible. In evaluating the development of an IPI, account must be taken of the fact of its having reached a certain phase of evolution through its own history, because its further possibilities depend upon the accretion of experience to that time. (The influence of successive accretions of experience upon future possibility is what differentiates “epigenesis” from mere “genesis.”) Where do the challenges come from? They may come from an internal developmental dynamic internal to the institution and/or from incoming demands imposed by the international environment. In this conception, the international system is nothing but the ecological carrier of innovations necessary for IPI survival that constrain how the IPI might respond to the other demands upon it.

Analysis of the existence of historical IPIs (prior to 1991, for example) might take also into account a differentiation among international systems and particularly the constraints that they may place upon IPI evolution. It is natural to hypothesize that IPIs born under different international systems may exhibit different developmental syndromes, since different
international environments may impose different tasks upon them and their members. The
typical developmental syndromes of IPIs born since 1991 may well differ qualitatively from,
although being typologically congruent with, that of IPIs those were born before 1991.

It is natural to suppose, also, that demands upon IPIs by their members should differ
across international systems, because the degree of relative autonomy of regional international
systems varies with the overall structure of international politics. For example, in a densely
networked international environment, life may impose the obligation that an IPI begin
engaging in external relations before all of its internal functions are fully developed and
institutionalized. The BA would be an example of this phenomenon (Compare Navarro 2010;
Murzakulova 2012). If typical, it would suggest the counterintuitive conclusion that the nature
of world society and politics in the current era actually tends to limit the general extension of
powers and responsibilities of IPIs, even as their networked nature and greater connectedness
encourage more liberally their creation. Yet, it is also possible this was a feature only of the
post–Cold War transition, and the greater structural stability of the present international system
will lead to a reversion to the older syndrome by new IPIs. For this and many other reasons,
more theoretically driven comparative empirical research is to be desired.

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