SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN LITERARY INFRINGEMENT CASES: A CHART FOR TURBID WATERS

Robert F Helfing
INTRODUCTION

"We delve once again," wrote Ninth Circuit Judge Alex O. Kozinski in 2002, "into the turbid waters of the 'extrinsic test' for substantial similarity under the Copyright Act." Judge Kozinski had before him a claim of literary infringement, where the waters of substantial similarity are especially cloudy. A lawsuit asserting copyright infringement is a common sequel to the latest hit motion picture or television series, ending almost invariably with a pretrial ruling that the plaintiff failed to show substantial similarity as matter of law. It might be that no claims are dismissed with greater regularity than those asserting infringement of literary works: In the past 35 years, courts in the Ninth Circuit have allowed only three cases to avoid summary dismissal, none since 2002. How, then to explain the unending parade of cases asserting a type of claim that is essentially dead on arrival at the courthouse?

For the plaintiffs, the answer lies in “that obsessive conviction, so frequent among authors and composers, that all similarities between their works and any other which appear later must inevitably be ascribed to plagiarism.” For the attorneys who take their cases, only part of the answer lies in dreams of headlines and financial reward. The rest can be attributed to the sad fact that the law on the subject is confused and contradictory, lacking clear principles to help them evaluate the merit of the claims presented to them. The same messy precedent that prevents lawyer from effectively evaluating the claims brought to them empowers judges to resolve them as a matter of law. Judicial zeal in vaporizing the high percentage of groundless cases has caught up the few well-grounded ones as well. Without effective guidance, lawyers will continue to file frivolous cases, and judges will continue to dismiss valid ones.

In this article, we examine the history of the Ninth Circuit’s influential two-step test for substantial similarity, showing how a quirk in the evolution of the test has created a confused and ineffectual body of law on the subject, leading the courts to look for substantial similarity where it cannot be found. We also offer a rule to direct that inquiry. Finally, we argue that, in their assumption of the role of final arbiter of these claims, the courts have underestimated the complexity the question and given too much credit to their own unaided judgment. We focus upon the Ninth Circuit, not only because that jurisdiction encompasses the fictional geography that generates most of the claims in this

1 Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 2002).
2 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612, 613 (2d Cir. 1945).
area of law – Hollywood – but also because its confused precedent has been adopted by, or at least greatly influenced, all other jurisdictions on the issue.

II. THE PROBLEM: WHEN DOES COPYING BECOME INFRINGEMENT?

A copyright is the exclusive right to copy an artistic work; it is infringed when someone who does not possess that right copies the work protected by it. The proposition is clear in the utterance, but not often clear enough in the application. The confusion begins with the elusiveness of the definition of copying.

The issue would be simple if, in the dialect of copyright law, the verb, “copy,” meant what it means most everywhere else: to duplicate an original. But copyright infringement does not require literal duplication; the creation of something equivalent or even similar might do. With literary works, the vagueness of the issue is particularly acute because these consist of language, the most elastic of human creations. A literary work can be effectively reproduced without duplicating a single word of the original. Further, a finding of infringement does not require the “copying” of an entire work. The unauthorized reproduction of only a part of the work, or even of a single element, might be enough. On the other hand, one might duplicate a literary work – verbatim, and in its entirety – and not infringe.

If the defendant copies all, and the copying is verbatim, then to find infringement the courts need only determine that the copied work is entitled to protection. But if the copying is less than total, how much is needed? Even more perplexing, what sort of likeness is required if the copying is not verbatim? It is in addressing these questions that the courts have stumbled into uncertainty. They tell us that there must be similarity, and that the similarity must be substantial. What sort of similarity is substantial? Why, just this: likeness in protected content. Okay then, what is protected?

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3 “[A]n infringement is not confined to literal and exact repetition or reproduction; it includes also the various modes in which the matter of any work may be adopted, imitated, transferred, or reproduced, with more or less colorable alterations to disguise the piracy.” Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corporation, 162 F. 2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947) (quoting 18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property § 34, p. 217); Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977)(“Duplication or near identity is not necessary to establish infringement.”)

4 In this article, “literary works,” will be used to refer, not to all works falling within the term as specifically limited by 17 U.S.C. § 102(1), but, rather, more specifically to books, screenplays, plays, motion pictures, television programs, even videogames, in other words, works that are “based on the elements of theme, plot, characters, sequence of events, dialogue, mood, setting, and pace.” See, Gable v. National Broadcasting Company, 727 F.Supp.2d 815, 834 n. 14 (C.D Cal. 2010).

5 See Cavalier v. Random House, 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir.2002).
THE “ABSTRACTIONS TEST”

To be protected, an artistic work must be original in the sense that it was not copied from something else and that it is sufficiently creative. In evaluating creativity, the courts refer to a conceptual dichotomy: Ideas – in this context, usually described as “mere” ideas – are not protected, while the expression of ideas is protected. So, when there are similarities between works, how do we tell whether the similarity is in an idea, or in the expression of an idea? In 1930, Judge Learned Hand wrote:

Upon any work ... a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the [work] is about, and at times might consist of only its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended.

This language has been called “the abstractions test,” but it describes no test at all. Judge Hand showed us the path which leads from idea to expression, but proposed no means to identify when we reached the destination. Two decades later, he was equally unspecific in stating the converse, “[N]o one infringes unless he descends so far into what is concrete [in a work] as to invade . . . [its] expression.” A further decade on, he acknowledged the impossibility of specificity, stating:

The test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague. . . . Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the “idea,” and has borrowed its “expression.” Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.

In five decades since Judge Hand threw up his hands and consigned the issue to the realm of ad hoc, no court has attempted to define the point at which idea becomes expression. In 1977, however, the Ninth Circuit established a framework to analyze the question.

THE KROFFT TEST OF SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY

The history of literary infringement in the Ninth Circuit effectively began in 1977. In Sid and Marty Krofft v. McDonald’s, the producers of “H. R. Pufnstuff” sued the McDonald’s restaurant chain for infringement, claiming that the anthropomorphic hamburgers and other features of its “McDonaldland” television commercials were copied from their animated fantasy program. In reviewing the judgment against

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8 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.1930).
10 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
11 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
defendant McDonald’s, the Ninth Circuit established an analytic framework for evaluating substantial similarity.

The court began by stating the traditional dual elements of infringement: ownership of copyright by the plaintiff and copying by the defendant.\textsuperscript{12} It said that the second element, copying, could be established by proof of the defendant’s access to the copyrighted work and substantial similarity between that work and the defendant’s work.\textsuperscript{13} In examining prior cases, the Ninth Circuit found that the courts had stated those principles as mere “boilerplate” to their opinions.\textsuperscript{14} Literally applied, proof of mere access and substantial similarity would produce “untenable results.”\textsuperscript{15} As an example, the court noted that the owner of the copyright in a cheap plaster statue of a nude could readily establish infringement against subsequent manufacturers who had access to it “since most statues of nudes would in probability be substantially similar to the cheaply manufactured plaster one.”\textsuperscript{16} “A limiting principle,” stated the Court, “is needed.”\textsuperscript{17} The court found that limiting principle in the “classic distinction between an ‘idea’ and the ‘expression’ of that idea.”\textsuperscript{18} The purpose of this distinction is to reward individual creativity and cultural growth without diminishing the collective right to exploit their source – the world of ideas. The “real task” in copyright litigation, therefore, is to determine whether the defendant copied the copyrighted work’s expression of an idea, or just the idea itself.\textsuperscript{19}

To accomplish that purpose, the \textit{Krofft} court prescribed a two-step test. First, the copyright owner must prove substantial similarity in the ideas of the respective works. The \textit{Krofft} court dubbed this initial step the “extrinsic test.” The test is extrinsic, said the court, “because it depends not on the responses of the trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed.” Due to the nature of the test, it was appropriate for courts to dissect the works and to consider expert testimony on the issue.\textsuperscript{20} The court stated that the determination was often a simple one and, because it was factual, “may often be decided as a matter of law.”\textsuperscript{21}

If there is no protection for ideas, why test their similarity at all? The \textit{Krofft} court explained the purpose for its extrinsic test directly and in detail: Substantial similarity between the ideas of the works showed that the defendant had “copied” the plaintiff’s work in the broad, literal sense of the word – that is, that the defendant created the infringing work, at least in part, by duplicating the plaintiff’s copyrighted work.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} 562 F.2d at 1162.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{15} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} 562 F.2d at 1162-1163.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} \textit{Id.}, at 1163.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{19} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} 562 F.2d at 1164.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{22} 562 F.2d at 1164-1165 (\textit{citing Arnstein v. Porter}, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946)).
\end{itemize}
Proof of literal copying, however, was only a threshold requirement. To establish infringement, “there must be substantial similarity not only of general ideas but of the expressions of those ideas as well” -- there must, in other words, be substantial similarity of protected content. For that determination, the court prescribed an “intrinsic test.” This second step was to be a subjective determination of whether the defendant had “captured the total concept and feel” of the plaintiff’s work, determined by the “response of the ordinary reasonable person.” Because similarity of expression is “more subtle and complex” than similarity of ideas, this second part of the test is for the trier of fact to decide. The court stated that intrinsic similarity presents “an issue of fact which a jury is peculiarly fitted to determine.” It also noted that “analytic dissection and expert testimony are not appropriate” to the determination of protected similarity by this intrinsic test.

In Krofft, there was no need to consider similarity of ideas under the extrinsic test because defendant McDonald’s conceded that it had copied the idea of the H. R. Pufnstuf series. McDonald’s argued, however, that it did not copy protected expression. It attempted to support its position by dissecting the copyrighted series into its constituent parts – specifically, the characters, setting and plot of its commercials – and by attempting to demonstrate that the corresponding parts of its television commercials were not similar. The Ninth Circuit rejected that approach, stating that it was improper to apply an extrinsic test to determine whether the defendant had copied protected expression of the plaintiff’s work. The court affirmed the finding of infringement, deferring to the jury’s determination that the defendant had copied protected content. As stated by the court, “The more vague the test, the less inclined we are to intervene” with the jury’s determination of this exceedingly vague test.

The purposes and methods of the two-step Krofft test, painstakingly described and explained by the Ninth Circuit, would shortly be turned on their collective head.

**THE KROF FFT TEST IGNORED, MISAPPLIED AND TRANSFORMED**

**A District Court Shall Lead Them . . .**

In the first ruling on a literary infringement case in the Ninth Circuit after Krofft, the plaintiff claimed that his three-page treatment was infringed by the television series,

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23 Id., at 1164.
24 Id.
25 Id., at 1164 and 1167.
26 Id., at 1164.
27 Id., 562 F.2d at 1165 (quoting Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 472-473 (2d Cir. 1946.).
28 Id.
29 562 F.2d at 1165.
30 Id.
The district court dismissed the claim on summary judgment, finding that the common element between the two works consisted of an unprotected element, “the idea of an ex-convict studying law while in prison.” In reaching its decision, the court followed pre-

Krofft precedent in which district courts in the Ninth and Second Circuits had dismissed claims based upon the finding that the similarities between the works were limited to ideas. That conclusion directly contradicted the binding precedent of Krofft, under which similarity of ideas was precisely what the plaintiff needed to prove in order to avoid summary judgment under the extrinsic test; whether there was similarity in protected content was to be left to the subjective inquiry of the jury. The Miller court also dissected the parties’ works and analyzed whether there was similarity in protected elements, a method that Krofft had specifically rejected. The opinion makes no reference to Krofft.

The next district court to consider a literary infringement claim acknowledged Krofft but dismissed the case with an analysis no less contradictory than the one applied by the Miller court that had ignored it.

At issue in Jason v. Fonda, was a claim that the motion picture, Coming Home, infringed the copyright in a book written by the plaintiff. Both of the parties’ works dealt with “subjects such as morality and the effects of war on women, injured veterans and soldiers.” The court carefully set forth the essential attributes of the Krofft two-step test, quoting liberally from Krofft opinion, then it deviated from them. It acknowledged that the determination of substantial similarity involved a two-step inquiry, each fundamentally different in its purpose. Then it analyzed the issue in a single passage without differentiating the two tests. It expressly recognized that the extrinsic test looked for similarity in ideas and not in protected expression. Then it found that the plaintiff had failed to meet the test because the similarities consisted only of ideas and “other unprotectable characteristics.” It stated that the intrinsic test was applied, not by analysis of specific objective criteria, but by the subjective response of the ordinary reasonable person. Then it dissected the works to find that the plaintiff failed to meet the test. Finally, it stated that the intrinsic test was “uniquely suited for determination by the trier of fact.” Then it ruled upon the issue as a matter of law.

In only one published opinion would a district court ever apply the Krofft test as the Krofft court had prescribed. As to the Ninth Circuit, the approach of in Jason v.

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35 Id., at 777.
36 526 F.Supp. at 777.
37 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling without analysis. 698 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1982).
38 In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures International, Inc., 543 F.Supp. 1134 (C.D.Cal. 1982), the court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of the producers of the blockbuster movie, Jaws, against an alleged knock-off called Great White. The court found that the extrinsic test was satisfied by the parties’ stipulation that the underlying ideas of the two movies was the same: “a terror fish attacking a coastal town on the Atlantic seaboard.” Id., at 1140.
Fonda, fundamentally different from Krofft in almost every respect, would be adopted almost instantly.

B. . . . And the Ninth Circuit Shall Follow.

The Ninth Circuit was true to the spirit of Krofft in only one case, though a reading of the elliptic opinion leaves it uncertain whether even that case strictly applied its precepts. In Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc.39, the court reversed a summary judgment against the plaintiff, who claimed that defendant’s outer space television series, Battlestar Gallactica, had infringed its copyright in Star Wars. With passing mention to Krofft and no analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that reasonable minds could differ on whether 34 cited similarities between the works were “substantially similar in either idea or expression,” and left the issue to the jury.40 The court added unhelpfully that summary judgment was appropriate only where the parties’ works were “so dissimilar that a claim of infringement is without merit.”41

In its decisions published after the Star Wars case, the Ninth Circuit would invariably cite Krofft and correctly describe the Krofft court’s conception of the extrinsic and intrinsic tests. But it would apply the Jason v. Fonda court’s contradictory approach. Under that framework, seven years would pass before the Ninth Circuit allowed another literary infringement claim to escape summary judgment.

In Litchfield v. Spielberg42, for instance, the plaintiff claimed that the motion picture, E.T.—The Extra-Terrestrial, infringed her copyright in Lokey from Maldemar, a one-act “musical play” that also involved the stranding of an alien or two on a visit to earth. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to defendants, finding that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the extrinsic test because “[a]ny similarities in plot exist only at the general level for which plaintiff cannot claim copyright protection.”43 “Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,” the court found similarities in what “may be more than stock scenes.”44 Nonetheless, it found that there was no “substantial similarity” in the specific criteria examined as part of the extrinsic test. It did not elaborate upon this broad conclusion except in stating that the similarities of plot “exist only at the general level for which plaintiff cannot claim copyright protection,” citing Jason v. Fonda for authority.45 The court followed Jason (though it did not cite it) in ruling that the plaintiff had also failed to satisfy the intrinsic test as a matter of law, finding that “[t]he concept and feel of the works here are completely different.”46 Passing unmentioned was the fact that, under the Krofft formulation of the two-step test, the court did not rule upon the protectability of similarities under the extrinsic test, and

39 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983)
40 Id., at 1329.
41 715 F.2d at 1330.
42 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984)
43 Id., at 1356-1357.
44 Id., at 1356.
45 Id., at 1357.
46 Id.
did not apply the intrinsic test at all. The opinion, however, repeatedly cites *Krofft* and makes no suggestion that it is applying an inconsistent analysis.

The deviation from *Krofft* test was still unacknowledged, but even more apparent, in *Berkic v. Crichton*.47 Again purporting to follow the *Krofft* formulation, the court found similarities in “general plot ideas,” but held that the plaintiff failed to meet the test as a matter of law because “[g]eneral plot ideas are not protected by copyright law . . ..”48 The court punctuated its inconsistency with the *Krofft* formulation by criticizing the plaintiff’s attorney for arguing that the extrinsic test was satisfied by the similarity of ideas and scenes à faire, the very function of the test espoused in *Krofft*.49

In the two literary infringement decisions following *Litchfield* and *Berkic*, the Ninth Circuit continued to characterize the extrinsic test as a test of substantial similarity of ideas, but dismissed literary infringement claims because the plaintiffs had failed to show similarity in protected content, or, in the code used by the court, the “concrete elements” of the works.50 It was only in the next case that the Ninth Circuit recognized – and notified the rest of us – that it had long since departed from *Krofft*.

**THE CHANGE ACKNOWLEDGED**

In *Shaw v. Lindheim*51, the court abandoned any pretense of consistency with *Krofft*. It specifically acknowledged that the extrinsic test being applied by the courts was not the one it had originally prescribed, stating, “Now that it includes virtually every element that may be considered concrete in a literary work, the extrinsic test as applied to books, scripts, plays, and motion pictures can no longer be seen as a test for mere similarity of ideas.”52 Instead, said the court, the extrinsic and intrinsic tests “are more sensibly described as objective and subjective analyses of expression, having strayed from *Krofft*’s division between expression and ideas.”53

The *Shaw* court’s explanation for the deviation from *Krofft* was unsatisfying. The court stated, “Now that it includes virtually every element that may be considered concrete in a literary work, the extrinsic test as applied to books, scripts, plays, and motion pictures can no longer be seen as a test for mere similarity of ideas.”54 *Krofft*, however, had expressly called for the examination of such elements – or, as the *Krofft*

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47 761 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1985).
48 *Id.*, at 1293.
49 *Id.*, at 1293-1294.
50 *Olson v. National Broadcasting Company, Inc.*, 855 F.2d at 1446, 1450 (9th Cir. 1988); *Narell v. Freeman*, 872 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1989).
51 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990)
52 *Id.*, at 1357.
53 *Id.* (emphasis in original). The court’s language suggests that the deviation from the *Krofft* framework is particular to analyses of literary works. In this context, however, there is no reason to distinguish literary works from other works of art. Indeed, in developing its analysis, the *Shaw* court found it necessary to harmonize its ruling with earlier cases involving plush animals and videogames. *Id.*, at 1359-1360.
54 *Id.*
court had called them, “specific criteria” – as the method for applying its own version extrinsic test.\footnote{55 562 F.2d at 1164.} Indeed, in identifying plot, theme, dialogue and other components as the concrete elements to be examined, the court in Jason v. Fonda had relied upon that language of the Krofft opinion.\footnote{56 Jason, 526 F.Supp. at 777 (quoting Krofft’s call for the examination of “specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed”).} There is no question, however, that the test needed to be changed.

An inquiry limited solely to similarity of unprotected content – the function of the extrinsic test as conceived by Krofft – was unnecessary, as demonstrated by the fact that the courts’ failure to apply it had not raised even a ripple of attention. It is essential to a finding of copyright infringement, however, that the defendant copied protected content. Under the two-step test of Krofft, that finding was to be made through the intrinsic test, based upon the subjective impression of a jury. In applying their subjective impressions, however, jurors do not distinguish between protected and unprotected matter. Krofft’s two-step process, therefore, allowed for a finding of infringement even where the defendant had copied nothing but ideas and other unprotectable matter.\footnote{57 See Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1446, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988), where the court stated that, even if a reasonable jury were to find substantial similarity in total concept and feel, there is no infringement “where analytic dissection demonstrates that all similarities in expression arise from the use of common ideas.” (Quoting Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987).)} To avoid that untenable result, a threshold evaluation was needed to assure that the jury is responding at least in part to works that are substantially similar in protected content. That assurance is provided by an extrinsic test that dissects and analyzes the points of similarity.

Whether or not the courts were initially aware that they were applying a different extrinsic test at all, the change wrought by Jason v. Fonda was necessary to correct a serious flaw in Krofft’s two-step framework. The courts’ failure to acknowledge that change, however, created an evolutionary quirk that would install judges as the ultimate arbiters of substantial similarity. Their method of applying the test has led to the almost unvarying dismissal of literary infringement claims.

LOOKING FOR PROTECTED SIMILARITY IN THE WRONG PLACES

The Krofft court expressed its expectation that judges would play a primary role in resolving the extrinsic test by stating that the test “may often be decided as a matter of law.” In that opinion, however, the court was referring to an extrinsic test that addressed only whether there was substantial similarity in unprotected content. As we have seen, the test was almost never applied to that humble purpose but rather has been used by the courts to resolve the more “subtle and complex” issue of whether the works were substantially similar in protected content. Because, however, the transformation of the test was not initially acknowledged, the courts continued to apply the transformed test under the principles prescribed by Krofft for the original. Most notably, they continued to rely upon Krofft for authority to rule upon substantial similarity in protected content as a
matter of law. The result has been a line of cases notable for the consistency of their results.

In evaluating substantial similarity under the extrinsic test, the courts are enjoined to consider only “protectable elements, standing alone.” They must “filter out and disregard the non-protectable elements in making [the] substantial similarity determination.” As applied by most of the courts that have considered the issue, these guidelines leave no chance for a literary infringement claim to satisfy the extrinsic test. Whether described as “specific criteria,” “specific expressive elements,” “concrete elements,” or “objective details,” almost none of the components examined under the extrinsic test is, by itself, entitled to protection. There is no protection for a theme, a setting, a mood or a pace of a literary work. As to dialogue, protection exists only where it is sufficiently developed or distinctive. Essentially, substantial similarity can be found in dialogue only where the defendant has copied verbatim one or more extended passages.

Absent verbatim copying, character and plot are the only concrete elements that individually present even the potential for protection. As to literary characters, however, the courts tell us that they are “ordinarily” not protected; they say that protection applies only where the bundle of personal attributes that comprise a character is “especially distinctive” or constitutes the “story being told.” In fact, even those stringent conditions do not fully describe the difficulty of securing character protection: As a practical matter, protection is given only where a character is not only highly developed

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59 Cavalier v. Random House, 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir.2002)(quoting Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 589 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003)(“a party claiming infringement may place ‘no reliance upon any similarity in expression resulting from unprotectable elements’” (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir.1994)).

60 Cavalier v. Random House, 297 F.3d at 822-823.


62 37 C.F.R. §§ 202.1(a)(words and short phrases not subject to copyright); Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1959)(same); Wild v. NBC Universal, Inc., 788 F.Supp.2d 1083, 1106 (C.D.Cal. 2011)(ordinary words and phrases not protected); but see Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 989)(same as to “ordinary” phrases, but “original” phrase may be protected).

63 See Olson v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 855 F.2d 1446, 1450 (9th Cir. 1988).

64 Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003); Olson v. National Broadcasting Company, Inc., 855 F.2d at 1446, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988).
and distinctive, but is also the central feature of an extended series of literary works.\textsuperscript{65} Even then, protection may be denied.\textsuperscript{66}

Regarding plot, no Ninth Circuit court applying the extrinsic test has found substantial similarity in this element, though it is here that protection would most likely be found. In this context, plot means more than the general idea of the work: There is no protection for boy-meets-girl, or big-ape-from-forbidden-island-comes-to-New York-and-gets-shot-off-skyscraper-by-biplanes. These are “mere plot ideas,” and, as the courts often remind us, there is no protection for a plot idea.\textsuperscript{67} Protection for plot may be provided only to “the ‘sequence of events by which the author expresses his theme or idea’ in sufficiently concrete terms . . ..”\textsuperscript{68} In examining plot, however, the courts generally do not make a meaningful analysis of the “sequence of events.” Instead, they dissect plot into its own individual elements, then filter them out as unprotectable ideas or “scenes à faire” – that is, stock scenes (or characters) that “flow naturally” from the premise of the work.\textsuperscript{69} This process of reduction leaves nothing to satisfy the extrinsic test. Where courts carve down works to the molecules, they are looking for protected similarity where it does not exist. “Lest ‘every song [be] merely a collection of basic notes, every painting a derivative work of color and stroke, and every novel merely an unprotected jumble of words,’ a court cannot assess the originality of a work solely from the originality of the individual component parts.”\textsuperscript{70}

If protected similarity is not to be located in the individual components of a literary work, what, then, is the appropriate object of inquiry of the extrinsic test? The answer was provided at the very beginning of the substantial similarity saga.

**PROTECTION IN THE UNPROTECTED**

In *Krofft*, the Ninth Circuit rejected the use of analytic dissection in determining the existence of protected similarity. The Court explained:

Lest we fall prey to defendants’ invitation to dissect the works, however, we should remember that it is the combination of many different elements which may command copyright protection because of its particular


\textsuperscript{66} See Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 1954)(Sam Spade).


\textsuperscript{68} Zella v. E.W. Scripps Co., 529 F.Supp.2d 1124, 1135 (C.D.Cal. 2007).

\textsuperscript{69} See, e.g., Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985); Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 824 (9th Cir., 2002).

\textsuperscript{70} Diamond Direct, LLC v. Star Diamond Group, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 525, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)(quoting Yurman Design, Inc., v. PAJ, Inc., 93 F.Supp.2d 449, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. 1995)(“if we took this argument to its logical conclusion, we might have to decide that there can be no originality in painting, because all colors of paint have been used somewhere in the past”).
subjective quality. [Citations.] “While any one similarity taken by itself seems trivial, I cannot say at this time that it would be improper for a jury to find that the over-all impact and effect indicate substantial appropriation.”71

This critical principle was promptly disregarded, the extrinsic test was transformed and Ninth Circuit courts proceeded to dissect literary works, looking for protected similarity in their elemental units, as we have described. For more than 12 years following *Krofft*, the Ninth Circuit applied that method in every case but one, *Star Wars* case. It is no coincidence that *Star Wars* was also the only case during that period in which the court reversed the summary judgment of a literary infringement claim. The court did not disclose the method that it did apply, stating only that reasonable minds could differ upon whether there was substantial similarity in a list of 34 similarities cited by the plaintiff. It is certain, however, that if it had examined each of them for individual protectability, the summary judgment issued to the defendant would have been affirmed.72 It should not surprise, therefore, that in the next case to withstand Ninth Circuit review, the court found a genuine issue of substantial similarity, not in any individual element, but in a combination of elements.

The case was *Shaw v. Lindheim*, the same case in which the Ninth Circuit finally came to acknowledge the transformed nature of the extrinsic test. In reversing summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit found that that, although none of the similar plot elements in the works at issue was “remarkably unusual in and of itself, the fact that both scripts contain all of these similar events gives rise to a triable question of substantial similarity of protected expression.”73 Quoting a treatise and a fifty-year-old Second Circuit case, the court stated, “Where plot is . . . properly defined as the sequence of events by which the author expresses his ‘theme’ or ‘idea,’ it constitutes a pattern which is sufficiently concrete so as to warrant a finding of substantial similarity if it is common to both plaintiff’s and defendant’s works.”74

One year later, the Supreme Court recognized the principle in more definitive language. In *Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc.*75, the Court stated that copyright protection applied to an original “selection and arrangement” of the decidedly unprotectable individual elements of a telephone directory. The Ninth Circuit adopted the *Feist* language, first applying the principle in a case involving the alleged infringement of a computer display.76 By the year 2000, the *Feist* principle as so entrenched that, without even citing *Feist* or any case applying its language, the Ninth Circuit declined to reverse a jury’s determination of musical infringement because it was “well settled that a jury may find a combination of unprotectible elements to be

72 See 715 F.2d at 1329.
73 919 F.2d at 1363.
74 Id. (internal quotes omitted)(quoting M. Nimmer, *Nimmer on Copyright* § 1303[A], at 13-31 (1989) and *Shipman v. RKO Pictures, Inc.*, 100 F.2d 533, 537 (2d Cir. 1938).
76 *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994).
protectible under the extrinsic test . . .” 77 The Ninth Circuit, however, did not apply the
principle in the only two literary infringement cases presented to it in the twelve years
following Feist. 78 The omission was particularly conspicuous in the second of those
cases, where the court expressly considered “selection and arrangement” of similar
elements in analyzing whether the defendant had infringed the graphic content of the
plaintiff’s work, but not in analyzing the literary content. 79

Then came Metcalf v. Bochco.

THE COURT GETS IT RIGHT

In Metcalf v. Bochco, 80 a novice husband-and-wife screenwriting writing team
asserted that renowned television producer/writer Steven Bochco had infringed their
scripts with his short-lived television series, City of Angels. The district court dismissed
their claim for lack of substantial similarity, but now, for only the third time since the
adoption of the two-part test in 1977, the Ninth Circuit reversed.

On the appeal, the Metcalfs relied upon similarities in setting (an overburdened
county hospital in Los Angeles with a mostly black staff), characters (a young, handsome
black surgeon, raised in the hospital community, and romantically involved with a
thirtyish, formerly married, childless, career-oriented hospital administrator), theme (the
surgeon’s struggle between emotional rewards of a county hospital position instead of a
more lucrative private practice) and plot (a pivotal kiss; an equally consequential incident
of seeming infidelity between the surgeon and his former love interest, witnessed by the
current one; a challenge to the hospital’s accreditation by a Hispanic politician). The
court acknowledged that none of these similarities was protectable “when considered
individually.” They were “either too generic or constitute ‘scenes à faire’. ” The court
nonetheless found a genuine issue of substantial similarity, stating that “the presence of
so many generic similarities and the common patterns in which they arise do help the
Metcalfs satisfy the extrinsic test.” It noted that an original selection and arrangement of
elements may itself be protectable, even where protection did not exist for any of those
elements individually. 81 In justifying its ruling, the court quoted the Shaw v. Lindheim
(twice) in its finding that “the totality of the similarities . . . goes beyond the necessities
of the . . . theme and belies any claim of literary accident.” 82

One might argue with the court’s conclusion that the combination of unprotected
similarities cited in Metcalf v. Bochco was potentially entitled to protection, but one
cannot find fault with its method. Here was an extrinsic test based upon Feist, consonant
with Krofft and illuminated by Shaw. In this unanticipated opinion, the court avoided the

77 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).
78 Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 1994); Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 824 (9th Cir. 2002).
79 Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 825-826.
80 294 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2002).
81 Id., at 294 F.3d at 1074.
82 Id.
befuddlement caused by tortuous precedent, applying unassailable copyright principles in inquiring past the point where almost all previous opinions had stopped their inquiry. Metcalf v. Bochco signaled a sea change in the evaluation of literary infringement claims, offering a holistic approach, properly directed to artistic structure instead of the individual components of structure.

The case was promptly swept under the rug.

THE NEGATION OF METCALF v. BOCHCO

Since Metcalf v. Bochco, courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied the extrinsic test to literary infringement claims in nearly thirty cases. In every one, at each level, the courts have found that the plaintiff failed to meet the test as a matter of law. In the opinions supporting these dismissals, the Metcalf decision has been mischaracterized, distinguished or simply ignored.

In Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co., the first such case considered by the Ninth Circuit, the court distinguished Metcalf in its finding that the result in that case had depended upon application of the “inverse-ratio rule.” The Metcalf opinion does not support that reading. Under the inverse-ratio rule, the degree of similarity required to establish infringement stands in inverse proportion to the degree of access shown – the more access shown, the less similarity required. In Metcalf, the court did state that the

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85 See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990).
plaintiff’s case was “strengthened considerably” by Bochco’s concession of access. The court did not suggest, however, that its reversal of summary judgment depended upon any such concession, let alone that the applicability of the selection and arrangement rule required it. To the contrary, by that point in the opinion, the court had already found that the “totality” of the similarities confirmed that they were attributable to copying and that their “cumulative weight” allowed the Metcalfs to survive summary judgment. The court’s comment that the plaintiffs’ case was strengthened by Bochco’s concession of access appears as an afterthought, representing the court’s reflection on how the trier of fact might ultimately decide the ultimate issue of substantial similarity after remand to the district court. If an original selection and arrangement of unprotected elements is entitled to protection at all, no reason appears that a defendant must satisfy the element of access with anything more than sufficient evidence to prove infringement.

The *Rice* court did not rely solely upon the inverse-ratio rule in distinguishing *Metcalf v. Bochco*. It also noted that the works at issue did not present “the same pattern of generic similarities as in *Metcalf*.” The court, however, did not explain what pattern that might be. In two subsequent unpublished decisions, the Ninth Circuit again attributed a sort of self-evident significance to the similarities recited in *Metcalf*, eliminating any need for meaningful analysis to support the conclusion that the unprotected similarities in the works before them did not attain that level. A few have added the comment that the similarities did not constitute a protectable selection and arrangement because they were “random.” There was, however, no want of significant similarities between the works at issue in the next published Ninth Circuit opinion to analyze a literary infringement claim, and they were anything but random.

The plaintiff in *Funky Films v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.* was another industry outsider who claimed that her screenplay, *The Funk Parlor*, was infringed by the acclaimed television series, *Six Feet Under*. The similarities cited by the court were extensive. Both works centered upon a small funeral home and the lives of the family

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87 330 F.3d at 1179. In moving for summary judgment, Bochco and the other defendants had not, in fact, conceded access; they merely stated that they were not disputing it for purposes of their motion.
88 294 F.2d at 1074.
89 *Id.*, at 1075.
90 Cases applying the selection and arrangement rule in non-literary infringement claims have not referred to any such requirement. See, e.g., *Satava v. Lowry*, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003)(sculpture); *Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting Fixture Co.*, 345 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2003)(sculpture); *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994)(computer graphical user interface).
91 330 F.3d at 1179.
94 462 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2006).
members who operated it. Both were set in motion by the sudden death of the father, who had run the funeral home for decades. In both works, the older son, decidedly heterosexual, has long ago moved out-of-town and maintained no involvement in the family business, while the younger son, homosexual, has remained behind to assist his father in running it. After the father’s death, the two sons inherit the business, which is deeply in debt and operating from a deteriorating facility with obsolete equipment, including a malfunctioning hearse. Initially, the older brother wants no part of the business and announces his intention to sell it. He changes his mind, however, after the overbearing female head of a rival funeral home attempts to force the brothers to accept a low-ball offer to purchase, the first approach coming at the funeral of the father. The brothers manage to fend off the competitor and keep the business afloat, in part, by the unconventional methods of the older brother.95

Describing these similarities as merely “apparent,” the Court stated that there were few “real similarities.”96 In the analysis that followed, however, the court did not deny the actual presence of the cited similarities. Moreover, the similarities involved elements of setting, plot, sequence of events, character, theme that formed a “selection and arrangement” at least as cohesive and structurally related as those of Metcalf. Further, in their “totality,” these similarities went “beyond the necessities of defendant’s theme” no less than did those in Metcalf, and no less “belied any claim of literary accident.” The court, however, never addressed the protectability of the similarities in combination, despite the plaintiffs’ reliance upon the Metcalf principle as the cornerstone of their appeal. The published opinion in Funky Films cites Metcalf, but only in support of the court’s reference to an unrelated rule and in rejecting the plaintiffs’ invocation of the inverse-ratio rule.97

The next Ninth Circuit case to apply the extrinsic test to a literary infringement claim did not refer to Metcalf at all, let alone address the selection and arrangement principle.98 Following the example set by the Ninth Circuit, approximately half of the district courts applying the extrinsic test have cited Metcalf only for principles other than selection and arrangement, or have ignored it altogether.99 No case following Metcalf has found protection in the selection and arrangement of unprotectable similarities. The courts have resumed the virtually automatic rejection of literary infringement claims

95 See 462 F.3d at 1075-1078.
96 462 F.3d at 1078 (emphasis added).
97 Id., at pp. 1077 and 1081 n. 4.
under extrinsic test scrutiny, in part, by doggedly dissecting works to reach the continually renewing epiphany that the similarities are not individually entitled to protection. Increasingly, the courts have come to justify their dismissals with an additional rationale having no place in the extrinsic test analysis.

**DIFFERENCES**

In *Funky Films*, the court made the obligatory finding that the individual similarities were unprotected. Its conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the extrinsic test, however, was primarily attributable to something else. After reciting at length the similarities between the works, the court stated that, “at first blush,” they appeared significant, but “an actual reading of the two works reveals greater, more significant differences . . ..” Most of its discussion was devoted to describing those differences. Unmistakably, it was the court’s perception of the differences between the works that compelled its conclusion that there was no substantial similarity. Usually supported by reference to *Funky Films*, subsequent courts have adopted that rationale in dismissing literary infringement claims. That analysis is a fundamental misapplication of copyright law.

With literary infringement claims, it is often the case that the defendant has developed the accused work far beyond the allegedly copied portion. As a result, there will necessarily be numerous differences between the works at issue. Just as unprotected similarities are filtered out of the extrinsic test analysis, however, so should it be with differences. The role of the extrinsic test is solely to determine whether there is substantial similarity in protected content; where it exists, the test is satisfied, irrespective of the number or relative weight of differences. As noted by the Second Circuit, “No plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate.”

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100 462 F.3d at 1081.
101 *Id.*, at 1078.
102 *Id.*, at 1078-1081.
104 In *Metcalf v. Bochco*, the plaintiffs claimed that the copyrights in their film treatment and two screenplays were infringed by the defendants’ television series consisting of 21 hour-long episodes. In *Funky Films*, the plaintiffs asserted that their single screenplay was infringed by a 61-episode series.
105 *Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.*, 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936); see also, 4 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, *Nimmer on Copyright*, § 13.03[B][1][a] at p. 13-67-13-68(“It is entirely immaterial that, in many respects, plaintiff’s and defendant’s works are dissimilar, if in other respects, similarity as to a substantial element of plaintiff’s work can be shown.”; see also *Bethea v. Burnett*, 2005 WL 1720631 (C.D.Cal. 2005)
Thus if, for instance, the defendant copied verbatim a chapter of plaintiff’s 40-chapter book, it would not matter that the other 39 chapters show no similarity at all, or that the similarities of that single chapter are “outweighed” by the differences of the others, either in number or significance: The only question necessary to address in this scenario is whether the copied chapter is entitled to protection; if it is, then the extrinsic test is satisfied. Differences are relevant only where the plaintiff mischaracterizes elements of the works to create an illusion of similarity; in that circumstance, an objective analysis should point out the differences in those elements to demonstrate that the claimed similarity is not similarity at all. In themselves, however, differences between the works are irrelevant to the extrinsic test.

Differences do play a role in the *intrinsic* test, probably a determinative one. If differences overwhelm the impression of copying created by protected similarity, then the infringement claim will fail at the second step of the substantial similarity analysis because the defendant’s work has not “captured the total concept and feel” of the copyrighted work. Indeed, the courts’ current emphasis upon differences appears to be the legacy of early decisions in which they mistakenly ruled upon the intrinsic test as a matter of law. It was, once again, the *Shaw v. Lindheim* court that pointed out that the courts had taken a detour, reminding us that, because intrinsic similarity was measured by the response of the ordinary reasonable person, the test was not to be decided as a matter of law but “must be left to the trier of fact.” Later courts accepted that correction, leaving the intrinsic test to the jury. The courts should likewise have left behind consideration of differences as relevant only to that test. Again, however, due to confusion caused by the insufficiently examined deviation from the original *Krofft* framework, the courts adopted the analysis of differences as part of the extrinsic test.

A meaningful extrinsic test to determine substantial similarity of protected content in literary infringement cases does not consider differences. It identifies and examines individual elements of similarity, but not simply to produce the finding that they are individually unprotectable. Rather, if none of the customarily examined elements of similarity is entitled to protection, as is almost invariably the case, then it evaluates whether the selection and arrangement of those elements is itself a protectable element.

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*11 n. 10 (“The court recognizes that it cannot rely on an analysis or comparison of the dissimilarities between the two works in reaching its conclusion with respect to the extrinsic test”).

106 *See, Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corporation*, 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980)(“As a matter of logic as well as law, the more numerous the differences between two works, the less likely it is that they will create the same aesthetic impact so that one will appear to have been appropriated from the other.”)

107 *See, e.g.*, *Litchfield v. Spielberg*, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984)(“The concept and feel of the works here are completely different”); *Berkic v. Crichton*, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985)(“Our own independent review of the works satisfies us that they are substantially dissimilar in ‘the mood evoked . . . as a whole . . .’”); *Narell v. Freeman*, 872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989)(“Because of the fundamental differences between the works and the insubstantial nature of the copied passages, no reasonable reader could conclude that the works are substantially similar.”); *Jason v. Fonda*, 526 F.Supp.774, 777 (C.D.Cal. 1981)(finding that works were “substantially dissimilar” was basis for finding against plaintiff on both tests).

108 919 F.2d at 1358, 1360-1361.

109 One court went so far off the mark as to analyze “total concept and feel” – the object of the intrinsic test – as an extrinsic test factor. *See Capcom Co., Ltd v. MKR Group, Inc.*, 2008 WL 4661479 (N.D.Cal.).
As to this last inquiry, a new standard is needed. As Judge Hand told us more than 50 years ago, any standard for determining protectability must of necessity be vague and decisions *ad hoc*. But to retrieve this active area of law from the muddle of its precedent, more specific guidance is needed.

**THE PROPOSED RULE**

The *Metcalf v. Bochco* court applied an appropriate analysis, but only hinted at a useful standard. The court stated:

The particular sequence in which an author strings a significant number of unprotectable elements can itself be a protectable element. Each note in a scale, for example, is not protectable, but a pattern of notes in a tune may earn copyright protection. A common 'pattern' [that] is sufficiently concrete . . . warrants a finding of substantial similarity."

In applying a similar analysis twelve years earlier, the *Shaw v. Lindheim* court also found protection for a pattern of similarities because it was "sufficiently concrete." In fact, the courts have often stated the requirement that similarities be "concrete," whatever form their analysis might take. But if the only requirement were that the similarities are "concrete" then the word must mean more than its definition conveys: One can readily conceive a list of shared elements that are specific, real and tangible but so loosely connected as to fall short of the barest requirements of creativity.

Perhaps the closest that the Ninth Circuit has come to articulating a useful standard was in *Satava v. Lowry*, a case involving sculptures. There, the Ninth Circuit stated that "a combination of unprotectable elements is eligible for copyright protection only if those elements are numerous enough and their selection and arrangement original enough that their combination constitutes an original work of authorship." As to the first factor, the *Metcalf* court, too, found the volume of similarities an important factor. An extensive list of similarities, however, can be strained out of virtually any two literary works, no matter how dissimilar they are overall. The number of potential similarities is limited only by the resolve of plaintiff’s counsel to find them. Indeed, in *Shaw v. Lindheim*, the court noted that defendants had provided "a list of similarities between

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10  294 F.3d at 1074.
11  919 F.2d at 1363.
12  See, e.g., *Krofft*, 562 F.2d at 1163; *Funky Films v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.*, 462 F.3d 1072, 1077, 1081 (9th Cir., 2006); *Berkie v. Crichton*, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985).
13  *Satava v. Lowry*, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003).
14  *Id.*, at 811 (citing *Metcalf*, 294 F.3d at 1074; *Apple Computer, Inc*, 35 F.3d at 1446, and *Feist*, 499 U.S. at 358, 111 S.Ct. 1282 ("[T]he principal focus should be on whether the selection, coordination, and arrangement are sufficiently original to merit protection.")
15  "The presence of so many generic similarities . . . help the Metcalfs satisfy the extrinsic test," 294 F.3d at 1074.
'The Wizard of Oz' and 'Star Wars' that is virtually as compelling as the [plaintiff's list]."\textsuperscript{116} What matters in the analysis, therefore, is not the number of similarities, but the number of meaningful similarities. In this context, the number of similarities is meaningful only if in combination they form a protectable selection arrangement. So, in addition to requiring that the similarities be numerous enough, the \textit{Satava} court properly required that they also be “original enough.” Originality, in turn, means that the work was not copied from something else and that it is sufficiently creative.\textsuperscript{117} As we have already discussed, the question of whether the plaintiff copied from another source is no longer directly addressed by the extrinsic test. Whether a similar selection and arrangement of unprotectable elements is sufficiently creative to warrant protection, however, lies at the heart of the test, and it is here that guidance is needed.

The courts have developed a clear standard for determining whether artistic works are sufficiently creative: “To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it might be.”\textsuperscript{118} That forgiving standard, however, is the one applied where courts consider the protectability of an artistic work as a basis for an infringement claim. In that context, the justification for setting the bar nearly at ground level was stated by Justice Holmes at the turn of the last century in reversing a lower court’s snub of circus posters as a subject worthy of copyright protection: “It would be a dangerous undertaking,” he wrote, “for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves judges of the worth of pictorial illustration outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”\textsuperscript{119}

It is not suggested that the mysteries of artistic creation warrant the same degree of deference in determining whether a list of similarities between works is entitled to protection under the extrinsic test. The adoption of a standard that grants protection to a selection and arrangement of similarities only one notch more expressive than a “mere” idea would dial the extrinsic test almost all the way back to the original \textit{Krofft} formulation. A higher degree of originality is required because the courts are not simply attempting to determine protectability, they are looking for similarity that is substantial enough to establish copying. Where the arrangement of shared elements barely registers on the scale of creativity, that finding is not justified.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{116} 919 F.3d at 1363.
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.}, 188 U.S. 239, 250, 23 S.Ct. 298, 47 L.Ed 460 (1903); see also \textit{Pivot Point International, Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc.}, 372 F.3d 913, 924 (7th Cir. 2004)(artistic analysis is “a function for which judicial office is hardly a qualifier”).
\textsuperscript{120} Indeed, the Second Circuit has stated that “[o]riginality in this context ‘means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.’ No matter how poor artistically the ‘author's addition, it is enough if it be his own.” \textit{Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts}, 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951)(omitting citations.) This humble standard has no value for the extrinsic test analysis, whose very purpose is to determine whether there has been copying.
What standard of creativity should apply? The most useful guidance is provided by the courts that have rejected “lists” of unprotected similarities as a basis to satisfy the extrinsic test. The Ninth Circuit addressed such a list in *Litchfield v. Spielberg*, dispensing it with the oft-quoted statement that the court is “particularly cautious where . . . the list emphasizes random similarities scattered throughout the works.”121 Since then, Ninth Circuit courts have routinely dismissed a list of individual similarities invariably proffered by plaintiffs to avoid summary judgment, stating that the list is random, or that it consists of “disconnected facts,” with no “concrete” or “common” pattern, or “qualitative significance.”122 The unstated but clearly implied corollary is that, where the list of similarities is not random or disconnected – where the similarities in the list are, in other words, related in a way essential to the work – they form a combination that is potentially entitled to protection. This is what the *Metcalf* court meant when it illustrated its rule by stating that, while the individual notes of a scale are not protectable, “a pattern of notes in a tune may earn copyright protection.” In the world of literary infringement, a cohesive, sufficiently delineated artistic structure is the equivalent of a tune.

Taking into account, then, what the courts have said, or failed to say, or failed to say clearly, the following rule is proposed for evaluating substantial similarity of nonverbatim copying under the extrinsic test:

> The extrinsic test is satisfied where a combination of unprotected elements shared by the works constitutes a cohesive artistic structure sufficiently delineated and distinct from those of other works of its type to warrant protection.

Why the focus upon structure? Because it is structure – that is, how the similar elements relate to each other – that stamps a list of similarities as something more than random. Where the combination of similarities forms an artistic framework, it is a defining element of the literary work, the very opposite of a random list. Such a creation is not a “mere idea,” it is the blueprint for the expression of an idea, protectable in its own right. It is a thing of genuine value, warranting protection not only due to theoretic principles of copyright law, but due to the realities of the literary marketplace.123

The proposed rule assures that the test focuses upon the only literary component where non-verbatim infringement may be found, in the selection and arrangement of

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121 *Litchfield v. Spielberg*, 736 F. 2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984).
123 For validation of that fact, it need only be observed that, in Hollywood, a project usually depends upon a successful pitch for its funding – a presentation describing the structure of the proposed work.
similar elements. It also addresses the concerns that have properly been raised by the courts. The requirement that the structure be sufficiently delineated and distinct from other works assures that protection will be given only where the combination is original to the claimed author, and that it will be withheld where it is too broad or insufficient in creativity or in the number of its parts. The requirement of cohesiveness eliminates any potential for protection of random similarities. The rule provides that, as more detailed similarities comprising an artistic structure are found in the defendant’s work, the closer the defendant’s work comes to substantial similarity.\textsuperscript{124} While absolute specificity is neither possible nor even desirable in a standard for an inquiry whose method is essentially subjective, it is specific about the object of the inquiry.

**THE COURTS SHOULD NOT GO IT ALONE**

Though often presented under its alias, the “objective test,” the extrinsic test is objective only in its method: It requires the trier of fact to dissect the works to identify similarity, while the intrinsic test calls only for an emotional response to the undifferentiated whole of the works. In determining whether the similarity is “substantial,” however, the extrinsic test is no less subjective than the intrinsic test.

Until now, Ninth Circuit courts have made little if any use of expert testimony in applying the extrinsic test. Two district courts have even referred to authority outside the Ninth Circuit that “have cast doubt on whether expert testimony regarding substantial similarity is ever helpful in a case involving the comparison of two literary works.”\textsuperscript{125} The rationale is that, unlike a patent involving technical devices or a copyright involving software or music, movies and television series “are targeted at a general audience and deal with subject matter readily understandable by any ordinary persons, including the Court.”\textsuperscript{126} The rejection of expert assistance should be reconsidered.

The courts’ rejection of expert assistance in this area has largely been justified. When plaintiffs have used experts at all, they have used them simply to identify similarities in the works. There is no need for that type of expert testimony. Similarities are objective facts and, as one court has stated, a list of similarities is something that the plaintiff can directly present to the court without an expert acting as intermediary.\textsuperscript{127} That same court suggested, however, that expert testimony would have been useful to

\textsuperscript{124} The proposed rule adopts language used in evaluating the protectability of characters. See, e.g., Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir., 2003)(characters must be “sufficiently delineated”).


\textsuperscript{127} Bernal v. Paradigm Talent and Literary Agency, 788 F.Supp.2d at 1063.
explain “why such alleged similarities are qualitatively important to the two works.”"128 Precisely. Movies and other literary works are not necessarily less complex or nuanced than, say, music, painting or sculpture, which themselves are often works of popular entertainment. Judges are no better qualified to evaluate the originality or the significance of similarities in a literary work than they are to write a play, edit an anthology of literary criticism or teach a film class. The proof is that few courts have gone further in their analyses than to simply identify similarities and differences. The few courts that have attempted to go further have not supplied any meaningful support for their conclusions.

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television129 typifies the superficial treatment generally given to the issue. In that case, the plaintiff claimed that his screenplay was infringed by the motion picture, Honey, I Shrunk The Kids. The court found that the “idea” of the works before it consisted of the shrinking of young children to miniscule size, and their struggle against resultant life-threatening dangers. To support its claim of substantial similarity, the plaintiff identified a list of similarities including “a lawnmower scene, a sprinkler scene, the presence of an attic, danger scenes, concerned parents and kids sleeping outside overnight.” In finding that the list failed to satisfy the extrinsic test, the court stated simply that the similarities were random.130 As may readily be seen, however, the similarities were by no means random. Each one related directly to the “idea” of the work, and in combination formed a cohesive selection and arrangement expressing that idea. If these were the only similarities between the works, the court might have been justified in rejecting them as insufficient in number and in creative distinction from other narratives involving imperiled children. The court’s language, however, reflected that these were not the only similarities, and there is no way to confirm that either of the grounds for rejection was justified.

Certainly, expert testimony is not always required to apply the test. Some works present an “artistic structure” requiring no great depth of analysis or specialized knowledge to divine, such as an instructional video for magic tricks131, or treatments for a reality show132 or a cooking show133. Even such a structurally humble work, however, may require expert testimony to explain how it differs from those that preceded it – to show, that is, how original it is.

It will be recalled that the Krofft court established its two-part test as a result of dissatisfaction with treatment given to the issue by prior courts, which it perceived as inserting principles of substantial similarity in their opinions as “boilerplate” to support their conclusions.134 That practice has continued, and will continue until the courts acknowledge that the issue is more complex and nuanced than they have been willing to concede.

128 Id.
129 16 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 1994).
130 Id., at 1045-1046.
131 Rice v. Fox Broadcasting Co., 330 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2003).
134 562 F.2d at 1162.