The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali

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THE INDONESIAN KILLINGS
1965 - 1966

Studies from Java and Bali

Edited by Robert Cribb
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OF 1965-1966

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Glossary

For terms marked with an asterisk (*), see also pp. xiv - xv.

aksi sepihak  direct, or unilateral action by the PKI or associated organizations to implement land reform legislation in the countryside

ARMED, Artillery Medan

Ansor  Muslim youth organization affiliated with the Nahdatul Ulama

bakul  small trader

bambu runcing  sharpened bamboo spear

BAMUNAS, Badan Musyawarah Nasional  consultative body of ethnic Indonesian businessmen

BAPERKI, Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia  Deliberative Association for Indonesian Citizenship, an Indonesian Chinese political organization considered close to the PKI

BKKS, Badan Koordinasi Komando Slaga  Coordinating Body for the Vigilance Command

BNI, Barisan Nelayan Indonesia  Indonesian Fishermen's Front, fishermen's organization affiliated to the PKI

BTI, Barisan Tani Indonesia  Indonesian Peasants' Front, peasant organization affiliated to the PKI
bupati*, 'regent', head of a kabupaten, the major administrative division between province and village

BUTERPRA, Bintara Urusan Territorial Pertahanan Rakyat

Territorial and Civil Defence Officer

camat*, head of a kecamatan

carik, clerk, village secretary

CDB, Comite Daerah Besar

regional committee (of the PKI)

Darul Islam

Lit. the Abode of Islam, radical Muslim movement which fought in many parts of Indonesia, especially West Java, between 1948 and the mid-1960s to establish an Islamic state

desa, village, a territorial administrative unit, not necessarily a physical cluster of houses

DETGGA, Detasemen Gerilya

guerrilla detachments (of the PKI)

Dewan Jenderal

Council of Generals, a group of army generals allegedly plotting a military coup before 30 September 1965

Dewan Revolusi

Revolutionary Council, steering body set up by the coup organizers in Jakarta and allegedly elsewhere as a kind of governing council

DPR-GR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-Gotong Royong

Gotong Royong People's Representative Assembly

DPRD, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah

Regional People's Assembly

Front Nasional

National Front

GERWANI, Gerakan Wanita Indonesia

Indonesian Women's Movement, women's organization close to, though not formally affiliated with the PKI

GMNI, Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia

National Students' Movement of Indonesia

GSNI, Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia

Indonesian National School Pupils' Movement, affiliated to the PNI

G30S, Gerakan Tiga Puluh September

Thirtieth September Movement, formal name of the movement which launched the coup, also known as Gestapu, Gerakan September Tiga Puluh

GWNJ, Gerakan Wanita Nasional Indonesia

Indonesian National Women's Movement, women's organization affiliated with the PNI

GPIB, Gereja Protestant Indonesia Barat

Protestant Church of Western Indonesia
Gabungan Serikat Buruh Indonesia (GSBI)

Federation of Indonesian Trade Unions, affiliated to the PNI

haji

one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca

HANRA, Pertahanan Rakyat

People's Defence, a kind of village guard working in conjunction with the armed forces

HANSIP, Pertahanan Sipil

Civil Defence, similar to Hanra

Hari Peringatan Pancasila Sakti

Sacred Pancasila Memorial Day

HMI, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam

Muslim Students' Association

IKIP, Institut Keguruan Ilmu Pendidikan

Teachers Training College

INPRES, Instruksi Presiden

Presidential Instruction (describing projects 'directly' initiated by the President rather than proceeding from the normal administrative process)

IP!, Ikatan Pelajar Indonesia

Union of Students of Indonesia, affiliated to the PKI

IPKI, Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia

League of Supporters of Indonesian Independence

ITB, Institut Teknologi Bandung

Bandung Institute of Technology

kabupaten*
territorial administrative division, headed by a bupati

KAMI, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia

Indonesian Students' Action Front

kampung

hamlet, cluster of dwellings

KAP-Gestapu, Komando Aksi Pengganyangan Gestapu

Action Command to Crush Gestapu

KAPPI, Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Pemuda Indonesia

Indonesian Student and Youth Action Front

KASI, Kesatuan Aksi Sarjana Indonesia

Indonesian Graduates' Action Front

kecamatan*
territorial administrative division between kabupaten and kelurahan

kelurahan*
formal administrative term for desa, or village

KIAPMA, Konferensi Internasional Anti Pangkalan Militer Asing

International Conference against Foreign Military Bases

KODAM, Komando Daerah Militer

regional military command

KODIM, Komando District Militer

district military command

KOPKAMTIB, Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban

Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KOAMIL</td>
<td>local military command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOREM</td>
<td>sub-district military command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOSTRAD</td>
<td>Army Strategic Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOTI</td>
<td>Supreme Operational Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kuli kenceng</td>
<td>A small farmer owning a house and some agricultural land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kyai</td>
<td>Islamic teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEKRA</td>
<td>Institute for People's Culture, cultural organization affiliated with the PKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LKN</td>
<td>National Cultural Institute, cultural organization affiliated with the PNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lurah*</td>
<td>village head, head of a kelurahan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>modin</td>
<td>religious official who calls Muslim faithful to prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monumen Pancasila Sakti</td>
<td>Sacred Pancasila Monument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPRS</td>
<td>Provisional People's Consultative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammadiyah</td>
<td>modernist Muslim organization, chiefly involved in religious education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASAKOM</td>
<td>Nationalism, religion, communism, official doctrine of Guided Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEKOLIM</td>
<td>Neocolonialist-imperialist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>Lit. the Awakening of the Muslim Scholars, a Muslim political party, the main vehicle for conservative Islamic scholars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSUS</td>
<td>special operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>padi</td>
<td>unhusked rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pagar praja</td>
<td>village militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>panglima</td>
<td>senior military commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARKINDO</td>
<td>Indonesian Christian (i.e. Protestant) Party, deputy to a bupati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemuda Marhaenis</td>
<td>Marhaenist Youth, youth organization affiliated to the PNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemuda Pancasila</td>
<td>Pancasila-ist Youth, general term for anti-communist youth groups not affiliated with Muslim organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pemuda Rakyat</td>
<td>People's Youth, youth organization affiliated with the PKI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEPELRA</td>
<td>Regional [Military] Authority to Implement Dwikora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEPEKUPER</td>
<td>Pembantu Pelaksana Pesantren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PESINDO</td>
<td>Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETRUS</td>
<td>Penembakan Misterius Petut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGRI</td>
<td>Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia Non-Vaksentral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PII</td>
<td>Pelajar Islam Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPAN</td>
<td>Persatuan Pejuang Agama dan Nasional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPDI</td>
<td>Persatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUTERPRA</td>
<td>Perwira Urusan Territorial dan Pertahanan Rakyat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPELITA</td>
<td>Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPKAD</td>
<td>Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT</td>
<td>Rukun Tetangga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sawah</td>
<td>Associated irrigated rice field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sekolah Dasar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SH</td>
<td>sarjana hukum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMA</td>
<td>Sekolah Menengah Atas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEA</td>
<td>Sekolah Menengah Ekonomi Atas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMP</td>
<td>Sekolah Menengah Pertama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNMI</td>
<td>Serikat Nelayan Muslimin Indonesia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Acronyms:**
- PEBERKUPER: Assistant Martial Law Administrator
- PESINDO: Islamic School
- PETRUS: Indonesian Socialist Youth
- REPELITA: Teachers' Union of the Indonesian Republic, unaffiliated
- RT: Neighbourhood Association [head]
- SH: a law degree
- SMA: Senior Secondary School
- SMEA: Senior Economic Secondary School
- SMP: Junior Secondary School
- SNMI: Indonesian Muslim Fishermen's Association
SOBSI,
Sentral Organisasi
Buruh Seluruh
Indonesia

SUPERSEMAR,
Surat Perintah
Sebelas Maret
Sekelas Maret

TKK,
Taman Kanak-kanak

TPR,
Tentara
Pembebasan Rakyat

ulama

Undang-undang
Dasar '45

wedana*

ZIPUR,
Zeni Tempur

*NOTE ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND MILITARY TERMS

Indonesia in 1965-66 was divided administratively into a hierarchy of territorial divisions which may not be familiar to all readers of this volume. The country is divided into a number of province (propinsi), each headed by a governor (gubernur) and divided in turn into a number of 'regencies' (an old Dutch term), or kabupaten, headed by a regent or bupati. Beneath the kabupaten was formerly the kecamatan, headed by a wedana; this unit has now been done away with, though pembantu bupati, assistants to the bupati, play a role similar to that of wedana in some regions. The kecamatan, or district, headed by a camat, is now the principal administrative unit beneath the bupati, and the camat in turn supervises a number of kelurahan, each headed by a lurah. These were known formerly as desa, or villages, but since they were territorial units covering rice fields and forest as well as settlements, the term kelurahan is technically more accurate as well as administratively correct. Within a kelurahan are further administrative divisions, the rukun warga and beneath it the rukun warga, consisting of no more than a few families. The term kampung (occasionally perdukuhan), however, refers more commonly to a physical cluster of houses; in rural areas it is perhaps best translated as 'hamlet', in urban areas as 'neighbourhood'.

Parallel to this civilian administrative structure stands the territorial administration of the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI), responsible for general supervision of security matters, broadly defined, in the countryside. Although the boundaries and status of the military and civilian territorial hierarchies do not always exactly coincide, the Komando Daerah Militer (KODAM), or regional military command, covers roughly the jurisdiction of a province, the Komando Ressort Militer (KOREM) that of a kabupaten, Komando District Militer (KODIM) that of a kecamatan, and the Komando Rayon Militer (KORAMIL) that of a kecamatan.
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Preface

This volume has its origins in a conference on 'The trauma of 1965 in Indonesia' held at Monash University in 1987 and a panel on the killings of 1965-69 at the biennial conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Canberra in 1988. Some of the papers for the original sessions have not been included, while others, including all the translations, were produced especially for this volume.

In accepting the task of editing the collection, I was aware, of course, that the killings are a topic of unusual sensitivity. Both in Indonesia and amongst Indonesiasts there has been a deep reluctance to recall the killings and to examine them deeply or systematically. My hope is that this volume will encourage those - from both participants and observers - with memories of the events of 1965-69 to see that they are recorded, and that it will stimulate further academic investigation of what were perhaps the most traumatic years of modern Indonesian history.

I should like to thank the contributors for their cooperation and patience during the protracted compilation of this volume, as well as Ben Anderson, Ruth McVey and Ron Hatley for their encouragement and assistance with the project at various stages. The Department of Pacific and Southeast Asian History at the Australian National University, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in Wassenaar and the Department of History at the University of Queensland provided facilities for its preparation. David Bourchier and David Chandler offered much valuable help and advice throughout the editing process. Mrs Pilar van Breda-Burgueno typed several of the contributions and Ian Heyward of the Cartography Section of ANU's Research School of Pacific Studies did a fine job of preparing the maps.

Robert Cribb
November 1990
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

PROBLEMS IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE KILLINGS IN INDONESIA

Robert Cribb

The killing of several hundred thousand people in Indonesia in the aftermath of the 1965 coup attempt of the 30 September Movement ranks as one of the twentieth century's more extensive mass murders. It is striking, however, how little prominence this event has been given in general histories of Indonesia. The massacre, it is true, is almost invariably mentioned in standard works, though authors vary widely in the detail they give. Missing in most cases, however, are attempts to explain and to draw conclusions from the killings. In most accounts, the killings burst suddenly upon

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1 I should like to thank David Boucher, David Chandler, Gavan Daws, Donald Denoon, Herb Feith, Jacques Leclerc, Ruth McVey, John Maxwell and Tony Reid for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this introduction. Frank Palmos was also an invaluable source of information and comment on several aspects of the question. None of them, of course, bears any responsibility for this final version.

Demonstrating an absence of attention to the massacres in the literature is obviously more difficult than demonstrating its presence. In the following works, however, all recent general histories of Indonesia, I believe that the reader will not find significant allusions to the killings in the discussion of any period other than the 1960s.

the scene and then are over, having arrived and departed with the rapidity and evanescence of a tropical thunderstorm. Historians of Indonesia seem to have found it difficult to identify both those aspects of Indonesian society might have alerted us to the fact that the killings would take place and any traces they have left on the present political order.

This is surprising, because events of this kind and magnitude often provoke deep introspection. The historiography of modern Germany, for instance, has been confronted massively by the fact of the Holocaust. The tracing of its origins and its implications for the present is one of the more important endeavours in modern German historiography. In an earlier century, the massacre of French Protestants in Paris on St Bartholomew's Day, 24 August 1572, is seen by many as a pivotal event in European history. Similarly, the historiography of Cambodia has been transformed irreversibly by the killings carried out under Pol Pot. And although Japanese historians tend to avoid the issue of Japanese military violence before and during World War II, it is clearly a major preoccupation amongst Western writers who see it as a possible clue to contemporary and future Japanese patterns of behaviour.

The purpose of this volume therefore is to begin mapping the significance of the 1965-66 killings for Indonesian history, both by bringing together what is known about them and by offering a number of fresh interpretations of the events and their significance. It is a first attempt rather than a final statement, for the analysis of the killings presents an unusually difficult set of problems in contemporary Indonesian history, problems of information, problems of philosophy and problems of interpretation. By confronting these problems, however, we take at least one step towards resolving them.

2 The St Bartholomew massacre offers fascinating comparisons with the Indonesian killings. Both were intended to extirpate a radical political movement which appeared to threaten the existing political order. Both sets of victims were not only tainted with treason but also associated with foreign powers, the Netherlands and England in the case of the Huguenots, China in the case of the PKI. Both were sprung upon with little warning and went to their deaths with little resistance, pledging loyalty to their respective national leaders, Charles IX and Sukarno. And both massacres were initiated by the authorities but carried out to a large extent by mobs.

Problems of information

We know surprisingly little about the massacres which followed the 1965 coup attempt. The broad outline of events is clear enough. The killings began a few weeks after the coup, swept through Central and East Java and later Bali, with smaller scale outbreaks in parts of other islands. In most regions, responsibility for the killings was shared between army units and civilian vigilante gangs. In some cases the army took direct part in the killings; often, however, they simply supplied weapons, rudimentary training and strong encouragement to the civilian gangs who carried out the bulk of the killings. The massacres were over for the most part by March 1966, but occasional flare-ups continued in various parts of the country until 1969. Detailed information on who was killed, where, when, why and by whom, however, is so patchy that most conclusions have to be strongly qualified as provisional.

There are many reasons for this shortage of information. First, there were relatively few Western journalists or academics in Indonesia at the time, and those who were present often depended on the military for access to sources and stories. Travel was difficult and often dangerous and the scope for collecting accounts of the killing at close hand was limited. Travel in Indonesia of course has become much easier in subsequent years, but with the regime which oversaw and approved the killings still in power, those who have stories to tell against it are understandably reticent about what took place in 1965-66, lest they themselves become victims.3 Even when people do talk to foreign scholars of Indonesia, those scholars are often understandably cautious about publishing information which may put their informants at risk.

The Indonesian domestic press of the time was similarly hampered. Not only was access to stories outside the main cities severely limited, but the investigative qualities of Indonesian journalism had been greatly undermined under late Guided Democracy. Twenty-one newspapers had been banned by the government in early 1965 for supporting the creation of an anti-communist Sukarnoism Front (Barisan Pendukung Sukarnoism), and in the final months of Guided Democracy Indonesian press publishers
laid emphasis on ideological correctness (and often political caution) rather than journalistic investigation. In the two accounts of the 1965 Purwodadi killings translated in this volume, we see investigative journalists back at work, but the sensitivity of the authorities to their questions in this case indicates the immense difficulties which would have faced any probing of the earlier, greater killing.

Even after the worst of the killings had passed and the trails which might have led to individual killers had gone cold, Indonesians continued to be most reluctant to record any details of the killings. As Michael van Langenberg suggests, a sense of shame for the blood-letting may be partly responsible for this; although many Indonesians today express satisfaction, even pride, at the elimination of the communist party, few seem to think that manner of the party's destruction was praiseworthy. Thus, to my knowledge, only three substantial accounts of the killing have been prepared by Indonesians, aside from the official reports. One, translated in this volume as 'Additional data on counter-revolutionary cruelty in Indonesia, especially in East Java', was probably written some time in the 1970s and is a catalogue of incidents apparently compiled from the reports of others. The second is a brief but gripping personal account, written in 1989 by a member of a left-wing youth organization, probably Pemuda Rakyat, who escaped death himself but witnessed many killings from hiding. His account, translated as 'By the banks of the Brantas', has recently been published in the West. In neither case, however, do we know the identity of the author or any of the circumstances which led to the writing of these accounts. The third is a fascinating memoir by Pipit Rochijat, entitled, 'Am I PKI or Non-PKIP', especially interesting because it speculates on the significance of the killings for contemporary Indonesia. A far richer source for Indonesian visions of the killings is a group of short stories which appeared in Indonesian literary magazines in the years immediately after the killings. Collected and translated by Harry Aveling, these stories give us a sharp image of what the killings may have meant to a range of Indonesians, though their literary form and the political circumstances of their composition make them no more than a partial mirror of the events concerned.

From the start, too, there has been something of an absence of international moral outrage at the killings which has discouraged outside investigation. The killings took place at the height of the Cold War, when the West felt itself to be engaged in a global struggle with communism which would determine the course of history for decades or centuries to come. Counting the casualties in this struggle was secondary to rolling back the so-called communist tide, hence the often quoted callousness of Time magazine's description of the PKI's suppression as 'The West's best news for years in Asia.' Western governments and much of the Western media preferred Suharto and the New Order to the PKI and the Old, and have been in many cases comfortable with the simple statement that some hundreds of thousands of 'communists' were killed. A close investigation of who was being killed - and why - ran the risk not just of complicating a simple story but of uncovering skeletons in the New Order.

4 See Crouch, Army and politics, pp. 65-66; Oey Hong Lee, Indonesian government and press during Guided Democracy (Hull: University of Hull, 1971).
5 'Appendix A: Excerpt from "By the banks of the Brantas": an eye-witness account of the 1965 killings, Injustice, persecution, eviction: a human rights update on Indonesia & East Timor (New York: Asia Watch, 1990), pp. 87-90.


8 See, for example, the subdued reporting of Donald Kirk, 'Bali exorcises an evil spirit', The Reporter 15 December 1965, pp. 42-53. No less an authority than the United States Central Intelligence Agency has commented:

In terms of the numbers killed, the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War, and the Maoist butchery of the early 1950s. In this regard, the Indonesian coup is certainly one of the most significant events of the 20th century, far more significant than many other events that have received much greater publicity. (Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Report: Indonesia - 1965, the coup that backfired [Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1968], p. 71n).


for the killings in Washington DC does not demand detailed information on the killings themselves. 11

Political reasons apart, our comparatively meagre knowledge of the killings is partly a consequence of the fact that the relatively efficient record-keeping of the Nazis in Europe and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia had no parallel in Indonesia. Uncertainty about the identity of the killers is a major obstacle to analysis of the significance of any killings, and these problems of information hover over any attempt to go beyond the initial journalistic descriptions of the killings. Uncertainty extends to the number of people who were killed. The nature of the killing in 1965-66 - commonly dispersed, nocturnal and by small groups - was such that no-one could possibly have had first or even second hand involvement in more than a tiny proportion of the total number of deaths. Any estimate of the total number which perished must therefore be a composite of numerous reports, themselves probably also composites of reports. The first official figure for the number killed was 78,50012, and was produced by a Fact Finding

11 For examples of this genre of writing, see David Ransome, 'The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian massacre', Ramparts 9 no.4 (Oct. 1970), pp. 27-29, 40-49; Ralph W. McGehee, Deadly deceits: my 25 years in the CIA (New York: Sheridan Square, 1983), pp. 57-58, and Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: US foreign policy 1945-1980 (New York: Pantheon, 1989), pp. 177-183. The issue re-surfaced recently with claims, confirmed by United States former diplomats and intelligence officers, that embassy and CIA officials provided the Indonesian army with a list of five thousand names of PKI leaders and cadres. Embassy officials reportedly checked off the people on the list as they were then killed. Five thousand was only a tiny proportion of the total number killed, and several observers have pointed out that the Indonesian army would hardly have needed American lists to identify the top echelon of the party. The significance of the lists, however, was probably that they listed clandestine party members, agents and associates, especially within the armed forces, rather than well-known public figures such as Aidit. In the shadowy world of Indonesian intelligence and espionage, where the PKI and the army were each infiltrated by the other's agents and basic loyalty was virtually impossible to pick, Indonesian military intelligence authorities must have been aware of the possibility that PKI agents would plant lists in order to eliminate anti-communist officers. Under these circumstances, the American lists would have come into the army's hands with an air of reliability which no Indonesian document could have enjoyed. Thus, although the lists contributed to the total death toll in only a minor way, they were an important element in the destruction of PKI influence. See Kathy Kadan, 'Ex-agents say CIA compiled death lists for Indonesians', San Francisco Examiner 20 May 1990, pp. 1, 22; for sceptical responses, see Peter Hastings, 'A chilling story that just doesn't add up', Sydney Morning Herald 28 May 1990; Michael Vatikiotis and Mike Fonte, 'Rustic of ghosts', Far Eastern Economic Review 2 August 1990, pp. 18-19.

12 Crouch, Army and politics, p. 155.
Commission under Major-General Sumarno, appointed by Sukarno in late December 1965. This figure has been derided as too low, even by members of the commission itself, it was produced in any case well before the killings were over. It may nonetheless represent the number of identifiable individuals whose place and time of death can be stated with some certainty. How high our estimates for the total death toll go before the killings were over. It may nonetheless represent the number of identifiable individuals whose place and time of death can be stated with some certainty. How high our estimates for the total death toll go before the killings were over. It may nonetheless represent the number of identifiable individuals whose place and time of death can be stated with some certainty. How high our estimates for the total death toll go before the killings were over. It may nonetheless represent the number of identifiable individuals whose place and time of death can be stated with some certainty. How high our estimates for the total death toll go before the killings were over. It may nonetheless represent the number of identifiable individuals whose place and time of death can be stated with some certainty. How high our estimates for the total death toll go before the killings were over. It may nonetheless represent the number of identifiable individuals whose place and time of death can be stated with some certainty. How high our estimates for the total death toll go before the killings were over. It may nonetheless represent the number of identifiable individuals whose place and time of death can be stated with some certainty.

Some academics. This report, said to have been twenty-five pages in length, was conducted apparently by KOPKAMTIB using 150 'university graduates' in 1966 and made selectively available to various Western journalists and academics. This report, said to have been twenty-five pages in length, concluded that around one million people died, 800,000 of them in Central and East Java, 100,000 each in Bali and Sumatra. The reported scale of the investigation suggests that it was a genuine attempt to obtain reliable figures, but its conclusions cannot be accepted with any certainty.

The scope for the over-reporting of deaths is clear. Individual incidents may have been reported many times. Several observers who cast doubt on the higher estimates have pointed out that a village burnt or a body floating down a river may be noticed by many people and recorded many times. Part of the anecdotal evidence for the scale of the killings has been the story of householders in Surabaya rising each morning to push back into the canals bodies which had beached on their back landings during

13 One account, apparently referring to this report, cites an official figure of 180,000. See Horace Sutton, 'Indonesia's night of terror', Saturday Review 4 February 1967, p. 27.

14 Crouch, Army and politics, p. 155; Hughes, Indonesian upheaval, pp. 185-186.

15 Bridget Mellett, 'Political killings in Indonesia', New Statesman 5 August 1966, p. 189. This figure is also said to have been reached by enigm members of the PKI, though I have not been able to discover a reference to this in print. In 1978, the party exiles in China were still citing a figure of around half a million. See Ibrahim Isra, 'Suharto's swindle in releasing political prisoners', OISRAA Bulletin, special edition (Jan. 1978), p. 1.

16 [Frank Palmos], 'One million dead?', The Economis 20 August 1966, pp. 727-728; this article appeared in a slightly different form as Frank Palmos, 'Massacre toll in Indonesia', The Advertiser (Adelaide), 6 August 1966. See also Bruce Cleland, 'Greatest bloodbath in Indonesia's history', Dawn 2 August 1966. The KOPKAMTIB report on which Palmos based his story has never been published, though other researchers have described to me seeing material which was probably the same document.

The more horrific of incidents, moreover, were perhaps more likely to have been reported in the first place, and if these were interpreted as typical rather than exceptional cases the figure for the entire country would have been inflated. Nor is it impossible that figures were more or less deliberately inflated in the process of collection. Village heads, from whom many of the local estimates were collected, probably felt considerable incentive to demonstrate that vigorous action had been taken locally against the communists and would have been inclined to report that their people had killed many communist, whether or not this was the case. Once the notion that a huge massacre had taken place was firmly established, researchers would have been under some pressure to show they had been doing their work by coming up with suitably large figures. The ease with which large, round figures can be bandied about demands caution in the absence of firm data. Some scepticism towards the figure of one million is also suggested by the absence of demographic evidence indicating major population loss. Suggestions that one third of the population in the Solo region were killed are not borne out by later population figures. Large numbers of people from certain occupation groups were missing when the dust of the killings has settled. Teachers, for instance, poorly looked after under Guided Democracy, had been extensively recruited by the PKI as the key to influencing future generations (see Kenneth Orr's chapter), and they were consequently an especial target of the violence of 1965-66. Another report claims that the price of Balinese wood carvings and of Javanese batik cloth soared in 1966 because many of the artists had been associated with the left wing cultural organizations LEKRA and had disappeared or been killed. The fate of specific groups such as these, however, cannot be taken as representative of that of the population as a whole.

The absence of reports in later years of mass graves being uncovered, as has happened recently in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, is also a little puzzling, especially given the continuing construction boom in New...
Order Indonesia. It is possible that grave sites, selected on the whole for their secluded location, are still known and are avoided for all forms of construction; there are sporadic accounts of rice fields in parts of Central Java which are no longer tilled because they conceal mass graves. It is likely, too, that anyone discovering a mass grave would think carefully before reporting it, if only because the response of the authorities to this kind of discovery has not been tested. The authorities would not necessarily consider a mass grave to be politically damaging, since it could readily be attributed to Communist massacres of opponents in 1965 or even 1948, but in the absence of strong reasons for wanting to find graves - reasons of the kind which have led to the exhumations in Cambodia and Eastern Europe - the authorities would probably prefer to leave the ground undisturbed.

Conditions of burial, however, may be most important in accounting for this lack of skeletal evidence. Reports of the killings refer to bodies being dumped in a wide variety of locations, from rivers, isolated forests and rubber plantations to cane fields, wells and shallow urban graves. There is also some indication that significant numbers were dumped in the limestone caves of southern Central Java; this was certainly done systematically during the so-called petrus killings of the early 1960s. In most of these locations, a combination of abundant rain and a high level of acidity caused by decaying plant material would have quickly reduced skeletons to fragmentary remains, difficult for anyone but an expert to identify with certainty. In some circumstances, decay can make bones unrecognizable within a year, though survival up to fifty years is not unusual. Perhaps the best chance of preservation is in the limestone caves, but burial places there are likely to be disturbed only by open cut mining on behalf of cement factories, itself a rather destructive activity.  

On the other hand, there must also have been considerable scope for under-reporting of the killings. So many killings took place over many months that keeping an accurate track of deaths would have been difficult even if the operation had been the kind of coordinated genocide carried out by the Nazis. No group of investigators could have surveyed all the killings which took place given the time and resources available. It is impossible to know whether people actually involved in the killings would have reported accurately - if they had indeed bothered to keep close count - or would have exaggerated or under-estimated, but it is likely that they were reluctant to be specific and would have under-stated their own personal involvement. There is ample incidental evidence of reluctance on the part of killers to be identified. Some executioners wore masks; a Western visitor to Kupang in Timor was invited by the local army and police to attend some of the killings, but only on condition that he take part, so that he would share the complicity of the killers. It has also been reported that in many cases party members were killed along with their entire families in order to prevent the possibility of retaliation in the future. Reluctance to report accurately would have been even stronger where killings were used as an opportunity to settle old scores. Paul Webb cites a case of villagers punished because they killed non-communists and this possibility must have inhibited, at very least, the full disclosure of events.

In the years immediately after the killings, therefore, scholars on the whole discounted both the low Fact Finding Commission figure and the high KOPKAMTIB one, settling, mainly on the grounds of plausibility, for something around a quarter of a million. A third set of official figures became available in July 1976, when security officials, including the KOPKAMTIB commander Admiral Sudomo suggested that somewhere between 300,000 and 500,000 people had been killed.

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20 See, for example, Peter Polomka, Indonesia since Sukarno (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), p. 161.
Table I: Number of people killed according to various estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kirk (1969)</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson and McVey (1966)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turner (1969)</td>
<td>300,000-600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King (1969)</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topping (1969)</td>
<td>150,000-400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Economist, citing KOPKAMTIB (1969)</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mellor (1969)</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wertheim (1966)</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hughes (1967)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fact Finding Commission (late 1965)</td>
<td>78,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fact Finding Commission member</td>
<td>780,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Malik</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.N. Palas</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contenay (1967)</td>
<td>100,000-200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant (1967)</td>
<td>200,000-300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vittachi (1967)</td>
<td>300,000-500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paget (1970/68)</td>
<td>400,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moser (1968)</td>
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<td>Sullivan (1969)</td>
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<td>Henderson (1970)</td>
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<td>Dahm (1971)</td>
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<td>Sloan (1971)</td>
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<td>Polomka (1971)</td>
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<td>Leggs (1972)</td>
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<td>Neil (1973)</td>
<td>750,000</td>
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<td>Palmer (1972)</td>
<td>200,000</td>
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<td>Sievers (1974)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression and Exploitation (1974)</td>
<td>5000,000-1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB COMMANDER (July 1976)</td>
<td>450,000-850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fryer &amp; Jackson (1977)</td>
<td>100,000-500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluvier (1978)</td>
<td>500,000-1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caldwell and Utrecht (1979)</td>
<td>500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legge (1980)</td>
<td>250,000</td>
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<td>Bicklars (1981)</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frederick (1983)</td>
<td>750,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anderson (1985)</td>
<td>500,000-1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mody (1987)</td>
<td>500,000-1,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Superscript figures refer to the footnote in which full bibliographical details of the work cited can be found. In citing these estimates, I have omitted indefinite qualifiers such as 'more than' and 'up to'.
around half a million people had died. It is not clear what evidence, if any, was used to reach this new figure, but it has prompted a general upward revision of the casualty figure and probably a little more interest in the earlier KOPKAMTIB figure. We are unlikely now to find empirical evidence to resolve this question.

Problems of philosophy

Behind the technical problems lie deep theoretical ones. Atrocity is an abiding source of fascination. ‘One of the great needs of the twentieth century is a scientific study of atrocity and of the moral issues involved’, wrote Herbert Butterfield. A major reason for this is the window which atrocity appears to open into the human soul. Some time after an earlier massacre in Indonesia, that of the Chinese in Batavia in 1740, a Dutch participant wrote:

I myself also had to join in. As I knew that my Chinese neighbour had a fat pig, I intended to take it away from him and bring it into my house. When my boss, the master-carpenter, saw this, he slapped me and told me to kill the Chinese first and then to plunder. I therefore took a rice pounder and with it beat to death my neighbour with whom I so often had drunk and dined.

As far as atrocity literature goes, this is mild stuff, but it illustrates a concern for the tearing question: how can human beings treat each other in so inhumane a way? The mind of the torturer, the hangman, the mass murderer has been a perennial fascination for novelists and historians alike. This, I think, is one of the main reasons why events such as the Holocaust and the killings in Cambodia continue to demand attention.


we look into the hearts of mass murderers and wonder whether we are in fact looking into those of our colleagues, our families, ourselves.

The Indonesian massacres, however, have not appeared to raise such issues. While it may seem unacceptable to some to suggest that there can be degrees of inhumanity, the manner of the killings reached no extremes of barbarism, at least as far as we know. It was a time of gratuitous slaughter, unsophisticated cruelty and unplanned brutality of a kind that is regrettably familiar from the pages of the press. On the whole, the studies in this volume have avoided graphic description of acts of violence, but some hint of what went on can be found in Kenneth Orr’s description of ‘Margosari’ and in the report ‘Additional data on counter-revolutionary cruelty’. The Indonesian killings brought no new technical refinements to the business of mass killing: there were no gas chambers, no ghastly medical experiments, no sense that advanced technology and modern science had been turned against humanity. The killing was done with knives, clubs and firearms. The victims were not moved hundreds of kilometres in order to meet their deaths in technologically advanced instruments of extermination; most indeed perished within a few kilometres of their homes. Nor was a grand vision being implemented. Part of the fascination of the massacres of Hitler, Stalin and Pol Pot is the fact that they were all driven by an ideologically determined vision of a new world to be created. Ideological motives were there in the Indonesian case, of course, along with fear, revenge, adventure and so on but for the most part the perceived need to kill arose out of a sense of self-interest and self-defence, and was in no way dictated by a formal ideological world view. One looks in vain in the Pancasila, Indonesia’s current state ideology, for reasons why communists should be exterminated rather than, say, gently re-educated.

Only from Islam did an apparently ideological basis for mass killing come, in the form of rhetoric calling for holy war against the infidel communists. Even for radical Muslims, however, the purpose of the killings was relatively limited. Western observers, following modernist Muslim scholars such as Syed Ahmad Khan, have tended to see holy war or *jihad* as a special state, the resort to apocalyptic warfare after a suspension of the normally peaceful coexistence between Islam and non-Islam. The term *jihad*, however, strictly applies to a much wider range of activities for promoting Islam, from writing, reflection and peaceful proselytization to outright warfare. In traditional Islam, the *jihad* never ceases, though it may take many different forms from time to time. When various religious teachers in East Java announced holy war, therefore, they were reminding...
their followers of their obligations as good Muslims, rather than changing the rules of the game. In the context of the time, *jihad* was directed at eliminating a particular set of opponents of Islam, rather than at establishing an Islamic state.\(^27\)

If anything, the Indonesian killings have been treated as if they fell into an anomalous category of 'accidental' mass death. Commonly it is death from starvation and disease which is treated in this manner, as in the Ukraine in the 1920s, in Bengal in 1943, in China during the Japanese occupation and again during Great Leap Forward and even in Indonesian-occupied East Timor. In all these cases, negligent, sometimes deliberately neglectful, government policies resulted in the deaths of large numbers of people under circumstances which allowed the governments concerned to claim that mass death was not their intention but was a consequence of circumstances beyond their control.\(^28\) The killings in Germany and occupied Europe were unambiguously the work of representatives of the state and, although some scholars have debated whether responsibility for these actions went right to the top of the Nazi state apparatus, the state as an institution clearly stands guilty. In the Indonesian case, on the other hand, the government was at least in some cases simply a bystander in the killings. This seems to put the massacres in part into the class of communal violence of the kind that accompanied the partition of India in 1947 or the expulsion of the Greeks from Asia Minor in 1922.\(^29\)

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\(^28\) The literature on each of these cases is substantial and involves subtle argumentation on either side. By way of example, see George C. Hildebrand and Gareth Porter, *Cambodia: starvation and revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), which argues that Khmer Rouge population policies were a consequence, not a cause, of massive food shortages in Cambodia.

\(^29\) The theoretical literature on mass killings is dominated by cases of inter-ethnic massacre, or genocide: Armenians in Turkey, Ukrainians in the Soviet Union, Jews and Gypsies in German-occupied Europe, Huts in Burundi, Tibetans in the People's Republic of China and so on, and tends to disregard more narrowly political killings such as those in Indonesia. The difficulty, however, with extending to concept of genocide to other forms of mass violence is the absence of theoretical grounds for distinguishing mass political killings such as those in Indonesia from smaller scale killings. For various attempts to grapple with these issues, see Leo Kuper, *Genocide: its political use in the twentieth century* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981); Israel W. Charny, *How can we commit the unthinkable? genocide: the human cancer* (Boulder: Westview, 1982); Irving Louis Horowitz, *Taking lives: genocide and state power* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1982); Israel W. Charny, ed., *Towards the understanding and prevention of genocide: proceedings of the International Conference on the Holocaust and genocide* (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1984); Israel W. Charny, *Genocide: a critical bibliographical review* (London: Mansell, 1988); Ervin Staub, *The roots of evil: the origins of genocide and other group violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The history and sociology of genocide: analyses and case studies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990).

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Nor is there much sign that the killers themselves felt morally challenged by the killings, despite the fact that those who slew generally confronted their victims personally, commonly beheading them with broad-bladed knife, rather than in the somewhat less personal setting of a firing squad or gas chamber. Novelists in particular have been fascinated by the mental adjustment which those committing inhumane acts must make in order to retain their sense of humanity.\(^30\) This may be a mistaken view in many cases; there is evidence enough that plenty of mass murderers remain unaffected by what they do, but it is a plausible enough position. Indonesia's mass killers, however, as far as we can identify them, have shown little evidence that they feel this particular moral difficulty.\(^31\) Michael van Langenberg's suggestion, therefore, that a deep sense of shame over the killings is an important part of the political base of the New Order is a valuable window on this issue.

This apparent 'routineness' of the massacre is compounded by the fact that the killings, extensive though they were, remained within the bounds of recent human experience. Even a figure of one million deaths in the Indonesian killings is still a good deal fewer than the six million Jews who perished in the Holocaust. Certainly a much smaller percentage of the total Indonesian population perished than the 5 percent of Cambodians...
who are said to have died at the hands of Pol Pot and his colleagues.\textsuperscript{32} Nor has there been much tendentiousness in the discussion of how many perished; even government representatives, although highly wary of detail, are generally not embarrassed by broad suggestions that a million may have died. This contrasts with attempts by Nazi and Khmer Rouge apologists to minimize the number of killings carried out by those regimes, and by the parallel attempts of their opponents to inflate the numbers.

Yet the fact that we habitually assess massacres by the total number of casualties, and by the percentage of victims from amongst the total population, encourages us to disregard the speed with which the Indonesian killings took place. Hitler’s extermination of the Jews was a massive and costly operation, taking many years and requiring the construction of camps, the requisition of strategically vital railway rolling stock and the extensive use of troops and other staff. Even Pol Pot took four years and a good deal of organization to accomplish his destructive work in Cambodia. The Indonesian killings, by contrast, were largely over within a few months and were carried out with a minimum of organization and technical infrastructure.\textsuperscript{33} We may routinely refer to both the scale and the intensity of mass killings, but intensity is a difficult notion to define and there is something especially distasteful about applying statistical analysis to the rate of killing during an atrocity. Even if the Indonesian killings stand out from the global experience because of the relatively short space of time they took to be completed, they are unlikely draw special attention on that account.

History as a discipline is poorly equipped to deal with massacres. While history’s attention to empirical detail perhaps equips it well to discover the ‘facts’ of massacre, the dominant trend in modern historiography is to analyze structural change in time, an approach which discounts the significance of individual events such as massacres. Sukarno displayed a true historian’s consciousness (and political insensitivity) when he described the killing of the generals on 30 September/1 October 1965 as a ‘rippl[e] in the ocean of the Revolution’.\textsuperscript{34} Massacres, moreover, create a literal dead-end for many of the protagonists. Whig historians, as Butterfield has pointed out, prefer winners, or at least survivors. They like continuity; change, when it comes, is preferred in long inexorable movements, not sudden hissus. One of the distinguishing characteristics of historiography is its ability to set its subjects in the context of their pasts and their futures. Subjects whose future has been curtailed are less attractive. The abrupt departure of the PKI from the Indonesian political scene makes it now a difficult topic for discussion unless one can trace, as David Hill has done, the re-emergence of a leftist literature, or can believe, in line with public pronouncements of the Indonesian Minister of Defence Benny Murdani, in the existence of an active underground party.\textsuperscript{35}

A comparison of the historiography of Australia and South Africa suggests that history is generally kinder to killers than to enslavers. However brutal or extensive a massacre, it is an act which retreats steadily into the past; there is a kind of historical statute of limitations beyond which it seems to make little sense to pursue the guilt of mass murderers. Enslavement on the other hand is constantly present; contemporary criticism of the Indonesian government, which focuses on current conditions rather than past crimes, reflects this sense of historical priorities.

\textsuperscript{32} As with Indonesia, the exact number of deaths is uncertain. Michael Vickery, who has examined the available figures with greatest care has concluded that probably around 740,000 more Cambodians than normal died during the Khmer Rouge years, out of a 1975 population of about 7.1 million. Of this 740,000, approximately half were executed, the remainder dying mainly of disease and starvation. See Michael Vickery’s letter to the editors of the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 20 no. 1 (1986), pp. 70-73. Region-by-region, though, the contrast may not be so strong: the killing in Bali, for instance, reached levels not dissimilar to those in parts of Cambodia. See Ben Kiernan, ‘Wild chickens, farm chickens and cormorants: Kampuchea’s Eastern Zone under Pol Pot’, in David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan, eds., Revolution and its aftermath in Kampuchea: eight essays (New Haven: Yale University, 1983), p. 142.

\textsuperscript{33} I am grateful to Ruth McVey for this point.

\textsuperscript{34} Quoted in J.D. Legge, Sukarno: a political biography (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 398.

Robert Cribb

The meekness with which PKI members are often believed to have gone to the slaughter also hampers the serious historiographical treatment of their fate. Perhaps the strongest image we have of the massacre is of PKI members on Bali lining up, dressed in their white funeral clothes, to be executed methodically. A deep historiographical problem arises here from the fact that history commonly focuses on those who accomplish change or who at least seek it. Massacres, however, are catastrophes visited upon a group of people, and so the historical dynamic must inevitably appear to be external to the victims. Lack of will, for whatever reason, is for many historians an abdication from being historical agents at all. 'Death in the fury of battle is [considered] glorious, but meekness in the hour of death is curiously culpable, a sign of weakness, and it compromises in the eyes of history.' A strong philosophical rebuttal of this position can be made, by arguing that precisely in facing death with serenity, in accepting it as a consequence of one's principles, victims retain their humanity up to the moment of death, but it helps to be able to believe that the principle and the cause will survive after the deaths.

Aside from the problems of information and philosophy, the central difficulty for historians of Indonesia in attempting understand the massacres has been the problem of reconciling their national and local dimensions. The killings were precipitated by a national event, the attempted coup in Jakarta and they involved avowedly national actors - the army, the PKI, organized Islam - and yet the relatively scanty information we possess suggests that a host of local factors in each region determined the scope and scale of each bout of killing.

Some national dimensions of the killings have been thoroughly discussed in the existing literature. The works of Crouch, McVey and Sundhaussen have shown convincingly the origins and development of political rivalry between the Indonesian army high command and the PKI. Each saw the other as fundamentally antagonistic to its own sectional interests as well as to the national interest and each desired as far as possible to remove the other from political influence. When the opportunity arose, anticommunist army units, especially KOSTRAD and the RPKAD, moved swiftly to destroy the PKI, both by direct killing and by encouraging, arming and training civilian vigilantes who were then sent out to do the job. In most cases, the killings did not begin until elite military units had arrived in a locality and had sanctioned violence by instruction or example. A significant number of those killed had already been detained by the authorities and were either killed in jail or handed over to vigilantes for killing. At the same time, rural tension was sharpened by disputes over land, with the PKI promoting land reform by means of aksi sepihak, or unilateral actions, in the face of deeply entrenched opposition from

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36 Hughes, Indonesian upheaval, p. 181, also p. 160. For other reports of meekness, see Gavi, Konserrevolutiu in Indonesia, pp. 13, 32. Outside Indonesia one of the most striking, though little known, instances of meekness was the passivity with which the Hutu of Burundi faced massacre by the Tutsi in 1972. See Chalk and Jonassohn, History and sociology of genocide, pp. 388-389.

37 In a Gestap example, Sal Tas attempts to argue that the PKI brought its destruction on its own head, but he expresses it as an issue of moral rather than historical responsibility. See Sal Tas, Indonesia: the underdeveloped freedom (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1974), pp. 319-321.

38 Philipp Fehl, 'Mass murder, or humanity in death', Theology Today 28 no. 1 (April 1971), p. 64.

39 Ibid., pp. 69-71.

landlords. These factors alone help explain some of the violence which followed the coup, but they do not satisfactorily explain massacres.

Although the elimination of the PKI was necessary for the establishment of army rule, the scale of the violence of 1965-66 seems gratuitous when compared with the nature of the political change which it ushered in. When one considers that the massacre of St Bartholomew, to which historians have given a pivotal position in the rise of absolutism in France and the development of the Counter Reformation, achieved its notoriety and policy brought about by Suharto's accession to power seemed to make of army rule, the scale of the violence of 1965-66 seems incomprehensively excessive. In 1966, it is true, the change in style and policy brought about by Suharto's accession to power seemed to make the coup and the massacres a major watershed in modern Indonesian history. Since that time, however, the scholarly consensus has been retreating steadily from this position. Crouch in particular has drawn attention to the continuity of army power and of political structures between the Old and New Orders, which suggests that the transformation was more superficial than was first thought. Even those who have persisted in seeing the Old Order as holding dramatic possibilities now closed off by the New have tended to accept a continuity in state power from the Dutch colonial era up to the present. If the destruction of the PKI and the removal of leftist influence from the levers of power were the sole aim of the army, then it is hard to see that the rise to power of Suharto or the success of his

subsequent policies would have been any more imperilled had the death toll in 1965-66 been 10,000 or even 1000. Similar qualifications apply to the effects of the land reform campaign. Although the akt sepibak generated great bitterness and considerable violence, they are widely acknowledged to have been a failure for the PKI. The occasions on which land redistribution could be carried out were far outnumbered by those on which determined and violent resistance by landlords and their associates not only prevented re-distribution but rolled back PKI influence in the villages. Although there were scores to be settled and lessons to be reinforced in 1965, the land reform issue alone hardly explains the ferocity of the killings.

On initial inspection, that ferocity seems to have been a product of local factors. To appreciate this, we need to look briefly at each region in turn. As Ken Young stresses, no central set of events encapsulates the massacres as a whole; the killings were scattered in time and space and whatever we know about one massacre only dimly illuminates the others. Only in some regions is it even possible to paint a broad picture of events. In strongly Muslim Aceh, where the PKI's support was minuscule and largely confined to the towns, cadres and their families are reported to have been eliminated swiftly in early October. We know little more, but the fact that Aceh's history contains a number of instances of the rapid and ruthless elimination of political opponents when the opportunity presented itself makes this brief account plausible. Immediately to the south, the plantation area of East Sumatra had been an area of endemic social conflict and labour unrest since the 1940s and the PKI was influential through its affiliated plantation workers' union SARBUPRI. Labour tension was exacerbated by hostility between Malays, Bataks and Javanese. Extensive killings certainly took place, though it is not clear what share in the killings was taken by the army under local divisional commander Kemal Idris and anti-communist youth groups with army backing. Just how many people were killed and who, precisely, they were also remains unknown. Stoler, who has studied the political economy of the plantation region most closely, was able to do no more than note that the total estate workforce of 283,000

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This combination of sharp social tension and official complicity is reminiscent of the White Terror in France in 1794-1795. During this extended series of massacres, the authorities commonly allowed crowds to seize and slaughter imprisoned Jacobins and proved most reluctant to prosecute killers, even when their identities were known. Other features in common with the Indonesian killings were a disregard for legal process, wide variation in the extent of the killings from region to region, the prominence of secret gangs and rural criminals, the use of death lists and the broad targeting of all who had been prominent on the left, regardless of their personal role in the defeated order, and the frequent killing of whole families. See Jacques Godechot, The counter-revolution: doctrine and action 1789-1804 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 246-254; and Richard Cobb, Reactions to the French revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

42 Soman, The massacre of St. Bartholomew, p. viii. This figure refers to the killings in Paris alone; subsequent massacres in other French cities claimed more lives.
just before the coup had been reduced by 16% - 47,000 people - a year later, but this figure does not take into account those who fled or were dismissed, nor family members of workers who may have been killed along with them, nor additional workers recruited after October 1965. In the southern Sumatra province of Lampung, there was a good deal of killing near the town of Metro. Here the victims seem to have been Javanese transmigrant settlers, while their killers were local Muslims, resentful of Javanese intrusion into the area.

Paul Webb's valuable report on the killings in Nusatenggara is a model for the kind of report we need on those many areas which were not acknowledged as PKI strongholds. His account draws out a multitude of local factors in the killings, local particularities of the kind emphasized by Ken Young. Especially important here was the strength of Christianity and of traditional religions. The ambiguous, or at least less uncompromising, relationship between Christianity and Communism which is hinted at in the Purwodadi Affair, appears also in Nusatenggara. In Timor, sections of the Protestant church aligned themselves with poor peasants on the land reform issue, and Protestant clergy, staff of the local university and teachers in general were an early target, many killed by local vigilantes. Some followers of traditional religions simply told army investigators that they had no minimal understanding of the PKI ideology they were caught up in the security sweep along with their erstwhile associates. Some unfortunate followers of traditional religions simply told army investigators that they belonged to none of the 'official' religions; they were then assumed to be communists and were dealt with accordingly. In Lombok, local memories report 50,000 killings in early 1966. Here the killers seem to have been carried out predominantly by Muslim Sasaks, with the majority of victims Balinese - traditionally the ruling elite in the western part of the island - and Chinese, who controlled the commercial sector.

More killing took place in West Kalimantan, although there the worst massacres were in October and November 1967, well after the massacres had peaked in more other regions. The victims were almost exclusively Chinese, the killers predominantly indigenous Dayaks. Before the coup, West Kalimantan had been one of the bases for Indonesian operations against Malaysia, which included sponsorship of ethnic Chinese guerrilla forces across the border in Sarawak. When Indonesian politics turned abruptly to the right after 1965, and especially after the recognition of Malaysia in August 1966, some of these guerrillas began operations on the Indonesian side of the border, finding support amongst the large and predominantly rural Chinese community. Coppell, the only scholar to examine these killings closely, links them both to Chinese guerrilla attacks on Dayak villages and to a deliberate 'psychological warfare' campaign by the Indonesian army to incite the Dayaks against the Chinese.

Of killings in the rest of Sumatra and Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Maluku, we know virtually nothing. It is probable that the killings in these areas were on a much lesser scale, if only because fewer communists were available to be killed. Scholars studying perennially violent Madura off the northeast coast of Java report that the left had been largely eliminated well before 1965 and that the island was consequently quiet during the killings. The 1955 general elections which definitively marked the rise of the PKI on Java gave it only meagre representation in other provinces, except North

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46 Frank Palmos, personal communication.


48 See also Gavi, *Kontervolution in Indonesien*, p. 33.


51 Contrary, 'Another bloodbath?', p. 358, on the other hand, identifies Madura as a place of especially unrestrained killing.
and South Sumatra, and in South Sumatra the army had been arresting
PKI members since late 1956. After the declaration of martial law in 1957
and with much of the archipelago under direct army rule, expressing
allegiance to the PKI had been dangerous well before 1965.

On Java, a number of relatively spectacular anti-communist riots took
place in the cities, especially against the PKI headquarters in Jakarta and
against the communist mayors of Cirebon, Magelang, Solo, Salatiga and
Surabaya. In Surabaya, whose corpse-clogged canals were widely reported
in the Western media, Muslim Madurese apparently carried out most of
the killings. By far the worst massacres, however, took place in the
countryside. The main killers were army units, especially the para-commando
unit RPKAD, and civilian vigilantes, most commonly drawn from youth
groups associated with anti-communist political parties. Of these the Muslim
youth group Ansor, affiliated with the Nahdatul Ulama, is reported to
have played the greatest role. West Java was relatively untouched by mass
violence, mainly because the local Siliwangi Division, having spent fourteen
years from 1948 to 1962 attempting to crush the fundamentalist Muslim
Darul Islam movement in the West Javanese countryside, was most reluctant
to encourage Muslim youth groups to take political matters into their
own hands.

The main exception in West Java appears to have been the Indramayu
area between Subang and Cirebon, an area of endemic poverty where the
PKI had been relatively strong. The focus of tension in Indramayu was
the occupation of government teak forests by squatters, who had resisted
violently when police tried to remove them, leaving one policeman dead.
The killings in 1965 were then carried out by vengeful members of the
police force.

In Central and East Java, the main killing grounds, there were clear
differences in the scope of the massacres from region to region. In Central
Java, killing was heaviest in the Solo-Klaten area, in Pati to the north
and in Banyumas, at the western end of the province; here the army’s para-
commando unit RPKAD commanded by Sarwo Edhie presided over most
of the killings. In East Java, the Kediri region (discussed by Ken Young),
probolinggo/Pasuruan, Situbondo and Banyuwangi appear to have been
the worst areas. Throughout Central and East Java, the ferocity of the
killings seems to have been associated particularly with ancient hostility
between cultural-religious groups, the so-called abangan, Muslim Javaneses
whose religion is heavily influenced by pre-Islamic beliefs, and the santri,
who are more orthodox and more averagely Muslim. In Bali, discussed
in the concluding section of this volume, killing was concentrated in the
three western kabupaten of Jembrana, Buleleng and Tabanan, and seems
to have been associated both with the defence of Hinduism and with long-
standing rivalries between patronage groups. Both army units and PNI
vigilantes called Tamins took part in the killings. In all these cases, the
killings peaked at some stage between early November 1965 and late January
1966, though they continued at a reduced level for a good deal longer
and localized outbreaks of more numerous killings took place for another
three years. The Purwodadi killings described by Iskandar and Lasut are
one such incident.

In this volume we can only begin to outline the probable connections
between local factors and the national scale of the killings. It is clear to
begin with that between national and local factors in the killings there
was at very least a multiplier effect. Ken Young shows in the case of Kediri
how the coincidence of national and local motives for killing in the unusual
absence of restraining forces, unleashed deep antagonisms in a fury of
murder. The failure of national politics to provide workable and working
institutions to fulfil the promises of independence threw the Indonesian
people back on loyalty to older social divisions which became polarized
around Islam and Communism. Old antagonisms which might once have
been mitigated by a shared national loyalty deepened instead into bitter

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53 The best available reports of Banyumas are those of Frank Palmos, most easily
accessible as 'And how they died', The Economist 20 August 1966, p.728. See also Palmos,
'Massacre toll in Indonesia'. Accounts of the killings in Central Java can also be found in
Gavi, Konterrevolution in Indonesien, pp.11-14 and 31-35.

54 Pipit Rochijat, 'Am I PKI or non-PKI?', Indonesia 40 (1985), pp.37-52, offers
an extended personal account of the killings in East Java. An army intelligence on the situation
in East Java in late November 1965 has been translated as 'Report from East Java', Indonesia
41 (1986), pp.134-149. A few brief reports from other areas can be found in Contenay,
p.5, and Gavi, Konterrevolution in Indonesien, pp.35-37. For further discussion of East Java,
see Ken Young's chapter.
hatred. Many accounts assert that old grudges unconnected with the political tensions of 1965 were settled when this opportunity arose, but that mis-states the situation: in the highly charged atmosphere of 1965-66, very little was not political in one sense or other, and grudges fell into that broader pattern of social polarization.

But why did this tension lead to massacres rather than to civil war? What special burden did the PKI carry in these critical months? Part of the answer may lie in the international environment. The Cold War was at its height, hot war was escalating in Vietnam, China had begun to turn to anti-communists to demand extra effort. More important, however, was the army's success in identifying the PKI as a transgressor of social and political norms. Indonesia had come to independence with few established rules for the conduct of politics. Constitutions and constitutional practice had changed frequently and politics was characterized by constant experimentation with new forms. Guided Democracy attempted to end this volatility by restoring Indonesia's original 1945 constitution and by insisting on an ideological orthodoxy defined by Sukarno. Political manoeuvre, however, continued, the only serious restriction being the need to cloak political actions in the ideological terminology of the day. The PKI, the army and the rest of the players in Indonesian politics all operated competently within this somewhat ritualistic framework. For the mass of the Indonesian people, however, the absence of conventions of political behaviour and the habit of paying lip service to the ideology of Guided Democracy made political judgement difficult at a time when unprecedented economic decay and naked political rivalry made such judgement imperative. Indonesians scouring the political horizon for signs of the future or of the real political agendas of the major contenders did so in vain. The Indonesian public, therefore, was ready for an event which would, as it were, show the political players in their true colours.

When the coup of 30 September 1965 took place, its organizers probably saw it as no more than another innovative manoeuvre in the Jakarta political game. Just how the Indonesian public viewed the initial pronouncements of Untung's coup group is not clear, but within a few days message from army public relations units was clear: the events of 30 September had been a PKI-planned attempt to seize power and to overthrow the delicate balance of national politics. The coup itself was presented as definitive evidence that the PKI had at last gone too far, but this message was rammed home by careful exploitation of the alleged circumstances of the coup. Indonesian politicians had been virtually free of assassinations since the revolution, and little effort was needed to portray the killing of the generals as a transgression even of the tolerant standards of Guided Democracy. To this was added a carefully orchestrated campaign of disinformation about events at Halim airforce base on the night of the coup portraying the party, which had previously enjoyed an enviable reputation for chastity and incorruptibility, as a hotbed of immorality. After the arrival of the captured generals at Halim, it was widely rumoured, members of the left wing women's organization GERWAN stripped and performed a lascivious 'Dance of the Fragrant Flowers' before an audience of PKI cadres and airforce officers, culminating in the ritual mutilation of the generals, living and dead. The frenzied women allegedly gouged out the eyes of their victims, cut off their genitals and, after dumping the remains down a nearby well, abandoned themselves to an orgy with the watching officers and cadres, Aidit himself awarding medals to the most depraved. Official autopsies on the bodies of the generals, now published, have shown these stories to be fabrications. The killings were not an outraged response to these specific 'events'; rather, in the highly charged atmosphere of the time these 'revelations' were sufficient to make the party in general appear to be a demonic force whose destruction would be a service to the nation. People were willing to believe these stories because they felt it was particularly fitted with what was previously known about the PKI but because the crisis of the age demanded a culprit. Once the PKI was identified as the guilty party, no manoeuvring could save it.

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56 See especially Paget, 'The Indonesian military and the burden of power', pp. 295-296.

57 Some of these details are recorded in Vittachi, The fall of Sukarno, pp. 79-80; more lurid accounts, often presented as confessions by participants, began appearing in the Indonesian press from mid-October 1965.

58 See Ben Anderson, 'How did the generals die?' Indonesia 43 (1987), 109-134.

59 This and the preceding paragraph draw substantially from ideas expressed by Ruth McVey in her unpublished paper 'The great fear in Indonesia'.
This argument helps to explain the frequency with which non-communists described the killings as a kind of cleansing. It seems not improbable that the killers allowed their depredations to become all the more cataclysmic by comparing them to the Bharatayuddha, the final destructive battle of the Mahabharata epic, which is the basis of Java's wayang kulit or shadow puppet tradition. 60 Another scholar has suggested intriguingly, though without much elaboration, that the disfigurement of victims may have been caused by a desire to make them formally imperfect and thus to disqualify them from harmony with the universe and thus from obtaining cosmological power. 61 Perhaps related is a story recently recounted by John Gittings that the killers on Bali put whitewash into their victims' eyes so that 'the eyes would not take their picture to the other world'. 62 Those accounts which deal with a significant number of specific killings - 'By the Banks of the Brantas' and the account translated in this volume as 'Additional Data on Counter-Revolutionary Cruelty' - however, present a more complex picture of gratuitous, rather than systematic, cruelty compounded by inexpert techniques and a desire to make the bodies unrecognizable. The best known case of mutilation is that of the PKI leader on Bali, I Gde Puger, a corpulent man widely believed to have profited commercially from his close association with the Balinese governor Suteja. Puger's punishment - to have the fat cut from his body before he was shot in the head - was a matter of political rather than spiritual symbolism. 63

60 The fact that the killers frequently acted under the banner of Islam is no barrier to their having thought in terms of wayang stories; Resink cites no less an Islamic authority than S.M. Kartosuwiryo, leader of the Darul Islam rebellion of 1948-1963, who wrote to Sukarno in 1951 prophesying a Bharatayuddha. See Resink, 'From the old Mahabharata to the new Ramayana-Order', p. 214; Howard Palfrey Jones, Indonesia: the possible dream (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 386-387.


63 Sutton, 'Indonesia's night of terror', p. 27. See also Moser, 'Where the rivers ran crimson from butchery', p. 26, for other incidents. It is hard to know, of course, whether actions such as the beheading of victims were undertaken simply as a means of execution, as a precaution to hamper the identification of bodies or for reasons of superstition. See, for instance, 'By the banks of the Brantas', p. 89.

64 Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1965. Anderson's study had the misfortune to appear just before the killings, which appeared to demolish any plausibility in his argument that the Javanese were especially tolerant. Anderson's point, however, was that Javanese tolerance of different character traits was related to their experience of similarly varied character traits amongst figures in the wayang kulit stories. He did not suggest that tolerance meant a peaceful disposition; wayang kulit stories, after all, are peppered with battles and brawls, and the Mahabharata itself concludes with the cataclysmic Bharatayuddha. Although one imagines that Anderson would have written somewhat differently a year later, his argument was not substantially rebutted by the killings.
as the arrival of the Japanese forces in 1942 or their departure in 1945, these were people who killed wildly, confident that the chaos would permit no retribution for their crimes. We find the same exultation in murder in Maskun Iskandar’s Purwodadi ‘James Bond’ who was ‘licensed to kill’. Gadjah Mada University’s report on Klaten describes the PKI as working both with and against local gangsters and it would be fascinating to know whether and to what extent the violence of 1965-66 simply tapped the violent potentials of gangsters on the other side. The Ansor and Tamir gangs which were responsible for much killing in East Java and Bali respectively bear some resemblance to the evanescent gangs which emerged around politically conscious bandit leaders during the Indonesian national revolution. Anecdotal evidence, including Bu Yeti’s account in this volume, suggests that a desire to seize property may have been a motive for at least some of the violence; this was also the case in France’s White Terror. We are now accumulating a useful range of studies which deal directly or tangentially with this social phenomenon. We find the same exultation in the style of the 1965-66 killings also bears some resemblance to the pemuda (youth) violence of the early revolution in 1945, when young nationalists in collaboration with local underworld figures, launched a campaign of terror against the Dutch who were attempting to return to power on Java after World War II. As in 1965-66, this violence was partly aimed at attrition of the enemy, but it aimed mainly to create an atmosphere of horrifying menace which would cripple the adversaries’ sense of purpose.66

A second dimension to explore is the extent to which the alleged harmony of the traditional Indonesian village is based on social sanctions which could be enforced if necessary by communal violence. The collective murder of thieves by villages is reported even today, and the West, from lynch mobs to the recent retributions after the Romanian revolution, has plenty of examples of its own. Violence of this kind may not represent a direct breaking down of the social order so much as a reaffirmation of community standards in the eyes of villagers.67

Another suggestion has been that the killings were a kind of collective running amok (mengamuk).68 This idea, popular just after the killings, does not match up to what we now know of amok as a psychological phenomenon. Amok has two classical forms, individual and collective. In the individual form, a person facing ruin, shame or social humiliation suddenly breaks into indiscriminate, murderous violence which only ceases when he (the amokker is invariably male) is killed by appalled bystanders or by the forces of law and order. Collective amok is more calculated and resembles the Viking berserker: typically a group of soldiers adopts violent frenzy against opposing troops as a military tactic in the face of defeat or overwhelming odds. Both forms of amok involve the redemption of honour by frenzied violence resulting in the death of the amokker.69 There is little in the character of the 1965-66 killings which matches this description; with their death lists and clandestine killing grounds, and with

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clearly no suicidal motive, the killers have little in common with the typical amokker. Indeed, one would be more inclined to expect amok under these circumstances on the part of the communists, though there is no evidence of this.

Even this, however, fails to explain the meekness, mentioned above, with which many victims seem to have gone to their deaths. Just how meek party members were is, like so much else, a matter of dispute, and it may well be that isolated incidents of striking passivity have been taken wrongly as the norm. Several studies here strongly qualify this image of meekness. We have not only the official view that the PKI was planning a campaign of armed rebellion to follow up the coup of 30 September in Jakarta, but a variety of anecdotes discussing PKI resistance. Newspaper accounts of the period give a somewhat similar picture, with repeated reports of armed PKI movements in the countryside, though it is doubtful whether these can be trusted as factual. Against this must be placed the reported casualty figures for the RPKAD paracommandos in their extensive operations in Central Java and Bali: a total of two.

The eventual complete failure of PKI resistance has led us perhaps to underplay its extent in the first months after the coup, but even if we add together all the scattered cases of resistance to the better known operations in Blitar and West Kalimantan, we still do not come up with anything approaching a period of civil war.

Some scholars have extended the wayang theme by explaining the reported passivity of party members in the face of destruction by suggesting that the PKI’s place on the political left put it also on the symbolic left; in the wayang kultt shadow puppet play, the left hand side of the screen is occupied by the Kurawa, who are allegedly morally wrong and destined to lose, salah dan kalah, in the draw-out struggle with their Pandawa cousins. As good Javanese, so the argument goes, the communists merely submitted to the fate marked out for them since the beginning of time. Although the PKI certainly used wayang metaphor to understand its place in the world far more than one would expect of a Marxist party, any argument along these lines needs to take account of the far more subtle notions of good and bad, and left and right, in the wayang, whose message stresses duty in the face of moral ambiguity, rather than clear-cut moral polarities. In the absence of detailed accounts of the killings we are never likely to find out.

The problem of PKI passivity is complicated by its relationship to the question of guilt. Some observers have argued that passivity implied acknowledgment of guilt, and have suggested that meekness in the face of destruction was the party’s admission that it had erred. The party, of course, was neatly pinned in a no-win situation by this kind of argument: if it did not fight, it acknowledged its guilt, if it did fight, then its guilt was proven. Passivity is so frequently reported in stories of the Indonesian massacres that it probably was indeed the typical response of victims, but the most plausible explanation is that the victims were paralysed by that combination of uncertainty and vague hope which makes acquiescence right until the very last moment always seem wiser than resistance.

Questions of guilt, in fact, were much more of an issue for the killers. Wholesale killing required justification, hence the eagerness with which people accepted stories of death lists, holes dug by PKI members for the bodies of their intended victims and the whole panoply of PKI demonic activities, in which simple tools such as rubber tapping implements could become cunningly disguised eye-gougers. Hence, too, the emphasis on documentary proof of involvement in the coup in the army’s ‘Crushing the G30S/PKI in Central Java’. Part of the motive for the killings, however,

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20 Gavi, Konterrevolution in Indonesien, p. 41, uses the term amok to describe and explain the apparent suicidal submission of the left, but without accompanying violence it is hard to accept this categorization. Topping, ‘Slaughter of Reds’, p. 16, is one of the few to report cases of suicide by PKI members. p2141Y


22 Gavi, Konterrevolution in Indonesia, p. 35. Another report states that fifteen members of the Muslim youth group Ansor died in clashes in Kediri. See Topping, ‘Slaughter of Reds gives Indonesia a grim legacy’, p. 16.


25 Anderson, Mythology and the tolerance of the Javanese, pp. 4-27.
was also to create guilt. Although Indonesian politics under Guided Democracy had been polarized between the PKI and its opponents, political uncertainty and the discontinuities between rhetoric and reality had left many people to equivocate, to avoid doing anything to cut their links irrevocably with either side. This was good political sense: Indonesian politics is unforgiving; those who choose the wrong side are seldom permitted to return, and each major showdown in Indonesian politics - the Madiun Affair, Dutch-sponsored federalism, the PRRI-Permesta revolt - had seen capable and patriotic individuals, great and small, excluded from the nation's political life. In 1965, the army was determined to force another such parting of the ways, not only to remove its rivals but to force commitment on the uncommitted. Although confident within days that the Gestapu coup itself had been crushed, General Suharto and those close to him remained deeply uncertain about which people in the armed forces and bureaucracy could be relied upon. Encouraging as wide as possible participation in the massacres was a way of creating complicity, a way of committing fence-sitters to the victory of the anti-communist forces. The more hands which were bloodied by the suppression of communism, the more hands which could be depended upon to stand firm against any future PKI resurgence and depended upon not to turn and point in accusation against those who sponsored the massacres. The killing which took place within families seems to have had the deliberate intention of placing blood-guilt on those otherwise most likely to seek revenge.  

As Michael van Langenberg points out, too, the extent of the killings soon became an element in the army's case for a drastic restructuring of the Indonesian political order. Suharto and those close to him realized very soon after the coup that an opportunity had arisen not simply to eliminate the PKI and to seize power but to restructure Indonesian politics so that a political order such as Guided Democracy need never emerge again. The exact nature of the army's new order was not determined until later - indeed it is still being adjusted - but a compelling case for a clear and definitive break with the past was required. The killings served this army purpose by placing clearly on the historical record just what a disaster it was for Indonesia to dabble in liberal democracy and leftist politics. Constructing a memory to uphold a New Order, thus, was an important army motive.

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26 Sutton, 'Indonesia's night of terror', p. 27; Moser, 'Where the rivers ran crimson from butchery', p. 28.
Consequences of the massacres

What is the place of the massacres in contemporary Indonesian politics? Did the efficacy of the killings, for instance, help to establish violence - both remembered and continuing - as an effective tool of policy under the New Order? Although a literature on structural violence in Indonesia does exist, and is summed up by such titles as Ten Years' Military Terror and Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror, much political analysis of modern Indonesia downplays the structural role of violence, arguing that the majority of brutal incidents are gratuitous and politically unnecessary.

In this respect, however, the so-called petrus killings (from penembakan misterius, mysterious shootings) of 1983 and after may have exercised a profound academic influence. These killings were, initially at least, a response to sharply rising criminality in the cities of Java. They began in Yogyakarta in early 1983 and spread from there to most regions of the archipelago. The victims, on the whole, were known criminals or former criminals whose names appeared on an official black list and who were hunted down by murder squads clearly composed of military personnel. The campaign later extended to the carefully staged shooting of escaped prisoners. Estimates of the number of victims in this campaign vary substantially, but it seems likely that several thousand were killed.

Systematic terror of this kind seemed at first to be a new phenomenon in Indonesian history, but as scholars have probed the origins and style of the petrus killings more closely, some have come to link them with other cases of state violence, including the Gestapu killings. Much of the work in this direction, however, is still in preparation or has only just been published, and we cannot yet say just how it will influence the study of Indonesia in general.

Another reason, of course, why we study mass killings is for their psychological effect on the survivors. There is little doubt that most Jews feel themselves to be in some way or other survivors of the Holocaust, just as probably a majority of Cambodians feel themselves to be survivors of Pol Pot and that this sense of survival has enormous effect on politics in both Israel and Cambodia. Biting uncertainty as the killings went on, the loss of family members, often without sure knowledge of their fate or burial place, and the sight of violence and of corpses must all have had a psychological effect on those involved, who will have included small children now grown to adulthood. Webb cites the story of a child suffering years of vivid nightmares after seeing his father hacked to death by neighbours, both Kenneth Orr and Maskun Iskandar hint at similar cases of trauma. Just how this trauma, however, may have influenced Indonesian society is not clear. Commentators at the time predicted that accumulated blood debts would see a further explosion of mass violence; this has not happened. And although the killings soon produced the crop of short stories translated by Harry Aveling as Gestapu, only in recent years, as Keith Poulcher explains, have the killings re-entered Indonesian literature as a topic for exploration.

Perhaps much of the trauma which the events of 1965-66 inflicted on Indonesian society was channelled into the wave of religious conversion which followed them. In the six years immediately after the killings, an estimated 2.8 million people converted to Christianity (both Protestantism


and Catholicism\textsuperscript{53}, predominantly in Java, Timor and North Sumatra.\textsuperscript{54} Significant numbers on Java converted to Hinduism during the same period.\textsuperscript{85} The reasons for these conversions are complex. Since 1966 the New Order government has insisted that all Indonesians must believe in God and adhere to a religion, so that they cannot subscribe to atheism which is seen as linked to communism. Some conversions, therefore, were undoubtedly pro forma registrations. Since the Christian churches before 1965, moreover, were an object of suspicion because of the Western connections, their conversion figures may also have included something of a pre-coup backlog of unannounced conversion.

The scale of conversion, however, suggests that the political trauma of 1965 shook many people loose from their previously held values and world views, making them receptive to new messages and new spiritual solutions. Christianity was especially well-placed to benefit from this shaking loose because, unlike Islam, it had remained relatively aloof from the political confrontation before 1965 and from the killings themselves, although as Kenneth Orr and the Gadjah Mada team report Christians were involved in the killings in some regions. Far more than Islam, too, the Christian churches carried out energetic pastoral work amongst prisoners, their families and remnants of the Left in general. As Bu Yeti's reminiscences reveal, this work, disregarding the official ostracism of the Left, won Christianity much respect amongst groups who would previously have had little time for it.\textsuperscript{86} In the case of Hinduism, the appeal of a return to Java's pre-Islamic beliefs as part of a search for stability was probably important; Hinduism also attracted those politically committed to resisting the expansion of Muslim political influence.

\textsuperscript{53} Following Dutch usage, Indonesian reserves the term \textit{Kristen} (Dutch \textit{Christelijk}) for Protestantism and has no generally accepted term for Christianity as a whole, hence the need for specifying both main branches of Christianity.


\textsuperscript{86} See Willis, \textit{Indonesian revival}, and Webb, 'The sickle and the cross'.

\textsuperscript{87} I suggest this figure on the debatable basis that the PKI might have obtained close to a majority of the vote had free elections been held in Indonesia in 1964/65. Certainly, PKI support was never more than 50\% nationwide.

\textsuperscript{88} The women's organization Gerwani alone claimed nine million members in 1961.

\textsuperscript{89} Polomka, \textit{Indonesia since Sukarno}, p. 161.
This fact that those conscious of being survivors of the massacres in Indonesia were a relatively small proportion of society as a whole, in contrast with Cambodia or the Jews of Central Europe, means that the role of survivors and their families in shaping Indonesian consciousness is likely to be far smaller than in Cambodia or Israel. Perhaps even more importantly, however, is the fate of those survivors. People in huge numbers were detained but not killed after the Gesta pu affair. Just how many these were is as uncertain as the number of deaths. In the 1970s, official figures for the total number ever detained ranged from 600,000 to 750,000. Amnesty International put the figure at 'about one million'. More recently, the Indonesian government has suggested that 1.5 to 1.7 million former prisoners are 'at large' in society, but it is hard to know whether this is part of an attempt to keep the issue of a 'communist threat' alive. Whatever the total, only a small number remain in jail, but many hundreds of thousands of people spent months or years behind barbed wire because of their alleged involvement in the 30 September Movement. Amongst these were a good number of pathetic victims, detained by accident or out of malice although they had absolutely no connection with the PKI. A large majority of those held, however, were 'guilty' in the New Order’s flexible sense of the term, that is they were recognizable members of the broad left before 1965, the category that was in danger of being killed all over Indonesia in 1965-66. The conditions that these prisoners were held under have been well documented as have the various social disabilities imposed on former prisoners after their return to society. For such people, the burdens of imprisonment and discrimination probably form a much more important part of their consciousness than the relatively brief risk of being killed in the massacres of 1965-66. Bu Yeti’s story, translated in this volume, supports this conclusion, her chief bitterness being against those who made her life hard drudgery after the coup.

Something different must apply to those who escaped death and detention by going underground. For such people, changing their names and appearance, calling clandestinely on circles of friends, often spending long periods as gelandangan (wandering, homeless people), risk more than suffering must have been the dominant feature of their lives after 1965. We catch a glimpse of life on the run in Ibu Marni’s 'I am a leaf in the storm’ and in Umar Kayam’s short story ‘Bawuk’, but no more than a glimpse. We need many more such stories before we know what the fate of Ibu Marni and of so many other victims means for modern Indonesia.

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91 Indonesia: an Amnesty International report (London: Amnesty International, 1977), pp. 41-44. A significant but unknown number died while in detention, either formally executed or from deliberate maltreatment or neglect or from natural causes.
92 Government figures vary considerably. In 1981, officials gave a figure of 1,590,020 former prisoners, of whom 42,084 were said to be disqualified from voting in the coming election. This figure was repeated in 1985, with some suggestion that it might rise to 1.7 million. In 1990, the news magazine Tempo referred to 1.43 million former prisoners, while the Dutch journal Indonesi, Feiten en Meningen cited the army commander Try Sutrisno as saying that the total number was 1.8 million. See Korting hak pilih, Tempo 12 December 1981, p. 14; ‘Pendataan ulang bebas tahanan G30S/PKI selasa akihir 1985’, Kompas 6 June 1985, p. 1; ‘Pemilih baru Pemilu’, Tempo 17 February 1996, p. 24; ‘Geen stemrecht voor ex-tapol’, Indonesi, Feiten en Meningen 15 no. 3 (April 1996), p. 20.
93 See, for instance, McDonald, Suharto’s Indonesia, pp. 216-231; May, The Indonesian tragedy, pp. 27-40; Indonesia: an Amnesty International report and the British campaigning magazine Tapol.
94 These include restrictions on the kind of job they may hold, disqualification in some cases from voting in general elections, limits on freedom to travel and having the letters ‘ET’ (eks tahanan, ex-prisoner) marked on their identity cards.
95 For another prisoner's personal account, see Pandu Nusa, 'The path of suffering: the report of a political prisoner on his journey through various prison camps in Indonesia', Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 19 no. 1 (1987), pp. 15-23.
Chapter 2

GESTAPU AND STATE POWER IN INDONESIA

Michael van Langenberg

The usual historical image of the establishment of Indonesia's 'New Order' (Orde Baru) and Suharto's rise to political power is one of gradual, 'slow but sure' progress. But, in fact, the political process which actually replaced the 'Old' order of Guided Democracy with the 'New' had been carried out effectively within six months of the outbreak of the so-called Gestapu affair of 30 September/1 October 1965. The basic power structure of the New Order state was put in place between 1 October 1965 and mid-March 1966. This was possible principally because the violence of mass killings in late 1965 permitted the speedy elimination of political opponents and the restoration of order upon which future hegemony could be built.

The Gestapu affair erupted on the night of 30 September 1965 with the abduction and murder of six senior members of the military high command and an adjutant to the Defence Minister. This was ostensibly part of an attempted transfer of state power to a Revolutionary Council (Dewan Revolusi), appointed by a '30 September Movement' (Gerakan 30 September). In fewer than twenty-four hours, however, the attempted seizure of power had been crushed by military forces led by the commander of the Army's Strategic Command (KOSTRAD), Major-General Suharto.


The Suharto-led military command did not merely crush the attempted ‘coup’, but also set about seizing political power. The defeated Movement was dubbed with the acronym Gestapu (for Gerakan September Tiga Puluh, Movement of September 30), a term allegedly coined by the director of the armed forces newspaper Angkatan Bersenjata, Brigadier-General Sugandhi, presumably with the intention of investing it with the aura of evil associated with the term ‘Gestapo’. On 2 October 1965, the army’s Supreme Operational Command (Komando Operasi Tertinggi, KOTI) established an Action Front to Crush the Gestapu (KAP [Komando Aksi Pengganyangan]-Gestapu), an alliance of militant young anti-communist leaders in Jakarta. In the meantime, the corpses of the seven murdered officers were recovered from a well in the Lubang Buaya (Crocodile Hole) district at the Halim Perdanakusumah Air Force base outside Jakarta. Five days after the recovery of the bodies, KAP-Gestapu held a mass rally in Jakarta which climaxed with an attack on the headquarters of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The building was ransacked and burned. In the next few days, an Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, KOPKAMTB) was formed under Suharto’s command to identify, arrest and investigate all those responsible for and involved in the 30 September Movement. KOPKAMTB’s powers were undefined, other than ‘to restore order and security’, and effectively unlimited by any judicial restraint. Almost immediately afterwards, in the province of Aceh, troops from the regional military command joined militant Islamic youth movements of September 30, a term allegedly coined by the director of the army personnel, declared the PKI to be ‘traitorous’ and announced that 1 October, the day on which the 30 September Movement had been crushed, would henceforth be celebrated as Sacred Pancasila Memorial Day (Hari Peringatan Pancasila Sakti).

Within days of the failure of the 30 September Movement, the commanders of the army’s strategic reserve, KOSTRAD, and of the para-commando unit RPKAD, together with their allies embarked on a deliberate campaign to promote a climate of fear and retribution. A crucial element was a propaganda campaign, especially during October and November, aimed at creating popular fear and loathing of the PKI and its supporters. Photographs of the grisly exhumation of the bodies of the seven slain officers were displayed prominently in most of the print media. These were accompanied by lurid accounts of the murdered officers having been sexually assaulted and mutilated by members of the PKI women’s movement, Gerwani. The murder of General Nasution’s infant daughter, fatally wounded in the course of the attempt to abduct Nasution himself on 30 September, was publicized to its maximum tragic extent. The state funerals of the seven slain officers and of Nasution’s young daughter were held with pomp and ceremony, and wide media exposure. The populace was urged to have little mercy on the perpetrators of the Gestapu affair who were principally identified as being the PKI. They were publicly vilified as ‘traitors’ (pengkhianat), ‘devils’ (setan), child-murderers and sexually dissolute women. Published reports and rumours spread widely that the nation had only just escaped a massive purge of anti-communists, planned by the PKI, in the wake of the Gestapu. From the popular media, from military commanders and from anti-communist political leaders, the crushing of the ‘Gestapu/PKI’...
One of the generals' bodies, shortly after exhumation. After three days in the well at Lubang Buaya, the bodies had begun to decay, and the resulting disfigurement gave rise to wild rumours that the generals had been tortured before death.

The 'kill or be killed' atmosphere was heightened soon after Gestapu by the appearance in virtually all regions where mass killings later occurred, of alleged death lists, purported to have been drawn up by the PKI in preparation for a post-coup extermination of anti-communists.

In the second half of October 1965, groups of anti-communist youth in Central and East Java, mostly belonging to Islamic and Christian organizations, began mass killings of alleged PKI sympathisers. Simultaneously, RPKAD units began moving through Central Java, with instructions from Jakarta to restore order and crush the remnants of the 30 September Movement. The Movement as such no longer had organized form, but its remnants were identified as being members and alleged sympathisers of the PKI. In Java the RPKAD armed and trained anti-communist youth groups for the specific purpose of crushing the PKI. Similar activity was under way in northern Sumatra, where KOSTRAD special units and others from the regional military command promoted and supported the mass killing of PKI sympathisers by local anti-communist youth.

Under army supervision, and with army participation, large-scale massacres took place in Central and East Java, Bali and northern Sumatra. Class interests, religious fervour, communal hatreds, deep ideological differences were all mobilized in the anti-communist violence. In a near-hysterical anti-Communist pogrom, thousands of vigilante groups, supported by local military units and frequently directed by military commanders, spread through the regions, killing or arresting alleged PKI sympathisers. Tens of thousands were placed under military detention. The PKI, which in early 1965 had claimed some three million party members

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with another fifteen million in affiliated organizations, was destroyed as a political force.

By early December, the bloodbath, having claimed at least a quarter of a million victims, began to lose the 'momentum' of the previous two months.\(^{11}\) The main institutional instrument for the exercise of state power on behalf of the new regime, the KOPKAMTIB, was in place. The consolidation of power now demanded a restoration of order. The military high command moved to bring the mass violence to an end, restraining vigilante actions by militant anti-communist groups.\(^{12}\) KOPKAMTIB, as an intelligence and security command network extending from Suharto, as commander, down to local military commanders at village level, was utilized for this purpose. All military commanders within the national territorial military command structure were made responsible for carrying out the KOPKAMTIB tasks of intelligence and internal security. In particular, KOPKAMTIB was made responsible for purging the civil service of persons alleged to have been involved in the 30 September Movement.\(^{13}\) Suharto, the KOPKAMTIB commander, was promoted to Minister/Army Commander. On 6 December, a presidential decision expanded KOPKAMTIB activities to 'restore the authority of the Government by means of physical-military and mental operations'.\(^{14}\) The Army general staff was made the staff command for KOPKAMTIB, with power to co-opt assistance from the navy, air force and police. Special operations by KOPKAMTIB could, in addition, draw on the resources of all government departments, as required. Finally, all military units in the country, from the inter-regional and provincial commands down to village level, were made operational units of KOPKAMTIB.

\(^{11}\) Published estimates on the total number of persons murdered in the massacres range from eighty thousand to one million. There would be a wide consensus today among scholars of the period that a quarter of a million is a conservative estimate of the number of victims. It was most likely considerably more.

\(^{12}\) Regular killings continued, however, in some areas, notably Bali, throughout December. While in Central Java and Bali during January 1966, I knew of summary executions of PKI detainees still being carried out by squads of vigilante youth and soldiers.

\(^{13}\) See 'Instruksi Presiden R.I. No.22/KOTI/1965 Tgl. 15 November 1965 Ttg. Dasar/ Kebijaksanaan Pemurnian/Pembaharuan Personil Sipil dari Komparsimen2, Departemen2 dan Badan2 lainnya din Aparatur Pemerintah' - signed by Suharto, as Operational Commander for Restoration of Security and Order, on behalf of President Sukarno; text in 'Himpunan ketentuan komando operasi pemulihan keamanan dan keterbinaan tentang screening personil dari tahun 1965 s/d 1985' (Jakarta: Departemen Pekerjaan Umum, 1985), pp. 1-6.

Between December 1965 and March 1966 the state's management of violence shifted from military-promoted killings at the local level to more centrally-directed arrests and detention of Old Order remnants, carried out through the KOPKAMTIB apparatus. At the same time, the transfer of state power was completed. In March 1966, President Sukarno was compelled to sign the now famous Instruction of 11 March (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret) or Supersemar, empowering Suharto, newly appointed as Minister/Army Commander, to:

Take all measures considered necessary to ensure peace and order and stability of the Revolution...in the interests of the Nation and State of the Republic of Indonesia...

This acknowledged that effective control of state power was in the hands of Suharto and his military command. The next day, Suharto issued a decree in the name of the President declaring the PKI illegal, and ordering the dissolution of the party and all its affiliated organizations.

Within a week of Supersemar, on Suharto's orders, fifteen ministers were removed from Sukarno's presidential Cabinet. Twelve of these, including two of the four deputy prime ministers, were placed under arrest by KOPKAMTIB. In the next few weeks further purges took place. More cabinet ministers were removed. PKI and Sukarnoist sympathisers in the state bureaucracy were purged. Over three hundred Air Force officers were arrested. Purges were extended rapidly to the other armed services and the police. In June 1966 the new military command convened a session of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPRS), purged of its PKI members and their supporters. This New Order MPRS endorsed the legality of the Supersemar and drastically curtailed Sukarno's powers as president, including rescinding his appointment as president-for-life.

The power of the New Order state was consolidated and expanded during the next five years. By the middle of 1966, state power was effectively in the hands of a new military-dominated oligarchy, headed by General Suharto. Nine months later, by the end of March 1967, virtually the entire state apparatus (civilian and military), purged of 'Old Order' elements, was under the control of this oligarchy. Suharto was appointed Acting President by the MPRS. Several senior members of the former regime were put on trial for treason, and convicted. These included Dr Subandrio (first Deputy Prime Minister), Jusuf Muda Dalam (minister for central banking), and Omar Dhani (air force commander). Drastic changes in economic policy were under way. The army swiftly completed the formulation and issue of a long-standing doctrine asserting its permanent role in Indonesian social-political life. The command structure of the armed forces was re-organized, centralized, and brought under Suharto's authority. Construction was begun of a new state-controlled, 'non-party', political organization. The nucleus for this was the army-sponsored Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekber Golak), which had been set up in 1964, as an anti-communist popular front, to coordinate anti-PKI organizations within the National Front (Front Nasional). In 1969, the implementation of the first Five Year Development Plan (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Repelita), saw a major program of state-directed economic reconstruction under way. Within a further three years, following a successfully managed general election, state power was considerably more centralized and more functionally effective over the civil society at large than at any time since 1942.

Before Gestapu, a dominating feature in the history both of Indonesian nationalism and of the Indonesian national polity had been the defining

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16 'Keputusan Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/Mandatari MPRS/Pemimpin Besar Revolusi No. 1/3/1966 (12 March 1966); text in KOPKAMTIB, Himpunan surat-surat, pp. 102-3. For an Indonesian 'retrospective' to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the events of 11 March 1966, see Tempo 15 March 1986, pp. 12-20. For a detailed account of the events surrounding Supersemar, see Crouch, Army and politics, chapter 7.


19 For details of the events between June 1966 and March 1967, see Crouch, Army and Politics, chapter 8.


21 Crouch, Army and politics, pp. 266.
of Indonesian national identity. The building of state power was intrinsically absorbed within, and took second place to, struggles to construct a nationalist polity. After the declaration of Indonesian independence in 1945, the major forces competing for control of the national state were primarily concerned with establishing a nationalist legitimacy to govern. The struggles were for the control of, rather than the building of, state power. Since Gestapu, it is the growth and centralization of state power that has dominated the national polity. Before Gestapu the building of state power was intrinsically absorbed within struggles to construct a nationalist polity. Since Gestapu these priorities have been reversed. From this perspective the image of continuity of state power through the twentieth century, from Dutch colonial state to present New Order, needs to be qualified. There has undoubtedly been continuity in state apparatus from the colonial state to the present - such as institutions of civil administration or organized religion. But this does not mean the same thing as continuity of state power. On the contrary, the conditions of state power have varied drastically during this century. Throughout the twenty-three years from the termination of Dutch colonial rule by the Japanese in 1942 until the collapse of Guided Democracy in 1965, the power of the state was considerably diminished if compared both with the preceding forty years of Dutch colonial rule and the subsequent era of the New Order since Gestapu.

Neither has the consolidation of state power in the post-Gestapu era been simply a continuity between pre-World War II ‘colonial’ and contemporary ‘post-colonial’ state systems: broken briefly by a deviant period of immediate post-independence upheaval. Rather, the New Order is a distinctive product of the dialectic between national identity and state power that has dominated a half-century of Indonesian national politics. That dialectic, important in the nationalist discourse of the 1920s and 1930s, became even more prominent after the Japanese occupation of the Indies in 1942. Since then, the emergence of the military as an important institutional base for Indonesian nationalism has seen even more overt assertions of authoritarian models contributed to the debates about the ideal Indonesian nation-state.


23 See David Reeve, Golkar of Indonesia: an alternative to the party system (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985).
construction of a powerful state system that has engendered manifold changes in the structural patterns of civil society.  

The mass violence that had occurred in the wake of the failure of the 30 September Movement was crucial to the consolidation and expansion of state power under the New Order regime. It served three important purposes. First was the elimination of the leadership of the PKI and the destruction of its mass cadre structure. Second, it issued an unequivocal warning to those who might consider a challenge to new ruling elite. Third, it created a dramatic historical break, a break since made part of the hegemonic ideology of the state system with the official celebration of 1 October as Hari Peringatan Pancasila. The sheer scale of the killings particularly was important in facilitating state hegemony. Southwood and Flanagan, in their study of political violence in New Order Indonesia, contend that:

The Indonesian massacre was essentially a project of systematically indiscriminate killing. A project connotes aims, means and responsibility. It was systematic in that the military leadership clearly defined the set of victims: the PKI and its sympathizers. It was indiscriminate in that within the category of victims specified, all members were to be killed, regardless of age, sex, guilt, or any other criteria.

It is perhaps rather too sweeping to suggest that all the killings were all-encompassing of a particular category of victims. Many informants say that it was not uncommon for women and children to be spared. Also, there were regional variations. In Java and Bali, some of the most intense violence took place within families. In Batak northern Sumatra, in some cases intra-clan (marga) relationships worked to save persons from violence in others inter-clan rivalries intensified the violence. The precise extent

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26 For recent analyses of this relationship between state power and changes in Indonesian civil society, see: R. William Liddle, 'Soeharto's Indonesia: personal rule and political institutions', Pacific Affairs 58 no 1 (1985), pp. 68-90; and Richard Robison, Indonesia: the rise of capital (Sydney: Allen & Unwin Australia and Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1986).

27 I am grateful to Robert Cribb for emphasizing these three points to me.

28 Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia, pp. 73.

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The massacres occurred because of the convergence of deep communal hatreds, on the one hand, and state direction of violence, on the other. The state utilized and directed the spontaneity of those hatreds. There were, thus, discrepancies in both the scale and patterns of the post-Gestapo violence between different local regions. In many cases these reflected differing intensities of local social and political conflicts. In some areas local military and civilian leaders were more willing to contain intercommunal violence than in others. In some other areas local leaders sought to deliberately promote such violence. But, regional variations notwithstanding, the killings occurred widely across the nation. In late 1965 there was no efficient, centralized government to issue a coherent policy of genocide or mass extermination of political enemies. But, there were widespread local anti-communist hatreds, which were easily linked with other local political conflicts and just as easily mobilized into mass violence through state intervention.

The legitimacy of the New Order has been built on its role as the restorer of order. The scale of the killings has served to consolidate in the public mind an image of the Old Order as a period of chaos and disorder. The New Order has used the historical memory of the killings in the establishment of its own legitimacy. The killings themselves are not given any prominence in the official histories of the New Order. They are certainly not justified solely as retribution by the New Order against the Old. Where retribution is suggested, it is usually presented as being that of the spontaneous actions by the ‘People’ against ‘communist’ treachery. This places ultimate responsibility for the mass violence at the feet of the PKI and its political allies: making that violence a consequence of the chaos of the Old Order, not the beginning of the New. In the years since 1966, it is the memory of past disorder, and not the details of the mass killings themselves, which the official discourse of the New Order regime has emphasized. If the engineered climate of fear and retribution in the immediate aftermath of Gestapo was important to the seizure of state power itself, the historical memory of disorder has been crucial in the subsequent consolidation of that power.

\[\text{\footnote{The picture gathered from informants in North Sumatra during 1969/70 indicates just such local differences within that province.}}\]

Establishing a contrast with the disorder of the past is, therefore, a crucial need. In the dominant ideology and political iconography of the New Order, the mass killings are a consequence of the Old Order, a signifier of an especially distasteful past. The heroes of the New Order are the seven officers who fell victim to that disorder (killed by the 30 September Movement) and those who brought that disorder to an end. The term G30S/PKI has been coined by the victors to emphasize the demonic forces of the Old Order, from which the nation has been rescued. The chief satanic enemy is identified as ‘Gestapo/PKI’ or ‘G-30-S/PKI’. Formulations about Pancasila, Undang-undang Dasar ‘45 (the 1945 State Constitution), and Dwiftungs ABRI (the civil-military ‘dual function’ of the armed forces)...

\[\text{\footnote{‘Enabling’ = authorize/empower/legalize something otherwise unlawful.}}\]

\[\text{\footnote{See, for example, such an explanation for the post-Gestapo violence in Hakekat Pembangunan Menurut Pancasila Sakti, pp. 9. Also the statements in 1976 and 1979 by the then KOPKAMTIB deputy commander, Admiral Sudomo, cited in Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia, pp. 72 & 80 (n.21).}}\]

\[\text{\footnote{The enabling function of the massacres is particularly important given the emphasis that the New Order state has placed upon order and constitutionality as a basis for its legitimacy. See Southwood and Flanagan, Indonesia, and Michael van Langenbarg, ‘Analysis of Indonesia’s New Order state: a keywords approach’, Review of Indonesian and Malay Affairs 20 (Summer 1986), pp. 1-47. I am grateful to Charles Copp for drawing my attention to the particular relevance in this case of the notion of an ‘enabling process’.}}\]
are used to stress constitutional order, political stability and cultural cohesion as products of the New Order state. Implicit, is that these will protect the nation from political chaos such as that of 1960-65.

Since 1966, the term Gestapu has come to signify chaos and disorder. In contrast, Supersemar signifies social order and stability. The two ‘icons’ of the New Order state, the Monumen Pancasila Sakti (Sacred Pancasila Monument), erected on the site of the ‘Crocodile Hole’ well in which the bodies of the seven murdered officers were found in October 1965, and the Supersemar document itself, emphasize this. In the discourse of both nationalism is subordinated to assertions of state power. Whilst nationalist sentiment has certainly not disappeared from public political rhetoric since October 1965, it has been subordinated to the interests of the state. During the pre-Gestapu Guided Democracy years, it was nationalism that had been the driving force in a popular rhetoric of revolution and anti-imperialism. Since Gestapu, nationalism has been made part of the hegemony of order and stability, and put to the service of a corporat~

The exercise of state power in New Order Indonesia has not displayed the sadistic brutality of many of the Latin American and African regimes. Yet, the deliberate control and manipulation of violence has been a consistent feature. State power, in the first decade after 1965 came to rest principally upon the effective management of violence, particularly through KOPKAMTIB, and the hegemony accruing from the post-Gestapu killings and subsequent restoration of order. Officially sanctioned violence against a defined category of citizens in late 1965 and early 1966 set the conditions for a substantial consolidation of state power. By the end of its second decade, the New Order state had built up a substantial apparatus of social control reaching deep into the daily lives of its citizenry. Persons and groups defined by the state system as ‘communists’, Islamic ‘extremists’, or ‘criminals’ have all been subject to the select use of violence (summary execution or imprisonment) by the state. The most dramatic recent example was the so-called ‘mysterious killings’ (penembakan misterius, or petrus), a campaign of state-sanctioned murders of ‘criminals’. The killings were widely publicized, thereby demonstrating state power in the enforcement of civil order through the selective, extra-judicial, use of force against a defined social group. In the context of the history of the New Order, petrus was a consistent expression of the state’s use of violence in the interests of its own hegemony.

The Gestapu affair initiated the greatest outbreak of violence in modern Indonesian history. The many thousands who resorted to violence in 1965 and the few who utilized it to build a strong state system were all responding in some sense to circumstances arising from the intense internecine conflicts that had beset Indonesian nationalism for over half a century. Prominent in these conflicts were struggles between ‘marxism’ and ‘anti-communism’, tied in with, and mostly determined by, primordial factors of cultural identity and religious belief. This long struggle was called upon to motivate and justify the violent seizure of state power in 1965/66. Both God (Tuhan/Allah/Dewa) and cultural traditions (ethnic identity, traditional values, etc.) were invoked to combat communism as ‘atheistic’ and ‘foreign’. By 1965, after more than half a century of an Indonesian nationalist movement characterized by intense ideological and physical conflicts, millions of Indonesians were committed anti-communists, ready to wreak violence upon their political enemies should the opportunity arise. In the event, the Gestapu affair provided that opportunity. Throughout much of small-town and village Indonesia in 1965 long-standing communal conflicts and rival visions about the nation-state together provided a volatile political mixture. To this extent, in so far as the ‘government’ in October/November 1965 may have been a bystander to the killings, the killings themselves were also part of a power struggle for control of government itself. In the history of Indonesian nationalism the mass violence of Gestapu, therefore, marks a significant stage in the relations between state and civil society. The massacres have, thereby, also provided both community experiences and a national historical memory which have enabled and legitimized the subsequent growth of state power.

The Gestapu affair and its consequences is significant well beyond the history of modern Indonesian alone. It could be argued that apart from Indonesia, only in the Soviet Union, China and Spain in this century has mass violence on a huge scale within the national polity also been utilized to build a state system vastly more powerful than before; and, in consequence, so markedly change the civil society within a generation.

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34 See Ijihakat Pembangunan Monumen Pancasila Sakti; and Monumen Pancasila Sakti (Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Direktorat Jenderal Kebudayaan, Panitia Hari Peringatan Kesaktian Pancasila, 1982).

Chapter 3

LOCAL AND NATIONAL INFLUENCES IN THE VIOLENCE OF 1965

Kenneth R. Young

Introduction

We still know remarkably little about the social upheaval within Indonesia in 1965. Among the many causal elements that shaped the course of events in that year, we know least about the underlying social tensions which, in parts of Indonesia, were released with such perplexing intensity in uninhibited communal violence. Given the passage of time and the consolidation of the New Order, prospects are poor for improving our knowledge of the sociological dynamics of violence at the grass roots. Hence independent research on these problems within Indonesia is positively discouraged.

We would be therefore left to rely upon established accounts of the violence, but for the fact that one encounters many people, Indonesians and foreign scholars, who have experience of those times. It is not likely that their separate stories will be published, and many do not want their material made public in an attributed form. From years of listening to such stories, and from information gleaned as a by-product of my own research in East and Central Java, I have a number of observations to make about the ways in which local and national influences combined to release the mass killings of 1965.

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As in other large complex countries such as India and the Soviet Union, government efforts to achieve national integration in Indonesia have to deal with differences which arise from the strength of complex political,
cultural and economic influences whose main focus is limited to particular regions. In such countries, regional developments are not just an embellishment of patterns determined at the centre - they are part of the substance of that determination. The question is not whether national considerations prevail, but to what extent they do, and to what extent these partly separate regional influences are being integrated over time into a more unified polity.

In Indonesia's case, I believe that a comparison of the local dynamics of conflict in 1965 will reveal a rather limited degree of national integration at that time. That leads me to question the extent to which we can generalize about the sociological dynamics of violence in 1965. The understandings we have at the moment are heavily dependent on material from East Java and especially from the Kediri region, and these cases are not, in my view, especially useful as a guide to social patterns elsewhere.

My own research in Java was predominantly concerned with the Kediri area. Therefore in the comparative survey of the interaction of local and national influences that follows, I will give most attention to the case I know best and most directly. I want to convey my sense of how much more we need to take account of the religious differences between Muslim communities in some parts of Java - the mutual alienation between those (often referred to as 'santri') who seek to conduct their lives strictly in conformity with what they take to be orthodox Islamic precepts and those ('Javanists', often referred to by the santri as 'abangan') who blend Islam with pre-Islamic beliefs and practices. I will argue that here in many respects these cultural categories, however combined, have limited utility for characterising Indonesian social divisions at this time.

Though we are still too much in the dark about these matters in many regions, there is enough material from other parts of Java and the rest of the country to show that Kediri was not 'typical' in a sense that would lend it to being the source of a more comprehensive model of the violence of 1965. The comparison of cases I review - from my own research area of Kediri, from other parts of Java, and from regions beyond Java - also show that local influences still exerted considerable weight in 1965. A further source of interest in comparing these cases arises from what they suggest about the course of longer term trends toward national integration.

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Much of the scholarly analysis of these explosive times is rightly given to the cloudy and complex manoeuvring at the centre of national politics. Once the fatal moves were made in the centre, however, an eruption of violence destroyed the PKI and ended the lives of innumerable obscure, minor victims. Any attempt to understand the tensions in society that made such a tragedy possible impels us to come to grips with a variety of local social and political dynamics. The accounts we do have of local events in these turbulent times are predominantly concerned with Java, especially East Java. These analyses invoke anthropological studies which stress a variety of socio-economic and cultural categories. Some familiar concepts, such as class or patron-client relationships, are used, and these might suggest the workings of patterns of conflict close to those in other predominantly agrarian societies. However, almost all authors conclude that these approaches need some modification (there is considerable disagreement about how much) to take account of the special socio-cultural characteristics of Indonesia. For example there is widespread agreement about the need to take account of the religious differences between Muslim communities in some parts of Java - the mutual alienation between those (often referred to as 'santri') who seek to conduct their lives strictly in conformity with what they take to be orthodox Islamic precepts and those ('Javanists', often referred to by the santri as 'abangan') who blend Islam with pre-Islamic beliefs and practices. I will argue that here in many respects these cultural categories, however combined, have limited utility for characterising Indonesian social divisions at this time.

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1 Cf. Clifford Geertz, The religion of Java (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). Another important and widely used socio-cultural category of this nature is "aliran". This is an indigenous concept (the word literally means 'stream') employed by Clifford Geertz to identify the major social cleavages which cut across classes in Java. He explains the workings of 'aliran' in such classic studies as The social history of an Indonesian town (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965) and in some of his earlier works. Another closely related concept, this time taken from the Netherlands, is the idea of 'cultural pluralization'. For an excellent discussion of Indonesian social divisions at this time is explored in Ruth T. McVey, 'Nationalism, Islam and Marxism: the management of ideological conflict in Indonesia', introduction to Sukarno, Nationalism, Islam and Marxism (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University, 1970). McVey's essay is an excellent discussion of Indonesian society and of the ideas used by scholars to understand it. Understandably the literature on this subject is very extensive. McVey's essay is a good place to start, but a glance through Margo Lyon, Bases of conflict in rural Java (Berkeley: University of California Center for Southeast and South Asian Studies, 1970); Rex Mortimer, 'Class, social cleavage and Indonesian communism', Indonesia 8 (1969), pp. 1-20; Rex Mortimer, Indonesian communism under Sukarno: ideology and politics 1959-1965 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974); W.F. Wertheim, 'From aliran to class struggle in the countryside of Java', Pacific Viewpoint 19 (1969), pp. 1-17; Robert R. Jay, Religion and politics in rural central Java (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies Cultural Report Series, 1963) and Koentjaraningrat, Indonesian culture (Singapore: OUP/ISEAS, 1985), will reveal many of the key terms in use, as well as the range of the literature.
geographic and social scope, and will not serve as the basis of an Indonesian or even all-Java pattern.

The point is rather that, by 1965 at least, the working out of national conflicts was still very variable from region to region. These regional patterns were not wholly separate, autonomous processes, but rather they easily assimilable in analysis into a uniform national pattern. That I believe, is an aspect of the study of Indonesia which we should be pleased to acknowledge, since it recognizes a fascinating but relatively neglected dimension of the study of the longer-term development of politics, society and economy in Indonesia.

The upheaval of 1965 can be viewed as marking a critical stage in the internal integration of the modern Indonesian state, and, less certainly, of the Indonesian nation. The nationalist cause began to realize its ideal after 1945, building from the dispersed, disparate and very loosely connected regional dynamics which clearly manifested themselves during the struggle for independence. The degree of national integration in 1965 was much more advanced than that of 1945. Now, after the passage of almost twenty-five years, the many-stranded connections between the national center and the regions are more numerous than they ever were. The mechanisms of control, of 'steering', by the centre are much more precise and reliable than they were. Local communities are not always encouraged to do more than act in conformity with directives from above, but when they do assert themselves they are much more likely now to see themselves as actors in the national context. This is all relative, since, even to-day, there are many parts of Indonesia where local functionaries of the state still tend to go their own way. In such places, officials and representatives of large private interests have constantly to balance the demands and perceptions of the centre with local realities, resistances and perceptions which do not match at all well the views of the centre.

In 1965, the capacities of the protagonists at the centre to steer their adherents throughout the nation stood somewhere between the present situation and the sharply regionalized dynamics of the national revolution. In the independence struggle, the centre served largely as a common focus of inspiration for ' ... a series of largely autonomous regional revolutions in pursuit of a common formal goal - an independent Indonesia whose contemplated content and character varied in accordance with both the traditions and changing social dynamics of each region.' The nationalist symbolism at the centre was a blunt, imprecise instrument, but powerful precisely because of its imprecision - it could be interpreted without much difficulty to match the aspirations of a range of different regional anti-colonial struggles. In 1965 the army was in a position to restrain popular violence, as it did in West Java, but once it chose to licence civilian vigilantes to drive against the communists, it set in motion dynamics of conflict which were deeply embedded in regional political processes, and which were expressed through local class and cultural configurations. Similarly, the collective ideological unity of the killers (as far as we are able to know in their perceptions of their victims, and their rationale for such extreme acts), were also variable.

There are difficulties which follow once we accept the importance of regionally specific variables for analyzing the violence and politics of 1965. The least desirable outcome is the mere production of a series of local studies. To avoid this, there are spatial, conceptual and historical issues which must be addressed. The spatial ones, as Heather Sutherland points out in her perceptive review of the volume on the national revolution edited by Audrey Kahin, are those of drawing the boundaries between distinct regional clusters of political, cultural and socio-economic relations.


4 Ibid., p. 282.

5 These struggles were undoubtedly nationalist, and therefore also supra-local, in orientation. The interest in this issue then, in 1965, and today is in exploring how and to what extent such localized struggles combined to make up the complete Indonesian national pattern.

6 Creating such a 'map' would be an extremely ambitious task. Something like this has been attempted for Javanese culture - see Koentjaraningrat, Javanese culture and Ron Hatley, 'Mapping cultural regions of Java', in Ron Hatley and J. Schiller, eds, Other Javas: essays from the kraton (Clayton, Vic.: Monash University, 1983). In her review of Kahin's Regional dynamics of the Indonesian revolution (Heather Sutherland, 'The Indonesian revolution: a review', Indonesia 42 (1986), p. 118), Sutherland remarks:
The historical problem is the choice of temporal perspective. Events such as the civil catastrophe of 1965 or the national Revolution, are, as Sutherland observes 'abnormal', and consequently it is desirable to view them in a longer time-frame, so that 'both the continuities and the aberrations become visible'.

The conceptual problems are no less challenging. They require specification not only of 'the region', but also of the elements of the internal dynamic of the region, and how, and to what extent, these elements are linked into broader national and international processes. One needs also to choose categories appropriate to the task of investigating how these inter-regional and centre-regional relations are changing over time.

My concern in this paper is much more modest. I simply want to establish that the major case (East Java) that has frequently been taken as the exemplar of the violence of 1965 cannot adequately elucidate the dynamics of communal conflict for Indonesia generally: that this case was too much influenced by significant local factors to allow this; and that a brief survey of these events from a selection of other places will show that they developed elsewhere in accordance with local political, socio-economic and cultural factors unrelated to the East Java case.

The Violence in Kediri

It is not surprising that the violence in Kediri was much worse than in many other parts of Java. 'The kabupaten was simultaneously a

Selection of units of analysis could ...[have concentrated]... on regions as defined by their patterns of interaction and behaviour rather than following the convenient residency borders. The very attempt to map out politically relevant boundaries would be fascinating, leading to an examination of local cultural identities and social relationships.

Sutherland, 'The Indonesian Revolution', p. 116.

Otto van den Munckenberg, Pieter Streefland and Willem Wolters, Focus on the region in Asia (Rotterdam: Study Group on Tropical Asia - Kona, 1982).

On this and other administrative and military terms, see the explanation on p. ix.


on explanations which confine themselves to national influences. Later, after looking at Kediri, I will briefly survey the conflict in a number of other parts of Indonesia to show that delving into the sociology of violence elsewhere would lead to the identification and emphasis of significantly different, but equally regionally specific, variables.

General Considerations (National Forces)

After independence, a number of the protagonists of Jakarta-based politics struggles, not always successfully, to integrate regional power structures into a unified national polity. Even where organizational ideological and bureaucratic integration was weak, the regions were often strongly influenced by political actions at the centre, such as the moves towards greater centralization of the armed forces command structure, or economic policy-making which led to runaway inflation or depleted foreign reserves. The following brief summary reviews national developments in general terms to show that these alone had created a situation of great civil tension by 1965.12

Since the 1930s, the whole country had been through successive decades of great upheaval - depression, war, national revolution - followed by further economic difficulty in the 1950s and 60s. During Guided Democracy in particular, economic decline accelerated. Inflation reached very serious proportions and conditions worsened for the impoverished masses. The great expectations stimulated by the achievement of independence and kept alive by party agitation were seldom fulfilled and, as the colonial era receded, a search for foreign and domestic scapegoats to explain the lack of general betterment. Party rivalries sharpened in an era of mass mobilization, great campaigns and extreme populist rhetoric. Traditional

12 The specific details of these developments are complex but well documented in a considerable volume of writing - see McVey, 'Nationalism, Islam and Marxism'; Mortimer, 'Class, social cleavage and Indonesian communism'; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno; Herbert Feith’s three works, The decline of constitutional democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), ‘Dynamics of Guided Democracy’ in Ruth T. McVey (ed) Indonesia (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1963), and 'President Sukarno, the army and the communists: the triangle changes shape' Asian Survey 4 (1964), pp. 969-980; Wertheim, 'From alien to class struggle', Harold Crouch, The army and politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978); Geertz, The social history of an Indonesian town; and Jey, Religion and politics.

In rural areas, the dominant economic classes as well as bureaucratic and traditional political elites faced increasingly bold challenges by workers and peasants. Open class conflict was complicated by cross-cutting cultural and communal identifications, and the patronage structure of political parties. Nevertheless, these potent rivalries tended to be channelled through political parties, whose organizational links ran through an amazing array of civil associations.

In the 1960s, during the Guided Democracy period, the PKI in particular amassed a vast constituency, and was opposed principally by the army, while the President tried to balance political rivalries in a volatile environment. The central contest for power became an increasingly 'triangular' - a tense and unstable situation focused around three nodes of power: the President, the army and the PKI. In the regions, the PKI sometimes confronted the army directly, as in North Sumatra, though the army was not always the PKI's most committed opponent; in Central Java, for example, the Diponegoro Division contained many elements sympathetic to the PKI. In Bali, the party's main rival was the PNI, while in East Java it was the Muslim parties and affiliated organizations.

In 1963 the PKI initiated a policy of class-based mobilization (aksi seperuh: the 'unilateral actions' campaign) over issues of land reform, sharecropping rights, and bureaucratic obstruction. The party also promoted the claims of peasants squatting on army-controlled nationalized estates. The tactics, scale of action, degree of reliance on confrontation by force within this general policy varied considerably from region to region. The campaigns were most developed in East and Central Java, but Bali, North Sumatra and West Java also were sites of large-scale actions.13 The main campaigns were in 1964. By late 1964, however, landowners had mobilized resistance through the PNI and NU, rolling back the PKI campaign. To

13 Herbert Feith, 'President Sukarno, the army and the communists: the triangle changes shape' Asian Survey 4 (1964), pp. 969-980.

its surprise, the PKI found itself on the defensive in this test of strength by early 1965, particularly in strongly santri areas, such as East Java.

All of these strains were intensified by political developments in 1963. There was heightened anxiety, conflict, tension and great uncertainty in public life in the months before the Untung coup. There was, therefore, an explosive situation throughout the most populous regions of Indonesia. However, the impact of all these developments, and the form and degree of violence of their resolution once the crisis came was not at all uniform. The full story requires further specification of historical, institutional and cultural factors, which show marked regional differences. The dynamics and the outcomes of the violence before and during 1965 were rather diverse.

**The Importance of Kediri's Social History**

The social polarization within Kediri between supporters of the Muslim parties (NU and to some extent Masyumi) and the communists was not an antagonism which began with party competition after independence. This conflict had a strong class basis, but it was also an expression - and a heightening - of inter-communal tensions which had a longer history. The most important of the social cleavages within the rural village complex was that between the pious Muslim santri communities and those of the abangan Javaneses whose religious observances blended Islam with vestiges of Hindu and animistic belief-systems. The unresolved tensions between these groups derived from Kediri's experience, in the early part of the century, of being a frontier area opened up by the sugar industry.

There had been ancient kingdoms in this part of East Java, but war, famine and disease in the eighteenth century had virtually depopulated it, apart from a small area around the main town, also called Kediri, on the Brantas river. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the region was opened up by Dutch corporate plantation interests, especially the sugar industry, and the region 'filled up' with a stream of migrants attracted by the highly commercialized economy. A high proportion (over 40%) of villagers acquired no land and came to work as wage labourers.

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15 Mortimer, Indonesian communism under Sukarno, chapter 7.

16 Geertz, Religion of Java.

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For these and other reasons, there were from the outset rather visible class differences among the new settlers.

The other significant consequence of rapid migration to the sugar-and-landnahme lands that were opened up in Kediri was the haphazard, side-by-side settlement of groups from two distinct subcultural areas of Java. The immigrants came mainly from two areas of origin - south-central Java (Cikarang and the negarigung around Yogyakarta and Surakarta), and the regjar wetan, or north coast, of the island. They settled in contiguous communities in a complex checker-board pattern. Residential groups, neighbourhoods which were often no larger than part of a village, drew upon the cultures they brought with them to assert their distinctiveness against the other immigrant groups settled next to them. Whether their cultural and religious differences sprang from a simple re-affirmation of beliefs and values prevailing in their region of origin, or whether they were more actively reconstituted in an effort to resist assimilation with other immigrant groups in the new settlements of East Java is not certain; in either case, an abundant repertoire of symbolic and cultural practices was available to distinguish the separate communities. Those from the north coast asserted their identity through their closer adherence to Islam. They established distinctively santri communities which then clearly fixed the contrast between them and the next-door communities of Central Javanese immigrants who, for their part, diligently 'preserved' their abangan way of life.

These communities never worked out a settled modus vivendi in the turbulent years that followed. These later decades brought the depression, the catastrophic collapse of the sugar industry, war, revolution, and then finally the era of open party competition.

Some of Clifford Geertz's analyses of aliran rivalries in the 1950s:18

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18 See Jay, Religion and politics.

19 Clifford Geertz, 'The Javanese village', in G. William Skinner, ed., Local, ethnic and national loyalties in village Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University, Cultural report series, Southeast Asia, 1959); Clifford Geertz, The social history of an Indonesian town (Cambridge,
suggest that the political parties of the parliamentary period, backed by their numerous affiliated mass organizations, gave a sharpness and clarity to social tensions which were previously rather unfurmed. However, the lines of inter-communal tension were already firmly drawn well before independence. The Madiun affair of 1948 triggered off violent clashes between the communities. Although the abangan were identified with the PKI, they were feared among ordinary santri villagers not because of communist ideology or political strategy, but because of their black magic and irreligious abangan practices. This remained the most significant part of the idiom of de-humanization used by their civilian enemies when they were attacked in 1965.

The party system of the period of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s both expressed these divisions and intensified them. Rival communal groups were socialized through party-affiliated associations which reinforced their separate identities, heightened class tensions, and stressed the ‘otherness’ of competing groups. Competition ran through many aspects of ordinary everyday life, so that rivalries were energized not just by disputes over land or economic advantage, but recreational events such as football matches. The sharply polarized situation was clear enough in the elections of the 1950s. In 1955, the PKI vote, at 33%, was about 50% greater than the party’s all-Java and East Java averages. By the 1957 DPRD elections, it had grown to about 40% of votes cast. The NU vote on the other hand was also strong, just over 20% in 1955 and about 23% in 1957, about equal to its all-Java average, though it was about one third less than the East Java average. Although the NU vote was lower than in other parts of East Java, the Muslim parties’ constituency was large and comparable in size to the PKI’s - the combined NU and Masyumi votes were 36% in 1955 and 34% in 1957.20

Kediri, therefore, was a region whose historical development had left it with closely settled communities markedly polarized along cultural-religious and class lines.

Land Reform in the 1960s

The confrontation over land reform was as sharp in Kediri as anywhere in the country. In some regions the land reform campaigns were pursued militantly, and the open class character of the PKI agitation was relatively subdued compared with East Java, but the tensions generated by differences at the time were part of a national trend. There were numerous campaigns against santri landholders, often involving complex disputes over terms of a pawning agreement or land redistribution order.21 The objectives on the PKI side were primarily class objectives, concerned with land and the terms of share-cropping agreements. The prescribed PKI doctrines and class categorizations had been memorized religiously (literally so - Jay notes how their rote recitation resembled the pengajian of Koranic texts by their opponents22). Their efforts to redistribute land were not restricted to Muslim landholdings. Perhaps the best known of the atak in Kediri was the Jengkol incident of 1961. The aim, on this occasion, of the communist peasants’ union, the BTI, was to occupy and redistribute long-lease rice land still attached to one of the remaining sugar mills in Kediri, run by the military. The occupation was made by as many as three thousand peasants. They made a determined attempt to hold the land and there were twenty-four casualties before the army ejected them. While Jengkol was the largest incident, I was told of others involving large numbers of peasants confronting the army in Plosoklaten, Plemahan, Ngancar and Puncu in these years.23 Furthermore, the old Dutch upland


22 The Jengkol incident is described in the Surabaya newspaper Data Masjarakat (November 1961). I am obliged to Mr Andrew Gunawan for drawing this and other details to my attention. See also the vivid description of the Jengkol atak in Pipit Rochijat ‘Am I PKI or non-PKI?, p. 29, as well as other incidents in Kediri, ibid., p. 40. Pipit adds details such as an episode in the Jengkol clash in which PKI members were said to have buried alive a bulldozer driver and a policeman prior to military intervention. I was told a similar story, but have chosen to keep the present account to the most essential details.
estates had been occupied by poor villagers from Kediri and neighboring residencies, and the squatters backed by the PKI had fairly successfully resisted attempts to move them.

As elsewhere, the political parties and their associated mass movements (unions, women, youth etc.) gave organizational structure to the civil conflict, but the fear and hostility that was channelled through the political parties was an ambiguous mixture of class and communal antagonisms, the intensification of deep seated antagonisms expressed in cultural-religious terms, which predated the formation of parties. The protagonists had struck out at each other in the 1940s, after which the lines of battle had become more sharply delineated by years of mutually hostile acts - mostly peaceful, but numerous and constant - during the 1950s. The demonology which had flourished on both sides then found violent and frightening confirmation during the aksi sepihak and the backlash that followed. What is important for the present argument is that, while the political and class antagonisms gave form to the actions, the extremity of the feelings on both sides were also, as Svein Aass24 noted from his fieldwork in Kediri, the result of 'the emergence of long-standing conflicts which had only a marginal relationship with the problem of agrarian reform itself'. These additional tensions give the dynamics of violence in Kediri a regionally specific character unsuited to easy generalization to other parts of the country.

Rumours of plots and hit lists flourished on both sides. The PKI organizations may have seen their objectives primarily in class terms, but they remembered the aftermath of Madiun, when victorious government troops and Muslim irregulars had systematically executed PKI followers and they too were not averse (in spite of party admonitions to the contrary) to type-casting their opponents as religious fanatics, especially as the poor abangan peasants saw their claims under land reform legislation blocked by local committees staffed by an unholy alliance of Muslim landlords and PNI bureaucrats. Their campaigns of occupation of land ('dropping') and confrontation of recalcitrant bureaucrats ('retooling') were mostly thwarted by the military or by Muslim youth groups.

fires of national politics, they would ignite this volatile East Javanese mixtu
and burn here with great intensity.

The Reaction to the Untung Coup

For a few weeks after the Untung coup, one of the influences of national politics in Kediri was to create uncertainty which held back anti-communist forces. They were unclear at first about what was happening at the center and doubted the 'reliability' of some local elements in the armed forces and bureaucracy. During the first week or so, Major General Basuki Rachmat, commander of the East Java military region (KODAM), seemed unwilling to risk provoking large-scale clashes, in spite of informal encouragement from military circles in Jakarta to move to crush the PKI. The commander of the infantry brigade based in Kediri was strongly anti-PKI, but not all of his officers were equally trusted by anti-communist leaders. The territorial commander of the Madiun-Kediri resort, Willy Soedjono, argued against the caution of his immediate superiors and advocated immediate firm action against the PKI. He himself, however, was regarded with some suspicion, and was eventually arrested in 1967.

Among villagers in Kediri there was fear and uncertainty during this period. Many stayed in their houses, and in some sub-districts they were advised to do so by local officials. On the other hand, those organizations which had been active against the PKI were prepared, indeed were eager for action. They only needed clear evidence of the PKI's vulnerability and assurances from the military to move against their enemy. There appears to have been private consultation among anti-communist leaders, some of whom had contacts within the military and bureaucracy. I have no evidence of similar moves among communist organizations, though presumably they must have conferred about what was happening.

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29 Ibid., p. 151.

30 The East Java military region had its own infantry brigades, one of which was based in Kediri. The main forces of the army however were organized in a territorial hierarchy of KODAM-KOREM-KODIM-KORAMIL (see pp. 10-6).


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The anti-communist organizations had institutionalized networks throughout Kediri, and could mobilize paramilitary youth groups, of which the most formidable was the NU youth group Ansor. It seems likely that they would have attacked the PKI in the villages alone, so the declaration of intent by the armed forces was critical to triggering the killings.

NU youth organizations were in action early in October in other parts of East Java. Their actions sometimes responded to, sometimes ran ahead of events in Jakarta. In the capital, the NU leadership had been quick to cooperate with the armed forces and other anti-PKI groups. This coalition set up, on 2 October, an action front ('KAP-Gestapu') to crush the PKI. On the 5th, the national NU leadership called publicly for the killing of the PKI and on the same day sent instructions encouraging such committees to give active support for this campaign. Starting about October there was a wave of anti-communist (and anti-Chinese) rallies in East Java, which led to attacks on PKI buildings. In Jakarta on the 6th, a mob formed mainly from Muslim youth organizations set the PKI's headquarters on fire.

In Kediri the anti-communist coalition was not mobilized quite this early. However, as the days passed in undiminished tension, the news of widespread unchecked violence against the communists buttressed the resolve and the confidence of the local anti-PKI groups. Their leaders had by this time satisfied themselves that they had sufficient backing from within locally stationed army groups. They had heard, too, of the swift actions of the RPKAD against the communists in the core regions of PKI support in Central Java. The army appeared to be rapidly gaining control there, though this was only because it had augmented its strength by inviting anti-communist vigilantes to participate. Clashes with the PKI in Banyuwangi further stiffened the resolve of NU leaders in East Java. Ansor leaders from a number of regencies in East Java met and agreed to hold coordinated rallies in a number of towns in the southern Brantas Valley (Kediri, Blitar, Trenggalek and others) on 13 October. They agreed that the demonstrations would conclude with physical attacks on local
PKI headquarters and personnel. So it was that the ‘Vigilance Rally of Godly People’ came to be held in the city of Kediri on 13 October.

This demonstration marks the beginning of widespread mass violence in Kediri. The rally itself was violent enough, eleven PKI members being beaten and hacked to death as they vainly defended local PKI headquarters. Once this was done, the systematic killing of people identified as PKI members or sympathizers commenced throughout the kabupaten. The Ansor demonstration of the 13th was a demonstration of strength. The crowd was huge. The passions of the demonstrators were first fired up by rousing speeches, then they marched off noisily to PKI headquarters, their progress resisted by a much smaller crowd of PKI youths. The encounter was one of chaotic fighting, but did not long hold up the attack on the PKI buildings. Before they were destroyed, the offices were ransacked. The Muslims claimed that they found documents showing that the communists had already prepared lists of their enemies, presumably for subsequent execution.

The viciousness of the fighting that day showed that there would be no quarter given in the coming assault on all who were believed to be associated with the communist party. The taste of mortal combat against a surprisingly ill-prepared enemy was an experience which galvanized many of the youthful Muslim participants, committing them to an absolutely religiously-sanctioned crusade of extermination of their enemies. Many, who were there today speak proudly of their deeds. Others who now have troubled feelings about what was done, nevertheless felt swept along by the collective spirit at the time. A minority were appalled and sought quietly to escape from the insistent peer pressure of their Ansor comrades.

The two informants cited by Harold Crouch (Army and politics, p. 147, and ‘The Indonesian army in politics: 1950-1971’ (Ph.D. thesis, Monash University, 1975), pp. 264, 281) belong to polar opposites in terms of their responses to deliberate killing. One expresses pride in his actions, the other left Kediri in horror of what was being done - private communication Dr Harold Crouch (for whose help I am most thankful). See also Pipit Rochija, ‘Am I PKI or non-PKI?’, p. 43f, and John Hughes, The end of Sukarno (London: Angus & Robertson, 1968), p. 160.

I know of no accurate estimates for Kediri as a whole, but for East Java more generally see the Report from East Java, Crouch, Army and politics, and Hughes, The end of Sukarno.
Their loyalties and hatreds were invariably set, too, by the accident of being born into a particular household and neighbourhoud, of being raised in a certain cultural tradition, of being oppressed by recognizable people whose faces were seen every other day. For such ordinary villagers, bound to the PKI primarily by communal loyalties and immediate class experience, the ideological antagonisms and political machinations of the capital were surely more than geographically remote, however much they were shrugged in danger should their political standard bearer be cast down. With great suddenness their cause was lost, and they were to die not only for what they had done and believed in, but simply because they could be labeled ‘PKI.’ To have the wrong friends, to wear such a label was enough to warrant summary execution. This awful situation moved the former剖s
clear indication of how much the violence in Kediri was not that of anger against relatively anonymous enemy, but most frequently that of organized murder carried out by neighbour against neighbour.

The victims were mostly trapped in a hopeless situation. Some sought refuge in the city (or even in mosques) in preference to waiting for the inevitable anti-communist attack. Mostly this did them no good. Those in jail or other holding areas were often ‘pawned’ to vigilante groups, or transported to a place of execution by the military, who handed them over to the civilian execution squads. The patterns of violence were not entirely uniform, but they were for the most part the result of planned attacks. Stories of peoples’ desperate attempts to escape are not hard to find. In Pare (‘Modjokuto’ of the Harvard-MIT study) the local Ansor leaders and the lurah tried to protect some of their peasants who were mere ‘taggers-on’ of the communist party...

... by giving them badges as members of Ansor or NU. They were gathered together, and coincidentally, there happened to be an operation by the military and Ansor going on. Seeing many people gathered together, the soldiers and Ansor asked the lurah who all these people were. The lurah, nervous and panicked, responded that they were PKI. Before he had finished speaking, every one of the approximately 300 people was killed.... This shocked the people, and within Ansor itself mutual mistrust arose. 

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36 See especially p. 52.

37 This pattern was followed, though with significant variations, in other parts of Java as well; see Hughes, The end of Sukarno, chapter 13.

38 Pipit Rochijat, ‘Am I PKI or non-PKI?’; ‘Report from East Java’.


40 Ibid., p. 145.
At times, the killings hovered uneasily between orderly ruthless and pointless chaotic massacres. There are nevertheless no grounds for describing them as unpremeditated or spontaneous. No one disputes that there were people killed who were in no sense ‘communist’, and one rarely encounters much doubt that those who were PKI deserved what was done to them. The central political interest of the army was satisfied if the network of PKI cadres and activists were liquidated, but there was at least one instance in Kediri where the inhabitants of a whole village, reputed to be solidly PKI, was attacked indiscriminately by religious vigilantes, leading to heavy loss of life by people of all ages.

In Wates, one of the southern sub-districts, the PKI gathered in sufficient numbers (about ten thousand) to attempt to march to ‘safety’ in Madura. This was one case where the military was obliged to combine with Anon forces to be sure of overwhelming the communists. The PKI group refused to surrender and lost 1200 of their number before they were subdued.

Depressing stories of individual tragedies are numerous even in published sources. Kediri had these in abundance. Not least of these, perhaps, is Pipit’s story of his encounter with crowds of starving five to ten year old orphans at Kertosono. These bewildered homeless children had been reduced to begging like dogs for scraps of food at the railway station. It serves no purpose here to dwell on the many atrocities of that dreadful period, except to observe again that systematic civil violence of such intensity deserves the most searching of explanations. Party political rivalry alone certainly seems to me to be insufficient cause for the suspension of all other consideration of shared humanity among neighbours.

After December the army re-asserted its prerogative in the exercise of violence, and the worst of the killings in Kediri were over. The great intensity, the special pitch of internecine hatreds, that characterized the violence in Kediri depended on the conjunction of national developments with existing elements of inter-communal hostility which must be understood in local terms. The social history of Kediri - as a region of closely settled immigrants, a region whose social antagonisms were shaped in the boom years of the corporate sugar industry and the decades of upheaval that followed its sudden collapse - reveals many important factors which gave civil and inter-group conflict in this area its distinctively uncompromising character in the 1960s. Elsewhere (in the kabupaten of Kebumen in Central Java for example), the termination in 1965 of the PKI’s influence was accomplished with nowhere near this level of violence or eager participation of the civilian population. We can now turn to briefly consider the pattern of violence in other parts of Indonesia. In some cases, as in Bali, inter-communal conflict reached, or even surpassed, the level of destructiveness observed in Kediri. However, it can be quickly seen that in these cases, the most destructive energy behind the violence flowed largely from local influences.

Regional Variation: Java and Beyond

In the final analysis, the violence in Indonesia in 1965 would not have achieved the catastrophic proportions it did without the deliberate decision of the army leaders to licence civil violence. They did so in order to amplify the force the army could exercise in the aftermath of the Untung coup. Certainly, there are instances - such as Pasuruan (East Java) or Aceh (Sumatra) - where the PKI’s local enemies did not wait until they were sure of army support. For the most part, however, had the army chosen to discourage civilian involvement, its prime political objective - the elimination of the PKI as an effective force in society and politics - might have been achieved with relatively few casualties. The number of deaths in Kediri would certainly have been much smaller. The clearest support for this proposition is probably the case of West Java. Here the regional military commander firmly opposed the use of civilian auxiliaries and the numbers of deaths were much less than in the other two Javanese provinces. There were, it is true, places like the coastal town of Cirebon on the border with Central Java, where many people died - `... the anti-communists [reports Hughes] set up a guillotine that worked steadily throughout the day, day after day' - but civilian violence very significantly curtailed. Clearly,

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41 Ibid., p. 148.


43 Fortunately this does not appear to have been a lasting phenomenon. By most accounts I know of from Kediri, such young orphans were adopted and brought up by other families.

44 Hughes, The end of Sukarno, p. 157.
the commanders of the army had considerable power to contain and prevent violence.

At the time, however, the leaders of the armed forces in Jakarta had other calculations to make. In their judgement, early and effective action against the communists required the mobilization of civilian auxiliaries. They were most uncertain of their capacity to act in Central Java where the regional commander was very unsure of the loyalty of at least three battalions whose commanders had expressed support for the 30 September movement. Elite troops were still needed in Jakarta, and logistics and political considerations complicated calculations about troop movements. The Dutch were most uncertain of their own ability to contain and prevent violence. The commanders of the army had considerable power to contain and prevent violence.

The violence that convulsed Indonesian society in that year was, therefore, more than the climax of years of internal struggle within Indonesian society. It was a political choice deliberately taken by the military commanders who controlled perhaps the only instrument of State policy that could be relied upon - the army itself. The army remained a coherent force while the civilian side of the State lost all the limited effectiveness it had once had. As Anderson observes '...the efficacy of the civilian side of the State apparatus disintegrated as corruption and...

Crouch, Army and politics in Indonesia, p. 265, pp. 268-269.

Ibid., p. 268.

Ibid., p. 272.
and politics were broadly divided by ecological boundaries. NU predominated in the populous lowlands where Madurese emigration had been very significant, whereas the PNI and the PKI were more important in the Javanese midslope region and the Hindu uplands. 51

In the lowlands of Pasuruan, the killing of the small number of PNI activists followed soon after the news of the coup and its aftermath reached Jakarta. In Pasuruan (unlike Kediri), Ansor did not wait on outside encouragement to act. On the other hand, the complex lines of conflict in lowland Pasuruan were (unlike Kediri) not so clearly NU against PKI, but more that of Muslim anti-Javanist against the non-santri minorities living there. Some of the first to be killed here by Ansor vigilantes were PNI members who had been prominent in Hindu-Buddhist religious organizations with a reputation for anti-Muslim agitation. 52 However, Hefner warns against the simple reduction of the violence there in 1965 along simple Muslim-Javanist (santri-abangan) lines. He observes in a forthcoming study that 'whatever its very real religious dimensions, the conflict was not in any organizational sense exclusively or even primarily about religion.' Hefner's studies 53 explore a complex local history of conflict in Pasuruan which has many similar ingredients to Kediri. In spite of this, it is a history which led to the entrenchment of dynamics of conflict which could not be readily anticipated from a knowledge of comparable developments in Kediri.

Hefner's carefully developed ethnographic analysis of Pasuruan shows with great cogency the strength of the distinctive local configuration of cultural-religious, class and political divisions in that part of East Java.

51 Hefner, in chapter 7 of his forthcoming book, Economy and morality in Mountain Java: an ethnographic history, says that Pasuruan had the strongest NU organization in all of Java. The same chapter also documents how Pasuruan presents a case, even sharper than in Grobogan (see note 50), where ecological boundaries mark off profound differences in cultural, religious and political orientation. My characterization of the situation in Pasuruan relies entirely on Hefner's superb analysis. See also Robert W. Hefner, 'Islamizing Java: religion and politics in rural East Java', Journal of Asian Studies 46 no. 3 (August 1987), pp. 533-554, and Robert W. Hefner, Hindu Javanese: Tongger tradition and Islam (Princeton University Press, 1985).

52 Hefner, 'Islamizing Java?'.

53 Hefner, Hindu Javanese; Hefner, 'Islamizing Java?'; and Hefner, Economy and morality in Mountain Java.

While it would be rewarding to compare these two East Javanese kabupaten at length, there is not scope to do so here. What matters for present purposes is to indicate that the circumstances of this time allowed locally-grounded dynamics of conflict full range for their expression. As a consequence, the blending of conflicts of national scope with these much more locally restricted patterns of socio-cultural, class and communal division produced a far from uniform series of actions, shepherded with varying degrees of success by the army. (At the same time the armed forces were themselves still engaged in an internal struggle to purge themselves...
of partisan political connections.\textsuperscript{55} First among the circumstances that produced such diverse conflicts was a legacy of the past, the still rather limited degree of national integration, be it unity imposed on local communities through the State apparatus (the trend within the New Order) or unity developing organically within civil society. Locally based political, cultural and economic relationships still retained a high degree of salience in public affairs in the regions. Given the crisis in central authority in the 1960s, and the army’s encouragement of local anti-communist groups, in addition to the rather limited penetration of State and even party\textsuperscript{56} control at the local level, it is hardly surprising that the patterns of conflict should be so strongly influenced by local considerations.

Kediri and Pasuruan are not far distant from each other, either spatially or culturally, in East Java. They still may be close enough to invite some kind of explanatory synthesis which might possibly work for a significant part of Java. But if there is barely sufficient underlying similarity between the local studies of the dynamics of conflict on Java to undertake such an analytical synthesis, would that help us identify a national pattern? An extremely brief review of Bali and a few other places will illustrate that this is really not feasible.

\textsuperscript{55} East Java had been a battleground of internal army resistance to centralized authority since the time of the struggle for independence. D.C. Anderson observes (‘Military aspects of the Madiun affair’, p. 53):

The struggle between the hinterland Javanese units, determined to preserve a mass popular army, and a high command no less determined to bring the field units under greater central control, was a principal theme of the revolution which pre-dated Madiun and continued well into the post-independence period. Within this military struggle over power and ideology, East Java occupied a key position as an entrenched and highly articulate source of opposition to the centralizing policies of the high command and its political allies.

Central direction was only established in the 1960s (ibid., see also pp. 35-36 and Anderson, ‘Old state, new society’, pp. 484-486).

\textsuperscript{56} Crouch, ‘Indonesian army in politics’, p. 153, notes that in the year prior to 1965, the PNI and the NU both found themselves bound by ‘the need to pursue one policy in Jakarta and another in the regions.’

The killings on Bali\textsuperscript{57} did not start in earnest until relatively late - the first week of December 1965. Here too the floodgates of violence were opened following action by the military, in this case army reprisals for the killing of a soldier in a clash with communist youths in Jembrana (east of the island). Once initiated by regional army units, however, the killing of communists was taken over on a large scale by civilians - but erupted in a frenzy of savagery worse than Java’s.\textsuperscript{58}

The massacres here were perhaps comparable only with the rapid wholesale elimination of the PKI in Muslim Aceh. However, there has been, to my knowledge, any serious study of the dynamics of communal violence on Bali comparable with the attempts to identify the roots of conflict in parts of Java. Nor for that matter has there been such a study for Aceh or for many populous non-Javanese regions such as West Sumatra.

The little we do know does not suggest any simple equation with Javanese patterns.

On Hindu Bali tensions between Muslims and Javanists (sanjid-ahangan and landlords are simply not relevant. Class conflict between poor peasants and landlords in earlier years had some relevance, since the PKI had successfully recruited poor villagers because of its serious agitation to implement land reform. However, it was also well known throughout Bali that pro-PKI landlords were protected by the party. Furthermore, the governor, Suteja, was a PKI sympathizer. Suteja had very close connections with the leader of the party on Bali, Gde Puger. Puger had prospered through this association, and the party had an unusual degree of influence within the State apparatus, especially in Suteja’s home district of Jembrana. Communist party practice, therefore, was hardly a model of scrupulous class confrontation.

\textsuperscript{57} The PKI’s major rival was not NU, as in East Java, but the PNI. The anger of PNI administrators, landlords and traditional rulers had been roused by the boldness of the PKI’s agitation in the 1960s, including communist attacks on the religiously structured banjar system which

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{55} Kent Hughes, The end of Sukarno, chapter 15; Crouch, Army and politics, chapter 5; and Kenston pedesian, chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{56} Hughes, The end of Sukarno, p. 175.
\end{footnotesize}
controlled many important aspects of communal ritual and ceremonial life, including irrigation.

Anger against the PKI was undoubtedly stimulated, as elsewhere in Indonesia, by confrontations over land and tenancy which community organizations pursued vigorously on Bali during the aksi sepihak campaigns. As elsewhere, landlords associated with the PKI were not seriously harassed. There is some evidence that, on Bali, deviation from the PKI, and by the peasants’ union the BTI, from strictly class-based action went further than this. On Bali, “...the BTI attacked not only [non-PKI] landlords, it attacked small peasants as well.” The organized BTI attacks (usually in groups of hundreds) frequently came after adverse decisions by land reform councils (dominated by PNI bureaucrats) against them. Many of the documented attacks were against fairly small landholders.

Whatever the grounds for anti-communist hostility were, they were clearly widespread and deep. Following the army action in December, the PNI mobilized its paramilitary groups (known as Tamins). The Tamins’ systematic programme of village-to-village killing using lists of party members (or following denunciation by local “informers”) confirmed a pattern rather similar to the actions of Ansor groups in Kediri. However, on Bali uninhibited mob violence was at least as significant as the more methodical activities of the Tamin groups. There were cases where whole villages (including children) are said to have participated in a frenzied hunt for communists, or in attacks on pro-PKI settlements. People I have spoken to suggest that political party identification was by no means always the first consideration in the selection of victims (though there is no doubt that the PKI itself was indeed thoroughly purged). While the PKI was bloodily uprooted from Balinese soil, it was also clear that “old grudges, debts and feuds were being settled” and that non-communist Javanese and Chinese merchants were coming under attack.

The RPKAD was ordered in, not to supervise the purge of the PKI, but to restore order. In a press interview, the RPKAD commander Sarwo Edi remarked: “in Central Java the people had to be aroused to oppose the PKI whereas in Bali the spirit of the people was overflowing so that we had to control them.” What we lack is a thorough study which might shed more light on why “the spirit of the people” overflowed so voluminously here and on who, (in sociological terms) the protagonists were. A model abstracted from East Java has little direct application. An elucidation of what happened on Bali would have to identify the crucial local influences (Balinese not Javanese) which merged with national developments to produce this complex (and at times almost chaotic) pattern of violence.

In the province of North Sumatra, where some accounts put the number of victims close to the number killed (perhaps one hundred thousand) on Bali, we find again that the army encouraged local youth groups in the capital city (Medan) to murder their communist rivals. The youth groups here were Muslim, Catholic and “Pemuda Panca Sila”, this last group including a fair proportion more interested in looting than in pursuing ideological defined aims. The class, socio-cultural, ethnic and religious profile of North Sumatra is very different from that of either Java or Bali, notwithstanding the large numbers of Javanese migrants there. The region stands out, not only for its sociological complexity, but because the struggles over economic issues in the decades prior to 1965 created a situation of conflict which does not resemble the parts of East Java I have discussed.

East Sumatra is a region of massive estates (tobacco, rubber, oil palm etc.), established originally by Dutch and other foreign corporations. The Dutch estates fell into army hands after they were nationalized in 1957,

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59 Keresahan pedesaan, chapter 5.
60 Ibid., p. 93.
61 Ibid., p. 93f.
63 Crouch, Army and politics in Indonesia, p. 154.
65 Crouch, Army and politics, p. 153.
so that in this region the PKI, through labour organizations such as SARBUPRI,67 confronted the army directly. The army therefore confronted radical unions for about eight years in its role as employer. The confrontation was not confined to industrial relations since the military largely took over the exercise of government in the region following the 1957 declaration of martial law.68 The army organized and promoted a rival, and ‘reliable’ trade union, SOKSI. The crisis of 1965 triggered off swift military action on the estates to eliminate the communists comprehensively69, the army’s purge being substantially backed up by members of SOKSI.70 Javanese killed Javanese heroes (as did Batak and Malay), but considerations such as santri-abangan cleavages, which were crucial in Kediri, had little to do with the patterns of violence in the Sumatran estate areas. Identifying who killed whom, and why, in North Sumatra, accounting for the interaction of national and local politics, receives insufficient illumination from models of communal conflict drawn from East Java. The dynamics of conflict in this Sumatran region in 1965 have to be understood substantially in their own terms.

Many parts of Indonesia were even less responsive to central influences than the cases we have looked at so far. Even beyond the populous centres of PKI strength, there were other parts of the country which experienced serious violence in 1965 and 1966. In these remoter regions there was little similarity between local political processes and those we have looked

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67 Sosialis Indonesia, Union of Indonesian Plantation Workers.
68 Stoler, Capitalism and confrontation, p. 143.
69 Stoler, Capitalism and confrontation, pp. 142-143, 162; Crouch, Army and politics, p. 87.
70 Crouch, Army and politics, p. 153. SOKSI was the Central Organizing Karyawan Socialis Indonesia, the Central Organization of Indonesian Socialist ‘Workers’. SOKSI’s selection of the term karyawan was deliberate: buruh (labour) in Indonesian implies workers as distinct from – and often in opposition to – the management; karyawan, literally ‘functionary’, refers to all employees of a large operation, including management, and implies no distinct interests on the part of labour; cf. Jacques Leclerc, ‘An ideological problem of Indonesian trade unionism in the sixties: “Karyawan” versus “buruh”, Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 6 no. 1 (1972), pp. 76-91; Jacques Leclerc, ‘Vocabulaire social et répression politique: un exemple indonésien’, Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 2 (March-April 1973), pp. 407-425; and Stoler, Capitalism and confrontation, p. 159.

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71 As noted before, my information has been gleaned from a number of informants whom I prefer not to name. I am however particularly thankful for pertinent material supplied to me by two graduate students – Paul Sutherland and Patricia Thatcher. I would like to thank them, and acknowledge their as yet unpublished work. See also R.A.F. Paul Webb, The sickle and the cross: Christians and communists in Bali, Flores, Sumba and Timor, 1965-67, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 17 no.1 (March 1986), pp. 94-112.
the PKI gained many members in rural areas. The PKI here was a part of reform, but it was in no sense revolutionary or subversive. Many of its members were Christian, and its cadres tended to be local Protestant teachers and clergy. The political ‘choices’ made in Nusatenggara in those years revolved around local issues, but they were no less fateful for that. When the army swept through this region - in some cases months after the killings had died down on Java - the retribution meted out to them gave little recognition to the ingenuousness of the ‘communism’ to clanspeople. I was told, for example, of the pathetic bewilderment of a remote tribal group rounded up because their names had been placed on a PKI petition by a member of the local elite.

It is unnecessary to elaborate on such cases. It is surely very obvious that the blending of local and national influences in many parts of the ‘Outer Islands’ often had a most tenuous relationship to developments on Java. Such places clearly do not fit a ‘national’ model of the dynamics of violence in 1965 beyond the specification of the major national influences (and even these were frequently mediated in locally distinctive ways). It is all a matter of degree. These are cases at the end of a spectrum. The variation is not merely a matter of geography or remoteness from the national centre; it depends on the different historical experiences of different elements of the Indonesian population and the variable speeds at which they have been, and still are being, integrated into the nation.

The integration of political dynamics at the grass roots with developments at the national centre was most advanced on Java, even though, as we have seen, influences in both directions were mediated by groups whose interests were still defined to an important degree within the idiom and experience of older local conflicts. Across the narrow straits of Bali local influences meshed with national developments in ways that were markedly different from Java. In North Sumatra, we find another pattern again, with the army well entrenched in the control of the region’s plantations. Here, consideration of the pre-coup period reveals a history of complex class conflict between the military elite and the (largely Javanese) plantation work-force - conflict further complicated by distinctive local configurations of class, ethnic and religious loyalties. The more one looks beyond East Java, the more the East Javanese and especially the Kediri case is put in comparative perspective, the clearer it becomes that Kediri is merely one local variant, and not a case that is readily generalizable to Indonesia more broadly.

Conclusion

We know little enough about the dynamics of conflict within Indonesia in 1965-66. We know something about parts of Java - though I am struck by the paucity of published information relative to what can be heard in conversation with Indonesians and foreign scholars with experience from those times - and next to nothing about the rest of the country. This regrettable lack of knowledge can only worsen as time passes unless more people with direct experience act to record what they know. I have reviewed my reasons for believing that, once we move from the gross fact of the declaration of war on the communists by the military, (supported by a hastily arranged but eager civilian coalition) to the consequences in the towns and villages of Indonesia, we will find no single formulation, excepting exceedingly abstract or formalistic ones with very limited social and cultural specificity, that will adequately identify the dynamics of the remarkably bloody civil conflict which followed.

I have argued that the patterns of conflict, and the blending of national and local influences probably had to produce very variable results from region to region because of the weakness of what might loosely be called ‘national integration’. The unity of Indonesia has always been primarily imaginary, both in colonial and post-independence times, by the military-bureaucratic apparatus of the State. The inculcation of a single overriding identity with the national community among all the peoples of the vast territory of the Republic of Indonesia (the creation of an ‘imagined community’ if you will - in Anderson’s words) is even today a widely shared aspiration rather than a fully realised actuality. In 1965 this kind of ideological unity was weaker than it is today. Popular nationalism and neo-continentalism was of course, as the returning Dutch discovered after August 1945, a most potent force. Nevertheless, the real political reckoning of just what that hope-filled dedication to the nation entailed had to be made once the unifying threat of Dutch return was removed.

The newly independent government inherited a difficult situation. Colonial policy had encouraged - indeed policies of indirect rule depended on - the growth and elaboration of local particularisms. The colonial state was extremely wary of institutions or social movements that could command mass constituencies. On the other hand, it positively depended on the

Anderson, ‘Old state, new society’; Anderson, Imagined Communities.
authority of minor local authority figures. The fragmentation was not just political, but cultural, linguistic and even in certain respects economic. Eventually nationalism, Islam and Communism, each in their different ways, displayed a capacity to articulate the aspirations of the colonized (especially the small numbers with access to education) in idioms which transcended many of these boundaries. Nevertheless, after independence, a poorly resourced State faced a formidable task in trying to forge a workable participatory polity from the diverse territories of the former Netherlands Indies.

The State itself proved to be a weak and, with the exception of the gathering strength of the army, a failing complex of institutions. In spite of this, there was undoubtedly a widespread popular will to hold the country together. Much of the striving to achieve the promise of the struggle for independence therefore fell to political parties, and to centrally-inspired mass campaigns. The mass campaigns of Guided Democracy reached a broad spectrum of Indonesian society because of Sukarno’s charismatic leadership, and his skill at mobilising support across party divisions. Nevertheless, his populist symbolism was given varying local and partisan interpretation, and the energy of the campaigns deepened divisions as much as they superseded them. The political parties seemed to act to break down local particularisms, but they were engaged in an energetic scramble to thwart each other and to create their own mass base through a comprehensive array of civil associations which touched not only politics but every aspect of organized public life. This mass base had to be created very quickly and by whatever means were at hand - inevitably this involved compromises through which older structures of local privilege and influence could be preserved. The PKI in particular made many such compromises across class boundaries. Therefore party competition at the local level was an uneasy combination of recently articulated conflicts given imprecise meaning by broad national symbols blended with older sources of intra-regional tensions and their existing symbolic complexes.

In these circumstances it is scarcely surprising that a crisis in central authority should precipitate patterns of action which owed as much to local influences as they did to conflicts of national scope. The identification of how these influences combined will require that greater attention be given to various regionally based sources of tension. The lack of uniformity across Indonesia is illuminating, not because it asserts a false (and ultimately simplistic) primacy of ever increasing restrictions of social and geographic scope, but because, in the longer view of the development of Indonesian society and politics, it is some gauge of the gradual movement towards a more inclusive national polity in Indonesia.

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75 Mortimer, 'Class, social cleavage and Indonesian communism'; Wertheim, 'From aliran to class struggle'.
Chapter 4

MAKING HISTORY:
RECENT INDONESIAN LITERATURE
AND THE EVENTS OF 1965

Keith Foulcher

Throughout most of the 1970s, creative literature in Indonesian was almost totally silent on the meaning of the events of 1965 and their aftermath in the lives of individuals, communities and the nation. During this period, remembered history seemed to have no place in the national literature, as prominent writers turned inward to highly subjective explorations of personal experience or outward to issues of international interest as subjects for creative expression. Realism and social observation in general tended to be replaced, among those writers who drew recognition, by experimentation with forms that gave expression to inner, psychic reality and religious experience. In 1979, however, history began to resurface, not initially in the mainstream or 'art' literature but in the burgeoning

This essay is a revised and updated version of a review article which appeared under the title 'Historical Past and Political Present in Recent Indonesian Novels', Asian Studies Association of Australia Review, 11 no. 1 (July 1987), pp. 87-99.

In the period immediately following the massacres, a number of short stories by witnesses or participants in the killings recorded the horror of the experience, often pleading for understanding or seeking to expunge the guilt of their author/narrators. These stories were discussed by Satyagraha Hoerip in an article published in the journal Budaja Djoja in 1972, and republished as 'Pemberontakan Gestapu/PKI dalam Cerpen-cerpen Indonesia', in Pamusuk Eneste, ed., Cerpen Indonesia Mutakhir (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1983), pp. 55-75. The stories were translated into English by Harry Aveling in the collection Gestapu: Indonesian short stories on the abortive communist coup of 30th September 1965 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper no. 6, 1975).
entertainment literature genre usually known as sastra pop or 'popular literature'.

The huge growth in popular literature in the 1970s was one of the byproducts of the expansion of the literate urban middle class in early 'New Order' Indonesia. It was a tradition of writing that was both free of the aesthetic concerns of the 'art' literature tradition, and unencumbered by the trauma of the literary politics of the pre-65 period. Within the 'art' tradition, major writers and critics of the 1970s carried strong personal and collective memories of that time, when they felt themselves to be the embattled centre of resistance against the increasing tendency toward the politicization of art and literature by the left. The 'popular' writers of the 1970s, on the other hand, were mostly of a younger generation who had been children in 1965, and so were less directly affected by the events which 'art' literature appeared thankful to be able to forget or ignore. They were also the youth of the 1970s, and they shared the general outlook of the youth culture of that time, enthralled by the glamorous possibilities of 'modernization', and yet also aware of the social issues and problems which surrounded it. Some of them saw popular literature as a means of communicating to other young Indonesians issues they felt to be of serious social concern.

One of these writers was Ashadi Siregar, a lecturer at Gadjah Mada University who had been involved in student activism in the early 1970s and had turned to popular literature as an alternative to journalism after the banning of the Yogyakarta student newspaper Sendi in 1971. In 1979 Ashadi published a novel entitled Jentera Lepas (Detached Wheel) (Jakarta: Cypress, 1979), clearly in the popular literature vein, but like his previous novels having a set of definite 'messages' for its anticipated youth audience. The novel concerns the fortunes of a family associated with the PKI after the events of 1965; its warning of the social implications of a generation of dispossessed young Indonesians growing up under the New Order was the first of a number of similar evocations of this theme in the literature of the early 1980s. Indeed, before 1979 was out, Yudhistira Ardi Noegraha, another and perhaps more accomplished young writer who was also on the fringe of serious and popular expression, moved away from the satirical humour and iconoclasm of his Arjuna Mencari Cinta (Arjuna in Search of Love) series, in favour of an imaginative portrait of the trauma of 1965 in Mencoba Tidak Menyerah (Try not to surrender) (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1979). This novel, ostensibly for children and told in the voice of a child narrator (like Yudhistira himself eleven years old in 1965), details the ordeal of a relatively prosperous and respected family in a kabupaten in West Java after October 1965. It covers the period from some months before October 1965 until late in 1966. During this time the narrator's father is imprisoned, released and finally abduced, not to be heard of again. The respected Jakarta poet and critic, Sapardi Joko Damono, in a review of the novel, emphasized its 'melodramatic' narrative style, and suggested it had more value as a social document than a work of literature. Yet it is precisely this conscious mixing of 'literature' and 'social document' which marks the novel important, regardless of the critics' qualification. Mencoba Tidak Menyerah tacitly rejects the literary conventions of the 1970s and contributes to the new development, the use of remembered history as a subject of creative narrative.

By 1980, a concern with history and social observation in general began to be transferred into the area of 'art' literature itself, initially as a result of the reappearance of left-wing writers gaolled for their political affiliations after the 1965 coup. 1980 was the year of the publication of Pramoedya Ananta Toer's Bumi Manusia (This Earth of Mankind), the first in his series of specifically historical novels, dealing with the awakening of Indonesian political and cultural consciousness at the beginning of the twentieth century. Other literature written at the time recorded the experience of political imprisonment, even though for obvious reasons it was slow to make its way into print. As this was occurring, however, younger writers not associated with the left, and not directly belonging to the 'popular' tradition, were beginning to take up themes which

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2 See David T. Hill, 'Alienation and Opposition to Authoritarianism in the Novels of Ashadi Siregar', Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 13 no. 1 (June 1979), pp. 25-43.


5 In published literature it is only the poetry of H.R. Bandahara, Dua Apar (Jakarta: Inkultra, 1981) and Putu Oka Sukanta, Selu Baru (Jakarta: Inkultra, 1983) and Tembang Jalak Bul (Kuta Lampur: Wira Karya, 1986) which has spoken directly of the experience of political imprisonment and its aftermath.
reintroduced the events of 1965 and their legacy into the mainstream literary tradition.

In 1980, there appeared the novel *Kubah* (Mosque Cupola) by Ahmad Tohari, followed in 1982 by the first of his *Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk* (The Dancing Girl from Dukuh Paruk) trilogy, published in book form after being serialized in the national daily *Kompas*. *Kubah*, published in Jakarta by Pustaka Jaya, is a story of change in the lives of a rural community set against the national history of independent Indonesia and told in the formal narrative style that had been largely repudiated by writers according to prominence in the 1970s. Its main theme is the problem of alienation and reintegration, the attempt by both individuals and community to re-establish lives disrupted and ravaged by political polarization and political imprisonment. It tells the story of Karman, who is enticed by promises of personal wealth into affiliation with the left before 1965, and suffers imprisonment and the disintegration of his family as a result. Returning to his village after his release, he is fearful of the community's response to him, but gradually he is reassured of their acceptance. The novel ends with a symbolic act of reintegration, Karman's making of a new cupola (*kubah*) for the village mosque. Similarly, an element of the *Ronggeng Dukuh Paruk* trilogy is the tragic fate of a poverty-stricken and traditional community with no sense of life beyond its own immediate surrounds which is nevertheless drawn into the national political arena by the manipulation of political propagandists for the left. In 1966, the community is destroyed and its hamlet razed, after it had been tricked into seeing a neighbouring Islamic community as its enemy.6

It is possible also to suggest that by the early 1980s the awareness of remembered history may have been making itself felt in the anti-realist literature of the Jakarta centre. The nightmarish world of Putu Wijaya's remarkable novel *Nyali* (Bile) (*Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1983*) bears no direct relation to history or observable reality at all. It is a story of inhuman violence and cruelty, and political betrayal and deceit, set in a world which uses elements of an Indonesian environment only in the way that twentieth-century America is recognizable in Western popular culture's vision of the technological future. In a publisher's preface to the novel, the government printer Balai Pustaka suggests that the author wishes to show that cruelty in human beings is unconquerable. In the publisher's words,

> "The novel asks us whether 'all our actions which appear to be good are actually based on something vile which is always in control of all we do'. Maye. But the blood which flows in Nyali's other-worldly kingdom, penetrated by the unidentifiable enemy and its pursuers, the social conditions under a developmentalist-minded military ruler who is the victor of a coup whose origins are unclear, and the regime's (and the novel's) stress on the 'enemy within' the social fabric all point towards recent history being a part of the 1980s collective consciousness, expressing itself in different strands of the national literary tradition."7

1 In his paper to the 1987 Monash University 'Trauma of 1965' Seminar, Ben Anderson contrasted the imprisoning cycles of violence and revenge in *Nyali* with Pipit Rochijat's *Am PKI or non-PKI*, *Indonesia* 40 (October 1985), pp. 37-56, in which a mechanism for escape from the cycle is suggested.

most prestigious arts body, the Jakarta Arts Council (DKJ). In 1981, he took an appointment as visiting professor at the Osaka Foreign Language University in Japan, where he has remained ever since. The 300-page novel Anak Tanahair was written in Japan, initially under a grant from the Japan Foundation.

Both the literary conventions on which it is based and aspects of the way in which it treats its subject matter make Anak Tanahair arguably not a work of the literary centre, as represented by Putu Wijaya's Matahari. It is a realist historical novel, in part a historical documentary, full of autobiographical elements and peopled by actual historical figures, either under their own names or thinly disguised behind pseudonyms. It is Aji's personal record of what it meant to be a creative artist in Indonesia in the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, when questions of personal and national identity went hand in hand, and when political pressures ultimately impinged on all areas of personal creative and intellectual life. It is structured in three parts, with a single chronological progression maintained by three different narrators.

In Part 1, the voice of the omniscient narrator tells the story of Aji, a young Sundanese boy who is coming from his isolated village, first to Bandung, on his way to live with his uncle in Jakarta, some time in the early 1950s. His father has died in the revolution, and his mother is poor and unable to cover the expense of his upbringing. He is a simple village boy, at first ill at ease in the urban environment and shocked by the poverty of his surroundings. In Jakarta, he attends a Taman Dewasa school, and soon finds himself drawn into a lively intellectual and artistic environment. As this occurs, Aji finds in himself the ability to debate and question, and comes to feel himself in revolt against convention. In discussion he is able to question religious dogma, for example, to the point where he even surprises himself. As he is drawn more and more into the life of the school community and its artistic activities, the novel begins to draw more and more on names and events familiar to an educated Indonesian audience. There is a lively debate, for example, on the issue of 'appropriate' content in a work of art, occasioned by Aji's sense of admiration for the audacity of Affandi and one of his artist friends in painting each other nude. Aji himself shows a talent for painting, and feels himself in the process of becoming an artist. As this occurs, he is also evolving a social and political conscience. We see him taken by artist friends to visit prostitutes in the red-light district of Senen, where Aji's attempt to overcome his inexperience and unease finally breaks down in the face of the reality of child prostitution, represented by a young girl who had been orphaned in the West Java regional insurrection.

This rebellion, the so-called Darul Islam movement, figures significantly in the ending of this part of the novel. On a holiday visit to his home village, Aji visits a school friend some distance away, and during the visit his friend's father and mother are both killed in a graphic description of an attack on the village by Darul Islam rebels. This event is important in Aji's development, for it confirms forever his distrust of religion as a social and political force. Back in Jakarta, Part 1 finishes around the time of the 1955 elections, with the main preoccupation of Aji and his friends being the rival claims of Indonesian communists and socialists, through their political parties the PKI and PSI.

In Part II, the story's narrator becomes Aji himself. We first see him attending the opening of an exhibition of paintings by his friend Hasan, engaged in a discussion of how appropriate the concerns of European artists, expressing themselves as alienation and loneliness, might be in the Indonesian arts. He becomes attracted to Hermin, a girl from an upper class background who is interested in art and discussion of ideas. Aji learns of his depth and ill at ease in her social environment, but the relationship deepens and, on her initiative, becomes Aji's first sexual involvement. With his new-found unorthodox relationship Aji keeps going further apart from social convention. He finishes school and begins to live as a painter, with a job as illustrator for a new arts magazine enabling him to rent a tiny kampung house for himself. He is friends with other young artists, both those sympathetic and those hostile to the left, and keeps with excitement the opportunity offered to him by his leftist friends to meet the painter Hendra Gunawan. Reporting the meeting, and the interest Hendra had shown in him, to his anti-communist friends, he is shocked at their reaction, and rejects their advice that he should have nothing more to do with such people. 'It is the anti-communists who insist that art should be free of politics', Aji tells himself. 'Isn't it they who are now setting up political barriers to friendship and interaction between artists?'

Following this development, Aji becomes more self-reflective about his art, and the vocation of an artist in modern Indonesia. On an assignment for his magazine he comes to re-think his attitude to traditional art, learning to understand that its bases and social function are different but just as valid as his own art. Meanwhile he continues to pursue the relationship
with Hermin and dreams of a future with her. There are all kinds of class tensions between them, however, which surface and cause a rift between them after a visit, Hermin's first, to his kampung house. Her family, come to learn, is associated with the PSI, and she believes, contrary to Ardi's experience, that independence has done away with class divisions that all are equal and free in a democratic Indonesia. An old friend Hermin and her family appears on the scene and exacerbates the tension between Hermin and Ardi. He is Asep, known also to Ardi but distanced from him as Asep is the son of a former official in Ardi's home region who is now a governor in Kalimantan. Ardi ponders with resentment the fact that Asep's father, who before the revolution worked for the Dutch, is now a governor, while his own father, who fought for independence, is dead and his mother impoverished. In a state of anxiety and depression over his relationship with Hermin, Ardi is visited by some leftist friends who are seeking his support for the Konsepsi Presiden, Sukarno's call for the creation of a 'genuinely Indonesian' political system in 1957.

In reply to their appeal for support, Ardi at first responds that he, an artist, not a politician, but the ensuing discussion eventually persuades him that artists should take a stand on questions of political importance. Indeed, this in no way conflicts with Ardi's beliefs as we have seen them develop. He signs the document of support for the Konsepsi, although he does not join the delegation to the palace out of shame at the state of his clothes, and his name is published in the leftist press along with other artists who declared their support. This is a crucial point in Ardi's story, because from this point on, circumstances turn against him. Hermin rejects him, saying she had always loved Asep (indeed, he was her former lover) and that her father has now forbidden their relationship because Ardi is now known to have become a communist. His anti-communist artist friends all desert him, and withdraw their offer of sponsorship for an exhibition of his work. He loses his source of income, as the magazine which employs him folds, and other magazines which previously accepted his sketches for publication now will not deal with him. Ardi remains faithful to his convictions, debating issues of artistic freedom and defending the rights of artists to political involvement, even as he is horrified at the polarization he sees taking place around him. Finally, deserted by former friends and without any means of support, he becomes ill. In this condition he is visited by leftist friends belonging to LEKRA, the left-wing cultural organization. They offer him a job, and sponsorship of an exhibition. Ardi is at first wary, but decides in full conscience and awareness that he can accept this further step towards 'involvement'. Part II ends with Ardi on his feet and holding an exhibition. Hasan, one of his few former friends who attends the exhibition warns him to be careful. 'Your work shows talent and promise', he says, 'but if you are not careful you will end up serving interests outside of art'.

At this point, the end of Part II, Anak Tanahair has shown itself to be a remarkable novel in a number of ways. Its 'documentary' nature makes it arguably a limited 'in group' novel, only to be appreciated fully by the artistic and intellectual community whose concerns it records, or by outsiders sufficiently familiar with that world to recognize the reference to works of literature and other arts, and to identify the figures shielded behind pseudonyms. At the same time, however, this characteristic is also a strength, indicative of a growing self-referencing Indonesian tradition, making concessions to the needs of outsiders and without a self-conscious need for 'universal' relevance. More importantly, it is the first time that an anti-communist artist (for while his relationship with the hegemonic centre of the 1960s was ambiguous, Ajip had no sympathy or alignment with the left-wing cultural forces of the time) has written of the challenge posed by the left in a way that avoids caricature and trivializing. Ardi's progression towards becoming a member of LEKRA is sustained and credible, even sympathetic. Ajip allows Ardi a well-drawn moral and intellectual basis for this development, as well as making room for the more familiar personal frustration and disappointment at his failure to gain recognition and satisfaction as an individual and an artist. We see, moreover, how the circumstances which Ardi faced were at a certain point beyond his control as an individual. Acting initially on the basis of personal conviction, the need to express a social conscience without wishing to become aligned with any particular group, he is propelled into a situation where his personal and artistic survival is only assured by coming to terms with the broader social and political conditions in which he finds himself. All this represents a way of viewing recent Indonesian history which as a published statement inside Indonesia is perhaps unique, and as creative work is certainly itself history-making. It is not a story of 'innocent victims' of a national tragedy, but a detailed attempt to illustrate the circumstances which might have
led an individual artist to make a left-wing political commitment in 1963 in Indonesia. 8

Ajip's reconstruction of history is all the more remarkable when seen in the light of his involvement in recent events which indicate how raw are the scars of the period of history with which Anak Tanah Air is concerned. Throughout much of 1987, the national literary journal Horison was the forum for an at times fiery series of claim and counter-claim on the question of the legitimate view of pre-1965 literary politics. Ajip Rosidi himself initiated the exchange by responding to a claim made in a ‘romantic biography’ of the critic H.B. Jassin by Darsjaf Rahman that Ajip and a group of young West Java writers, somewhat in league with LEKRA, had sought to sabotage the anti-communist ‘All-Indonesia Writers’ Conference’ (KKPI) of March 1964. 9 Ajip wrote a long article in reply to the claim, detailing his recollection of the period between 1963 and 1965, and rejecting the false and defamatory the claims made in the Darsjaf Rahman "Antaral Maginasi dan Hukum: Sebuah Roman Biografi H.B. Jassin" (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1986), pp. 263–267, and no. 2 (Feb. 1987), pp. 43–49.

His article points to the tendency of those associated with anti-communist cultural circles of the early 1960s to suspect the political motivations of those artists like Ajip who resisted formal affiliation with both the left and the right wing of the cultural political struggle of the period.

Darsjaf Rahman's reply to Ajip's article, while it dealt mostly with points of detail, maintained the general tone of the need for constant vigilance and action as the only means of defeating the left-wing threat. It was published in two successive issues of Horison, concluding in April 1987. The same April issue, however, contained an editorial essay by Arief Budiman, entitled ‘Do we have the courage to look at our past?’ His article points to the tendency of those associated with anti-communist cultural circles of the early 1960s to suspect the political motivations of those artists like Ajip who resisted formal affiliation with both the left and the right wing of the cultural political struggle of the period.

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written by Arifin C. Noer, and numbering among its actors such prominent figures as Umar Kayam, the film told with relentless detail the official version of the coup attempt, which led to the murder of six generals and the small daughter of General Nasution, before the future of the nation was assured by General Suharto’s counter coup of 1 October. While much of the film is taken up with shadowy recreations of clandestine meetings between the PKI and the coup plotters, it actually makes its bid for the sympathy of its audience not so much through appeals to the national interest as through repetitive affirmation of the sanctity of the family and children, which is violated by the inhuman and un-Indonesian actions of the PKI and its supporters. The detailed portrayal of each of the murdered generals as a loving husband and father, the focus on the suffering of families, and especially on the death of the five year old Ade Irma Nasution represents the film’s attempt to turn popular values to political advantage. The importance which was assigned to the film, especially as a lesson for those too young to have experienced directly the events of 1965, may be gauged from its widespread showings to captive mass audiences of students, civil servants and military personnel in the latter part of 1984. Stories of popular reaction to the film are varied, ranging from its successful confirmation of popular prejudice, through boredom and distaste, to antimonial military responses among some audiences of university students.12

In 1986, one year after the publication of Ajip’s Anak Tanahair, Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI entered Indonesian literature, in the form of a novel adapted from the film, written by Arswendo Atmowiloto from Arifin C.Noer’s film scenario.13 Written in documentary style and liberally illustrated with stills from the film, the book is more properly viewed as popular history rather than creative fiction, and is likely to be much more restricted in its circulation than was the film itself. Nevertheless, its appearance as a novel written by a popular and successful writer illustrates, much as the film, the need felt by the state apparatus to make its presence and its version of history felt within the sphere of creative discourse.


Placed within this overall context of the battle to define the recent past, Ajip's *Anak Tanahair* assumes an added degree of interest. The narrator's sympathetic treatment of its protagonist and his progress to the position of LEKRA artist may appear to be an outspoken reappraisal of a still very contentious past. Yet this is in fact not completely the case for the novel is compromised significantly by the climate in which it appeared. It goes some way towards reappraisal, but it ultimately submits to a reinforcement of orthodoxy. This only becomes apparent once the novel's third and final section is taken into account.

In this section, the last fifty-odd pages of the novel, Ardi himself recedes into the background, and the narrator becomes Ardi's painter friend Hasan, whose words closed Part II. It is Hasan who tells the final chapter of Ardi's story in a series of journal entries dated between 1962 and 1965, and written in the form of letters to a fictional friend. As becomes clear, Hasan is Ardi's persona, and the sentiments expressed by Hasan are those of Ajip himself. His letters describe the harmful effects of the politicization of the arts, the terrorizing of artists by the left, and the corruption and instability of the national level politics of the period. Hasan's own response is a deepening of his religious convictions and a thorough-going study of Islam and the nature of Islamic art. In the middle of his letters comes a meeting with Ardi, who looks well, but to Hasan is clearly tired in body and soul, deprived of help by his anti-communist friends when he was most needed of them. In the reported conversation Ardi speaks in formal and official terms, trying to convince Hasan that he should join the organization of Islamic artists, LESBUMI, and accept that the conditions of national life make individual identity an impossible luxury. Hasan insists on remaining unaligned, and comes closest to speaking for his own creator when we see him rejecting involvement with the anti-communist Manifes Kebudayaan of 1963, an issue also fought out between Ajip and Darsjaif Rithman in the *Horison* exchange. In Hasan's last meeting with Ardi, in September 1965, Ardi has just returned from an overseas trip. Hasan asks him out, to ask his help in assisting those artists who are being persecuted for their Manifes Kebudayaan connections. Ardi is shocked and horrified by what he hears, and confesses to Hasan that he wants to leave LEKRA. He has learned that artists involved in politics can't be free to create art. Hasan says quietly, 'Now you understand', but he warns Ardi to be careful, saying that once a member of an organisation like

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4 Thus, while aspects of Ajip's own biography are felt in Ardi's experience in Parts I and II, it is Hasan who represents the stance taken by Ajip during the period of extreme ideological tension before 1965.

5 The Manifes Kebudayaan has in fact been the subject of considerable and often passionate discussion in recent years, as individuals both centrally and peripherally involved in the events of 1964/65 have sought to 'set the record straight'. For a detailed personal account by a signatory to the original document, see Goenawan Mohamad, *The Cultural Manifesto* affair: literature and politics in Indonesia in the 1960s, a signatory's view* (Clayton, Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Working Paper no. 45, 1988). An enlarged version of this paper was published in Indonesian as *Peristiwa Manikebu: Kuisitasan Indonesia dan politik di tahun 1960-an* (Jakarta: Tempo, 1988).
LEKRA it will be difficult for Ardi to free himself again. To himself he expresses the hope that Ardi still has some talent left for his art. Hassan's final letter, dated December 1965, we are led to presume t6a Ardi has been killed in the aftermath of the coup. Hasan deplores the killing going on around him, and expresses the conviction that it will not solve Indonesia's problems. Communism, he says, will only be destroyed by a just and free Pancasila society. 'God has saved Indonesia for the present and only He will save us in the future.'

From Arifin C. Noer's Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI (the torture of the captured generals)

The function of this final section of the novel is clearly to undermine and reverse the ideological directions established in its earlier sections. The author himself intrudes, so as to define and justify the role he played in the events which form the backdrop to the narrative, and Ardi is forced to surrender the pen just when we, the reader, have come to know and understand him. The novel falters, and remains unconvincing, partly as a result of technical failure, and partly because of overt ideological manipulation of the narrative. Technically the intrusion immediately presents the author with a problem which is not satisfactorily resolved. A change in narrator of this kind demands a significant shift in narrative voice, along with that change, and Anak Tanahair does not achieve that transition. In Part III of Anak Tanahair, the narrator is Hasan/Ajip, but the 'voice' is the same voice established in the previous 150 pages as belonging to Ardi. Therefore, when we do glimpse Ardi in Part III, he speaks as a character in what we had come to see as 'his' story, and the focus of the novel becomes blurred and confused. (There is indeed no shift in voice between the omniscient third person narrator in Part I and Ardi's first person account in Part II, but its absence is not as damaging to the narrative as it is between Parts II and III, because there is no change in perspective in the transition from the third person narrator to Ardi himself). If Ardi had been allowed by the author to finish his story, the obvious sense of a flawed narrative might have been mitigated. Indeed, it is not inconsistent that the character we know Ardi to be should become the disillusioned and remorseful figure Hasan sees for the last time in September 1965. The internal logic of the narrative, however, demands that Ardi be allowed to reveal this process himself, and not to have the pen taken from him at the crucial point in the development of his story. But Ajip as author wants his own say, and so the reader must accept the blurring of the novel's main character.

That Ajip as author undertook this difficult technical problem, intruding constantly into the narrative, is an indication of how strong are the present day ideological imperatives governing the novel's production. Ajip's major purpose in the final section of Anak Tanahair is to establish the legitimacy of the stance of non-involvement which he took in the Manifes Kebudayaan period, and to indicate his ultimate rejection of any hint of sympathy with those artists who aligned with the left. As he does so, this part of the novel becomes subject to all the cliches which Parts I and II have so carefully avoided. Whereas, for example, Ardi discovered in Part II that the provision of basic physical needs of food and shelter inevitably impinged on an artist's creativity, Hasan in Part III finds peace and satisfaction in his art, avoiding any compromise with political pressures but without any visible means of livelihood and support. Where Ardi's views of Indonesian destiny are tested in rigorous intellectual debate throughout Parts I and II, Hasan enjoys an unchallenged vision of the Pancasila society and God as the deliverer from communism. The fact that these ideas do not emerge from
the narrative, but are reproduced in unmediated form indicates the extent to which Ajip Rosidi is mindful of the climate in which his novel is published. The present, in the form of Part III, subverts the historical consciousness which underlies Parts I and II.

From Arifin C. Noer's *Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI* (Detail from the recovery of the bodies of the murdered generals)

*Anak Tanahair* is an important book, for it is a major contribution to the tendency of 1980s Indonesian literature to begin recording and reflecting the experience of its readers as participants in processes of social and historical change. The past is being re-examined, as Arief Budiman urged in his *Horison* editorial. But although there is in that re-examination a sense of understanding and sympathy, present-day ideological imperatives demand that the sympathy be for innocent victims, individuals, families, or communities wrongly implicated in the events of October 1965 or politically manipulated into a position of responsibility for those events.

The large extent these tales of innocent victims in fact reinforce the guilt of the extra-literary actors, the PKI and those who knowingly and willingly participated in its ruthless pursuit of power. Clearly then, Wiratmo Soekito is right, in his angry retort to Arief Budiman that the past is also a part of the political present. As an art work, *Anak Tanahair* is an example of how uneasily the exigencies of the political present and the need to re-examine the past co-exist in contemporary Indonesian literature. 16

Since the publication of the novels discussed in this essay, there has been further coverage of the events of 1965 in at least two published Indonesian short stories. Those aware of are Anggia Putra's 'Penjual Bakso' (*Horison*, July 1987) and Nh. Dini's 'Petilan Kehidupan' (*Kompas*, 24 Jan. 1988). Both confirm the conclusion drawn from the novels that the remembered past is being both incorporated and compromised. Both are developments of the 'innocent victim of PKI crimes' theme. 'Penjual Bakso' points to the residue of the violence unleashed in 1965 and before, and 'Petilan Kehidupan' looks back to the experience of the wives of political prisoners after 1965. Both narrators are of the 19SOS, however. The past cannot be dismissed, but they themselves have adapted to new life in a new and changed society.
Chapter 5

RURAL VIOLENCE IN KLATEN AND BANYUWANGI

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Editor’s introduction.

Some of the heaviest killing in 1965-66 took place in the Central Javanese region of Klaten, lying on the lower slopes of Mount Merapi between Solo and Yogyakarta. This study was prepared by a research team from Gadjah Mada University and examines especially the relationship between the rising tensions in the countryside and the campaign of direct action (aksi sepihak) by the PKI and its peasant affiliate the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesia Peasants’ Front) to carry out the land reform laws of 1959-60. Implementation of these laws had run aground and a shoal of bureaucratic delay and resistance encouraged by rural landholders.

The study traces the origins of the aksi sepihak in Klaten from February and March 1964, when the BTI organized public meetings to demand land for the peasants and the crushing of what were described as the ‘seven village devils’. Aksi sepihak then began to take place in various

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1 From Pusat Penelitian dan Studi Podesaan & Kawasan Universitas Gadjah Mada, Laporan tentang studi mengenai keresahan pedesaan pada tahun 1960-an (Jakarta: Yayasan Pancasila Sakti, 1982), pp. 42-74. The text shows evidence of hasty compilation, perhaps by a committee; sections announced at the beginning of chapters are missing and the order of paragraphs is confused. To make the material more readily accessible to the reader, the text has been has been both edited and in some cases substantially rearranged. Except where noted, footnotes are from the original text.
The research team recorded a total of sixty-one such actions in the Klaten region in 1964, clustered in the periods February-July and October-December. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the incidents described is that they had to do with land which had only recently been alienated from its former peasant owners. While the seizure of land was accompanied by an assertion of the rights of villagers in general to take in the harvest, the actions were most clearly aimed at rescuing previously landholding peasants from the slide into landlessness.

Perhaps most important, the study sheds light on the level of violence in central Java after the coup and before the mass killings began. In the reporting of the time, regional branches of the PKI were accused not only of launching Gestapu-like local operations to remove conservative military officers (see the introduction to ‘Crushing the G30S/PKI in Central Java’), but were alleged to have launched more general actions against their political opponents in the countryside. Arthur Dommen reported an extensive killings in the Klaten-Boyolali area of Central Java in which two hundred and fifty PNI and NU leaders were murdered and some fifteen thousand people fled. Such reports, whether true, partly true or wholly false, helped to create the atmosphere of ‘kill-or-be-killed’, which many writers have pointed out lay behind some of the ferocity of the massacres.

The Gadjah Mada study unfortunately does not follow the course of events in Jlobo, Kraguman and Milese beyond the aksi sepihak into the period of the massacres. We do not discover what became of Harjosuwito, Jokosurkarno and Lulut Sunarno. Instead the focus shifts to other parts of the Klaten region, describing PKI activities before and after the coup, as recalled by their opponents, and re-creating the sense of fear and uncertainty which pervaded the non-communist communities of the region. The study ends with the remark, ‘tension subsided and calm was restored.’ For the non-communists this was so, but it points to the fact that the large

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2 For an explanation of this and other administrative and military terms, see note 3 on p. 120.
scale killings began only after the non-communist forces were assured of victory.

Aksi Sepihak

The following passages are accounts of several aksi sepihak protests organized by the BTI in the Klaten region. We begin with an account of a protest which aimed at regaining control over land which had earlier been rented out. Harjosuwito was a *kuli kenceng* who lived in the *k室友rah* of Jlobo, in Wonosari kecamatan. In 1957 he rented out one *pek* [about 0.45 hectare] of his rice field to Dulkamdi for a period of five years. The rental contract was ratified by the local village head. Before the end of the agreed five year period, the term was extended for a further five years. This extension was not ratified by the lurah. After the first three years of this extension, Harjosuwito requested the return of his land. Dulkamdi refused, and Harjosuwito reported the case to the village head who, in turn, conveyed it to the kecamatan Land Reform Committee, which decided in Dulkamdi's favour.

After failing to achieve his objectives by means of negotiation, Harjosuwito took action. On 19 February 1965 he began to work the land without Dulkamdi's permission, assisted by perhaps five hundred people, who came from the kelurahan of Sukoharjo, Lumbungkerep, Kingkang and Granting in Wonosari and from Mojorejo and Carikan in Juwiring. One third of them were women from Jlobo kelurahan. One of them brought two buffaloes to plough and harrow the soil, and with the help of these people Harjosuwito was able to plant the field with rice seedlings.

Similar action aimed at regaining control over rented land was organized in the kelurahan of Kraguman in Jogonalan kecamatan. In 1962 a farmer with a small plot of land named Joyosukarno pawned his land to a certain Suharto for Rp. 50,000. An oral agreement between the two set the contract at ten years, although the written contract made by the lurah had stated it as seven. The camat of Jogonalan refused to ratify the new contract, but the lurah nevertheless regarded it as valid. After two years, Joyosukarno decided to redeem his land, according to the 1960 land reform law which stated that redemption was possible before the agreed time limit. Joyosukarno was represented at the negotiations by Suradi, Suharjo, Mitropawiro and Hardomintoyo, well-known BTI figures in Jogonalan.

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5 A small farmer owning a house and some agricultural land. *Ed.*
since the BTI wanted to help him fight his case. Suharto, however, refused to hand the land over.

Once negotiations had failed, the BTI decided to take action. On 16 March 1964 the BTI organized an aksi sepihak on Joyosukarno's behalf. According to Joyosutarno, a police officer in the Gondangwagun District, at around 2.00 p.m. on 25 March, about two hundred men and women began to work the disputed land. Dozens of women harvested the rice manually while behind them the men hoed and ploughed the land. The harvested rice was then taken to Joyosukarno's house.6

In other regions, direct action was used to regain control of land which had earlier been sold. In the kelurahan of Mlese in Gantiwamo kecamatan, for instance, another wage labourer, Surosentono, had sold two blocks of sawah [rice field] to Sudarmono in 1940. Surosentono was then given the right to work half of one of those blocks, while Sudarmono worked the remainder.7 In 1960, Surosentono asked if he could buy back the land. Sudarmono refused, and the case was taken before the Klitan council, which decided in favour of Sudarmono. Nevertheless Surosentono retained the right to work his half block on a mortel share-cropping basis.

In May 1964, Surosentono decided to work Sudarmono's section of the block after Sudarmono's crop had been harvested. Surosentono was assisted in this work by members of the BTI. As the BTI members went to work, the commander of the PUTERPRA (Perwira Urusan Territorial dan Pertahanan Rakyat, Territorial and Civil Defence Officer) in Gantiwamo stood at the edge of the village, not far from the activity, and said: 'Terusro lehmu do nggarap sawah. Mengko yen wong teliSaren. If the PNI come, I'll shoot them.' With BTI help Surosentono was able to work the land successfully.

Several days after this aksi sepihak, Sudarmono and several well known figures from the Gantiwamo PNI met to discuss how to counter the BTI actions. Twenty days after Surosentono's aksi sepihak, Sudarmono decided to work his section of the block, with the help of eight members of the BTI.

6 In former times, it was customary that all members of a village could take part in the harvest and would receive a share of crop in exchange for their work. Ed.

7 Complex tenure-ownership relationships such as these were not uncommon in rural Java. See Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution: the process of ecological change in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963). Ed.

By May 1964 the peasants of Cucukan had finished harvesting their rice fields. Lulut had also finished and began planting a new crop. Three weeks after Lulut had finished planting, Sugito decided to work the land which he had rented. Early one morning in May, at around 6.00 a.m., others PNI members waited nearby. The BTI apparently found out what was happening and approached the eight PNI people who were hoeing Sudarmono's land. Two of the eight were forcibly taken to Sumbiyono's house in Mlese, where they were questioned on a variety of matters, before being allowed to return to the rice field.

While this was happening, BTI and PNI members gathered near the rice field being worked by Sudarmono. Numbers grew and two tight groups formed. Both showed their feelings of animosity. The atmosphere became increasingly tense and members of the PNI began to worry that a physical confrontation might develop. One of them reported what was happening to the Gondangwagun District Police and soon afterwards four armed police officers arrived on the scene. The police explained to both groups that they could not permit any action which might promote physical conflict between Indonesian citizens. The police spoke at length and tried to soothe the tension. They then instructed the people to leave the area.

A further example of aksi sepihak, this time aiming to regain control of land which had earlier been auctioned, was an incident which took place in the kelurahan of Cucukan in Prambanan kecamatan. The village secretary of Cucukan provided the following account of the incident. The disputed land had previously been a 2000m² reservoir belonging to the village administration and it was the policy of the kelurahan to rent it out every year. In 1962 a peasant from Cucukan with a small holding of his own named Lulut Sunarno obtained the right to work the land. At the end of his first year, however, Lulut had still not paid rent to the kelurahan, and he continued to work the land into the following year even though the rental period had ended. As in previous year he refused to pay his rent. Because the rental period had formally ended, the Cucukan kelurahan administration auctioned the lease again in 1963 and it was bought by a peasant named Sugito from the kampung of Saren in Cucukan, who was a member of the PNI. Lulut's right to work the field had by now been formally rescinded by the administration, but he stayed put. Seeing Lulut's attitude, Sugito was afraid to exercise his own rights over the land. The Prambanan administration, however, advised Sugito to work the land immediately, and guaranteed to protect him while he did so.
Sugito began to work the land, with the help of several members of the Pemuda Marhaenis including Suwarno, Saryono, Muhadi and Sumanto. The Prambanan administration also sent along the commander of the Prambanan Police Sector, Inspector Mulyono, and two aides, Yahmin and Projo. Suhardi from the pagar praja [village defence corps] represented the kecamatan administration. No-one came from the Prambanan military command. The youth from the Pemuda Marhaenis helped Suwarto enthusiastically. Four cattle were produced in order to plough and harrow the field and the field was guarded by police officers, the pagar prajan, as well as several members of the Pemuda Marhaenis.

When the work was half finished a group of Pemuda Rakyat, including Suwarto, Suroyo, Dono and Anto, arrived on the scene, and tried to get the reins of the harrow which was being operated by Suharno. Suman sapelle to stop him. Suwarto did indeed stop, but more and more members of Pemuda Rakyat and the Pemuda Marhaenis began to arrive at the field. The situation became chaotic and neither the police nor the pagar praja officials could control it. Not long afterwards the sound of a drum could be heard from the village of Manisrenggo. The situation became even more chaotic.

Marhaenis began to arrive at the field. The situation became chaotic and neither the police nor the pagar praja officials could control it. Not long afterwards the sound of a drum could be heard from the village of Manisrenggo. The situation became even more chaotic. More and more drums began to beat, the sound spreading from village to village. Members of the BTI began to arrive from all four points of the compass, carrying objects which could be used as weapons, such as hoes, sickles and hammers.

The new arrivals from the BTI and Pemuda Rakyat gathered together around the field, in their thousands. They came from areas including the kelurahan of Taji and from Prambanan, Manisrenggo, Jogonalan and Gantiwarno. The situation in the rice field became even more chaotic as BTI members continued to try and obstruct the work. More and more Pemuda Rakyat went into the field. The four cows which were pulling the plough and harrow were pulled indiscriminately over the furrows. One of the BTI members said: ‘Are you tired of eating rice? [i.e. are you tired of living]? Why have you taken someone else’s sawah?’ in the midst of the panic Suhardi fired his pistol once into the air. This was followed by two shots from Yamin. Suhardi then screamed to the BTI member: ‘Alright, we had better go and discuss all this in the kelurahan office.’

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8 Marhaenis Youth, a youth wing of the PNI. Ed.
9 People’s Youth, a youth wing of the PKI. Ed.
The Seven Village Devils Campaign and PKI Preparations for Rebellion

Several months prior to September 1965 there was a meeting of PKI branches in Klaten, organized by the Klaten branch and attended by representatives from twenty-three other branches. One of the resolutions carried by the meeting was to urge all classes within society to eliminate what the PKI called the 'Seven Village Devils'. These were: 1) landowners; 2) usurers; 3) people who bought padi at very low prices before it was harvested (penebas); 4) middlemen (tengkulak); 5) rural bandits; 6) embezzlers; and 7) bureaucratic capitalists.

Utilizing the Confrontation with Malaysia as a front, the PKI provided military training for all members of the Pemuda Rakyat. The following forces received his training: 1) a crack force (kekuatan inti) of five platoons to be based in the city - one platoon was trained from each of the five districts; 2) a platoon from the Pemuda Rakyat to be based in every village (desa/kelurahan); 3) a platoon of Pemuda Rakyat for every hamlet (kampung/perdukuhan); 4) and a special platoon consisting of eleven members: Suwandi, Ratno, Darmo, Mujio, Harjo, Partono, Pasikuon, Kuwaji, Tentoes, Suwandi and Pariman. This special platoon was led by Sumarto. Its brief was to commit murders and kidnappings. The members of this platoon had to display the highest degree of loyalty to the party in carrying out this bloodthirsty work, even to the extent of murdering their own relatives.

One particular task of this special platoon was to kill Village Devils whose names appeared on specially prepared lists. Before this task was carried out each list had to be ratified by the Sector Committees. Military training was provided by BUTERPRA (Bintara Urusan Territorial Pertahanan Rakyat, Territorial and Civil Defence Officer) at the kecamatan level. Several months prior to September 1965 military training under the auspices of preparations for crushing Malaysia was carried out in Prambanan. Members of Pemuda Rakyat took part in these exercises which included the assembling and disassembling of weapons.

Another part of the total PKI strategy was training to take power and control of the economy. At the village level the PKI proposed that all village heads aligned with the party should direct money collected from taxes and other charges to it rather than to the government. Trades of wealthy were requested to provide monetary contributions for buying vehicles and other necessary equipment for the party. Some time before the end of September, all PKI sympathizers were requested to provideinha one kilogram of rice. In the PKI view, anyone in Prambanan who did not support the movement belonged to one of the seven categories of Village Devils. There was a plan to kill a number of these people.

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The facts upon which this section is based are drawn from interviews carried out in the Prambanan region during June and July 1975.

The breakaway left-wing branch of the Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia (Teachers Association of the Republic of Indonesia) which was not part of the PNI-affiliated GSBI trade union federation (vak sentral). See also Kenneth Orr's chapter in this volume. Ed.
is located in the midst of a number of closely knit hamlets, and it is easy for outsiders to distinguish it from the rest. A number of guard posts were erected in a layered formation in the surrounding area, making it difficult for attackers to reach Klentengan undetected. It was easy to escape from this cluster of hamlets as was proven during the military operation which were carried out at the beginning of November 1965.

The mobilization of PKI forces just prior to 30 September 1965 was felt throughout the whole community. Apart from the special platoons and the platoons drawn from Pemuda Rakyat, the PKI also made all other inhabitants of the villages do guard duty and work in the interests of the party. The PKI leadership planned to use non-communist forces to further the party's interests. Because these forces were a minority they had either to submit to the PKI's wishes or risk being killed. Orders and instructions were often accompanied by threats. Every outsider who entered a PKI area had first to pass through a security screen and be interrogated by the PKI members. All inhabitants of the villages were obliged to participate in the guarding of their village, on the grounds that HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Muslim Students Association) was ready to seize power in the region. The PKI leadership also utilized informal leadership ties to extend their influence. The area around Klentengan and Watuileler to the north of Prambanan, was known as a centre of criminal activity. Two well known criminals were Karsopendek and Arjoslamet. They were known as petut (gangsters) and were feared by all. The PKI used them to kill several non-communists in Prambanan.

Anti-communist Counter-measures

One of the main tasks of both communist and non-communist youth was to maintain security in their respective villages. In areas in which communists were a minority, their every move was closely watched by the non-communists. Village administrations controlled by the PNI made it clear to PKI members that if they did not follow the orders or instructions given to them then their safety could not be guaranteed. But despite such warnings, communists usually preferred to leave their own village and join their comrades in other villages.

Since the 1950s, the term _nasionalis_ has tended to shrink in scope from denoting general commitment to Indonesian nationalism to implying no more than membership of an association with the Nationalist Party, PNI. The banteng or wild bull, mentioned below, is the PNI party symbol. *Ed.*
back. They were armed with *parang* (broad-bladed knives), *linggis* (crowbars) and *keris* (short swords or daggers).

During the night the sound of wooden drums could be heard clearly by all inhabitants of Prambanan. The sound caused alarm among the population but for certain members of the community it meant that some form of action had to be taken quickly. The non-communists were overthrown by fear and doubt. Communication was difficult as their homes were dispersed, though it was also difficult for communist activists to maintain contact with their leaders.

Several villages located relatively close to the main road became targets of communist action. These included Randusari, Joho, Bajran, Perang and Geneng. The village secretary (carik) of Bajran was the only non-communist in his kampung. All his neighbours were PKI members and became extremely frightened and decided to take refuge in the kecamatan office, since the lurah of Bajran was also a member of the PNI and could be relied upon to help. On his way to the lurah's house, he came across a tree trunk laid across the road. A group of young people were walking along the main road in a state of constant alert and they watched him suspiciously as he passed. On the other side of the bridge he could see bits of wood scattered all over the road. This wood was clearly from the door of Amat Darum's house in Klongkangan. It had been destroyed by a group of youth because Darum's son, Huri, was a member of the Pemuda Marhaenis. The carik then decided to head instead for the Prambanan kecamatan office, where he met several well known PNI figures, as well as large numbers of sympathizers and village officials who had taken refuge there because they were afraid of the terrorist activities of the PKI. The lurah of Barukan in Manisrenggo kecamatan was also present. The communist coup in Manisrenggo had not yet taken place [see below], but the Prambanan camat had convinced him that he was one of the most important people in Manisrenggo and that his life would be in danger if he returned.

With the help of lurah of Barukan, the camat of Prambanan formed a Command Team (Tim Komando) of non-communist party leaders, under his direct control. No members of the police force or BUTERGRA were invited, as both these forces has fallen under the influence of the PKI. The Team was aided by communications, supply and logistics departments and by a secretariat. The carik of Bajran was entrusted with logistical matters.

In order to counter every possible eventuality, young people were ordered to position themselves in strategic locations. The group of youth who were located at the front gate were accompanied by several pagar praja dressed in uniforms similar to those worn by the police. Several of the youth were armed with weapons from the kecamatan armoury, while the rest carried weapons from the kecamatan administration, were maintaining security in the area. The military patrol, which was led by Second Lieutenant Ngadimin, had thought at first that they were part of a communist force who had occupied the kecamatan. From a distance the pagar praja had looked like police who had been disarmed. It had seemed as though their hands had been tied behind their backs while armed youth were standing guard over them. After the misunderstanding had been resolved the military patrol returned to Klaten.

Not long afterwards more shots were heard. The patrol encountered a Pemuda Rakyat group which was about to carry out some form of terrorist activity. After failing to halt the patrol, the band disappeared into the bush, firing into the air.

The shots fired by the Battalion F unit proved to be of considerable help to the Prambanan Command Team. It was discover later that just before the battalion's arrival in Prambanan, Pemuda Rakyat units had surrounded the kecamatan from all sides. In the west they had reached
the desa of Karang, while in the north a unit was stationed in the kampung. In the east a unit was based in Borongan kampung and in the south they were positioned along the railway line. They were planning to launch a major attack on the Prambanan kecamatan, but when the gun battle continued for thirty minutes the communists were frightened out of their respective positions. The misunderstanding between the battalion and the Prambanan youth was indeed very fortunate for the people of Prambanan. When interviewed for this project, the lurah of Barukan said that he would probably have been killed by the Battalion F. At 1.00 a.m. a special envoy from the Commandant of Battalion F visited Prambanan to apologize for the misunderstanding. The lurah of Barukan was then able to sleep peacefully before joining the camat of Manisrenggo in Jambon the next day.

The Kidnapping and Release of Suwito and Darmosenjoyo

The vandalizing of Amat Darum's house in Klongklangan on 23 October was only one of a series of terrorist actions carried out by the communists. On the same morning, several people, including at least three PNI members, were kidnapped: Harjono, a primary school teacher from Borongan (Tlogosari), Suwito, a resident of the desa Randusari, and Darmosenjoyo, a resident of Bajran. Several people were kidnapped while carrying out their daily work. Suwito, for example, was kidnapped while digging a well. Darmosenjoyo was kidnapped while simply having a conversation. Although those people who were kidnapped were certain to be killed, the PKI established courts complete with judges and prosecutors. The chief magistrate (hakim tinggi) was Suwanto, one of the general leaders of the PKI. Darmosenjoyo was accused of being an accessory of the PNI and of being affiliated with the USA. He was also charged with being a follower of Katamso. He was pronounced guilty but was provided with an opportunity to appeal. His appeal was rejected, however, and he was sentenced to death. The punishment was to be carried out two days later.

The victims of kidnappings were usually taken to PKI headquarters. Suwito was taken to the Randusari headquarters while Darmosenjoyo was taken to Klaten. The house used for the Klaten headquarters was owned by Warnotemu, a farmer sympathetic to the PKI. The house

As the wave of terror intensified, members and sympathizers of the PNI and other non-communists fled to safer regions. Most of them headed for Yogyakarta or the headquarters of the Command Team in Prambanan,
taking with them food and their valuables. The people who came to the refugee centres were screened in order to ensure that they were genuine non-communist. If they did not possess written proof of their political affiliation, they were required to produce at least one person who could guarantee that they were not communist. Those people accepted as guarantors were usually village heads or political leaders who lived in the same village as the person in question. The Command Team was responsible for the increasing numbers of refugees and it had to provide food for them. In order to overcome this problem logistical sub-teams were formed in each village, with the responsibility for providing food for the refugees.

On 24 October a military unit from Klaten arrived in Prambanan. There were many refugees who wanted to launch a counter attack on the PKI with the support of this unit to free their friends who had been kidnapped. The leaders of the Command Team agreed to their request and it was decided that a clean up operation would be mounted against Randusari at midday.

Taking into account both the location and the difficulty of mounting a full-scale attack on Randusari, the army officers decided on a tactical encirclement. After seeing that they had been surrounded by non-communist forces, many communists began to flee. The officers called out to them: 'Don't run! we won't shoot!' Hearing this a number of communists began to show friendliness of the troops who accompanied the youth eventually convinced them of the sincerity of this appeal. Those who did not flee were ordered into trucks in groups of ten. One hundred and twenty-five communists were captured in the operation. Suwito, however, was not found among them. A communist named Trisnado was questioned concerning Suwito's whereabouts.

Just before the operation, it turned out, Suwito asked to be taken to the river so that he could wash and defecate. As he went down to the river with just one guard, he could see several communists including Joyodo discussing something on a big rock in the middle of the river. While he was washing, Suwito saw Joyodo and his followers run towards the north. The communist youth who had been guarding him also fled, and Suwito was making his own way back to Randusari when he met a soldier, who told him: 'Tomorrow morning I'll be freed. I've agreed to give them money and food'. The next day Suwito was allowed to leave. Darmosenjoyo wondered whether his kidnappers might be willing to give him his freedom in exchange for a ransom.

Two days before his death sentence was to be carried out, Darmosenjoyo could neither eat nor sleep. He was informed that several people had already been put to death: Harjono and his younger brother Pabian from Bonggan, both nephews of Ir Sabar; and the modin [a Muslim religious leader] of Bejan. His appetite completely disappeared after being told that he too would be put to death. For two days a few sips of tea were all that he could take in. On the day Kamto was freed, Darmosenjoyo gave a communist named Wongsoalip shot dead and another communist shot in the leg. A group of Pemuda Marhaenis had attempted to exhume the corpses of Harjono and Kisno which had been buried by the communists in the graveyard at Dengok. They were supported by the Prambanan police who possessed some firearms. In the ensuing struggle with the communists, the police fired several shots. It was one of these shots which killed Wongsoalip.

Darmosenjoyo could do nothing but think about his death the next night. His hands remained clenched behind his back. There were about ten youth assigned to guard him and they changed every hour. It was not possible for him to get to know them individually. When he heard the struggle taking place in the Dengok graveyard which ended in the shooting of several communists, he realized that the hole which would be used for his grave was located very near to his place of confinement.

That night he could not sleep. He could just hear the far-away sounds of the youth waiting in their base - in Gitosugih's house - and their tarian Nuam bunga [dance of the fragrant flowers]. Several of the youth guarding Darmosenjoyo told him that they had just been watching the dance. Members of the Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani joined in the dance as one part of their series of ritual ceremonies celebrating death and their terrorist activities. At 7:00 the next morning Darmosenjoyo was to die. Fortunately for him, at dawn on 3 November 1965, a Battalion F force...
launched a clean-up operation of communists from Manisrenggo north to the main Jogya-Solo road in the south. During this operation, an exhausted and greatly weakened Darmosenojojo was freed from kidnappers.

Growing tension

On the evening of 22 October, the echo of drums could be heard everywhere. For the inhabitants of Manisrenggo, this sound signified danger. The lurah of Barukan was woken by the noise at 3.00 a.m. Along with other villagers, he ventured outside the village to find out what was going on. The beating of drums normally meant that a robbery or looting had taken place. After checking the vicinity of the village, however, and discovering that the sound was coming from the west, beyond the village borders, he returned home. Next day, he attended a meeting at the office of the Manisrenggo kecamatan, along with other village heads, officials of the kecamatan, and leaders of non-communist political organizations. The major topic of discussion was the possibility of issuing a joint statement supporting Sukarno and condemning the Dewan Revolusi. All village heads in the Manisrenggo kecamatan attended, with the exception of the lurah of Tanjungsari, who was a member of the PKI, and they all signed the statement. Several village heads and kecamatan officials then left the office, while eight PNI village heads and leaders of other political parties remained.

This was not a normal day in Manisrenggo. The main road which passed through the kampungs was deserted and only a few people were visible. Very few roadside stalls were open. Youth began to gather in front of the office of the Pernuda Rakyat, opposite the Manisrenggo police station. The lurah of Barukan spoke to some of them and they chatted for a while about the atmosphere in the town. There was no hint of trouble.

The camat of Manisrenggo also felt uneasy that morning. As soon as the lurah of Barukan arrived at his office, the camat asked him to go to Klaten and request military support. The camat was not the only person to feel afraid. All the officials and political party leaders felt the same way. News had spread that the PKI masses had undertaken terrorist activities including the murder of a clerk in Logode who had been a member of the PNI. Acts of cruelty had also been carried out against religious
figures in various areas. The lurah of Barukan agreed to go to Klaten on the condition that he was accompanied by a policeman armed with an automatic weapon; the camat agreed. The lurah and the policeman left Manisrenggo for Klaten at 10.00 that morning, taking a Java motorbike, registration number AD 13251. On the journey to Klaten they passed the house of the communist lurah of Tanjungsari, who had attended the meeting that morning. In his house were several school teachers who were members of the PGRI non vak sentral, several school principals, and members of Pemuda Rakyat. Further on, about two kilometres before Prambanan, they met a member of the BTI on the side of the road earlier that day but that they had already left.

Before continuing on the journey to Klaten, the lurah stopped in Prambanan to discuss the situation with the camat. He then went to Yogyakarta to check on his son who was a student there. His police escort remained in Prambanan. On the return journey from Yogyakarta to Prambanan he met a policeman on his way to Yogyakarta. The policeman advised him not to go to Prambanan, as the situation there was very tense, but the lurah paid no attention and continued on his journey, arriving safely in Klaten at 2.00 p.m. He immediately called on Patih Setyo, the Kasubdit Kedesan (Head of the Military Subdirector for Village Affairs) for Klaten kabupaten and told him of the situation in Manisrenggo and of the camat's request for military aid. The patih, however, refused to send military aid, although he was a relative of the Manisrenggo camat. The lurah then turned to the commander of Battalion F Dharma-Pura of the KOSTRAD. In the battalion headquarters, the lurah met some of his friends, including the leaders of the Wedi PNI who were busy talking to the wedana of Pedan. They had come here for the same reason - to request military support, and competed with each other for help. Because no trouble had yet taken place in Manisrenggo, however, the Barukan lurah's request for support was again turned down.
a .95 rifle, and a pistol. They also found a limited quantity of ammunition for each weapon.

Retreat to Yogyakarta

Immediately after these events, the camat of Manisrenggo ordered the lurah affiliated with the PNI to take refuge across the border in the Yogyakarta region. The administration of the Manisrenggo kecamatan would also shift there temporarily. The distance from Manisrenggo to Jambon in Yogyakarta was only two kilometres. The office of the Manisrenggo kecamatan could be housed temporarily in the headquarters of non-communist forces from Klaten and Yogyakarta.

Before the evacuation could take place the communists locked the Manisrenggo camat’s wife and children in a room behind the kecamatan office. A number of communist youth surrounded the camat’s office and house and took complete control of the office. A little while later, when a group of young communists headed for a house on the other side of the street, the camat took advantage of this opportunity to escape through the back door, creeping down the bank of the river on the western side of the house in order not to be seen. He then ran south along the edge of the river. After reaching the village of Keditan he left the river and headed towards Jambon. With the help of members of the Sindumartani community, he managed to contact non-communist village heads from Manisrenggo and established a temporary kecamatan office.

Thousands of non-communist youth were then mobilized in the Ngempli kecamatan in Yogyakarta and in other kecamatans including Ngaglik and Pakem. This mobilization of youth was initiated in order to counter the communists who were centred in the Klaten region. In Yogyakarta the majority of the population was aligned with the PNI or NU. By the third week of October 1965, Jambon had become the main centre of defence for non-communist forces to the west of Klaten, as well as the headquarters of the Manisrenggo’s non-communist administration. There were about five hundred refugees from the Klaten region, there and, as in Prambanan, preparing food for them was an immediate problem. It was decided that the provision of food would be the responsibility of the Sindumartani.

By 24 October several thousand young people had gathered in Jambon; five general kitchens were set up and housewives and young people were responsible for preparing the food. At least 700 to 800 kilograms of rice had to be found.

The non-communist youth in Jambon were in a state of constant alert. Security posts were erected along the Yogyakarta-Solo border, with ten to twenty-five people stationed at each of them. They adopted this strategy because they knew that the communist youth were also active along the border. Jambon was a strategic location in the Yogyakarta-Solo region. The communists in Manisrenggo for their part organized an extensive surveillance system. The front line of defence was located along the Yogyakarta-Solo road. Further to the north, for example in Kemalang and Manisrenggo, the defence posts became increasingly concentrated. The headquarters of the Manisrenggo communists was located in the house of the lurah of Kebonalas. Several smaller posts also became sub-command centres.

On Sunday night the atmosphere in Manisrenggo was very calm. The streets through the villages and kampongs were deserted. Usually people would gather at cross-roads or at certain places within the kampongs to wait until dinner time, but on this occasion they were happier to be at home with their families. They all knew that something terrible might happen, and a feeling of distrust pervaded the community. Was it possible that their friendly and good-natured neighbour was actually a political opponent? Would one of their relatives cause trouble for them? In such a time of uncertainty, men and youths preferred to gather at the security posts while the women, children and elderly remained in their homes. Security posts were also established in the kampongs where the communists were a minority. Several dozen armed youth were stationed at strategic points. When the mosque called Muslims for the Isya prayer only a few old people ventured onto the streets. Most people preferred to pray in their own houses, afraid to leave their homes in case they met trouble.

The youth stationed along the border area had to fight against their desire for sleep. At around midnight news came through of a planned attack on non-communist posts in Jambon. The non-communist forces in Jambon were under the direct leadership of the camat of Manisrenggo, aided by the lurahs of Barukan and Sindumartani and by Slamet Wahadi, a well-known figure in the Jambon community. The distance between the non-communist guardposts of the Yogyakarta district and the communist posts in Manisrenggo was only about 200 metres. Tension began to increase...
on both sides. At the same time news spread among the communists an attack to be carried out that night by the Jambon youth. In the middle of the night, both sides attempted to estimate the strength of their opposition by shining lamps in the direction of their enemy. The Yogyakarta youth were instructed to adopt positions which would be difficult to attack and their drowsiness disappeared as the tension mounted. Both sides attempted to predict what would happen. The night became deathly still. Only the crickets could be heard. They sounded something like a drum roll intended to boost the enthusiasm of the two sides about to wage war.

The atmosphere remained calm as both sides awaited the break of dawn. When the cocks crowed they rested in their respective security posts.

The next day, Monday, the Jambon market opened for the small traders of Manisrenggo, Ngemplak and surrounding areas. In view of the tension which still existed, Slamet Wahadi suggested that the market not be opened. The Jambon command considered the idea and ordered the market to close, instructing people to return to their homes. Nevertheless a large number of people continued on their way, thinking that going to market was a fairly routine matter and that this day would be no different from any other. They also felt that this would be a good opportunity to stock up on goods in case conditions in the region continued to decline. As the nationalist youth of Jambon checked the small traders on their way to the market, they noticed a communist youth from Manisrenggo in the crowd. When questioned by the leader of the Nationalist youth there, the communist youth stated that he was bringing a message for the camat of Manisrenggo. He said that the communist leadership in Manisrenggo wanted to avoid bloodshed and physical confrontation and were now seeking to negotiate. After receiving this message the camat responded with a possible date and place for the meeting.

It was agreed that the meeting would take place in the Jambon market at 3.00 p.m. The communists were represented by the lurah of Kebonalii, who was accompanied by several members of the BTI and PKI. The nationalists were represented by the camat of Manisrenggo, lurahs of Barukan and Sindumartani and Slamet Wahadi. The negotiations proceeded smoothly, but unfortunately the communists followed them with several acts of violence. On the night after the negotiations, the house of the lurah of Barukan was burnt down. On 27 October, a fight broke out between a group of communists and Mangun Tumpo, a member of the Taskombang PNI, and ended with his death. The communists buried him along with his bicycle, which he happened to have with him at the time of the attack.

The non-communists in Manisrenggo were not as strong as the communist forces, the non-communist minority was thus a target of repression, especially as the surrounding kecamatan - Kemalang, Prambanan and Pangrango - were also PKI bases. The communists did not consider the non-communists in Manisrenggo a force to be reckoned with, since the PNI was only influential among village officials, the elite and rich peasants. Among other social groups communist influence was dominant. In Jambon the non-communist defences were organized in such a way as to counter a possible communist attack. Some consideration was also given to attacking the communist headquarters in Manisrenggo and regaining control of the area. But this plan was never implemented.

Area threatened by the communists finally received military support at the beginning of November. Manisrenggo itself received a platoon from Battalion F. Gradually the tension subsided and calm was restored. The camat of Manisrenggo was able to return to his house on 2 November, escorted by an armed forces unit from KOREM 072.
BANYUWANGI

Activity before the coup

Competition between the two major forces in Banyuwangi, the PKI and the Nahdatul Ulama, for the support of the mass of the population began long before 1965. The PKI assassinated NU leaders in 1948 during the Dutch period, on the grounds that these haji were spies; terrorist activities by criminal groups were also organized by the PKI against wealthy non-communists; and PKI members sabotaged sources of production owned by non-communists. In the 1960s, however, sources of disagreement between the PKI and non-PKI groups were: the implementation of the land reform law, the movement of PKI members to official positions, and mass mobilization.

The PKI's influence over the peasantry in Banyuwangi was fairly strong. There was, for instance, an active aksi sepihak movement in the kabupaten, which worked from district to district with the result that the movement that aksi sepihak took place there almost every day. According to a report published in Suara Indonesia of 5 January 1965, aksi sepihak took place in nine villages in the Genteng district and at least 6,720 people participated. Other districts in which there is evidence of an active movement include Srono, Cluring, Kabat, Gambiran and Glagah. In several villages this action degenerated into arson and the destruction of people's houses, the looting of crops and other activities which promoted disorder. The PKI incited members of the BTI to make aksi sepihak claims on land controlled by rich non-communist farmers. On several occasions wealthy beneficiaries donated land to a pesantren (Islamic school) or mosque but retained control of it.

Further conflict in Banyuwangi between the PKI and the NU was evident in the fishing industry. Port labourers who were organized by the PKI in the Indonesian Fishermen's Union (Barisan Nelayan Indonesia, BNI) sabotaged nets and boats belonging to non-communists. The port labourers boycotted fishing by non-communists. Fishermen, of course, are very heavily dependent on service facilities such as labour for transporting the fish from boats to the harbour and on salt for preserving the fish. Because of the PKI's influence over the port labourers, non-communist fishermen had extreme difficulty in finding labourers willing to carry the fish from the boats. Chinese boats, on the other hand, experienced no difficulty whatsoever. Indigenous fishermen, who were usually non-communist, also
found it difficult to get salt, whereas the Chinese had no trouble at all.

On several occasions, tensions over these issues led to fights and loss of life. The port labourers who had been attracted to the NU were organized

in the Indonesian Muslim Fishermen's Association (Serikat Nau Muslimin Indonesia, SNMI). The total membership of the SNMI, however, was far less than that of the BNI. Indigenous boat owners and captains on the other hand were more often attracted to the NU (more often to Chinese captains) because the boycotts by BNI port labourers often forced

to substantial financial losses on the part of indigenous captains.

The major spheres of communist influence in Banyuwangi were the kecamatan of Glagah, Singajuruh, Kabat, Rogojampi, Genteng, Pasanganga, Cluring, Purwoharjo and Glenmore. The NU was strongest in Wangsorejo, Giri and Cluring kecamatan, while the followers of the PKI, primarily civil servants and village officials, were spread through various sub-districts and unlike the other political parties were not concentrated in any particular areas. The influence of the NU was also rather strong in Muncar, but Muncar was also a coastal region and the PKI's influence among the port labourers was almost total. In the early 1960s B hại Prayitno, a well-known figure in the Banyuwangi PKI, made many visits to Muncar, apparently to bolster PKI influence there.

The selection of the bupati of Banyuwangi at the beginning of 1958 was also a major issue. Sixteen the three political parties operating in the region - PKI, PNI and NU - attempted to win the office for their own candidate. The PKI's candidate was Suwarno Kanapi SH, an official with the public prosecutor (kantor kejaksaan) who had a Chinese wife. The PNI's candidate was Lieutenant-Colonel Joko Supaat Slamet, the head of the Banyuwangi KODIM. In northern Banyuwangi, the NU was led by Haji Ali Mansur and supported the candidature of Kanapi while in southern Banyuwangi, Haji Abdul Latif was NU leader, with Supaat Slamet the NU candidate. The PKI was evidently successful in manipulating the selection in favour of Kanapi. Certain facilities were promised to Ali Mansur provided that Kanapi became the next bupati. It is said that certain funds for the construction of the Banyuwangi mosque were embezzled by Ali Mansur's faction. With the support of the PKI and Mansur's faction Kanapi was appointed as bupati of Banyuwangi. The PNI and Abdul Latif's faction of the NU refused to recognize this victory and protested to the Panca Tunggal Banyuwangi kabupaten.

Mass mobilization by the PKI, meanwhile, was taking place in all sectors of society, for example, in agriculture, in the fishing and transport industries and in the plantation sector. In the plantation sector the PKI attempted to influence short-term workers - from day labourers to the directors. A report to the screening committee in Banyuwangi in September 1966 by an investigative team under the State Plantation Corporation estate Aneka-Tanaman no 13 gives an insight into PKI activities before the coup. The team reported that the Corporation had disciplines 875 workers, forty of whom were employed on a monthly basis, the remaining 835 being day labourers. The investigative team had classified them under three headings:

1. Employees who had been either members of the Party or organizers of the PKI's mass organizations were dishonorably discharged; these were forced to leave the plantation;
2. Employees who had aided the PKI during the years and months leading up to the coup; these were forced to leave the plantation; and
3. Employees who had been ordinary members of the PKI's mass organizations; these were simply re-educated.

Several of those who were dismissed and forced from the plantations had been active organizers and recruiters for SOBSI. They had also been subordinate, cooperating with coffee thieves and refusing to work for the plantation company although they lived on the plantation. Also dismissed and forced from the area were junior plantation officials who had allowed BTJ secret meetings in their homes, instigators of demands for land belonging to the company, propagandists, coffee thieves and agitators for wage increases.

In its efforts to control the productive sector, the PKI also attempted to obtain senior management positions in the Corporation. During the 1950s, the upper management (Staf Direksi) of state plantations in East

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16 Bupati were appointed by the central government except during a brief period from 1957 to 1959. Under Guided Democracy, however, political parties strongly lobbied the authorities over the appointment of new bupati. Ed.

17 Plantations under the jurisdiction of Aneka-Tanaman no 13 were: Fabrik, Besaran, Sumber Bopang, Sumber Jambe 2, Sumber Wringin, Sumber Gandeng, Paal 4, Paal 6, and Bungin.
Java included members of mass organizations and political parties, the fact that KOPKAMTIB documents show that in thirty-two of the three sugar plantations in East Java SOBSI was successful in gaining a very strong sphere of influence among the labourers. It was usually through SOBSI that the PKI fought for the interests of the company workers, for example, for a reduction in the prices of goods, higher wages and improvements in social welfare. Its representatives in upper management positions espoused its policies whenever decisions were to be taken.

Tension rises

The activities of the BTI in the weeks and months leading up to October 1965 had made the relationship between communists and non-communists increasingly tense. Physical confrontations in the form of fights and violence between Ansor and the Pemuda Marhaenis on the one hand and the Pemuda Rakyat on the other took place almost every day during this period. The PKI employed the mass of its followers to strengthen its defences but, unavoidably, Ansor and Pemuda Marhaenis members who lived in areas of communist influence were also forced to do guard duty by the Pemuda Rakyat. The PKI usually used non-communists in the front line of its defences. We know that the PKI organized the forces guarding its strongholds in a layered formation, the more skilled and ideologically sounder units being placed closer to the centre. In Kalipahit, for example, Ansor youth were placed in the front line, with Pemuda Marhaenis behind them and communist youth in the rear. As in Central Java, the BTI leadership used tactics of intimidation and pressure against non-communists where they were in a minority, often physically threatening them, so that they had no other option but to submit to PKI orders.

In Tapanrejo region, for instance, a PKI stronghold, the BTI, Pemuda Rakyat and Gercwi based in Kalipahit desa included several members of the Ansor. As events unfolded in October 1965 and Kalipahit became the PKI's headquarters one measure taken by the party was to mobilize the masses for defensive duties. Several metres behind the non-PKI youth forced into the front line were a few members of the Pemuda Rakyat, posted to ensure that the Ansor youth did not attempt to flee. On one occasion two youth guarding the communist defences were captured in an Ansor raid into Tapanrejo. They were taken to Ansor headquarters where they were viciously beaten. Then, one of the Ansor activists approached the prisoners and, drawing his 'samurai' sword, decapitated the first of the prisoners. The remaining prisoner begged for mercy, explaining to his tormentors that he and his companion were actually members of the Ansor. The Ansor leadership in Muncar ordered one of the group to write down his story. After checking with the Ansor organizers in Tapanrejo headquarters one measure taken by the party was to ensure that the prisoner was indeed telling the truth.

After news broke of the Council of Generals and the Dewan Revolusi members of the PNI, NU, and PKI - Jafar Ma'ruf, Ali Mansur and Sigit - met to discuss the situation. Sigit claimed that the Council of Generals never existed, but Jafar and Ali Mansur denied the existence of either the Council of Generals or the Revolutionary Council. A heated debate developed between Sigit on the one hand and Jafar and Ali on the other. As tempers rose, Jafar Ma'ruf tried to calm things down and brought the meeting to a close, urging the others not to let the disagreement end in violence. The debate between Sigit and Ali, however, continued unabated and swelling as they came close to fistfights in the doorway of the police station where the meeting had been organized.

Anti-Communist activities

While the PKI masses were carrying out their terrorist activities against non-communist youth who were organized within the Pemuda Marhaenis and the Ansor youth joined to create a united front. To prepare themselves for possible communist attack, both Ansor and Pemuda Marhaenis youth actively trained in the skills of self defence. During the first week of October 1965, negotiations took place between the leaders of Ansor and the Marhaenis groups in order to decide on a strategy to counter the PKI's terrorist activities. They decided, amongst other things, that they needed a single commandant to plan the non-communist response to PKI activities, and they agreed to appoint Mursid. He was approached by two leading figures from the Ansor and Marhaenis groups and was asked to lead both groups against the communists. Thus, the clean up of communists in Banyuwangi during the events of September 1965 was undertaken by youth from Ansor and the Pemuda Marhaenis under the leadership of Mursid. Part of this cleanup involved operations in Kalipahit and Bangorejo.

During a period in which the power of the authorities was weakened, greater possibilities existed for the mass of the people to take individual action, especially those who had a score to settle with local Muslims.
Conscious of the potential for serious trouble, Jafar Ma'ruf and the leaders of the other non-PKI political parties established the BKKS (Bakor Koordinasi Komando Siaga, Coordinating Body for the Vigilance Command). The BKKS was established with the intention of monitoring and controlling the activities of the non-PKI people against their opponents. One day after the formation of BKKS the PKI organized a small demonstration displaying red banners. Then, on Friday 15 October action broke out in the town of Banyuwangi. Mobs marched on the shop, whose owner was accused of supporting the 30 September Movement, and on the house of Muhdar, a leading PKI figure. The shop was destroyed and foodstuffs were brought out into the streets and burnt. In the house, which was situated right next to the square, was also destroyed while his cars and household utensils were dragged out into his garden and burnt.

On Saturday 16 October 1965 a mass meeting was held in the town square. Thousands of people crowded into the square to hear the leaders speak. The main speakers at the meeting were Colonel Supaat Slam., Haji Abdul Latif of NU and Jafar Ma'ruf of the PNI. Suwarno chose not to speak. In general, the speakers told the public that there was no Council of Generals and that the Dewan Revolusi was a puppet of the PKI. This meeting seems to have provided the catalyst for the outbreak of non-PKI mass action throughout all sub-districts of Banyuwangi.

Incidents at Cemetuk and Karangasem

During the third week of October 1965 the activities of Ansor and the Pemuda Marhaenis become more intense. One movement against supporters of the 30 September Movement by non-communist youth which took place before the general butchering of communists is known as the Karangasem incident. On 18 October 1965 Mursid led a group of youth in an operation to mop up remnants of the 30 September Movement in Kalipahit. A convoy of four trucks, one jeep and a car was used on the operation. All along its journey the convoy was greeted with enthusiasm by the mass of the people, and many people, especially the younger ones, joined the convoy. Because of so many new members, the progress of the vehicles was slow. On reaching the Karangasem crossroads, the first group of youth decided, without informing Mursid, to take the Cemetuk road, rather than that to Kalipahit. When interviewed for this research project, Mursid explained that the first group had decided to go to Cemetuk because several people waiting at the crossroads informed them that PKI people in Cemetuk were ready to attack Muncar. As the first group was unable to restrain their curiosity, the young people moved forward more quickly. Suddenly they were showered with rocks and other projectiles and were attacked by a group of young people without shirts. Mursid and several of his men could see the first group being ambushed by the shirtless attackers and he ordered the youth who were still within his range to remove their shirts, enter the village and destroy everything. The situation in the village became totally chaotic. The Ansor youth who were still wearing their shirts received no mercy from the communists. They were killed. But the shirtless Ansor youth set fire to several houses and destroyed the belongings of communist members. The communists in turn set fire to the abandoned vehicles, though several members of Mursid's group succeeded in escaping from Cemetuk by car. Their reports of the activities taking place in Cemetuk were given credence by the bloodstains in the village.

We know that Cemetuk village was a PKI base. For this reason we can say that 99% of its population were either members or sympathizers of the PKI, and it is clear that Cemetuk was indeed used by the PKI as a defensive stronghold. There was a concentration of PKI forces in the village. Many roads in East Java are lined with tamarind trees. Ed.
village and for this reason the youth group from Muncar, though large, was unable to match the strength of the PKI forces. Many injured members of the non-communist group escaped to areas which they thought were safe. Those unable to escape were killed by frenzied PKI supporters, but those who succeeded in breaking through the PKI net were not pursued. Exhausted but fearing for their lives, they ran and kept on running, heading for an area where they hoped there would be no PKI. Soon they came across a group of girls wearing the Fatayat NU uniform - long green skirts, white blouse and white veil. The girls welcomed the exhausted young men with the hand of friendship. Although they did not know the young men personally, the warmth and softness shown by these girls seemed a natural outcome of friendship between members of the same organization. The tired young men were not at all suspicious. They were invited to sit down in a place that had already been prepared and were served with a range of delicious snacks. Soon after eating this food, however, some of the men began to faint, others became violently ill and some began to convulse. Only one young man had not eaten the food served by the girls. He had been concerned by what had happened earlier; in Cemetuk, the communist base, he had seen the flags and banners of Ansor and the NUDI displayed as a deception, and the girls dressed in Fatayat uniforms with friendly smiles serving previously prepared food aroused his suspicion. When he saw that his friends had been poisoned he ran off to the nearest police post in Yoso Mulya to report the incident.19

Meanwhile, a patrol from the Genteng KODIM received reports of a clash in Karangasem. On their way to Karangasem they noticed crowds of people along the road. Many of them were shirtless and were carrying weapons, including swords, sickles and bamboo stakes. People could be seen standing on guard in front of their houses, in a PKI stronghold area known as Alas Malang. The non-communists20 had begun by setting fire to houses in the area. Apparently the clean-up operation by non-PKI forces against the remnants of the 30 September Movement was being carried out in several parts of Banyuwangi kabupaten at the same time.

19 This story is also told, in rather obscure terms, in 'Report from East Java', Indonesia 41 (1986), p. 138. It is reminiscent of an incident during the national revolution, when troops of the West Java Siliwangi Division were poisoned at a dinner offered by Muslim members of the fundamentalist Darul Islam movement. Ed.

20 Apparently the remainder of the expedition which had set out from Muncar under the command of Mursid. Ed.
Chapter 6

CRUSHING THE G30S/PKI IN CENTRAL JAVA

Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat

translated by Robert Cribb

Editor's introduction.

Most Western accounts of the 1965 coup stress that it was centred on Jakarta. In Jakarta, after all, were the main keys to power - the leading political figures, both victims and victors, the centres of administration and communication, and the symbolic significance of the capital.1 Outside the capital, a group associated with the 30 September Movement launched a somewhat similar coup in Central Java, in which the army's divisional commander, Brigadier-General Suryosumpeno was deposed by the division's intelligence chief, Colonel Suherman, who appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Diman Sastrodibroto in his place. Similar coup attempts took place at lower levels of the military hierarchy and two middle-ranking officers were kidnapped and killed.2 In official Indonesian accounts of the coup, action by the 30 September Movement is described as far more widespread, covering virtually every province, though most of these offer no more than a few vague sentences of description.3 The account translated here is

1 John Hughes, Indonesian upheaval (New York: McKay, 1967), pp. 3-87, is especially good in evoking significance of Jakarta in these times.


3 See, for example, 40 hari kegagalan 'G-30-S'; 1 Oktober - 10 November 1965 (Jakarta: Pertahanan-Keamanan, Lembaga Sejarah, 1966). The accounts refer to operations to destroy the PKI, rather than to actions by the party. The only other significant coup-like action by the left at this time was the seizure by workers of a number of state owned enterprises in East Java. See Basuki Gunawan, Kereta: stuwagreep in Djakarta, de achtergronden van de 30 September-beweging in Indoneisa (Meppel: Boom, 1988), p. 183.
from an official publication, *Pemberontakan G30S/PKI dan penumpasan [The revolt of the G30S/PKI and its suppression] (Jakarta: Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, 1982).* Although vague in some respects, repeating in style and at times self-contradictory in its details, it is a useful statement of the official view of the killings as it was a decade and a half after the event. Like the account of Gadjah Mada’s Centre for Village Study, this report stops short of a detailed description of the killings, but is noteworthy for the care with which it sets out the alleged guilt of PKI members and associates far from Jakarta. Not only does the army discover “incriminating documents” but it obtains active confessions of complicity from PKI members and presents the coup of 30 September as no more than the first stage in a PKI plan to seize power by armed struggle. A case for the mass killings which followed is thus laid.

The coup of 1 October 1965 in Jakarta spread rapidly to the territory of KODAM VII/Diponegoro. Based on captured documents and reliable reports, it can be said that Central Java was a refuge for the PKI and a base for its attempts to move into phase two of its programme. For this reason, revolutionary activities were more widespread in Central Java than in other regions. This was logical, because the results of the 1955 elections and other data showed that Central Java had the largest number of PKI members of any province.

On 1 October 1965 at 1:30 p.m., ex-Colonel Suherman announced the formation of a Dewan Revolusi (Revolutionary Council) in Central Java, with himself as chairperson. Using units he could rely upon, the adventurer seized the offices of KODAM VII as his headquarters, and used its facilities to communicate his actions to all territorial and mobile units in the KODAM. The Diponegoro Panglima, Brigadier-General Suryosumarto, was in Magelang at the time and held a briefing with the garrison commanders there to organize a plan for crushing the 30 September movement. The plan was as follows:

- **a.** To restore the line of command from the KODAM to all units;
- **b.** To consolidate the order of battle of KODAM VII by means of
  - (i) physical consolidation
  - (ii) psychological and ideological consolidation
  - (iii) consolidation of personnel
- **c.** To restore security and order throughout the territory of KODAM VII.

To carry out the first plan, on 2 October 1965 at 5:00 a.m., the Panglima himself led an operation from Magelang with a single cavalry unit to liberate Semarang. Within five hours, Semarang was in their hands and the Panglima once more in control of KODAM VII. Ex-Colonel Suherman, with followers from two companies of Battalion K under Major Kaderi, joined the city. Two other companies who were alerted by the Panglima assembled in the barracks of Battalion 454 at Srondon, along with two companies from Infantry Battalion D.

In the Yogyakarta area, G30S/PKI adventurers led by a number of infamous officers with the help of PKI leaders and sympathizers were on the alert first to seize Radio Republik Indonesia. They influenced a number of other officers and kidnapped several officers whom they could not seduce. The Panglima and leaders from other regions, however, were quickly able to counter these actions, and within a few days some of the officers who had joined the revolt came to their senses. After the putsch [in Semarang] had been crushed, the leaders of the revolt supported the Pemuda Rakyat campaign of sticking up posters and disturbing the people with a campaign of terror and murder. The Pancasila forces resisted these actions, and a number of mass demonstrations opposing the G30S/PKI were organized...

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4 English language terms in the original text are italicized. Some passages have been slightly rearranged and a short section dealing with the location of anti-communist troops has been omitted. The events described here are dealt with at greater length in Major Trissaputra, 'Dengan Jon Kav-II/VII Magelang Pak Soerojo menggagalkan 'Dewan Revolusi' ejen G 30 S/PKI di Djawa Tengah', *Vidya Yudha* 2 no 5 (Dec. 1968), pp. 113-129.

5 Indonesia was divided at this time into regional military commands (Komando Daerah Militer, KODAM), generally named after historical figures prominent in resisting the imposition of Dutch rule. For this an other administrative and military terms, see note on p. ix.

Pemuda Rakyat, People's Youth, was the main youth affiliate of the PKI.
by the HMI, Pemuda Pancasila, and Anshor youth. There were also outbreaks of terror and disruption in Solo, Klaten, and Boyolali.

To deal with the situation, the Panglima worked out a plan to crush the remnants of the G30S/PKI adventurists in Central Java, making use of the units under his command. The RPKAD, headed by Colonel Sarwo Edhie, was also given orders to help restore security and order in the region. The RPKAD sent a full battalion under command of Major Santoso, which reached Semarang on 17 October 1965. After entering the city, the battalion made a show of force, marching through the city streets to the cheers of the people. Semarang was already under the control of Kodam VII and it was clear that things were calm there. The Panglima Major Santoso met and discussed a plan of action. That night they arrested eight hundred people strongly suspected of involvement in G30S/PKI, as well as capturing incriminating documents and a number of weapons. The G30S/PKI group continued their activities in the form of posters supporting the treason of the movement. As they saw the RPKAD firmly to crush the G30S/PKI remnants, the Pancasila group began to realize their opportunity to oppose the enemy themselves. Clashes took place, and a war of posters broke out across the city. The atmosphere became tense. To avoid a further breakdown, the RPKAD units and the regional government organized arrests of G30S/PKI followers, many of whom then fled from the city.

On 21 October 1965, three RPKAD companies together with three units from the Kodam departed left for Magelang, leaving Semarang in the hands of other troops. The RPKAD arrival in Magelang was greeted with cheers from the people and after the RPKAD had made a show of force around the city the people organized a demonstration in which PKI and BAPERKI buildings and members' houses were destroyed. After arresting and securing G30S/PKI members in Magelang, the units proceeded to Boyolali. According to information received, the local military command in Boyolali was surrounded by thousands of Pemuda Rakyat and PKI members armed with knives and sharpened bamboo spears (bambu runcing). The units called in at Yogyakarta on the way to attend the funerals of Brigadier-General Katamso and Colonel Sugiyono, who died after being tortured by the rebels on 2 October.

One RPKAD company pressed on to Boyolali with cavalry support and launched arrest and clean-up operations against the PKI and Pemuda Rakyat members who were causing the trouble there. The rebels' attempt to surround and seize the Boyolali district military command was thwarted and the troublemakers fled into the forests. Boyolali was well known as

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7 The Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Students' Association) was formally affiliated with the banned Masyumi party; the Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila-ist Youth) was associated with the PNI and the Anshor was the youth wing of the Nahdatul Ulama.

8 Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia, Deliberative Association for Indonesian Citizenship, a largely Chinese Indonesian organization, founded in 1954 and considered close to the PKI. It encouraged resident Chinese to accept Indonesian citizenship, but argued against cultural assimilation.
an area where a great many PKI members carried out their terrorist disruptive activities.

On 22 October, another RPKAD unit was sent to Solo after information was received that trade union members at Balapan railway station had gone on strike on 21 October. The unit, under the direct command of Colonel Sarwo Edhie, went straight to the station. After carrying out the necessary security measures, they told the workers forcefully to go back to work as normal. The unit then made a show of force around the station. G30S/PKI and its mass organizations also took place here, and the people demanded that the PKI and its organizations be abolished. After arresting G30S/PKI leaders, the unit continued by driving them into the outskirts of the city and then hunting them down up in the mountains where many of them had fled.

Another RPKAD unit moved to Wonosobo on 23 October. The roads had been damaged and blocked by G30S/PKI gangs, but the unit was able to push through, capturing 115 G30S/PKI elements along the way, along with a number of weapons and documents proving the involvement of the PKI in the coup. Meanwhile in Klaten, a local training camp had been surrounded at 3.00 a.m. by thousands of G30S/PKI followers who hoped to seize weapons. The attack, however, was beaten off and 135 leaders and members were arrested.

On 26 October Colonel Sarwo Edhie held a meeting of the Surakarta Joint Security Staff in the Surakarta district military command staff office, along with local civil and military officials, to plan an intensification of the campaign. Forces in Solo were reinforced by three battalions from the 4th Infantry Brigade of the Diponegoro Division. These operations were based on the following principle:

The G30S/PKI should be given no opportunity to concentrate/consolidate. It should be pushed back systematically by all means, including power, distribution of pamphlets and the spreading of information to achieve the goal of slowing down [G30S/PKI activities].

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9 Psychological warfare.

Neocolonialist-imperialist.
On 15 November, the RPKAD arrested eighteen military personnel from KODIM 0708 Purworejo, three officers and fifteen NCOs, all suspected of involvement in G30S/ PKI. This brought the number of detainees in Purworejo jail to 1017. In Magelang there were 1250 detainees, consisting of thirty-four military personnel, fifty-two Gerwani members and communists. On 25 November, the regional military commander and head of the security staff assembled seven PKI members of the Yogyakarta DPR-GR to discuss the dissolution of the PKI, and at 8.00 a.m. the same day Radio Republik Indonesia in Yogyakarta announced that the PKI and its mass organizations had been dissolved by the PKI leadership itself.

To intensify the campaign to track down and destroy remnants of the G30S/ PKI, especially ex-Colonel Suherman and his colleagues, a Komando Operasi Merapi (Mount Merapi Operational Command) was formed on 1 December under the command of Colonel Sarwo Edhie. In order to defeat the PKI tactic of arousing the mass of its followers in a campaign of terror and disruption, the government itself mobilized the mass of the people. The RPKAD gave military training, including instruction in the use of weapons and techniques for securing villages, as part of a general programme of cooperation between the army and the people to crush the remnants of the G30S/ PKI. In this way, the Pancasila forces regained the spirit and their confidence in the ability of the armed forces to restore security and order.

On 9 December 1965, the RPKAD launched a joint operation with a platoon from Battalion E and with civilians who had already had training against rebel hideouts on Mount Merbabu which were led by ex-Lieutenant Colonel Usman, ex-Colonel Maryono, ex-Colonel Suherman, ex-Major Samadi and several other G30S/ PKI leaders. These leaders were shot, and the remnants of their followers were steadily pushed back by the armed forces operations. Suherman, Maryono and Sukirno, too, were captured on 14 December, and with the arrest and execution of the former head of the Dewan Revolusi for Central Java, the influence and strength of the G30S/ PKI in Central Java began to wane. PKI followers throughout the region began to surrender and disperse.

Thus, in a short time, the influence of the G30S/ PKI leadership and mass was broken. The people regained confidence in the government as a result of its positive actions to restore security and order and because of the cooperation between government and people in carrying out these undertakings. After undertaking their duties, the RPKAD turned over responsibility for the region's security and on 25 December 1965 returned to Jakarta, ready to take up new duties.

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11 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat-Gotong Royong, Gotong Royong People's Representative Council, the popular assembly for the Yogyakarta Special Administrative Region.
Chapter 7

ADDITIONAL DATA ON COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY CRUELTY IN INDONESIA, ESPECIALLY IN EAST JAVA

Anonymous

Editor's introduction

The following document is a rare Indonesian report on the killings in East Java in 1965-66. The origin of the document itself is obscure. It deals with the period from December 1965 to January 1966 but was apparently compiled in the 1970s. There is no clue to the identity of the author - for obvious reasons - but there is no evidence that he or she was a witness to any of the killings. The document, which came into the hands of the British campaigning organization Tapol in the mid 1970s, may in fact have been compiled from information collected amongst Indonesian exiles in Europe; the document is a collection of specific reports on a number of distinct incidents rather than a narrative of one person's experience. Part of the report was published in Tapol's Bulletin, but the sharpness of the individual accounts makes the report worth reproducing here in full. Detailed accounts of individual killings are themselves uncommon, and accounts by Indonesians are even more so, for the reasons outlined in the introductory chapter. Although parts of this report make particularly unpleasant reading, the document opens a rare window to the massacres.


I am grateful to Carmel Budiardjo for supplying me with a copy of the original document and for her permission to include it in this collection. The text here draws partly on a translation prepared for Tapol.
1. Lawang, Kabupaten Malang

Members and sympathizers of the PKI who were to be murdered had their hands tied. Then an Ansor gang, accompanied and protected by an army unit, ZIPUR V (Zenzi Tempur, Combat Engineers), took them to the killing places, the village of Sentong and the Botanic Gardens (Kebon Raya) in Purwodadi. Holes had already been prepared in these places. The victims were taken one by one up to the holes; nooses were put around their necks and then tightened until the victims collapsed. Then they were beaten with iron rods and other hard implements. After the victims died, their heads were cut off. Dozens of people were killed at Sentong and about a thousand in the Botanic Gardens. Banana trees were planted over the graves.

3 Not the Purwodadi mentioned elsewhere in this book, but a town north of Malang in East Java. The place name Purwodadi, which means 'perfectly made', is found in many parts of Java.

Singosari, Kabupaten Malang

A young boy, member of the IPJ [Ikatan Pelajar Indonesia, Union of Indonesian Youths] and son of Pak Tjokrodihardjo, who was a member of the local PKI committee (CSS) in Singosari Kecamatan, was arrested by An- sor. He was then tied to a jeep and dragged behind it until he was killed. Both his parents committed suicide.

Oglip' Kalsum, a woman who was lurah of the village of Dengkol in Singosari, was a member of the PKI. Before being killed, she was ordered to take off all her clothes off. Her body and her honour (kehormatanannya) were then subjected to fire. She was then tied up, taken to the village of Sentong in Lawang, where a noose was put around her neck and she was hacked to death.

Most of the murders in the Singosari region were done by beheading the victims. The bodies were then buried in gardens and plants such as banana trees were planted over the graves.

Tumpang, Kabupaten Malang

About two thousand people from Tumpang and Poncokusumo Kecamatan surrounding districts were killed by methods similar to those described above. These killings were carried out by ARMED I (Artilleri Medan, Artillery), working closely with An- sor. The bodies were buried in gardens in the village of Kunci.

Kabupaten Jember

The killings in Jember were carried out by ARMED III; in most cases the victims were shot. The killing places were the rubber plantations of Kompiwiri and Glantangan and the Nglangan coconut plantation. For more than three months, the victims were brought in on trucks belonging to PN Perkebunan. They were buried in holes, each with about ten to fifteen victims. One of the thousands killed was a mother called Ny. Sudiono.

The handwritten original is not clear.

PN Perkebunan, state-owned plantation corporation.
Before she was killed, she asked for permission to kiss her child but was refused.

In the village of Pontang, the killing was carried out by the village and retired soldiers.

5. Nglegok, Kabupaten Blitar

a) Japik, a leading figure in the local branch of Gerwani and a member of the PGRI Non Vaksentral was killed along with her husband Djuwita, the village head of Kalisambha, and a member of the Kediri branch of the PPDI [Persatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia, Union of Indonesian Village Officials]; Samina, an official of the Standards Office of Kabupaten Kediri; and a member of the PGRI Non Vaksentral; Kusnan, deputy chief of the Office of Social Affairs in Kabupaten Kediri and a member of the Serikat Sekerja Seri (Union of Social Affairs Department Employees); and Nono Ariatun, a master of the primary school in Kampung Dalam II and a member of the PGRI Non Vaksentral - were all inhabitants of the village of Kalisambha. All five were captured by an Ansor gang. They were beaten and they were crippled, then taken to the banks of the Brantas river, to the east of the market at the village of Kaliamba and to the south of the mosque at Kediri. There they were butchered and their bodies thrown into the river.

b) Nursamsu, also a member of the PGRI Non Vaksentral, was dismembered and the pieces of his body were hung in the homes of his friends.

c) Sutjipto, a former lurah of Nglegok and member of the PKI, was castrated and then killed. This was also done by an Ansor gang.

6. Garum, Kabupaten Blitar

Ny. Djajus, a woman who was lurah of the village of Tawangsari, Garum and a member of Gerwani, was pregnant at the time of the coup. Her body was cut open before she was killed. Pak Djajus, her husband, was sliced in the face with a dagger until he died.

7. Kecamatan Gurah, Kabupaten Kediri

a) Sackun, head of the Information Service in Gurah, was visiting his brother, H. Ridwan, in the village of Tremas Babadan (Patianngrow) in Kertosono when he was murdered by his own nephew and a gang of Ansor youths. They beat him until he fell unconscious and then butchered him.

b) Kasman, a teacher in the village of Ngasem, north of the town of Kediri, and a member of the PGRI Non Vaksentral, was captured by an Ansor gang. They paraded him along the street, beating him as they went. When he finally collapsed, they cut his head off, stuck it on a bamboo (bambu runcing) and placed it on a guard post at an intersection of the village of Gumul.

c) Suranto, headmaster of the Sekolah Menengah (High School) in Pare and one of the leaders of the Pare branch of Partindo and a member of the DPRD Kabupaten Kediri, lived in the village of Pulorejo, Pare. On 8 October 1965 at about 5.00 p.m. he went by bicycle to meet his wife, nine months pregnant, who had been at an arisan.4 On the way home, they were stopped and taken prisoner by an Ansor gang. They were beaten until they fell unconscious and were then killed. The man's head was cut off and his wife's stomach was cut open, the baby taken out and cut to pieces. The two bodies were thrown down a ravine to the east of the market in Pare. For a week afterwards, their five children who were all small (the oldest was eleven) had no-one to help them because the neighbours were warned by Ansor members that anyone helping them would be at risk.

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4. An arisan is perhaps best described as a rotating credit and social club. Members of the arisan gather regularly for conversation and snacks; at each meeting, the members put a fixed amount into a kitty, which is then allocated by lot or by prior agreement to one of the members. Each member is eligible for the kitty only once and the arisan breaks up once all its members have received a payment.
9. Kecamatan Keras, Kabupaten Kediri

Danum, head of the market in Keras and a member of the trade union SEBDA, was arrested by an Ansor gang. Along with other prisoners, he was taken down to a ferry crossing at the Brantas River near the village of Ploso, being beaten all the way. At the river bank, they were tied up and their bodies thrown into the river.

10. Kabupaten Banyuwangi

Mass killings began in Banyuwangi on 20 November 1965 and ended on 25 December 1965. There was another outbreak from 7 October 1966 and the final (?) killings took place from May to October 1968. The murders were carried out as follows:

a. Shooting by the firing squads of KODIM 08325;

b. Mass round-ups by Ansor and Pemuda Demokrat wearing black shirts and led by members of the Raiders. After their detention, the victims were beaten to death.

c. Kidnappings at night by members of Ansor and the Pemuda Demokrat. Victims were strangled with nooses around their necks. The bodies were then placed in a sitting position under trees along the main road. In some cases the victims were beheaded, the body being left in the middle of the road and the head taken elsewhere. The killings took place along the roads and on river banks, and bodies were buried in mass graves.

d. Some victims who had been arrested by the authorities were 'loaned out' (dibon), and dropped off one by one along the roads, where toughs (algojo) were waiting to dispatch them.

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7 Question mark in original.

8 Apparently another name for, or perhaps a similar organization affiliated to, the PNI's Pemuda Marhaen.

9 The elite commando unit of the East Java Brawijaya Division of the army, similar in style and orientation to the RPKAD.
c. Tampuh, a village in a secluded plantation, where members of the PKI committee were shot after a ceremony attended by all members of the Banyuwangi National Front. The killings were led by Col. Djoko Supaat Slamet of the Banyuwangi KODIM, with the assistance of a firing squad.

d. Curahjati, a teak forest in Beculuk kecamatan. A large hole was dug for victims who had been taken from Banyuwangi prison and from Kalibaru detention camp.

e. The villages of Bulusan and Ketapang on the coast. The people killed here were mainly former detainees in the Banyuwangi KORAMIL and police stations. Big holes were dug at the edge of the beach for victims.

f. The Chinese cemetery, in the village of Giri, Giri kecamatan. This was where members of the Banyuwangi KODIM and KORAMIL generally executed people they had arrested or kidnapped.

Places of detention included the various KODIM headquarters; the number of prisoners in these places is difficult to calculate, because there was much coming and going. There was also a camp at Kalibaru with around 7,670 detainees. Prisoners were also held in police stations in the towns and at kecamatan level; again the number held is difficult to know because of the constant through traffic. KORAMIL headquarters in each kecamatan also held prisoners. And finally, the Lowokwaru prison in Malang held 150 people from Banyuwangi in Block I; only four have been released.

By 25 December 1965, when the Fact Finding Team consisting of Brig. Gen. Dr. Sumarno, Oei Tju Tat10 and police chief Sukamto, the number of victims had reached 25,000. On 1 October 1966 another 150 were killed and more were killed in May 1968, though the number is not known.

That is all for the moment. I am still collecting data!

Chapter 8
SCHOOLING AND VILLAGE POLITICS
IN CENTRAL JAVA
IN THE TIME OF TURBULENCE

Kenneth Orr

Author's note.

There is a whole range of complex procedures which the government of Indonesia requires of intending researchers before it gives them permission to operate, especially in the villages. It is very unlikely that any foreigner would be granted permission to investigate as sensitive a topic as the coup of 30 September 1965 or its aftermath. It has been no part of my intention during my several visits to Indonesia for authorized field work on village education to pursue unrelated matters. However, in the course of being asked about the history of the founding and funding of schools in two villages, my informants have as the subject demanded talked of events of the latter part of 1965. The material that follows is therefore heavily oriented towards schools and schooling.

A great deal of the substance of this paper was gleaned by my energetic and enthusiastic graduate assistants. In this case, it might be no good service to quote their names. Should any of them read this paper, they will hereby be assured that I remain conscious of a debt of gratitude owed to them. At points in the paper where 'we' is used, reference is to the research team, 'I' is to the writer alone.

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10 Sumarno was minister for Internal Affairs, Oei Tju Tat was minister of state.
MARGOSARI

The kabupaten of Klaten lies between the two strongholds of Java's court culture, Yogyakarta and Surakarta. It has for many centuries been a heavily cultivated rice bowl, providing income for the development of a high culture of polished sensitivity centred on life around the palace. One consequence was that, in the colonial period, there was rather more Dutch enterprise in the area than in many others in Central Java: this included schools. Another consequence has been serious over-population and the early development of a landless labouring class. Not surprisingly, the area provided a fertile recruiting ground for the Partai Komunis Indonesia, which by 1965 had built up a strong base through much of the kabupaten.¹

Along one of the kabupaten boundaries, running up the slopes of Mount Merapi, is the village of Margosari.² Though some of the villages in the district further up the mountain side are more well-watered and less productive, Margosari itself shows several signs of relative prosperity: strong concrete irrigation channels carrying water to well-constructed concrete points and beyond them to the paddy-fields; and solid homes, many of them of permanent materials set on raised stone platforms above all possibility of snap flooding. Indeed, one of its boundaries is the main road and a frequent bus service to each of these centres. And this is partly a consequence of the easy access to Klaten, now a large and prosperous market town, and to the proud city of Yogyakarta: it takes only fifteen minutes on the pillion seat of a motor cycle taxi to be on the main road and a frequent bus service to each of these centres. And it is partly a consequence of the educational level of a sizeable number of Margosari people.

¹ For this and other administrative terms, see the note on p. ix.

² It was one of a number of kabupaten in Central Java which returned a vote of more than 50 per cent for the PKI in the 1957 elections, which were the last to be held before the banning of the communist party. See Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 226.

³ Names of places and persons from the kecamatan level downward are pseudonyms.
of the government SD had once attended a secondary school run by the Taman Siswa Association, and maintained links of loyalty and conscience with this movement through a junior high school it conducted in Dororejo, an adjoining district. The founder of Taman Siswa, Ki Hadimawan, had been one of the key ideologues of moves for an indigenous curriculum during the final twenty years of colonial rule, and he was one of the formulators of plans for a national system of education in the early years of the revolution. Most of his life was spent in Yogyakarta in Dororejo, an adjoining district. The founder of Taman Siswa, Ki Hadimawan, had been one of the key ideologues of moves for an indigenous curriculum during the final twenty years of colonial rule, and he was one of the formulators of plans for a national system of education in the early years of the revolution. Most of his life was spent in Yogyakarta in Dororejo, and were erratic in attendance. The pupils in their second of the wealthier people in Margosari had links with the movement, and they supported the SD principal in his concern to provide an opportunity for local children to continue beyond primary school, and to do it under the auspices of the movement which had in its heyday epitomized the struggle to re-assert a national identity for Indonesia. So it was agreed that the principal would administer a single class of children under the aegis of the Sekolah Taman Dewasa in Dororejo. (Taman Siswa translates as 'garden of pupils'; Taman Dewasa, 'garden of maturity', was the term adopted for secondary schools.) That was in 1955. The venture seems never to have prospered. Most of the teachers commuted from Dororejo, and were erratic in attendance. The pupils in their turn did not receive that pastoral care and individual stimulation which was one of the hallmarks of the Taman Siswa tradition, so that they were not purposeful enough in study to achieve satisfactorily in the examinations conducted by government for private school pupils. And, most fatally for the future of the school, the increasing politicization of the village population produced rifts running right through the area between particular) PNI and PKI supporters. Many of the teachers involved in the Taman Dewasa school at Dororejo aligned themselves, overtly or covertly, with the communist cause. Neither the Dororejo school nor its Margosari affiliate survived the upheavals of the latter part of 1965.

The Taman Siswa contribution to the extension of educational facilities in Margosari seems rather to have been as a stimulus to others. Between 1960 and 1970 no less than five secondary schools were initiated in Margosari or its immediate environs, several of them with a conscious concern to provide a counter to the growing influence of the PKI on the younger generation. The first in 1960 was a proposal by a Catholic priest in Klaten that an SMP (junior high school) be adumbrated by setting up a single continuation class for those who had successfully completed primary school. Some forty children were gathered together in borrowed premises, and many words spoken about the value of the venture. But supporting funds seem to have been lacking and the enrolled pupils melted away within months. The following year, a dozen pupils were gathered together on the home of one of the devout Muslims in what was announced as a private school but was hoped by its initiators would become a Muslim school. Like the Catholic venture, this one avoided many of the complex demands of registration with government as a private foundation school. It was evident that there was a market for secondary school places. Members of the PNI in particular, and others with no strong ideological commitment, saw the need for a national SMP in Margosari, serving the district without distinction of persons or creeds. The district officer, Sanjowo, was more than casually supportive of the notion, and he provided sensitive awareness of what needed to be done both to ensure that any initiatives did not fall foul of party strife and that they were eventually taken over by the Department of Education. First, he formed a grand committee (panitia besar), including among the membership the lurahs of all the villages in the district, under himself as chairman. Once this committee had sufficiently expressed the direction of its commitment, it appointed a working committee of eight to take action. These members were persons with a proven capacity for executive endeavour, and were carefully chosen to represent the three major political forces of the district: the PNI, the PKI and the Muslim parties. In the words of one observer, it was a golongan Nasakom effort; that is, it followed carefully the political financing act which the president had declared normative for the Republic at that time.

This group set itself to fulfil the four conditions necessary if the venture was in time to be taken into the national system. The first of these was that an SMP (junior high school) be adumbrated by setting up a single continuation class for those who had successfully completed primary school. Some forty children were gathered together in borrowed premises, and many words spoken about the value of the venture. But supporting funds seem to have been lacking and the enrolled pupils melted away within months. The following year, a dozen pupils were gathered together on the home of one of the devout Muslims in what was announced as a private school but was hoped by its initiators would become a Muslim school. Like the Catholic venture, this one avoided many of the complex demands of registration with government as a private foundation school. It was evident that there was a market for secondary school places. Members of the PNI in particular, and others with no strong ideological commitment, saw the need for a national SMP in Margosari, serving the district without distinction of persons or creeds. The district officer, Sanjowo, was more than casually supportive of the notion, and he provided sensitive awareness of what needed to be done both to ensure that any initiatives did not fall foul of party strife and that they were eventually taken over by the Department of Education. First, he formed a grand committee (panitia besar), including among the membership the lurahs of all the villages in the district, under himself as chairman. Once this committee had sufficiently expressed the direction of its commitment, it appointed a working committee of eight to take action. These members were persons with a proven capacity for executive endeavour, and were carefully chosen to represent the three major political forces of the district: the PNI, the PKI and the Muslim parties. In the words of one observer, it was a golongan Nasakom effort; that is, it followed carefully the political financing act which the president had declared normative for the Republic at that time.

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Those who worked on the staff of the school in that period say the experience of being in the place from day to day was less smooth than its progress might have seemed to those whose primary concern: buildings. Each of the major political streams had set up student movement in the district complete with theme songs and banners and slogans and token items of distinguishing clothing. Rallies and marches took place. This occurred off the school property, of course; but the atmosphere of partisan loyalty it engendered overflowed into classroom jibes and playground brawls. Official celebrations conducted according to school convention drew very different attendances, according to whether their significance was religious or national or revolutionary. Arrangements for these were often a source of contention among staff. They were after all, however, in a conviction that the school was important for the future of the district, whoever eventually won the struggle for power.

Early in October news filtered through that the struggle had reached a flashpoint. No group had any clear perceptions of what action to take. One night a small band of PKI zealots broke into the district office and stole some small arms. Fearful for their immediate safety, several Muslim leaders left Margosari and took refuge with friends in the villa of Plumbon, which was strongly santri. School attendance dropped sharply and several principals decided to close until the atmosphere cleared. Rumour told of the killing here of a noted PNI figure and there of a PNI leader. On 10 October a detachment of troops arrived and took up residence. After due consultation with Sanjowo in the district office, the teachers sought out some of the most noted PNI and Muslim citizens to participate in a program for cleansing the district of the influence of communism. Damsyuki, one of the members of staff of the SMP, was invited to join the use of his longstanding association with Muhammadiyah. He became a member of the small team charged with screening those taken into custody for use as a makeshift prison. It was guarded by members of the Partai Pejuang Agama dan Nasional (PPAN), a youth group formed to secure santri sponsorship to struggle against communism. Those prisoners arrived wearing watches or other items of value soon had them taken off. Some suffered a deal of abuse from the less temperate of the young men who suddenly found themselves in a position of unwovent power. Some of the detainees were very quickly cleared and allowed to depart others took their place. Damysuki said that a total of 300 were arrested or another taken in for checking. This included ninety per cent of the teachers in the district.

The investigating committee began with records and membership lists for the homes of PKI leaders, and also took verbal evidence of political and social activism. The case of the teachers illustrates the haziness of the lines which they had to draw. The teachers in Indonesia (Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia, PGRI) had split years before, mainly, it seemed to teachers in this part of the country, the question of the proper function of a union. The official continuing body regarded support of the government in the building of the nation as its primary concern: it therefore held the loyalty of the staunch PNI members as well as many of the older and more cautious. The breakaway movement (the PGRI non vak central) said that the object of a union should be the welfare of its members rather than the support of their employer: while teachers were hungry, one of its current slogans declared, they could not teach. This stance drew teachers with a variety of political loyalties: its more militant policies ensured that a sizeable proportion

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5 The Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Muslim Students of Indonesia) was associated with the Masyumi, the Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia (National Student Movement of Indonesia) with the PNI, and Ikatan Pelajar Indonesia (Union of Students of Indonesia) with the PPAN group.

6 We arrived at this tentative suggestion as to when the programme of political elimination began on the basis of comparing and weighing the dating given by our informants. Others have suggested slightly later dates. Rex Mortimer says that Colonel Sarwo Edan, commander of the army's para commando force (RPKAD), was ordered to Central Java to clean up the province on 17 October; see his *Indonesian communism under Sukarno: ideology and politics, 1959-1965* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 389-90. Leslie Palmer says that commando troops subdued mutinous military elements of the Diponegoro division at Solo on 22 October, and thereafter began the elimination of the PKI. See his *Communism in Indonesia* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), pp. 247-48.

7 The vak central, or trade union federation, in this case was the PNI-affiliated GSBI.
of the leadership were PKI members. Consequently, in the aftermath of the coup, all members of the PGR1 non vak sentral were called in for screening. Damsyuki, as a teacher himself, was much involved in able to establish their credentials as members of other political parties or leaders of Christian youth groups or well-known supporters of some other religious congregation. On the other hand the names of some were readily identified as office holders in PKI branches, positions for which their superior education had readily qualified them. Others with an especial interest in wayang or gamelan had been associated with LEKRA, and such were under suspicion by association. It would have been a difficult task for a competent lawyer. Damsyuki and his colleagues were inexperienced amateurs, and there were no directives from the government as to the criteria that should be applied. As the days went by, and the makeshift prison was filled, news began to get through of widespread slaughter in other parts of the residency, some of it clearly beyond the control of even such a makeshift body of investigator-prosecutor-judges as themselves. Better a few semi-judicial errors than uncontrolled mayhem.

So, on about 20 October, the first group of those condemned were taken by the soldiers to a nearby field to be killed. A sizeable number of villagers went along to watch. One of those, a ten year-old, found the whole event a colourful change from filling in time without school:

Sometimes the stabs would hit the stomach, sometimes the head. I liked the ones to the head most, because sometimes the skull split and then blood and brains would spill out. Others would be hung from a tree. Some of them would not die immediately, and would cry out for another stab. Sometimes their throats were cut: one time I saw this I shuddered as there was so much blood all at once. It all happened in the middle of the day, so lots of people were there to see it. All the killings were done by soldiers with red berets.

On that last point our sources are not consistent. Some say that the young men of the PPAN were also involved. In view of the general underworldliness of the process, I wonder if this does not represent wishful thinking on the part of those who would like to be able to tell of having played a more dramatic part in the stirring events of the period. One story told by several concerned a young blade who did his utmost to be near at the death, borrowing uniforms from the military personnel whenever he could. His delight in the whole process (even, it was said, to the point of drinking the blood of his victims) became the stuff of local legend, so that when he returned to the district in 1980 everyone recognized him. By then he was suffering from large body ulcers which ate into his flesh and caused him to die in agony. It was clear, the locals said, that his cruelty was remembered in heaven, and he had been given his just deserts.

By the time the killing was over, some 120 to 130 had been killed. This included seven lurahs, eighty SD teachers and sundry pamong. Of his colleagues at the SMP, Damsyuki recalls, two including the principal were killed, one sentenced to imprisonment, one deprived of civil rights and one suspended from teaching. For several weeks, the schools remained closed. When they opened it was hard to resume regular classes. Not a single SD in the district had a full complement of six teachers. Several had themselves operating with two or three. One such told of having to share the entire six primary classes with just one surviving colleague.

They devised a programme of rotation. One class was sent outside to play sport, one to do some written work without supervision. The four remaining classes were put in adjoining rooms. Each teacher operated through a door in a dividing wall, keeping two classes busy under his alternating stimulus and supervision. Classes I and II were sent home early. Even so, work programmes were delayed and confused. The crisis seems to have been widespread enough to demand a response from Jakarta. The government declared a six-month extension of the school year. Meantime the Kursus Pendidikan Guru (Teacher Training Courses) of the 1950s were revived, offering three months of afternoon classes to SMP graduates to train them rapidly as teachers. The results were of indifferent

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9 The manner of execution and the identity of the executioners is less than clear from our material. Had it been our intention at the time to research the killings we could easily have followed this to a point of greater clarity. On most matters we have regarded Damsyuki as the most reliable informant: he was a relatively educated man with a modern background (his senior secondary school was an Ahmadiyah foundation, he himself belonged to Partai Masyumi), and in interview he showed a consistent sobriety of utterance, avoiding decoration or undue elaboration. But he made no reference to being actually present at the place of killings, which others did.

10 A term used to cover all village officials from the lurah down.
quality, but the products were snapped up by harassed headmasters, and put in charge of classes. Many are there to this day.

The Margosari SMP survived the shaking better than most, and the opening of the school year in 1966 was ready to promote its first into Class III and admit its third into Class I. Furniture from the defunct SMP Taman Dewasa was added to its own stock. It was a fully functioning school, and its supporters could present its case to the Department of Education with some assurance, despite the insecurity of the times. Sanjowo put in a word to his superiors, and their assessment of the political atmosphere may well have added weight to the case. The district had purged itself of a very sizeable communist movement, done it with a minimum of casual slaughter. The New Order government had committed itself to the practice of considerable restraint in expenditure for all that, it was still clear that the district deserved a mark of approval. So it was that on 1 July 1966 the school was officially proclaimed a national school, and its property handed over to the Department of Education. The staff were given equivalence of status on generous terms, which allowed those without any tertiary qualifications a set period of time and adjusted timetables to attend upgrading courses.

In time, the New Order government devised its version of the events of 1965, and these have been used in the classrooms of all the schools in the district. The Department of Education and Culture issued a bulletin announcing the status of all teachers who had been judged to be involved with the PKI. They were not subsequently allowed to resume teaching until 1977, and then only in non-government schools. (In practice the application of this directive seems to have depended on the sponsoring foundation: a number of such teachers were re-engaged before that date.)

The effects of this pedagogic short-changing on that generation of school children cannot be documented. Other more obvious consequences can. Families which had lost a bread winner often found themselves strained to the point where even decent clothing for school attendance was beyond their means, and the children dropped out. Supporting mothers who had relatives in other districts were sometimes able to move to an environment without agonising associations and attempt a fresh start. Others lacked such alternative resources and stayed put. One such family lived next door to the home in which the research team was billeted. Both mother and father had been teachers, and were deprived of civil rights, father after serving a period in detention. In time they developed skill in the repair of household electrical appliances. The several children of the family were sent school against all odds; and, when two of the boys performed well in SMP, they were sent away to Yogyakarta to attend senior technical school. A Catholic priest in the district arranged for them to be granted residence papers in a church hostel in the city. These boys used to come home over weekends and spend all their time helping in the repair shop. A keen sense of mutual loyalty kept that family together. Others doubtless fared as well, though their stories will never be told. One SMP teacher told me she was teaching a civics class in 1981, and dealing with the events of 1965. As she spoke, his glance was caught by the face of a serious-minded student in the back row. She was sitting utterly still, her face an emotional blank; her eyes had filled with tears.
KALIMANGKO

The kecamatan of Demangan is a dry district some twenty kilometres from Purwodadi, away to the east of Semarang. One of the northern river valleys of Java, the Kuntang, forms one boundary of the district and in a season of high rainfall and unreliable fashion serves as a source of water. But the water which the villagers rely for agricultural irrigation and household use comes from a large canal which runs in a southerly direction the full length of the district. Alongside it, straight and flat, runs the only access road for most of the villages, an assemblage of stone which at sometime in the past received an asphalt surface but has long since relapsed into broken and pits which jar even the best-sprung vehicle. Not surprisingly, the attempt to visit Kalimangko only on market days can village people count on the probability of a single minibus plying irregularly along this road. There are a number of bicycles, and during the dry weather they were a manageable track for themselves through and alongside the irregular patches of stone and metal. A fortunate few own motor-cycles. The rest walk. That means, for those who wish to reach the village of Kalimangko from the nearest main road, a trek of some twelve kilometres.

These minimal communications bespeak poverty. A brief glance at farming practice in Kalimangko explains part of the reason for it. These fields which are in close proximity to the canal are allocated water for one crop of padi per year. The rest have to make do with the rainfed so corn and tapioca are sown in October, at the beginning of the monsoon. Some of these fields are inundated during the wet season when the Kuntang River bursts over its banks and spreads itself far and wide. Sometimes the flooding comes at an appropriate stage of growth, and a good harvest is gone quickly enough to leave the crop with an enhanced topsoil, so there is a good harvest. At others, the vast volume of water moves too quickly, removing topsoil and uprooting the young plants in its turbulent path. The village people most affected by this calamity may well have been up all the previous night, moving their children and belongings out of their homes onto the higher reaches of the nearest roadway. The few who are wealthy in Kalimangko have their homes built on raised platforms; and most of their land is sawah (wet paddy), to which intermittent flooding is a minor benefit.

The village then is bounded on one side by the Serang and straddles both the road and the canal; but ninety percent of its territory is between the river and the canal. There are three hamlets, each one running along the Kuntang River and the canal. There are three hamlets, each one running along the main road towards the river. The most northerly, Kaliparas, which is the one at which the visitor first arrives, was once the centre of village government for forty years, and includes the lurah's home and the village hall and offices, two of Kalimangko's three schools and a number of warungs. A kilometre further south is Kalitetor, which has the largest population and is the site of the recently built SD Inpres and the neglected mosque. The remaining hamlet, Kuntang, is much further south, and plays little part in village affairs. A trek around one or two of these settlements serves to reinforce the impression of poverty: a high proportion of houses have only rattan walls, and many of them consist of only one small living room and a tiny kitchen.

The combination of isolation and poverty makes it easy to understand why in the mid-1950s there was still no school in Kalimangko: the few families who much wanted their children to be literate sent them to neighbouring villages. Indeed, there was so little pressure for education that when the vigorous village secretary, Sulibuh, a member of the PKI, suggested in 1956 to the Department of Basic Education that it should build a school in Kalimangko it pleaded a shortage of funds and directed resources elsewhere. Despite lack of interest in the project on the part of the lurah, Sulibuh went on canvassing the need of the local children and struck a sympathetic listener in a Christian pastor of his acquaintance from Purwodadi. The result was the appointment of Kristiardjo, a trained primary school teacher, to take charge of twenty-five children gathered in the living room of Sulibuh's house.

By the mid-1960s, the polarization of Indonesian politics was being increasingly felt in Kalimangko. Budiapto, the lurah, was a member of the PNI. Though Sulibuh was his son-in-law, and had indeed gained his office by virtue of that relationship, he was increasingly building up an alternative power centre within the village, and winning support both because of his energy and personal charisma and because of the attraction of the PKI's policies of economic betterment for the poor. As the wealthiest landowner in the village, Budiapto had no counter to this latter score. It was therefore all the more desirable that Sulibuh should no longer be able to take credit for being the only leader in the village to show a concern for the education of village children. Budiapto and his friends discussed the issue, and put together the most convincing case they could to the Department. To help them put the case with maximum persuasiveness, they involved in the negotiation Rusiman, a teacher from elsewhere in the district, who was very active in the PNI.
The Christian school (the deputation pointed out) now had a full six classes, and there were still a large number of unschooled children in the village. Many parents, they also claimed, with much less plausibility, were uncertain about sending their children to a school where everyone received Christian religious instruction. Besides, in a whisper to selected government officers it was said, that school had been initiated by a PKI leader, and it was time that the village had alternatives. Initial approaches were received with great courtesy, but no assurances of action. When the matter was pressed, one departmental officer seems to have suggested that, however reprehensible Sulibuh’s motives may have been, his initiative was worthy of emulation. If the village leadership founded a school, and demonstrated both the general need and its own commitment, the government might when more funds became available be more easily persuaded of Kalimangko’s claim over others. This was not the kind of response that Budiyanto had hoped for. Where was this village in its poverty to get resources to pay for accommodation and teacher’s salary, except from the pockets of the leader and one or two of his immediate relatives? So the matter might in quieter times have been allowed to rest. But as the year 1965 had arrived and the pitch of political contention became more strident, it was clear that the people of the village needed something more tangible than news of another unsuccessful deputation to government if they were to believe that the PNI deserved their support. The Christian school, having quickly outgrown the resources of Sulibuh’s house, had tried meeting for a while in the village hall and then moved on to some nearby houses. What was the point of that? The deputation had proposed a Class I of the proposed national school from meeting in the village hall? So Rusiman, heavily involved in the cause, was offered some minor inducements from village funds to travel across from his own village after school there closed at 12.30, and teach through the afternoon hours in Kalimangko. It was an erratic and educationally minimal service, but, graced with the title SD Persiapan (primary school in preparation), it served its purpose as a sign to the people of the village of the lurah’s benevolent concern for the education of their children and to the government of the village’s aspirations for a subsidy from the nation’s coffers.

Meantime, the PKI continued to be active, conducting its campaign for support by both symbolic and substantive action. Its members talked of the coming revolution, when they would take over every office in the land, from presidency of the Republic to lurahship of Kalimangko. They went around under cover of darkness and painted hammer and sickle signs on the doors of the homes of some of the leaders of the PNI faction. Promoted Javanese puppetry performances laced with leftist innuendoes and began recruitment for a gamelan orchestra under the sponsorship of the KEKRA. Nor were they willing to acknowledge defeat on the educational front. Recognising that kindergarten classes were becoming increasingly common in other places, Sulibuh organized one in his home, known as Kanak-Kanak Melati. One report says that the children were actively taught atheism. ‘Now, boys and girls,’ the teacher was reported to say, ‘we ask God for a pencil... Have you got the pencil you asked for?... Then ask the teacher for a pencil... There you see, there is no God. Only human beings can give you things.’ Whether this was so or not, the kindergarten could be clearly identified as a communist initiative. There was none of the ambiguity which attached to the Christian SD, which had been founded by Sulibuh but established itself over the subsequent years as an unambiguously Christian institution responsible to its supporting foundation in Purwodadi. And through all this activity, PKI adherents went on talking of the redistribution of land which would follow communist victory.

On the first day or two of October of that year news began to circulate through the village that the revolution had in fact begun in Jakarta. Reports were confused, and in that atmosphere of tense expectancy and fear they multiplied in rapid confusion. Within two or three days it was clear, however, that, whatever had happened in Jakarta, the PKI was not in power. Its members turned to Sulibuh for advice on what they should do, and he was not much consoled to find that he knew as little as they. Two weeks or so later, he was asked to attend a meeting in the district office in Banjargan. That evening a messenger returned his bicycle and his books: the village secretary himself was never seen again in Kalimangko. Two days later a platoon of soldiers arrived. They arrested several of the known leaders of the local PKI branch, and announced that a youth group for the defence of Indonesia’s basic ideology, the Pancasila, was to be founded. Markus Yahmo, deputy principal of the Christian SD, volunteered, as did Sutarmet, another of the lurah’s sons-in-law. Sutarmet originated somewhere in the Klaten region. A combination of poor health and poverty had driven his father to move north looking for employment, and after sundry vicissitudes he and his wife and son had settled in Kalimangko. Sutarmet was bright enough to recognize early that for some people poverty at the beginning of life did not keep them for ever at the bottom of the heap. He walked five kilometres to the nearest primary school, and when he left it began buying and selling
on a tiny scale. With his savings, and some help from his newly acquired stepmother who was an experienced trader, he went off to Purwodadi, the junior high school. By the time he had completed he was twenty of age, and increasingly aware of the rewards of enterprise. He got a job as a clerk in the Semarang office of the Department of Education, and a few months later managed to transfer to the Purwodadi branch. Meantime, he courted and married one of Budiyapto's daughters, in the formation in October 1965 of the Barisan Garuda Pancasila, to effect a thorough destruction of communism in the villages of Penawangan, and his entrepreneurial inclinations precisely. After a brief period of training by members of a military unit in Purwodadi, the young men were given the right to wear a yellow shirt and a red beret, and to go and roam all traces of the allegedly alien doctrine. Such a patriotic duty was a sufficient reason for non-attendance at the office, while nevertheless draining his salary.

There were only six members of the Barisan in Kalimangko. Though ones with any initiative and independence of judgement were Sutarmet and Markus Yahmo. The military had already taken into custody one of the known leaders of the local PKI branch. The Barisan were thus able to operate on a confused and demoralized rank and file. Sutarmet's first investigation convinced him that his hunches were correct. The farmers whom he interviewed had indeed been a paid-up member of the Party, he was now however willing not only to deny all connection but to mortgage his tiny plot of land in order to recompense anyone who would support him in his denial. The situation was perfectly tailored to Sutarmet's talents. Exuding high purposefulness and earnest goodwill, he set out to divide the wicked from the misled, and managed over the next two months to marshall nearly all of Kalimangko's erstwhile communists into the latter corral. His reputation spread, and one day he received a call from his bekel 11 of Kalitelor. When Sutarmet checked the documents to which he had access, he had no doubt at all about the man's PKI membership over several years. A man holding a public office like this would be certain to lose it, and the income attached to it, possibly his freedom and maybe his life. So Sutarmet, as an officer of the PNI, wrote out a membership certificate in that party in the name of the bekel, and backdated it. Thus armed, the man was able to claim that he had been framed, and, while

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11 The lurah's administrative deputy in that hamlet.
and extending their own wealth. National elections see a flurry of support for Golkar.

For the rest of the time, in happy harmony with New Order politics, economic considerations have taken over from political ones, except for an election for a new lurah which had at the resident’s directions to take place in 1980. The family coffers were then opened to ensure that the district officer disqualified the only plausible non-family candidate, the headmaster of the Christian SD, who was deemed to have failed the literacy test taken by all candidates at the district office, and to buy as many votes as possible for the most favoured candidate: the only one of Budiapto’s sons who did not already have either government employment or a post in the village. Of course an edict removing parties from villages does not necessarily eliminate political debate within them. In Kalimangko however, the New Order government has no cause for concern. Struggles for power now occur only within the closed circle of a family, whose members squabble in private over their share of the spoils: the commoners are preoccupied with an exhausting struggle to feed themselves.

Chapter 9
THE PURWODADI KILLINGS
Two accounts

Maskun Iskandar & Jopie Lasut
Translated and introduced by Robert Cribb

Readers of the Indonesian press in 1965 and 1966 found little reference here to the killing. Reports on the alleged activities of PKI members and army operation to suppress them appeared regularly in newspapers, but the mass killings themselves were touched on only indirectly, at all. Soe Hok Gie’s 1967 attempt to address the issue of the killings was never published. Only in February and March 1969 did this silence break, when reports of renewed extensive killing in the Purwodadi area of Central Java occupied the front pages of the Jakarta press for about three weeks. The difficulties which journalists faced in investigating and reporting this story, however, help to explain why the earlier, more extensive, massacres were so meagrely covered.

On 26 February 1969, the newspaper Harian KAMI carried a page one headline ‘Pembunuhan gelombang dalam 3 bulan di Purwodadi’ (‘A wave of killings over 3 months in Purwodadi’), together with a report of an interview with Haji J.C. Princen of the Human Rights Defence Foundation (Embaga Pembela Hak-hak Asasi Manusia) in Jakarta. Princen, just back from a week in Central Java with two Dutch journalists, reported that two to three thousand people had been killed in the Purwodadi area since November 1968 by army units of the Central Java Diponegoro Division. The victims, he said, has been struck on the back of the neck with iron bars before being buried in nearby teak forests. At least one was still alive when he was buried. Many more people were in detention in jails in the region, Princen said, where they were being tortured with electric shocks.
The local military district (KODIM) commander Lieutenant-Colonel Tejo Mono had earlier told a public meeting in Purwodadi that the people would 'do better to clean yourselves up than to let me do it'. Purwodadi, in consequence, was in a state of terror, and some people had committed suicide, rather than risk torture and death at the hands of the military.

Reports of a PKI resurgence themselves nothing new. The conservative press were in no doubt in 1965 that the PKI and its mass organizations would fight and each incident in which party members or associates fought may and vigilante units in the immediate aftermath of the coup was seen as battle in the civil war. Even after the army was clearly in power, reports of official 'terrorist' activities by the PKI continued to appear in the press. Reports of this kind came from many parts of the archipelago. In West Kalimantan, there was a prolonged guerrilla struggle between the Indonesian army and troops of the Pasukan Gerilya Rakyat Sarawak, which had been formed originally with Indonesian assistance to promote the confrontation of Malaysia. The most substantial of the reports from Java were of the establishment of PKI guerrilla bases on the slopes of Mounts Merapi and Merbabu in Central Java in late 1966 and in the South Buitar area in East Java in 1968. Accounts of the Buitar bases described them as full scale guerrilla headquarters, complete with a People's Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat), underground bunkers and a network of cells throughout the countryside. The PKI's South Buitar operation had been crushed in the army's Operation Trisula in mid-1968, but the public was well-primed to expect a further recrudescence of communist activity, and news of the Purwodadi operations was initially thought unremarkable.

The report of extensive massacres in Purwodadi, however, led other Jakarta newspapers to pick up the story. *Indonesia Raya* (28 February 1969) described Purwodadi as a miserably poor limestone area, no good for agriculture, where people could survive only by stealing wood from the state teak forests. In 1966, the newspaper recalled, local people had hacked to pieces a member of the forest police. This was perhaps a cause of the present crackdown, the newspaper speculated. Indeed, alongside the question of land reform, forest policy had been a major issue of political

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For a summary of publicly reported PKI activity after the coup's suppression, see Lautus M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia since Sukarno* (Singapore: Donald Moore, 1971), pp. 111-124.
land and was well known as a PKI stronghold, and had successfully
Santin commander General Maraden Panggabean promised and investigation.'
crimes.'
during the fifties and sixties the PKI and its affiliates had argued for,
contention in the poorer areas of Central Java since Dutch times.2
control and resistance
in the town of Purwodadi. He had, moreover, they alleged, gone
tortures and was joined by the Central Java governor, Major-General
Purwodadi clandestinely, after telling the military authorities in Semarang
had never visited the villages where he claimed the massacres had taken
place but had obtained his information entirely from a Catholic priest
in the town of Purwodadi. He had, moreover, they alleged, gone
to Purwodadi clandestinely, after telling the military authorities in Semarang
he was on his way to Yogyakarta. Nor, said Surono, was there any such
netherlands, which proved to be impeccable. Jailed by the Nazis for his
in the Dutch wartime resistance, he had joined Dutch military forces
atempting to suppress the Indonesian revolution, only to discover, in his
that the Dutch had cast themselves in the erstwhile German role
foreign oppressors. In 1948 he deserted to the Republic but was jailed
PKI units in Kudus, coincidentally no far from Purwodadi, as soon as
appared across the border. Released by anti-communist Siliwangi
Division troops after the Medan affair, he joined the Siliwangi in its march
Dutch-occupied West Java and was awarded the Guerrilla Star
for his role in the final stages of the struggle against
Dutch. In 1955 he was elected to parliament as representative of the
communist Liga Demokrasi (Democratic League). He had been jailed
Sukarno from 1962 to 1966 for his opposition to the rise of the left.8
Munadi, on the other hand, said Princen, had only started fighting the
PKI after it had been crippled. Perhaps he had always disagreed with
communist activities, 'but none of us sitting in those cells heard his voice'.9

Confronted by journalists with reports of the killings, the army
commander General Maraden Panggabean promised and investigations
Governments ranks, however, quickly began to close. The Diponegoro
commander Major-General Surono categorically denied the killings.ana

Surono and Munadi also turned the heat on Princen, saying that he
had never visited the villages where he claimed the massacres had taken
place but had obtained his information entirely from a Catholic priest
in the town of Purwodadi. He had, moreover, they alleged, gone
to Purwodadi clandestinely, after telling the military authorities in Semarang
he was on his way to Yogyakarta. Nor, said Surono, was there any such
person as Lt-Col. Tejo Sarwono; rather there were separate Lt-Cols. Tejo

On 7 March, Surono invited Jakarta journalists to visit Purwodadi to
see things for themselves, and this invitation was taken up by the
Indonesia newspaper journalist Maskun Iskandar, whose report is translated here. Surono's
offer, it turned out, was for journalists to be escorted through the region
local military authorities. Iskandar's account described the difficulty
reaching any conclusion under such circumstances. Other journalists
attempted to go without military sponsorship, and the report of Jopie Lasut
Dinar Harapan on his brief visit is also translated here. Harian KAMI
published a sarcastic story suggesting that a tourist guide to Purwodadi
would soon be published for the many journalists who had suddenly become
interested in the previously neglected region. The paper advised journalists
to travel alone, and to dress as simply as possible, preferably in an old
jung and peci (black Muslim cap). No arrangements for accommodation

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4 JPRS, Translations on South and East Asia no. 135 (14 Nov. 1966), p. 5.
5 Indonesian Raya [IR], 3 March 1969.
6 IR, 3, 4 March 1969; Harian KAMI [HK], 3 March 1969.
7 IR, 4, 6 March, 1969.
8 For Princen's own memoirs, see 'Pelarian KNIL Berbintang Gerilya', Tempo 7 July 1990, pp. 51-53.
9 IR, 4, 6, March 1969.
or for return journey were necessary, however, said Harian KAMI
the army was happy to provide free overnight lodgings and to arrange
rapid transport back to Semarang. 10

Despite military restriction, hints about the nature of the killings sur-
as as the days passed. What these hints suggested, however, was rather
more than simple army massacres of suspected PKI supporters. Amongst
those arrested, according to early reports, were a number of religious
teachers. These turned out, in later reports, to include between seven
and ten Protestant teachers. One of these, a teacher called Limaran, had
died in detention, from a fall in the bathroom on 19 December 1968 as well
as a number of Protestant teachers. One of these, a teacher called
Llmaran, had died in detention, from a fall in the bathroom according
to the military, from severe beating according to a medical report lea-
ding the affair was reinforced by a report that a Hansip
PKI leader had been killed in Ambarawas, apparently on suspicion of leftist sympathies.14

In mid-March, Harian KAMI published three further reports from
the region, none of them explicitly related to the army killings. It told how
the story of an Islamic religious teacher who had attended, more or less
by mistake, a clandestine meeting of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI)
which had also been fairly strong in the region. At this meeting people
had spoken out in favour of Sukarno. When, however, the teacher reported
this to the local authorities, he was himself jailed, tortured and accused
of planning to slaughter Protestants and Catholics in the region. Second,

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10 HK, 13 March 1969.
11 HK, 5 March 1969; IR, 6 March 1969.
12 IR, 4 March 1969.
13 HK, 14, 15, 17 March 1969.
14 IR, 14 March 1969; Sinar Harapan, 14 March 1969.
sub-district (KORAMIL) in the area had been shot by a PKI (gerombolan PKI) on 13 March strengthened this feeling.

And third, the reports raised the suggestion, already aired by Soetarto Gie, that some of those who had avoided irrevocable commitment to side before Gestapu deliberately promoted the killings after the coup. The suggestion, if true, was dangerous, a way of showing their loyalty to the New Order. Few Indonesians had been able to avoid, even if they wanted to, a form of compromise or accommodation with left. Munadi's acquiescence in a flow of events which seemed unstoppable, was more common than Princen's outspoken opposition. Even Sudharmono, current president and vice-president of the Guided Democracy had been able to avoid, even been accused, in different contexts, of close contact with sections of the PKI's political aims. Few had the anti-communist 'credentials' of Princen, and even those credentials did not save him from virulent personal attack. If there was any lesson drawn from the Purwodadi case it was that the lid was best kept firmly on the earlier, greater killings.

The Purwodadi affair ended, as far as the Jakarta press was concerned, with a flurry of government assurances and warnings. On 14 March, the foreign minister Adam Malik warned against 'magnifying' the issue; it would only, he said, distract the country from the forthcoming five year development plan (REPELITA) and could damage Indonesia's international relations. President Suharto was planning a state visit to Europe in May and the affair could provide, Malik said, a pretext for anti-Indonesian demonstrations. Then on 17 March the information minister Air Vice-Marshall Budiarjo returned from an unannounced visit to Purwodadi to tell the president, the cabinet and reporters that nothing untoward had happened and that the area was calm.

Since leaving Jakarta for Semarang, my mind had been churning with thoughts and questions. I had to be alert to the possibility that someone was orchestrating a split here between the armed forces and the people. It was possible, too, that government bodies had been infiltrated or that people were spreading false information for their own ends, whatever those ends might be. There was also the possibility of interference from outside to create tension between religious groups.

Arrived in Semarang on Monday 3 March 1969. On the same day, and Major Suhirno, head of the Diponegoro Division's information section, and the division's official denials had not satisfied me and that I wanted to see things for myself. On the following day, together with a colleague from Kompas, I received a letter of permit from the Assistant I of KODAM Semarang, and I also had a long discussion with Major Suhirno about the rule of law, freedom of the press, human rights and so on. He warned me against seeking information from individuals not competent to supply it. This included members of the community and officials not from the local military...

15 IR, 15 March 1969.

command (KODIM). This was, he emphasized, a matter of security and order.

The morning of our arrival in Purwodadi, Wednesday 5 March, there had been a military search operation at Purwodadi railway station. Captain Sarwono told me that these operations were launched frequently at the station, because it was a kind of open door into the region. It was an easy place to pick up new faces, especially suspect ones. The commander of KODIM 1717, Lieutenant-Colonel Tejo Suwarno told us that they had arrested a PKI member the previous night in Toroh. His name was Kasman alias Prawirosudarno. When I was in Semarang, I had read that a Reuters journalist in East Java had been arrested on suspicion of PKI connections, and we heard on the train that two journalists from Soeharto had been arrested. So Princen’s information that detentions were still going on was also true. This of course was the reason we had asked for a letter of authorization in Semarang. We were afraid to be mistaken for being PKI, which happens commonly these days.

Before we left Purwodadi for the Kuwu area, which had been identified in press reports as the centre of the killing, the KODIM commander gave us a briefing. PKI membership in Purwodadi was estimated at 200,000 out of a population of 700,000 in eighteen kecamatan. Two hundred and eighty-five lurah were PKI, he told us. Out of this number, only about a thousand had been ‘finished off’, and these were only the leaders. ‘If we arrested everyone who was PKI,’ the commander told us, ‘we would not know what to do with them. We do not have space to detain them and we could not simply release them because the rest of the population would not have them back.’ The commander of KODAM VII plans to transmit them.

According to reports I had read in the Central Java press, some officials had admitted that torture of prisoners had taken place, though only during operations. The same was true of killings. Unfortunately, however, we were not allowed to interview any prisoners on this matter. And was the torture done to an inhuman degree? How can I weigh up the evidence of different stories we were told? Someone told us that the body of Limaran had been dug up after being buried for two days and a night. His left hand was smashed, his cheeks had black spots on them, traces of torture. But the official story was that he died from a fall in the bathroom. Someone else told us that soldiers had brought the body to hospital for a post mortem, but that all the staff had to stay at their posts. No-one was allowed to

and all the lights were turned off. I cannot say which, if any, of these stories are true: there is simply no firm evidence to confirm or deny them.

We heard more stories. Major-General Surono and Governor Munadi may have denied them, but people kept talking. In my diary, I noted, ‘This situation should be settled by a proper explanation, true and objective, from the relevant authorities. No exceptions, no ifs and buts.’ This would answer my questions. As it was, so much depended on the honesty and reliability of my informants, official and otherwise. Of course I already had plenty of pieces of information, but I also had a lot of question marks after them.

On the afternoon of 5 March I visited four of the fourteen prison camps in Purwodadi kabupaten. I saw 987 prisoners and it would be dishonest if I were to say that they were either fat or the reverse. The camps themselves, I was told, included former store houses which the military had borrowed from local people. So there were no terrifying iron bars,
but they were secure enough. Let us take Camps I and II in Kuwu as examples. Local people call them kamp maut, camps of death. It is not clear to me, however, just what they mean by this. Is there some connection with those reports about Kuwu being in the grip of fear? I don’t know why my editor had sent me to get first hand accounts. Had killings taken place without due legal process? Was it true that each desa had to supply seventy-five victims a night? Was it true, as we heard, that the victims were tied up in groups of five before being shot, struck with iron or slaughtered without mercy? I had no success in checking these details and I got tired of hearing the same words ‘I don’t know’, and ‘Perhaps it was just because my Indonesian seemed rather strange to them.

Stories passing from mouth to mouth tend to get bigger. This was why my editor had sent me to get first hand accounts. Had killings taken place without due legal process? Was it true that each desa had to supply seventy-five victims a night? Was it true, as we heard, that the victims were tied up in groups of five before being shot, struck with iron or slaughtered without mercy? I had no success in checking these details and I got tired of hearing the same words ‘I don’t know’, and ‘Perhaps it was just because my Indonesian seemed rather strange to them.

We took a rest in one of the local houses. I had not lived in a kampung for years, and now I felt that old feeling of ease which is absent in the cities. Simplicity is the civilization of the village. Honesty and friendliness. The wooden table was laden with food and drink. There were coconuts with their delicious, refreshing milk, especially welcome after our tiring ride. My hands shook as I filled my glass with the coconut milk, and I spilled some on my trousers. There were oranges, coffee and snacks, bread but I did not try it. My stomach could not take any more; I remembered my own village which had also once been in the grip of terrible disturbances. Suddenly I longed to enjoy the full moon, to play hide-and-seek with my playmates.

Little children surrounded the jeep, but they did not dare come close, like the children at army barracks. They seemed to wonder why so many outsiders were visiting their village lately. I approached one of them and asked in low Javanese, ‘Do you have a sister?’ He was silent. ‘Where is your mother?’, I asked again. He remained silent, making circles in the sand with his big toe. ‘Is your father here?’, I asked at random. The child raised his eyes. They were brimming over. Then he ran away into the narrow streets of the kampung. I deeply regretted asking those ‘useless’ questions.

When I had got off the train in Semarang, fresh from Jakarta, I had bought almost all the newspapers I could find which mentioned the Suwodadi affair. What had excited me was that invitation [from Surono] to check for yourselves. I was impressed. Here was an honest and honourable official, not afraid to speak openly because he had nothing to hide. Lieutenant-Colonel Tejo Suwano had also told me, ‘I am always open and straightforward.’ My confidence had increased. If we had not been in front of the commandant, I would have grasped the hand of my Kompas colleague and said, ‘We’re going to make it.’ Like some senior officer at a banquet, I could have raised a toast, ‘To our common prosperity.'
We uphold the Message of the People’s Conscience. 19 We promote Renewal of the people, by the people, for the people. 20 I felt relieved Pak Tejo accompanied us when we visited the prison camps and until we left Purwodadi. We had lunch at the best restaurant in the kabupaten. But when my Kompas colleague went to wash his hands, the military man who was escorting us whispered something to one of his colleagues. I did not suspect anything and I do not know what happened, but indeed nothing happened. Our room to move suddenly became limited.

As I travelled, I tried to go over what I had heard. I know the government faces a dilemma when it comes to communism. Sometimes the relationship between communists and communism is like that between a snail and its shell. The snail can abandon the shell if it wants to. On the other hand, sometimes it is like the relationship between a fire and its heat. Without heat, there is no fire. Although we know that there are groups A, B and C, 21 it must be hard to draw a firm line between them. If they are released, there are problems, too, because the community may reject them, or they may revolt again. To detain them means facing the cost of providing food for them; they are human beings after all. Finishing them off or killing them is no solution either, for these are not just inanimate objects or numbers to be dealt with summarily, and killing them will just entrench feelings of revenge in the following generations.

Kill! But kill the idea, not the people. Not that I think this will be an easy task. Without wanting to make things more difficult, I do wonder whether our present apparatus is capable of doing this and of convincing people to discard communism. As far as I am concerned, communism is clearly bad and as long as people believe in something else I don’t mind what it is. But what about these people? I was very tired and sleepy but could not sleep at all. Those rough roads kept jolting my mind. But thought, once I have a rest at the hotel things will be clearer, and I was confident that I would have complete answers to take back to Jakarta.

Back in my hotel, I attempted to sort my confused notes. The very figures I had written down of numbers killed seemed to be shaking. The graves of victims were witness to it. I asked the same questions to all those who gave me information, people who wanted to crush the PKI but did not want it done in this way. What they said was, ‘This kind of thing will not solve anything, not for the people who do it, not for those who did it done.’ When the army took me through those areas which were to be tense, I tried to find proof. Was it true that there was a grave behind Cerewek railway station which had recently been planted with banana trees? Was there a grave in the rice fields at Banjarsari? Someone told me there were graves along the river in Tanjungsari, but our escort did not let us see any of these things. I got tired of writing down the names of villages where there were supposed to have been executions and burials. Pakis, so my official source said, there were one hundred victims, in Grobogan fifty. Outside this area my source did not have specific information, but he named villages: Toroh, Kedungglundung, Sambongbangi, Grbogan.

I noted once again what I had heard from an official source who wanted to remain anonymous. Three hundred prisoners, he said, had been killed in the desa Simo. Two hundred and fifty in Cerewek, two hundred in Kelasari, one hundred in Kuruw, two hundred in Tanjungsari. Was this true? Did this really happen? I had asked him. ‘It’s no secret any more’, he told me. ‘All the locals know about it. No honest man will deny it. The graves of the victims are witness to it.’ I asked the same questions to all those who gave me information, people who wanted to crush the PKI but did not want it done in this way. What they said was, ‘This kind of thing will not solve anything, not for the people who do it, not for those who did it done.’ When the army took me through those areas which were to be tense, I tried to find proof. Was it true that there was a grave behind Cerewek railway station which had recently been planted with banana trees? Was there a grave in the rice fields at Banjarsari? Someone told me there were graves along the river in Tanjungsari, but our escort did not let us see any of these things. I got tired of writing down the names of villages where there were supposed to have been executions and burials. Pakis, so my official source said, there were one hundred victims, in Grobogan fifty. Outside this area my source did not have specific information, but he named villages: Toroh, Kedungglundung, Sambongbangi, Grobogan.

Like Princen, I began to suspect that not everyone who was arrested was a communist. I heard that eighteen members of the Muhammadiyah had been arrested, as well as sixteen Catholics and Protestants, and some from the Nahdatul Ulama and other organizations. Officials told me that these detainees were suspected of being PKI infiltrators into the religious organizations.

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19 Amanah Hati Narawi Rakyat, Message of the People’s Consciousness, the slogan which appears on the masthead of Kompas.
20 Suara Pembahasan dari Rakyat oleh Rakyat untuk Rakyat, the Voice of Renewal of the People, by the People, for the People, the slogan on the masthead of Indonesia Raya.
21 Those detained on suspicion of involvement in the coup were divided into three categories (golongan), A, B and C. Category A prisoners, generally major figures, were those accused of direct participation in the coup and were generally brought to trial. B category prisoners, generally lesser figures within the PKI and affiliated organizations, were detained without trial, often for more than ten years. C category prisoners, about 550,000 in total, were detained only briefly.
Almost the whole night long, I sorted at my notes on the Purwodadi affair. I made a simple map, marking important places, places with reported killings, reported burial places, areas where there was a majority of women, and was told that in Cerewek, Gabus and Sulur 70% of the population were widows. Some people even said that in Banjardowo it was hard to find a single adult male. Where could they have gone to?

I was told that in Cerewek, Gabus and Sulur there were a majority of people involved in crushing the PKI. Asking here and there, officials only of course, and only from the KODIM. I had even managed to talk directly to people who took active part in crushing the PKI.

I had a lot of information about the operations in Purwodadi, from when they began, but that would take too much space. Let us start with 5 April 1968, just under a year ago. The police in Purwodadi had arrested Sugeng, a former PKI member who conducted raids in the area. Under interrogation, he told the police that the PKI was putting together an underground organization called the People's Liberation Army [Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat, TPR], led by Suratin, who was still at large. Level I of the TPR (equivalent to the PKI's old Comite Daerah Besar, regional committees) was based first in Semarang, at Jl. Dr Cipto 296 and 298. Government forces then took over these buildings and began breaking up PKI operations with increasing success. The PKI kept up its operations, but it was shadowed ever more closely and had to change its operatives frequently. 'When did the large-scale arrests begin?' I asked one of those involved. '27 June 1968', he answered.

Hearing that date reminded me that responsibility for operations had been transferred to KODIM 0717 Purwodadi. If I am not mistaken, the headquarters had then been in Grobogan, about four kilometres from Purwodadi, while the investigating team had been first at Kradenan and then at Kuwu, about five kilometres away. I stopped writing, and tried to remember what I had noted down about Corporal S and Sergeant S. From what I had been told, both men were much feared in Kuwu. Perhaps there was some connection with the story I heard from Kuwu residents in Semarang that the sergeant was known as Agent 007. Ian Fleming's James Bond. Licensed to kill. I was surprised people could be so loose in their use of terminology. James Bond was on the side of Good, but was this man? People told me that he used to summon the authorities to a ritual meal before he went out on his operations. One time he got drunk and shouted 'I am Agent 007. I have killed hundreds of people.' Fortunately an official who happened to be sitting next to him was able to stop his mouth and prevent him from saying any more.

Again I rummaged through my notes on the arrests. There was an official who told me that the arrests had gone on for a month from 27 June. When the prisoners had been collected, they took seventy-five away each night, in two lots. Later this became less and they only took away seventy-five prisoners every Saturday night.

Someone walked past my room. I quickly hid the papers under the mattress and switched off the light. Then everything fell quiet again, except for the constant short cough of the nightwatchman. It reminded me of the incident before I had met the KODIM commander in Purwodadi the previous night, but I might come back to that. I still had not finished transcribing my notes on the arrests and killings.

According to the earliest information from Princen, two to three thousand people had been killed. This seemed very high, out of a total population of eight thousand in Purwodadi kabupaten. So I began to count. Seventy-five people at night for, say, two months, how much would that be? Now, there are 285 desa in Purwodadi. There cannot have been killing in all of them, so let us assume just ten, and that the killings took place once a week, not every night. This would make 8 (weeks) x 10 (desa) x 75 people = 6000 people. Impossible! What if I make it just one desa? That is still hundreds, still mass killings. I folded up my notes. I would return them in due course to the authorities in the form of questions. We had actually had plenty of information before we met the KODIM commander in Purwodadi and before we went on our escorted inspection trip, but there were question marks all over this information. What I really wanted was to be able to remove those question marks. So much for my hopes. I had not despaired at first. In Semarang I read that the army commander had sent an investigatory team to Purwodadi and that Princen had quietly asked members of parliament to use their right to move freely in order to undertake a proper investigation, in a way that neither of us had been able to, with our pockets full of question marks. I had also been confident that the government would be open, that they would allow journalists from Jakarta and the provinces to conduct a proper investigation.
investigation because there was nothing to hide, no mass killings, no inhuman tortures, no disregard for due legal process. I believed that all had good intentions and honest aims. I still remember law faculty students carrying a big poster at a carnival, reading, 'Goddess of Justice, open the hearts of our rulers', 'When weapons speak, law is silent', and other similar slogans. I would not like to have to see those posters again.

Under other circumstances, I would not have believed the story of Hanra [civil defence officer] from one of the villages around Purwodadi, who told me that he and his colleagues had rehearsed uniform answers to visitors from Jakarta when they passed through. I was told this on Tuesday evening, 4 March, while we were still on our way to Purwodadi. Hanra told us to be careful if we had not yet reported to the KODIM office. I could not understand this. After all, we had a letter from KODAM My Kompas colleague and I were confident that both we and the local authorities had nothing but good intentions, so we did not suspect anything when we heard about the military raid on Purwodadi station that morning. It did not occur to us that they might have heard we were coming and that it might be us they wanted to arrest. This kind of raid was common, they told us, and it did not seem strange that they asked us when we had arrived. Any good host would have done that.

I saw no beggars in Purwodadi. They say the kabupaten was once full of them, but there was now no sign of them. I asked my escort. They had been pulled in during the searches, he said; there were forty-three in the camps now. Were they PKI people hiding as beggars, I wondered, or just ordinary non-communist beggars. Another thing drew my attention. There were said to be five mad people in the camp, and none had been sent to a mental hospital. Even one mad person is a lot for a small kabupaten, but five? Perhaps Purwodadi is an exception. It was not clear whether these people were mad when they went into the camp or whether they became mad there. I do not know.

There are fourteen women among the prisoners, perhaps Gerwani, perhaps not. I did not get a chance to ask them. But let me give details of prison camps as I know them. There are fourteen camps in Purwodadi. In the town itself, there are 411 prisoners, in Toroh fifty-one, in Gundik forty. Ah yes, and before I forget, the total includes 127 prisoners left from the arrests in 1965. In Godong there are nine prisoners; in Sorengan two camps, the first with fifty-five, the second with sixty-seven. In Sulur, seventy-two in Grobogan. The total number of prisoners, including beggars, lunatics and women is 987 in fourteen camps. In Wirosari there are seventy-nine prisoners, in Ngaringan sixty-four, in Tawangharjo sixty-six, in Pulokulon forty-seven, in Grubug five, in Tawangani thirty-three, in Medungjati one. In January there were four cases of illness, in February five. Some people said these were all recent arrivals, others called them 'overs' (sisa). It was not altogether clear to me what the term sisa meant, so I did not pay much attention to it.

I put all my notes and the materials I had not yet transcribed back in my bag and closed it with a large question mark. I hope that an investigation team dedicated to upholding the law will open it.

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23 A reference to demonstrations before the establishment of the New Order.
We left Wirosari station at 4 a.m. in an old local train heading for Kradenan. People in Wirosari had told us of many widows there whose husbands had been killed and F. from Pedoman said that this was what we should be looking for; an Australian journalist, Frank Palmos, told Angkatan Bersenjata [an armed forces newspaper] that large numbers of widows and orphans would be one of the signs of a massacre, if it had occurred.

The train crawled on like something out of a spaghetti Western. It occurred to us to begin by asking the women who happened to be there in the same carriage with us. There was a young woman near us, and it turned out she was indeed a widow, but only by divorce, not because her husband had been killed. We were disappointed. But as we chatted with her, my companion’s eyes suddenly began to glint. ‘He’s onto something,’ I thought. I asked him what he had found. He smiled and said, ‘Her father was killed because he was accused of PKI activities.’ Perhaps, I thought, she would be able to lead us to other widows and help us draw the curtain from these ‘mass killings’ in Purwodadi.

After her father was arrested, she said, she had seen him once at the KORAMIL in Kuwu, commanded at that time by Lieutenant Sutopo. Surprisingly, her father had said that he was being interrogated by ‘another PKI prisoner’. After that visit, she and her family had heard nothing more of her father and according to civil defence troops stationed in the Kuwu KORAMIL, he had been killed somewhere along with other prisoners. None of this was proof, though, that this woman’s mother was a widow. Perhaps, I thought, her father had just been ‘lent’ to another military unit for interrogation or some other purpose.

Her story reminded me of something told me by an officer who had been in the Operation Kekis (Rub Out) in Semarang. He said that he had been forbidden to give out information but that he felt that he should

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**REPORT FROM PURWODADI**

**Jopie Lasut**

We arrived in Kradenan at about 4.30 a.m. F. leapt from the train like an El Fatah guerrilla a few hundred metres from the station. He was lucky not to sprain his ankle. Since it was still dark, we were able to avoid the watchful eyes of the guards and spies who were at the station and we immediately went to the house of one of the local people.

People there told us about the mass arrests and about places where the prisoners had been killed. Those who had been arrested and had not been heard of for months had been killed, it was rumoured. Most of them were Muslim. When we said we did not believe this, they urged us to meet the local ustadz (Muslim teacher). He lives in the mosque, they told us. But we did not want to delay in one place for too long. We were
getting used to the fact that people here were 'security-minded'. When people we talked to heard we were from the press, they became agitated. Everyone we talked to would look nervously left and right as we spoke. So we promised we would come back tomorrow. 'Tell Haji Rohman that we do want to meet him,' we told them.

The stories we heard in Kradenan and Wirosari were hair-raising. It was not because of the mass killings (most people knew about these newspapers such as Kompas, Duta Masjarakat and Andika). What terrified people were the arrests and the tortures. 'They took one person and cut his throat with a knife, in front of everyone,' said an old man. 'Where?' I asked. 'In Cerewek, pak.' Had he seen it himself? 'The old man hesitated. 'No,' head said. But then he added, with a voice trembling and full of emotion, 'It was my only child. I heard about it from other people. I hate the way things are here.'

We did not want to ask anything more, but then it occurred to me: what if this man is a communist? So I asked him, 'Bapak, what party were you in?' He replied that he was just an ordinary labourer and had not taken part in politics, but the callous treatment of his child was more than he could bear. E. from Pedoman said, 'I am a good Muslim. As soon as I get back to Jakarta, I am going to get in touch with the party leaders there.' In Jakarta they talk about community leadership, democracy, humanity, rule of law and so forth, but it is clear that they just don't know what their followers are going through in kabupaten Grobogan-Purwodadi.

People here know men such as Haji Rohman, Father Wignyo Sumarto and other religious leaders from their own kabupaten, kecamatan or village, but have never seen the faces of party men like Harry Tjan, Liem Biau Koen, Liem Biau Kie and Worotikan. In fact the Catholic community has never even seen the head of the Central Java branch of the Partai Katolik. This must have applied just as much to people such as Mari'i Muhamad, Binsar Siampar, Victor Matondang and Sabam Strait, the secretary-general of PARKINDO (Partai Kristen Indonesia, the Protestant political party), who gave me a letter addressed to his dear colleagues in the party's Purwodadi branch. Our movements, however, were rather restricted and I was not able to meet them. In Wirosari, on the other hand, the Protestant congregation, which numbers about five hundred, was able to tell me about Drs Ngayi Iman Marsudi, head of the Christian Economic High School (SMEA) in Wirosari who was detained along with eight other Protestant leaders without the local Parkindo so much as breathing a word of enquiry about their fate. Aside from the question of their innocence or guilt, surely the local Protestant representatives had no duty to ask where they were and to ensure that they were being treated according to the law.

According to information I received, Limaran, one of the sixteen Protestant and Catholic teachers detained, was tortured to death. Of the sixteen remaining in detention, only one was still refusing to sign a confession acknowledging that he was a PKI member ordered to infiltrate the Christian community. (When I asked at the Purwodadi KODIM, they denied any of the sixteen Christian teachers had been arrested; this, however, was not what the Jatinegara Divisional information section had told me.) The Protestants in Purwodadi are afraid to talk; their ministers are hoping we will do something, Father Noto explained. He said that the Catholic community had contacted the Purwodadi KODIM in December for permission to conduct a Christmas service in the jail. This had been refused. The Catholics then made a request through Father Projo for a guarantee that the fifteen Christian detainees would be treated in a humane fashion. This was also refused.

In fact, although Father Projo's actions had the blessing of the Cardinal, the army came next to arrest him. He told them, 'I'll come with you only if you have an official order authorizing my detention. Otherwise you'll have to take my dead body.' (I confirmed this later with Father Projo's deputy as head of priests in the region, Father Endra at Ungaran.)

This was the kind of story we heard in Wirosari. It was a relief to meet amongst these terrified people a few men such as Father Projo, Father Wignyo Sumarto, Haji Rohman and the KAPPI members who told us when they heard that Mami 'one of Princen's informants' had been arrested: 'We are willing to point out the location of the graves to an investigating team and we are prepared to accept the consequences. Mami was the only Hanra in Purwodadi who was willing to reveal where the graves were. But now he has been kidnapped.' I later asked a KODIM officer, Lieutenant Yusuf Tohiran, who knows the Purwodadi area well, what had

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27 Conservative Catholic leaders associated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies think-tank in Jakarta.

28 Perhalianan Rakjat, people's defence, i.e. civil guard.
become of Marni. 'We heard he was missing,' I was told, 'We are
with other Marhaenist leaders. The people in Cerewek did not want
organizations', but these generally seemed to have been abandoned
PNI symbols plastered along the walls of houses in Cerewek. There
their occupants.
houses with posters from GSNI, GWNI, LKN and other
organizations of those Marhaenist houses would be more willing to talk, if
they could.
I wondered whether the chickens running wild in the
gardens of those Marhaenist houses would be more willing to talk, if
they could.

As I contemplated this state of affairs, I became nauseous. In Semarang
the Marhaenist leaders were busy gathering funds to pay off the
wedding of the child of some party bigshot. I read about this in the Central
newspaper: And whereas the PNI signs were freshly painted, that of the
Nahdatul Ulama mosque with the party symbol of the Nahdatul
Ulama, Hadisubeno Sosrrowerdoyo had proudly proclaimed that no Marhaenists were involved
in the Purwodadi killings. But here in Cerewek notices were tacked
to the houses of Marhaenists saying 'Under supervision of
PEPERKUPER'.

One other thing was striking about Cerewek (which incidentally was
attacked that night by the PKI). There was a single sign in front of the
mosque with the party symbol of the Nahdatul Ulama, the only one we
saw. And whereas the PNI signs were freshly painted, that of the NU

Marhaenism was the official philosophy of the Partai Nasional Indonesia and
encompassed general concern for the poorer sections of society without any strict calculation of
class identity. The philosophy was based on Sukarno's observation in colonial times that
the majority of impoverished Indonesians were not proletarian in the strict sense, since they
owned some of the means of production, perhaps a small plot of land or a few tools.
GSNI (Gerakan Siwa Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National School Pupils' Movement),
GWNI (Gerakan Wanita Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Women's Movement)
and LKN (Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional, National Cultural Institute) were social organizations
affiliated with the PNI.

Hadisubeno Sosrrowerdoyo, PNI mayor of Semarang under Guided Democracy
and an old colleague of President Suharto.

Pembantu Pelaksana Penguasa Perang, Assistant Martial Law Administrator.

OPSUS, operasi khusus, or special operations, was the name of an intelligence
unit under the control of General Ali Murtopo known for its 'dirty tricks'. The term was
intended to any activist, as opposed to intelligence-gathering, intelligence operation.
to them and ask whether thirty-three people had indeed been arrested and whether they were really communists. As we left, F. tried to give some money to the village children, but they would not take it, quite a contrast with city kids. I asked F. to tell me what he had learnt from the women and children, but 'Bajingan...' [gangsters] was all he would say.

As far as I am concerned, it is at least as criminal to permit evil by remaining silent as it is to commit a crime actively. Silence keeps the army leaders in Jakarta ignorant of the tense situation in Purwodadi and lets the situation there be exploited by enemies of the Suharto government. Such people use the Catholic fathers and the Central Java army officers indirectly, as became clear from the first interrogation of Pono, leader of the Biro Khusus 33, who acknowledged that he had 'followers' in the PKI, PNI, Parkindo, Partai Katolik and even the Muhammadiyah. He confessed that officers in Kodam Diponegoro had supplied the PKI in Purwodadi with 125 grenades and fifteen rifles. I also recalled an interview with a Catholic party leader in Semarang, J. Wanggasoputro, who said that communications between his party and the army had broken down entirely because of the actions of ‘some Indo priest in Purwodadi with no political sense.' For us non-communists, it is a question of to be or not to be, he said. If the PKI recovers, we will be killed, he told me. Presumably this view is shared by most party leaders in Central Java, especially those in the legislative bodies and other government institutions.

As we headed back to Kradenan from Banjardowo, we met a man on his way to Cerewek. We put a few questions to him and he told us that there had been killings in Cerewek some months ago, but only a few. He could show us, he said, two graves, each containing about twenty skeletons of political prisoners. According to him, these people had been helped into the next world by ‘yang berwajib’ 35. A little while later the graves had been planted over with bananas by Hansip from ‘Garuda’ (presumably he meant Hansip/Hanra from the Garuda Pancasila unit) 36.

33 The Biro Khusus, or Special Bureau, of the PKI was allegedly the organization within the party which masterminded the coup attempt of 30 September.

34 Le. Eurasian.

35 Literally ‘those with the duty’, that is, the authorities.

36 On this unit, see Kenneth Orr, pp. 179-194.

On hearing this, we decided not to go and check on the graves without cameras. We had decided that we should contact the authorities in Jakarta to get greater freedom of action to check the reports. We decided this for various reasons. First, if it were true, as I had heard from a security officer in Semarang, that the Kwu Koramil was working in cooperation with the PKI, then we were in trouble. ‘They’ll take us away too,’ said F. Second, there were those Hanra trailing us on their bikes. They had not approached us yet, just followed us. ‘If we approach the site of the graves, they are bound to do something,’ said F., half-whispering. ‘But we have to check our information,’ I replied. In Central Java, you always have to check information many times. People like exaggerating things. It is possible that what the man from Cerewek told us was influenced by the ‘bush telegraph.’ He had not been there himself, that was certain.

I showed signs of thought. ‘And if the graves are there, perhaps they have been “manufactured” by the PKI or filled with the bodies of dogs or something,’ he remarked. On the other hand, if there were really human corpses in the graves, then surely dogs would have smelt them and dug up the remains (assuming that the graves were shallow). People in Cerewek had not reported anything along these lines. If, on the other hand, the graves were deep, then digging them must have been a major operation, either for the people or for the Hansip or for the army. And how were the victims killed? No-one reported hearing shots. Was it possible that Lieutenant Sutopo, head of the Koramil, had deliberately staged a fake mass execution to discredit the government in the eyes of the international community, which is of course opposed to that kind of fascist behaviour? We would only be able to get answers to these questions, I thought, if we were able to interview people in Cerewek fully, without being shadowed or watched.

Even so, we would have to be scientific about it. You can’t just put twenty corpses in a pit and forget about them. Gas accumulates in the stomachs of corpses and with twenty corpses this would raise the soil over the grave by about a metre. The people who had given us information did not know about this. To avoid this inflation of corpses, it would have
been necessary to hack the victims into little pieces as well, as had happened in India. So from a scientific point of view, we could not immediately accept the stories we had heard from people. I deliberately did not read Princen's report when my editor sent me to Purwodadi, because I wanted to be as objective as possible in making my report. And I could tell after just a few days in Central Java just how effective rumours were in psychological warfare. Some people in Jakarta say ‘Where there's smoke there's fire,’ but that is the kind of attitude that led people who had heard about the ‘Glichrst letter’ to believe that there was indeed a ‘Council of Generals’. By using psychological warfare, the PKI could ride on the backs of priests and ministers who are naturally sensitive to issues of human rights.

I recalled an officer I had met in Semarang who had put forward the following hypothesis: ‘PKI members who were aware of this “weakness” of Christian leaders when it comes to human rights issues gave orders via their cells for the priests to be told fabricated stories about atrocities. They even managed to produce a soldier who had “taken part” in the executions but who was actually a PKI agent. Of course the religious leaders would believe the story and report it to Semarang. Party officials then take it up with the army and point out that the killings damage the standing of the New Order, but of course the story is fake and the army pays no attention. The party leaders then get in touch with their allies in the religious parties in Western Europe. The European parties organize for Western journalists to visit and they talk Princen into coming along. The operation had been a success, my informant said, thanks to a priest who had put full documentation of the affair, including photographs of the mass graves. They assured me that the materials were in safe-keeping with a Catholic priest in another city. I got in touch with the priest concerned late that night and promised him that Sinar Harapan would take the risk of publishing the materials in full for the sake of Truth and Justice based on Love. But then he told me with great disappointment that he did not have the materials himself. He was sure, however, that someone else had them. I left and on the following day went to the town where I had told me of. Here too, however, the story was: ‘It’s another priest who has the material’. I was irritated at being shuffled around like this, but I thought, ‘I cannot let this possible rumour-mongering by the PKI go unchecked…”

The problem now was not whether the mass killings had really taken place but how the issue was to be resolved as a matter of social concern; that was what my editor told me when I came back from Purwodadi. It was totally acceptable for an editor to push his journalists around, but quite different matter when outsiders try to do it. An important person came to me and suggested gently that I should not write a report which might damage the army. I thanked him for his concern and promised that I would take account of it. He then added some remarks which rather changed the tone of the visit. The army, he said, was ‘beginning to doubt the good intentions’ of the Protestant community. ‘What is it you really want?’ he asked. I was stunned, and when I made no reply he went on. ‘The army is not going to get involved, but you should bear in mind that Hadisubeno has said on behalf of the Marhaenists that nothing happened in Purwodadi. You may have to deal with them. And remember that this is the PNI that has the power in Central Java now. If they decide to take you on, what are you going to do about it?”

I replied that I had no wish to discuss these things with him. I said that we had nothing but moral strength behind us. As far as the ‘Marhaenist
danger' was concerned, I offered the opinion of a primary school teacher in Wirosari: ‘The Marhaenists here have lost heart; they are afraid of each other after all the arrests.’ But I am sure you can find other groups in Central Java, I said, who want to prove by attacking us that they have not been infiltrated by the PKI. This remark concluded our short briefing session.

More difficult for me is the question: will the government adopt the Westmoreland anti-communist strategy being used in South Vietnam, search and destroy; or will they follow the McNamara-World Bank path, using economic development to destroy the roots of communism by fighting poverty in the villages? The hard liners want to destroy the PKI with an iron fist; the soft liners have more confidence in economic development as promoted by the contemporary ‘military technocrats’. Up until now the hard line had not been particularly apparent in Indonesia; on the other hand there had been no signs of a social explosion as portrayed by the Australian journalist Frank Palmos in Angkatan Bersendjata. An important lesson from the Purwodadi affair, however, was not to let the PKI use it to establish a ‘second Hunan’, which has long been its goal. In Hunan in 1928 the Chinese Communist Party succeeded in forming its first peasant army after the Kuomintang in 1927 had carried out mass executions of communist cadres during which many peasants became the victims of KMT excesses. We should not let Purwodadi create another Ho Lung, an anti-communist general who suddenly changed sides and joined the communists because he could not stand to see his own family butchered. If something like the Purwodadi affair had taken place ten years ago in North Sulawesi, it would have helped the PRRI-Permeta rebels. We see the same thing happening now in Biafra. If similar things happen in Indonesia in the future, the Purwodadi affair will certainly influence the general trend and not in favour of the government.

The government in Jakarta needs to make these choices. At the moment, the situation in Purwodadi remains unchanged. Arrests are still taking place, and the Information Minister has even stated: ‘Killings will continue as long as the military operations take place.’ My thoughts fly to Purwodadi. I remember what my colleague from Pedoman whispered into my ear when we finally met the representatives of the Kuwu KORAMIL: ‘When we get back to Jakarta, I am going to write an article about our trip here, with the title “Captured at last...”’ A sergeant had just politely but firmly ordered us into a jeep which he said would take us to face the Purwodadi KODIM commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Tejo Suwono. In the jeep I whispered back to F., ‘If we can escape from the KORAMIL, you’ll be able to write your article. If not...’ Still fresh in our minds was the advice I had received from Major Dwipayana, press officer in the presidential palace in Jakarta. He had reminded us always to be careful with lower ranks. ‘With officers you can always talk. With ordinary soldiers it is usually difficult.’ We had heard so many complaints from the local people about the operations of the Kuwu KORAMIL commander and his subordinates that I was keen to meet him face to face. We wanted to know whether Lieutenant Sutopo really was a sadist, as people had reported. Sutopo’s reputation had already spread far beyond the boundaries of Purwodadi kabupaten.

We arrived in Kuwu and the jeep pulled up in front of the KORAMIL headquarters. I remembered a question which one of the people in Wirosari had asked me the previous night when they heard that we were journalists from Jakarta. ‘Aren’t you afraid of being killed?’ F. had answered. ‘No,’ I said, ‘We are not afraid. We have not come to look for crimes but for the truth.’ That night, after hearing this answer, in a room crowded by young men, they explained to us how to get to places where we might find the ‘truth’.

This must be him,’ I thought, as an officer approached us, in gleaming dress uniform. Our guards got out of the jeep and disappeared. Only the driver, of Chinese descent, remained behind the steering wheel. We sat in the back. The officer came to the door of the jeep and began deliberately to look at us angrily, his hands on his hips. Meanwhile, other officers in a variety of other, new uniforms began to collect on the veranda of the KORAMIL office. They watched their champion watch us. Fortunately, someone called him away. He was only a rather trigger-happy NCO from the Raiders, a sergeant-major named Sutrisno.

Eventually, after a brief interrogation by the sergeant-major, we were ordered to get ready to go back to Purwodadi. I was able to imagine the feelings of a non-communist detainee confronted with these Hanra, civilians wearing their version of dwifungsi within the KORAMIL. It is so much...
safer to deal with real armed forces personnel, such as the KORAMIL commander in this instance. In correct fashion, he asked us for our occupations, addresses and reasons for being in the area, and then apologised, saying that he was just carrying out his duties. F. said the same: 'We are just carrying out the orders of tens of thousands of readers of Sinar Harapan and Pedoman who what to know the truth.' And after showing him as a kind of passport the newspaper article in which the Diponegoro commander had invited journalists to see Purwodadi for themselves, he invited us to get in touch directly with the KODIM commander in Purwodadi.

To be continued

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Lasut's report was not continued. Sinar Harapan on 22 March 1969 instead contained the following brief statement:

The government has concluded that Princen's information concerning 'mass killings in Purwodadi' is connected with PKI remnants who wish to discredit the government. And if there were killings, then they were a result of military actions taken under martial law.

Chapter 10

SURVIVAL: BU YETI'S STORY

Translated by Anton Lucas

Introduction.

Those who survived the massacres of 1965-69 have never been 'liberated' in the way that, say, concentration camp victims in Europe were liberated at the end of World War II. Survival was difficult in the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt of 30 September 1965, but life after survival was also difficult. Whether inside or outside prison, former members and associates of the PKI saw their families scattered, their health broken, their careers blighted. Wives of male political prisoners bore the heavy burden of trying to keep their families together, coping with illness and seeking education for their offspring.

The following account is the story of a woman who survived both the camps and the depressing struggle for existence which followed release. It illustrates the dual psychological burden carried by survivors: escape from death, with all the questions of guilt and meaning which that entails, and long, scarring years of drudgery. As in the story of Ibu Marni, survival is possible partly because Indonesian society offers so many niches at the very edge of subsistence.

Two themes emerge strongly from this account. First is the importance of children. Not only do Bu Yeti's children anchor her to one place, but

39 The journalist Brian May, who visited the Purwodadi area to check the stories of mass killing, reported a similar impression of Tejo Suwastro. See The Indonesian tragedy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 206-209.

1 For another woman's account of life as the wife of a former political prisoner, see Ruth Havelaar, 'Quartering: a story of a marriage in Indonesia during the eighties', published serially in Inside Indonesia no. 17 (December 1988) to no. 25 (December 1990).

educating them becomes the key to social rehabilitation.\(^3\) Bu Yeti had determined that the alleged sins of the parents should fall as lightly as possible on the children, and seeing her children settled with a good education was her highest priority.

Second, social relations were re-forged by the trauma of the coup. Fear of implication in the general purge of the Left made Bu Yeti's family wary of associating with her; opportunism led them to use her as servants when they were farmed out to relatives while she was in prison. The wedge between her and her family was driven deeper by growing differences over religion. Bu Yeti never forgave Islam and Muslims for her treatment immediately after the coup, the taunting reference to her miscarriage and the ransacking of her house - not just destruction but calculated looting - by HMI youth crying 'Allahu akbar, Allahu akbar ('God is great').\(^4\) During the time of trial which followed, the Catholic and Protestant churches won her respect by their charitable work in the prison and by their direct help in her children's education. Both the charity itself and the defiance of social norms which the churches showed won for them numerous converts and sympathizers in the months and years following the massacres, despite the participation of Christians in the killings in some areas (see Kenneth Orr's chapter in this volume). Bu Yeti's respect for the churches deepened the antagonism between her and her family, and she remarked,

I really hate the Muslims. All my family was Islam. Even when they helped me, it was not genuine (tidak sepenuh

3 Not that education alone is enough. Current official regulations in Indonesia require holders of many 'sensitive' positions, such as school teachers and workers in export industries, not only to be free of all personal involvement in leftist organizations, but to come from a 'clean environment' (bersih lingkungan), that is, not to have close family members who were involved with the Left. The 'cleanliness' of the social background of members of the police is checked by the periodic re-registration of former political prisoners, as part of which registrants must list their family members. Ruth Havelaar describes how her husband filled this section of the form with the names of deceased relatives as a means of protecting the living. See Inside Indonesia 19 (July 1989), p. 30.

4 Ruth Havelaar describes the victimization of her husband's younger brother after he helped his elder brother following the coup; Inside Indonesia 19 (July 1989), p. 31.

5 In background discussions before this interview, Bu Yeti stated that the Muslim youth were goaded (dipanas-panasan) by the military into making the attack.

6 Ruth Havelaar remarks on the protection which the organized religions gave to their followers, but sees this as often consolidating oppression; Inside Indonesia 19 (July 1989), p. 30.
I went home by myself from the hospital in a becak. I saw graffiti on the walls beside our house. 'Gestapu keguguran' [Gestapu has miscarriage] was scrawled on the walls of my house. I was very sad; this was such a terrible insult (hina betul). And no-one at all in my kampung dared to greet me.

On 19 October [1965] at 12 midday a crowd of adults and children began stoning my house. I ran out the back, straight for the RT’s house. I had to leave my father behind. The crowd destroyed everything. My younger daughter ran away. Because it was a school holiday, they were sleeping. They were all kicked. I found the RT, and he said, "Stay here, don’t go anywhere else." Then he went to the military and asked them to come and stop what was going on. After the military came, the crowd left, and I was allowed to go home. I heard from my children that the crowd put our belongings in a big sack, including documents relating to the ownership of the house. It was lucky that there was no Gerwani branch in the RT, though I had opened a TKK [Taman Kanak-kanak, kindergarten] Gerwani there. I was also deputy RT.

The next day [20 October] my cousin arrived and asked me to move to his house in Slipi [in West Jakarta]. I was still bleeding [from my miscarriage]. I moved to my cousin’s place with my youngest child, aged three years, but I was still fearful. My child was very scared; he would cry if he had to leave the house or if he saw a person dressed in military uniform. We took him back to his grandfather in Kuningan, but he was more upset there.

I stayed in Slipi for a month. During that time the military often came to the house in Kuningan [in South Jakarta]. They kept asking 'Has your father returned [from China]? Where is your mother staying?'. My child always replied, 'Mother is staying with relatives. She is still recovering'.

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Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian Women's Movement) was a left wing women's organization founded in 1954. It campaigned for the equal rights of men and women in marriage and for greater penalties for rape and abduction, as well as establishing kindergartens and midwifery and literacy courses. It was never formally affiliated to the PKI, but was to all intents and purposes the party's women's organization, claiming nine million members in 1961. After the coup it was the target of special hostility, because it was seen as having promoted promiscuity and as having encouraged women to neglect their family duties. For a brief account of Gerwani, see Saskia Wieringa, 'Feminism aborted: Gerwani and the coup', *Indonesia Reports - Culture and Society* Supplement 14 (March 1986), pp. 1-4.
he collapsed covered in blood, and she fainted screaming. She was quickly moved to the KODIM.

I was the third prisoner who was sent to the Jatinegara KODIM. When we got to the KODIM, we met many of our friends. Before I arrived the majority were males, but by the time I arrived there were fewer men. There were about forty people in a room about 6 metres square. If you slept on the floor, there was not enough room to get comfortable. The toilet was outside. There was one large bathroom.

While I was at the KODIM, I was allowed to see my children, to receive food, and to go out into the yard. But we were treated with great contempt (kita dihina sekali). In the mornings they divided us into groups, and we were told to clean the rooms of the military guards who slept there. Some were still asleep, some had just taken a bath, and were still in their underpants.

Maybe the military received the interrogation reports from the police, because they didn't carry out many interrogations there, though we did hear that some people were beaten and given electric shocks. No women were given this kind of treatment while I was there. Before I arrived I heard some had been.

I found out that my youngest child had got hepatitis (sakit kuning). My other children didn't know who to go to for help. I went to see the KODIM commander and said to him, 'How am I going to look after my sick child?' He let me go home for a day and a night, and I was able to see the RT, and asked neighbours to take her to the general hospital, with a guarantee [of meeting the hospital's expenses] from my relatives in Slipi. Her older brothers and sisters took it in turns to be with her at the hospital. I got permission to visit her once more. She cried and cried, she wouldn't let me go back to the KODIM....

I was three months in the Jatinegara KODIM. By March 1966, there were no more political detainees in the KODIM. When we arrived we are put in the one cell. There were many old friends, including national leaders [of Gerwani?] there. 'What are you doing here?' they asked, 'Why are you so thin?' 'Yes, I don't know why I am here', I replied.

9 Presumably this was immediately after the Supersesmar order of 11 March 1966, transferring effective power from President Sukarno to General Suharto.

10 Cf. Seth King's report of a visit to a prison in Tangerang, near Jakarta: 'They [the guards] said that they thought there were about 5,000 people inside, most of them Communists. The eerie thing was that during the two hours I sat talking with them, I never heard a sound or saw any movement. Not even a truck coming or going. I got the sickening feeling that the inmates were slowly being starved to death inside'. Seth S. King, 'The great purge in Indonesia', New York Times Magazine 9 May 1966, p. 89.
night. Two of them for a hundred of us, we weren't allowed to meet our leader [i.e. of Gerwani]. After a while Tante Aidit\(^\text{11}\) came to the prison. We had to be in our cells whenever she was allowed out of hers.

In the beginning we managed to get anything we wanted from outside. We read newspapers smuggled in with other things in bundles of cloth. But after the Acehnese [was made prison commander], this stopped, and they searched the clothing that was sent in. Also in the beginning we were only allowed to do exercises and play badminton. Then the Muslim women were allowed to go to hear sermons. We were told that we were sinners and that the PKI was the infidel. We couldn't react at all to this. Lieutenant-Colonel Pusro, from the Army's spiritual affairs department told us, 'Communists are criminals, they kill people.'

They were very offensive to us. Some of them only had primary school education, and they were teaching intellectuals, members of parliament and so on. There was a lot of sexual innuendo too, expressions about 'below the navel' and so on, lewd talk. We couldn't react at all to this.

There was a Christian deputy of [the commander] Sani Gondjo who used to come to Bukitduri to check up on us, too. He asked us, 'What do you need?' We were given Christmas presents by members of the church. We had to attend. If the Protestants were doing it, Protestant prisoners had to attend. The prison commander said that Muslims couldn't attend Christian religious instruction. The Protestants gave us different religious instruction from the Muslims. They talked about the suffering of Jesus. There was no mention about 'sins which can not be forgiven'. They gave us books, and a Christmas tree in the second year. The Muslim women asked for veils (kudung), but they didn't get anything. Only at Idul Fitri [the end of the Muslim fasting month] were Muslim prisoners given meat.

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\(^{11}\) The wife of PKI leader D.N. Aidit. *Tante*, a Dutch word meaning aunt, was used as a term of familiar respect.
hitch a ride with a truck to get to and from school every day. Once on the way home he jumped off the truck and hurt his leg. His uncle gave him a pair of old police boots to wear, but they were too big for him. He didn't dare ask for a pair of shoes. Other family members helped with his school expenses. My fifth child, then aged between eight and ten, was living with a cousin. He had to get up at 5 a.m., cook rice, make the rambal, and look after the young children; he went to school after lunch. Three of our children were with my relatives and three were with my husband's relatives. My daughter in first year of senior high school, who had also been a member of Gerwani, was staying with another relative.

After I had been released, I made contact with all my children. We couldn't all live together in Slipi. The atmosphere was not free enough there. After my third child finished SMP, he was sent to SMA by a family who was well off, so he could study full time, he didn't have to work.

My fourth child was in Palembang. Luckily my children were all conscientious (cerdas). Only there was no money for school, every day they had to go out and look for money. My youngest child was often sick. For the first few years after I was released, we got powdered milk and beras from the Protestant ecumenical centre in Salemba. The minister who had often come to Bukitduri also came to our house. My relatives were fanatical Muslims (fanatik Islam). When he made a house call, he usually said some prayers. He didn't say any prayers at this house. I couldn't collect my husband's salary. We had no home of our own. Our furniture that could be removed from our house was all sold by the children so they could buy food.

I didn't know what would happen to my third child. The minister wanted to send him to school to the Protestant high school in Salemba. The director of the school asked for an appointment with me. I said I would try send him there. He had to get up really early at 5 a.m. and get a bus which stopped a lot along the route. The school gate was locked at 7 a.m.

After a month my son got hepatitis, and the minister said, ‘This is too hard for him, leaving every morning with no breakfast; he can stay with my family’. My son said that was alright, so he stayed three years with the minister from the GPIB [Gereja Protestant Indonesia Barat]. Then he went to ITB [Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung Institute of Technology] and did a four year course in electrical engineering. His wife is an architect.

At first he wanted to study medicine, but the course was a long one and very expensive. The wife of the minister [who was helping him] came from a big family and had many nephews and nieces. They said to him, 'Don't look for problems with medicine. Do a technical diploma.' But he wasn't satisfied with that. He went to Bandung, where entrance exams were being held. He said to me, 'Look, at least one of your children should do something worthwhile, something that will get social standing.' I went to the minister for advice. 'Oh, so that's where he's gone.' I told them that he wanted to study at ITB. The minister's wife said, 'Your son doesn't know what's good for him. Why doesn't he enrol in a course at an academy? It's only three years.' But the minister said, 'If he passes the entrance test, I will support him financially to go there. If not, we'll find somewhere else for him to study.' He passed the entrance test, and the minister's wife got together a whole suitcase full of clothes for my son. She said to me, 'Check through this. Is there anything else he needs?'

When he was in fourth year of electrical engineering, my son had to build a tall radio aerial. Where was the money going to come from for that? 'I'm embarrassed to tell my [adopted] father', he told me. 'You have to tell him about it', I replied. So he told the minister. 'I've got money every year for you', he said. All his expenses were paid for by the church.

I didn't go to my son's graduation because I didn't have any clothes to wear. My oldest child never came back to live with the family again. She tried to finish SMA, but was not happy where she was living. She went to live with her father's family, but she only lasted two days with them. They said she was troublesome (cerewet). So I asked for help again from the church. There was a woman in the congregation who didn't have any children. So my daughter stayed with her for three months. Then she started at IKIP [Institut Keguruan Ilmu Pendidikan, Teachers Training College], with her expenses being paid by the minister. But she needed a lot of money, money for the college, for transport, for food (you had to eat lunch on the campus). She was studying German literature. In the end I just couldn't manage to pay for her, I couldn't find the money. I got her a job for her, in a Protestant foundation. It was a pity she couldn't continue studying.

My second child was 14 years old at the time, in second class of SMA. We were in very difficult straits financially. He sold newspapers and didn't pay much attention to his schoolwork. The money he got from selling newspapers he gave to his older sister for food. It wasn't much. Because
of his school he stayed with a brother of his father, where he was discriminated against a lot. He went to school run by the Sam Ratulangi foundation, in Menteng [in Central Jakarta], with one of Ibnu Sutowo's children. He mixed with all these upper class people (orang atas), and wanted to have nice things like them, including a nice uniform. After finishing SMP he stayed with a minister. But he started to do naughty things, like taking the minister's car out for a drive. After he finished high school I asked him, 'Where do you want to study?' 'I'll look for work myself,' he said. I got him a job as a driver. I couldn't see where his abilities lay. He worked on a newspaper with a relative and decided to be a journalist as he was good at writing stories. I told him to take an English course.

Then I moved from Slipi to Palmerah in Jakarta, so my children could be near their grandfather. After my father died, my fourth child went to see his brother in Bandung, but his brother wasn't at home when he arrived. So he went on to Surabaya. He had made no plans for this trip, he had no addresses of family there. He ran out of money in Surabaya. He wanted to get home, but had no money to buy a train ticket, so he rode back to Jakarta on the roof of a carriage. Near Batang, before Pekalongan, the train went under a bridge and he was knocked off the carriage roof, near the Batang river. A farmer found him and took him to a hospital. I told him to take an English course.

My father died in 1972. We had been three years in Palmerah. I worked in the Protestant ecumenical office in Salemba for a Dutch minister, van Willie, who had been in Irian. My youngest child I took to the house of the domine so I could send him to school. After my son finished his studies in Bandung and got a job straight away, our situation improved. He was sent overseas and paid in dollars. After that he often went overseas, so we could afford a contract a nice house.

I tried to get news from my husband, but there was no answer, until 1981, when he finally sent news via a minister. He had earlier tried to send word via a relative but it was never passed on to us. My daughter was given the letter to bring home; she didn't know who it was, as her father used a pseudonym. She brought the letter home and gave it to me. It was the first time we had heard anything of him for sixteen years.

A friend in Lampung who knew my husband later said to me, 'You're lucky. My wife married again.' 'That means she was thinking of how to support your children,' I said. 'No, she only thought of herself,' he replied, 'My eldest daughter hanged herself.' I didn't think about being married again. I only thought of the children. I was asked, 'Do you want to go to China [to join him]?' The children said, 'We've lost Father, we don't want to lose you as well.'

The main problem for us was how to support ourselves. Someone in the family had to be able to earn money. Only when my son became an engineer after graduating from ITB Bandung would family come and visit us. I think that they were afraid they would be tarred with the same PKI brush. They were also afraid I would ask them for money, but both our families did help with the children. They took them in, even if they treated them like servants. The Muslims didn't help at all. 'Communists don't believe in God (Komunis tidak beribadah)' they said. I hated the Muslims, all my side of the family were Islam. Even when they helped, it wasn't genuine (sungguhpun mereka membantu, tidak sepenuh hati).

I have wiped out the past now. I have no contact with former friends. I was asked to be politically active again, but I said no. All I want to think about is my family.
To step beyond Java and investigate the killings of 1965-69 in Indonesia's Outer Islands is to take a deeper step into the unknown. The island of Bali, however, is a slightly different matter, for here the best known accounts report killings on a scale even greater than Java's. The most influential report is that of John Hughes, whose chapter 'Frenzy on Bali' outlines a story repeated by many later authorities. Bali was initially tense but calm, as people tried to sense where events in Jakarta were leading the country. There was a minor clash between rival parties in Buleleng in the north in November, but little else took place until early December, when an altercation between PKI villagers and local troops in Jembrana left one soldier dead.

This incident, according to Hughes, sparked off a wave of killings, across the island. As on Java, the army played an important role in backing the killings initially, with RPKAD units distributing blacklists of PKI members for liquidation and training gangs of civilian youths, generally called Tamins, in the basic techniques of killing. The Balinese, however, exceeded their instructors, turning on PKI members and those associated with them with a chilling ferocity. Whole villages were destroyed, women and children as well as men, leaving the countryside pock-marked with the blackened shells of former settlements.

2 The most detailed description of this event is in M. Brawang, 'PKI lanjutan aren padi di Bali',ing in the basic techniques of killing. The Balinese, however, exceeded their instructors, turning on PKI members and those associated with them with a chilling ferocity. Whole villages were destroyed, women and children as well as men, leaving the countryside pock-marked with the blackened shells of former settlements.

Baliinese PKI leader, I Gede Puger, was killed by being cut to pieces. Tales of over-filled graveyards and rivers clogged with corpses echo similar reports from Java. The story given perhaps widest coverage in the West was a chilling account of PKI members, calmly accepting their fate, who dressed in white funeral robes and walked peacefully with their executioners to the place of death. The RPKAD commander Sarwo Edhie, whose troops arrived in late December, is said to have remarked, 'In Java we had to beg the people on to kill Communists. In Bali we have to restrain them, make sure they don't go too far.'

Something of a scholarly consensus exists to explain the Balinese killings. In the first place, although the antagonism between Islam and communism which sharpened tensions on Java was clearly absent, a similar antipathy had emerged between upholders of Balinese Hinduism and members of the local PKI. Communists showed the same disrespect for established religious practice as they did on Java and aroused the same kind of hostile reaction, although it is a little ironic that in East Java the PKI was associated with Hinduism, while the Muslim vigilantes who broke up Hindu organizations in East Java and destroyed pre-Islamic sacred sites in South Sulawesi would have shared the PKI’s iconoclastic attitude to Balinese Hinduism. Vickers describes the consternation caused when a group of PKI supporters attempted to desecrate the funeral ceremony of the Dewa Gung, or paramount traditional ruler of Bali, in Klungkung in 1965. Mobilization in the defence of religion was perhaps also combined with an urge to purify the island in a ritual sense. The Japanese occupation, the revolution and years of independence had all been times of trial for the whole society. A catastrophic eruption of Gunung Agung, the island’s highest and most sacred mountain in 1963, had been widely seen as the consequence of meddling by Sukarno and other secular figures in the timing and structure of the ritual. Just as elsewhere in Indonesia people cast about in a secular search for culprits to be blamed for Indonesia’s post-

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5 Hughes, *Indonesian upheaval*, p. 181. These remarks, apparently made during a press conference, have been widely reported in varying forms. For an Indonesian version, see Darmawan Tjondronegoro, *Ledakan fitnah subversi G-30-S* (Jakarta: Maiton, 1966), p. 57.

independence malaise, so Balinese looked for the cause of spiritual disharmony so great it could move a mountain.

More prosaically, the picturesque countryside of Bali also had its share of class conflict. Semi-popular literature has made much of the supposedly egalitarian system of landholding in Bali, but the reality was more complicated. Dutch reorganization of the administrative structure in the early twentieth century followed by the Great Depression of the 1930s left a growing proportion of Balinese society without rights to land, and in the depressed economic circumstances of the 1930s and 1940s there was little scope for the development of alternative, off-farm employment. Especially in the east of the island, land increasingly came into the hands of the aristocratic and royal families, the Dewa Agung becoming the largest of the landowners. When economic growth resumed in the 1950s, moreover, with the resumption of trade and tourism, it was the aristocratic families, together with Chinese entrepreneurs, who took the lion’s share of the new opportunities. After the 1960 Agrarian Law was passed, some official redistribution of land took place, but it was slow, incomplete and by all accounts inequitably handled. Resentment was exacerbated by an outbreak of famine in 1964 which highlighted disparities in wealth. From mid 1964, landless peasants increasingly found an advocate in the PKI and BtI; there were aksi sepihak of the kind launched on Java. PKI leaders apparently also encouraged their supporters, as on Java, to move into forest areas and clear land for themselves. These issues are all mentioned in the first translation below, a brief account of social tensions in Bali in early 1965, taken from the same work as the reports on Klaten and Banyuwangi earlier in this volume.

7 The most important source for the political and social history of Bali since 1945 are the as yet unpublished writings of Geoffrey Robinson.

8 Vickers, Bali: a paradise created, pp. 138-139.


It is interesting that in both accounts translated here we find now-rare reference to Chinese Indonesians as victims, in this case Chinese businessmen singled out for retribution after aligning themselves with the PKI. At the time of the killings, much attention focussed on the fate of Chinese, and it was even alleged that ‘most’ of the victims were Chinese.


11 William Glenn, ‘Let’s be practical [on Taiwan-Indonesia trade], Far Eastern Economic Review 61 no 32 (8 August 1965), p. 271.
Observers speculated on whether they were targeted because of their alleged closeness to the PKI (seen as an aspect of the PKI’s good relations with the Chinese Communist Party) or whether Indonesians resentful of the economic wealth of the Chinese simply took a convenient opportunity for looting and settling scores. Coppel, however, has concluded that anti-Chinese violence was probably not an important part of the killings of 1965-69. There was a ‘frenzied rampage’ against Chinese in Makassar (Ujung Pandang) in November 1965 and repeated outbreaks over the next two years, but the level of violence was not dramatically different from that of incidents well before and well after the coup. Chinese members of the party and of affiliated organizations such as the BAPERKI were of course in especially great peril in 1965-66. But thanks to a regulation of May 1959 banning Chinese from retail trade in rural areas, Coppel argues, relatively few Chinese were present in the countryside where the killings were most fierce on Java. To this he adds the observation that many wealthy Chinese must have already developed protective relationships with local power-holders, civilian and military, which they were able to mobilize when the crisis came. This may point to an explanation for Bali’s anti-Chinese incidents: the relative dominance of the Left at provincial level in Bali led men such as Tjan Wie, described by Soe Hok Gie below, to make the wrong choice of political patron.

As for Indonesia as a whole, there is neither certainty nor consensus on the number of people killed. The London Economist’s report on the basis of information collected by a team of Indonesian graduates suggested that 100,000 people may have died in the few months from December 1965 to February 1966, and estimates have gone as high as 750,000, but figures most commonly cited lie in the 20,000-60,000 range. Even these figures, however, have been called into question by Mabbett and Brackman. This uncertainty arises from the even greater shortage of anecdote and evidence than we have for Java. Although many authors, including Soe Hok Gie in this volume, report unprecedented ferocity in the Balinese killings, it is difficult to pin accounts to time and place. Without Hughes’ account, our image of the Balinese killings would be rather more sober. Despite Sarwo Edhie’s cheerful attribution of all responsibility to the Balinese, a number of stories make it clear that it was the arrival of army units with death lists which played a key role in prompting the killing in many cases. Webb cites a case in which a Catholic village in western Bali refused military orders to kill communists in neighbouring Hindu-Balinese village. It is probable that the army, overwhelmingly non-Balinese, was reluctant to carry out a massacres which would have pitched ethnic groups in a direct confrontation, and preferred to see Balinese killing Balinese. Army accounts of spontaneous Balinese ferocity may therefore merit some scepticism. There is also some evidence that many killings - which took place especially in the eastern regions close to Java - were carried out by Ansor gangs who crossed the Bali Strait from Sanyuwangi for this purpose.

A second reason for scepticism is the special place of Bali in the Western imagination as a place of enchantment, an island of smiling, deeply cultured people in close harmony with their world and with each other. Edward Said and others have shown how such images, whatever their factual basis, are often part of an ongoing definition of Western culture and a number of scholars, including Boon and Vickers, have traced the evolution of contradictory ideas of the nature of Bali. The joyfulness of life on Bali which some authors have described is for others a standing rebuke to the lifestyles of the West, and there may have been an over-eagerness on the

15 See, for example, Don Moser, ‘Where the rivers ran crimson from butchery’, Life (1 July 1966), p. 28; and Donald Kirk, ‘Bali exercises an evil spirit’, The Reporter 15 December 1966, p. 42.
part of Western observers to 'discover' that frenzied violence was as much a part of Balinese culture as rippling music and sleek sculptures.

RURAL VIOLENCE IN BALI

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Translated by Robert Cribb

On 3 January 1965, around 300 members of the BTI from Mendoyo in kabupaten Jembrana organized an action to cut forest in the area of Pangkangmanggis and Yeh Embang. Two days later, a small number of state police arrived and were able to stop the action. As is known, there were 290 hectares of neglected forest in the area.

In the same month, it was also reported that there was an aksi sepihak in Buleleng to implement the government's land reform regulations. With the intention of carrying out these regulations, the BTI attacked not only landlords but also small peasants. One such conflict over land took place between Pan Tablen, a land owner, and Wayan Wanci, his tenant. The local assistant camat has already decided that the land should be surrendered to Pan Tablen, and this decision had been ratified by the bupati of Buleleng. Wayan Wanci, however, was a member of the BTI and he decided to retain the land. On 8 January 1865, he summoned 250 other peasants and destroyed the house of Pan Tablen.

Another incident concerning land occurred between I Made Abian, a small peasant, and his son-in-law, I Sukaria, who was a member of the BTI. In front of kecamatan officials, I Sukaria promised to return the land to his father-in-law, but later, with the support of his friends in the BTI, refused to do so. With the help of the police, I Sukaria was persuaded

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19 From Laporan tentang suatu mengenai keretaan pedesaan pada tahun 1966-an (Jakarta, Yayasan Pancasila Sakti, 1982), pp. 93-95. Footnotes in the text suggest that these accounts are based on reports in the Denpasar newspaper Suara Indonesia, rather than on first hand field research.

20 The scattered incidents mentioned in this account all occurred in the western kabupaten of Buleleng, Jembrana and Tabanan, areas where conditions for tenant farmers and sharecroppers were considerably better than in the eastern regions of Klungkung (home of the Dewa Agung), Karangasem, Gianyar and Bangli. The redistribution of land was carried out far more thoroughly in Buleleng and Jembrana than elsewhere in Bali and the kabupaten were the site of the earliest and most bitter violence in 1965-66.
to hand the land over. On 14 January 1965 at about 3.00 p.m., however, I Sukaria and 180 BTI members moved onto the land, cut the corn that was growing on it and as night fell began to work the land.

A third case connected with land occurred between I Nyoman Gedang, a small farmer, and his tenant Wayan Tiasa, both from Kubutambahan. According to the Land Reform and Sharecropping Committee, the land was to be returned to its owner by 1 October 1964. On 15 January 1965, I Nyoman Gedang began to work the land, but three days later, Wayan Tiasa and two hundred others pulled out the plants and replaced them with his own.

Around the middle of January 1965, the atmosphere in Mambang village was full of tension because of a dispute over the purchase of land by Nang Deger, a member of the PNI, from the Puri Aseman. The Land Reform Committee for Selemadeg had decided that from 17 January 1965 the new owner should have the right to work the land. Bagus Budal, however, a BTI member who cultivated the land when it was owned by the Puri Aseman, refused to accept the verdict and continued to work the land. On 19 January a number of BTI members accompanied Bagus Budal noisily to the Selemadeg kecamatan office and protested forcefully against the decision. There was a long discussion between the representative of the BTI peasants and officials from the kabupaten and the Land Reform Committee, and eventually it was decided that the land should not be worked at all for the time being until the kabupaten government had reached a decision.

On 1 March 1965, at about 11.00 a.m., there was an incident at Jatiluwih in Kecamatan Penebel, Kabupaten Tabanan. According to a report to the local camat by the head of Jatiluwih village, a villager called Nang Janten, his wife, son and daughter-in-law, were picking coffee in a plantation he had pawned when about a hundred people led by Nang Renjung of the BTI had surrounded them, seized and tortured them and then tied them up. They were told that they would only be released if they joined the BTI. Fortunately, a number of police arrived just in time. Neng Janten and his family were released and sent to hospital to have their serious injuries treated.

At midnight on 4 March 1965, several members of the Mendoyo branch of the PNI were attacked by a group armed with parang and other knives. The attack was led by Nyoman Gedur, with about two PKI members. Meanwhile, the PNI members were able to capture seven people from Poh Santen and two from Pakutatan after an incident in which their houses were pelted with rocks. The nine people were taken to the police station.
THE MASS KILLING IN BALI

Dewa [Soe Hok Gie]
Translated by Anton Lucas

In describing the events which took place in Bali, this writer is in no way defending the Gestapu/PKI, or the methods they used against their opponents. We must oppose, indeed denounce, their uncivilised and cruel methods of behaviour without using the same methods against them.

Bali does not have the political, economic or military importance to determine who wins or loses in the struggle for power in our country. Yet toward the end of 1965 and around the beginning of 1966 a terrible catastrophe took place on this beautiful island, a series of mass killings which have no comparison in modern times, because they took place over such a short period, and because so many were killed.

Was this a war then? No, the killings were not the result of a war. In war, no matter how unevenly balanced are the two sides facing each other, they will always try to attack or at least defend themselves in some way. [But this is not what happened in Bali.] Killings (penyembelihan atau pembantalan) would be the most appropriate term to describe what happened.

In Russia in Stalin's time the term 'mass terror' was very often used to explain this imbalance. In situations of this kind, groups of people who were afraid or who had no hope would simply surrender to the authorities, who could do with them what they wanted. The same thing happened in Bali, only it was the PKI masses, or those who were accused of being PKI, who acted like this. There was no resistance in Bali, no resistance of any importance. Those who admitted they were PKI or who were accused of being PKI gave themselves up voluntarily to the authorities.

When the killings were being carried out, it often happened that people who had been arrested wanted to be killed because they knew their days were numbered anyway. They preferred to be killed because they were afraid of torture or other methods of mass murder which are totally unacceptable to normal human beings who say they believe in God.

The Situation Before the Coup

Before the coup Bali was known as the second capital of Indonesia after Jakarta. Bung Karno, when he was in Indonesia, spent almost equal time in Tampak Siring and Jakarta. Bali had a unique and sentimental significance for Sukarno, especially since his mother was Balinese. The Governor was his special protege, and was always ready to fulfil all Sukarno's demands (hajat), whatever they might be. Governor Suteja was also head of Pepeirada, a civil position which was always held by those whose faithful loyalty to Sukarno was in no doubt. Other Sukarno followers were I Gusti Putu Merta, chairman of the DPRGR [the Gotong Royong People's Representative Council]; I Gede Puger, chairman of Bamunas; and Ida Bagus Kompyung, head of the Tourism Board. Military positions in Bali were also given to Sukarno loyalists. However it was widely known that governor Suteja did not get on with Pangdam [Regional Military

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21 This article was written for the Bandung student newspaper Mahasiswa Indonesia. Due for publication in minggu I & III (December 1967), it reached the stage of galleys proofs, but was apparently never actually published. Whether this was for political or other reasons is not clear. We are grateful to John Maxwell for this information. Italicized words in English are the author's original. The translator and editor would like to thank Geoffrey Robinson for his help with the preparation of these notes.

22 A sacred spring on Bali. The site of one of Sukarno's presidential palaces.

23 In around December 1965, after many complaints about Suteja's pre-coup activities, Sukarno summoned him to Jakarta, where he disappeared. According to some accounts he was killed there by a PNI hit squad sent from Bali for this purpose. See also Utrecht, 'Het bloedbad op Bali'.

24 I Gusti Putu Merta, a former teacher and cooperating nationalist, had held a succession of political posts in Bali since 1950 and from 1961 was chairperson of the PNI's executive committee on the island. By June 1966 he had been appointed governor of the province.

25 I Gede Puger had been a youthful member of the anti-Japanese and anti-Dutch resistances on Bali. He was a member of the Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth) during the revolution and was probably later a member of the PKI, holding a variety of executive and legislative posts on the island until the coup. He was killed in 1965/66.

26 The Tourism Board was a major source of income through patronage and corruption and was thus an important political resource on the island. Nothing further is known of Kompyung.
Commander Supardi and Sukarno replaced Supardi with Brigadier General Syafiudin, who was known for his stinginess. Syafiudin's wife was a Gerwani supporter who publicly approved of the principles of the PKI's struggle.

The process of 'Nasakomisation' continued in Bali, and every government agency and board, including those mentioned earlier, was 'Nasakom-ised'. The close cooperation created by Nasakom was very evident. Commander Supardi and Sukarno replaced Supardi with Brigadier General Syafiudin, who was known for his stinginess. Syafiudin's wife was a Gerwani supporter who publicly approved of the principles of the PKI's struggle.

The situation in Bali remained unchanged until a month after the coup. Suteja was still Governor, and even went twice to Jakarta (on 8 and 17 October). In front of Sabur, Sumarno, Subamya, Chaerul Saleh and

After the Coup

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Syafiudin himself, he was asked if he was PKI. He replied that the accusation was only slander. Bung Karno convinced Suteja that he should continue to hold his position.

The situation in Bali was now becoming tense. People who had previously been silenced by Bung Karno now began to speak out. News of the killings in Central and East Java began to spread in Bali. In Jakarta Bung Karno still held the highest position of state but Pak Harto was beginning to take control. At the beginning of November, still no arrests had been made. While Puger (PKI) was busy with his guests from KIAPMA, Kompyang and Kandel went to Jakarta several times to assess the situation. Now people began to get impatient and ask why no action was being taken against PKI dignitaries. The people were waiting to see what the Armed Forces would do to solve the situation. But it seemed that the military leaders in Bali, especially Syafiudin, wanted to see how things developed, and to see who was going to win the power struggle going on in Jakarta, Sukarno or Subarto, the Nasakom or the Pancasila group. Syafiudin, with reptilian cunning, saw which way the wind was blowing, and perhaps he realised that history wanted the Pancasila group to win. Eventually, sooner or later, the time would come when Bung Karno would be pushed aside.

Survival is a very strong motive for action. To succeed, one has to cover one's tracks and leave no traces. Killing is the easiest and safest way to do this, because dead people do not speak. For the Nasakom clique which was in power in Bali at that time, mass killing was the way to show the outside world, especially Jakarta, that they were strongly anti-PKI and strongly pro-Pancasila.

Wedagama, a PNI figure, incited the people to violence by saying that God approved of the killing of PKI people, and that the law would...
not condemn people for it. Wijana\textsuperscript{36}, another figure close to Bung Karno, told the people that taking property belonging to the PKI did not break the law. Thus the leaders who had been the strongest supporters of Nasakom were now the strongest and most active PKI haters.

Vigilante groups began roaming around dressed in black and armed with swords, knives, cudgels and even firearms. Houses of people accused of being PKI were burnt as part of the warming up for much crueler actions. Then the killings began everywhere.

For the next three months, Bali became a nightmare of killing. If there is anyone amongst my readers who has a Balinese friend, ask him if he has a friend who became a victim of this bloodbath. He will certainly answer affirmatively, because that was the reality of the situation in Bali. There is no-one living in Bali now who does not have a neighbour who was killed and left unburied by the black devils with red berets who roamed about at that time.

By the most conservative estimate, at least 80,000 people were killed, including young and old, men and women. The burning of houses and the amount of property either destroyed by fire or lost in robberies cannot be estimated. Rape of women accused of being members of Gerwani occurred everywhere, the example being set by local party leaders. The most monstrous example was Widagda, a PNI leader from Negara, and a younger brother of Wedastra Suyasa, a leading Balinese PNI figure who was a member of the DPRGR at the national level. He raped tens of women who had been accused without basis of being PKI. Three of them brought a case to court last March and in a decision given in June 1967 Widagda was sentenced to three years jail in Negara.

Political Aftermath

The consequences of the killings are enormous and will be felt beyond this generation. Hundreds of thousands of widows are a very serious problem. But what most interests us is whether these actions have been effective in liquidating the PKI or not. Certainly not if you look at who was killed and who escaped the axe (kapak berantai). Kompyang, Suteja, Merta who were members of the Dewan Revolusi\textsuperscript{36} in Bali are still free. These are only a few examples. The victims of the killings were not these people, but the masses who were deceived by the promises of the PKI. And the sentences given to these victims were far too severe. Motives of jealousy and revenge were extremely strong. Anak Agung Gde Agung,\textsuperscript{37} for example, who was head of the government Information Service in Bali, was kidnapped and killed. The person behind this was his deputy who wanted his job. Another example is Lie Lie Tjen, a wealthy businessman in North Bali who financed the PKI in Bali. He saved himself and his wealth by an alliance with Wijana, an important political figure in the region, while his business competitors, Tjan Wie for example, were victims. Tjan Wie's coffee - hundreds maybe thousands of tons - was spread out on the roads all around Singaraja, and Tjan Wie later went crazy. The important PKI people from Bali are free and living in Jakarta, probably because the regional government has not done anything, or did not give authorities in Jakarta information so they could be arrested.

Conclusion

The killings which occurred in Bali were not sporadic\textsuperscript{38} but something which was just left to go on. If the government or officials had really wanted to stop them, then the killings need not have occurred. But government officials did absolutely nothing. In fact they even initiated the killings in some areas. We can understand the reason for this from the above analysis. The killings in Bali were supported and allowed to go on unchecked by officials who were affiliated with the PKI. By supporting the killings they could wash their hands of any involvement with the PKI.

\textsuperscript{36} Dewan Revolusi (Revolutionary Councils) were established by the coup organizers in Jakarta and other regions immediately after the coup.

\textsuperscript{37} Soe Hok Gie incorrectly has Anak Agung Made Agung here. This Anak Agung Gde Agung should not be confused with the politician of the same name who was prime minister of the Dutch-sponsored Negara Indonesia Timur and later Indonesian minister of Foreign Affairs.

\textsuperscript{38} It is not clear what Soe Hok Gie meant by this term.
The new military commander Brigadier-General Sukertiyo is honest and the fact that he wants to clean up the government in Bali is shown by his efforts at the beginning of this year to get rid of leftist elements in the officer corps in Bali. However, his efforts to clean up the military, the political parties and the civilian government apparatus have been obstructed. Within ABRI itself there is much opposition of a complex kind, with the result that many officers with doubtful background are still in important positions. The new Governor of Bali, Colonel Sukarmen, is very close to the PNI Asu in Bali under the leadership of Wijana. The PNI Asu group is in this way hoping to get protection from Colonel Sukarmen if anything should happen.

The civilian government in Bali has also never been purged by its own leadership in any meaningful way. The PNI in Bali is the only branch of the party which has not publicly condemned Bung Karno. They still idolize him especially as the local chairman is a close friend of his.

The New Order forces in Bali are under pressure, and intimidated. KAMI, KASI, and KAPPI cannot do much, especially because there are no joint actions in partnership with ABRI. This is because these groups will not cooperate or help each other so there is no united action against the Left in Bali.

What can be called Orbanisasi [the process of political change to establish the New Order] has not occurred in Bali. Those who call themselves New Order loyals are in fact PNI Asu people who have changed sides. If the government in Bali is not serious about carrying out the process of implementing the New Order, Bali will continue to have the same appearance as before 1965. The people of Bali are hoping for some action from Panglima Sukertiyo. Up until now he has not found a way or maybe he will not find a way. We will see what the results of Pak Harto's visit to Bali will be.

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39 Since Merta was civilian governor of Bali, Sukarmen must have held a senior military post.

40 Asu, meaning ‘dog’ in Javanese, stood in this context for Ali Sastroamijoyo and Surachman, leaders of the left wing which was dominant in the party at least at the centre. Although the PNI itself was not banned after 1965, the Asu wing was heavily purged.

41 ‘Action Fronts’, of students, graduates and school pupils respectively, which spearheaded anti-communist actions in the larger cities.
In its campaign of disruption, the PKI had succeeded in influencing a number of army members and they tried to get weapons from the divisional training camp. These treacherous troops included 1st Lt. Teduh and Sutiono, and Sergeant Sarjono; they were assisted by a civil servant called Ridas. Under interrogation, the two lieutenants denied their involvement, but Ridas confessed openly. Sergeant Sarjono was so frightened that he committed suicide, killing himself with a hand grenade.

The mass demonstrations loudly demanded abolition of the PKI. At a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the Youth Pledge on 28 October 1965, the Bali Regional Youth Front expressed its determination in demanding that the government dissolve and ban the PKI and its mass organizations. The governor of Bali, Anak Agung Bagus Suteja, who was suspected of involvement in the G30S/PKI was declared non-active as head of the Front Nasional, which then asked for him to be dismissed as regional head. The activities of Anak Agung Bagus Suteja had indeed given rise to suspicion.

The PKI was apparently not willing to accept its defeat, and several of its members who had not been arrested continued their disruptive activities. The leadership and cadre of the PKI and its mass organizations held meetings to plan killing and destruction. Some, however, apparently realized how mistaken their leaders' policies were and they dispersed or resigned from their organizations. In Jembrana, the local PKI and its mass organizations dissolved themselves in the presence of the bupati and swore an oath to help the armed forces crush the G30S/PKI until it was totally destroyed.

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