Military strategy in the Indonesian Revolution: Nasution's 'Total People's war' in theory and practice

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possible for the natives to take advantage of this holiday. However, at a meeting in Serowe two weeks later the chiefs ‘took this (latest) opportunity to renew to His Majesty the King their promise of loyalty and obedience.’ The idiom of loyalty did little to represent the experiences and problems of the Protectorate’s population, but a war record of loyalty to the Crown strengthened the African claim to remain under the imperial wing rather than be transferred to the tender mercies of the South African or Southern Rhodesian regimes. Though BechuanaLand had been peripheral to the horrors of the fighting war in other parts of Africa and the world, the amazing fact is that this underpopulated, vast, and inhospitable land should have been involved at all. It not only played a part in operations against neighbouring enemy territory, but had grown in size, and furnished men and money for a remote cause barely perceived by the overwhelming majority of its people. Such was to be the price of empire in the twentieth century.

Military Strategy in the Indonesian Revolution: Nasution’s Concept of ‘Total People’s War’ in Theory and Practice

Robert Cribb

A.H. Nasution (1918–2000) was independent Indonesia’s foremost military theorist. He was responsible for the initial formulation of the doctrines of total people’s war (perang rakyat semesta) and military engagement in politics (dawfungsi) which continue, formally at least, to underpin the operations of the Indonesian armed forces (TN). In the 1950s and 60s, in fact, Nasution gained something of an international reputation as a non-communist theorist of guerrilla war. His handbook, Fundamentals of Guerrilla War, was published internationally[1] and he was widely presented as a man who could use guerrilla tactics against left-wing insurgencies.

Nasution’s familiarity with guerrilla warfare stemmed from his experiences in Indonesia’s war of independence against the Dutch, 1945–49, when he was instrumental in formulating military strategies which, although they did not win the independence war alone, nonetheless played a major role in forcing the eventual Dutch withdrawal. Nasution applied the term ‘total people’s war’ to these strategies, and in his Fundamentals he set out a doctrine rather reminiscent of that of other people’s war theorists in Asia. ‘It is the people’, he declared,

who fight, not just the armies. It is the people who declare war and determine peace and create their own armed forces. The military leaders must always remember this: they are like the spearpoints of the people and are directed by the people. That is why the army is now an army of the people and no longer a separate entity.[2]

Stirring language of this kind in fact peppers much of the text of Fundamentals, and this tone, together with Nasution’s frequent reference to Mao and to the experience of people’s war elsewhere in the world, seems to place Nasution in the category of guerrilla theorists such as Vo Nguyen Giap and Che Guevara.

2. Ibid., 13.
A closer but still sympathetic reading of Fundamentals would suggest that the volume should be regarded as one of the minor classics of people's war theory. Nasution presents the argument that guerrilla warfare is not merely a matter of techniques and tactics but must rest on the strong ideological conviction of the people and of the guerrilla fighters. In contrast to Giap, Mao and other people's war theorists, however, he maintains that nationalism, rather than a drive for internal social change, provides the strongest impetus behind the struggle. Ideologies of social reform, in his view, divide the nation and weaken the struggle; only nationalism is capable of welding the entire people into a force to defeat the enemy. Nasution's biographers, Penders and Sundhauzen, while acknowledging that some parts of his writing are unremarkable or derivative, regard this discussion of the role of nationalism in popular mobilization as Nasution's most significant and distinctive contribution to theory.

In describing the struggle as total people's war, Nasution did not suggest that the entire population should fight. Ninety-eight per cent of the population, he said, simply assist and encourage those who do the actual fighting. The important thing, rather, is an organic relationship between the guerrilla and the people on whose behalf he fights:

the guerrilla fighter is a champion of the people's ideological struggle which lives in the hearts of the people. If the ideological foundation and roots are not there, there will be no support for a guerrilla war. The guerrilla soldier is rooted completely in the soul of the people, and therefore, the guerrilla movement can only prosper if the people serve as its foundation.

It is this emphasis on direct communion between guerrilla and people which justifies Nasution's inclusion in the ranks of people's war theorists.

When reading Nasution, however, it pays to be cautious. He was a prodigiously voluminous author, and he writes with unusual clarity, articulateness and persuasiveness. His topics are military, or military-political, and as one of Indonesia's foremost soldiers for over two decades he features extensively in his own works. Although his tone is by no means modest, he refrains on the whole from exaggerating his own role in events, and indeed often portrays himself as

having been a victim, outmanoeuvred and frustrated by the actions of others. A corollary of this latter tendency, however, is that the Nasution world often seems to be inhabited entirely by fools, knaves and those who agreed with Nasution, three mutually exclusive categories. In particular, he credits himself with insights and understandings which he appears to have developed only in hindsight. As a historian of his own ideas, therefore, he is distinctly unreliable.

He writes, moreover, with a purpose. His 11-volume history of the war of independence, for instance, although sometimes tedious in its compilation of facts, contains the clear message that the armed forces and no-one else won independence for Indonesia. This is not an unreasonable point of view, but it is certainly a contentious one; most historians would argue that the diplomatic activities of the Republic's civilian leaders also played an important role. When it comes to Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare, therefore, it is important to remember that the book was written in 1982-83 at a time when Nasution had been dismissed as army chief of staff over the 17 October Affair of 1952, in which disident army units demonstrated in front of the presidential palace and demanded the dissolution of parliament. During this time of enforced retirement Nasution was grappling with the problem of the appropriate role for the armed forces in the Indonesian political system. He rejected outright military rule, but he was determined that the army should have some say in the running of the country, and his Fundamentals, therefore, was in part an attempt to lay the ideological groundwork for what was later identified as his 'Middle Way' thesis, namely, that the army neither should be a 'dead tool' of the civilian government of the day nor should take over the government but rather should work with civilians as a partner in government.

Fundamentals contains clear foreshadowing of this doctrine:

a member of a guerrilla army, fighting for an ideology, can not only be used as a country's tool to be ordered to carry a gun but also as an ideological pioneer, he must be active in ideological matters and in politics. How can he be the vanguard of an ideology or fight for a political aim if he is merely a tool to be ordered around with no voice in political decisions. It is not sufficient for him to be merely acquainted with political matters, but he must champion and propagate them. An army which is merely a country's tool does not have the inner strength to withstand a violent guerrilla war.

Nasution's remarks about the organic relationship between the guerrilla and society were thus not made just for the sake of developing guerrilla strategies but also to claim for the army a direct relationship with the people, independent of the republican state, and so to establish a platform and justification for army involvement in politics.

If we now examine the actual practice of Nasution's total people's war during the war of independence, we find a military philosophy not only with very different social and political implications from those of Giap's 'people's war', but

different in spirit and substance from Fundamentals. The identity between guerrillas and people in practice was a great deal weaker than Nasution’s rhetoric would have us believe. This distance was partly due to Nasution’s decision to keep the army aloof from domestic social issues, which meant inevitably that it appealed to the mass of the people on a considerably narrower front than it might have; the cost of a broad nationalist coalition was a watering-down of demands for social change. The choice between a broad, loosely committed coalition and a smaller, more dedicated revolutionary force, however, is a constant dilemma of national liberation movements and need not concern us further here. More important were Nasution’s notions of what an army should be. A major thrust of his activities during the revolution was to create and sustain the army as a conventional military institution distinct from the rest of society. His adoption of guerrilla warfare did not arise out of a sense of the political possibilities it offered but rather was an expedient to ensure the army’s survival in the face of defeat. And while constructing a guerrilla strategy he sought to avoid a political transformation of the army along the lines espoused by Giap. His principal contribution to the theory of guerrilla warfare, thus, was his technique for depoliticising it, and it was this which the international publication of Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare implicitly acknowledged.

Nasution’s commitment to military professionalism can be traced from before the war, though it is difficult to be precise when his own memoirs are the principal source on his attitudes. His father was a moderately well-off farmer and trader, and Nasution himself received his schooling at a Dutch-language school in West Sunantra.8 After a short career as a schoolteacher, he obtained military training at an emergency branch of the Dutch Royal Military Academy (KMA), established in Bandung after the fall of the Netherlands in 1940. Training was rushed, and it is not clear how much of an introduction to European military theory Nasution and his fellow cadets received. They continued reading, however, during the Japanese occupation and by the end of the war were acquainted with the military writings of Liddell Hart, Jomini, de Gaulle, Hindenburg and Chinese authors. Nasution borrowed Clausewitz to read, but did not finish the volume, finding it, he said, very tough going.9 He was not politically active against the Dutch before the war—indeed he could hardly have remained a cadet if he had been—but he shared with the vast majority of the indigenous Indonesian modern elite the belief that greater autonomy and an end to European privilege in the colony would be desirable. When the Japanese occupation came to an end, therefore, and independence was declared by Sukarno and Hatta in August 1945, Nasution was a natural recruit to the ranks of the new Republic’s supporters. He joined the incipient Republican army and rose rapidly through its ranks, on the basis of his training and great ability, to become commander of the army’s West Java division, the Siliwangi, in May 1946.

From his steadily rising position in the army, Nasution set about creating a conventional army. His programme as commander of the Siliwangi Division was to create a unit which could defeat, or at least hold, the Dutch on their own terms. He sought first of all to slim down the division by demobilising those troops and units he saw as unnecessary. The Siliwangi, like other army and irregular units (known as lesyur), had benefited at the start of the revolution from an outpouring of nationalist fervour which saw tens of thousands of young people rush into the armed forces. Many of these troops, however, had no training, no weapons and little affinity with the harsh military lifestyle demanded by Nasution; others came from criminal backgrounds or had been too heavily involved in the violence of late 1945; still others retained the view that the army should itself espouse an ideology more specific than nationalism. All these groups found themselves likely to be removed from the Siliwangi if they were already part of it or summarily demobilised if they were not.

Nasution also set about putting in place an officer corps which shared his view of the struggle. In the early phases of the revolution, officers were typically elected by their men and Nasution himself had participated in the election of the Army High Command in November 1945. Now, however, he began to remove these populist officers one by one, putting in their places officers with Dutch training who shared his views on order and discipline.

Third, he attempted to establish reliable administrative and logistic backing for this disciplined army. He recognised that one of the principal obstacles to military discipline was the fact that the central authorities in the army were unable to supply the basic necessities for warfare. Units and their commanders were thrown largely on their own resources in acquiring not only day-to-day supplies of food and clothing but in obtaining weapons and other equipment. The enforced autonomy of military units made them naturally less receptive to instruction from above. Nasution’s great strength in this third prong of his army-building activities was his alliance with the Republican defence minister, Amir Syahridin. For from Amir the Siliwangi Division received privileged access to the funds and other resources which enabled Nasution to establish a firm hegemony over divisional affairs.

Amir’s keenness to build up the Siliwangi stemmed from the broader defence policy of his government. From the outset of the revolution, the Republic’s leaders had rejected the notion of attempting to achieve independence by a war of national liberation. They judged that the infant Republic was too weak and the international forces backing the Dutch too strong for armed struggle alone to succeed. They believed, rather, not only that there were elements on the Dutch side willing to compromise with Indonesian nationalism but that international opinion could be marshalled in Indonesia’s favour if the Republic presented its case carefully to the world. This strategy, generally described at the time as diplomasi, was a

8. For these and other details of Nasution’s life, see Panders & Sundhaussen, Abdul Haris Nasution.
complex one. It involved first convincing the Dutch that they could not win a military victory over the Republic, and second finding sufficient common ground between Indonesian and Dutch interests to make a negotiated settlement possible. The Siliwangi Division had an important role to play in both these elements of the strategy by virtue of its strategic location in West Java.

Nasution's military bailiwick was an unusual shape. It covered the roughly oblong province of West Java, but that province was deeply incised by a zone of Allied occupation some 25-100 km wide extending from the capital, Jakarta, which the Dutch still called Batavia, south to Bogor and then east to Bandung. In late 1945 this zone had been no more than the slenderest of corridors; by mid 1946 it was increasingly sausage-shaped and was growing further as Dutch and British troops nibbled at the edges of Republican territory in order to ensure the security of land already taken. Nasution's brief was to hold the line, not just to satisfy nationalist sentiments that Republican territory should not be sacrificed but also in order to keep the Dutch interested in a negotiated settlement of disputes, by showing that they could not win militarily and by keeping them cramped uncomfortably in their narrow enclave.

The Siliwangi Division also had an important role to play in showing the Dutch that an agreement with the Republic need not compromise all their interests. Although Indonesians on Java were generally united in wanting some form of independence, there was no consensus at all on its content. Opinion ranged from those who wanted no more than an abolition of the formal privileges which the European community enjoyed in colonial society to those who demanded a thoroughgoing social transformation accompanied by the total expiation of foreign capital and other interests. The Republic's leaders took a rather conservative position, at least publicly, on this spectrum, assuring the world that Indonesia would be safe for capitalism. To make this assurance plausible, however, the Republic not only had to show the will to protect Western investment but also the means. This strategy meant in particular being able to maintain law and order within its territories. This task was well beyond the capacity of the police and thus the Siliwangi Division, like the Dutch colonial army before it, was considered to have a policing role. Nasution's enthusiasm in disarming kampungs units, which commonly took a far less tolerant attitude towards Western interests than did the government, was thus not just in his own professional interests but very much in the interests of the government.

For almost a year and a half, therefore, Nasution conducted his section of the revolution as an exercise in frontal warfare of the kind he had learnt at the Bandung academy. Troops of the Siliwangi Division organised extensive patrols along the demarcation line, attempted raids across it and so on. And Nasution's forces steadily worked over the irregular units of the province, incorporating a few, disarming the rest and generally establishing Siliwangi hegemony. By late 1946 the strategy seemed to have worked. The Dutch had initially the Linggajati Agreement with the Republic, proposing independence for a federal Republic in which the original Republic would be the strongest element. The agreement fore-shadowed, moreover, a Dutch withdrawal from the occupied parts of West Java.

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On both sides, however, the compromises made to achieve the agreement aroused storms of protest and by the time the agreement was signed in May 1947 it was clear that it would never be implemented. This failure of negotiation left no way forward for either side but military action. On the Dutch side, the armed forces had by that time at last overcome some of the weaknesses which had plagued them at the start of the revolution and were keen to attempt a full scale military suppression of the Republic. On the Republican side, some irregular units were still optimistic about the possibility of sweeping the Dutch into the sea, but most army officers took a far less sanguine view. For all the military preparations of the past year, the Siliwangi Division was still badly under-equipped, poorly trained and ill-coordinated. Under favourable circumstances it had been able to hold off Dutch expansion, but it had never yet succeeded in regaining territory from the Allies. It was clearly not yet capable of meeting a determined Dutch thrust on any front, and preparations began therefore for a full scale retreat to a new line of defence running just west of the provincial border from Cirebon to Garut and the south coast.

Out of these unpromising circumstances Nasution's guerrilla strategies began to evolve. Like most theorists of guerrilla war, Nasution was led to it as a strategy not through an intellectual process but as a practical response to the grim prospect of defeat. Nor did Nasution's guerrilla strategy leap, Athena-like, fully formed from his head; rather it was the product of a number of separate responses to difficult conditions which eventually merged to form a relatively coherent strategy. Nasution's conversion to guerrilla tactics began with his recognition of the risks involved in a retreat under fire. The Cirebon-Garut line offered a more compact line of defence, it was true, but being thinly spread around the existing demarcation line was far from the most serious of the Siliwangi Division's problems. Reforming a front line while under retreat, on the other hand, was likely to be an exceptionally complex manoeuvre, offering the Dutch all sorts of opportunities to break through into Central Java. Under these circumstances Nasution proposed that army units should neither fight to the last when the Dutch attacked, nor flee to safe Republican territory in order to re-group, but rather should withdraw to prepared pockets (kantong) in the mountains from which they could emerge to re-engage the enemy at a more favourable time. When the expected Dutch attack was finally launched in July 1947, the Siliwangi units followed this strategy.

Withdrawal into the pockets was designed primarily to preserve the pre-attack Siliwangi Division in as intact a form as possible, rather than as a prelude to guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, the military circumstances the Siliwangi units found themselves in drew them inevitably into guerrilla tactics. Many of them had some familiarity already with commando-style operations across the demarcation line, and they applied these techniques to the new, more mobile style of war they were now forced to fight. The roots of a guerrilla strategy existed already in common practice along the front lines. Official and irregular units had already adopted the simple expedient of slowing the enemy's advance by blocking roads and destroying bridges. This scorched earth tactic was sometimes extended to
include economic targets such as factories and plantations as a means of denying the Dutch the fruits of their victory.

Even so, the old habits of frontal warfare died hard. Republican military commanders remained under the influence of the fact that the Republic was a state in control of territory and, rather than envisaging a complex gradation of control from liberated zones through various kinds of contested area to occupied regions, they tended still to think simply in terms of Republican territory and occupied territory, the two separated by a front line of the kind that had existed before the Dutch military action. Indeed, they set great store by such tokens of Republican control as the circulation of Republican currency. When the Republic subsequently signed the Remoulle Agreement of January 1948, which acknowledged Dutch de facto control of most of West Java, Siliwangi officers were incensed, not because they regarded this agreement as subverting their guerrilla strategy but because they saw it as conceding to the Dutch territory which was unambiguously in Republican hands.

In October 1947, however, Nasution had already taken another step away from frontal warfare with the creation of what he called Wehrkreise, or military regions. There were five of these in the province, each covering a strategic region which included both secure mountain retreats and Dutch-occupied lowlands. They amounted thus to formal notice that the whole of the province was open to guerrilla attacks.10

The initial rationale for the Wehrkreise, however, was not primarily strategic. In the first place, they were a means of restoring a sense of hierarchy within the Siliwangi Division. The retreats of July 1947 had thoroughly scrambled the distribution of Siliwangi units, so that battalions and companies were often far removed from their regiments and brigades. Although Nasution portrayed the Wehrkreise system later as a measure to de-centralise tactical decision-making, it was launched with quite the opposite intention, as a simple expedient to ensure that all the troops in a given region were under a unified command, while avoiding the contentious task of re-drawing the division’s formal order of battle. Second, Nasution needed to assert his division’s claim to the responsibility over the entire province after a somewhat bizarre episode in which the ministry of defence stripped him and the Siliwangi Division of responsibility for the security of the province in the wake of the apparent debacle of July 1947. Charged with military responsibility for the region in Nasution’s place was Sultan Akbar, leader of a major laskar unit and one of Nasution’s old enemies from the days of army–laskar clashes in West Java.11 This transfer of responsibility was subsequently reversed, but Nasution could not afford for political reasons to concede that any part of the province was safely in Dutch hands.

Despite being led by circumstances towards guerrilla strategies, Nasution nonetheless retained strong professional reservations about guerrilla warfare. Even in 1953 when, to some extent, he was idealising guerrilla warfare for political reasons, he could write:

We are forced to use guerrilla warfare when we are unable to defend an area by conventional means... but gradually... with the development of our army into a modern army, the importance of guerrilla warfare will decrease.12

The reason for these reservations was that Nasution realised, as did Giap, Mao and others, that guerrilla warfare alone could not win a victory: the final stage of a war of national liberation had to be in the hands of a strong conventional army.

Nasution, however, had two specific reasons for unease with guerrilla warfare. First, he feared that the transformation of the Siliwangi Division into a guerrilla army might render it incapable of reconversion into a conventional army.13 In guerrilla activities, he noted, communication is very difficult. Thus it often happens that regions or units pay insufficient attention to the hierarchy, and on the other hand higher commanders often let their subordinates go on their own. In this way the danger is great that the absolute condition for every army can no longer be met, namely, unity of command, army (organisational) unity, unity of strategy and so on.14

The risk was that the guerrilla army might fight on indefinitely without ever being able to prosecute the final victory.

Nasution’s second misgiving arose from the risk of popular fatigue with the struggle. Whereas Giap took the view that protracted war made eventual victory all the more certain by strengthening the people’s resolve, Nasution felt the grip of the Republic on its people to be a good deal more precarious. Although fighting on Java was generally sporadic and at a low level, the revolutionary years were a time of hardship for people in Republican areas, especially after early 1947 when the Dutch threw a blockade around the Republic, severely hampering the export of produce and the import of consumer goods. Experience had shown that a generous influx of supplies, together with strong and effective guarantees of protection against Republican retaliation could win at least the passive acceptance of their rule by the majority of the people in the territories occupied in 1945 and

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12. Fundamentals, 70-1.

13. The Dutch faced this dilemma, too. The 7 December Division of the Dutch army, which was one of the mainstays of the Dutch military effort in the Indies, was intended for service on the Rhine after its Indonesian tour of duty, and its commanders strongly resisted efforts to have it adopt commando-style tactics which might disrupt its internal organisation.

14. HQ Java Command, no. 7/MKID/40, Instruction on Communication, 7 January 1948, reprinted in Fundamentals, 133.
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our military government is at present the one and only basic organisation for regulating our national potential for the victory of the Republic of Indonesia through its protection by a mobile army. The organisation of this military government penetrates to the village and takes benefit from every citizen of the Republic of Indonesia in the national struggle which is conducted in total and under military discipline.16

The immediate effect of military government was thus to place the entire resources of the society at the disposal of the army at every level, though Nasution was careful to lay down guidelines on proper military behaviour comparable to those issued by any army commander who does not wish to turn the people against him.

In Vietnam, the penetration of the villages by the resistance was accompanied by an overthrowing of the old village order and its replacement with a new one better geared to the struggle. Nasution's military penetration of the village on Java, however, was essentially conservative. He identified the village chief, or lurah, as the key figure with whom the army would have to work: the lurah are the core of the maintenance of the Government's struggle. The lurah are the only leaders amidst the people who are still obeyed by the people... The lurah must be protected and respected.17

This was a telling decision, because the lurah were often at the centre of village tensions, distrusted for their former role as agents of the colonial government. True, many lurah had been replaced in village revolutions in 1945 and 1946, but the institution remained a conduit for the delivery of supplies and labour from the village to the authorities of the outside world, and Nasution sought to make use of this relationship in his guerrilla struggle. His enthusiastic espousal of the lurah as the pivot of his people's defence system reflected his general willingness to preserve the social order rather than seeking to transform it.

The period of guerrilla warfare turned out to be brief. The captured Republican civilian leaders had negotiated a settlement with the Dutch by early May 1949, and a general ceasefire came into force in early August. Nasution therefore had little time for the further development and implementation of his ideas on guerrilla strategy. Most intriguing is an idea which he expressed in August 1948 for the creation of what he called a territorial army. These troops were to be based in the villages and were to be responsible for lower level resistance to the Dutch, which, it was hoped, would tie down Dutch forces while the KRU hit them at their most vulnerable points. They were to be less well armed than the Siliwangi Division and were to be more dependent on local resources than the mobile forces. Their task, wrote Nasution,

15. See 'Executing Total People's Resistance' (August 1948), in Fundamentals, 109–10; Canti, 'Ketapang Lama—taun 1945, manuscript at Pernikahan Angkatan 45, Jakarta.
17. In fact the Chins depended heavily on radio communications and external supply by air drops, neither of which was available to Republican troops in Java. Nasution's reference to the Chins was probably partly an attempt to share in their romantic reputation.

20. 'Executing Total People's Resistance', 110.
is to protect the Republic's pockets by guerrilla means, both against attack from within as well as attack from without. These units, together with the people, guarantee the presence of permanent resistance in each outlying district. It is intended that in the future these territorial battalions will become training-centers for the youth of every Kabupaten [regency], in order to train them for sustained and guerrilla duties ... in this way the people's military units will be obtained for the total people's resistance.21

A territorial army structure along these lines might indeed have taken on the characteristics of a people's army in the style of the People's Army of Vietnam had time been available, but it is by no means clear that Nasution placed a high priority on this development. The document 'Executing Total People's Defence', in which he waxes most eloquent about the territorial units, was itself a political document designed to defuse discontent with his policy of channeling money and supplies to the Siliwangi Division at the expense of other units. The territorial army appeared to those destined for it to be a second-class army for those rejected by the KRU. While this assessment is probably unfair, Nasution certainly devoted a good deal more effort to the KRU, so that whereas it was ready to function in at least a rudimentary fashion by the time the Dutch attacked, the territorial army was scarcely in existence.

Nasution's reputation as a military strategist and tactician is both high and deserved. With Amir Syahruluddin and the army commander General Sudirman, he ranks as one of the foremost creators of the modern Indonesian armed forces. His own account of his role, however, needs to be read with caution; he was an astute propagandist and tailored his writings to the political exigencies of the day. In particular, his concept of people's war as expressed in *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* turns out to be rather different in theory and in practice.

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Information for Contributors

Articles should normally not exceed 10,000 words, exclusive of endnotes. Shorter articles are most welcome. Articles, including notes, should be typed double spaced on one side of A4 paper, with 3 cm margins on both sides. They may be submitted on an IBM or, preferably, an Apple Macintosh disk. They may also be submitted as an email attachment (preferably in rich text) to warassoc@adelaide.edu.au. Detailed style sheets are available on request. In general, the style of articles already published should be followed; follow the *Oxford English Dictionary* for spelling. Single quotation marks should be used, with double marks enclosing quotations within quotations. Dates in the text and in the notes should be written in full. 3 September 1939. Abbreviated forms such as USA should not use full stops between individual letters. Numbers should be written in full to ten, and should have no comma to 9999 but then should be 10,000 and so on.

The following style is required for notes which should be limited to references and not contain substantive information:


4. Ibid., 62.

Thus, for subsequent references use ibid. or a short title as appropriate; do not use *op. cit.* or *loc. cit.* Page numbers should not be preceded by p. or pp. Abbreviate chapter as ch. but use vol. only where volume reference is to a composite publication or series title. For archival references, the order should be as follows: Minute by Morrison, 13 October 1942, FO 837/1213.

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21. Ibid., 111.