Comparative Judicial Daring: Constitutional Powers and Political CultureBerkeley Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series (1997)
AbstractPositive political theory has developed important predictive insights into interpretation of statutes, specifically what structural conditions lead judges to defer to the preference of the legislature. Where the legislature can easily reverse judicial decisions, "strategic" judges are more constrained in interpreting statutes. This paper extends the structural model to include political factors. It then develops a comparative empirical test of the model and shows the model has explanatory power. Finally, it extends the model to include Constitutional interpretation. A Xerox of these older working papers can be obtained on request from Jeanette Sayre at Sayrej@law.berkeley.edu.
Publication DateJune, 1997
Citation InformationRobert D. Cooter and Tom Ginsburg. "Comparative Judicial Daring: Constitutional Powers and Political Culture" Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series (1997)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/robert_cooter/187/