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Separate, But Not Equal: Racial Segmentation in Cigarette Advertising

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Richard W. Pollay, Jung S. Lee, and David Carter-Whitney

The ethnic segmentation of the cigarette market is currently controversial, but not a new phenomenon. A census of 540 cigarette ads from 1950-1965 Ebony magazines, compared to a matched sample from Life, reveals segmented and segregated advertising toward black consumers. The ads in Ebony eventually featured black models almost exclusively, primarily professional athletes. Despite endorsements from black athletes and musicians also famous to white audiences, none of these appeared in the Life ads. On average, the segregated advertising was two to three years tardy in offering filtered products to black consumers, suggesting that appeals to black pride were not without prejudice. Potential reasons for these historical results are discussed, as are current practices.

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The targeting of ethnic groups by cigarette firms has recently been the subject of much controversy. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Health and Human Services, publicly denounced the test marketing of the very high tar (19 mg) Uptown brand targeted at a black audience. He called it "contemtpible that the tobacco industry has sought to increase their market" among minorities because this population was "already bearing more than its fair share of smoking-related illness and mortality" (Schiffman 1990; Sullivan 1990). More pointed was comedian Jay Leno's jest that R. J. Reynolds named it Uptown "because the word 'Genocide' was already taken" (Spivey 1990). Despite a new product development sunk cost estimated at $10 million, R. J. Reynolds abandoned its launch of Uptown (Assael 1990; Newsweek 1990; Quinn 1990).

A Congressional committee subsequently recommended legislation to prevent the cigarette industry from future ethnic segment targeting, even though this is only one of several cigarette advertising policy issues (Arbogast 1986; Warner et al. 1986). The tobacco industry and the Association of National Advertisers attacked the proposal to constrain ethnic targeting as "bordering on racism, let alone censorship" (Schlossberg 1990). A Tobacco Institute spokesperson, Brennan Dawson, denigrated efforts at protecting ethnic youth as "paternalistic" when appearing on CNN's "Larry King Live" (8/90) and had earlier called such efforts "condescending" in the New York Times (Williams 1987). An unnamed tobacco executive described the racial and class segmentation as natural and necessary because "the overall market is trending toward downscale and low-income consumers and that often means blacks and Hispanics." The President of a black-owned ad agency commented that marketing a cigarette for blacks wasn't insulting, but that ignoring the black community would be (Dagnoli 1989b).

The heat of this controversy may suggest that ethnic targeting is a new practice, or one that has only recently become problematic. The purpose of this paper is provide a historical context for today's controversy by studying the targeting of blacks evidenced in cigarette advertising during the years 1950-1965. After a brief introduction on the general rationale for segmentation, the specific case for cigarettes is discussed. An historical perspective identifies 1950-1965 as an era of dramatic transition and development for both cigarettes and black consciousness, civil rights and media. Research
questions and null hypotheses are posited which presume ethnic targeting without manifest inequities between the races, i.e. advertising programs which were equivalent in character even if separate in media vehicles and using models for racial portrayals. Data comparing cigarette advertising in *Ebon*y and *Life* for this period are presented for the amount of cigarette advertising, the number of brands advertised, the use of ethnic models and athletes' endorsements, and the timing of the first offerings of filters. Finally, a discussion explores and qualifies alternative explanations for the observed results.

**The Rationale for Targeting Ethnic Segments**

Like the targeting of any market segment, ethnic targeting is done by brand managers to maximize sales and profits. The basic rationale behind this strategy is that a variety of marketing programs (unique combinations of products, advertising, packages, pricing, distribution, etc.), each designed to better match the psychology and interests of a separable segment, will ultimately generate more sales and profit than would a single undifferentiated marketing program, so called mass marketing.

Marketing segmentation is commonplace among large consumer goods firms and has incurred criticism only when the product itself is problematic. The central concern, therefore, is not typically with the use of race or sex as a basis for market analysis and initiative. Selective targeting can be benign or even beneficial, but only if the product is. When the marketing process is respectful and appropriately customized it may be more relevant, efficient and may provide better service and benefits to targeted segments. But if the product is unwholesome, even addictive and lethal, segmentation's efficiency delivers more death and disease, not more benefits, and provides a disservice, not a service.

A fully segmented marketing strategy can also be a segregation strategy. For example, by using only blacks to sell to blacks and only whites to sell to whites, crossover spokespersons who would example a more integrated perspective are avoided. Today, racial crossover spokespersons are commonly used for many products to be of general appeal, e.g. Bill Cosby (Jello), Ray Charles (Pepsi) or Magic Johnson (Gatorade). Research reported in *Advertising Age* suggested that at one time "Negroes Desire Integrated Ads" (*Advertising Age*, 11/12/62). Subsequent research suggests that this desire was of limited durability, with both blacks and whites found to often prefer their own ethnicity in ads over integrated portrayals (Whittler 1991).

**Cigarette Segmentation**

Research has shown that the cigarette industry focuses considerable efforts toward specific target segments, such as blue collar women, ambitious Hispanics, or urban blacks. Gender or race is unlikely to be the only basis for segmentation, as these examples with their social class and personality qualifiers suggest. Also, it is likely that other brands and programs in the U.S., like those of their Canadian subsidiaries, are aimed at segments defined with terms like "young starters," "pre-quitters," or "ostriches." These segments are seen by the industry, respectively, as the most important in the long run, the largest, and the least in need of advertising reassurance (Pollay 1990a). Women, long the target for "slim" brands such as Virginia Slims, Eve, More and Capri, were recently offered new products such as SuperSlims, Style, and a scented Chelsea (Dagnoli 1989a; Waldman 1989). Dakota is a new brand aimed at the "virile female," working class women who enjoy events like drag races, wrestling, tractor pulls, or shooting pool in bars (Gallagher 1990). Brands such as Rio and Dorado are targeted at Hispanics, making Philip Morris the single biggest advertiser in Hispanic media, with R. J. Reynolds not far behind (Levin 1988, p14; Maxwell and Jacobson 1989).

Black magazines, like those for Hispanics or youth, have been receiving an increasing number of cigarette ads since at least 1965 (Basil and Schooler 1990). Magazines in the aggregate enjoyed a nearly six-fold surge of cigarette ad income during the 1970s after the firms voluntarily withdrew from radio and TV to terminate the FCCmandated Fairness Doctrine messages of the Cancer Society and others (Feinberg 1971: Arbogast 1986). The idea that "they were booted off" radio and TV is a misunderstanding common enough to be shared by a reviewer. The Fairness Doctrine was withstanding industry challenge, being upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals. A bill renewing the 1965 package warning law, and pre-empting FTC and FCC initiatives with respect to cigarette advertising, passed the House in June 1969. Joseph F. Cullman III, the President of Philip Morris and Chairman of the Tobacco Institute, surprised many when he announced in a July Senate hearing that the industry would voluntarily discontinue all broadcast advertising effective Dec. 31, if granted immunity.
from anti-trust laws and released from forward contracts with the networks. The legislation blocking backsliding on this promised self regulation passed Congress in March 1970, eight months later. For detail, see the legislative history (P.L. 91-222, 2652ff). Broadcast cigarette ads stopped after the January 1, 1971 end of season football games.)

Ethnic markets for cigarettes are reached today primarily with outdoor, point of sale, transit, taxi-top, bus shelter, and other “street” advertising. Black neighborhoods have particularly high densities of billboards, and a higher fraction of these are for tobacco and alcohol ads than is true for billboards in general (Schooler and Basil 1990). Marketing and Media Decisions reported that the top ten outdoor advertisers were all cigarette brands (House of Representatives 1986, p772-3). This intense targeting of the ethnic neighborhoods motivated one priest, Rev. Michael Pfleger, to paint over brand names on some of 118 billboards within ten blocks of his Chicago school. This act of civil disobedience led to criminal charges, a trial and an ultimate acquittal (Castro 1990; Duff 1991). The anonymous Mandrake and New York’s Rev. Calvin Butts have engaged in similar protests (Wildavsky 1990). Handbooks are available to concerned citizens with plans of action to fight against billboards and ethnic targeting (McMahon and Taylor 1990). In response to ethnic protests, Philip Morris now trains its staff with a professional actress role playing an intruder disrupting ethnic promotional events screaming “You are killing my people” (STAT 1991).

More publicly, Philip Morris fights ethnic and other attacks on their advertising and promotional activities with a travelling exhibit and large advocacy ad campaign that champions the Bill of Rights, particularly “Free Speech.” This campaign, like other cigarette advertising, also uses black endorsers: Benjamin Brooks, the Executive Director of the NAACP; James Earl Jones, an actor; Barbara Jordan, a former Congresswoman; and Judith Jamieson, the Artistic Director of the Alvin Alley Dance Company, a regular recipient of funds from Philip Morris. The black community has enjoyed Kool Jazz Festivals and Achiever Awards, More’s sponsorship of Ebony’s travelling fashion shows, and Philip Morris’ patronage of the arts. Sponsorship and support is also extended to groups such as the United Negro College Fund, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the National Black Caucus of State Legislators, and the National Urban League, which receives an estimated $4 million plus annually from cigarette companies (Assael 1990; Williams 1987).

Blacks and Cigarettes in Post War America

Black Roles and Rights. The chronicles of the first two decades after WWII show dramatic change in black roles and rights (Daniel 1987). Black athletes, long established in boxing, were admitted to other sports, most visibly Jackie Robinson’s admittance into major league baseball where he soon was named its Most Valuable Player (1949). By 1950 the color bar was being lifted in more minor sports, such as bowling and tennis. The arts were opening up as well, allowing a black to sing at the Daughters of the American Revolution’s Constitution Hall for the first time in 1952, and at the New York Metropolitan Opera in 1953.

In the early 1950s, a series of Supreme Court decisions required school integration, but many cities and states balked, requiring repeated Court affirmations. In 1955 the Court required states to desegregate with “deliberate speed” and the Federal Government ordered it for all interstate busses and trains. New black leadership rose to national prominence, most notably Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. after he lead a bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama. Riots and demonstrations preceded a Civil Rights act focused on voter registration (1957), and continuing unrest saw black schools and churches bombed (1958). By 1960, lunch counter sit-ins were supported by student demonstrations and opposed by neo-Nazi rallies and Ku Klux Klan activity. King and supporters were being regularly arrested for their civil disobedience, with President Kennedy intervening. Freedom bus rides and voter registration drives continued throughout the south, often requiring National Guard protection and quelling of riots. In 1963, the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation, the frequent and ever larger demonstrations culminated in a record 200,000 gathered in Washington, D.C., where King delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” speech. In 1964, President Johnson’s “War on Poverty” included the most sweeping Civil Rights Act in history, providing rights for voting, public accommodations, Federal assistance programs and fair employment. King was named Man of the Year (Time 1964) and became the youngest-ever winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. These seeming victories virtually closed this chapter of U.S. history, as the military build-up in Vietnam claimed national attention, especially among college protestors.

Black Media. Before WWII, the ethnic market was served primarily by local newspapers, few of which survive in research libraries. Although the black
ethnic market was estimated in the 1940s as having a disposable income of over $10 billion, the media serving it obtained only about 1/10th as much advertising income as was generated in Canada, then a smaller market. Nonetheless, in 1946 anticipations of post war growth lead to new ethnic entrepreneurial initiatives: a New York modelling agency dealing exclusively in black talent and the first rate card for the newly founded Ebony magazine, serving blacks with a Life-like format (Marin 1980). Hirsch (1968) studied Ebony from 1945 to 1966 and reported that it reached a black audience somewhat older, better educated, and more affluent than the average black.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, headlines in Advertising Age heralded the importance and character of black consumers and media, paralleling the attention in the late 1950s and early 1960s being paid to civil rights. These encouragements in the trade press and dramatic news events doubtless stimulated many manufacturers and advertisers to at least consider paying closer attention to the needs of black consumers. Ebony got frequent specific coverage in Advertising Age. Stories featured survey results and client contracts, such as Pepsi-Cola's use in Ebony of black "leaders in their fields" in 1951. Pepsi was described as a "pioneer" advertiser in ethnic media, as they also ran these "leaders in their fields" ads in 35 black newspapers (Marin 1980).

In 1962, Advertising Age noted the post war growth of ethnic media. Some 600 black radio stations existed, where twenty years earlier there had been only a handful. Ebony now carried 57 of the top 100 advertisers, doubling its ad revenues in six years to $3.3 million (Time 1962). This made Ebony even larger than Life in pages, with more, but mostly smaller ads (Berkman 1963; Weiss and Chapko 1972). Ebony's attainment of a place in the media mainstream is suggested by its publisher's photo with President Johnson in Advertising Age (3/16/64).

Advertising Age headlines in the mid 1960s suggested a general acceptance of the ethnic market, albeit with some residual uncertainties: "Use of Negroes in Ads Has Not Hurt Sales: Lever (11/4/63)," "Race Question Doesn't Bother Curtis (5/18/64)," "Purex Launches in Ebony in Test of Subtleties of Negro Marketing (2/1/65)," and "Negro Market Sought Because of Hard Headed Economics (11/29/65)." The models appearing in typical ads at this time were increasingly black and more negroid, although these changes were sometimes slight, transient or found only for male models (Gitter et al. 1972; Weiss and Chapko 1972; Chapko 1976).

Cigarettes Contract Cancer. For the cigarette industry, too, the post WWII period was one of dramatic change. The industry was being challenged in the courts by the FTC in cases considering their ads from the 1930s and 40s, making most points at best as most campaigns were abandoned for newer ones long before any judgments. The "health scare" of the early 1950s, triggered by Reader's Digest articles (e.g. Norr 1952), led to the formation of the Tobacco Industry Research Council. The Research Council combatted health concerns with public relations, such as the "Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers," a single advocacy ad that cost almost three times what was actually spent that year on their nominal research purpose (Pollay 1990c). Cancer concerns also precipitated the launching of many brands with extra length, additives, or special packaging. Multiple filtered brands were introduced and these came to dominate the advertising in 1955, and the consumption by 1959.

In 1964, 12 years after the public "health scare," the first Surgeon General's report (1964) was issued, leading to many Congressional initiatives. In the end, a weak industry-sponsored bill was passed that Advertising Age and other columnists called shocking special interest legislation. The law required a package warning, but the warning was mild, avoiding the proposed reference to death, presented as only one person's opinion, and uncertain ("may cause"). The law also specifically excluded warnings in advertising, let the industry determine typography and placement, handcuffed the F.T.C., and preempted individual states from passing any tougher laws (Fritschler 1969; Miles 1982; Perschuck 1982; Taylor 1984; Whelan 1984).

Hypotheses

Of research interest here is how the cigarette firms behaved toward the ethnic market during this era of turmoil for both the industry and black consumers. The modest prior research and theory precludes strong directional hypotheses. Fairness and objectivity demand that the industry be presumed free of prejudicial discrimination in any targeting. Thus this research is guided by the general propositions that blacks were a sufficiently attractive segment to attract advertising and that this advertising was essentially equivalent to that targeting whites.

**Hypothesis 1**: Cigarette advertising was racially segmented.
Cigarette advertising and promotion, if well managed, should recognize and address the black ethnic market by both media choice and the use of ethnic models in the art direction. Ethnic vehicles provide supplemental reach to segments likely to be poorly reached otherwise. Cigarette firms, long among the most competent, sophisticated, thorough and well financed of consumer goods advertisers, should have employed national black media vehicles, such as "Ebony," as they became available and capable of quality production.

There is no strong reason to expect timidity by cigarette firms in the use of media vehicles delivering racially segmented audiences. Cigarette firms have consistently been bold pioneers in both their use of new media and their targeting of other segments, even when controversial. They have always been early and intensive users of new media such as billboard spectacles, radio, television, and sporting event sponsorships, and they promoted cigarettes to women beginning in the 1920s, when smoking by women was still uncommon and a relatively scandalous activity (Pollay 1988). Organizational pragmatism was presumed to be more likely than organizational racism, if any.

Segmented media permit selectivity in both promotional intensity and creative art direction. Once such media have been chosen, it is relatively inexpensive to shoot new photos to adapt campaigns to display ethnic models. Thus this hypothesis is operationalized as an expectation of evidence of:

- **Hypothesis 1a** a presence of cigarette ads in black vehicles ("Ebony"); and
- **Hypothesis 1b** the use of black models within those ads.

**Hypothesis 2:** Cigarette advertising was equivalent between racial segments.

Despite the Southern headquarters (at that time) of most of the cigarette firms, there is no a priori reason to expect any manifest inequities toward blacks. Indeed, such a presumption would, itself, be prejudicial. Hence, this null hypothesis holds that black and white consumers were treated equivalently, with ads showing campaign consistency across various creative executions. While models and copy language may be ethnically adapted, the basic appeal and art direction was expected to display brand consistency. Compared to the ease of obtaining an ethnic model and photo, a highly differentiated campaign involves research and development expenses and, more importantly, it also risks brand image confusion and political backlash. Operationally, this hypothesis is specified as several null hypotheses that the advertising efforts of the cigarette industry in "Ebony" and "Life," toward blacks and whites respectively, were similar in:

- **Hypothesis 2a** promotional intensity (# of ads);
- **Hypothesis 2b** copy strategy (e.g. use of athletes);
- **Hypothesis 2c** product variety (# of brands); and
- **Hypothesis 2d** product type (timing of filter introductions).

**Method**

A complete census was taken of the cigarette ads appearing in "Ebony" for the years 1950 - 1965, the period of great evolution in black civil rights, the black ethnic media and cigarette industry. Data were gathered for the date, location, brand, ethnicity of spokesperson (if any), filters, and color or black and white production. Additional notes were taken identifying copy premises, slogans, spokespersons and their roles, scientific and health claims.

A comparison sample was generated from "Life" magazine for the same years by taking a census of all ads appearing in the second issue of every month, providing one issue of the weekly "Life" to match each and every issue of the monthly "Ebony." This sampling strategy was consistent with previous research (Weiss and Chapko 1972; Chapko 1976) and was motivated by the "almost perfect control situation. They are nearly identical in layout, format, typography and, to a considerable extent, content" (Berkman 1963). Original hard copies of the magazines were studied to the extent possible, using two major university libraries, with data for noted missing volumes generated by consulting microfilm versions.

Coding for content such as the presence or absence of people, their race, and if the product is filtered is a relatively simple task, with reliabilities typically well over 90% and often nearly 100% (Altman et al 1987; Basil and Schoeler 1990; Pollay 1990b, 1991; Ringold 1987; Ringold and Calfee 1989; Warner 1985). The coding for ethnicity in this sample was problematic for eight cases, or about 2% of the "Ebony" ads containing people, yielding a 98% reliability. This problem occurred primarily where microfilm sourcing and/or ambiguous art made racial determination uncertain, as in the 1963-1964 Marlboro portrayal of the cowboy made ethnically ambiguous in "Ebony" with visual tactics like a hand in a glove with no visible
Table 1
Cigarette Advertising Frequencies (1950-1965)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Ebony (12 Issues)</th>
<th>Life (12 Issues)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brands (#)</td>
<td>Ads (#)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>1957</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>1962</td>
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<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Based upon ads with human models.

flesh, a pen and ink drawing rendered in brown inks, and a figure silhouetted against a setting sun. These ambiguous cases were excluded from the analysis of ethnic portrayal. A redundant recoding of 40 ads for each vehicle resulted in perfect replication for all other measures, or a pi index of 100 (Scott 1955).

In general, conservative decision rules were employed. Only identified professional athletes were noted as athletic, so “athletes” do not include anonymous people engaged in recreational activities, like the 1963 Ebony examples of bowlers (Viceroy), skiers (Camel), or a coach with his Little League team (L&M). The introduction and promotion of cigarette filters were noted wherever they occurred, even if the filter images and/or copy was subordinate to that for other product variations of regular, king size, 100mm, menthol, or special packaging. Tareyton cigarettes, however, were considered as unfiltered until a filtered version was launched in Life in 1955 because Tareyton ads themselves differentiated between the filtered and unfiltered (cork) versions.

Results

During this 16 year period, 540 ads for 23 brands appeared in Ebony, while 526 ads for 33 brands appeared in comparable issues of Life. All six U.S. cigarette manufacturers were represented in both media vehicles. For no year and magazine were there fewer than four brands represented. The number of brands grew with the introduction of filtered products, with both carrying ads for 10 to 16 brands every year after 1959. Exact repetitions of ads were rare, but the sample does include the variations that constitute a coherent campaign. Only Kent’s campaign in the 1960s appeared in every monthly Ebony issue, but the data for those years also reflect ten or more other brands. Thus, for no year in either magazine is the data dominated by just one or two campaigns.

Table 1 provides data for Ebony and Life for the frequencies of ads, number of brands, and proportions of ads for filters or using black models. The data describe the cigarette advertising as readers would have experienced it, naturally weighted by the relative frequencies of various campaigns, although not weighted for special locations such as cover positions.

Hypothesis 1: Racial Segmentation

Hypothesis 1a) Use of black media. Cigarette ads appeared in Ebony throughout the studied period. The smaller number of brands advertised in the early years reflects, in part, the smaller number of brands in the market those years, a pattern also evidenced for Life. A sign test on the annual differences in advertising intensity is not significant (r=8, N=16, p=1.00), as one magazine had more cigarette ads in some years, and vice-versa, for exactly half of the
years each. For this period, on average, cigarette firms advertised as much in the ethnic vehicle of *Ebony* as they did in *Life*. This result and the simple observation of their persistent presence in *Ebony* are both consistent with the expected segmentation of advertising programs by the cigarette firms.

Hypothesis 1b) Use of black models. The vast majority (85%) of these cigarette ads feature people, with only a small minority featuring the product or other props. These people were both anonymous models and famous people providing testimonials and endorsements. Of the 445 *Ebony* ads that featured people whose ethnicity was identifiable in our sample, more than 90% featured black models. By 1958 and thereafter, virtually 100% of the ethnically identifiable cigarette ads in *Ebony* used a black model, the exceptions being small images of models used in an multi-image offer of many premium items and a faceless hand holding a cigarette pack. In 1950-1957, the whites appearing in *Ebony* ads were mostly TV and movie stars (Lucille Ball & Desi Arnaz from "I Love Lucy") or medical professionals ("More Doctors Smoke Camels..."). None of the black spokespersons for cigarettes appeared in *Life*.

Summing Up. The hypothesis that cigarette firms had marketing efforts tailored to the racial segment of blacks is supported. The black ethnic market was a targeted market segment since at least 1950. Cigarettes were marketed towards blacks using both black media vehicles and black models and spokespersons. Some white stars of stage and screen appeared in *Ebony* as cigarette endorsers in the earlier 1950s. By the late 1950s, the models in cigarette advertising had become almost exclusively black in *Ebony*, while remaining exclusively white in *Life*.

Hypothesis 2: Cigarette advertising was equivalent between segments.

Hypothesis 2a. Advertising Intensity. The ad intensity in *Life* was relatively consistent through this period with only a slight increase in the final years. *Ebony*, however, experienced a noticeable increase in the number of cigarette ads per issue. *Ebony* contained fewer cigarette ads per issue than *Life* in the early 1950s, but was getting comparable amounts of advertising by the mid 1950s. By 1960 and thereafter it carried more cigarettes ads per issue than did *Life*, peaking at twice as many pages in 1962. An analysis of runs tests the null hypothesis that two vehicles are equivalent, with the probability of one having more or fewer ads binomially distributed at p=.5. A two-tailed runs test on the annual differences in the number of ads is significant (u=4, N1=N2=8; p=.018). Thus, the pattern of fewer ads in *Ebony* until 1955, and more ads from 1959 to 1965, is statistically significant.

Hypothesis 2b. Copy Strategies - The Athletic Endorsers. Ads in *Ebony* were inclined to use an endorsement appeal. A little diversity of role models was displayed in the choices of spokespersons, notably Viceroy's use of a police chief and a deep sea explorer and Lucky Strike's 1961 endorsements from a civil engineer, an artist and even an advertising copywriter. Athletes were, however, by far the most frequently used type of endorsers and testifiers in *Ebony*: Jesse Owens, made famous by the 1936 Berlin Olympics (Lucky Strike 1950); Jackie Robinson (Chesterfield 1950); Roy Campanella (Lucky Strike 1955); Hank Aaron and Ernie Banks (Camels 1956); Willie Mays and Maury Wills (Tareyton 1961). Other ads featured Joe Black, baseball's Rookie of the Year (Lucky Strike 1953); Don Newcombe (Lucky Strike 1956); Elston Howard (Kool 1960); and Frank Robinson (Viceroy 1962).

So common were sports stars as celebrity endorsers that they continued to be used even when the advertising copy was inconsistent with athleticism, or when the resulting ad was inconsistent with that running in white media. For example, Lucky Strikes (1950) referenced scientific tests while showing Jesse Owens. Similarly, Kent (1960) illustrated its "scientist's choice" campaign in *Ebony* with another Olympic champion, not a scientist as used in *Life*. Marlboro (1960-62) illustrated its ads with football and baseball stars like Roosevelt Brown, Minnie Minoso and Ernie Banks, and not the long-lived and internationally travelled cowboy, or his military tattooed predecessor.

In *Ebony*, endorsements from athletes were consistently used in Camel ads from 1954-1962. However, during 1960-1962, five other brands (Kent, Kool, Marlboro, Tareyton, and Viceroy) also employed professional athletes in their campaigns. Athletes were more common in *Ebony* for eleven years, while *Life* had more in only 1951, when *Ebony* had none. A two-tailed sign test on the annual difference, excluding the four tied years, is significant (r=1, N=12; p=.006). This refutes the null hypothesis of equivalence in the use of athletes in *Ebony* and *Life*. Cigarettes ads aimed at black readers of *Ebony* were significantly more likely to use athletes than those aimed at white readers of *Life*. For 1950-1965, endorsements from athletes were about five times more common in *Ebony* than in *Life*.
Table 2
Timing of Filter Introductions by Brand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Filter Brand</th>
<th>Life Intro</th>
<th>Ebony Intro</th>
<th>Delay (Years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L &amp; M</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viceroy</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winston</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlboro</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tareyton</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salem</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1958</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 2c. Product Variety - Number of Brands. A comparison of the two magazines reveals that more brands were advertised in Life than in Ebony. This was true for 13 of the 16 years, with the reverse true for only two years when total advertising in Ebony was particularly intense. A two-tailed sign test on the difference in the number of brands is significant (r=2, N=15; p=.008). This also refutes the null hypothesis of equivalence. While all firms were explicitly targeting the ethnic segment, significantly fewer brands were offered in Ebony than in Life.

Hypothesis 2d. Product Type - Filters. Filtered cigarette advertising began in Life in 1953, but did not begin in Ebony until two years later in 1955. More than one half of Life’s cigarette advertising was for filters by 1955, but this was not true for Ebony until 1958, three years later. Table 2 shows that virtually all brands offered filtered versions to the white audience of Life two to three years earlier than to the black audience of Ebony. This tardiness is evident for every brand except Old Gold, offered to both races in 1955 advertising. A two tailed sign test rejects the hypothesis that this is just random variation (r=0, N=6; p=.032).

By the mid 1960s, at least three-quarters of all cigarette ads in both magazines were for filtered products. Transient declines in the percentages of ads offering filtered products occurred when efforts in the early 1960s supported traditional, unfiltered brands. Life experienced some advertising for unfiltered Pall Mall, Camels, Chesterfield and Philip Morris during 1960-1963. R. J. Reynolds, for example, ran a Camel ad in Life in 1963, but only this once after its 1957 switch in advertising emphasis to filtered products. In contrast, it consistently advertised unfiltered Camels in Ebony throughout the entire period.

A comparison of the percentage of ads for filtered products shows that Ebony had a consistently smaller proportion from 1953 through 1959, but a consistently larger proportion from 1960 to 1965. The null hypothesis that the two magazines were alike in the proportions of cigarette advertising for filters, and that this was random variation, was tested with a runs test. It rejects the null hypothesis (u=4, N=6, N=7; p=.086). The two media/markets were treated differently by the cigarette industry, with filter products offered less frequently in Ebony than in Life through 1959. For all brands save one, filters were offered by ads to blacks years after being promoted to white consumers.

Summing Up. The null hypothesis that cigarette advertising to blacks was equivalent to advertising to whites is rejected on each and every one of the operational criteria. Two-tailed non-parametric statistical tests find significant differences in the patterns of promotional intensity, the endorsements by athletes, the number of brands, and the timing of filter introduction. Blacks were subject first to less and then to more advertising than whites. Advertising toward blacks more often featured endorsements from athletes. Fewer brands were offered to blacks, and they were not offered filtered brands and versions in ads until years later than whites.

Discussion

Many conjectures might be offered for the observations, particularly those which evidence a lack of equivalence in the advertising to the two races. The reasoning of the firms will likely never be known, unless there is forced judicial disclosure of corporate documents, but one might suppose, for examples, that their observed behaviors were potentially motivated by: (a) differences in media costs, e.g. Ebony becoming a bargain media buy; (b) attractiveness of blacks as a target segment due to factors like higher rates of smoking, or rapidly rising discretionary income; (c) general trends in advertising practice, i.e., getting on the black bandwagon along with other advertisers; (d) deliberate "overbuying" to make amends with black media and win their goodwill; and/or (e) racial differences in advertising responsiveness, if they believed blacks to be more vulnerable to advertising in general or to specific appeals, such as endorsements by athletes. The results will be discussed in light of these possibilities.

On the Practice of Segmented Advertising. That cigarettes firms bought space in Ebony and used black
models is, in itself, of relatively little surprise, import or contention. It was encouraged by many converging influences: the development of credible ethnic media with the technical capacity to reproduce four color imagery, the trade press arguments about the pragmatics of racially segmented marketing programs, the growing popularity in the 1960s of the idea of market segmentation, and the moral suasion of the time to directly address black consumers. These combined to make ethnic segmentation an applauded practice engaged in by many major advertisers.

On the Lack of Blacks in Life. Most of the many athletes used in Ebony and mentioned above had fame with white audiences but were not used to sell cigarettes to them. Several famous entertainers gave endorsements in Ebony's pages but were not used in Life despite their interracial following: Sarah Vaughn (Chesterfield 1950), Count Basie (Camels 1956), and Lionel Hampton (Camels 1957). Their absence in Life, and the parallel absence of whites in Ebony, is evidence of fully segmented and segregated advertising programs.

On the Volume of Advertising in Ebony in the 1960s. The intensity with which cigarettes were being promoted in Ebony has been noted elsewhere, and seems to be persistent (Howe 1984, p6). This might, in part, be attributed to a greater smoking intensity among blacks, although this argument begs the cause and effect issue. We know, however, that there was no significant difference between blacks and whites in smoking prevalence in 1955, and that blacks were only about half as likely to be heavy smokers, consuming more than a pack a day (Haenszel, Shimkin and Miller 1956). Quitting rates were spurred by the first Surgeon General's report of 1964, with quitting rates higher among whites than blacks since 1965 (Center for Disease Control 1987). Novotony et al. (1988), using 1985 data, report a racial difference in quitting rates even after accounting for other demographic and socio-economic status variables. This analysis also found that blacks are less likely to be heavy smokers. Today blacks are about 20% more likely than whites to be smokers (Williams 1987). Thus racial differences in per capita smoking intensity potentially explain today's media buying patterns far better than they can those of the 1960s.

Previous research has reported that blacks are less critical and more accepting of advertising. Durand, Teel and Bearden (1979) found blacks to be the demographic group most favorably disposed toward advertising. Soley and Reid (1983) found race to be the strongest determinant of satisfaction with the inmational value of magazine and television advertising. To the extent that this translates into resulting advertising effectiveness, it implies that the same advertising goals could be attained with less advertising to blacks, not the greater amounts observed in the 1960s.

One might suppose that black discretionary income rose rapidly in the 1960s, attracting the interest of sellers like cigarette firms. However, for this to explain the differences between Ebony and Life and the timing of the surge of cigarette ads in 1960 would require the improbable event of black incomes rising dramatically relative to white incomes before, not after, the War on Poverty and the passage of the Civil Rights Act.

A more plausible conjecture is that more cigarette ads appeared in Ebony because it was a much better buy, a bargain for the cost per thousand of delivered audience. A comparison of the SRDS data for the costs of a full page four color ad and the total paid circulation, excluding bulk, appears in Table 3. While Life was 14 times larger than Ebony in circulation, the two were virtually identical in cost per thousand (CPM) of delivered audience in 1959. In 1960, Life raised its rates more than 10% to $44,400 a page while its circulation grew only modestly, driving its CPM to $7.36. Ebony's CPM went up only to $6.73 in 1960, providing an economic incentive for its greater use, and our data shows a greater volume of cigarette advertising in Ebony from 1960 on. This incentive of a 9 percent price differential was small, however, compared to earlier price differentials. In 1951, the price differential was almost three times larger (26%) without attracting a growth in cigarette advertising in Ebony. The price differential in the early 1960s in Ebony's favor was also short lived. By 1965 it was Ebony that was the more expensive vehicle by 10%, and it didn't offer the degree of merchandising support that Life did with its licensed "As advertised in Life" campaign. Nor, judging from library copies, did it seem to offer quite the same quality of paper and four color reproduction. Price alone, therefore, seems at best a partial explanation for the comparative volume of cigarette ads in Ebony in the 1960s and apparently was of little import in the 1950s.

Perhaps cigarette firms were simply one of many consumer goods firms joining a bandwagon of supporting Ebony and other black media vehicles. Ebony total ad revenues did increase by 100% between 1956 and 1962, by which time they carried ads for a majority of the nation's largest advertisers (Time 1962). In 1956 cigarette firms bought 31 pages list priced at
$2,750 each, and in 1962 they bought 57 pages priced at least at $3,750 a page, increasing their spending by an estimated 150% to become an estimated 6.5% of Ebony's 1962 total ad income. Cigarette ads filled less than 2% of Ebony's page space in the early 1950s, 3% in 1956 and about 4% in 1962. Thus, during this period of Ebony's growing popularity among advertisers generally, cigarette firms increased their spending and page acquisition even more than average, keeping themselves out in front of the pack.

Thus, none of these possible explanations for the 1960s ad intensity seems particularly compelling individually. Perhaps their confluence, along with other possible factors such as obtaining editorial goodwill toward cigarettes, collectively determined the increased spending in Ebony relative to Life. Only corporate documents can resolve these conjectures, specifying the intentions of the firms and their reasoning for the volume of advertising. The volume of ads is of import primarily to the extent that the advertising was false and misleading or otherwise problematic, e.g. if the ad income inhibited Ebony's coverage of the cigarette health problem.

On the Tardy Offering of Filters. Perhaps blacks were not as well informed and caught up in the "health scare" of the 1950s as were whites. If so, their greater contentment with traditional unfiltered brands might have encouraged the firms to leave well enough alone. One might also explain the delay in offering filters by conjecturing that a low fraction of blacks were filter smokers, but this confuses the cause and effect relationship. For filtered cigarettes in the 1950s, advertising led changes in consumption, not vice versa. Filters received their first substantial push with the launch of Kent in 1953 to whites. At that time no appreciable proportion of either race smoked filtered products. The majority of cigarette advertising was for filtered brands by 1955, while consumption of filters was still only about 20% of the total. Filter consumption was not 50% of the market until a full four years later in 1959 (FTC 1985 Annual Report). If blacks were not smoking as many filtered cigarettes as white in the late 1950s and early 1960s, this was likely to have been the result of the observed advertising practices, not their cause.

On the Preference for Athletes. Athletes might have been used to appeal to the black audience simply because black consumers were thought by cigarette firms to be more influenced by sports heroes than by other role models. Certainly, ethnic pride in sports heroes can be assumed to have been high. Blacks had difficulty obtaining full acceptance in professional sports, as evidenced by the separate Negro baseball league and the Harlem Globetrotters of basketball fame. Black athletes had long been prominent in boxing, but often faced hostile crowds cheering for opponents with nicknames like "The Great White Hope." With this history, the successes of Jesse Owens in the 1936 Olympics in Germany, and Jackie Robinson and others in baseball, must have been welcomed.

But blacks were prominent in other fields, too, and these other successful role models were seen as credible endorsers by other advertisers. Berkman (1963) found entertainment personalities to be more commonly employed in Ebony than sports figures, endorsing products like record players, pens, beer and alcohol. Amos and Andy had been one of radio's most successful shows since 1931. Ella Fitzgerald, Louis Armstrong, Duke Ellington, Count Basie, Sarah Vaughn and Cab Calloway all had well-established careers by 1950. Sidney Poitier won the Best Actor Oscar (1964) and a black music industry emerged with its own stars, such as the Supremes, Lena Horne, Harry Belafonte, Ossie Davis, Dinah Washington, and Miles Davis. Rhythm and blues music made stars of
Little Richard, Chubby Checker, Fats Domino, and Chuck Berry.

More ads could have featured businessmen, home makers, politicians, heroes, fire fighters, welders or any other occupational or social status. Advertisers like Carnation Milk, Smirnoff Vodka and Vaseline used status based appeals from the affluent, the "smart set" and "People of Importance" (Berkman 1963, p59). Pepsi found black leaders in science, politics, churches, charities, the arts and a variety of professions for its "leaders in their fields" campaign of 1951 (Marin 1980). Pulitzer Prize winner Carl Rowan endorsed Gleem toothpaste in Ebony in 1961. When Martin Luther King was named "Man of the Year" (Time 1964, p18ff), other blacks prominent in many fields and professions were also profiled: the U.S.'s youngest foreign Ambassador, a Bishop, the president of a medical school, a state Attorney General, Los Angeles' Postmaster, an architect, an astronaut, a dentist, a financier, an orchestra conductor, an engineer, a scientist and several judges, professors and military commanders.

The prominence of athletes in cigarette ads to blacks cannot, therefore, be explained by the lack of alternative endorsers or the notion that these alternatives carried no weight with black consumers. Other advertisers in Ebony used athletes, but only in one-third of all testimonials (Berkman 1963). Cigarette firms, like these other advertisers, had a broad range of feasible options. Professional athletes, in addition to their celebrity status, offer the cigarette and brand a very healthy image through the association with the endorser's own strength and stamina, attributes reinforced by the ad copy, e.g., Camel's 1956 "real sluggers," and 1962 "Hammerin' Hank Aaron." The cigarette firms' preference for athletes seems to rest, at least in part, on this healthful association provided by athletes for a product publicly described as cancerous since the early 1950s. This is consistent with other studies (King et al 1991; Pollay 1991) which find frequent visual portrayals in the cigarette ads of many decades displaying adventurous and recreational activity, bold and lively behavior or other "pictures of health." These associations with athleticism are criticized as inherently misleading for a product with high levels of lethal risk when used as intended (DeParle 1990).

On Advertising and Censorship. While the Surgeon General and Secretary of Health and Human Services have been outspoken about racial targeting, both the black media and most of the national black organizations have been far more subdued. Neither the intensity of advertising targeted at blacks nor the associated smoking and disease rates is the subject of much discussion by them. Since the lung cancer death rate among blacks has been estimated to be 40% higher than among whites, journalists suggest that the leadership's silence has been "bought" (Williams 1987). Only recently have some groups, like the National Association of Black Journalists in 1990, begun to decline offers of tobacco money on principle (Kern-Foxworth 1991).

Individual media vehicles might well fear jeopardizing their substantial advertising income from cigarettes firms and their packaged goods subsidiaries: Kraft, Nabisco Brands, and General Foods. By the mid 1980s, for example, Ebony was earning more than $3 million a year just from cigarette advertising (Davis 1987), and cigarettes were 12% of the ad income for Essence (Cooper and Simmons 1985). "Little is said about the issue because many black newspapers and magazines, as well as radio stations, depend heavily on ads" (Djata 1987). For example, when singer Nat King Cole died from lung cancer in 1965, Ebony's extensive coverage suppressed mention of the exact nature of his "illness" until one passing mention of "lung" in the last sentence of the ninth paragraph, and no text or pictures exposed his nicotine addiction (Robinson 1965).

Many studies have shown that the more ad income received from cigarettes, the less frequently and thoroughly the health aspects of smoking are covered by a media vehicle (Ernster 1985; Guyon 1982; Smith 1978; Tye 1990; Warner 1985; Weiss and Burke 1986; Whelan et al. 1991). Media managers are smart enough to know not to bite the hands that feed them. As both advertising agents (Seldin 1963) and editors (Steinem 1990) have admitted, and as learned the hard way recently by Saatchi & Saatchi, "free speech" about smoking can be very costly indeed even when relatively innocuous in content (Dougherty 1988). R. J. Reynolds fired Saatchi and Saatchi over a spot the agency created for Northwest Airlines announcing an in-flight no smoking policy. Saatchi and Saatchi did no cigarette work, so was dismissed from the $80 million plus accounts for Nabisco Brands: Oreo, Chips Ahoy!, Bubble Yum, CareFree gum and Life-Savers. The punitive dismissal's magnitude and abruptness made front page headlines in Advertising Age, teaching a "free speech can be costly" lesson to the entire industry (Dagnoli 1988).

Conclusion

The cigarette advertising in Ebony for 1950 - 1965 displayed several interesting features in comparison
to that in Life. There was clear and obvious targeting of a black audience from at least 1950. The advertising to this ethnic market was placed in black media vehicles. Ultimately only black models were employed there, but never in Life, as cigarette firms treated the segmented market in a fully segregated manner.

This segregation involved more than buying space in black magazines and appealing to ethnic pride with black models. Inequalities existed in differential promotional intensity, endorsements from athletes, the number of brands, and the timing of filter introductions. Blacks were subject first to less and then to more advertising than whites. Advertising in Ebony featured endorsements from athletes five times more often than it did in Life. Blacks were not offered filtered brands until years after whites. The cigarette industry treated the black and white markets separately, but not equally. They appealed to black pride, but did so with some prejudice.

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