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Lonergan's Ethics

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Originally given at a conference on Lonergan's thought in Piacenza, Italy, in 2003 and published in Italian as "L'etica in Lonergan," **Sviluppo della coscienza e valori: Il contributo di Bernard Lonergan**, Piacenza, Italy: Editore Berti, 2003, 15-35.

Lonergan's "Ethics"

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Thank you very much for asking me to speak with you on a core topic in the work of Bernard Lonergan, and that is "ethics." This is something that I am happy to do, not only because it brings me back to this beautiful country of Italy, in some ways "a second homeland" for me, but also because it was here that I first encountered Bernard Lonergan in 1960. I was a young seminarian sent to study for the priesthood in Rome and he was one of my professors. It was quite a time for me: it was the early 1960s and things were changing both in the Church and in the world I was a young man studying under a very erudite Canadian Jesuit who was teaching us – no less – in Latin!

You have asked me to speak about "ethics" in Lonergan, but I hope you will forgive me these few autobiographical words because my experience of Lonergan is not without relevance to my vision of Lonergan's ethics. When I had Lonergan in theology class in the early 1960s, much of what he said was, quite frankly, over my head! I knew he was on to something, but I was not sure what it was. It was as if the teacher had a secret that he wanted to communicate to us and he kept giving us clues – but the clues just were not falling into place.

It was not until I returned to Rome, after four years of theology, to do a doctorate in philosophy and was able to spend a good part of my time reading Lonergan's **Insight: An Essay on Human Understanding** (1957) that I began to "get it." And "it" was an understanding of my own process of understanding, of insight, of "getting it." So I was coming to an understanding of what coming to an understanding might mean – or as Lonergan put it, I was coming to "an insight into insight."

I remember one afternoon in particular that still stands out in my mind. It was in the spring of 1967, late one afternoon and I had been studying Lonergan's work for hours and there was a "brown-out" in Rome as everyone began to turn their electric lights on at the same time. (A fitting symbol, I thought, of the search for enlightenment!) So I decided to take a shower and while I was showering I was thinking about insight and all

of the sudden I remember saying to myself, “You’ve been asking the wrong question!” “You’ve been going at this all the wrong way!” and from that moment on what Lonergan meant by “an insight into insight” began to fall into place.

Now it would be too long and difficult for me to explain to you now the nature of the insight I had that afternoon in Rome, but for me it was a breakthrough that I have been trying to take advantage of for over thirty years. In fact, it is the reason why I am in the academic life today instead of, like so many of my classmates, becoming a pastor of a parish or doing some other things. It’s the reason why I am here today.

1. A Personalist Ethics

I mention this personal event in my life because Lonergan’s ethics is a very personal ethics. It has to do ultimately with “being oneself” that is, being one’s deepest and most authentic self, and being true to what one has experienced and understood on the deepest level. Lonergan himself was profoundly influenced by the nineteenth century writer, John Henry Newman who wrote in his **Grammar of Assent**:

I am what I am or I am nothing. I cannot think, reflect, or judge about my being, without starting from the very point which I aim at concluding...I cannot avoid being sufficient for myself, for I cannot make myself anything else, and to change me is to destroy me. If I do not use myself I have no other self to use...What I have to ascertain are the laws under which I live. My first elementary lesson of duty is that of resignation to the laws of nature, whatever they are; my first disobedience is to be impatient at what I am, and to indulge an ambitious aspiration after what I cannot be, to cherish a distrust of my powers, and to desire to change laws which are identical with myself.¹

Lonergan’s works constitute a constant call to understand what my “self” consists in and what these “laws” are that are identical with my very being. He begins, for example, with simple exercises, mathematical problems – puzzles - and he highlights the process of solving such puzzles. There are, first of all, the disparate elements of experience that attract our attention – like the many words Father Lonergan spoke in the classroom or wrote in **Insight**, each one of which I understood individually - but I did not understand how they hung together as a whole. We question our experience: what do these disparate elements mean? How do they hang together? What’s their order? We manipulate them, move them around - at least imaginatively in our minds – until, finally, we have the insight “I’ve got it!” and the pieces begin to fall into place. The structure of our consciousness, the structure of our being is unfolding.

Furthermore, we retrace our steps and ask the further question: “Have I really got it?” “Does this insight really explain all the data?” Or “is this just a bright idea that’s all wrong?” “Was that insight that hit me in the shower so many years ago just an illusion?” And after considering the evidence and reflecting, we make our personal judgment: “That’s it.” or “That’s not it.” And often enough our insights and judgments are about

practical courses of action, about possible decisions within a concrete situation, and so they are followed by questions of value: “Is this course of action worth while?” “Is it worth **my** while?” “Is it valuable?” and eventually we make a judgment of value, a decision and we act.

At first sight, such deciding and acting changes the world of objects around us; but on a deeper and more intimate level such deciding and acting affects ourselves. By our actions we develop the habits that become our character, our “second nature” and as Lonergan puts it, we produce freely and responsibly “the first and only edition of our self.”²

This, then, is the basic process of our consciousness in a nutshell and it embodies what Newman called “the laws under which I live” or “the laws which are identical with myself” and what Lonergan calls “the transcendental precepts:” that is, “Be attentive! Be intelligent! Be reasonable! Be responsible! And if necessary, change!”

And what drives the whole process is our very selves as questioning, as oriented to understanding the world, its truth and its value. The desire to know unfolds into the desire for goodness. Such desires move us toward fuller consciousness and also reveal whether our goals are being reached. Just as the notion of being is both satisfied by understanding and leads to further questions, so the notion of value rewards success in self-transcendence with a happy conscience and saddens failure with an unhappy conscience.³

Such moral development is a long process; indeed, it is life-long. It is one thing to move beyond ourselves to the meaningful, the true and the good in fits and starts. It is another thing to do this regularly, easily, spontaneously. It is only by reaching the sustained self-transcendence of the virtuous person that one becomes a good judge, not only on this or that human act, but on the whole range of human goodness. And throughout this development we are continually stopped with the disenchantment that asks whether what we are doing is truly worthwhile.

That disenchantment brings to light the limitation in every finite achievement, the stain in every flawed perfection, the irony of soaring ambition and faltering performance. It plunges us into the height and depth of love, but it also keeps us aware of how much our loving falls short of its aim. In brief, the transcendental notion of the good so invites, presses, harries us, that we could rest only in an encounter with a goodness completely beyond its powers of criticism.⁴

2. An Ethics of Intelligence and Order

It is important to note that ethics is implicit in virtually all of Lonergan’s writing, for as he notes in **Insight** “ought” flows from “is.” If reality is a certain way, human beings must act accordingly – under pain of self-destruction. If you are not living in the truth and in the real world, if you are living “in your own little world” at odds with the real world, sooner or later the chickens will come home to roost. “What goes around

comes around.” It is a conception not far from the Hindu *dharma*, a basic moral law at the core of the universe that must be obeyed if one wishes to live a full life.

Nevertheless, it is not a moral law “out there;” it is a moral law manifested to us as we grow into meaning, truth and reality in the midst of human community. So it is that because we can understand, we can understand that our basic human desires need to come under some order in order to flourish. The desire for ice cream is good and natural, but so is the desire to know and to bring one’s eating of ice cream into conformity with what one has come to know. Ice cream is good but it is not good all the time and in any amount and without any regard to our health. So also human sexuality is good; it is God-given. But so also is our intelligence that brings sexuality within an order beneficial for the full flourishing of the human family.⁵

Our human desires, then, can only find their fulfillment within the institutional orders or set-ups that communally humans create: whether those institutions be the family, the school, the church, and the worlds of technology, of economics, of politics. This immensely complicated maze of relationships has emerged because, unlike other animals, we have minds that can create these orders for the orderly achievement of the good. The fulfillment of any human desires we have are conditioned by the understanding and created orders that involve other persons. Concretely we can only have ice cream as a result of a tremendous number of interlocking schemes of farmers, manufacturers, truckers, retail stores, etc., etc. that constitute the technological, economic and political good of order.

As appetite wants breakfast, so an economic system is to ensure breakfast every morning. As appetite wants union, so marriage is to ensure life-long union. As appetite wants knowledge, so an educational system ensures the imparting of knowledge to each successive generation.⁶

One dimension then of the ethical is the dimension of intelligible order: the “real” ordered world of interlocking persons and institutions that are beyond our immediate desires and fears and condition the fulfillment of our desires and fears. The smooth functioning of this “good of order” gives rise to an increase in the quality and the standard of living. On the other hand, it is the breakdown of the good of order that is at the source of social and cultural disarray.

The call of being, then, unfolds through the various social and cultural orders that constitute human progress. Thus, for example, even Lonergan’s very erudite writings on the economy and on the flow of money in an exchange economy, published in recent years by the University of Toronto Press, have very definite ethical implications. If an exchange economy has a certain order to it, if it necessarily involves basic and surplus cycles of production that require different activities in different stages – then it is ultimately unethical and self-destructive not to act according to those built-in economic precepts. An economy that at one stage demands savings and thrift, at another stage demands beneficence and egalitarian benevolence so that the benefits of the achieved

surplus can be spread out to all the members of the society. In other words, knowing the actual technical workings of an economy has far-reaching ethical implications.

One dimension of Lonergan's ethics, then, consists in calling attention to the invariant structure of our consciousness as we move beyond our own little worlds into the world of others and the much larger world that philosophically we could call "the world of being." It is a process of self-transcendence and our human authenticity consists in this process of moving from attention to experience to understanding to correct judgment to responsible decision-making. It is a cyclical process as our experiences rooted in situations give rise to questioning, understanding, judging and deciding and such decisions ultimately alter situations to give rise to further experiences, understandings, judgments, decisions, etc.

This process takes place, of course, against the background of human community and human history. Such community and such history consist of much that fosters such ethical self-transcendence but it also consists in much that militates against such self-transcendence. There is the sediment of past selfishness, bias, evil. There is group selfishness and self-centeredness. There is such a thing as human resistance to the light. That resistance can manifest itself in actually doing what is wrong. It can also, even more insidiously, rationalize such wrong-doing philosophically or symbolically. As the ancient saying put it: "Whom the gods destroy they first make blind."

3. *An Ethics of Value*

But beyond the particular good and the good of order, there is the good of value. It is by appealing to value or values that we satisfy some appetites and do not satisfy others, that we approve some systems for achieving the good of order and disapprove of others, that we praise or blame human persons as good or evil and their actions as right or wrong.⁷

Because people disagree on the best good of order, another dimension of the good comes to the fore, and that is the dimension of value. It has been said that while children fight over particular goods, adults fight over the good of order. Which is the best educational system? Which is the best political system? What is the best ordering of family life? Your values, will determine where you fall on such questions. And the values can be terminal values – such as equality, freedom, fairness, etc. – or they can be originating value, that is, you yourself, the person, as either genuinely ordered to growing in goodness or not.

Value, then, is the dynamic principle or notion that keeps us moving toward an ever fuller realization of the good, of what is worthwhile. **Method in Theology** links values to "intentional feelings" such as beauty, goodness, justice, etc. Such feelings constitute "the mass and momentum" of our conscious lives and without them "our knowing and deciding is paper-thin."

Because of our feelings, our desires and our fears, our hope our despair, our joys and sorrows, our enthusiasm and indignation, our esteem and contempt, our trust

and distrust, our love and hatred, our tenderness and wrath, our admiration, veneration, reverence, our dread, horror, terror, we are oriented massively and dynamically in a world mediated by meaning.⁸

Such intentional responses to value can take place according to some interiorized preference scale and Lonergan distinguished vital, social, cultural and personal values. It is a schema that can be found in what St. Augustine called the “*ordo amoris*,” the order of our loves, and it was developed in the twentieth century by the phenomenological philosophers, Max Scheler and Dietrich von Hildebrand.⁹ Thus, each level builds on the prior level and is, one might say, a more subtle level that transforms the underlying level. Social values can be preferred to vital values and bring lower values to “a higher key” as it were: such as when a mother maintains her health in order to pour out her energies for her children. And cultural values, such as truth and meaning and beauty, can “sublate” social values as when one prefers truth to reputation. Personal value is the person herself, as loving and being loved, as an originator of values in herself and in her milieu, and as an inspiration to others to do likewise. Finally religious values are at the heart of human living in the world.

Such feelings can be merely transitory and fleeting. But they can also be so deep and strong that “they channel attention, shape one’s horizon, direct one’s life.”¹⁰ Here the supreme example is the loving. So also feelings of resentment over another’s superior qualities can lead to despair over one’s own qualities and the consequent distortion of one’s whole scale of values. And such negative assessments can be adopted by others in a group and spread throughout a whole society in feelings of racism, prejudice and discrimination.

Such feelings, then, though initially spontaneous, can develop through conscious advertence and approval or they can be curtailed by disapproval and distraction. The result can be a change in our spontaneous scale of preferences. This has implications for education.

Again, feelings are enriched and refined by attentive study of the wealth and variety of the objects that arouse them, and so no small part of education lies in fostering and developing a climate of discernment and taste, of discriminating praise and carefully worded disapproval, that will conspire with the pupil’s or student’s own capacities and tendencies, enlarge and deepen his apprehension of values, and help him towards self-transcendence.¹¹

In other words, the stories we tell children, the literature they read, the models and heroes that are set out for them can have no small influence on their moral apprehension and development.

4. Ethics as Dialectical

One dimension of the ethical, then, is what Lonergan calls the dialectical. That is, the call to ethical living takes place within the context of community and history, the

arena of intelligent progress and senseless, unintelligible decline. History is constituted not only by the element of progress but also by the misshapen inequalities and absurdities of decline. This conflict is concrete, taking place in each of our lives within the context of relationships with other people in history. As Lonergan puts it,

...continuous growth seems to be rare. There are the deviations occasioned by neurotic need. There are the refusals to keep on taking the plunge from settled routines to an as yet unexperienced but richer mode of living. There are the mistaken endeavors to quiet an uneasy conscience by ignoring, belittling, denying, rejecting higher values. Preference scales become distorted. Feelings soured. Bias creeps into one's outlook, rationalization into one's morals, ideology into one's thought. So one may come to hate the truly good, and love the really evil. Nor is that calamity limited to individuals. It can happen to groups, to nations, to blocks of nations, to mankind. It can take different, opposed, belligerent forms to divide mankind and to menace civilization with destruction. Such is the monster that has stood forth in our day.¹²

Here there is need for “a leap,” not beyond reason but to reason, and that leap takes place in the midst of community and history where “ignorant armies clash by night.”¹³ It is in the midst of such interpersonal battles that we are converted. It is in the midst of our relationships and our ongoing conversations with other people that our very being is challenged to move out the darkness into the light. That is, out of the darkness of inattention, stupidity, error, irresponsibility into the light of truth and righteousness. In **Method in Theology** Lonergan expresses this dimension of ethical transformation when he describes personal “encounter” as “meeting persons, appreciating the values they represent, criticizing their defects, and allowing one's living to be challenged at its very roots by their words and by their deeds.”¹⁴

In other words, two people can talk about a particular value, “freedom” for example, but the differences in what each means by freedom can come from two quite distinct personal **horizons**. One person can be talking out of a life of continuing sacrifice for the good of others; another can be talking out of a quite self-centered and even narcissistic perspective. One's moral horizon, one's moral development, makes all the difference in the world.

For Lonergan such personal horizons can change developmentally, by broadening, for example. But they can also change vertically as one undergoes a conversion from approaching life in one way to approaching life in a whole new way. There are four basic conversions – corresponding to the levels of our being: affective, intellectual, moral and religious. Affective conversion opens one up to one's symbolic and affective life and is a key beginning to self-appropriation. Intellectual conversion is very rare: it could be said to be the focal point of all Lonergan's work: that is, moving from thinking of reality as just the object of what we see and imagine to thinking of reality in terms of what we come to understand and judge to be true. It is what I

struggled with in Rome in the 1960s. Moral conversion is the quite deliberate decision to cease living on the basis of desires and fears and to begin to live on the basis of values – even if that costs us. Finally, religious conversion is the move to loving God with all our hearts and souls and minds, and in that, realizing that God indeed loves us.

5. The “critical point” in ethical development

According to Lonergan, there is a critical point in the increasing autonomy of the developing person. It is reached when the subject finds out for himself that it is up to himself to decide what he is to make of himself. It is the realization that moral decisions affect not only objects in the world but also the self I am going to become.¹⁵

This certainly describes the crisis of adolescence and young adulthood in which one discovers that one has to make up one’s own mind and not simply depend on what one has been taught since childhood. One has to discover oneself and one’s own autonomy and one’s own deed. This is a naturally disorienting period and one of the values of education is precisely to help young people to become themselves – that is, their best selves – and to help them come to a real apprehension of the human good in all its dimensions.

And what is meant by real apprehension? It involves, first, ascending from the particular goods that they know to the good of order that they can see within and conditioning those particular goods; next, going from that order to the notion of value, which they can see by comparing different orders. Education moves up from what is most easily apprehended to what is more subtle. And it includes some apprehension of the dimensions of choice, of the fact and significance of autonomy....¹⁶

Such a real apprehension need not be philosophic or theoretical. It can be symbolic, that is, expressed through good literature – or a good liberal arts or general education. The affective ideals of a culture are usually not philosophically expressed. They are exemplified in “the good person” of the Greeks, or the *oumo universale* of the Renaissance, “the gentleman” of nineteenth-century England, and so on.

And here, I think is relevant Whitehead’s remark that moral education is impossible without the constant vision of greatness. Moral education communicates that vision in unnoticed ways. The vision gathers the way dust gathers, not through any massive action but through the continuous addition of particles that remain.¹⁷

Lonergan often speaks of the ethical as the opposite of drifting, of autonomy disposing of itself, of open-eyed, deliberate self-control. But at one point he adds a most important caveat.

But I must not misrepresent. We do not know ourselves very well; we cannot chart the future; we cannot control our environment completely or the influences

that work on us; we cannot explore our unconscious and preconscious mechanisms. Our course is in the night; our control only rough and approximate; we have to believe and trust to risk and dare.

In this life the critical point is never transcended. It is one thing to decide what one is to make of oneself; a Catholic, a religious, a Jesuit, a priest. It is another to execute the decision. Today's resolutions do not predetermine the free choice of tomorrow, of next week, or next year, or ten years from now. What has been achieved is always precarious: it can slip, fall shatter. What is to be achieved can be ever expanding, deepening. To meet one challenge is to effect a development that reveals a further and graver challenge.¹⁸

6. An ethics of "call" or vocation

The notion of value, that universal principle of appraisal and criticism, gives rise to instances of the good, and those instances are good choices and good actions. But, Lonergan adds, "do not ask me what they are, for their determination in each case is the work of the free and responsible subject producing the first and only edition of himself."

It is because the determination of the good is the work of freedom that ethical systems can catalogue sins in almost endless genera and species yet always remain rather vague about the good. They urge us to do good as well as to avoid evil, but what it is to do good does not get much beyond the golden rule, the precept of universal charity, and the like.

Still the shortcomings of system are not an irremediable defect. We come to know the good from the example of those about us, from the stories people tell of the good and evil men and women of old, from the incessant flow of praise and blame that makes up the great part of human conversation, from the elation and shame that fill us when our own choices and deeds are our own determination of ourselves as good or evil, praiseworthy or blameworthy.¹⁹

Lonergan once used a very strange philosophical phrase to speak of "being," of all that is; he used the phrase "the passionateness of being."²⁰ And my interpretation of what he meant by that is that all that is and all that we are heading for can engage the deepest desires and passions of our being. In fact, in one of his early writings he noted that all desire, even sexual desire, is ultimately desire for God.²¹ All the questioning that is within us and all the way that questioning unfolds as it seeks meaning and truth and reality and goodness and beauty can ultimately be understood as the "call" of being to us. On a religious level St. John wrote, "It is not you who have called me, but I have called you and I have chosen you to go forth and to bear much fruit." (John 15, 16)

How does that happen? How does that call of being, take place in us? How does each of us find our "vocation?" Well, we find it through the concrete world that is, that is, the natural world and the concrete network of human relationships in which we are

enmeshed. Ethics, then, in Lonergan is not primarily a series of do's and don'ts, a catalogue of laws. For Lonergan ethics concerns first of all the passionate search to live in the truth and in the real world that is and at the same time it is the passionate call of the true, the real and the good on our whole being.

One can conveniently distinguish between an ethics of law and an ethics of achievement. While an ethics of law regards rules of conduct – don't do this, don't do that – an ethics of achievement reveals that there is a world and that there is something for me to do in it. It includes the idea of vocation, not simply in the sense in which we use the word “priest” but also in a general sense, and of development in the apprehension of the good. An ethics of achievement is more positive than an ethics of law.²²

Morality and ethics, then, can be looked at in a very individualistic way – and ‘being oneself’ is eminently personal. Nevertheless, that personal element takes place within the call of reality, including the reality of the human community in history. The “call” comes to us within the network of real historical relationships of family and friends and co-workers and students, and the wider framework of human history. This is symbolized by “the breaking of the bread,” that is, by the formal and informal liturgies of life.

It is important to put words on this “world of being” from which the call to responsibility comes to us. Jesus called it the coming “Kingdom of God.” In **Insight** Lonergan called it “cosmopolis,” a heuristic term, an unknown “x” that signifies the ideal community that beckons us and that we all long for.

What is necessary is a cosmopolis that is neither class nor state, that stands above all their claims, that cuts them down to size, that is founded on the native detachment and disinterestedness of every intelligence, that commands man's first allegiance, that is too universal to be bribed, too impalpable to be forced, too effective to be ignored.²³

7. Conclusion: The Ethical and the Religious

On several occasions Lonergan called attention to the parallel between his own categories of the experiential, the good of order and value and Kierkegaard's three spheres of existence: the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. The aesthetic sphere, symbolized by the character of Don Juan, is focused on pleasures and satisfactions. Paradoxically, the more one seeks happiness within this horizon, the less happy one becomes. It is only through a deep personal transformation, accompanied by existential *angst*, that one is able to make the leap to the ethical sphere that demands a correspondence between one's reason and one's behavior. Finally, it is only through realizing one's ethical powerlessness that one turns in faith to the religious level and takes one's stand before God in history. In his comments on Kierkegaard Lonergan called attention to the incommensurability of these spheres.

A person moves from one sphere to another only by a leap. In other words, when

a person is within a given sphere of existential subjectivity, as Kierkegaard would put it, or within a given horizon, to use the terminology we developed earlier, then it is not by arguing from that sphere that one will bring him to another sphere. That sphere becomes a closed system, and a person has to be dynamited out of it.²⁴

Or as he once put it in a discussion, “How do we get converted? Concretely, we get converted by getting kicked around.” So the chapter on ethics in **Insight** ends with a consideration of moral impotence: our inability for sustained development and our unwillingness to do what we ought to do. This sets up the question of God’s solution for our human predicament, that is, the level of religion – for Christians, the level of the grace of Christ. Or, as he puts it elsewhere, even though on the level of explanation he would prefer to explain intellectual conversion first, then moral conversion and finally religious conversion, in fact, causally, it is the other way around.

...(F)rom a causal viewpoint, one would say that first there is God's gift of his love. Next, the eye of this love reveals values in their splendor, while the strength of this love brings about their realization, and that is moral conversion. Finally, among the values discerned by the eye of love is the value of believing the truths taught by the religious tradition, and in such tradition and belief are the seeds of intellectual conversion.²⁵

Elsewhere he describes the “critical moment” in the emergence of moral awareness as implying this religious question.

One's judgments of value are revealed as the door to one's fulfillment or to one's loss. Experience, especially repeated experience, of one's frailty or wickedness raises the question of one's salvation and, on a more fundamental level, there arises the question of God.²⁶

Thus, the need for moral conversion can imply a need for religious conversion. The developing subject can reach the point of choosing a supreme value that entails all other values.

...at the summit of the ascent from the initial infantile bundle of needs and clamors and gratifications, there are to be found the deep-set joy and solid peace, the power and the vigor, of being in love with God. In the measure that that summit is reached, then the supreme value is God, and other values are God's expression of his love in this world, in its aspirations, and in its goal. In the measure that one's love of God is complete, then values are whatever one loves, and evils are whatever one hates so that, in Augustine's phrase, if one loves God, one may do as one pleases, *Ama Deum et fac quod vis*. Then affectivity is of a single piece. Further developments only fill out previous achievement. Lapses from grace are rarer and more quickly amended.²⁷

So in Bernard Lonergan’s work the ethical, as it completes the intellectual and is the foundation for human progress, so also, through the pathways of human decline, it opens up to the religious. “Out of the depths I have cried to you, O Lord, O Lord hear my voice!” And the religious in Lonergan is the realm of grace – of “healing grace” that

providentially works through world process to soften our hard hearts and enables us to do what previously we did not want to do; and “elevating grace” that unites us with the divine Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

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- ¹ John Henry Newman, **A Grammar of Assent** (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913)384.
- ² **A Second Collection: Papers by Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J.** (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 83.
- ³ **Method in Theology** (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 35.
- ⁴ **Method in Theology**, 36.
- ⁵ **Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 3** (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992) 210: "Sex, finally, is manifestly biological yet not merely so. On this point man can be so insistent that, within the context of human living, sex becomes a great mystery, shrouded in the delicacy of indirect speech, enveloped in an aura of romantic idealism, enshrined in the sanctity of the home."
- ⁶ **A Second Collection**, 81.
- ⁷ **A Second Collection**, 81-82.
- ⁸ **Method in Theology** (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990) 31.
- ⁹ Cf. Dietrich von Hildebrand, **Christian Ethics** (New York: David McKay, 1953). Also Manfred Frings, **Max Scheler** (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965).
- ¹⁰ **Method in Theology**, 31.
- ¹¹ **Method in Theology**, 32.
- ¹² **Method in Theology**, 39-40.
- ¹³ Matthew Arnold, "Dover Beach." On ethics in the midst of the "exchanges" of life, cf. Rosemary Haughton, **The Passionate God** (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1981).
- ¹⁴ **Method in Theology**, 247.
- ¹⁵ **Collection: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 4** (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988) 242.
- ¹⁶ **Topics in Education**, 102.
- ¹⁷ **Topics in Education**, 102.
- ¹⁸ **Collection**, 241-242.
- ¹⁹ **A Second Collection**, 83.
- ²⁰ **A Third Collection** (NY: Paulist Press, 1985) 29.
- ²¹ **Collection**, 31-32 and 49: "The sexual extravagance of man, unparalleled in the animals, has its ultimate ground in St. Augustine's "Thou hast made us for thyself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee."
- ²² **Topics in Education: Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 10** (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) 106.
- ²³ **Insight**, 263.
- ²⁴ **Topics in Education**, 179.
- ²⁵ **Method in Theology**, 243.
- ²⁶ **Method in Theology**, 38-39.
- ²⁷ **Method in Theology**, 39.