CHAPTER FOUR Synthesis, Apperception And The Opacity Of Consciousness: A Nietzschean Reading Of Kant’s A Deduction And Prelude To A Theoretical Account Of The Relation Between The Two Systems Of Reason

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“How far the perspective character of existence extends or indeed whether existence has any other character than this; whether existence without interpretation, without “sense,” does not become “nonsense”; whether, on the other hand, all existence is not essentially actively engaged in interpretation – that cannot be decided even by the most industrious and most scrupulously conscientious analysis and self-examination of the intellect; for in the course of this analysis the human intellect cannot avoid seeing itself in its own perspectives, and only in these.” (FW, KSA, 3, aphorism 374.)

CHAPTER FOUR

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Section One: Interpretive Approach

In the first and fourth speeches of *Zarathustra* titled "Three Metamorphoses of the Spirit" and “The Despisers Of The Body,” Nietzsche articulates his own views on themes central to Kant’s theoretical philosophy. The goal of this chapter is to present a faithful reading of Kant’s A deduction, and this reading will serve as the basis of my effort to show that and how these themes are related to Nietzsche’s views on theoretical reason. Specifically, the conception of reason that Kant articulates in his discussion of the A deduction of the categories will contribute significantly to the theoretical basis of my account of the concept of “spirit” or “little reason” that Nietzsche presents in the first and fourth speeches of *Zarathustra*. The overarching hypothesis of my interpretation is 1) that
while the deductions may perhaps provide formal logical proofs, there are certain disadvantages inherent in any approach that treats them exclusively as such, and 2) that research on the deductions would benefit from a broader interpretive approach. The approach proposed here, which resembles archeology or dissection, is motivated by what Kant himself says about his project in general and about the deductions. Additionally, it is motivated by the Platonic view of dialectic discussed in the introduction and by Nietzsche’s claim that reason is an instrument of the body. The interpretation offered here is therefore guided by the fact that Kant begins with reason and experience as we know them and the revolutionary assumption that our knowledge determines the objects of our experience. This interpretation assumes that Kant is attempting to "explain," from the perspective of this starting point, the role that the categories play in reason and experience. This approach, which is in keeping with Nietzsche's claim that reason is an

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1 This chapter is a version of a longer paper that I submitted to Professor Volker Gerhardt at the Humboldt University in Berlin as a chapter of my dissertation in the first week of May 2002.
2 I read the deductions, not merely as arguments, but also as explanations, a view I first encountered in Ottfried Höffe, *Immanuel Kant*. In A 85, Kant says that transcendental deduction is 'the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects a priori.' Explanation is a very different undertaking than logical proof or demonstration, and unless one minds the distinction, one may be led into misguided interpretations and assessments of the deductions. In section I of his essay titled *The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*, Paul Guyer mistakenly concludes from the description that Kant gives of the deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding in A xvi that Kant uses the word 'deduction' to mean argument, and thus in his closing remarks he mistakenly concludes that 'formally speaking, the deduction, which Kant describes in Axvi as 'investigation' and defines in A 85 as 'explanation,' is a failure' by virtue of not having provided a formal proof or argument. There are many and good reasons to think that the logical proof research paradigm is too narrow and that it does not allow us to mine all of the riches buried in Kant’s deductions. In B 87, the beginning of section IV of part II of *The Transcendental Doctrine Of The Elements*, Kant suggests that the logic of transcendental logic is the logic, not of formal proof, but of excavation. He says that in transcendental logic we 'isolate' the understanding, and that we isolate it from the cognition of the manifold in which the understanding is con-fused with a host of other mental content. In fact, Kant’s word choice suggests that he thinks of the understanding as being buried in the cognition of the manifold, i.e. in the whole of experience, and that the task of the deduction is like that of excavating a single though very significant artifact from a very rich archeological site. Kant says ['wir] *heben bloß den Teil des Denkens aus unserm Erkenntnisse heraus, der ledlich seinem Ursprung in dem Verstand hat.*' (Kritik) The primary meaning of the verb *herausheben*, which is, sadly, often translated as ‘to elevate’, is ‘to lift (something) out (from something else)’, and in the present case it means to lift the understanding out from the broader context that is the cognition of the manifold in order to discern the role that the understanding plays in the cognition of the manifold and its production.
instrument of the body, entails an overall strategy, namely to identify not merely the
total logical arguments that Kant employs in support of the claims he makes but also
the various component parts that he articulates in setting forth his account of theoretical
reason. Once these parts are identified, the next step is to examine them with an eye to
discerning how they fit and work together as a whole. In general, the interpretation
offered here makes no claims about the formal/logical aspects of the deductions because
this subject is already well covered in the scholarship on Kant and because it is the
structure of reason as Kant articulates it, and not so much the arguments Kant allegedly
puts forward in defense of his claims about this structure, that must be brought into relief
in order to show how his views relate to those of Nietzsche’s.

Apart from this interpretive approach, the overall treatment of Kant’s theoretical
philosophy is related to the deductions primarily by virtue of its discussion of
apperception or consciousness, for the evidence suggests that Nietzsche builds his views
regarding the spirit, i.e. little reason, and its relation to body and life upon Kant’s concept
of the understanding and his concept of the role that consciousness plays therein. As we
shall see, the great reason of the body influences the understanding through its effects on
the inner sense, these effects prompt the I to unconsciously cognize itself in terms of
these effects, and the I’s cognition of itself is at the same time a valuation of all of its
values. The soul then binds the I to this valuation of values, thereby giving the rule to the
understanding and its entire use, and since the cognition by means of which this valuation
of values is determined, namely the I’s cognition of itself, is an empirical cognition, this
cognition therefore assumes 1) the understanding, 2) all of its categories, and 3) the entire

See Za I, KSA, 4, “Von den Verächtern des Leibes.”
cognition of the manifold; for the \textit{I}, or \textbf{I think}, is a \textit{pure} representation that comes into being when the manifold in a given intuition is synthesized into a unity of rule according to the categories and brought before the apperception, which responds with the representation, \textbf{I think}, and this representation provides the cognition of the manifold with its objective unity. The representations or cognitions – which would be better termed \textit{perceptual values} - that the understanding produces via synthesis of the manifold are valued in this or that way according to the \textit{I}’s cognition of itself, and the same is true of our extra-perceptual values. It is Kant himself who provides the motivation for treating his system of reason as involving such a valuation, for he says in the preface to the second edition of his first \textit{Critique} that he had to “deny knowledge in order to make room for faith; and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice that without criticism reason can make progress in metaphysics, is the true source of all unbelief conflicting with morality, which unbelief is always very dogmatic.” Nietzsche is thunderstruck by this passage because it shows that “a cultural lack drove Kant” to write the first \textit{Critique}. As we saw in the previous chapter, Nietzsche was much concerned with the influence of the historical moment on reason, and Nietzsche’s discussion of intellectual conscience proved to be a critique of Kant’s moral philosophy. That his concern with this theme involved the Kantian conception of reason will become even more evident in subsequent chapters where it will be shown that Nietzsche routinely sought to exposes the influence that the historical moment, i.e. Kant’s sense of lack, had on the Kantian conception of reason.

However, Nietzsche does not undertake this task directly, i.e. by providing a systematic reading of Kant’s deductions so as to show how the historical moment
influences his concept of reason, so I provide a reading of the deductions in the interest of making possible a clear interpretation of Nietzsche’s views on the relation between the two systems of reason as they relate to Kant’s theoretical philosophy. I have chosen to use the A deduction because Kant’s concept of consciousness and the claim that it may not be transparent to itself in the cognition of the manifold - two ideas that are of central importance to Nietzsche’s views on the relation between little reason and the great reason of the body - are especially clear in the A deduction even though they play equally important roles in both deductions.

I offer a particularly detailed interpretation of this deduction, and I do so in order to lay the foundation for Nietzsche’s conception of reason as a faculty that produces a manifold of perceptual values, i.e. experience, which are capable of being valued in various ways. This interpretation marks an important step in the conceptualization of Nietzsche’s proposed revaluation of all values because it shows both that and how the Kantian conception of reason, according to which reason determines the objects of our experience that are thought to be representations of things in themselves, lends itself to Nietzsche’s concept of “little reason” as a faculty that produces, not objects of experience that are thought to be representations of things in themselves – even if these representations are such only to the extent that they are grounded in things in themselves, but rather a manifold of perceptual values that serve as conditions of life and that we value in different ways in response to changeable life conditions.

Nietzsche’s view is that in an earlier stage of our development, i.e. under earlier life and very different life conditions, we valued all of our values, and therefore our perceptual values, not as our own values, but rather simply as things existing outside and
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independently of ourselves, and we can think of this valuation as the pre-Kantian valuation of perceptual values. At a later stage of our development and under new life conditions, we value our values as being determined by our own human reason, i.e. by our a priori intuitions and categories, but as providing representations of things in themselves, and this is the Kantian valuation of our perceptual values. According to Nietzsche’s revaluation of our perceptual values, our perceptual values are, apart from our valuations of them, something that we ourselves produce. These values serve as conditions of our own human form of life in much the same way that a tree’s leaves are something that the tree itself produces and uses to cultivate its own form of life. As for our valuations of our perceptual values, these too are something that we ourselves create and posit. However, unlike our perceptual values themselves, i.e. unlike our perceptual values apart from our valuations of them, our valuations of our perceptual values are in each case something that we ourselves create and posit in response to changeable and accidental life conditions. Moreover, we do this in much the same way that a tree produces or sheds its leaves in response to changeable life conditions, and our valuations of these values serve to cultivate life under these changeable life conditions. The reading of Kant’s A deduction presented in this chapter is needed in order to show that Kant’s theoretical philosophy serves as an appropriate basis for Nietzsche’s conception of reason as a faculty that produces, not representations of things in themselves, but merely a manifold of perceptual values that are capable of being valued in various ways.

4 I want to stress that nothing is lost by constructing this foundation in terms of the A deduction. I have worked out a reading of the second deduction that is entirely consistent with my reading of the first deduction, and although the second deduction contains a few more themes than the first, my reading of the A deduction incorporates the most important of these additional themes.
Again, Kant’s theoretical philosophy is motivated by a revolutionary assumption. While metaphysics up to Kant’s time assumed that experience and knowledge conform to the objects that we experience and know, the *Critique Of Pure Reason* assumes that the objects that we experience and know conform to our own *a priori* knowledge. One of the chief elements of this *a priori* knowledge is the synthetic unity of apperception, which is the supreme principle of all use of the understanding, and this apperception is the consciousness that is represented in experience by the *I think*. It is with this consciousness, its curiously opaque nature, and the role that it plays in the production of the cognition of the manifold, i.e. in experience, that Nietzsche is, to a significant extent, concerned in the first and fourth speeches. My chief goals in this chapter will be 1) to explain the role played by consciousness, or original apperception, in the production of the cognition of the manifold, and 2) to explain the opacity of that consciousness.

**Section Two:**

**Sense and Intuition**

In Kant’s view, we have no immediate access to objects in the sense of things-in-themselves, for things in themselves presumably exist independently of the mind while all that the mind has of things in themselves are effects, which Kant calls sensations. These sensations are caused by things in themselves and they appear on the mind’s capacity for receiving representations, which Kant calls sensibility, where they are acquired and relatively undetermined mental contents.\(^5\) In so much as they are the effects

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\(^5\) Nietzsche is very critical of Kant’s notion of things-in-themselves, but he does think that we use the categories to organize something like the effects that Kant employs in his discussion of sense and intuition. As Leslie Paul Thiele points out in his *Friedrich Nietzsche And The Politics Of The Soul: A Study Of Heroic Individualism*, Nietzsche says in his *Daybreak*, aphorism 73, “… there is … no path into the real world! We sit within our net, we spiders, and whatever we may catch in it, we can catch nothing at all except that which allows itself to be caught in precisely our net.” The point is that reality is simply our reality, and that we go astray when we think that reality is
of things in themselves on a mental faculty, sensations undoubtedly have their source in things in themselves and are thus acquired. However, in so much as they are effects on a mental faculty, sensations are mere determinations of the mind, i.e. they amount to nothing more than a manifold of mental content. Sensations are relatively undetermined mental contents because although they are determined in so much as they are effects on a mental faculty, namely sensation, and are therefore determinations of that faculty, they are also undetermined in so much as the mind is yet to further assimilate them, i.e. organize and process them according to the mind’s other principles and faculties. As determinations of the mind acquired through sensation, sensations may well be utterly unlike things in themselves, just as the carbohydrates that a plant photosynthesizes are very unlike the solar energy, carbon dioxide and water that the plant synthesizes in order to produce these carbohydrates.

Given that they appear on the faculty of receptivity, sensations are referred to one or both of two mental principles, namely outer sense and inner sense. The form of outer sense is the pure a priori intuition of space. Sensations that are referred to outer sense are made to take on the form of space. They are subsequently represented as outside us and as in space, and this makes it possible for these sensations to be represented as standing in spatial relations. The form of inner sense is the pure a priori intuition of time, and

something that exists over against our experience. The way that we experience the world is real by virtue of its relation to life, i.e. by virtue of the fact that it is a condition of our own human form of life. The very notion of an absolutely objective world is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of our perceptual values in which we think that they are supposed to represent some absolute and objective truth or reality. In fact their purpose is to facilitate life just as the purpose of the spider’s web is to facilitate the spider’s life. As for the idea that things in themselves cause the effects that appear on our capacity for receiving these effects, it is based on Kant’s claim that what we have of things in themselves are their effects. Beyond Kant’s terminology and his insistence that sensibility is passive, I am not particularly committed to a causal account/reading of the material that serves as the empirical, i.e non-apriori, basis of cognition. What is important to my reading is the idea that the understanding is active in the production of the cognition of the manifold, i.e. the idea that the understanding actively synthesizes the manifold.
sensations that are referred to this principle are represented as in us, and they are thus made to take on the form of time. This form makes it possible for sensations to be represented as in time and thus as standing in temporal relations. But all sensations, whether they are referred to inner or to outer sense, are made to take on the form of time, while some of these sensations, those referred to outer sense, are made to take on the forms of both space and time. Sensations that have been given the form of intuition are called appearances, but appearances, like sensations, are still no more than relatively undetermined mental contents; for while appearances are determined in so much as they have been made to take on the form of intuition, they are yet undetermined in so much as the understanding is yet to process them.

Thus sensation and intuition provide the mind with nothing but a manifold of relatively undetermined mental content. In fact, Kant says that mere intuition provides, when compared to experience as we know it, nothing but a chaotic mass of mental content, "a blind play of representations, i.e. less than a dream." Yet our experience as a whole is always a thoroughly unified and objective experience, and one of the chief characteristics of our experience of discrete objects is that we experience them as though they were a unified manifold of appearances bound together in an object. But this raises an important question, namely how can we account for the objective unity of appearances in experience as a whole or for the fact that our experience of individual things seems to be experience of objects if we have no immediate access to either the totality of things-in-themselves or to individual things-in-themselves?

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6 First Critique, A112.
Section Three:

The Problem of Objective Unity

In Kant’s view, while the concept of an object is the objective foundation of each of the objects comprising my experience, this concept does not come from things in themselves, nor again does the objectivity of experience as a whole come from the totality of things-in-themselves. In the case of an individual object of experience, for example, the unity of a thing, which we think in terms of the concept of an object, most certainly does not come to us from the thing in itself – say, by providing the understanding with empirical data from which it derives the concept of an object. Kant makes it very clear that intuition provides the understanding with no more than a mere manifold of appearances, a mere synopsis of them, and that these appearances are mere determinations of the mind. As mere determinations of the mind, these appearances are merely subjective; so this manifold provides, in and of itself, neither objects of experience as we know them nor perceptions. In fact, in and of itself, this manifold does not even provide anything of which we are conscious. So from whence comes objective unity?

Kant thinks that the concept of an object is a transcendental content and that the understanding brings this content to the manifold of appearance given in intuition. The concept of an object is a thoroughly formal unity, and as such it is nothing more or other than my singular consciousness of 1) the act of synthesis of apprehension in which the categories of the understanding are identified with the manifold given in intuition, 2) the unity of rule in which this act of synthesis results, 3) the reproduction of this unity of rule in the imagination, 4) the identification of this reproduction with the unity of rule it
reproduces, 5) the identification of the objective unity of this consciousness with unity of rule, and 6) the explicit identification of concepts with the manifold of appearances in representations as in such judgments as 'This is a cube.' The act of synthesis of apprehension is an act by means of which I first run through and unify, according to the categories, the manifold of appearances that are given in intuition, and this synthetic unity of the manifold according to the categories, which Kant calls unity of rule, is then reproduced in the imagination.

This is a crucial point in Kant’s A Deduction. It is simply because 1) this singular consciousness provides objective unity for the unity of rule and because 2) it does so simply by having unity of rule as its object and because 3) objective unity is nothing more or other than the form of this consciousness that 4) experience, weather it be experience as a whole or experience of individual objects, is objective. It is because of 1, 2, and 3 that we experience the totality of appearances as an objectively unified whole and that we experience smaller bundles of appearances as a unity of appearances inhering in an object. It is nothing but the form of this singular, self-identical consciousness that provides both the objective unity of experience as a whole and the objective unity of individual things that we think in the general concept of an object = X.  

The objective unity of the whole of experience and the general concept of an object are not to be confused or conflated with the concepts of the understanding, i.e. the categories, even though the categories play an all important roll in the synthesis through

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7 In numbering these conditions, I do not mean to claim that they comprise the definitive sufficient condition for objective unity. The numbers serve merely the presentational function of setting various points apart for the sake of clarity.
8 As I show in my dissertation, Nietzsche's view entails that apperception is common to both the soul and to the understanding, and his view entails that just as the apperception provides the objective unity for the unity of rule that is produced by a synthesis that is brought about by the
which this unity is brought about in the manifold given in intuition. In fact, objective unity is impossible without the unity that synthesis of apprehension brings about in the manifold by creating therein a unity (of rule) according to categories. It is the categories that steer and determine the synthesis so as to bring about a unity of rule in the manifold, and this unity of rule is a unity that they alone determine. Furthermore, it is only in and through unity of rule that the objective unity of consciousness can be brought about in the manifold. Nevertheless, by itself this unity of rule is, in effect, no more than a unity of a manifold of mere determinations of the mind according to merely subjective, even if \textit{a priori}, concepts, i.e. the categories, for unity of rule alone does \textit{not} provide the kind of unity required in order for experience and thought as we know them to be possible.

Experience as we know it exhibits a necessary and objective unity, and thought as we know it requires this objective and necessary unity. The necessity of this objective unity becomes evident in the process of excavation. In this process, certain aspects of our experience, for example the nature of the \textit{empirical imagination}, are considered in light of the fact that intuition alone provides us with no more than a manifold of mere determinations of the mind, and they are considered in this way in order to discern what role the understanding plays in determining the objects of our experience.

\textbf{Section Four:}

\textbf{Synthesis, Objective Unity, and the Empirical Imagination}

In A 101, Kant observes that the empirical imagination is only possible if experience provides us with objects that are always identical to themselves and thus, we might say, with objects that obey the law $A = A$ (where $A$ is any given object). It is only understanding, so also does the apperception provide "objective" unity for a valuation of values that is produced by means of a synthesis brought about by the soul.
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because objects obey this law that the empirical law of association, which Kant also calls the empirical law of reproduction, is possible. It is in accordance with this associative-reproductive law, which governs the empirical imagination, that 1) representations that follow or accompany one another are subsequently connected in such a way that one representation brings to mind, i.e. leads to the associative reproduction of, those representations with which it has been associatively connected in the empirical imagination, and that 2) this associative reproduction occurs even when the object, i.e. the thing in itself, is not present to the mind.9

Take, for example, the representation that is the piece of wax on my desk. Whenever I look at it and reflect on the perception to which it gives rise, I am aware of its shape, its size, and its opaque bluish hue; and whenever I think about this piece of wax when I am away from my desk, these of its component representations are brought to mind. Why should this be so? After all, whether I am looking at the piece of wax or thinking about it, what I have immediately before me is, not a thing in itself in which shape, size, and color are all bound together, but only a manifold of appearances that are mere determinations of my mind. In other words, I have no access to the thing as it is in itself, but only to its effects on my faculty of sensibility, i.e. to sensations, which in intuition have become a manifold of appearances, and even these appearances, though they have the form of intuition, are, in and of themselves, still nothing but determinations

9 In chapter one of his Critical Philosophy Gilles Deleuze says of synthesis that it consists in 1.) the posing of a diversity as contained in a representation, and 2.) that synthesis has two aspects. While 1 is wonderfully concise, synthesis consists in far more than the posing of a diversity as contained in a representation and is therefore not well served by this formulation. Far more problematic, however, is his treatment of the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction as two aspects of one and the same synthesis. While theses two syntheses are indeed inseparable, they are not two aspects of one and the same synthesis. What is singular is consciousness, but the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction are two and distinct from each other, and I illustrate this point in section ten.
of my mind and thus relatively undetermined mental contents. How, then, does it come to pass that these mere determinations of the mind are processed in such a way that when I look at or even merely think about an object of experience, say the piece of wax on my desk, I always see or think its shape, size, bluish hue, and so on?

This question remains even if we take into account the synthesis of apprehension and the unity of rule in which it results. For though this initial synthesis may result in a unity of rule in the manifold given in intuition, this synthesis does not by itself guarantee that the unity of rule that it produces will not dissolve into disunity and that the various component representations comprising the complex representation that is the piece of wax on my desk will not drift apart from each other and thereby render impossible the empirical imagination as we know it. Thus, unity of rule alone is still little more than a determination of my mind, and as such it is, in itself, by no means the cognition of the manifold, i.e. it is by no means objective experience, for it is merely a unity of the manifold according to concepts, and it therefore lacks the objective unity characteristic of experience as we know it. But, again, this objective unity cannot come to us from the things in themselves, so from whence comes this objective unity?

Consider, once more, the piece of wax on my desk. Since the unity of the component representations comprising the representation that is the piece of wax does not come from the thing in itself, it must therefore somehow come from the mind. In Kant’s view, the component representations or appearances, call them a, b, c, and so on, comprising the representation ‘the piece of wax on my desk’ have undergone, together with the other appearances in intuition, a synthesis of apprehension according to concepts and have thus been drawn into a unity of rule. However, Kant thinks that this unity of
rule must be further synthesized in such a way that the appearances that it synthesizes always hang together so as to yield, not discrete objects in which a manifold of appearances are ordered merely in some way or another, but rather discrete objects in which a manifold of appearances are so ordered that these objects and their component representations always obey the law $A = A$, where $A$ is a representation composed of component representations, $a$, $b$, $c$, … that stand in determinate relations to one another. Kant calls this further synthesis the *synthesis of reproduction*.

It is, thinks Kant, this further synthesis of reproduction that accounts for and makes possible the empirical law of association. If the manifold of representations comprising a given synthesis-of-apprehension-produced representation, say $A$, i.e. the piece of wax on my desk, were not organized according to and bound together by a further synthesis of reproduction, then there would be nothing preventing one or more of the component representations, say $a =$ the bluish color of the piece of wax, from breaking away from the complex of component representation and thus ceasing to be one of the properties, or component representations, of the piece of wax on my desk. This component color representation is nothing more than a *mere determination of my mind*, and as such, it is *not* bound to the other component representations comprising the complex by my immediate experience of the thing in itself. Therefore, without the synthesis of reproduction, there would be nothing preventing the component representations comprising a given representation from drifting apart from the unity of rule into which they were drawn by the synthesis of apprehension according to a concept.

In a mind that lacked the capacity for synthesis of reproduction it would be possible for the blue-color-representation that is one of the component representations in
the complex representation ‘the piece of wax on my desk’ to drift away from that complex and to be replaced by a different color-representation, i.e. a different free-floating determination of my mind, say the red-color representation that has broken away from the complex representation ‘the dictionary on my desk.’ The point is that if the component representations comprising a representation like that of the piece of wax on my desk were free to drift apart from each other and to be replaced by other free floating component representations, and this is conceivable in so much as they are, in and of themselves, nothing but mere determinations of my mind, then there would be no guarantee that the piece of wax on my desk that I perceive at one moment as having a determinate set of properties will at a later moment still be perceived by me to have that same set of properties, and thus there would be no guarantee that thinking about the piece of wax while I was away from my desk would bring to mind the same set of associations at one moment as it would at a later moment, and there would therefore be no empirical law of associative reproduction as we know it and thus no experience as we know it.

Kant draws an important conclusion from the nature of empirical imagination, namely the conclusion that "there must therefore be something that itself makes possible this (associative) reproduction of the appearances by being the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of them." He says that this something is the reproductive synthesis in the imagination, that this synthesis is grounded in a higher condition, and that this higher condition is a certain kind of combination of the manifold. But if experience is possible only if there is a synthesis of reproduction that makes associative reproduction

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10 First Critique, A 101. (My parenthetical remark.)
possible, then, says Kant, this combination of the manifold is a condition that makes experience possible.

As we have seen, a merely category determined unity of the manifold given in intuition, i.e. a mere unity of rule, would not suffice to give us objects as we experience and think them. While the synthesis of apprehension yields a unity of rule comprised of representations like the piece of wax on my desk, and while the representation that is the piece of wax on my desk is a unity according to concepts of various component representations, this does not provide experience as we know it. Experience obeys the law of associative reproduction, and associative reproduction is only possible if the mind reproduces the unity of rule that is first brought about in intuition by the synthesis of apprehension. It is, Kant thinks, precisely such a reproductive synthesis that explains why the component representations comprising a given representation, like the piece of wax on my desk, is blue every time I see it, and not sometimes blue, sometimes red, and sometimes yet another color.

Therefore, reproductive synthesis makes associative reproduction possible. It is because the mind reproduces unity of rule in the imagination that objects obey the law A = A, and it is because objects obey this law that their properties can bring to mind other representations in a law-like manner. It is because objects obey, due to synthesis of reproduction, the law A = A, that every time I see or recall an object like the piece of wax on my desk it always has all of the same properties (component representations), and it is because the object always has the same properties that I come to associate it with those properties. It is not the case that the piece of wax on my desk always has the same properties because it, the object that I immediately experience, is a thing in itself in which
the properties inhere. Rather, the object that I immediately experience has the same properties only because the initial unity of rule brought about by synthesis of apprehension is continuously reproduced in the imagination. However, this synthesis of reproduction is, Kant says, grounded in something that makes it possible, namely a higher condition, and this higher condition is that combination of the manifold which serves as the *a priori* ground of the synthesis of reproduction.

**Section Five:**

**Synthesis of Reproduction and Objective Unity**

In the second part of his discussion of reproduction, Kant sets out to show that this empirical synthesis of reproduction must be grounded in, i.e. made possible by, a higher condition. He wants to show that synthesis of reproduction in the imagination is grounded in or made possible by a *necessary* synthetic unity of appearances. In so doing, however, he argues, not from the nature of empirical imagination, but from the nature of our concepts (not to be conflated with the pure *a priori* intuitions) of space and time, which he has already established in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" to be conditions of experience, and the goal of this argument is to further explain why there must be a synthesis of reproduction and why this synthesis must be grounded in a higher condition.

Kant begins this argument by eliminating two possible alternative accounts of the unity in which he thinks synthesis of reproduction must be grounded, and he eliminates these possibilities with the help of the by now familiar claim that "appearances are not things in themselves, but rather the mere play of our representations, which in the end come down to determinations of the inner sense."\(^{11}\) Kant restates this claim because he

\(^{11}\) Ibid., A 101.
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wants to rule out the possibility that either appearances or things in themselves are the source of the objective unity in which synthesis of reproduction must be grounded, for one conceivable account of objective unity is made possible by the assumption that appearances are things in themselves. If appearances are things in themselves, then the unity of our representations is grounded in these things in themselves. For example, the unity of the various component representations, or appearances, comprising the representation that is the piece of wax on my desk would be, on this assumption, grounded in a thing in itself, for the representation, the piece of wax on my desk, would itself be a thing in itself and the relations between the component representations comprising this representation would be grounded in and determined by the thing in itself. However, 1.) Kant is operating on the assumption that appearances are, taken alone, not things in themselves, but rather a manifold of mere determinations of the mind which, in and of themselves, exhibit no unity whatsoever, and even after this manifold is synthesized into a unity of rule according to the categories, it still does not, in and of itself, exhibit object unity. Therefore, neither as mere determinations of the mind in the intuition nor as unity of rule do appearances exhibit, in and of themselves, objective unity. So, the objective unity in which synthesis of reproduction is grounded must therefore come from elsewhere than appearances, or things-in-themselves, or unity of rule.

Kant also considers the possibility that the synthesis of reproduction is grounded in the pure *a priori* intuitions of space and time, but he quickly eliminates this possibility when he says that even the pure *a priori* intuitions of space and time yield cognition only if there is added to them a combination (of the manifold that space and time contain)
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which makes synthesis of reproduction possible. He says, in effect, that our a priori intuitions of space and time, which contain a pure a priori manifold, must undergo a synthesis-of-apprehension-according-to-concepts before there can be, in the manifold they contain, a unity of rule, and even then this unity of rule, though it can be produced a priori, can only be effective in experience in conjunction with a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction. This, of course, entails that space and time could not possibly be the a priori ground of the synthesis of reproduction, for the unity of our representations (or concepts) of the intuitions of space and time presupposes both synthesis of apprehension in intuition and synthesis of reproduction in imagination. In other words, the pure a priori intuitions of space and time, though they contain that form which, when added to sensations yields appearances, do not in themselves contain that form which provides the objective unity required for objects of experience and thought.

Kant’s argument for the claim that our concepts of space and time presuppose the synthesizes of apprehension and reproduction is very similar to the one he gives when argues that the reproductive synthesis is necessary given the nature of the empirical imagination. In fact, it is the same argument except that it is applied, not to the manifold of appearances given in an empirical intuition, but to the manifold contained in the pure a priori intuitions of space and time.

Kant uses the drawing of a line in thought to illustrate why both the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination and the synthesis of apprehension in intuition are necessary conditions for the concept of space. He says that drawing such a line requires an initial act in which the manifold representations contained in the intuition, space, are grasped in a certain way, i.e. one after the other in thought, and this grasping is analogous
to the synthesis of apprehension according to a concept. However, this synthesis of apprehension of the manifold contained in the pure *a priori* intuition of space cannot by itself provide us with a thinkable spatial object, like a line, and thus cannot yield any cognition, like the thought ‘This is a line.’ For there is nothing in the *a priori* intuition of space itself but a pure manifold of representations, and these representations are mere determinations of an intuition in my mind and thus mere determinations of my mind, and the unity of rule that the act of synthesis of apprehension brings about is a mere unity according to the subjective concept ‘line.’ Therefore, the intuition, space, contains, in and of itself, no objectively present things, no lines or even possible lines for example, nor does it contain or comprise an objectively present space; and since the intuition, space, neither contains nor comprises an objectively present space, it therefore contains no independently existing part of space in which the component representations that I take together through synthesis of apprehension according to the concept ‘line’ into a unity of rule, inhere.

The only thing that synthesis of apprehension brings about is a unity of rule in the manifold of representations given in the intuition, space, and this unity of rule is nothing but a very abstract rule that determines an arrangement of representations according to concepts; and since this arrangement is brought about by nothing other than my mind, this unity of rule is therefore by no means an objectively present existence. In fact, the unity of rule brought about by synthesis of apprehension does not even determine a given sequence by means of which the line is to be produced. Instead, it only brings about a unity of concept and manifold – which unity becomes an imaginary *identification* of
concept and manifold when it becomes the object of consciousness\textsuperscript{12} - in the form of a rule governed manifold, a schema, in which the rule would be instantiated in any one of a vast number of different ways.

For example, the rule provided by unity of rule would be instantiated if I began at the right and constructed the line by drawing it from right to left, or if I began at the left and drew the line from left to right, or if I began at the center of the line and drew first from the center to the right and then returned to the center and drew from it to the left, or I could first draw from the left to the center and stop, and then go to the right and draw from the right to the center, and so on.

The point is that there is no objectively present something, neither a part of space nor even a determinate sequence, in which this unity of rule inheres and by which it is preserved, nor is the unity of rule itself, which is brought about by synthesis of apprehension, anything that can stand on its own after it has been bought about by the synthesis of apprehension. In and of itself, unity of rule is a mere determination of my mind and is thus relatively undetermined. In fact, Kant says of synthesis in general that it is "the mere effect of the imagination, [and the mere effect] of a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious."\textsuperscript{13} This means that without synthesis of reproduction there would be absolutely nothing ensuring that unity of rule would continue to be an abiding content in my mind. But even if it is reproduced, unity of rule alone is only present \textit{in the imagination}; and yet if it were not thus present in the

\textsuperscript{12} This identification must be imaginary since, as Kant points out in his discussion of the schematism, the categories of the understanding and the manifold given in intuition are heterogeneous.

\textsuperscript{13} First \textit{Critique}, A 78.
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imagination, there would be no line to draw, i.e. no rule to instance. For the concept ‘line’ is not there, in the intuition, space, waiting to be found and to inform the drawing of lines. Rather, the concept ‘line’ is brought about in the intuition only in the form of a unity of rule, but unity of rule is only there, in the intuition, as an effect or result of the act of synthesis of apprehension and only by virtue of the imagination in which the result of that synthesis, namely unity of rule, is reproduced. However, this act is not like the act of a sculptor whose finished work remains standing after she has completed it. Instead, it is a deed that must be continuously done, and if the synthesis of reproduction did not reproduce the unity of rule in the imagination, then there would not be any abiding unity of the otherwise amorphous manifold to serve as the object of the thought ‘This is a line.’ Thus cognition of the line, i.e. the concept of the line, is impossible without the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination.

Kant thinks that what he has shown in the case of the line illustration is true of intuition in general: space and time must be brought into a unity of rule through synthesis, according to the categories, of apprehension, and this unity of rule must be reproduced in the imagination. Thus Kant thinks that our representations of space and time are just as dependant on this synthesis of reproduction as is the cognition of a line, and he therefore says that without the synthesis of reproduction we could not even have the pure representations, i.e. cognitions or concepts, of space and time, let alone the empirical imagination which presupposes these pure representations. So, given that experience and cognition are impossible without both of these syntheses working in conjunction, Kant concludes that synthesis of apprehension in intuition and synthesis of
reproduction in the imagination are inseparable in experience. Kant also concludes that synthesis of reproduction is "[a] transcendental action of the mind" through which the something that makes both reproduction and empirical imagination possible, namely combination, is brought about in the manifold given in intuition, and so he calls synthesis of reproduction "the transcendental faculty of imagination." Kant then attempts to conceptualize this combination in terms of a relation between the manifold given in intuition and consciousness, and he first begins to articulate this relation in his discussion of yet a third kind of synthesis, namely synthesis of recognition in the concept.

Section Six:

Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept and Objective Unity

The first two syntheses are by no means the only syntheses required for experience and cognition. Just as synthesis of apprehension requires synthesis of reproduction in order to be effective, so also does synthesis of reproduction require yet another synthesis in order to be effective, namely synthesis of recognition in the concept. Kant articulates the need for this third kind of synthesis in terms of consciousness of the unity of the synthesis.

Suppose that by means of synthesis of apprehension the mind were to run through and take together the manifold representations given in intuition so as to produce, among other representations, the representation that is the piece of wax on my desk, and suppose that the mind were to reproduce this series, i.e. this synthesis produced unity of rule, of component representations comprising the complex representation, the piece of wax on my desk, in the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination. However, suppose also that

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14 Ibid., A 102.
the mind did not identify the unity of rule that was produced by the synthesis of apprehension in intuition with the reproduction of this unity of rule in the imagination, and suppose that the mind did not identify this reproduction with its successor reproduction, and that the mind did not identify the successor of this successor representation with its predecessor, and so on. In other words, suppose that the mind were not conscious of the unity of the synthesis, or, as Kant also says, that the mind were not conscious that that which it thinks at one moment, namely reproduction in the imagination of the unity of rule that was brought about via synthesis of apprehension, is identical to that which it thought a moment before, namely the unity of rule that was produced by synthesis of apprehension, and that the mind were not conscious that any given reproduction is identical to its predecessor reproduction. Kant says, in connection with his counting illustration, that if my mind worked this way, then “I would not cognize the generation of the multitude through this successive addition of one to the other, and I would not cognize this unity; for this concept consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis.” In other words, cognition requires that the mind be conscious of the unity of the synthesis, i.e. that it be conscious of the synthesis of apprehension and that it be conscious that its reproduction is, or is the reproduction of, the initial synthesis of apprehension. In fact, cognition is, says Kant, nothing but the “consciousness of the unity of the synthesis.” We might also say that cognition is the mind’s recognizing the unity of the synthesis in the concept, or that cognition is the recognition, or consciousness, of the unity of the synthesis in the concept.
The counting-of-the-units-illustration that Kant uses to illustrate this point is very helpful provided that one first sorts through its very confusing presentation. When Kant says, “If, in counting, I forget that the units that now hover before my sense were successively added to each other by me, …,”\textsuperscript{16} the units themselves serve as an \textit{analogy} for a manifold given in intuition; the presence of units before his senses \textit{presupposes} the synthesis of apprehension according to the categories – for prior to synthesis we are not conscious of the manifold given in intuition; the phrase “the units that … were successively added to each other by me” serves as an \textit{analogy} for the synthesis of apprehension; the hypothetical forgetting of the successive addition of the units to each other serves as an \textit{analogy} for the hypothetical breakdown in the reproductive synthesis; while the actual “counting” of the units is to be taken more literally, namely as an example of the kind of thinking in which we do in fact engage. Kant wants to show us that and how our thinking, or cognition, is made possible by the synthesis of apprehension and the synthesis of reproduction; he wants to show us that our thinking or cognition is a third kind of synthesis that is contingent upon the first two syntheses.

If I forgot that the units that hover before my senses were successively added – i.e. run through and taken together - by me in the synthesis of apprehension, i.e. if there is a breakdown in the reproductive synthesis, then I would not \textit{cognize} “the generation of the multitude through this successive addition of one to another; for this concept consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis.” In other words, if there was a breakdown in the reproductive synthesis, which reproduces the synthesis of apprehension in which I first run through the manifold of otherwise disordered intuition and synthesize

\textsuperscript{16} First \textit{Critique}, A 103.
it into a unity of rule according to concepts, then there would be no longer be any basis or foundation for the counting - for apart from the synthesis of apprehension according to the categories and its reproduction in the imagination, the manifold of intuition contains no number of things for me to count – and “I would not cognize the number, for this concept (number) consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis.” That is to say, this concept, number, consists solely in the consciousness of the synthesis of apprehension according the categories and the reproduction of this synthesis in the imagination, and this concept is but the recognition of this synthesis, i.e. it is the recognition of this synthesis in the concept, namely in the concept that I myself first put into the manifold given in intuition via the synthesis of apprehension through which I produce the unity of rule that makes the counting possible.

Kant says, in A103, that the idea that the concept consists in the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis is implicit in the very word ‘concept,’ and he explains this claim by saying that “it is this one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited (i.e. apprehended according to the categories so as to produce a unity of rule), and then also reproduced (synthesis of reproduction), into one representation (i.e. unifies the manifold into, or recognizes it in, one cognition or concept).”17 The synthesis of recognition in the concept is the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis, i.e. the consciousness that it is the unity of rule that synthesis of apprehension produces that is reproduced in the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination, to which I give expression in the concept when, for example I arrive,

17 My parenthetical remarks.
through counting, at a number, say 100, of units – though I give expression to this consciousness in various other, less explicit ways.

Kant says that this consciousness “may often only be weak, so that we connect it with the generation of the representation only in the effect, but not in the act itself, i.e., immediately; […] .” For example, this consciousness is connected with the generation of the representation only in the effect, and is therefore only weak, when I am aware of a mere multitude of units, minus the explicit cognition of their exact number, hovering before my senses. It is thus connected with the generation of the representation only in the effect, and thus only weak, when I become aware, through counting, that there are a hundred units before my senses, but this consciousness is in this case somewhat less weak than in the former case. Or, it may be connected with the generation of the object, not only in the effect, but also in the act of generation, or synthesis, itself, i.e. immediately as it is when we are doing transcendental philosophy, in which case it is a strong and clear such consciousness. But whether this consciousness is strong or weak, whether it is connected only with the result of the synthesis and not with the act or with both the result and the act that produces the result, “one consciousness must always be found.” Two ideas come to light in this passage. The first is the idea that consciousness may be opaque to itself with respect to the unity of the synthesis; I will discuss this idea in Section Eight. The second idea is the idea that it is this consciousness that makes concepts and the cognition of objects possible, and Kant discusses this idea in terms of the objectivity of our representations and the concept of an object in general.
Section Seven:

The Object of Consciousness and Objective Unity

Thus with respect to the cognition of the manifold and its production, the complex object of this consciousness consists of elements of various kinds: 1) mental content provided by the intuitions (both *a priori* and empirical), 2) acts or actions such as synthesis, 3) products of these acts and actions such as unity of rule and its reproduction in the imagination, 4) the relations between contents such as the identification of categories and the manifold given in intuition, and 5) the relations between products of actions such as the identification of unity of rule and its reproduction in the imagination.

Considered from this perspective, this consciousness is one in which 1) the categories are identified with the manifold given in intuition, an identification that is brought about in the synthesis of apprehension and which takes the form of unity of rule, 2) unity of rule is identified with its reproduction in the imagination, and 3) the reproduction of the unity of rule in the imagination is identified with the concepts in terms of which we form cognitions or representation, which may be raw and confused, and then analyze these representations, in which case this identification is made explicit in judgments like ‘This is a cube.’ Alternatively, we can characterize this consciousness by saying that it is a consciousness of these identity relations and of the terms identified.

In any event, this characterization of the object of this consciousness, though it is important to our understanding of the role consciousness plays in the production of the cognition of the manifold, is incomplete. To site but one reason, Kant says that in order for reproduction to be effective, it must *belong to the act of synthesis of apprehension* through which the unity of rule that it reproduces was generated, and the only way it can
be thus made to belong to this act is if act, unity of rule in the intuition, and its (unity of rule’s) reproduction in the imagination are all connected in one consciousness, i.e. if 1) they are all elements of the object of one consciousness and 2) this consciousness is cognizant of the role the act plays in the production of the unity of rule. As we have seen, the act of synthesis of apprehension does not bring about anything that is, in and of itself, permanent, i.e. permanent in the sense that it is able to stand on its own the way that the statue that the sculptor creates is able to stand on its own once the sculptor has created it. Synthesis of apprehension brings about a mere unity of rule which would, in and of itself, fall apart just as soon as it had been brought about in the manifold given in intuition. Nevertheless synthesis of apprehension does bring about something, namely unity of rule, and it is only because this act, the unity of rule it brings about, and the fact that this act brings about this unity of rule are all elements of the object of one consciousness that the reproduction of unity of rule in the imagination always belongs to the act. For unity of rule, its reproduction in the imagination, and its recognition in the concept are, in effect, nothing but the continuous carrying out of this initial act.

In order to further illustrate the need for this very interesting consciousness and the role it plays in the production of the cognition of the manifold, let us return to Kant’s counting illustration. Suppose that I am looking, not at the piece of wax on my desk, but at black dots placed on a blank piece of white paper. First, it must be understood that merely looking at the dots presupposes synthesis of apprehension, for prior to this synthesis intuition provides neither objects of perception nor even anything of which I can be conscious. Then, if I am to count the dots, I will only be able to do so if and because I am conscious that I have first run through the intuition in which they are given
and *taken its manifold together*, by means of an act of synthesis of apprehension according to concepts, *into a unity* that is determined by those concepts.

To simplify the illustration, we can think of this unity as a unity according to the concept ‘number.’ It is through synthesis of apprehension according to this concept that I bring about a unity in what would otherwise, i.e. prior to or apart from synthesis, be a mere manifold of dots given in intuition of which I would not even be conscious. This manifold therefore comes into my consciousness *as* a unity determined by that consciousness, and I never know this manifold as it is in itself, i.e. prior to or independently of the act of synthesis. *In this unity*, the concept serves *as a rule*, for it is the concept that determines the unity of the manifold, and Kant therefore calls this unity a unity of rule. However, if I now count the dots, I am only able to do so by *reproducing in the imagination* what I have already cognized, namely the initial unity-according-to-the-concept-‘number’ of these dots in which the manifold given in intuition has been brought into consciousness and identified with the concept ‘number’ through the synthesis of apprehension. For counting the dots necessarily presupposes the *cognition* of the manifold of dots, though that cognition may initially be “raw and confused.” Furthermore, in counting the dots I must also be and remain conscious throughout the counting procedure that the sequence of dots that I rehearse in counting them is identical to, i.e. is an instantiation of, the initial unity of rule that I first brought about in the dots through my initial act of synthesis of apprehension. This initial synthesis yields a unity according to the concept ‘number’ that is an initially raw and confused representation, and I make this representation more refined clearer by means of analysis, which in this
case consists in simply counting the dots and arriving at a refined and clear concept, say ‘100 dots,’ of the initially raw and confused representation ‘a number of dots.’

This consciousness, which we can characterize as one in which unity of rule is identified with its reproduction in the imagination, is indispensable to the counting of the dots because the sequence that I rehearse in counting the dots is not really there, in the intuition, space, where the dots are given. Rather, all that is there is a unity of rule according to the concept ‘number,’ and this unity of rule is there, in the intuition, only in the imagination and only in the form of its reproduction in the imagination. In fact, this unity of rule provides neither a single given sequence nor even the image of such a sequence. Instead, it provides something far more abstract, namely something like a rule, and this rule is one that would be instantiatied whether I began at the right and counted the dots from right to the left, or vice versa, or whether I began at the bottom and counted the dots from top to bottom, or etc.

Furthermore, since the manifold of dots given in intuition contains, in and of itself, neither number nor sequence, and since number and sequence are only in, so to speak, the intuition in which the dots are given as a result of synthesis of apprehension, it is nothing but my consciousness of this act of synthesis and of the unity of rule in which it results that keeps number and sequence there, in the intuition. So if my consciousness of the act of synthesis and of the unity of rule it brings about were to lapse after I began counting, i.e. after I began rehearsing this unity of rule that I first brought about in the manifold given in intuition, then I would no longer have any sequence to rehearse, for the manifold given in intuition would no longer contain a rule-determined-sequence of dots for me to count. It is only because, and in so much as, my consciousness is one in which
the initial unity of rule in the intuition is identified with its reproduction in the
imagination that I am able to count the dots, i.e. to rehearse the rule in the unity of rule
that I first brought into the manifold of dots by means of synthesis of apprehension.\(^\text{18}\)

And when the counting is complete and I arrive at a number, all that I really do in
arriving at a number is to analyze the initially raw and confused cognition of the manifold
that I myself first brought forth through my own act of synthesis of apprehension in
which I brought about the unity of rule that is ‘a number of dots.’ In other words, all I do
when I arrive at a number is to uncover in the manifold of dots what I myself first put
into it, namely the concept ‘number,’ when I first produce the cognition of that manifold
via synthesis of apprehension according to the concept ‘number.’ Therefore, it is only
because 1) this consciousness is a consciousness in which the manifold has been
identified with a concept, ‘number,’ and thus cognized as ‘a number of dots’ and
because 2) this consciousness is one in which this cognition is, in turn, identified with its

\(^{18}\) In her *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, Beatrice Longuenesse rightly argues that in his discussion
of the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination Kant *merely alludes to* ‘a program for
explaining* the ‘phenomenal regularities’ of experience that make associative reproduction
possible. Kant does say in A 101-103, however, that it could be shown that the empirical law of
associative reproduction (‘reproducibility of the appearances) presupposes a synthesis [of
reproduction in the] imagination ‘if we can demonstrate that even our pure *a priori* intuitions
provide no cognition except insofar as they contain the sort of combination of the manifold that
makes possible a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction,...’ With this statement the program
for explaining phenomenal regularities is virtually complete. Kant goes on to preliminarily
complete the explanation by giving the line illustration, but Longuenesse misses the point of this
illustration. She says on page 41: “Kant gives as ground for the given regularity of appearances,
which must provide the occasion for their empirical reproduction, *another reproduction*, though a
‘pure’ one, exercised not on empirical representations but on the successively synthesized
elements of a line, ...” The line illustration is not an *example* of a ‘pure’ reproduction, for nothing
can be *reproduced* that has not first been *produced* through the synthesis of apprehension, and the
line is no exception. Drawing a line presupposes a synthesis of apprehension in which the
manifold given in space has been made into a unity according to concepts, i.e. a unity of rule, and
it is this initial unity of rule that must be continuously reproduced if I am to draw a line. This
reproduction of the unity of rule is a *something there*, in the imagination, underlying the drawing
of the line, not only while I am drawing it but even before I begin to draw. And this must be so
because I cannot even be conscious of the manifold as a manifold in the way I must be conscious
of it in order to draw a line *until after it has been drawn into a unity of rule via synthesis of
apprehension*. So prior to synthesis of apprehension, I could not even be conscious of the manifold
representations involved in the drawing of a line, (and here we should note that the
reproduction in the imagination, and because 3) this reproduction is identified with, i.e.
recognized in, the concept that in counting these dots I am able to arrive at a number and
to make the judgment 'There are 100 dots.'

The case is the same with synthesis of apprehension and synthesis of reproduction
as it is in this illustration involving a number of dots. There are not, given in intuition
alone, a number of things or a number of representations or a number of appearances,
nor, for that matter, is there given in intuition alone anything whatsoever that could serve
as the object of a thought like ‘This is a piece of wax.’ Intuition provides only a manifold
of appearances, i.e. mere (a priori) determinations of the mind, of which, taken alone,
one cannot even be conscious. The concept ‘number’ in the thought ‘I see a number of
things on my desk’ does not originate from an objectively present number of things on
my desk; rather "it consists solely in the consciousness of [the] unity of synthesis."19
Thus in the dots illustration this consciousness must be a consciousness of 1) the unity of
rule, of 2) the fact that unity of rule was produced by a synthesis of apprehension
according to a concept carried out on the manifold given in intuition, of 3) the concept
determining the unity of rule, of 4) the reproduction of this unity of rule in imagination,
of 5) the identity of unity of rule and its reproduction, and of 6) the identity of the
reproduction of unity of rule in the imagination and the concept ‘number’. And again, it
is simply this concept ‘number’ in terms of which I eventually explicitly think what I
myself first put into the manifold when I produce the cognition of the manifold, which is
initially raw and confused, when I formulate the thought ‘There are 100 dots on the
page.’ And this judgment simply demonstrates the consciousness of the identification of

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representation involved would be those comprising the whole of space and not just those
comprising the line).
concept and manifold that was initially brought about in the synthesis of apprehension. For, again, Kant says, "[…] this concept consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis."\(^{20}\)

It is already clear from this account of the role that consciousness plays in the counting of the dots that this consciousness provides one of the chief characteristics of experience, namely its objective unity. The objective unity of our experience is provided neither by the intuitions of space and time, nor by the synthesis of apprehension, nor by unity of rule alone, nor again by its reproduction in the manifold. There is more to our experience of, and thinking about, objects than a multiplicity of appearances synthesized according to merely subjective, even if \textit{a priori}, categories. We experience and think of objects as a manifold of appearances that are \textit{necessarily} bound together in an object and thus as a \textit{necessary} unity, and this is evident given not only the fact that the empirical law of associative reproduction and cognition, like that involving the counting of the dots, would be impossible without such necessary unity in our representations, it is also evident when we analyze some of the more general aspects of our experience.

Consider, once again, the piece of wax on my desk. Its size, shape, opaqueness, weight, and bluish hue are some of the appearances connected with it, but I do not experience the piece of wax and the appearances connected with it as mere determinations of my mind bound together merely a merely subjective concept, nor do I think of the piece of wax as a whole in this way, namely as a bundle of mere determinations of my mind ordered according a subjective concept. Rather I experience the piece of wax \textit{as} an object in which its size, shape, color, weight and other

\(^{19}\) First \textit{Critique}, A 103.
appearances necessarily and objectively (as opposed to merely accidentally and subjectively) inhere; and this is also what I think when I think the piece of wax and its properties, namely that the various appearances connected with the piece of wax are connected, not simply with a merely subjective concept in my mind, but with an object, a *something there*, in which they necessarily (i.e. not merely subjectively) inhere. The objectivity of the individual objects of our experience and of our experience as a whole has its source neither in things-in-themselves nor in the categories alone, but rather in *consciousness* - which Kant calls the transcendental apperception.

The role played by the categories of the understanding in the production of the cognition of the manifold can neither be confused nor conflated with the higher unity provided by consciousness. While we can have neither experience nor thought without the categories, and while the categories therefore have *a priori* objective validity, the *possibility* of applying the categories to the manifold given in intuition and the *unity* that they enable consciousness to bring to representations in the cognition of the manifold as a whole are contingent on the relation between *original apperception* and *sensibility and all possible appearances*.

This relation consists in the fact that when 1) the totality of appearances given in intuition are made by synthesis to take on the form of a unity of rule and 2) this unity of rule is brought to consciousness, these appearance are given the form of consciousness simply by virtue of their becoming and remaining the object of that consciousness, and the *form* that these appearances are, in this way, given is simply the "thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness" which is thought in and through the categories and the unity of

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20 Ibid., A 103.
rule that they determine.\textsuperscript{21} The objectivity of the cognition of the manifold, i.e. of the experience, that results when unity of rule becomes the object of this consciousness, weather it be the objectivity of experience as a whole or experience of individual objects, is nothing more than the unity of this singular self-consciousness. This self-consciousness imparts its unity to the unity of rule brought about by synthesis of apprehension simply in that this singular self-consciousness is simultaneously a consciousness of 1) the act of synthesis and of 2) its resulting unity of rule and of 3) the synthetic reproduction of this unity of rule in the imagination. In other words, the objectivity of experience as a whole as well as the general concept of an object is nothing more than the fact that the synthesis-produced-unity of rule is the object of the singular and self-identical consciousness that is apperception.

It is this general concept of an object = X that makes the unity of appearances according to a concept, ‘piece of wax’, a necessary, as opposed to a merely subjective, unity. This becomes evident when we examine what Kant calls our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object. When I think, for example, of the piece of wax on my desk, I find that my various thoughts about it - that it is round, that it is three dimensional, that it blue and so on - are related to the piece of wax, i.e. the object, with all necessity. It is not merely because it pleases me to think that the piece of wax is blue that I see, when I look at the piece of wax, that it is blue and, based on this experience, that I think that it is blue. Given the object, the piece of wax, the experience based thought that this object is blue

\textsuperscript{21} In A 105, Kant says: 'Now this unity of rule determines every manifold, and limits it to conditions that make the unity of apperception possible, and the concept of this unity is the representation of the object = X, which I think through [the predicates of a given representation, say] a triangle.'
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carries something of necessity with it. It is precisely the object that is opposed to my formulating merely whimsical and arbitrary thoughts when I observe the object.

Furthermore, the necessity of the unity of the component representations comprising the complex representation that is an object is such that all of the thoughts that I have in connection with this object must agree, or be consistent with, each other. Suppose, for example, that there is a cube on my desk and that each of its six sides are one of six different colors, green, blue, red, black, orange and white; and suppose that it is, in fact, the case that the orange side is adjacent to the red side and that the orange side is not adjacent to the green side. In the case of thinking as we know it, it does not happen, for example, that I can have two thoughts about the object, such as ‘the orange side is adjacent to the red side but not to the green side’ and ‘the orange side is not adjacent to the red side but it is adjacent to the green side,’ that agree, or are consistent with, each other. These two thoughts cannot both be true, at the same time and in the same respect, because the relation of all my thoughts to the object is such that all my thoughts must necessarily agree with one another, and yet the unity of the representations comprising the object to which these thoughts are related can be nothing more than a formal unity since we have no immediate access to things-in-themselves while the manifold of appearances in intuition are mere determinations of my mind.

Kant says that unity of rule determines every manifold and limits it to conditions that make unity of apperception possible, but he adds that the mind conceptualizes this unity of rule in the representation or concept of an object (= X) and that the mind thinks this general concept of an object in and through both the unity of rule and the representations united therein. It is only in so much as and because this unity of rule is the
object of the consciousness that is apperception that this unity of rule (which is unity according to the categories) has objective unity, and this objective unity is but the form of this consciousness. We can think of the adding of this objective unity (or this form of consciousness) to unity of rule in much the same way that we think of the adding of the forms of the intuitions of space and time to the mere effects that appear on our capacity for receiving these effects. Just adding the forms of the intuitions of space and time to the relatively indeterminate sensations yields a relatively more determined acquired mental content, namely appearances, so also does adding the form of the unity of consciousness that is apperception to the relatively undetermined unity of rule yield a completely determined mental content, namely the cognition of the manifold, which, unlike mere unity of rule, provides objects of experience and thought and objective experience in general.

Therefore, this form is but the manifestation of the unity of this consciousness, and this form is expressed in the cognition of the manifold in the general concept of an object = X. In experience, the sense I have that something, say the piece of wax on my desk, is an object is occasioned by nothing more or other than the unity of my consciousness of the unity of rule that synthesis brings about in a manifold of appearances given in intuition. Kant illustrates this point using a triangle, which is a manifold of appearances synthesized according to a rule, namely the concept ‘triangle’, and the result of the synthesis is a unity according to a rule. The sense I have that I am experiencing an objectively present object when I look at this triangle does not come from the mere unity of rule brought about by synthesis of apprehension. Rather the sense that I am experiencing and thinking an objectively present object comes from my
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consciousness of 1) the act of synthesis and its result (which is a unity according to a rule in which the concept ‘triangle’ is identified with the manifold of appearances given in intuition) and of 2) the reproduction of this act, and of 3) the identification of unity of rule with its reproduction in the imagination. Thus unity of rule serves as the object of this consciousness, which consciousness is itself a unity, and it is precisely the formal unity of this consciousness that is brought about in the unity of rule when the unity of rule is made the object of this conscious. Furthermore, it is the unity of this consciousness, which is infused into unity of rule when unity of rule becomes the object of this consciousness, that provides, or is, the concept an object = X in which I think the unity of various appearances comprising the triangle. Further still, this formal unity is not only the objective unity of individual objects of experience like the piece of wax and the triangle, it is equally the objective unity of experience as a whole, or, as Kant also calls experience, the cognition of the manifold. In other words, just as each space is a part of the intuition, space, so also is the objective unity of each of my representations but a part of the objective unity of the entire cognition of the manifold, and this objective unity is but the form of the consciousness that is apperception.

Section Eight:

Explaining the Opacity of Consciousness

The account of the production of the cognition of the manifold is now sufficiently complete so as to support a discussion of the various degrees to which this consciousness can be transparent to itself with respect to the unity of the synthesis. Kant says in both the first and second versions of his deduction that the apperception must be conscious of the synthesis that it brings to the manifold of representations. In A 103 Kant explains that a
concept consists “solely in the consciousness of” the unity of by means of which it is brought about, and then goes on to say: “The word ‘concept’ itself already leads us to this remark. For it is this one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also reproduced, into one representation. This consciousness may often only be weak, so that we connect it with the generation of the representation only in the effect, but not in the act itself, i.e., immediately; but regardless of these differences one consciousness must always be found, even if it lacks conspicuous clarity, and without that concepts, and with them cognition of objects, would be entirely impossible.” Kant reiterates this claim in B 132-133 of the second deduction: “For the manifold representations that are given in a certain intuition would not all together be my representations if they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness; i.e., as my representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must yet necessarily be in accord with the condition under which alone they can stand together in a universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not throughout belong to me.”

In each of these passages it is clear that Kant thought that the apperception, or consciousness, must be conscious of the synthesizing or unifying role that it plays in the cognition of objects. In the first passage, he claims that consciousness of this synthesis is that in which alone a concept consists. In the second passage, he claims that the manifold of representations are all my representations because they belong to a self-consciousness, but to say that they belong to this self-consciousness is simply to say that this self-consciousness also has these representations as its object, i.e. it is to say that this consciousness is a self-consciousness of those representations. At the same time,

22 My emphasis.
however, Kant insists in both passages that consciousness either is or may be opaque to itself with respect to its relation to its representations. In other words, he insists that consciousness is or may be opaque to itself. The importance of the opacity of consciousness has gone virtually unnoticed by Kant commentators, and yet its importance, indeed its necessity, to Kant’s first *Critique* is evident from reflection on the description of his project that he gives in the preface.

Kant proposes a “Copernican Revolution” in metaphysics in which he reverses the heretofore-favored assumption that the objects of our experience determine our knowledge of them and reestablishes metaphysics on the assumption that our knowledge determines the objects of our experience. Kant’s approach is to argue that experience is the cognition of the manifold in a given intuition and that this cognition is a synthetic unity of a manifold of intuition according to the categories of the understanding that is grounded in the unity of apperception, i.e. in the unity of consciousness. Kant insists that consciousness *must be conscious of this synthesis* even if only “weakly” so, and this claim stands to reason when we consider the implications of assuming the opposite, namely that this consciousness is always perfectly transparent to itself with respect to this synthesis (or *strongly* conscious of it). If consciousness were always strongly conscious of this synthesis, then we would be able to explain neither why metaphysicians spent centuries operating on the assumption that the objects of our experience determine our knowledge when they were perfectly conscious that our knowledge determined, via synthesis of the manifold of in a given intuition according to the categories, the objects of our experience nor why there was ever any need for Kant to write the first *Critique*. The opacity of consciousness is a crucial aspect of Kant’s views on the categories, and
Nietzsche and I exploit the opacity of consciousness in claiming that reason is in fact an instrument of body and life.

Kant says that the concept consists exclusively in the consciousness of the unity in which synthesis results. In the terms of the dots illustration, the cognition of the manifold of dots is but the consciousness of the initial synthesis of apprehension according to the concept 'number' and of the unity of the manifold in which that synthesis resulted. However, Kant also says that "this consciousness may only be weak" and that we may therefore connect it with the production of the cognition of the manifold (representation) “only in the effect,” i.e. only in the representation or in the cognition of the manifold. In other words, though this consciousness is, as we have seen, a consciousness of each of the acts and elements involved in the production of the cognition of the manifold, it may only be a very weak such consciousness in the sense that it is explicitly connected, not with the various acts and elements involved the production of the cognition of the manifold, but only with the fully produced cognition of the manifold itself.

Kant says of this consciousness that it admits of varying degrees in the sense that it can be so weak that it is manifested only in its result, i.e. in the sustained reproduction of the initial unity of rule produced by the synthesis of apprehension. Whether weakly or strongly, however, we are indeed conscious of the act of synthesis by means of which we synthesize and then continuously generate the unity of rule, even if only in the effect, i.e. only in the representation. Indeed, we must be conscious of this act, for in and of itself

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23 First Critique, A 103 - 104.
this act brings about nothing permanent and it is therefore only in so much as the act is continuously carried out, i.e. in so much as the categories are continuously identified with the manifold and the resulting unity of categories and manifold is reproduced in the imagination, that unity of rule is an abiding image in the imagination and an object of consciousness. We can see in ourselves the necessity of the consciousness of that act when we consider that it is only because and in so much as we are and remain conscious of our cognition of the dots according to the concept 'number' that we are able to count some or all of them. If we were to somehow disengage our consciousness of the synthetic production and reproduction of this cognition or representation, then the representation would be lost. However, this consciousness is predominantly concentrated or absorbed in the result, i.e. in the representation, and it is but faintly connected with the productive and reproductive acts. So the act and activity by which the representation is generated is covered over by or buried under, though by no means obliterated by, the absorption of this consciousness in that representation.

Consider another illustration, if while looking at a diagram consisting of an arrangement of straight lines drawn on a blank sheet of paper I see a three dimensional object, say a cube, then I see this object only because I have first synthetically apprehended "the manifold of appearances on the page" according to the concept of a cube and thus brought about in the manifold of appearances a unity of rule, for there is no cube on the page. And if I continue to see this same cube, it is only because I continuously reproduce my initial synthesis of the manifold of lines and the unity of rule in which this synthesis resulted, for, again, there is no cube on the page. But I can only
reproduce this act of synthesis and its resulting unity of rule if I am at least to some
degree conscious of them, and it is therefore clear that seeing the cube on the page is to
be conscious of the act of synthesis by which it was produced and conscious that I am
reproducing the unity of rule that I initially produced via synthesis of apprehension. This
claim is borne out by the fact that if I interrupt and thus disengage this consciousness,
then I lose sight of the cube. At the same time, however, in the seeing of the cube, my
consciousness of these acts may be totally overshadowed by my “seeing” or being
conscious of the cube, and since my very consciousness of the cube is at the same time
the consciousness of theses acts, we can say that I exhibit my consciousness of these acts,
not explicitly, but only in the consciousness of the representation, i.e. in the
consciousness of the cube that “I see.”

Kant says that this consciousness is "one consciousness that unifies the manifold
that has been successively intuited (synthesis of apprehension), and also reproduced
(synthesis of reproduction), into one representation."25 He adds, however, that this
consciousness may often only be weak, and this means that this consciousness may not
be transparent to itself, even while it is actively bringing objective or necessary unity to
unity of rule. In other words, even as this consciousness is effectively bringing its own
objective unity about in the synthesized manifold of appearances, and while it is thus
bringing this unity about simply by having unity of rule as its object - i.e. simply by being
a consciousness of unity of rule, this consciousness may nevertheless at the same time be
a predominantly weak conscious of 1.) the acts of synthesis by means of which unity of

24 This analogy is, of course, a limited one since the manifold of appearances given in intuition is
not, unlike the appearances comprising the diagram on the page, something of which we are or
can be conscious prior to synthesis.
25 Ibid., A 103.
rule is brought about and perpetuated in the manifold of appearances and 2.) the act by 
means of which unity of rule is brought to objective unity. This, however, is not to be 
taken to mean that this consciousness does not exist, for Kant adds "… regardless … one 
consciousness must always be found, even if it lacks conspicuous clarity, and without 
that concepts, and with them cognition of objects, would be entirely impossible."26 In 
other words, although this one consciousness must exist, it may not be transparent to 
itself and may therefore be opaque. How, we must therefore ask, can we account for the 
opacity of this consciousness?

There are various factors responsible for the opacity of consciousness. As I 
pointed out in the previous section, given the entire cognition of the manifold, the object 
of this consciousness consists of various elements and is therefore complex. If we 
consider the complexity this object in light of the manner in which it is produced, we can 
begin to glean something of the causes of the opacity of this consciousness. I have found 
it helpful to present this account in the form of a narrative version of the production of 
the cognition of the manifold in which I treat it as taking place in progressive stages, i.e. 
in various acts of synthesis and unification that I depict in such a way that the second 
stage assumes the first, the third assumes the first and second, and so on.27 However, 
while this presentation is conducive to the task of articulating the "moments" of the 
production of the cognition of the manifold, there would be serious theoretical difficulties 
involved in taking the chronological account too seriously. The chronology is merely a 
heuristic device that serves the purpose of illuminating the relations that hold between the

26 Ibid., A 104.
27 The dramatization of the production of the cognition of the manifold is precisely Nietzsche's 
task in the first chapter of Zarathustra and in the first of the three metamorphoses.
various terms of Kant's theory if we are to make sense of his claim that consciousness may not be transparent to itself.

First, it will be clear that in “the course of” the production of the cognition of the manifold the various acts of synthesis take place prior to the emergence of the completed cognition of the manifold, yet consciousness is conscious of each of these acts and they are therefore elements of the object of consciousness. So consciousness is conscious of some of these elements prior to being consciousness of others, and it is conscious of all of the acts/elements involved in the production of the cognition of the manifold before it is conscious of the completed cognition of the manifold, i.e. the representation. For this reason, there arises in the course of the production of the cognition of the manifold not only three different forms of the object of this consciousness, but also three very different conditions under which this consciousness is conscious of its object, and these conditions result from and correspond to these three forms of the object of consciousness.

In the “beginning,” this consciousness is, Kant says, a pure, original, unchanging consciousness. It is not clear what the object of this pure consciousness might be in the beginning, but if it were rightly deemed consciousness, then it would, presumably, have some object and thus be a consciousness of something, even if it were only a consciousness of itself. Then, once the production of the cognition of the manifold gets under way (though before it is complete), this consciousness would have as its object the various acts of synthesis that bring about the cognition of the manifold, and it would have as its object, not only each one in turn, but also each one in addition to its predecessor/s (with the exception, of course, of the synthesis of apprehension which presumably has no
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predecessor act). So the object of this consciousness would be taking on new content and dimension with each new "moment" of the production of the cognition of the manifold. Then, in addition to these acts, this consciousness would have as its object the products of each of these acts, i.e. unity of rule, reproduction in the imagination, etc., until finally there would thereby be added to the object of this consciousness the act by which it subjects unity of rule to its own objective unity and thus also the full blown cognition of the manifold itself, and with this the production of the cognition of the manifold, or experience, would be complete and the cognition of the manifold would provide us with objects of thought and experience as we know them.

If we assume that consciousness is always just that, namely consciousness, then we must concede that it is always conscious of whatever happens to be its object. Since it is the understanding/consciousness that cognizes the manifold and since this consciousness must, as consciousness, be conscious of this cognition, i.e. have the act of this cognition as its object, then it must be conscious also of whatever “moments” comprise this act, i.e. these moments must be objects of this consciousness. When we think of this act as being comprised of various “moments,” it is evident that there must occur some very dramatic changes in the object of consciousness and thus very dramatic changes in the cognitional29 conditions under which it is conscious of its object and of the elements of which that object is comprised. These dramatic changes and the markedly different sets of cognitional conditions to which they give rise might contribute

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28 In the second deduction, Kant designate this consciousness as it is thought in and through the categories alone as a consciousness 2that I am,” and in my treatment of the second deduction I discuss this consciousness.

29 I use the term ‘cognitional’ for lack of a better term and to serve as the adjectival form of ‘conscious.’
significantly to the fact that consciousness, while it has as its object the entire cognition of the manifold, acts and all, is yet not transparent to itself with respect to these acts. Kant tells us that consciousness is predominantly conscious only of an aspect or element of its object, namely the representation that is experience or the cognition of the manifold, but he says that in order to produce the cognition of the manifold it must be conscious of all of the elements of its object even though it is only very faintly conscious of some of them. It is not difficult to imagine, if not to explain, why consciousness should be so disproportionately distributed over the elements of its object if we simply reflect on the "beginning" of the production of the manifold. Prior to the act of synthesis, this consciousness does not have much before itself that can serve as its object. Indeed, prior to the act of synthesis, there is not yet even the objective unity of the concept of the a priori intuition, time, in which unity alone inner experience would be possible, for as Kant says in the second deduction the understanding determines the inner sense, nor again is there an objective unity of the concept of the intuition, space, in which unity alone outer experience is possible. So prior to the act of synthesis, there is nothing but a pure, original, unchanging consciousness. In this void, the only object of this consciousness would be this consciousness itself. However, this initial self-consciousness would have to differ greatly from self-consciousness as we, who have before us the full-blown cognition of the manifold in and through which we are conscious of ourselves, know it. We might say, though only figuratively, that under these cognitional conditions this consciousness is, with respect to what it has before itself in the way of something of which it can be conscious, very much in the dark, and the heuristic idea that this consciousness "begins" in this void suggests an explanation as to how it comes to pass
that this consciousness is unevenly distributed over the elements of its fully developed
object, i.e. over the cognition of the manifold, in such a way that it but weakly conscious
of its own activity.

Considered from the perspective of the A deduction alone, the first thing that
“happens” in this void is the act of synthesis of apprehension in which the manifold given
in intuition is taken up, run through, and drawn into a unity according to concepts, and, as
Kant says, this act must be one of the elements of the object of this consciousness.
However, if we make a distinction between the act itself on the one hand, and the unity of
rule in which it results on the other, then it will not be difficult to imagine how this mere
act is overwhelmingly upstaged by the unity of rule in which it results. Given the void in
which it takes place, the act itself is a mere stirring of the understanding in the void, and
thus an event that takes place in a context in which it is able to make only a very raw,
confused, and weak impression on consciousness.

Now compare this act of synthesis with the comparatively conspicuous unity of
rule that it brings before consciousness and consider that this unity of rule becomes,
immediately upon being produced, the object of a consciousness that/who had up to that
moment been very much in the dark, so to speak. Consider also that in becoming the
object of this consciousness, unity of rule is thereby brought to the objective unity of this
consciousness, and consider that the cognition of the manifold, i.e. experience, is but
consciousness of unity of rule. It will be clear from these considerations that the
cognition of the manifold “comes about” in such a way and under such circumstances
that the consciousness of certain salient elements of the completed cognition of the
manifold overshadow the acts and activity by which this cognition is produced, and the
notion of this overshadowing makes it possible for us to explain how a consciousness that is, indeed must be, a consciousness of the act by which it brings unity of rule to objective unity could nevertheless be a merely weak such consciousness, i.e. to explain how consciousness could be opaque to itself with respect to this act.

If the cognition of the manifold is consciousness in communion with its object, and if the object of this consciousness consists of not only unity of rule but also of 1) the act of synthesis of apprehension in intuition by means of which unity of rule is first produced, 2) synthesis of reproduction in the imagination, 3) identification of unity of rule with its reproduction in the imagination, and 4) the act by which unity of rule is subjected to objective unity, then in the cognition of the manifold the object of this consciousness is, as we have said, complex. If, however, each of these elements is, in fact, an element of the object of this consciousness, then the mind will be conscious of each of these elements. However, if in this consciousness some of the elements of its object, namely the acts, transpire under cognitional conditions that make thinking about them and being strongly conscious of them very difficult, and if the products of these acts come about in such a way and are of such a nature that they overshadow these acts, then this consciousness, though it is a consciousness of all of the elements of its object, will nevertheless be a weak consciousness of the overshadowed elements, namely the acts. In other words, the consciousness of these inconspicuous acts, each of which are elements of the object of consciousness, will be covered over by the consciousness of the comparatively far more conspicuous and spectacular synthetic unity of the manifold, which is also an element of the object of this consciousness, that these acts produce, and
so this consciousness, which is an utterly singular consciousness, will nevertheless be unevenly distributed over the elements of its object.

When Kant says that consciousness of synthesis and reproduction is weak, he clearly does not mean to say that this consciousness is nonexistent, nor does he mean to say that it is, by virtue of being only weak, a merely possible consciousness. On the contrary, this consciousness is actual and effective and manifested in the very cognition of the manifold and in each of the objects of experience with which it provides us, though it is predominantly disassociated from the acts themselves and is thus predominantly manifested and expressed, though relatively unconsciously, in the result of that act, namely unity of rule, and in the experience and thinking that it makes possible. In fact, experience and thinking are, as we saw in the cube analogy, only possible so long as the mind is and remains conscious of the act of synthesis of apprehension and of the identity of function by which their result is reproduced in the imagination and recognized in the concept, even though this consciousness may not be transparent to itself. Due, however, to the manner in which the cognition of the manifold is brought about, this consciousness becomes predominantly absorbed in one of the elements of its object, namely the unity of rule to which objective unity has been unconsciously added, and it becomes thus absorbed to the extent that it is virtually unconscious of the other elements of its object even though it must be, and is, a consciousness of these elements. In other words, in spite of the uneven distribution of this consciousness over the elements of its object, it must be sufficiently conscious of all of these elements so as to be able to produce the cognition of the manifold, and in this case it is conscious of these overshadowed elements only in the representation - i.e. only in the cognition of the manifold.
If we now treat the theoretically problematic chronology as a ladder that had no use or value beyond that of enabling us climb down to our target vantage point, we can therefore kick the chronology away and be left simply with that segment of the structure of Kant's theory in terms of which an account of the opacity of consciousness can be given. The cognition of the manifold is the consciousness of a unity of the manifold given in intuition that is brought about via synthesis of apprehension according to the categories and subjected to the objective unity of apperception, but since the cognition of the manifold itself is far more salient than both the syntheses by means of which it is brought about and its grounding in this consciousness, this consciousness tends to be opaque to itself with respect to the latter and conscious of the latter only in the former. Furthermore, while it is and indeed must be possible for this consciousness to become transparent to itself, it must do so by thinking its way to this consciousness, and it must think its way to this consciousness by thinking over the cognition of the manifold.30

Nietzsche exploits Kant's notion of the opacity of consciousness by claiming that just as consciousness is opaque to itself with respect to these elements of its object, so also is it opaque to itself with respect to the nature and function of the soul and with respect to the great reason of the body and its relation to “little reason”; the notion of opposing forces is, as we shall see, central to Nietzsche's view of the little reason and the soul.

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30 The reason that consciousness can only become transparent to itself by thinking over the cognition of the manifold has to do with the fact that this consciousness is never a consciousness of the manifold given in intuition “prior to” synthesis and it can therefore not become conscious of the transition from a mere synopsis of that manifold to the category determined unity of that manifold that synthesis produces. The crime and crime scene can therefore only be reconstructed using the clues provided in the cognition of the manifold as Kant did in his first Critique.
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Section Nine:

The Great Reason of the Body, Little Reason, and the Opposing Forces of the Soul

Nietzsche builds his own view of reason, which he calls little reason or spirit, around the system of reason that Kant articulates in the first Critique, and little reason is a dynamic system, namely the soul and the understanding or intellect, which carry out two distinct functions. Nietzsche's view of the soul is in certain ways similar to that put forward by Plato in the Phaedrus where Socrates likened the soul to a chariot drawn by two winged horses and driven by a charioteer. The horses have opposite natures, one horse is very cooperative by virtue of its remarkable sense of form while the other is very unruly by virtue of it’s dull senses and its excess of desire. Thus the challenge to the charioteer is to bring himself and the horses into agreement so that the charioteer can steer the chariot where he will, and it is the vision of beauty that makes this agreement possible. The good horse is the analogue of the form-giving force, the unruly horse is the analogue of the acquisitive force, the chariot is the analogue of the I think, and the charioteer is the analogue of the apperception or consciousness. In Nietzsche's view the great reason of the body prompts little reason or spirit to unconsciously cognize itself in a certain way, and this unconscious cognition of itself determines both a valuation of values, which is analogous to the beautiful one, and, contrary to Plato’s account, an arrangement of the soul’s opposing forces in relation to that valuation of values. Furthermore, the I in relation to its valuation of values, which relation I call identification, determines all of the I’s activity. As we saw in the investigation of heaviness, it was the spirit’s cognition of itself in terms of an inner stimulus and as lacking what it needs in order to be what it is, and not its valuation of values, that
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determines an arrangement of the soul's opposing forces as well as its valuation of values, and the business of the soul and its opposing forces is to bind the I to this valuation of values. The notion of opposing forces is implicit in Kant's first Critique and in his deductions of the categories, though in the deductions these forces are not opposing forces of the soul but rather the opposing forces of the understanding that drive synthesis.

Specifically, the notion of the form-giving and acquisitive forces is implicit in A 111 where Kant makes a case for the necessity of the “transcendental unity.” Given that we have to do, not with things in themselves, but only with a manifold of appearances given in intuition, unity according to merely empirical concepts would never yield anything like experience as we know it. Kant says that without a transcendental unity being imposed on this manifold “it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill up our souls without experience ever being able to arise from it.” Kant says that in this case “all relation of cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appearances would lack connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws…” He goes on to say that we would therefore have neither thought nor cognition of any kind, but only mere intuition which would be a mass of mere determinations of the mind. In this passage we find juxtaposed to one another two very interesting ideas, one of them explicit and the other merely implicit, which seem to be integrally related, and I propose that an advance on Kant can be made by developing these ideas in terms of the notion that the mind involves opposing forces.

The first of these ideas is the implied idea of a mental force that imposes the form of the categories onto the manifold given in intuition, and the second is the implied idea of an opposite acquisitive force that draws that same manifold in toward consciousness.
While these two forces are clearly opposing forces, they would seem to work together in the production of the cognition of the manifold. The role of the acquisitive force in the production of the cognition of the manifold would seem to be that of *drawing mental content before consciousness* while the role of the form-giving force in the production of the cognition of the manifold would seem to be that of *imposing a form onto that content*. The passage in A 111 is not, however, the only place in the text where these ideas are implied, for we can also see these forces suggested in synthesis itself, which, on the one hand, *takes* the manifold *in towards* consciousness, while on the other hand it *makes* the manifold *into* a unity according to concepts. Furthermore, it is conceivable that both forces working in conjunction are necessary to the production of the cognition of the manifold.

Given Kant’s focus on the objective unity that is imposed on unity of rule when it is subjected to the original apperception, it will already be clear both that and how the form-giving force is necessary to the production of the cognition of the manifold, but it is not immediately clear why the acquisitive force might also be necessary to the cognition of the manifold. However, Kant's view of matter as an arrangement of opposing forces suggests an answer to this question.\(^3\)\(^1\) We can imagine that without the acquisitive force the manifold would never be drawn in toward the understanding, would therefore not be brought to consciousness, and would remain a confused manifold of intuition without any connection to consciousness whatsoever. In this case, and as Kant himself points out, the manifold would be “as good as nothing for us” since it would lack both unity of rule and the objective unity of consciousness. We see further evidence as to why the acquisitive

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\(^3\)\(^1\) Kant discusses this view in his *Metaphysical Foundations Of Natural Science*. 
force would be necessary when we think of the two opposing forces as working, not immediately on each other, but on the manifold given in intuition. If the acquisitive force ceased to draw the manifold in toward the understanding and consciousness, then the opposing form-giving force would push it away from and out of consciousness, the intuition in the unity of rule would fall away from the concepts according to which the intuition would otherwise be unified, and consciousness would once again be left with nothing but the mere understanding and its concepts and would thus be unable to produce the cognition of the manifold. If, on the other hand, the form-giving force were to cease imposing its unity on the unity of rule, then both the concepts which determine that unity of rule and the formal objective unity of apperception would fall away from the manifold of intuition, and there would be nothing to prevent an amorphous swarm of mere determinations of the mind from filling the soul. Thus it is conceivable that the cognition of the manifold would be impossible without both the form-giving and the acquisitive forces. However, whereas in the case of the understanding and the cognition of the manifold the arrangement of these forces is one and permanent, in the case of the soul in its relation to a given valuation of values the arrangement of the soul's opposing forces is not permanent but changeable.32

As we have seen, Nietzsche thinks there are two integrally related systems of reason: little reason and the great reason of the body. Little reason consists of the understanding and the soul, and the understanding falls entirely within the scope of the broader function of the soul. The understanding produces the cognition of the manifold

32 In the fourth chapter of his Zarathustra Nietzsche claims that the soul is just something about the body, but I have shown that both the understanding and the soul are opposing forces. When we take into account Kant’s notion that matter consists simply of an arrangement opposing forces, these three ideas suggest a
while the soul produces a valuation of values that determines all of the I's activity, for this valuation of values is a valuation of all of the perceptual values that the understanding brings forth when it produces the cognition of the manifold as well as of all of the extra-perceptual values that it creates while laboring under this valuation.

Nietzsche thinks that the I is always informed by a cognition of itself and that the I in each case forms this cognition in terms of primordial feelings about a change in the conditions of body and life that is conveyed to little reason by the great reason of the body, and we can think of these feelings as effects of body and life on reason's capacity for receptivity and on the inner sense where they take the form of appearances in the intuition, time. It is in terms of these appearances that the I, prompted by the feelings conveyed through these appearances, then cognizes itself. However, the I does not, in this way, cognize itself as it is in itself, but only as it appears to itself in the inner sense whose form is time. The I's cognition of itself determines the way it cognizes or values all of its values, this valuation of values determines all of the I's activity, and this cognition also determines an arrangement of the soul's opposing form-giving and acquisitive forces that bind the I to this valuation of values. Since I give, in the next chapter, a thorough account of the great reason of the body, little reason, I will conclude this chapter by illustrating some of the main points of my interpretation of the A deduction.

**Section Ten:**

**Further Illustrations**

First, I will provide further illustrations designed to clarify the nature of the concepts of the understanding, synthesis, and consciousness and their role in the solution to the mind body problem, namely that the body is simply a different arrangement of the opposing forces exhibited by the understanding and the soul. I discuss this solution in chapter seven.
Consider the following diagram, which I will hereafter refer to as the *original diagram* so as to distinguish it from the various objects of perception and thought that it makes possible:

I propose that this diagram serve as an analogy for the manifold of appearances given in intuition, and to avoid confusing the analogy with that to which it is analogous I will refer to it as "the manifold given in the original diagram." But before any use is made of this diagram, it must first be made clear that in so much as this diagram is perceptible and something of which we are conscious, it serves as but a very limited analogy for the manifold of appearances given in intuition. In B 160, Kant says that the synthesis of apprehension is a “composition” of the manifold of appearances and that it that makes perception of that manifold possible. Given this claim, the original diagram could not possibly serve as an instance or example of a manifold given in intuition prior to its having been run through and then taken together in the synthesis of apprehension, for in and of itself the manifold of appearances given in intuition is neither anything that we perceive nor even anything of which we are conscious. On the other hand, the above diagram may be, for this very same reason, just as good an analogy as any other we might

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33 I want to stress that I am providing illustrations and not examples or instances of Kant’s concepts.
34 I would like to thank Rolph Peter Horstmann and the students in his "Philosophische Themen" course at the Humboldt University at Berlin, in which I presented this illustration during the 1999/2000 academic year, for their comments on my diagram and on my reading of Kant.
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use, provided of course that its limitations are borne clearly in mind. So let the original diagram serve as an analogy for the manifold given in intuition upon which the synthesis of apprehension is then brought to bear.

First, we can illustrate the act of synthesis of apprehension of the manifold in a given intuition and its unity of rule using an *apprehension* of the original diagram, which I will call the A Cube:

![A Cube](image1)

![Original Diagram](image2)

First, it will be clear that the A Cube is the product of an act of synthesis of the manifold of appearances given in the original diagram, and since we have assumed that the original diagram serves as an analogy for the manifold given in intuition we will also assume that this act of synthesis is analogous to the synthesis of apprehension in intuition. There is, of course, no cube, or any object for that matter, in the original diagram, and looking at the diagram is therefore not tantamount to “seeing” the A cube. The A Cube is only “there” in the original diagram if one synthesizes its manifold appearances into a unity according to the concept ‘cube.’ Since this concept plays a role analogous to that which the

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35 There are, of course, illustrations that would do more to dramatize the potential disparity between mere appearances on the one hand and representations and cognitions on the other. For example, I am currently working on a lecture on the deductions in which I use a manifold of dots as an analogy for a manifold given in intuition, and my goal is to create a brief computer generated animated video in which this manifold of dots is synthesized into various unities of rule - cube, pyramid, sphere, etc. However, the value of this approach is merely pedagogical since in Kant's view this manifold is neither known nor perceived prior to synthesis and we therefore have no way of knowing the extent to which this or any illustration represents the manifold prior to synthesis.
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categories play in bringing about unity of rule in the manifold given in intuition, we will assume that this unity of the manifold given in the original diagram is an analogy for unity of rule in the manifold given in intuition and that the concept ‘cube’ is an analogy for the categories of the understanding.

We can distinguish the *act* of synthesizing the manifold given in the original diagram from the unity of rule in which it results. For in the *act* of synthesizing the manifold given in the original diagram we *run through* it, we *take it together* into our consciousness *in a certain way*, and we draw it into *a unity* according to the concept ‘cube.’ We can distinguish this unity from the act of synthesis that produces it once we have made it clear that it is none other than the act that produces this unity. This unity of rule, the particular unity that is the A Cube, is clearly not accidental, yet neither is it a *necessary* result of the mere act of synthesis. Instead, it is a unity determined by a particular concept, namely the concept ‘cube,’ that is brought about through an act of synthesis, and so we can say that this act of synthesis is guided by the concept ‘cube.’

Consider the following unities of rule:

![Diagram](image.png)

**B Cube**  **C Plane Figure Puzzle**  **D Line Puzzle**

It will be clear that each of the three figures, B, C, D, have been produced by an act of running through and taking together the manifold given in the original diagram, and we will assume this act of synthesis of apprehension of the manifold given in the original
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Diagram to be analogous to the act of synthesis of apprehension in intuition. However, it will be equally clear that each of these figures differs significantly from the A Cube, which we said was also produced by an act of synthesis of apprehension. But if it was the act of synthesis of apprehension alone that brought about the A Cube, then the acts of synthesis involved in the production of B, C, and D would not have resulted in the figures B, C, and D, but in the A Cube. Therefore, synthesis alone does not bring about any particular unity of rule, so it therefore cannot by itself account for the particular unity of rule in the manifold given in the original diagram that is the A Cube. How, then, do we account for the unity of rule that is the A Cube? While this unity of rule is clearly brought about by an act of synthesis, the particular unity of rule that synthesis brings about is determined by the concept that determines what the act of synthesis does or produces. And if we assume that the roles played by synthesis and concept in the production of the cognition of the manifold are the same as in this analogy, then synthesis of apprehension and unity of rule are distinct from one another and they play very different, even if integrally related, roles in the production of the cognition of the manifold.

We can also use this illustration to show how the unity of rule that is brought about by the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition is related to synthesis of reproduction in the imagination, and we can show that, how, and also why unity of rule must be grounded in consciousness. Once one has apprehended the manifold given in the original diagram as the A Cube, one can (try it if you like) continuously reproduce it as such, but in so doing, one engages in an activity of synthetic reproduction in which one reproduces precisely the unity of rule that is the A Cube, though only in the imagination; and it is clear that this unity of rule is reproduced only in the imagination from the fact
that the A Cube is not really *there* in the original diagram, a fact that can be established simply by discontinuing the consciousness by means of which one continuously reproduces that synthetic unity or cube. As for its continuous reproduction, however, the A Cube is reproduced only *if* and *in so much as* one is conscious of 1) the initial act of synthesis of apprehension in which the manifold given in the original diagram is identified with the concept ‘cube’ and of 2) the unity of rule in which this act results *and* of 3) the identity of this unity of rule with its reproduction in the imagination, for seeing the A Cube in the original diagram is nothing but the unbroken consciousness of these mental contents, of the acts by which they are produced and reproduced, and of the relations between them. Kant distinguishes this consciousness from reproduction of unity of rule in the imagination, but he thinks that this consciousness is a higher, transcendental condition in which synthesis of reproduction is *grounded*, and so he says that synthesis of reproduction is one of the “transcendental actions of the mind.”(A 103)

It is an all important point that this reproductive synthesis takes place *only in the imagination*, and this point is illustrated, as I have said, by the fact that the A Cube is not objectively present in the manifold given in the original diagram. As we have seen, prior to the act of the synthesis of apprehension, which is a mere function of the imagination, the A Cube is not even present in the manifold given in the original diagram as a unity of rule. So once the unity of rule that is the A Cube is brought about in the manifold given in the original diagram by an act of synthesis of apprehension, it is “there,” not as something objectively present in the original diagram, but only in the imagination *through the activity of reproductive synthesis*. And if, for the moment, we allow the A Cube to serve, not as an analogy for the cognition of the manifold, but instead as an
analogy for a single object of perception and thought, then we can see, quite clearly, how the reproduction of the initial apprehension of the manifold of appearances given in intuition would make possible such aspects of the empirical imagination as associative reproduction.

For example, so long as the \textbf{A} Cube is continuously reproduced in the imagination, the sight of it in the original diagram will bring to mind such associations as ‘three dimensional figure’, ‘six sided figure’, ‘squareness’, and so on. Conversely, if the manifold that is the \textbf{A} Cube were not continuously reproduced, and if, instead, the manifold of appearances in the original diagram were now changed into the plane figure puzzle, now into the line puzzle, now into something else, then the empirical imagination would never have the chance to create connections between the representations and to call up the above mentioned associations. So the illustration allows us to see how the role that synthesis of reproduction plays in the production of the cognition of the manifold makes possible the empirical imagination.

We can also use this illustration to show how synthesis of recognition in the concept works. It is clear that the source of the reproduction of the \textbf{A} Cube in the original diagram is not the original diagram itself. In fact, not even so much as the conceptual source of the \textbf{A} Cube itself is to be found in the original diagram. For while the manifold of intuition in the original diagram provides the material and occasion for the \textbf{A} Cube, the \textbf{A} Cube as such has its source in the act of synthesis, in the concept according to which the synthesis is carried out, and in the unity of rule in which this synthesis according to a concept results. And the continuous appearance in the original diagram of the unity of rule that is the \textbf{A} Cube, i.e. its being there and appearing to us \textit{as} an object that is present
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in the original diagram, is grounded neither in the manifold given in original diagram nor in a thing in itself, but in the reproduction of that unity of rule in the imagination, and the perpetuation of this synthesis of reproduction has its source in nothing but the consciousness of the initial act of synthesis and of the unity of rule in which it results and in the identification of the unity of rule in the original diagram and its reproduction in the imagination. This claim can be clearly illustrated if we note that the “objective presence” of the \textit{A} Cube in the original diagram dissipates just as soon as our consciousness of the act by which the unity of rule that is the \textit{A} Cube was produced and of the reproduction of this unity of rule in the imagination is sufficiently disrupted, for as soon as this consciousness is disrupted, I lose track, as it were, of what I am doing, i.e. I lose consciousness of the act of synthesis, and I thus lose sight of the \textit{A} cube.

Thus, the \textit{objecthood} of the \textit{A} Cube is simply a matter of our being and remaining conscious of the initial synthesis of apprehension, of the unity of rule in which it results, and of the identity of the unity of rule and its reproduction, and nothing more. Similarly, experience (i.e. the cognition of the manifold) and objects of experience are not continuous and objective due to objectively present objects in the manifold given in empirical intuition, for there is, in that manifold, neither objective experience as we know it nor individual objects of experience like the ball of wax on my desk. It is only through the activity of the mind that the manifold is presented in a unity according to concepts, and if this unity according to concepts is to yield objects and objective experience, then it must be grounded in a higher condition. Kant says that in order for reproductive synthesis to be effective, it must be connected with the synthesis of recognition in the concept, and he articulates this synthesis of recognition in terms of a “consciousness that that which
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we think is the very same as what we thought a moment before.” As we have seen, it is the synthesis of apprehension that first provides the object of this consciousness, for it provides the initial apprehension-according-to-a-concept of the manifold given in intuition, i.e. the unity of rule, which is perpetuated by the reproductive synthesis in the imagination. But reproductive synthesis can yield experience and objects of thought as we know them only if the consciousness that what I experience or think at one moment is the same as what I experienced or thought at a previous moment, for it is only through such consciousness that objective unity is brought about in the unity of rule.

Consider, again, the A Cube apprehension of the original diagram:

![A Cube](image1)

![Original Diagram](image2)

In order for synthesis of reproduction to be effective and in order for it to make it possible for me to see the A Cube in the original diagram, I must be conscious that I am reproducing the unity of rule that is the A Cube. The synthesis-of-apprehension-produced-unity-of-rule that is the A Cube is a unity of the manifold that has been determined by concepts, and this unity of rule is therefore something thought; and the reproduction of this unity of rule in the imagination is the reproduction of that concept determined unity of the manifold, and it too is thus something thought. But in order for this reproduction to be to be effective in the experience of the cube, i.e. in the production of the cognition of the manifold, I must be conscious, even if my consciousness is only

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36 First Critique, A 103.
very weak, that the unity of rule that I think in the synthesis of apprehension is the same as the unity of rule that I think in its reproduction in the imagination, and I must be conscious that the reproduction of this unity of rule at one moment is the same as its reproduction at another moment. Otherwise, I would experience the A Cube, not as an object that obeyed the law A = A, but as a new object in each and every moment. One can see that this is so for oneself simply by observing the manner in which one is able to see, continuously, one and the same A Cube in the original diagram, for in so doing, one realizes that one is only able to continue seeing that cube by remaining conscious that the cube one sees in the imagination is but the synthetic unity one has brought about in the manifold given in the original diagram. In fact, it is nothing but the consciousness that 1) the initial act of apprehension of the manifold in the original diagram according to a concept produced the A Cube and 2) the consciousness that it is this initial synthesis of apprehension that I am reproducing in the imagination which allows me to then think the unity of rule that is the A Cube conceptually as a cube in the judgement ‘This is a cube.’

The cognition or thought that what I see before me in the original diagram is a cube “consists solely in the consciousness of this (initial) unity of the synthesis.”37 So when I think that what I see before me in the manifold given in the original diagram is a cube, as in the thought ‘This is a cube’, I am merely demonstrating that my consciousness is one in which the synthetic unity that I myself brought about in that manifold in the act of synthesis of apprehension is identified with its reproduction in the imagination. For all I really do when I think ‘This is a cube’ is to identify the representation, say the representation that is the A Cube, with the concept ‘cube,’ but in so doing, I am but

37 Ibid., A 103. (My parenthetical remark.)
demonstrating my consciousness of the fact that in the synthesis of apprehension, I identified this concept with the manifold given in the original diagram to bring about the unity that is that is the A Cube. Kant says, "it is this one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also reproduced, into one representation." He also says that this one representation may not initially be clear and that it therefore stands in need of analysis. However, it is nothing other than the representation that we first produce through the synthesis of apprehension that we then analyze and think about and eventually explicitly conceptualize so as to produce knowledge like that contained in the proposition ‘This (the A Cube) is a cube.’ However, this explicit knowledge was implicit in the representation that I brought about through the synthesis of apprehension. Kant makes it very clear that analysis presupposes the synthesis of apprehension by means of which concepts are first infused into the manifold given in intuition, and the present illustration allows us to see how this process works.

It will be clear from the A Cube illustration that it is only after and because I apprehend the manifold according to the concept ‘cube’ and given that I continuously reproduce the unity of rule in which that synthesis results that I have before me a representation that can be experienced and thought in a way that makes it possible for me to formulate the thought ‘This is a cube.’ This thought consists in discovering in the raw and confused representation that is the A Cube nothing more or other than the concept ‘cube’ that I myself first put into the manifold given in the original diagram through the synthesis of apprehension in which I ran through and took up this manifold according to a concept, i.e. in which I identified the manifold with the concept ‘cube.’ And once again, 38

38 Ibid., A 103.
the consciousness that holds this cube in place, as it were, is nothing but a consciousness
of 1.) the act of synthesis and of 2.) the unity of rule in the intuition in which this act
results and of 3.) the fact that it is this unity of rule that is reproduced in the imagination.
Furthermore, it is nothing but this consciousness and its formal manifestation in the
concept of an object = X that renders necessary the unity of all cognition that I have in
connection with the A Cube.

Kant’s says that the unity of cognition that the object necessitates is “nothing
other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the
representations.” 39 Consider, once again, the original diagram:

It is precisely my consciousness that makes necessary the unity of the representations that
I think in connection with the cube, i.e. the object, or that I see in the original diagram,
namely the A Cube. For example, it is my consciousness of the act of synthesis of the
manifold given in the original diagram, and nothing else or more (certainly nothing in the
diagram itself and certainly nothing outside my mind) that continuously determines or
unifies the manifold given in the original diagram in a manner that makes the two
thoughts “the side labeled a, a, a, a is in front of the side labeled b, b, b, b” and “the side
labeled b, b, b, b is behind the side a, a, a, a” agree, not only with the object I see in the
original diagram, but also with each other. The logical agreement, with the object and

39 Ibid., A 105.
with each other, of these and any other thoughts that I might formulate about the A Cube is grounded in nothing more or other than the merely formal unity that is my consciousness of the synthesis of apprehension and of the manifold of appearances given in the original diagram and of the reproduction of that unity in my imagination and of the identity of this unity of rule with its reproduction in the imagination. For if my consciousness of these things were to cease, I would no longer be able to think or even to “see” the A Cube in the original diagram even though I would still see the diagram itself, and there would no longer be “present” in the manifold given in the original diagram any object of which I could even so much as think the thought ‘the side \( a, a, a, a \) is in front of the side \( b, b, b, b \)’ or the thought ‘the side \( b, b, b, b \) is behind the side \( a, a, a, a \)’, let alone an object that necessitated the agreement of these thoughts with itself and with each other. Thus, it is in and through precisely this consciousness, and nothing more or other, that “the relation of all cognition to its object carries something of necessity with it.”

The illustration can also be used to clarify the nature and causes of the opacity of consciousness in the cognition of the manifold. As has been shown, seeing a given object like the A Cube in the original diagram is only possible if one has synthesized the manifold contained in that diagram according to a concept and is conscious of that synthesis. As we have seen, it is only by being and remaining conscious of this synthesis that one is able to see and to continue seeing the A Cube in that diagram, for seeing the object is nothing but being conscious of the synthesis by means of which it is brought about and perpetuated. Yet in spite of the fact that it is possible to see other objects in the original diagram, it often happens that when one encounters the diagram for the first time,

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40 Ibid., A 104.
one immediately sees therein only a single object, like the A Cube, and identifies the diagram with this cube by thinking it to be a drawing intended to depict the A Cube. But how can this be so when the object is only there to be seen due to one's having oneself synthesized the manifold given in the original diagram? Clearly there is no denying either that what one sees is the product of one's having synthesized the manifold according to a concept or that one must be conscious of this synthesis, and yet such a one also seems not to be conscious of this synthesis. In other words, one's consciousness must have as its object the act of synthesis by means of which the A Cube was brought about, and yet one is clearly not fully conscious of this synthesis. It would seem, then, that the result of the synthesis, i.e. the A Cube, upstages the act of synthesis by means of which this cube is brought about and made to appear, and it would seem that it does so in such a way that while one is and must be conscious of this synthesis, one is only conscious of it in the result of the act of synthesis. It would therefore seem that the act of synthesis, though it must be part of the object of consciousness, is pushed to the margins of consciousness by the very result of that act, and we can imagine that it is in a similar manner that consciousness is rendered opaque in the cognition of the manifold.

As for the opposing forces of the understanding, we can see them in ourselves if we reflect merely on the original diagram without apprehending it according to any concept. In so doing, we find both that we are compelled to integrate the diagram into our consciousness and that we are compelled to thus integrate it as something, i.e. as one of the cubes, or as plane figure puzzle, or as the line puzzle. The compulsion to integrate the diagram into our consciousness serves as an illustration of the acquisitive force, while the compulsion to integrate it into our consciousness as something serves as an illustration of
the form-giving force. Further reflection will reveal that the compulsion to integrate the

diagram into our consciousness as something is a powerful and predominant tendency,
and this tendency serves to illustrate the idea that opposing forces of the understanding
exhibit a fixed arrangement in which the form-giving force prevails over the acquisitive
force. In the next chapter, however, it will be shown that the forces of the soul admit of
various arrangements, and it is the ability of the soul’s opposing forces to be differently
arranged that makes it possible for the spirit to value its values in different ways.

As I said at the beginning of this chapter, my discussion of Kant’s A deduction
and of the conception of reason that it yields serves as the theoretical basis of Nietzsche’s
concept of spirit or little reason. In the next chapter I will assume the Kantian concept of
reason in my discussion Nietzsche’s account of how the great reason of body influences
little reason, or the spirit, so as to cause it to take on the various forms represented the
camel, the lion and the child in the first speech.