Litigating Nonhuman Animal Legal Personhood

Richard L. Cupp, Jr.

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/richard_cupp/2/
LITIGATING NONHUMAN ANIMAL LEGAL PERSONHOOD

Richard L. Cupp, Jr.*

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2017 a New York appellate court issued a landmark ruling rejecting an animal rights organization’s efforts to assign legal personhood status to chimpanzees in Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery.¹ This Article provides context for the ruling and includes an amicus curiae brief the Author filed in the case. The court discussed the amicus curiae brief in explaining its ruling, and a prominent animal law blog described the court’s decision as “[c]iting to and relying on” the brief.² The brief asserts and the court ruled that rights are broadly connected to humans’ norm of capacity for legal duties and that because chimpanzees cannot bear legal duties they cannot be legal persons.³ Animal personhood litigation is in its infancy. The 2017 Lavery decision will be debated and cited for many years because the court directly embraced legal personhood’s foundational connection to the human community rather than dismissing the case on narrow grounds.⁴ This Article illuminates the reasoning behind the court’s decision and the argument that society should focus on evolving norms of human responsibility toward animals’ welfare rather than on the pretense of animal legal personhood.

I. INTRODUCTION

The issue of legal personhood for intelligent nonhuman animals,

* John W. Wade Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.
³ See Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d at 396; see infra Part IV (detailing the Author’s amicus curiae brief).
⁴ See Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d at 396–97.
long a subject of intense debate among legal academics and philosophers, has spread into the courts. In late 2013, an animal rights organization named the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (NhRP) filed three related lawsuits in New York seeking to force the relocation of a total of four chimpanzees to a sanctuary in Florida. The lawsuits argued that the chimpanzees should be considered legal persons. As legal persons, the NhRP asserted, the chimpanzees were eligible for release from unlawful imprisonment under the common law writ of habeas corpus. The NhRP pointed out that habeas corpus is not restricted to situations involving unlawful detention by the government; it has also been utilized by courts when a person’s liberty is unlawfully restrained by a nongovernment actor.

In addition to the landmark 2017 decision by the Appellate Division of the First Judicial Department that is the focus of this paper, other New York appellate courts have issued rulings that will likely have less long-term influence on the animal personhood debate. Although the NhRP’s arguments have not persuaded any judges to rule in the NhRP’s favor thus far, the lawsuits are continuing and evolving. Further, despite their early courtroom failures, the lawsuits have been successful in generating enormous publicity. In addition to numerous television, radio, print, and digital media news stories around the world—perhaps

5. See, e.g., id. For purposes of brevity in this Article, “nonhuman animals” will hereinafter be referred to as “animals.”
7. See id.
11. Regarding the other appellate decisions, see, e.g., Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.3d at 249; In re Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Presti, 999 N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). Although the First Department’s 2017 ruling may have more impact as the more recent decision, whether the Third Department’s Lavery I decision is less significant may be debatable. See infra Part II (discussing the importance of the Third Department’s Lavery I decision).
spearheaded by prominent and repeated coverage in the New York Times—the lawsuits were highlighted in an HBO documentary entitled Unlocking the Cage in 2016. The celebrity chimpanzee expert Jane Goodall serves on the NhRP’s board of directors, and other celebrities such as Jon Stewart and Alec Baldwin have expressed support for the lawsuits. The prominent legal scholar Laurence Tribe has actively supported the lawsuits, as has prominent and controversial philosopher Peter Singer.

Litigation seeking animal legal personhood is not a passing phenomenon. It is in its infancy and will likely continue and expand into the foreseeable future. The NhRP has indicated that it will continue adding lawsuits, with the next target likely being elephants. It is also considering lawsuits involving orcas or other cetaceans.

The push for animal legal personhood began with a widely discussed book entitled Rattling the Cage, which was published by NhRP president Steven Wise in 2000. The book relied heavily on research indicating that chimpanzees typically have strong

---


20. See Karin Brulliard, This Man Is Trying to Help Chimps — and Soon, Elephants — Sue Their Owners, WASH. POST (May 24th, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/animals/wp/2016/05/24/this-man-is-helping-chimps-and-soon-elephants-sue-their-owners/?utm_term=.523f582942f3 (“As with chimps, we will argue that elephants are autonomous beings who should not be enslaved or kept in cages.”).

21. See id.

intelligent. Wise argued that chimpanzees’ cognitive abilities are sufficiently strong and that they have “realistic autonomy” or “practical autonomy.” He argued that, regardless of their species, individuals with practical autonomy should be considered legal persons based on liberty and equality interests. The lawsuits also focus on liberty and equality interests in arguing for chimpanzee legal personhood.

In Part II, this Article analyzes the background context of the First Department’s Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery decision. Part III briefly summarizes the court’s landmark 2017 decision. Part IV provides the text of the Author’s amicus curiae brief. A prominent animal law blog described the court as “[c]iting to and relying on” the amicus curiae brief in reaching its decision.

II. CONTEXT FOR THE FIRST DEPARTMENT’S MATTER OF NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC. V. LAVERY DECISION

The most prominent appellate decision in the chimpanzee lawsuits prior to the First Department’s 2017 Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery ruling involved the same parties. The original Lavery habeas corpus lawsuit (Lavery I) was filed in Fulton County, New York, in the Third Department of the New York Supreme Court. The lawsuit centered on a chimpanzee named Tommy. Tommy appeared in movies, and he was later kept at a private facility in Fulton County. After a trial court rejected the Lavery I lawsuit, the Appellate Division of the Third Department ruled on the case in late 2014.

As with all of its lawsuits, in Lavery I the NhRP provided declarations from several chimpanzee experts highlighting chimpanzees’ strong cognitive abilities in arguing that Tommy is a legal person being unlawfully detained. The Third Department Appellate Court found it notable that:

24. See RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 22, at 248.
27. See Petitioner’s Lavery I Memorandum, supra note 9, at 49–52.
29. Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d at 392; see infra Part III.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See Halpern, supra note 2.
33. Id. at 248.
34. Id.
36. Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
37. See id. at 249.
We have not been asked to evaluate the quality of Tommy’s current living conditions in an effort to improve his welfare. In fact, petitioner’s counsel stated at oral argument that it does not allege that respondents are in violation of any state or federal statutes respecting the domestic possession of wild animals . . . .

Instead, the NhRP argued that “the statutes themselves are inappropriate.”

The five judges of the Third Department Appellate Court hearing the case unanimously rejected the Lavery I lawsuit. In its later appeal in the First Department (Lavery II), the NhRP asserted that the Lavery I decision “relied almost exclusively” on two law review articles published by the Author.

The first article the Lavery I court quoted, entitled *Children, Chimps, and Rights: Arguments from “Marginal” Cases* (hereinafter *Children, Chimps, and Rights*), was published in 2013 by the *Arizona State Law Journal*. The second article cited in the decision, *Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A Legal/Contractualist Critique* (hereinafter *Moving Beyond*), was published in 2009 by the *San Diego Law Review*. The *Moving Beyond* article broadly explored the societal connections between legal rights and social responsibilities at the core of our societal framework. Referencing John Locke’s contractualist theory that strongly influenced the United States’ founders, the article asserted that legal protections should only be viewed as rights when the norm among individuals for whom rights are sought is the ability to bear sufficient moral responsibility to be legally accountable. The article did not argue that every right must correlate to a specific duty or that only humans capable of bearing societal responsibilities should have rights, but rather that the broad concept of rights in our society assumes a norm of sufficient moral agency to be held legally accountable.

---

38. *Id.* (citation omitted).
39. *Id.*
40. *Id.* at 252.
45. I support strong protections for animals, but I agree with some animal rights activists that only a legal person can hold a legal right. See *id*.
46. See *id.*
Of course, not all individual humans meet the norm of being able to accept responsibilities sufficient to bear legal accountability. *Children, Chimps, and Rights* is the first of two related articles the Author wrote focusing on a challenge to the connection between rights and responsibilities philosophers often refer to as "the argument from marginal cases." The argument from marginal cases asserts that because some "marginal" humans—in particular young children and humans with significant cognitive impairments—have less capacity for autonomy than some intelligent animals, granting personhood based solely on one’s identity as human is irrational.

The *Children, Chimps, and Rights* article rejected the argument from marginal cases as a basis for animal legal personhood and refuted assertions that granting rights to humans with cognitive limitations negates the broad connections between rights and responsibilities woven into our societal foundation. The article focused primarily on the comparisons between young children and intelligent animals highlighted in the argument from marginal cases, leaving deeper analysis of comparisons between other humans with significant cognitive impairments for the later Florida Law Review article. The *Children, Chimps, and Rights* article surveyed the history of granting legal rights to children and found that children’s rights are rooted in their humanity rather than in their individual capacities. Thus, rights and responsibilities are connected in a broad societal framework based on norms and focused on human rights. This connection does not require that every individual human must be capable of bearing responsibilities that are the norm for others in the human community. As detailed in the article, the rights of children are anchored in their belonging to the human community where moral agency, sufficient to be held accountable in society’s legal system, is the norm.

Citing the *Moving Beyond* article, *Lavery I* noted that the connection between rights and responsibilities “stems from principles of social contract, which inspired the ideals of freedom and democracy at the core of our system of government.” Then quoting the *Children, Chimps, and Rights* article, the court added that “rights [are] connected to moral agency

---

47. See *Children, Chimps, and Rights*, supra note 42, at 22–24; see also Richard L. Capp, Jr., *Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal Personhood*, 69 FLA. L. REV. 465 (2017) [hereinafter *Cognitively Impaired Humans*].
49. See generally id.
50. See generally *Cognitively Impaired Humans*, supra note 47.
52. See id. at 12.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 41–48.
and the ability to accept societal responsibility in exchange for [those] rights.\textsuperscript{56}

The court concluded that, because chimpanzees cannot bear legal duties and are not held legally accountable, their protections do not correlate with the concept of legal personhood.\textsuperscript{57} The court recognized the argument from marginal cases which challenge that not all humans with legal personhood are legally accountable, but rejected the argument:

To be sure, some humans are less able to bear legal duties or responsibilities than others. These differences do not alter our analysis, as it is undeniable that, collectively, human beings possess the unique ability to bear legal responsibility. Accordingly, nothing in this decision should be read as limiting the rights of human beings in the context of habeas corpus proceedings or otherwise.\textsuperscript{58}

Rather than rejecting vigorous legal protection of chimpanzees, the court noted significant New York laws addressing appropriate treatment of animals, and pointed out that “while petitioner has failed to establish that common-law relief in the nature of habeas corpus is appropriate here, it is fully able to importune the Legislature to extend further legal protections to chimpanzees.”\textsuperscript{59}

In late 2015, following its defeat in \textit{Lavery I}, the NhRP filed a new habeas petition regarding Tommy in the New York Supreme Court in Manhattan, which is in the state’s First Judicial Department.\textsuperscript{60} In its First Department \textit{Lavery II} petition, the NhRP added some new declarations from chimpanzee researchers and supplemented some of its previous declarations.\textsuperscript{61} The new language in the declarations sought to establish “that chimpanzees routinely bear duties and responsibilities and therefore can be ‘persons’ even under the erroneous \textit{Lavery} holding.”\textsuperscript{62}

After the trial court in Manhattan rejected this new \textit{Lavery II} petition, in late 2016 the NhRP appealed to the Appellate Division of the First Judicial Department.\textsuperscript{63} Following the Author’s filing of the amicus curiae brief (provided below) opposing the NhRP’s appeal, Professors Laurence Tribe, Justin Marceau, and Samuel R. Wisemen filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the NhRP’s appeal.\textsuperscript{64} The court rejected a motion by the NhRP

\textsuperscript{56}. \textit{Id.} (quoting Children, Chimps, and Rights, supra note 42, at 13).
\textsuperscript{57}. \textit{Id.} at 251–52.
\textsuperscript{58}. \textit{Id.} at 251 n.3.
\textsuperscript{59}. \textit{Id.} at 251–52.
\textsuperscript{61}. \textit{See NhRP’s \textit{Lavery II} Appellate Brief, supra note 41.}
\textsuperscript{62}. \textit{Id.} at 29.
\textsuperscript{63}. \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{64}. \textit{See infra Part IV.} Much of the Author’s amicus curiae brief is excerpted from Richard L. Cupp, Jr.’s works. \textit{See Cognitively Impaired Humans, supra note 47; see also Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Focusing on

III. THE LAVERY II APPELLATE COURT’S DECISION

The First Department issued its unanimous decision rejecting the Lavery II appeal in June 2017. The decision will be debated and cited for many years because the court directly embraced legal personhood’s foundational connection to the human community rather than dismissing the case solely on narrow grounds.

The First Department’s decision roughly tracks the organization of the amicus curiae brief provided below. The decision began by adopting the amicus brief’s opening argument. The brief argued, and the court held, that the NhRP’s appeal was not sufficiently different from an earlier habeas petition that had been rejected by another New York court. This argument is fleshed out in Part II of the brief below.

The court then expressed agreement with the Third Department’s Lavery I decision and with the Author’s amicus curiae brief that legal personhood reflects a foundational connection between legal rights and legal duties. As addressed in Part III of the amicus curiae brief, this does not mean that every legal right has a specific correlative legal duty. Rather, our society is based on the understanding that societal membership and legal duties are, as the norm, broadly connected. The court held that legal personhood is not appropriate for animals because animals are not capable of bearing legal duties. The court contrasted this with the human community, where capacity to bear legal duties is the norm.

The court discussed two amicus curiae briefs in its decision. It first addressed the brief filed by Professor Lawrence Tribe in favor of the NhRP’s appeal. The court noted that Professor Tribe’s argument that legal duties can be imposed on animals, citing a “long history, mainly from the medieval and early modern periods, of animals being tried for offenses such

---

70. See id.
71. See infra Part IV (laying out the Author’s amicus curiae brief).
72. See infra Part IV.
73. Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d at 394; see infra Part IV.
74. See infra Part IV.
75. Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d at 396.
76. See infra Part IV.
77. See infra Part IV.
78. Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d at 396.
79. See id. at 396–97.
80. See id. at 396.
81. Id.
as attacking human beings and eating crops . . . ."82 The court was not persuaded, pointing out that “none of the cases cited took place in modern times or in New York.”83

The court then addressed the Author’s amicus curiae brief.84 Immediately following its discussion of Professor Tribe’s brief, the court stated:

Moreover, as noted in an amicus brief submitted by Professor Richard Cupp, nonhumans lack sufficient responsibility to have any legal standing, which, according to Cupp is why even chimpanzees who have caused death or serious injury to human beings have not been prosecuted.85

The court went on to adopt reasoning of the Author’s amicus curiae brief that the inability of some humans, such as infants, to bear legal duties does not negate the foundational relationship between rights and duties because “[t]his argument ignores the fact that these are still human beings, members of the human community.”86 The court’s analysis regarding infants follows Part IV of the Author’s amicus curiae brief, which analyzes the legal personhood of children and other humans with cognitive limitations as being anchored in the human community.87

The court concluded by ruling that the concept of legal personhood is not a mere term of art that may be divorced from humans and their proxies (such as corporations) in the United States, and that the NhRP’s petition is also invalid because it “does not challenge the legality of the chimpanzees’ detention, but merely seeks their transfer to a different facility.”88

Shortly after the Lavery II decision was issued, the NhRP indicated that it would seek leave to appeal to New York’s highest court, the New York Court of Appeals.89 However, the New York Court of Appeals previously declined to grant the NhRP leave to appeal the Lavery I decision.90

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.; see infra Part IV.
88. Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d at 394.
IV. ARGUING AGAINST ANIMAL LEGAL PERSONHOOD: THE AUTHOR’S AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF91

New York County Clerk’s Index No. 162358/15

91. The original numbering of the amicus brief’s footnotes is retained below.
New York Supreme Court
APPELLATE DIVISION – FIRST DEPARTMENT

In the Matter of a Proceeding under Article 70 of the CPLR For a Writ of Habeas Corpus

THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., on behalf of TOMMY,

Petitioner-Appellant, Against

PATRICK C. LAVERY, individually and as an officer of Circle L. Trailer Sales, Inc., DIANE L. LAVERY, and CIRCLE L TRAILER SALES, INC.,

Respondents-Respondents

LETTER-BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE RICHARD L. CUPP JR. IN OPPOSITION TO PETITIONER-APPELLANT’S APPEAL OF DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In December, 2015 the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, denied the motion of Petitioner-Appellant Nonhuman Rights Project Inc. (hereafter “NhRP”) for an Order to Show Cause and Writ of Habeas Corpus. This Letter-Brief argues that the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, should deny the NhRP’s appeal of that ruling.
In appropriately declining to sign the NhRP’s proposed order to show cause, the trial court wrote: “Declined, to the extent that the courts in the Third Dept. determined the legality of Tommy’s detention, an issue best addressed there, & absent any allegation or ground that is sufficiently distinct from those set forth in the first petition (CPLR 70039b)[].”


II. THE NHRP ASSERTED CHIMPANZEES’ ABILITY TO BEAR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THEIR EARLIER TOMMY LAWSUIT THAT WAS REJECTED

The NhRP argues that “the Second Tommy petition presented substantial new grounds not previously presented and determined in response to Lavery.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 29. The alleged “new grounds” are affidavits “demonstrat[ing] that chimpanzees routinely bear duties and responsibilities and therefore can be ‘persons’ even under the erroneous Lavery holding.” Id. However, this is not a new issue in the litigation. The NhRP asserted in its first brief in the original Tommy Fulton County lawsuit filed in 2013 that chimpanzees possess moral agency, and it cited expert affidavits in support of this assertion. The brief stated:

Chimpanzees appear to have moral inclinations and some level of moral agency; they behave in ways that, if we saw the same thing in humans, we would interpret as a reflection of moral imperatives (McGrew Aff. at ¶ 26). They ostracize individuals who violate social norms (McGrew Aff. at ¶ 26). They respond negatively to inequitable situations, e.g. when offered lower rewards than companions receiving higher ones, for the same task (McGrew Aff. at ¶ 26). When given a chance to play economic games, such as the Ultimatum Game, they spontaneously make fair offers, even when not obliged to do so (McGrew Aff. at ¶ 26).

The brief also asserted:

The evidence that chimpanzees and humans share the capacity for "autonomy" is strong (King Aff. at ¶¶ 11; Osvath Aff. at ¶ 11). Autonomous behavior demonstrates that a choice was made; it was not based on reflexes, innate behaviors, or any conventional categories of learning, or concept formation (King Aff. at ¶¶ 3–4).

Essentially, the new affidavits submitted by the NhRP following the Lavery decision simply repeat and provide more details on issues that the NhRP previously raised in its original Tommy lawsuit that was dismissed.

III. THE NHRP’S BRIEF FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF HUMANS’ AND THEIR PROXIES’ CAPACITY TO BEAR LEGAL DUTIES

The NhRP’s efforts to utilize additions to previous expert affidavits and some new expert affidavits to strengthen the argument already made in the original Tommy lawsuit that chimpanzees have some sense of moral responsibility in their relationships is the most notable distinction between the original Tommy lawsuit and the present Tommy lawsuit. This is in response to the Lavery court’s unanimous decision recognizing that chimpanzees are not persons in our legal system because they are not capable of bearing legal duties. Lavery, 124 A.D.3d at 152.

The Lavery court’s focus was on legal accountability, not on whether chimpanzees have some sense of accountability. (“Needless to say, unlike human beings, chimpanzees cannot bear any legal duties, submit to societal...
responsibilities or be held legally accountable for their actions”). Id. Whether chimpanzees could be described as having some capacity for moral responsibility in their relationships is quite obviously not the pertinent question regarding legal personhood under our human legal system. Common sense suggest that ants, whose ability to work together for the greater good of their colony is observable even by non-experts, could probably be described as having something like a sense of responsibility toward the other ants in their colony or to the colony as a whole. Across many species of animals, mothers and, among some species, fathers demonstrate characteristics that probably could be described in terms of a sense of responsibility for their young offspring. Absent this capacity for responsibility in a parent, in many species the young would die. Perhaps any type of mature animal that lives cooperatively in some kind of family or group normally has something like a sense of responsibility to the other animals in the family or group.

But of course we do not assign legal duties to ants or to any other nonhuman animals. The pertinent question is not whether chimpanzees possess anything that could be characterized as a sense of responsibility, but rather whether they possess a sufficient level of moral agency to be justly held legally accountable as well as to possess legal rights under our human legal system. When, in 2012, an adult chimpanzee at the Los Angeles Zoo beat a three-month-old baby chimpanzee in the head until the baby died, doubtless no authorities seriously contemplated charging the perpetrator in criminal court. Similarly, when, in 2009, a chimpanzee attacked a woman in a manner that police described as “unprovoked” and as “brutal and lengthy,” causing severe, life-threatening injuries, doubtless no authorities seriously considered bringing criminal battery charges against the chimpanzee.

According to the NhRP website, NhRP President Steven Wise has a poster at his home office that reads “[w]e may be the only lawyers on earth whose clients are always innocent.” This makes the point. As confirmed by the unanimous Lavery decision, our legal system appropriately does not view chimpanzees as possessing sufficient moral agency to be accountable under our human legal system. Lavery, 124 A.D.3d at 152. A typical prosecutor in the United States would not even entertain the idea of seeking to impose legal responsibilities on chimpanzees based on the concept of


moral responsibility. Whether chimpanzees possess some degree of a quality that could be described as moral responsibility is irrelevant; they can only interact with our society in a manner that suggests they should be legal persons with rights and duties if they have sufficient moral agency to be generally held accountable under our laws.

The NhRP’s brief argues that “[t]he two Cupp articles merely set forth one professor’s personal preference for a narrow philosophical contractualism that arbitrarily excludes every nonhuman animal, while including every human being, in support of which he cites no cases,” Appellant’s Brief at 54. An amicus brief filed opposing the appeal of the original Lavery case responded to a similar assertion by the NhRP that practically no philosophers have supported “rights for being human” by noting “the vast western philosophical canons to the contrary.”

But at an even more fundamental level, the NhRP’s brief is incorrect in seeking to pigeonhole the connections between rights and duties that are at the foundation of our society and our legal system narrowly into any “branch” of an abstract academic philosophical theory, with the apparent implication that the connections should be accepted or rejected based on whatever views are currently fashionable among academic philosophers. Noting that courts do not feel bound by strict adherence to the formal confines of competing academic philosophical theories would be quite an understatement. Philosophical theories may be useful to courts in some endeavors, such as understanding or explaining the foundations of a society, but abstract theoretical philosophy is merely a tool at best. Courts seek justice and are influenced by a multitude of factors, rather than deferring to the shifting sands of current majority, minority, and majority and minority branch positions among theoretical academic philosophers, most of whom have no legal training or experience.

Similarly, the observations and analyses in my law review articles regarding our society and legal system broadly connecting the concepts of rights and duties since our foundation as a nation are not a call for judicial endorsement of any formal academic philosophical theories—or their branches—in all of their particulars. Focusing legal personhood on humans and their proxies is not arbitrary, but rather a recognition that requiring legal accountability to each other as the norm in a community of humans is at the core of our human society and its legal system. John Locke’s contractualist

---

5. Authorities restrain, confine, or even kill chimpanzees and other animals if they are a threat to humans or to other animals (whether ever killing a violent chimpanzee is ever appropriate is highly questionable, other than in a situation involving an imminent and very serious threat where no other options are available). This is based on a perceived need to protect humans, animals, or property, rather than based on a conclusion that the animal is morally blameworthy.

assertions were appropriately important to our nation’s founders, and thus are important to understanding the foundations and core of our society. But our founders viewed Locke’s ideas as a useful tool for explaining the foundations of a democratic society rather than treating contractualism—much less any of its branches—as a formal academic philosophical theory that must be embraced in all of its particulars as set forth by scholars.

The history of rights expansion in our society has been a history of focusing on the humanity of those who were previously denied rights. As stated in Article I of the United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights adopted after the atrocities of World War II, “All humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward each other in a spirit of brotherhood.” Even the rights evolution of humans with limited autonomy, such as children and individuals with significant cognitive impairments, has appropriately focused on those individuals’ belonging in the human community as the basis for granting them rights.

While there may be no case law prior to Lavery expressly rejecting habeas corpus for animals because no reported lawsuits had previously made such a radical assertion, courts have readily rejected analogous claims. For example, when a lawsuit was brought seeking application of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to orcas held in captivity, a district court dismissed the lawsuit in a short opinion because the Thirteenth Amendment “applies to persons, and not to non-persons such as orcas.”

---

7. See, e.g., Eric G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L. J. 757, 859 (1999) (“Locke’s writings were a primary authority for the Colonists, and his social contract furnished the political theory for both the American Revolution and the framing of the Constitution.”).

8. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. I, Dec. 10th, 1948 (available at http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/). Regarding our legal system’s eventual recognition of slaves as full humans deserving of rights, the famed primatologist Frans de Waal wrote: “rights are part of a social contract that makes no sense without responsibilities. This is the reason that the animal rights movement’s outrageous parallel with the abolition of slavery—apart from being insulting—is morally flawed: slaves can and should become full members of society; animals cannot and will not.” Frans B.M. de Waal, We the People: And Other Animals . . . , NY TIMES, Aug. 20th, 1999 (available at http://www.emory.edu/LIVING/LINKS/OurInnerApe/pdfs/WePeople.html).

9. This Letter-Brief will use the term “cognitive impairments” to refer to all human cognitive limitations, including those related to childhood and intellectual disabilities, as well as being comatose or being impaired due to an injury, illness, or medical condition.

IV. AMONG BEINGS OF WHICH WE ARE AWARE, APPROPRIATE LEGAL PERSONHOOD IS ANCHORED ONLY IN THE HUMAN COMMUNITY

As explained by the philosopher Carl Cohen, “[a]nimals cannot be the bearers of rights because the concept of right is essentially human; it is rooted in the human moral world and has force and applicability only within that world.” Carl Cohen & Tom Regan, The Animal Rights Debate 30 (2001). Our society and government are based on the ideal of moral agents coming together to create a system of rules that entail both rights and duties. Being generally subject to legal duties and bearing rights are foundations of our legal system because they are foundations of our entire form of government.

We stand together with the ideal of a social compact—one might call it a moral community—to uphold all of our rights, including our inalienable rights.11 As stated in the Declaration of Independence, “to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). One would be hard-pressed to convince most Americans that this is not important, as from childhood Americans learn it as a bedrock of our social structure. It is not surprising that the American Bar Association’s section addressing civil liberties was until 2015 called “The Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities.”12

This does not require viewing every specific protection of a right as corresponding to a specific duty imposed on an individual. The connection between rights and duties for personhood is in some aspects broader and more foundational than that. It comes first in the foundations of our society, rather than solely in analysis of specific obligations and rights for persons governed by our laws. As the norm, we insist that persons in our community of humans and human proxies be subjected to responsibilities along with holding rights, regardless of whether a specific right or limitation requires or does not require a specific duty to go along with it.

11. Of course, we have in some instances shamefully failed to follow this ideal, such as in allowing the odious institution of slavery. Because noncitizen humans, even noncitizen unlawful enemy combatants, are human, recognizing some rights for them is consistent with our foundational societal principles. We assert some responsibilities for noncitizens as they interact with our society in addition to recognizing that they have some rights as they interact with our society.

12. See Proposal to Amend §10.1(a) of the ABA Constitution and Bylaws to reflect the name change of the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities to the Section of Civil Rights and Social Justice, Aug. 3–4, 2015 (explaining that the name was being changed from the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities to the Section of Civil Rights and Social Justice because “[t]he Section's activities have always been grounded in Constitutional rights and principles, but have expanded beyond that,” leading to confusion regarding the section’s focus), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2015_hod_annual_meeting_11-2.docx.
It misses the point to argue, as the NhRP seems to do (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 57–58), that personhood is unrelated to duties because bodily liberty is an immunity right that does not require capacity. First, as explained above, this is too narrow a conceptualization of connections between rights and duties: although rights and duties are broadly connected in the foundations of our society, not every specific right needs to correlate with a specific duty. Further, whether bodily liberty requires capacity and hence duties does not control the question of personhood, since the personhood of humans lacking capacity, such as those with significant cognitive limitations, is anchored in the responsible community of humans, even if they cannot make responsible choices themselves.

Humans’ personhood is not based on an individual analysis of intellect, but rather on being part of the human community where moral agency sufficient to accept our laws’ duties as well as their rights is the norm. The NhRP’s argument does not avoid the problem that a chimpanzee, although an impressive being we need to treat with exceptional thoughtfulness, should not be considered a person within our intrinsically human legal system, whereas humans—including humans with significant cognitive limitations—should be recognized as persons.

Professor Wesley Hohfeld wrote about the form of rights and duties between persons in the early twentieth century, and the NhRP’s Appellate Brief seeks to invoke his analysis to argue for chimpanzee legal personhood. Appellate Brief, pp. 56–57. Perhaps the most basic problem with the NhRP’s argument is that we are dealing with a question that must precede the Hohfeldian analysis of the forms of rights granted to persons. Professor Hohfeld’s description of rights assumed it was dealing with the rights of persons.13 This case’s issue revolves around who is a member of society eligible for those rights and protections; in other words, who is a person. This is a foundational question that is not answered by Hohfeldian analysis.14

It is sometimes asserted that since we give corporations personhood, justice requires that we should give personhood to intelligent animals. However, this argument ignores that corporations and other entities granted personhood in the United States are created by humans as a proxy for the

13. Professor Hohfeld stated, “[S]ince the purpose of the law is to regulate the conduct of human beings, all jural relations must, in order to be clear and direct in their meaning, be predicated of such human beings.” Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 721 (1917).

rights and duties of their human stakeholders. They are simply a vehicle for addressing human interests and obligations.

The Appellant’s Brief argues that “if humans bereft even of sentience are entitled to personhood, then this Court must either recognize Tommy’s just equality claim to bodily liberty or reject equality.” Appellant Brief, p. 49. Although not described as such in the Appellant’s Brief, reasoning along these lines is often referred to by philosophers as “the argument from marginal cases.” See Richard L. Cupp Jr., Children, Chimps, and Rights Arguments from “Marginal” Cases, 45 AZ. ST. LAW J. 1, 22–28 (2013). The concept of an “argument from marginal cases” has an unsettling tone, because most of us do not want to think of any humans as being “marginal.” The pervasive view that all humans have distinctive and intrinsic human dignity regardless of their capabilities may have cultural, religious, or even instinctual foundations.

All of these foundations would on their own present enormous challenges for animal legal personhood arguments to overcome in the real world of law, but they are not the only reasons to reject the arguments. Humans with significant cognitive impairments are a part of society’s community, even if their own agency is limited or nonexistent. Among the beings of which we are presently aware, humans are the only ones for whom the norm is capacity for moral agency sufficiently strong to function within our society’s legal system of rights and responsibilities. Further, it may be added that no other beings of whom we are presently aware living today (even, for example, the most intelligent of all chimpanzees) ever meet that norm. Recognizing personhood in our fellow humans regardless of whether they meet the norm is a pairing of like “kind” where the “kind” category has special significance—the significance of the norm being the only creatures who can rationally participate as members of a society subject to a legal system such as ours.

Morally autonomous humans have unique natural bonds with other humans who have cognitive impairments, and thus denying rights to them also harms the interests of society—we are all in a community together. Infants’ primary identities are as humans, and adults with severe cognitive impairments’ primary identities are as humans who are other humans’ parents, siblings, children or spouses.

Humans have all been children and humans in general relate to children in a special way. Further, we all know that we could develop cognitive impairments ourselves at some point in our lives, and this reminds us that humanity is the most defining characteristic of persons with cognitive impairments.

15. This is addressed in more depth in Richard L. Cupp Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A Legal/Contractualist Critique, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27, 52–63 (2009) (analyzing the history of corporate personhood being consistently defined as a proxy for human interests under all major theories seeking to explain corporate personhood).
Thus, recognizing that personhood is anchored in the human moral world does not imply that humans with significant cognitive impairments are not persons or have no rights. As explained by Professor Cohen, “[t]his criticism . . . mistakenly treats the essentially moral feature of humanity as though it were a screen for sorting humans, which it most certainly is not.”

It would be a serious misperception to view the Lavery decision as actually threatening to infants and others with severe cognitive impairments in finding connections between rights and duties. This misperception would reflect an overly narrow view of how rights and duties are connected. Regarding personhood, they are connected with human society as a whole, rather than on an individual-by-individual capacities analysis.17 Again, appropriate legal personhood is anchored in the human moral community, and we include humans with severe cognitive impairments in that community because they are first and foremost humans living in our society.18 Indeed, as noted above, the history of legal rights for children and for cognitively impaired humans is a history of emphasis on their humanity.

V. ANIMAL LEGAL PERSONHOOD AS PROPOSED IN THE TOMMY LAWSUIT WOULD POSE THREATS TO THE MOST VULNERABLE HUMANS

A danger that is underestimated and far out on the horizon may be more likely to advance from threat to harm than a similar danger that is immediate and clearly seen. One of the most serious concerns about legal personhood for intelligent animals is that it presents an unintended, long-term, and perhaps not immediately obvious threat to humans—particularly to the most vulnerable humans.

Among the most vulnerable humans are people with significant cognitive impairments that may give them no capacity for autonomy or less capacity for autonomy than some animals, whether because of age (such as

17. Of course, individual capacities are relevant to some specific rights (for example, the right to vote). They are not relevant to humans’ personhood.
18. Further, the status quo views humans as persons based on their humanity, and infants and other cognitively impaired persons are unquestionably included. It is rejecting this status quo in favor of an approach that denies membership in the human community as the foundation for personhood that would create risk for cognitively impaired humans, not maintaining the status quo.
in infancy), intellectual disabilities or other reasons. To be clear, supporting personhood based on animals’ intelligence does not imply that one wants to reduce the protections afforded humans with cognitive impairments. Indeed, my understanding is that the NhRP seeks to push smart animals up in legal consideration, rather than to pull humans with cognitive impairments down.

However, good intentions sometimes create disastrous results. There should be deep concern that over a long horizon, allowing animal legal personhood based on cognitive abilities could unintentionally lead to gradual erosion of protections for these especially vulnerable humans. The sky would not immediately fall if courts started treating chimpanzees as persons. As noted above, that is part of the challenge in recognizing the danger. But, over time, both the courts and society might be tempted not only to view the most intelligent animals more like we now view humans but also to view the least intelligent humans more like we now view animals.

Professor Laurence Tribe has expressed concern that the approach to legal personhood set forth in a much-discussed book by NhRP President Steven Wise might be harmful for humans with cognitive impairments. Mr. Wise’s book, Rattling the Cage, was published in 2000, and it broke new ground in setting forth arguments for intelligent animal legal personhood. Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage (2000). In 2001 Professor Tribe stated “enormous admiration for [Mr. Wise’s] overall enterprise and approach,” but cautioned:

once we have said that infants and very old people with advanced Alzheimer’s and the comatose have no rights unless we choose to grant them, we must decide about people who are three-quarters of the way to such a condition. I needn’t spell it out, but the possibilities are genocidal and horrific and reminiscent of slavery and of the holocaust.


Mr. Wise later responded in part: “I argue that a realistic or practical autonomy is a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for legal rights. Other grounds for entitlement to basic rights may exist.” But Mr. Wise also noted that, in his view, entitlements to rights cannot be based only on being human. I did not find in the Appellant’s Brief an explanation of why, despite Mr. Wise’s apparent view that being part of the human community is not alone sufficient for personhood; he and the NhRP think courts should recognize personhood in someone like a permanently comatose infant. If the

20. Id. at 650–51. I disagree with Mr. Wise and believe that treating humans distinctively makes sense because the human community is in fact distinctive in important aspects.
argument is that the permanently comatose infant has rights based on dignity interests, but that dignity is not grounded in being a part of the human community, why would this proposed alternative basis for personhood only apply to humans and to particularly intelligent animals? Would all animals capable of suffering, regardless of their level of intelligence, be entitled to personhood based on dignity? If a rights-bearing but permanently comatose infant is not capable of suffering, would even animals that are not capable of suffering be entitled to dignity-based personhood under this position? The implications of some alternative non-cognitive approach to personhood that rejects drawing any lines related to humanity may be exceptionally expansive and problematic.

Further, regardless of the NhRP’s views and desires regarding the rights of cognitively impaired humans, going down the path of connecting individual cognitive abilities to personhood would encourage courts and society to think increasingly about individual cognitive ability when we think about personhood. Over the course of many years, this changed paradigm could gradually erode our enthusiasm for some of the protections provided to humans who would not fare well in a mental capacities analysis. Deciding chimpanzees are legal persons based on the cognitive abilities we have seen in them may open a door that swings in both directions regarding rights for humans as well as for animals, and later generations may well wish we had kept it closed.

21. In his book Drawing the Line, Mr. Wise seems to argue that under equality principles, granting rights to a “baby born into a permanent vegetative state” or to a man with an IQ of ten supports granting rights to what he describes as “Category 2” animals in terms of autonomy values. See Steven M. Wise, Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for Animal Rights 238 (2002). In Category 2, he includes animals such as dogs, African Elephants, and African Grey Parrots, which are known to probably have relatively strong intelligence. Id. at 241. He also asserts that, with animals that are lower on the probability scale of practical autonomy, there is a point at which the disparities in autonomy between the animals and a man with very low intelligence “become small enough to allow a judge to distinguish rationally between that creature and a severely [mentally disabled] man. At some point, the psychological and political barriers to equality for a nonhuman animal with a low autonomy value become insuperable.” Id. at 238. But what if we consider the baby born into a permanent vegetative state instead of an adult with a severe cognitive disability (who may, despite his disability, have some abilities)? Would an equality argument based on individual autonomy, if accepted, suggest personhood for many, many more animal species that may have autonomy equal to or less than that of an adult with a severe cognitive disability but more autonomy than that of an infant born into a permanently vegetative state? In light of our recognition of the legal personhood of an infant born into a permanently vegetative state, how many (or how few) animals would not merit personhood if an equality argument based on individual autonomy were accepted?
VI. THERE IS NO CLEAR OR EVEN FUZZY LINE REGARDING HOW FAR ANIMAL LEGAL PERSONHOOD, IF RECOGNIZED, MIGHT EXTEND

The NhRP has stated that a goal of using these lawsuits is to break through the legal wall between humans and animals.22 But we have no idea how far things might go if the wall is breached. One might suspect that many advocates would push for things to go quite far.

As noted above, in the real world law does not fit perfectly with any single philosophical theory or other academic theory because courts are intensely conscious of the practical, real world consequences of their decisions. One practical consequence that should be expected if the legal wall between animals and humans is broken through is the opening of a floodgate of expansive litigation without a meaningful standard for determining how many of the billions of animals in the world are intelligent enough to merit personhood. The consequences of this lawsuit are not, in any way, limited to only the smartest animals.

How many species get legal personhood based on intelligence is just the start. Once the wall separating humans and animals comes down, that could serve as a stepping stone for many who advocate a focus on the capacity to suffer as a basis for granting legal personhood. Animal legal rights activists do not all see eye to eye regarding whether they should focus on seeking legal standing for all animals who are capable of suffering or on legal personhood and rights for particularly smart animals like chimpanzees. However, these approaches may only be different beginning points with a similar possible end point.

The intelligent animal personhood approach is more pragmatic in the short term, because the immediate practical consequences of granting legal standing to all sentient animals could be immensely disruptive for society. We do not have much economic reliance on chimpanzees, there are relatively few of them in captivity compared to many other animals, and we can recognize that they are particularly intelligent and closer to humans than are other animals. Thus, it is perhaps tempting to some to believe that granting personhood to chimpanzees would be a limited and manageable change. But if that were accepted as a starting position, there is no clear or even fuzzy view of the end position. It would at least progress to assertions that most animals utilized for human benefit have some level of autonomy interests sufficient to allow them to be legal persons who may have lawsuits filed on their behalf on that basis. NYU School of Law

---

22. “Our goal is, very simply, to breach the legal wall that separates all humans from all nonhuman animals.” Michael Mountain, Lawsuit Filed Today on Behalf of Chimpanzees Seeking Legal Personhood, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/12/02/lawsuit-filed-today-on-behalf-of-chimpanzees-seeking-legal-personhood/ [https://perma.cc/6BDE-85B8].
Professor Richard Epstein has recognized the slipperiness of this slope, pointing out that “[u]nless an animal has some sense of self, it cannot hunt, and it cannot either defend himself or flee when subject to attack. Unless it has a desire to live, it will surely die. And unless it has some awareness of means and connections, it will fail in all it does.” Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights, in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions 154 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004).

Opening the personhood door to the more intelligent animals would also encourage efforts to extend personhood on the basis of sentience rather than solely seeking extensions based on autonomy. The implications of much broader potential expansion of legal personhood based on either autonomy definitions or sentence could be enormous and are not limited simply to chimpanzees.

VII. CONCLUSION: APPLAUDING AN EVOLVING FOCUS ON HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANIMAL WELFARE RATHER THAN THE RADICAL APPROACH OF ANIMAL LEGAL PERSONHOOD

When addressing animal legal personhood, the proper question is not whether our laws regarding animals should evolve or remain stagnant. Our legal system will evolve regarding animals and indeed is already in a period of significant change as society is demanding better treatment of animals. At one extreme, some might argue that our laws and enforcement of those laws regarding animal protection are adequate and require no further significant evolution. Such an approach is unrealistic and undesirable. Arguing that courts should grant legal personhood to animals is at the other extreme, and, as described above, could wreak disastrous consequences.

A centrist alternative to these extremes involves maintaining our legal focus on human responsibility for how we treat animals, but applauding changes to provide additional protection where appropriate. As emphasized by the Third Department In unanimously dismissing the NhRP’s Lavery appeal, the Third Department emphasized that “[o]ur rejection of a rights paradigm for animals does not, however, leave them defenseless,” and that the NhRP “is fully able to importune the Legislature to extend further legal protections to chimpanzees.” Lavery, 124 A.D.3d at 152–53. As a society we need to continue our evolution toward increased protection of animals, but they should not be made legal persons.