Understanding the behaviour of transnational religious NGOs (RNGOs) in China can be a challenging proposition. This is partially attributed to the nation’s nascent civil society, corporatist measures governing NGOs, and the general suspicion towards social organizations with Western origins. This is also due to the difficulties in categorizing whether a NGO is considered religious or not. To complicate matters further, the Chinese state has been wary of religion in general, with documentation by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China claiming “foreign hostile forces” are using religion to “infiltrate China” to “Westernize” and “divide China”. The documentation highlights the spread of Christianity as notable concern.

In reaction, the state has a tendency to over-regulate religious activities and RNGOs. For example, children under the age of 18 are not allowed to receive religious education in public sites. Public sector employees are not allowed to practice a religion or wear religious attire while working. Further, the registration of religious organizations is handled differently than other types of NGOs in China. In general, NGOs should be registered under the Ministry of Civil Affairs, however, RNGOs are registered and managed under separate organizations, the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) at the central level, and the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) at the local level.

In spite of this environment, transnational RNGOs are increasingly prevalent in mainland China, and continue to be of the most resilient social organizations outside the Chinese party-state structure. This begs the urgent query: what tactics do transnational RNGOs employ to maintain a continued presence? Insight into their survival strategies can provide a blueprint to other NGOs operating in sensitive issue areas in China, and in jurisdictions with restrictive regulations towards civil society actors.