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Unpublished Paper
Persistent statistical discrimination in a competitive environment
(2014)
  • Rebecca M Glawtschew, Kennesaw State University
Abstract

I consider a dynamic model with endogenous human capital formation, competitively determined wages and two distinguishable, but ex ante identical groups of long-lived workers. It is shown that a group with a history of low human capital investment or whose workers expect low investment by future generations will converge to an inferior steady state. Similarly, a group with historically high human capital or high expectations for future generations will converge to a superior steady state. When a group reaches a steady state, they become stuck. Consequently, the inequality that results from two groups converging to different steady states is persistent.

Keywords
  • Statistical discrimination,
  • General equilibrium,
  • Asymmetric information,
  • Human capital
Publication Date
2014
Citation Information
Rebecca M Glawtschew. "Persistent statistical discrimination in a competitive environment" (2014)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/rebecca_glawtschew/1/