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Article
Managed Courts under Unstable Political Environments: Recruitments and Resignations in the 1990s Japanese Judiciary
Journal of Comparative Economics (2007)
  • Eric Bennett Rasmusen
  • J. Mark Ramseyer, Harvard Law School
Abstract
Because of the risk of political interference, in countries with managed courts jurists who share ruling-party preferences disproportionately self-select into judicial careers. During political turmoil, such jurists will find judicial careers less attractive. Orthodox potential jurists will disproportionately shun the courts, and orthodox incumbent judges will disproportionately resign. Unorthodox potential jurists, on the other hand, might find the judiciary more attractive. Combining data on a random sample of 1,605 Japanese lawyers and all 2,502 judges hired between 1971 and 2001, we locate evidence consistent with these hypotheses: after the political crisis of 1993, the recruitment of young lawyers from elite universities lagged, while the number of early resignations increased.
Keywords
  • Japan,
  • judges
Disciplines
Publication Date
June, 2007
Citation Information
Eric Bennett Rasmusen and J. Mark Ramseyer. "Managed Courts under Unstable Political Environments: Recruitments and Resignations in the 1990s Japanese Judiciary" Journal of Comparative Economics Vol. 35 Iss. 2 (2007)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/rasmusen/65/