Rent Seeking in Successive Monopoly: The Case of Casino Gambling in New OrleansEvolutionary and Institutional Economics Review
AbstractThis study explores how rent seeking in the U.S. casino gambling industry relates to unique issues concerning industry structure. To do so, we apply mathematical and graphical approaches from industrial economics to the history of land-based casino gambling in New Orleans, Louisiana, a history that includes public franchising, successive monopoly, vertical separation and integration, and rent seeking costs. Our conceptual approach highlights how local governments can gain advantages over higher forms of government (e.g., state government) in rent seeking contests.
Citation InformationFranklin G. Mixon and Rand Ressler. "Rent Seeking in Successive Monopoly: The Case of Casino Gambling in New Orleans" Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review Vol. 11 Iss. 1 (2014) p. 41 - 51
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/rand-ressler/10/