Skip to main content
Article
Rent Seeking in Successive Monopoly: The Case of Casino Gambling in New Orleans
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review
  • Franklin G. Mixon, Jr., Columbus State University
  • Rand Ressler, Georgia Southern University
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-1-2014
DOI
10.14441/eier.110103
Abstract
This study explores how rent seeking in the U.S. casino gambling industry relates to unique issues concerning industry structure. To do so, we apply mathematical and graphical approaches from industrial economics to the history of land-based casino gambling in New Orleans, Louisiana, a history that includes public franchising, successive monopoly, vertical separation and integration, and rent seeking costs. Our conceptual approach highlights how local governments can gain advantages over higher forms of government (e.g., state government) in rent seeking contests.
Citation Information
Franklin G. Mixon and Rand Ressler. "Rent Seeking in Successive Monopoly: The Case of Casino Gambling in New Orleans" Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review Vol. 11 Iss. 1 (2014) p. 41 - 51
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/rand-ressler/10/