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Two conceptions of response-dependencePhilosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Document TypeJournal article
AbstractThe traditional conception of response-dependence isinadequate because it cannot account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence. In particular, it is unableto account for the response-dependence of (aesthetic, moral, epistemic ...) values. I therefore propose tosupplement the traditional conception with an alternativeone. My claim is that only a combination of the twoconceptions is able to account for all intuitivecases of response-dependence.
Copyright © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Citation InformationDe Clercq, R. (2002). Two conceptions of response-dependence. Philosophical Studies, 107(2), 159-177. doi: 10.1023/A:1014708132150