Article
Markov-Perfect rent dissipation in rights-based fisheries
Economics Working Papers (2002–2016)
Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
9-26-2012
Working Paper Number
WP #11009, May 2011 revised September 2012
Abstract
We present a general, dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-Perfect equilibrium harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. We identify rent loss caused by a heterogeneous-in-value fish stock, congestion on the fishing ground, revenue competition and stock uncertainty. Our results show that biological, technological and market conditions under which rents will be dissipated in a standard individual transferable quota program are fairly special. These findings provide new insights for designing rights-based programs capable of generating resource rent in marine fisheries.
Disciplines
File Format
application/pdf
Length
46 pages
Citation Information
Adriana Valcu-Lisman and Quinn Weninger. "Markov-Perfect rent dissipation in rights-based fisheries" (2012) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/quinn-weninger/9/