Skip to main content
Markov-Perfect rent dissipation in rights-based fisheries
Economics Working Papers (2002–2016)
  • Adriana Valcu-Lisman, Iowa State University
  • Quinn Weninger, Iowa State University
Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
Working Paper Number
WP #11009, May 2011 revised September 2012

We present a general, dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a fishery managed with individual transferable quotas. Markov-Perfect equilibrium harvesting and quota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. We identify rent loss caused by a heterogeneous-in-value fish stock, congestion on the fishing ground, revenue competition and stock uncertainty. Our results show that biological, technological and market conditions under which rents will be dissipated in a standard individual transferable quota program are fairly special. These findings provide new insights for designing rights-based programs capable of generating resource rent in marine fisheries.

File Format
46 pages
Citation Information
Adriana Valcu-Lisman and Quinn Weninger. "Markov-Perfect rent dissipation in rights-based fisheries" (2012)
Available at: