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Article
Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries
Economics Working Papers (2002–2016)
Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
12-26-2011
Working Paper Number
10014
Abstract
We present a dynamic game of search and learning by fishermen who seek the true location of a partially observable fish stock. Bayesian Nash equilibrium search patterns for non-cooperating fishermen and members of an information sharing cooperative are compared with first-best outcomes. Independent fishermen do not internalize the full value of information and do not replicate first-best search. A fishing cooperative faces a free-riding problem as each member prefers another undertake costly search for information. Contractual agreements among coop members may mitigate, but not likely eliminate free-riding. Our results explain why information sharing is rare in fisheries and offer guidance for improving fishery management.
File Format
application/pdf
Length
21 pages
Citation Information
Keith S. Evans and Quinn Weninger. "Information Sharing and Cooperative Search in Fisheries" (2011) Available at: http://works.bepress.com/quinn-weninger/32/