Skip to main content
Welfare Comparison of Electoral Systems under Power Sharing
Social Choice and Welfare (2016)
  • Marco Faravelli, University of Queensland
  • Priscilla Man
  • Bang Dinh Nguyen
We generalize Borgers' (2004) results to a broad class of power sharing electoral systems. We show that voluntary voting under a power sharing regime Pareto dominates both random decision making and compulsory voting. We also show, however, that voluntary voting is not socially optimal, as individuals vote too frequently.
  • Costly Voting,
  • Power Sharing,
  • Compulsory Voting,
  • Random Decision Making
Publication Date
Citation Information
Marco Faravelli, Priscilla Man and Bang Dinh Nguyen. "Welfare Comparison of Electoral Systems under Power Sharing" Social Choice and Welfare Vol. 47 (2016) p. 413 - 429
Available at: