Welfare Comparison of Electoral Systems under Power SharingSocial Choice and Welfare (2016)
We generalize Borgers' (2004) results to a broad class of power sharing electoral systems. We show that voluntary voting under a power sharing regime Pareto dominates both random decision making and compulsory voting. We also show, however, that voluntary voting is not socially optimal, as individuals vote too frequently.
- Costly Voting,
- Power Sharing,
- Compulsory Voting,
- Random Decision Making
Citation InformationMarco Faravelli, Priscilla Man and Bang Dinh Nguyen. "Welfare Comparison of Electoral Systems under Power Sharing" Social Choice and Welfare Vol. 47 (2016) p. 413 - 429
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/priscilla_man/7/