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Mandate and Paternalism: A Theory of Large Elections
Games and Economic Behavior (2015)
  • Marco Faravelli, University of Queensland
  • Priscilla Man, University of Queensland
  • Randall Walsh, University of Pittsburgh - Main Campus
Abstract
We propose a game theoretic costly voting model of large elections that incorporates the assumption that mandate matters. This innovation is motivated by empirical evidence that US Representatives with larger victory margins on average vote in a more partisan manner. If voters are paternalistic, this new model predicts strictly positive limiting turnout rates as the population grows arbitrarily large. The model also preserves stylized comparative statics results of costly voting models, including the underdog effect and the competition effect. Finally, we develop an innovative computational strategy to solve the model for large, finite, electorates and show that our results are not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively relevant.
Keywords
  • costly voting,
  • large elections,
  • turnout,
  • mandate,
  • paternalism
Disciplines
Publication Date
2015
Citation Information
Marco Faravelli, Priscilla Man and Randall Walsh. "Mandate and Paternalism: A Theory of Large Elections" Games and Economic Behavior Vol. 93 (2015) p. 1 - 23
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/priscilla_man/5/