Social ideology and taxes in a differentiated candidates frameworkAmerican Economic Review (2014)
AbstractMany observers have diagnosed an increasing ideological polarization, particularly on non-economic matters, in the United States. How does this influence the political competition between candidates on economic issues? We analyze this question using a differentiated candidates framework in which two office-motivated candidates differ in their fixed ideological position and choose a level of government spending and implied taxes to maximize their vote share. In equilibrium, candidates choose their tax rates to cater to a mix of swing voters who contain socially-conservative and economically liberal voters, as well as socially-liberal and economically-conservative voters. We analyze how economic positions are influenced by the ideological positions of candidates and the distribution and intensity of non-economic preferences in the electorate.
- Differentiated candidates,
- policy divergence,
Publication DateJanuary, 2014
Citation InformationStefan Krasa and Mattias K. Polborn. 2011. "Social ideology and taxes in a differentiated candidates framework"