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横向合并控制中的资产剥离问题 : 基于古诺竞争的分析
中国工业经济 = China Industrial Economics
  • Xue BAI, Shandong University
  • Ping LIN, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
  • Xuheng ZANG, Shandong University
Alternative Title
Asset divestitures and horizontal merger control : based on cournot oligopoly
Document Type
Journal article
Publication Date
  • 横向合并,
  • 资产剥离,
  • 竞拍,
  • 社会总福利,
  • horizontal mergers,
  • asset divestiture,
  • auction,
  • total social welfare
本文基于古诺竞争构建了一个"三阶段"的博弈模型,分析了外资企业合并控制中的资产剥离问题,探讨了资产剥离的有效性及福利效应。研究发现:在一定条件下,资产剥离能够削弱合并带来的单边效应,改善社会福利,增加合并被批准的可能性。在此基础上,本文探讨了消费者福利标准与社会总福利标准之间的差别,认为提高社会总福利的资产剥离很有可能会降低消费者福利。同时,本文还详细模拟了外资企业与国内企业竞拍剥离资产的过程,认为竞拍结果的不同取决于市场规模的大小以及资产剥离的数量。最后,得出结论并为中国资产剥离的实施提出建议。 Based on a three-stage Cournot competition model,this paper builds an asset divestiture model of horizontal mergers control with foreign firms.It analyzes the effects of the merger on consumer surplus,firm profits and social welfare.It is shown that asset divestitures can weaken the unilateral effect of a merger,promote consumer surplus and increase the possibility of merger approval.Based on this,this paper discusses the difference between consumer welfare standard and total social welfare standard.In the meanwhile,it explicitly analyzes the auction game of the assets to be divested.We find that auction results depend on market size and the amount of divested assets.We also discuss some of the issues the anti-monopoly authority might face when adopting asset divestiture remedies.
Citation Information
白雪、林平、臧旭恒 (2012)。横向合并控制中的资产剥离问题 : 基于古诺竞争的分析 = Asset divestitures and horizontal merger control: Based on cournot oligopoly。《中国工业经济 = China Industrial Economics》,(1),90-100。