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横向合并控制中的资产剥离问题 : 基于古诺竞争的分析
中国工业经济 = China Industrial Economics
  • Xue BAI, Shandong University
  • Ping LIN, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
  • Xuheng ZANG, Shandong University
Alternative Title
Asset divestitures and horizontal merger control : based on cournot oligopoly
Document Type
Journal article
Publication Date
  • 横向合并,
  • 资产剥离,
  • 竞拍,
  • 社会总福利,
  • horizontal mergers,
  • asset divestiture,
  • auction,
  • total social welfare


Based on a three-stage Cournot competition model,this paper builds an asset divestiture model of horizontal mergers control with foreign firms.It analyzes the effects of the merger on consumer surplus,firm profits and social welfare.It is shown that asset divestitures can weaken the unilateral effect of a merger,promote consumer surplus and increase the possibility of merger approval.Based on this,this paper discusses the difference between consumer welfare standard and total social welfare standard.In the meanwhile,it explicitly analyzes the auction game of the assets to be divested.We find that auction results depend on market size and the amount of divested assets.We also discuss some of the issues the anti-monopoly authority might face when adopting asset divestiture remedies.

Chinese (Simplified)
Citation Information
白雪、林平、臧旭恒 (2012)。横向合并控制中的资产剥离问题 : 基于古诺竞争的分析 = Asset divestitures and horizontal merger control: Based on cournot oligopoly。《中国工业经济 = China Industrial Economics》,(1),90-100。