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Article
Merger control policy under China’s anti-monopoly law
Review of Industrial Organization
  • Ping LIN, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
  • Jingjing ZHAO, Norton Rose Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Document Type
Journal article
Publication Date
8-1-2012
Keywords
  • Merger control,
  • China’s Anti-Monopoly Law,
  • Theory of harm,
  • Welfare standard,
  • Industrial policy
Abstract

China’s merger policy and enforcement approaches since its Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) took effect in August 2008 are by and large based on the same conceptual framework that is employed in advanced economies. While China has shown a very fast learning capability in conducting competition analysis, further capacity building in China is crucial. There is no clear evidence of industrial policy considerations being at the forefront in the eight published decisions by the Ministry of Commerce to date, except for its very early decisions. We propose a competition-neutral principle, which requires that a competition test be conducted before, and independently from, any consideration of industrial policy and argue that industrial policy matters only for competition-neutral mergers. On a more technical level, if China adopts the total welfare standard, then its treatment of efficiencies and the meaning of sufficiency of entry post merger should be modified accordingly from the US/EU consumer-oriented model.

DOI
10.1007/s11151-012-9345-9
Scopus EID
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84863100682&doi=10.1007%2fs11151-012-9345-9&partnerID=40&md5=9e97df5f98728ac5d103dfa2b42d1c0c
E-ISSN
15737160
Publisher Statement

Copyright © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012

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Citation Information
Lin, P., & Zhao, J. (2012). Merger control policy under China’s anti-monopoly law. Review of Industrial Organization, 41(1-2), 109-132. doi: 10.1007/s11151-012-9345-9