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Article
Foreign direct investment in a two-tier oligopoly : coordination, vertical integration, and welfare
International Economic Review
  • Ping LIN, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
  • Kamal SAGGI, Vanderbilt University, U.S.A.
Document Type
Journal article
Publication Date
11-1-2011
Abstract

We study foreign direct investment (FDI) by two independent investors/entrants into a two-tiered oligopolistic industry. An FDI subsidy at a single stage of production can be sufficient to resolve the coordination problem facing investors thereby inducing entry at both stages. However, due to linkage offsetting, FDI at both stages may yield lower domestic welfare than FDI at a single stage. Vertical integration not only solves the coordination problem, it also eliminates double marginalization. But since the integrated multinational does not sell the intermediate to local firms, its entry generates no vertical linkages and can yield lower welfare than FDI by independent firms.

DOI
10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00667.x
E-ISSN
14682354
Publisher Statement

Copyright © (2011) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association

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Citation Information
Lin, P., & Saggi, K. (2011). Foreign direct investment in a two-tier oligopoly: Coordination, vertical integration, and welfare. International Economic Review, 52(4), 1271-1290. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00667.x