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Article
Downstream R&D, raising rivals' costs, and input price contract
Centre for Public Policy Studies : CPPS Working Paper Series
  • Samiran BANERJEE
  • Ping LIN
Document Type
Paper Series
Publication Date
1-1-2001
No.
111
Abstract

We analyze the incentives for cost-reducing R&D by downstream firms in a two-tier market structure. Downstream R&D increases the demand for an input,thereb y allowing the upstream firm to raise the input price. While it lowers the benefit of R&D to a downstream firm,suc h a price adjustment by the input supplier leads to a higher production cost for all rival firms. Due to this “raising rivals’ cost” effect,a downstream oligopolist may invest more in R&D than does a downstream monopolist,a phenomenon that does not occur in a purely horizontal setting. Fixed-price agreements under which the input price remains unchanged in response to downstream R&D promote innovation by eliminating the opportunistic behavior of the input supplier. In general,the incentive for downstream R&D is positively related to input pricing rigidity

Comments

CPPS Working Paper Series No.111 (5/01)

Citation Information
Banerjee, S., & Lin, P. (2001). Downstream R&D, raising rivals' costs, and input price contract (CPPS Working Paper Series No.111). Retrieved from Lingnan University website: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/cppswp/58/