Origins and Trajectory of the Shining Path

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7. Origins and Trajectory of the Shining Path

Peter Stern

In May, 1980, a previously obscure guerrilla group performed the symbolic act of burning ballot boxes in the Plaza de Cangallo in Ayacucho, one of the poorest and most Indian provinces of Peru. Shortly thereafter the capital Lima awoke to find dead dogs hanging from lampposts and traffic lights, adorned with signs that read, "Deng Xiao Ping, Son of a Bitch." Thus did the self-proclaimed "fourth sword of Marxism," the Partido Comunista del Perú por el Sendero Luminoso de José Carlos Mariátegui, otherwise known as the Shining Path, make its public appearance on the national, if not the world, stage. Eleven years later, with more than 21,000 persons dead, 37 out of 127 provinces declared emergency zones under military law, and losses to the national economy in the vicinity of $18 billion, the Shining Path represents the deadliest and most intractable of all the guerrilla insurgencies of the past three decades in Latin America. The purpose of this paper is to examine Sendero a decade into its open struggle to impose a radical agrarian and collectivist vision onto a society deeply divided between European and indigenous worlds.

Before examining the texts of Sendero, a few comments about the parameters of the literature might be appropriate. Sendero Luminoso has been covered extensively in Peru, the journals Debate and Quehacer being the most cogent reporters. Not surprisingly, Peruvians, rather than Europeans or North Americans, have been the most thorough chroniclers of the movement. As of this date not one dissertation has appeared in the United States on Sendero (although there have been at least five master's theses), nor a single full-length monograph in English (the only foreseeable books will be an abridgement of Gorriti's projected three-volume work, planned by Princeton University Press and a translation of Carlos Iván Degregori's Ayacucho, 1969-1979: El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso by the University of North Carolina Press). Compared with insurgencies in El Salvador or Nicaragua, this lack of attention is worthy of note. Possible explanations for the relative disinterest by outsiders may be distance, language, and the
indigenous remoteness from which Sendero draws its very strength in the closed communities of the altiplano.

One common observation that runs through most of the non-Peruvian work on Sendero is that the guerrilla movement seemed to have emerged, like Athena from the head of Zeus, fully developed, both tactically and ideologically, literally from nowhere. Both the paucity of texts and the sudden appearance of Sendero represent, to internal and external observers, a radical departure from the normal curve of insurgent development, whether rural or urban in nature. Actually, as Peter Johnson has shown, both the movement and its own documentation have deep roots in the Peruvian intellelgentsia, antedating the beginning of armed struggle by some fifteen years:

From the earliest positions of its founder, Abimael Guzmán, to the formal establishment of his Communist party (CP) faction and its subsequent armed engagement of government forces, the movement's objectives were enunciated and refined within a nationalist and ideological context. Much commentary characterizes it as a hermetic group and considers it difficult to discern its real intentions. A review of a cross section of the literature for the fifteen years preceding its first armed attack suggests that Sendero Luminoso leaders were open about their intentions and objectives.1

Sendero draws its inspiration from two sources; the first from Marxist-Leninist ideology as refined by Mao Tse-Tung and his blueprint for rural “people's war,” and from the nationalist historical interpretations of José Carlos Mariátegui, founder of the Peruvian Communist Party. Most writers have emphasized the Maoist aspect of Senderista thought, wondering how such a seemingly alien doctrine can be applicable to the Andean highlands. Actually, Guzmán and his colleagues successfully rooted their ideology in an indigenous framework, combining Mariátegui's analysis of the feudal structure of Peru with a peasant-based rural insurrectionary doctrine.2

Mariátegui's appeal to Peruvian radicals is a natural one, for he combined a socialist outlook with an appeal to the country's indigenous past. Mariátegui's analysis of Peruvian evolution is circular: from native communalism to European feudalism, to independent capitalism, and from there, hopefully, back to socialism. He idealized an aboriginal past:

The degree to which history was severed in Peru by the conquest can be seen better on an economic than on any other level. Here the conquest most clearly appears to be a break in continuity. Until the conquest, an economy developed in Peru that sprang spontaneously and freely from the Peruvian soil and people. ... All historical evidence agrees that the Inca people—industrious, disciplined, pantheist, and simple—lived in material comfort. With abundant food their population increased. The Malthusian problem was completely unknown to the empire. ... Collective work and common effort were employed fruitfully for social purposes.

The Spanish conquistadors destroyed this impressive productive machine without being able to replace it. The indigenous society and the Inca economy were wholly disrupted and annihilated by the shock of the conquest. ... Indigenous labor ceased to function as a concerted and integrated effort. The conquistadors ... allotted land and men with no thought of their future use as forces and means of production. ... On the ruins and remnants of a socialist economy, they established the bases of a feudal economy.3

Mariátegui declared that “The problem of the Indian is rooted in the land tenure system of our economy,”4 and prescribed a return to the Pre-Hispanic communal past as a cure for the nation. Sendero has also tied the liberation of the Indian in Peru to the destruction of the capitalistic economic system, but so far has failed to outline precisely what kind of nation a postcapitalist, post-Eurocentric Peru would be.

The period from 1965 to 1980 demonstrates that Sendero's ideological evolution reflected the Sino-Soviet split; Sendero placed its faith firmly in the prosecution of a Maoist “people's war.” As early as the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party in 1965, the strategy for victory was enunciated: organizing the countryside, forming a popular army for armed struggle, infiltrating worker organizations, establishing a clandestine network to rally the masses, and creating links between the party and students, workers, and peasants.5

By the late 1960s the men and women who would form the core of Sendero had gathered in Ayacucho province at the Universidad Nacional de San Cristóbal de Huamanga. There, far from Lima, they debated and honed their strategy of guerra popular, building strength among the students at the university, especially the Indian students. They also fought fierce polemical battles with other leftist factions at the university, and split irrevocably from the Partido Comunista Peruano (PCP).

Ayacucho was fertile recruiting ground for Guzmán and his followers. Ayacucho is a Quechua word meaning “corner of death.” The province rates among the lowest in literacy, access to services, including water, sewage, and electricity, transportation, including cars and bicycles, and even in possession of household items such as radios, televisions, refrigerators, lavatories, and sewing machines. Life expectancy is only forty-five years. Ayacucho's contribution to the GDP of the country lags far behind its proportion of national territory and population. It is overwhelmingly an agrarian department, its industry being largely of an artisan rather than of a manufacturing character. Per capita income is far below the national average (around $70);
Ayacucho is tied with Apurímac as the poorest department in all of Peru. In short, Ayacucho was strongly Quechuan, agricultural, and very poor: excellent conditions for the launching of a revolutionary movement of a predominantly rural character. It even had a strong tradition of rebellion: prior to the arrival of the Spanish, Ayacucho was the scene of clashing rival ethnicities and resistance to Inca conquest.

In Manuel Abimael Guzmán Reynoso the movement found its Fidel, its Mao, its Ho Chi Minh—a theorist, organizer, and inspiration, the revolutionary known as “Presidente Gonzalo.” Born in Arequipa in 1934, Guzmán was first educated by the Jesuits in his home department. Said to be a brilliant student, he graduated from San Agustín University in Arequipa, having studied philosophy and law. He wrote not one but two theses: one entitled “The Kantian Theory of Space,” the other, “The Bourgeois Democratic State.” He arrived in Ayacucho in 1963 at the age of thirty to take over the philosophy department of the University of San Cristóbal de Huamanga. Guzmán earned wide respect as a conscientious teacher and at the same time editor of Bandera Roja, the official journal of the now-splintered PCP. Within five years he had almost totally gained control of the university; ironically, despite terming the government as “fascist,” Guzmán adherents occupied important positions within the university itself, including those overseeing personnel and student welfare. From these crucial posts, Guzmán and his followers could recruit students and faculty to their cause and debate endlessly the nature of Peruvian society and their plans for its future. In Huamanga, the Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario (FER), a loose coalition of leftist groups, was the focus of political agitation at the university in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Gradually a division appeared between those allied with the FER and those under the influence of Guzmán over Sendero’s “maximalist” line. (Senderistas called other leftist factions “parasites”; they retailed by referring to the Senderistas as los dogmáticos.) Another area of contention was Sendero’s refusal to participate in the many strikes and land invasions carried out in Ayacucho during this period. By 1974 the anti-Guzmán faction gained control of the university’s executive council, and Guzmán resigned and withdrew from the institution that had been his most important recruiting and training grounds. Three years earlier, in 1971, Guzmán planned out the path to power in five stages that reflected classic Maoist thought: mobilization, agitation, and propaganda; sabotage and rural guerrilla activity; widening of violence into general guerrilla warfare; establishment and expansion of bases and liberated zones; blockade of towns and cities by peasant armies, leading to the collapse of the government.

Guzmán was also strongly influenced at Huamanga by an agronomist, Emilio Antonio Díaz Martínez, one of the leading contributors to senderista philosophy. Díaz Martínez was born in Cajamarca, another poor agrarian department in the Andes, but one that significantly had lost its indigenous culture, the “Indian campesino culture based on the Quechua language and Inca traditions of mutual help and cooperation which were still alive in some parts of rural Ayacucho.” Trained as an agronomist near Lima, he completed his thesis at Huamanga on the socioeconomic composition of agriculture in Ayacucho in 1959. He joined the newly formed Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization in 1960, and worked on colonization schemes for three years, gradually growing disillusioned with the government’s technocratic approach to agrarian problems of the country, an approach that rejected restructuring landholding patterns in Peru.

He moved to the agronomy faculty at Huamanga, and in 1969 wrote Ayacucho, hambre y esperanza, based on his fieldwork in the department. He concluded that dominance of the latifundio was the greatest obstacle to progress in the countryside, and the entrapment of the campesino in various unfair labor practices a sign of the still-feudal nature of Ayacucho society. Díaz Martínez did not reject modern technology and training as catalysts of agricultural change; his argument with the schemes of the university were that they totally ignored the peasant himself, and his culture’s traditions of self-help and cooperation. In his view, the agronomy specialists tried to impose rigid and narrow technical solutions on the peasantry; better if they were encouraged to rediscover their old communal and cooperative traditions, and were merely encouraged and given technical assistance by outside experts. Above all:

The worst feature of what was going on in rural Ayacucho in the mid-1960s, as far as Díaz Martínez was concerned, was the insidious introduction of values and behaviours from an alien culture, thereby destroying the emotional and ecological equilibrium which had enabled campesino communities to withstand centuries of exploitation and aggression. Teachers, engineers, government officials, bank employees, all brought in a foreign way of life which left the Indians at a disadvantage.

Eventually Díaz Martínez came to believe that nothing could be changed in the countryside until the entire society was transformed as well. His book ends with the daunting challenge, “Peru will have to take the socialist road to development, the only road left to the semi-colonial and semi-feudal countries of Latin America.” A trip by Díaz Martínez to China in 1974 merely strengthened his view that only radical change could bring about real reform in the countryside. Two
years' residence and work in China made him a confirmed Maoist and believer in the necessity of a prolonged people's war to achieve true liberation and democracy. (Díaz Martínez joined Sendero Luminoso and was captured by security forces; he died in the bloody uprising at San Pedro prison outside Lima in June, 1986.)

Since the inauguration of armed struggle in 1980, Sendero has been surprisingly reticent about its goals and objectives, perhaps the only insurgency in modern times to abjure publicity, press conferences, moral aid from Western sympathizers, material aid from fraternal socialist countries, and resolutions of support at the United Nations. Sendero's isolation on the left is near total: the Soviets have been called "filthy revisionists," the Chinese "dogs who betrayed the Cultural Revolution," Fidel Castro "a puppet of social imperialism," Kim Il Sung "another Fidel Castro," and even Enver Hoxha of Albania "a betrayer of the worst kind." A comparison that many observers have made is with the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, not only for reasons of comparable ideology but also for the extremism and ruthlessness of Sendero's military actions. No doubt many analysts wish the world to draw correspondingly negative comparisons between the fate of Cambodians under Khmer Rouge and the implied fate of Peruvians should Sendero triumph.

The texts of the movement itself are few, consisting of a few manifestos: one of the first, published in 1982, was Desarrollamos la guerra de guerrillas, followed five years later by a lengthier document, Desarrollar la guerra popular sirviendo a la revolución mundial. These two papers, along with an extensive interview with "Presidente Gonzalo" in the leftist newspaper El Diario in 1988 and what amounts to little more than some proclamations and flyers, are all the world has to analyze the objectives of the Shining Path.

Developing Guerrilla Warfare is a somewhat turgid and bombastic document, but provides insight into the mentality of Sendero. It begins by recounting 15 years of hard struggle to reconstitute itself as the organized vanguard of the proletariat which Mariategui founded, and congratulates itself for 21 months of armed struggle, for more than 1,900 "actions" against the forces of reaction, and for being active in all but 4 departments in the country. A lengthy catalog of successful "actions" includes peasant mobilizations, sabotage of electrical lines, fire bombs in factories, bank robberies, and so forth. The blowing up of a bust of John F. Kennedy in Miraflores is mentioned as a special blow against the forces of Yankee imperialism, as are jailbreaks in Ayacucho against the reactionary state.

What has been the reactionary response of the counter-revolutionary forces to Sendero's successes? "What has been the response of the self-proclaimed democratic government and the self-proclaimed respecter of constitutional order and sacred human rights?" Persecution, repression, torture, jail, and death, says Sendero; "the government of Belaúnde, falsely democratic and demagogically hypocritical, has launched its repressive forces, principally the police, to drown in its own blood the newly-born revolution." The government declares the rebellion "terrorism," is aided and abetted by the Reagan administration, and is supported by the revisionist Peruvian Communists, obsequious followers of Brezhnev, servants of Russian revisionism. In fact, a good deal of invective is reserved for the "self-proclaimed" left inside Peru. The military government of 1968-1980 tried, Sendero concedes, to meet its challenge by altering Peruvian society, and strengthening bureaucratic capitalism. To accomplish this the military increased spending to make the government the principal engine of the economy, and increased the "corporatist" reorganization of society, guided by "fascist" political conceptions.

But whether the government is military, or civilian under Belaúnde, the real force deciding the fate of Peru is monopoly capitalism, especially international banking institutions at the behest of North American imperialism. Obsolete parliamentarism, "so-called" judicial and electoral power, are all but parts of a political reactionism masquerading as democracy, while it is the police and the army which are the real "vertebral column" of the state. And the people of Peru? They are divided into campesino, proletarian, petit bourgeois, and middle bourgeois sectors; it is the worker-peasant alliance (joined by the petit bourgeoisie), which united under the direction of the proletariat, and which will form the core of the revolutionary forces and lead the armed struggle. The logic is clear, if simplistic. Who says exploitation says State, and who says State says classes, and who says classes says struggle of the classes, and who says struggle of the classes says popular struggle ... and who says popular struggle says rebellion, armed struggle, people's war. ... Revolutionary violence is essential to our historical process, and if republican emancipation was gained by arms on the field of battle, it is easy to understand that the development and triumph of the Peruvian revolution, of our democratic revolution, of the emancipation of the people and of the classes will be gained only through the widest revolutionary war by our people, rising in arms en masse through people's war.

The manifesto ends: "People of Peru! Labor, peasants, workers, women, young people, intellectuals, support the armed struggle!
Support the development of guerrilla warfare! *Viva el Partido Comunista Peruano! ¡Gloria al marxismo-leninismo-maoísmo!*

The same year “Sendero’s 8 Basic Theses” was published in *Quehacer*. In just one page the article manages to restate the entire basis of its philosophy with remarkable brevity. Peru is a semicolonial, semifeudal, dependent country. The peasantry is its most retarded, oppressed, and exploited sector. In such a society, one cannot have democracy, and bourgeois institutions such as a parliament can exist only as caricatures. Electoral participation and bourgeois laws can only favor the exploiters. The forces of the left must choose between “parliamentary cretinism” and the view of the people, which is armed struggle. The Peruvian revolution will be democratic, nationalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-feudal. Its base will be an alliance of peasants and workers; of these two, the peasants will be the leading force while the proletariat develops and becomes the ruling class. The principal and only form of revolutionary struggle to take power and build the New Democratic State is armed struggle, “people’s war,” because the dominant classes will not be easily dispossessed of their power with an armed force that has converted itself into an army of occupation in its own country. Popular war is a war of the countryside, and will move into the cities: popular war is a peasant war or it is nothing. The party grows and develops in the course of armed struggle and, as a political organization, seeks during the struggle to convert itself into a true popular army.22

In 1987, a longer manifesto appeared, entitled *Developing the People’s War, Serving the World Revolution*. Six years into the war, it posed the same questions as before: How have the forces of counter-revolution reacted to the struggle? The dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and landlords, it opines, backed by Yankee imperialism, has resorted to turning the masses against one another and has committed genocide against the people of Peru.23 The manifesto catalogs a detailed and, unfortunately, entirely credible list of massacres in the countryside, citing villages raided and peasants killed, the discovery of mass graves, persons “disappeared,” and incarceration and torture on a wide scale. Sendero charges that the government, by 1987, had killed 8,700 Peruvians.24 Still, such tactics have not availed the government; they have, Sendero boasts, been humiliatingly defeated, and forced to abandon the countryside and take refuge in provincial and departmental capitals.25

In contrast with the generalities of Sendero’s first manifesto, its second is quite specific in its analysis of the course of six years of people’s war, going as far as to calculate the percentage of actions carried out by department (64 percent in Ayacucho, Huancavelica, and Apurímac, 28.2 percent in other areas, only 8.4 percent in metropolitan Lima), and by type of activity (military attack, sabotage, selective raid, propaganda, and armed agitation). It also analyzes in detail the voting patterns in the general elections of 1985, the economy of Peru, and agrarian reform, mocking President Alan García’s early radical attempts at reform and revitalization. Not surprisingly, Sendero still finds that the ultimate aim of the civilian government is the strengthening of bureaucratic capitalism and semifeudalism within the framework of imperialism, principally Yankee imperialism.

Nowhere in these documents is any specific or concrete goal beyond the destruction of the existing order; the establishing of a workers’ and peasants’ democracy, it is implied, will cure all of Peru’s problems. Even the celebrated interview with Guzmán in *El Diario* in 1988 (entitled “Presidente Gonzalo rompe el silencio”) yields few clues as to Sendero’s vision of the New Democracy. The interview (for which the newspaper was closed shortly after its publication) is a long, mind-numbing Marxist polemic (a reprint is 153 pages) that nevertheless gives valuable insight into the mentality and worldview of “Presidente Gonzalo.” Mariátegui would be a Maoist if he lived today, declares the president. For Guzmán, Marxism-Leninism-Maoism is the highest form of evolutionary political thought; combined with the principles Mariátegui espoused, “Gonzalo thought” (pensamiento Gonzalo) is a universal truth.26 He denied that a personality cult about him existed, calling such a cult a “sinister revisionist thesis: ‘In our Party, revolution, and people’s war, the proletariat has generated a group of leaders through necessity and historical causality; in the opinion of Engels, it is a necessity that leaders and a leader emerge, but who they may be is determined by chance and specific conditions of a place and time.’”27 In regard to violence, he reminded the interviewer that Mao declared violence to be a universal law without exception; only revolutionary violence permitted the resolution of the “fundamental contradictions” with an army and through people’s war.

War has two aspects, one of destruction, the other of construction; construction is the principal one, and not to see this is to undermine the revolution, weaken it,…from the moment the people take up arms in order to overthrow the old order, from this moment the reaction will seek to crush it, destroy it, annihilate it, using all means at their disposal including genocide; in our country we have seen this and are seeing it, and we will continue to see it until we demolish the decrepit Peruvian state.28
He denied that Sendero was practicing terrorism, insisting that terror was a tool of the forces of reaction. He called the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Front counterrevolutionary for agreeing to a truce with Alán García. He acknowledged that the people of Peru were religious, and did not condemn this faith per se, but termed the new evangelism espoused by John Paul II as merely a prop to sustain a reactionary instrument of bourgeois domination.

Regarding the future of Peru, new relations of production, he declared, will be the outcome of a successful people’s war. Land, collective work, and the reorganization of social life would constitute a “new reality,” under the joint dictatorship of workers, peasants, and progressives. Asked about the confiscation of property under the New Democracy, he replied that the goals of Sendero—the smashing of imperialist domination, semifeudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism—imply redistribution of land under Mao’s slogan “the land to those who work it,” and the confiscation of bureaucratic capital as crucial to the economic foundation of the New Power.

In regard to the middle or national bourgeoisie, the policy would be to respect their rights. This they could rely on, but to go further would be to change the character of the revolution. The threat to confiscate all property, he said, was part of the lies and falsehoods always leveled against Communists. Furthermore, since the foreign debt was imperialist property, it would simply be confiscated.20

Land would be distributed principally to the poor peasantry, and later to the middle peasants, and, if there was some land left or it was convenient, to rich peasants. Even landlords could work, Mao taught, if they wanted to earn their bread with the sweat of their brow. In one area, Guzmán said, Sendero had already distributed 300,000 hectares and mobilized 150,000 peasants, undermining the APRA land reform program, which he declared a sham.20

It is only at the conclusion of the twelve hours of interview that Guzmán was asked some personal questions, about his early life and intellectual development. He confirmed that he had spent time in China, and that he had been trained not only in Marxist philosophy but also in guerrilla warfare, including the use of explosives. Everything in his life was related to politics, even his enjoyment of poetry and Shakespeare. Through his Marxism he was, he stated, an optimist, in an almost organic manner. Friends he had none, but he was proud of the comrades he did have.21

Despite his denial that any cult of personality exists in his movement, Abimael Guzmán is “more than an ideological leader; he is the guiding light, the father of a new age in Peru. The ethereal nature of his character is portrayed in Sendero propaganda. On posters, pamphlets, and wall paintings, he is depicted as a bright, soaring flame, burning with ideological passion and power.”22 Rumors abound that “Presidente Gonzalo” is suffering from a terminal illness and may be dead, but seem beside the point. Manuel Granados, who studied at Huamanga and knew many of the future senderistas, argues that the movement now has a life of its own. “Mao,” he says, “has died. He’s buried. But there are thirty or forty groups in the world that continue fighting for the ideas of Mao.” More important than Guzmán in the flesh is the “subjective myth” that surrounds him. Senderistas declare that they are fighting for the guiding thought of President Gonzalo.23

Another commentator declared that for Sendero’s men and women, “Marxism is understood not as a scientific theory, but as a quasi-religious myth. For them, as for André Malraux, the communist myth gives creative energy to the heroic soul.”24 A final word on the role of Guzmán in Sendero Luminoso might be provided not by a sociologist or political scientist, but by the most celebrated writer of the left in this century, George Orwell. In the novel 1984, Winston Smith asks his interrogator O’Brien, “Does Big Brother exist?” O’Brien replies, “Of course he exists. The Party exists. Big Brother is the embodiment of the Party.” Smith then asks, “Will Big Brother ever die?” And O’Brien responds, “Of course not. How could he die?”

Carlos Iván Degregori is, along with Gustavo Gorriti and Raúl González, a veteran Sendero observer. Midway through the decade he published Ayacucho, raíces de una crisis, which examines in microscopic detail the province that gave birth to the rebellion. In virtually every vital indicator, Ayacucho ranks near the bottom of all Peruvian departments. But Degregori brought out other factors: Ayacucho had, in the 1970s, one of the largest rates of emigration in the country; with the notable exception of Huamanga (where the University is), females over the age of 15 outnumbered males, as the men migrated out of the department in search of work.25 In urban areas 27 percent of the population was illiterate; in rural areas the number was 56 percent.26 Fifty-two percent of urban households had electricity; in the countryside, scarcely 1 percent.27 Access to potable water by household was 56 percent in cities, but only 34 percent in rural areas. Even worse were figures for “paños y servicios higiénicos”: 20 percent in Huamanga in 1981, but bordering on 0 percent in the rest of the province. Hepatitis and internal parasites were endemic throughout Ayacucho.28 Land concentration was just as skewed. Agricultural entities of less than 1 hectare made up 33 percent of the department’s total entities, occupying only 1 percent of the available cultivated land. Units of 500
or more hectares made up 0.18 percent of the total agricultural enterprises, but occupied more than 76 percent of the arable land. In sum, 86 percent of the land was controlled by 0.6 percent of the population. Agrarian reform by and large bypassed Ayacucho; a census in 1971 found just 11 agricultural cooperatives with an average of 321 hectares apiece.39 Degregori’s conclusions are succinctly stated: Ayacucho is an agrarian, overwhelmingly rural (meaning Indian), and poor province. Unemployment, underemployment, infant mortality, and illiteracy are high. The convulsion and crisis that grip Ayacucho have their central and indisputable roots in the exploitation, backwardness, misery, and neglect of the department.40

Degregori’s first book on Shining Path, Sendero Luminoso, appeared in 1985. Since then he has written Que difícil es ser Dioceses: ideología y violencia política en Sendero Luminoso (1989) and Ayacucho 1969-1979: El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso (1990). He has written extensively on the origins of Sendero, but it is his prognosis that engages our interest. Degregori observes that Sendero chose to launch its people’s war at a critical moment in Peruvian history: when the armed forces left politics, weary after twelve years of military rule, a period known as the “Peruvian military experiment,” an experiment that began progressively and ended in reaction. The military did not want the burden of repression, and left the task of countering Sendero to the police. Sendero’s audacity, political will, capacity for organization, and decentralized structure were more than a match for the civil authorities in the first years of the struggle.41 (The organization, like most modern revolutionary movements, is organized into compartmentalized “cells,” a design that maintains strict security and makes infiltration difficult.) Sendero also benefited from its appeal to traditional Andean values; Sendero, González wrote, arrived in Indian communities not like other factions of the left but in a distinctly nativist manner, within the authoritarian aspect of the Andean tradition: “Sendero appears really like a new good landlord, almost a kind of Inkarri [a Quechua myth] which arrives from above to impose a new order, or restore, perhaps, an old one, more just but not necessarily democratic.”42 Sendero launched a “raise the harvest” movement in zones under its control, emphasizing communal agriculture in the manner of the old mita communal labor levy, a traditional (and pre-Inca) institution. In abandoned haciendas and captured experimental farms, hundreds of peasants were organized for collective cultivation. Degregori believed that most of the peasants participated voluntarily in these efforts.43

Sendero established “red zones,” not strictly liberation zones in the classical Maoist sense but areas where “Popular Committees” ruled absolutely, and Sendero reorganized the inhabitants in functional support groups: workers, women, peasants, youth, and others. Degregori reported that “cleaning” these areas of all things not in conformity to its doctrines quickly wrecked the fragile communal equilibrium of the communities, destroying the links of compadrazgo, familial relationships, and participation in civic and religious institutions (such as hermandades and cofradías), which were so instrumental in the survival of Andean communities.44

Sendero’s appeal could wear thin quickly. Summary executions of landlords (who were often not hacendados but small landholders), civil authorities, and “exploiters of the people” did not gain universal favor, and worse, Sendero began to impose a puritanical vision of society, beating, for example, or cutting the hair, of anyone abusing alcohol, transgressing family monogamy, and so forth. In some communities they even forbade traditional rituals of dancing and courtship.45 Also, when Sendero tried to force communities into autarky, by cutting off all trading links with neighboring communities and cities by blocking roads, threatening to close ferries, or trying in some cases to restrict how much land was planted, peasants resisted. Community autonomy fit in well with Sendero’s military needs, the creation of isolated “red zones.” But when Sendero closed the ferry of Lirio in Huanta province, for example, poor peasants and small merchants in Huancasancos resisted when Sendero tried to block the construction of a new road to the coast.46

Such stories belie the impression that Sendero’s appeal is universal and unchallenged among an undifferentiated and disgruntled peasantry. Degregori’s conclusions in 1986 were that Sendero could not repeat the experience of the victorious people’s war in China. Nevertheless, the poverty and exploitation among some sectors of Peru, especially among the young, gave Sendero a tremendous advantage. Sendero’s greatest weaknesses were its rigidity, which rejected alliance with other sectors of Peru, and its tactics, which called for a “frontal assault” upon power. This assault had caused, in Degregori’s opinion, not a fragmentation of Peruvian society, but instead a drawing together of the center-left political spectrum of the country. This was demonstrated by the proliferation of worker organizations, peasant groups, barrio committees, popular organizations, women’s and youth groups, organization among professionals, intellectuals, journalists, and political parties. It is these bodies, Degregori believed, and not an incapable and repressive state, that represent an obstacle to Sendero’s strategy. “It is this civil
society and its political and democratic manifestations, those which provide a national alternative of democratic reconstruction, which confront the violence which bloodies Ayaucuo and threatens to engulf the whole country. 47

Manuel Jesús Granados's knowledge of Sendero comes not from outside observation; he was "present at the creation." Granados is a Quechua-speaker, and attended San Cristóbal de Huamanga in the 1970s, where he befriended many who would become leaders in Sendero. As an educated Indian he is caught in a contradiction of prejudices: the indigena is told that education is a way to rise out of poverty and misery, but to be an educated Indian is to be suspected of being a senderista. "I am an Indian," Granados says, "but I have had access to books, to an education, so I could be a Senderista leader—there are many like me who are." 48

Granados's bachelor's thesis at Huamanga was probably the earliest study of Sendero, based on his acquaintance with leftists at the University, and hundreds of the pamphlets with which the Guzmán faction had waged paper war. When he wrote his thesis, Sendero was about to launch its offensive, and it put pressure on many faculty members at Huamanga, who declined to read it. It was eventually approved by two foreigners and a man from Granados's hometown, after he removed all names from it, including Guzmán's. He typed three copies of the 178-page thesis himself. One was stolen by Sendero, which warned Granados that it would be used someday "for... adjusting accounts." Another was "borrowed" in 1983 by the government commission investigating the massacre of journalists at Uchuraccay and never returned. Granados says that it is now in the hands of the military commander of Ayacucho. 49

A more accessible work by Granados on Sendero appeared in 1987 in the journal Socialismo y participación. The article shocked and alarmed many people, and came to be the topic of discussion among a wide circle of influential lúmeros as no other work on Sendero had been up to that time. 50 Granados feels impelled at the outset of the article to confront frankly and openly the suspicions that his ethnicity engenders:

I am not a member of Sendero Luminoso, and therefore not a senderista. Nor will I ever be one. In this sense trying to interpret some of their basic statements in a certain manner might indicate that I am justifying some of their violent actions. There is no intention here of making a kind of apology; this work is pure and simple a recognition of a reality that affects Peruvian society... 51

Granados's intention is to make the world at large aware of the implications of Sendero for his country, to refute misconceptions about a group many considered mysterious and impenetrable. In the beginning, he writes, it was like a game. Some electrical towers here, some bombs there. No one took Sendero seriously. Its own systematic silence, its unknown ideology, these helped its first actions to be seen as irrational and illogical by national and international eyes. But Sendero is neither; from its first actions in 1980 it has proceeded to apply in a most practical manner a philosophy, in ideology known as "Pensamiento Gonzalo."

Being essentially an adaptation of Maoism, Sendero conceives of its struggle as a rural one. The class struggle has begun there, he writes. The representatives of the state and capitalism are the governing authorities (alcaldes, lieutenant governors, the police), the rural authorities (community presidents, traditional authorities), small merchants and bureaucrats. All of them are labeled "petty reactionaries," and they are the first victims of Sendero. Such persons are chosen selectively for punishment as easily perceived symbols. Ethical notions of good or evil do not apply in Sendero's worldview; one is either for or against the revolution. To occupy a position of authority in the countryside is to support the capitalist state. Other enemies of the people are any peasants who have wealth or power of any kind. A campesino who has five cows, a plot a little bigger than others, or a small store, is seen as a rich person, and often also has a communal or government position. This approaches decencia, or respectability, synonymous with wealth and blanqueamiento or "whitening," Europeanization, values of a feudal or semi-feudal system. A senderista once explained to Granados that such people, gente decente, could not help but be natural allies of the existing order and the armed forces. 52

The peasants, then, are the motor of the revolution. The working class has the role of directing the war, and the small and middle bourgeoisie are at best auxiliary forces. In the countryside poor peasants, especially the young, are the principal targets of consciousness-raising. Adults are not reliable or trustworthy; adults are an overwhelming majority in the civil patrols organized by the government called rondas. In urban areas, Sendero concentrates its efforts among the young poor who inhabit the barrios that now surround Lima, many of them migrants and children of migrants. Another important recruiting ground is the university. Here Sendero makes no class distinctions whatsoever; the sons and daughters of the middle and upper class are as welcome as those of the workers and the poor. The experiences of Argentina and Uruguay (not to mention
Europe and the United States) demonstrate that the most extreme of leftist ideologies can appeal powerfully to members of the privileged classes. Furthermore, these recruits are more likely to have family members occupying high positions in the government, the armed forces, political parties, industry, and commerce, and so are useful sources of information for the movement.53

Once recruited, the new guerrillas are tightly organized in cells, hermetically sealed one from the other for security. The main tactic of Sendero is the act of sabotage. Frontal assault on the state is to be avoided. Granados denies that Sendero engages, as the government accuses, in terrorism. Terrorism, he asserts, is the tactic of groups that lack an ideology and strike out in blind anger. Sendero acts from a design which it has clearly announced to the world. Its tactics keep the forces of order in a continual state of suspense and insecurity. They undermine the credibility of the government, the police, and the armed forces; no sooner is an announcement made that terrorism has been smashed than Sendero blacks out the capital and launches attacks all over the country. The economy of the nation is progressively bled by the war, as damaged infrastructure and revenues lost through inactivity contribute to the worsening of the economic situation. The tactics of guerrilla warfare are appropriate to the feudal and semicolonial condition of the country, to the arms at hand (dynamite hurled from huaracas, Indian slings), and to the theory of people's war. Sophisticated arms, Granados writes, have no correlation to the Moisidialectic of Sendero. The link between Sendero and narco-trafieantes should, in theory, yield enormous sums of money to Sendero, with which it can buy whatever arms it wishes. But in 1987, Granados found no evidence of any change in Sendero's tactics or armaments, although he conceded that this may change in the future.54

Granados, unlike other observers of Sendero, is able to confront directly the ethnic dimension of the rebellion. Historically, the Indian has been crushed, brutalized by five hundred years of domination. Because of this, many peasants have a fatalistic and resigned view of their place in society, accepting domination as natural. Sendero, he believes, understands this reality and presents itself as a "we," a defender of the indigena against "them," the exploiters. In communities where the peasants have not been receptive to Sendero, the choice is simple: cooperate in silence or die; permit your sons to be enrolled in the Popular Guerrilla Army or die. Neutrality, to Sendero, is impossible. Reeducation is a gigantic task; to eliminate the reluctant is more convenient.55

Terror, however, has its limits, especially when it is applied by those fighting subversion. When the peasants are under such pressure, some flee to other areas, some ally themselves with one side or the other, but the majority try to maintain a neutrality in which they suffer from both sides. Granados, in the end, is unequivocal about where he stands in his judgment of Sendero Luminoso. On the one hand, he quotes the bishop of Ayacucho, who explains that infant mortality in the province is high not because of a lack of food but because people do not know how to balance their diet properly from the foods they have on hand, and they must be taught proper nutrition.56 He also quotes a general who states that it matters little that to kill two or three senderistas it is necessary to kill eighty innocents.57 But on the other hand, he believes that Sendero's triumph would utterly devastate Peru:

From the massacres of the ancient Assyrians, Persians, Romans, Huns, we pass to the massacres of the civilized world, which had one of its maximum expressions in that of Nazi Germany. In the realm of socialist revolutions, we see that with Stalin there were more than thirty million deaths; in the Cultural Revolution of Mao, the figure is almost forty million; the Vietnamese achieved six million; but it is Pol Pot whose almost half of the population of the country was annihilated. In our country, up to now, the deaths numerically are still not many. If Sendero Luminoso triumphs, how many Peruvians will be left to tell the story? A million, half a million? For Sendero, in the Marxist conception, these "cleansing operations" are necessarily indispensable in order to adequately secure their aims.58

Virtually all Peruvian intellectuals have attacked Sendero Luminoso from the left, condemning its violence while simultaneously decrying the social and economic conditions that have permitted Sendero to flourish, and accusing the government of indecision, ineptitude, and brutality in fighting the insurgency. It is, possibly, the only attitude they can adopt safely today in Peru under the circumstances. Henri Favre, who wrote Perú—Sendero Luminoso y horizontes ocultos in 1987, believes Sendero is merely the most violent manifestation of a crisis gripping all of Latin America. To begin with, Sendero could have begun in any number of departments in Peru. The fact that Ayacucho is among the poorest is incidental. Favre argues that poverty and backwardness have never spurred a people to rebel; in fact they tend to be powerful forces for conservatism.

The forces Sendero has tapped are not local but national and even transnational. Modernization and the multiple shocks of the modern capitalist state have created landless peasants, uprooted peoples, cities swarming with the under- and unemployed: "Day labor yesterday in Chanchamayo, porters today in Huancayo, tomorrow they will be in
Lima washing . . . the windshields of cars waiting for a green light at the corners on Arequipa Avenue. Since the 1970s, Favre asserts, many migrants and children of migrants have returned to their ancestral homes in the sierra, carrying all the frustrations of their failed urban experiences, which is manifested in senderista violence. To such people, whom Favre describes as "not campesinos, nor workers, nor rural nor urban, neither andinos nor criollos, who have little social or cultural identity and who are adrift in anonymity, Sendero offers structure, norms, values, for their frustrations, action. To their useless life, a purpose."

Sendero knows that the only victory it can win will be a political one, with Lima, as the center of power, the ultimate prize. Its purpose now is to make life in Lima unlivable, to show limeños that the government cannot function. In ten, twenty, or thirty years the inhabitants will take control of the metropolis for themselves and for Sendero. Urban terrorism is not even an exclusive prerogative of Sendero: the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and other fringe groups have entered the fray. Sendero's more fearsome legacy may be that it has legitimized recourse to the bomb and the machine gun in the pursuit of political objectives. Favre calls this the "senderization" of society. But, like Granados, he cannot identify with either MRTA or Sendero Luminoso. He calls Túpac Amaru a terrorist group without a social base, and Sendero an insurrectional movement that values terrorism as part of a more general scheme of armed popular revolt.

Favre nevertheless sees only a grim outcome for Peruvian society. Sendero, in classic guerrilla manner, does not seek military victory. It weakens the economy, destabilizes the government, and prevents the real problems of society from being effectively addressed. In 1986 the military was absorbing 26 percent of the total government budget; to continue to fight inflation the government must raise taxes, alienating the middle class, or cut social spending, alienating the popular classes. Finally, Favre sees Sendero as part of a larger pattern of social and economic change marginalizing large portions of the continent's people. The model of capitalist development to which Latin America has subscribed is responsible for Sendero. He concludes an interview in Quehacer by pointing out that in 1937 the per capita income of Argentina was equal to that of France, and in 1950 Peru's surpassed that of Japan. What remains of this today [1986]? It would be, Favre says, cruel to answer.

Analysis of Sendero from outside Peru comes from a less politically engaged but no less sympathetic viewpoint. Often it has focused on a particular aspect of the problem. Cynthia McClintock, for example, differs from many observers in that she actually did field research in rural Peru. In her 1984 article "Why Peasants Rebel" she analyzed the rural structure of Ayacucho and its relevance to the origins of Sendero there. What distinguishes Sendero from other rural revolutionary movements is that it arose after a major agrarian reform. The southern highlands of Peru, McClintock notes, are mainly agricultural, in an area particularly unsuitable for agriculture: the terrain is stony, arid, and windswept; altitudes often surpass 12,000 feet. Pasture for cattle is meager, and little beyond potatoes will grow there. Ayacucho is not only poor, but poorer than other rural departments, and poorer now than it was twenty years ago. Throughout the 1970s, food consumption actually fell in many parts of Peru. In 1980 families in the central sierra consumed 92 percent of daily caloric requirements specified by the FAO, while families in the northern highlands consumed only 72 percent. McClintock presumes that figures for the southern highlands, which are worse off, were probably actually below 70 percent. In a government study, daily caloric intake among lower class people throughout the entire country fell from 1,984 calories per capita in 1972 to 1,486 in 1979, 63 percent of FAO requirements. Population density in Ayacucho increased by more than 25 percent since 1961, and by almost 50 percent since 1940. Land is scarcer in Peru than in any other country in Latin America except El Salvador, and is eroding rapidly under population growth and the decline of traditional soil management mechanisms.

Land reform under the Velasco government transformed the land tenure in Peru. Most hacendados were dispossessed, their haciendas turned into cooperatives. Nevertheless, only about one-quarter to one-third of farm families benefited from the reform, and Ayacucho as a province benefited the least of all; although 30,000-35,000 families gained property, the average value of the property they gained was less than $150 (4,900 soles). In addition, agricultural terms of trade worsened over the last two decades. Prices for agricultural staples increased much more slowly than consumer prices. Fertilizer prices were low until the 1980s, when they rose at almost twice the rate of inflation. Real credit availability increased until 1975, when it declined precipitously, and, in any case, it has always been more readily accessible to large-scale estates on the coast than to highland communities. Half the agricultural investment budget of the Belaúnde government went to just three high-tech coastal irrigation projects. According to the World Bank, between 1975 and 1982 Ayacucho
received less than 2 percent of the Bank's annual credit, and in 1981-82 only 1.1 percent. Even more distressing, Peruvian imports of U.S. wheat, high interest rates for agricultural credit, the withdrawal of subsidies for fertilizers, and the reduction of agricultural tariffs on imports (mandated in large measure by agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund), contributed to the marginalization and alienation of highland peasants. McClintock adds two geopolitical elements: Ayacucho is the only one of five southern highland departments without a main road from the coast, and has a prominent university where the sons and daughters of traditional communities could be educated. All these combined to turn Ayacucho into an isolated area of misery, fertile soil for the seeds of revolution. McClintock points out that the reverse of the very factors that aided revolution in Ayacucho—effective land reform, access to credit, government financial backing—improved the lot of coastal peasants, and probably accounts for their resistance to Sendero. In fact, in a certain sense, Ayacucho validates the revolutionary theory known as the “j-curve” of rising expectations: “Although the agrarian reform did not significantly improve the lot of the highland peasants, it set the stage for their politicization and radicalization. The military government had promised even more strongly than previous administrations that it would provide help; when it failed to do so, intense disillusionment was the predictable result.”

By 1989 McClintock believed that Sendero’s early success in Ayacucho, up to 1983, was attributable to an absolute economic decline and a real threat to subsistence, a politicization of society during the 1970s, shrewd strategies on the part of the guerrillas, and a weak and disorganized response by the government. The Belaunde government at first ignored Sendero, and then dispatched to Ayacucho special counterinsurgency police called sinchis, purportedly trained in counterinsurgency techniques. Most were from the coast and found the highland environment alien. The sinchis were reported to be not only ineffective but also abusive of the people they were supposed to be protecting. Even after the rebellion had begun, the government made no special economic or political initiatives to improve conditions in the highlands. More than 90 percent of all agricultural investment went to the coast or the jungle. Total planned public investment for Ayacucho in 1982 was 1 percent of the national public investment.

Indians in the highlands were angry, and Sendero appealed powerfully to their anger. Many observers have placed “Presidente Gonzalo” and the fourth sword of Marxism in the context of a messianic revival tradition familiar to highland communities. Still, if “Indianness” were the only basis of Sendero’s appeal, Cuzco, not Ayacucho, would be the center of the rebellion. It is not; McClintock suggests that Cuzco had been more prosperous and had benefited more substantially from agrarian reform and peasant organized activity. Cuzqueños were therefore more oriented toward participatory politics than toward revolution, and Izquierda Unida, a coalition of Marxist parties seeking power through elections, had garnered much of their support.

If both Peruvian and outside social scientists have traced the origins of Sendero Luminoso in the generalized problems of Peruvian society and the localized conditions of Ayacucho province, what prognosis do they offer as to the continued viability of the guerrilla war? Most observers believed that, by the middle of the decade, Sendero had seriously eroded its own base of support outside Ayacucho through harsh and alienating tactics. But when the Peruvian army finally awoke to the seriousness of the guerrilla threat, it flooded the troubled areas with troops whose own repressive measures quickly alienated in turn the very people whose support was essential for counterinsurgency. During 1985 between five and seven thousand army, air force, civil guard, republican guard, and police personnel were deployed in the highlands, along with helicopters. In many cases senderistas fled from the army, leaving the people defenseless in the face of repressive countermeasures by the military. Various Americas Watch reports chronicled the increasing toll of human rights violations by the security forces of the state.

The military also established civil defense patrols among the peasant communities, a classic counterinsurgency tactic that had only questionable success in Vietnam, and less in Guatemala. These patrols, known as rondas campesinas, have proved to be little more than litmus tests of loyalty; if you refuse to join, you are a senderista and the army kills you. Many armed peasants in fact took advantage of the chaotic situation in the sierra to wreak vengeance upon traditional enemies. The Garcia government also attempted to improve the social and economic conditions that gave rise to revolt. Agricultural credit was dramatically increased, by some 68 percent. The total of hectares worked in the highlands with this credit rose by 141 percent between 1985 and 1986, and the amount of revenue loaned went up by 17 percent. In the “Andean trapezoid” the Garcia government’s name for the poorest areas of the highland (Ayacucho, Apurimac, Huancavelica, Cuzco, and Puno), a majority of the loans were made at zero interest. The prices for fertilizers were cut, and sales tripled in the
same period. Government subsidies for food crops were increased; the price paid for corn, sugar, and rice was $110 million by 1987. Deliberate economic policies under García stimulated a national growth rate in 1986 of 8.5 percent nationally, and 7 percent in 1987, the best since the early 1970s.

Yet it may be a case of too little, too late. By the end of the García administration, public confidence had shrunk to almost nothing (less than 4 percent, and the disastrous state of Peru’s economy undid most of the benefits of the mid-1980s (inflation ran at over 20,000 percent). Ayacucho remains the fiercely loyal heart of the rebellion: one military officer estimated that 80 percent of the people were committed to Sendero. When Edith Lagos, a 19-year-old guerrilla commander, died in police custody in Ayacucho in 1982, an estimated 10,000 to 30,000 people turned out for her funeral, in a city of only 70,000. The Lurigancho prison uprising (at the conclusion of which the government massacred 279 Sendero prisoners, 100 of them after surrendering) demonstrates that Sendero’s strategic and tactical errors have been more than matched by those of the government at every turn. The ominous rise of a Sendero-narcotraficante alliance has opened a whole new arena of opportunity for Sendero, and an immense military and economic headache for the government. The new alliance demonstrates that whenever Sendero is counted out, it astutely adapts its tactics to an evolving situation. An analysis for RAND ventured that Sendero is really waging four campaigns simultaneously: the battle for the emergency zones, the campaign for the coca-producing Upper Huallaga Valley, a struggle to bring the rebellion to areas not yet affected, and the battle for the cities. Each has required a different set of tactics and strategy; that Sendero has been able to do so in the face of strong government opposition is a testament to its viability after a decade of war.

One of a seemingly endless series of articles analyzing Sendero Luminoso and its people’s war offered the following prescription for defeating the rebellion: a more sophisticated counterinsurgency strategy and extensive military and economic aid for Peru, an analysis about as astute as saying that America’s underclass problem can be solved with better education and more jobs. Sendero’s ideological extremism, and the ethnic dimension of the conflict, are elements that distinguish Peru’s war from other revolutionary movements, but they do not essentially alter the parameters of guerrilla warfare, the “war of the fleas.” The numerous insurgencies in colonial or neocolonial societies since the end of World War II have given Britain, France, the United States, and other nations many opportunities to analyze and try to

address the social and economic roots of popular insurrection. More than thirty years ago, as America started on its road to disaster in Vietnam, the following words were written:

To bring about some degree of social, economic, and political justice or at the very least to ameliorate the worst causes of discontent and redress the most flagrant inequities, will invariably require positive action by the local government. In some cases only radical reforms will obtain the necessary results. Yet the measures we advocate may strike at the very foundation of those aspects of a country’s social structure and domestic economy on which rests the basis of a government’s control.

Peru has the advantage over South Vietnam, Guatemala, El Salvador, and other countries in that successive governments have tried, however feebly, to take that positive action. But the present cholera epidemic in Peru reveals that the scale of reform necessary, both urban and rural, is staggering, and may be beyond the power of any government to bring about. To effect those changes in the midst of epidemic, economic disintegration, and world recession may be impossible.

The Peruvian journal Quehacer has covered Sendero Luminoso in many articles since the early 1980s. In one, an editor inserted a photograph, more to fill up space than for any real purpose of illustration. The picture was that of a peasant sitting in the back of a truck, cloaked in a poncho, with a hat pulled down over his eyes, the very embodiment of the mystery and remoteness of the altiplano. But it was the photo’s caption that summed up neatly the frustrating challenge of senderismo in Peru. It read: “It is probable that they do not understand the programs nor the ideology but they feel their poverty.”

NOTES

2. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 22.
5. Partido Comunista Peruano (PCP), Conferencia nacional, Resoluciones y conclusiones, Peru, pp. 1-4; cited in Johnson, p. 272.
11. Ibid., p. 69.
13. Harding, pp. 72-73. Díaz Martínez wrote China: la revolución agraria out of his experiences overseas, a work that wholeheartedly praised Mao Tse-Tung and the radical collectivization of rural China.
15. Other publications include Nuevo gobierno y la perspectiva economica, política, y de la lucha de clases en general (n.p., 1981); ¡A nuestra herida pueblo combatiente! (n.p.: Comité Central, 1981); ¡Si voté! Sino, Generalizar la guerra de guerrillas para conquistar el poder para el pueblo! (n.p.: Ediciones Bandera Roja, 1985); ¡Combatir y resistir, repudiar las elecciones del régimen genocida y desarrollar más la lucha armada! (n.p.: Bases, 1985); Día de la heroicidad (Peru, 1986); Nada más nadie podrá derrotarnos (Peru, 1986).
17. Ibid., p. 7.
18. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
19. Ibid., p. 16.
21. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
24. Ibid., p. 17.
25. Ibid., p. 5.
27. Ibid., p. 11.
28. Ibid., p. 15.
29. Ibid., pp. 36-37.
30. Ibid., p. 37.
31. Ibid., pp. 46-47. The interview, originally published in El Diario, has been reprinted in English as Interview with [sic] Chairman Gonzalo (n.p.: Red Banner Editorial House, 1989). The translation is exceedingly literal, making the dialectic at times incomprehensible.
35. Carlos Iván Degregori, Ayacucho, raíces de un crisis (Lima, PROPACEB, 1986), p. 44.
36. Ibid., p. 52.
37. Ibid., p. 56.
38. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
39. Ibid., pp. 78-79.
42. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
43. Ibid., p. 45.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 43.
46. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
47. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
48. Bonner, p. 36.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
52. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
53. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
54. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
55. Ibid., p. 17.
56. Ibid., p. 19.
57. Ibid., p. 33.
58. Ibid., p. 18.
60. Ibid., p. 213.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., p. 216.
67. See ibid., n. 61.
68. Ibid., p. 83.
71. McClintock, “Peru's Sendero Luminoso,” p. 32.