The International Court of Justice’s (“ICJ”) 2007 Judgment in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide case (“Genocide case”) has, perhaps predictably, already attracted significant attention from the academic community. Much of this attention has focused on the merits of the judgment, but one commentator has suggested that the Genocide case will be remembered mostly “for the wider impact it will have on issues of res judicata and evidence.” While the important evidentiary issues in the Genocide case have started to generate their own commentary, the issue of res judicata has received less attention. This comment attempts to fill this void by assessing the implications of the Genocide case’s analysis and use of the doctrine of res judicata for other courts and tribunals. It argues that the anomalous factual circumstances of the case, as well as the Court’s legal reasoning carefully circumscribed to its particular Statute, severely limit its usefulness for other cases.
- International Court of Justice,
- Genocide case,
- res judicata
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/peter_prows/1/