The Standard Model at War

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Abstract:
In 1775-1776 a North Atlantic superpower’s thirteen provinces found themselves maneuvered into a declaration of independence and (the inevitable) follow-on recognition war. The empire’s strategic goal was clear: force the rebels into the open, crush them while vulnerable, and unleash a program of post-rebellion oppression which would enrich superpower loyalists and establish their (and imperial) political ascendancy. Our Constitutional Logic offers, preliminary to a complete survey, considerations pertinent to the wartime provenance of America’s political society as founded under the standard model.

Key Words: governance styles, United Kingdom, United States

A. INTRODUCTION. In 1775-1776 a North Atlantic superpower’s thirteen provinces were pushed into a declaration of independence and (the inevitable) recognition war. The superpower’s strategic goal was clear: force the rebels into the open, crush them while vulnerable, and unleash a program of post-rebellion oppression which would enrich superpower loyalists and establish their political ascendancy.

Everything about this design was dicey, and, no less, from the git-go. The plan premised exportation of talent from the provinces: either those loyal to the British raj would embark, furnishings ahoy, and sail away to another province, or those opposed, ditto, would embark, ditto, for any parts on the planet which would have them. In any event the exportation of talent beginning in 1607 would be re-launched without any consideration for whether the loyalists would not, in the future, get fed up with the same ill treatment meted to yesteryear’s rebels.

It’s one thing to get into armed conflict with rebels who assert that the empire isn’t run as well as it should be. Even money says the rebellion will be crushed and champagne corks popped in the superpower’s capital city. But that doesn’t prove the rebel complaint wrong. If there is a better way to run an empire, even the dullest loyalist – he least inclined to advocate reform – may find what was tolerable in the eighteenth century intolerable a century on.

Plenty of voices pointed this out on the other side of the Atlantic. It is merely OCL’s task to spin out the consequences of this international competition to get a handle on better designs for national and international political societies.
B. **NOTHING REVOLUTIONARY ABOUT IT.** Our Constitutional Logic terms this the First War for American Independence. There was, on account of the rebels, nothing revolutionary about their doctrine. Everything they said, as a matter of improvement, was demonstrably, well, demonstrable. Their allies in Great Britain were not shy in pointing this out. Americans were not grabbing ideas from alien sources and suggesting better ways of running the empire; they were turning ideas then current into programs for imperial reform. Adopted or not, they certainly met fertile ground.

By mid-century one would be hard put, except in Canada, to find anyone of intellect or stature who would not, at least privately, accept that imperial reform, *in toto*, owed at least as much to the Philadelphians as to Book IV, Chapter 33 of Blackstone’s *Commentaries*. See *The Pace of Change in Civil Polity 1688-1765 As Cataloged in Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England*, 2 OCL 933. In abstract:

Wm. Blackstone’s *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (in its ultimate chapter, Book IV, Chapter 33) lists 35 changes in English civil society from 1688-1765. The list references sixteen Acts of Parliament, four instances of executive acquisition of power and fifteen instances of judicial reform. These 35 changes in political society over 77 years compute to one change every 2.2 years, making generous allowances for assumptions. OCL investigates.

C. **SUBTRACTING ARMED CONFLICT.** Declarations of independence are followed, as a matter of course, by recognition wars. See *When Do Civil Societies Exist? Of Declarations and Recognitions*, 2 OCL 488.

If such wars inevitably follow on such declarations, the investigator will subtract the armed conflict from analysis, at least on one prong of her inquiry.

The provinces therefore attempted to contour a form of organization, or politeia, on the fly. That is to say, during the war. Supra-provincial alliances are acts of rebellion; mostly they are acts of desperate rebels pushed over the limit by the mother country.

To fight a recognition war is ho-hum. To organize a government is worth a raised eyebrow.

D. **A NEW POLITICAL SOCIETY FOUNDED AS ACT OF NO RETURN.** A commitment by a civil society to create a new political society is irreversible. See *Chartered Organizations: An Introduction to Their Patterns*, 2 OCL 413. Once such a new society is launched, it has no choice but to succeed by surviving. This is rather the immediate point of the action, considered as a political message, to the mother country. ‘We would rather hang together considering the alternatives.’ Franklin said something to this effect; quotation would be tedious.
The provincial commitment to politeia – with its express overtones of partnership at the supra-provincial level – entails a commitment to writing laws which meet performance standards. More precisely, as OCL has repeatedly underlined: it is not the laws that must meet the standards, but rather the process by which laws are crafted.

OCL introduced this topic in Aristotle Divides ‘Laws Correctly Laid Down’ from ‘Laws [Which] Must Necessarily Be Just,’ 2 OCL 326. Multi-province rebellions may require alliances of convenience, but then that is surely the lesson of Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War. That story is as old as the hills. The making and breaking of such alliances: (a) rebel with rebel province, (b) rebel with mother country’s enemy and so forth provides a narrative skeleton for the history Thucydides writes for posterity. Again, old hat.

What is of interest is that there was no more likelihood that any multi–province rebel alliance would survive the war, win or lose. To repeat, jumping yourself up in supra-provincial dress does not enhance the odds that this arrangement will survive the war, even if the rebels win. A point of departure here is supplied by The Standard Model Introduced, 2 OCL 318_1. In abstract:

The standard model offers civil society’s perspective on the creation, management and disposition of political society. There is a one-to-one relationship between a civil society and a political society. Each political society creates, manages and disposes of systems. Taken as a system-of-systems, a political society fulfills service missions on behalf of and at the behest of the civil society. Agreement on this point may be drawn from Aristotle to Burke: civil society views a political society as a contrivance to fulfill its needs. Our Constitutional Logic offers three purposes of political societies considered as constructs within civil or bourgeois society: (1) promoting private wealth (and its counterpart goal: avoiding wealth destruction); (2) disabling hostility to minorities identified as such; (3) setting a threshold by which minorities (in coalition) may block organic change.

That article, in turn, drills back to “the principle of order in political society,” which cites to the Politics. 1253a38-39. See Why Do Political Societies Exist? 2 OCL 883.

E. PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR ROLE. A more modern insight is supplied by political societies that organize themselves provisionally; these societies do not claim the predicate ‘permanent’ or ‘eternal’ but instead work the margins on the predicate ‘disposable.’ Let’s take this on: if government asserts, affirmatively, that it is disposable, isn’t it also asserting that it can replicate its systems (= structures) at will? Isn’t such a government asserting the primacy of the needs of civil society? And, much more to OCL’s theme: a provisional government asserts that it has the means to automate the production of new structures in place of the old.
What has been lost in investigation of the interval 1775-1781 is that expedience in forming government – taken as a formative principle – devolves into confidence in process. Whatever is formed during wartime – order, organization, partnership, bonds among men: reader’s choice – is not designed to have any significant shelf-life. A glance at the procedural rules extant during the formation of Constitution I shows this. See The Legislative Rules and Orders of the Continental Congress in Various Text Formats (July 17, 1776), 17 OCL 132.

The reader might suppose, along with hundreds of scholars, that expedience gives the academy a pass: whatever is disposable – and was disposed – lacks value as a subject of attention. Actually, the standard model guides us to exactly the opposite conclusion. The buffeting of crisis and opportunity which civil society expects, rightfully, political society to handle, will inspire political society into action.

A nascent political society will triage: is it a new society or an offshoot (=rebel) organization?

If the latter, then the political society coming into existence must checklist how much of the mother country’s legal infrastructure will be adopted, how much imitated, what structures rejected and which entirely new structures will be constructed without any significant pedigree traceable to the ex-mother country.

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