Table Annexed to Article: Henry Adams’s History of the United States of America During the Second Administration of James Madison in MR Text

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TABLE ANNEXED TO ARTICLE:
HENRY ADAMS’S
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DURING THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF JAMES MADISON IN MR TEXT
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TABLE 457A

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History

of the

United States of America

During the Second Administration of

James Madison

By Henry Adams

Vol. I.

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OHAPTXB FAOM

I. England Angrt 1

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The American declaration of war against England, Julj 18, 1812, annoyed those European nations that were gathering their utmost resources for resistance to Napoleon's attack. Russia could not but regard
it as an unfriendly act, equally bad for political and commercial interests. Spain and Portugal, whose armies were fed largely if not chiefly on American grain imported by British money under British protection, dreaded to see their supplies cut off. Germany, waiting only for strength to recover her freedom, had to reckon against one more element in Napoleon's vast military resources. England needed to make greater efforts in order to maintain the advantages she had gained in Russia and Spain. Even in America, no one doubted the earnestness of England's wish for peace; and if Madison and Monroe insisted on her acquiescence in their terms, they insisted because they believed that their military position entitled them to expect it. The reconquest of Russia and Spain by Napoleon, an event almost certain to happen, could hardly fail to force from England the concessions, not in themselves unreasonable, which the United States required.

This WBB9 as Madison to the end of his life *v*tam-tained, ^a fair calculation; " ^ but it was exasperating to England, who thought that America ought to be equally interested with Europe in overthrowing the military despotism of Napoleon, and should not conspire with him for gain. At first the new war disconcerted the feeble Ministry that remained in office ou the death of Spaicer Perceval: they pointed on preventing it, and did their utmost to ptop it after it was begun. The tone of arrogance which had so long characterized government and press, disappeared for the moment. Obscure news* papers, like the London ^' Evening Star," still sneered fA the idea that Great Britain was to be ^ driven from the proud pre-eminence which the blood and treasure of her sons have attained for her among the nations, by a piece of striped bunting flying at the mast-heads of a few fir-built frigates, manned by a handful of bastards and outlaws," — a phrase which had great success in America, — but such defiances expressed a temper studiously held in restraint previous to the moment when the war was seen to be inevitable.

Castlereagh did not abandon the hope of peace
mitil Jonathan Russell, August 24, reported to him the concessions which the President required ante

^ Madison to Wer^ton, Feb. 26; 1827; Works, ill 653.

1812. ENGLAND ANGRY. 8
cedent to negotiation, — the stoppage of impressments, dismissal of impressed seamen^ indemnity for spoliations, and abandonment of paper blockades. The British secretary intimated that he thought these demands, as conditions precedent to an armis-tice, somewhat insulting;* and in conversation he explained to Russell that such concessions would merely cost the Ministry their places without result. "You are not aware," he said,^ "of the great sensibility and jealousy of the people of England on this subject; and no administration could expect to remain in power that should consent to renounce the right of impressment or to suspend the practice, without certainty of an arrangement which should ob-viously be calculated to secure its object." Russell then proposed an informal understanding, — adding of his own accord, without authority from his Govern-ment, a proposal, afterward adopted by Congress, that the United States should naturalize no more British seamen. Castlereagh made the obvious re- ply that an informal understanding offered no more guaranty to England than a formal one; that it had the additional disadvantage of bearing on its face a character of disguise; that in any case the discussion of guaranties must precede the under-standing; and that Russell had on this subject nei-ther authority nor instructions.^

1 Castlereagh to Russell, Aug. 29, 1812; State Papers, iii. 689.
* Russell to Monroe, Sept. 17, 1812; State Papers, iii. 693.
3 Castlereagh to Russell, Sept. 18, 1812; State Papers, iii 692.
The correspondence closed September 19, and Bus-Bell left England; but not until October IS, after learning that the President had refused to ratify the armistice made by Prevost with Dearborn, did the British government order general reprisals, — and even this order closed with a proviso that nothing therein contained should affect the previous authority given to Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren to arrange a cessation of hostilities.

The realization that no escape could be found from an American war was forced on the British public at a moment of much discouragement. Almost simultaneously a series of misfortunes occurred which brought the stoutest and most intelligent Englishmen to the verge of despair. In Spain Wellington, after winning the battle of Salamanca in July, occupied Madrid in August, and obliged Soult to evacuate Andalusia; but his siege of Burgos failed, and as the French generals concentrated their scattered forces, Wellington was obliged to abandon Madrid once more. October 21, he was again in full retreat on Portugal. The apparent failure of his campaign was almost simultaneous with the apparent success of Napoleon’s; for the Emperor entered Moscow September 14, and the news of this triumph, probably decisive of Russian submission, reached England about October 3. Three days later arrived intelligence of William Hull's surrender at Detroit; but this success was counterbalanced by simultaneous news of Isaac Hull's startling cap-
ture of the "Guerriere," and the certainly of a prolonged war.

In the desponding condition of the British people, — with a deficient harvest, bad weather, wheat at nearly five dollars a bushel, and the American supply likely to be cut off; consols at 67½, gold at thirty per cent premium; a Ministry without credit or authority, and a general consciousness of blunders, incompetence, and corruption, — every new tale of disaster sank the hopes of England and called out wails of despair. In that state of mind the loss of the "Guerriere" assumed portentous dimensions. The "Times" was especially loud in lamenting the capture: —

"We witnessed the gloom which that event cast over high and honorable minds. • •. Never before in the history of the world did an English frigate strike to an American; and though we cannot say that Captain Dacres, under all circumstances, is punishable for this act, yet we do say there are commanders in the English navy who would a thousand times rather have gone down with their colors flying, than have set their fellow sailors so fatal an example."

No country newspaper in America, railing at Hull's cowardice and treachery, showed less knowledge or judgment than the London "Times," which had written of nothing but war since its name had been known in England. Any American could have assured the English press that British frigates before the "Guerriere" had struck to American; and even

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in England men had not forgotten the name of the
British frigate "Serapis," or that of the American captain Paul Jones. Yet the "Times's" ignorance was less unreasonable than its requirement that Dacres should have gone down with his ship, — a cry of passion the more unjust to Dacres because he fought his ship as long as she could float. Such sensitiveness seemed extravagant in a society which had been hardened by centuries of warfare; yet the "Times" reflected fairly the feelings of Englishmen. George Canning, speaking in open Parliament not long afterward,\(^\dagger\) said that the loss of the "Guerriere" and the "Macedonian" produced a sensation in the country scarcely to be equalled by the most violent convulsions of Nature. "Neither can I agree with those who complain of the shock of consternation throughout Great Britain as having been greater than the occasion required. ... It cannot be too deeply felt that the sacred spell of the invincibility of the British navy was broken by those unfortunate captures."

Of all spells that could be cast on a nation, that of believing itself invincible was perhaps the one most profitably broken; but the process of recovering its senses was agreeable to no nation, and to England, at that moment of distress, it was as painful as Canning described. The matter was not mended by the "Courier" and "Morning Post," who, taking their tone from the Admiralty, complained of the enormous superiority of the American frigates, and called them "line-of-battle ships in disguise." Certainly the American forty-four was a much heavier ship than the British thirty-eight, but the difference had been as well known in the British navy before these

\(^\dagger\) Cobbett's Debates, xxiv. 463; Feb. 18, 1813.
actions as it was afterward; and Captain Dacres himself, the Englishman who best knew the relative force of the ships, told his court of inquiry a different story: "I am so well aware that the success of my opponent was owing to fortune, that it is my earnest wish, and would be the happiest period, of my life, to be once more opposed to the *Constitution,* with them [the old crew] under my command, in a frigate of similar force with the *Guerriere.*" After all had been said, the unpleasant result remained that in future British frigates, like other frigates, could safely fight only their inferiors in force. What applied to the "Guerriere" and "Macedonian" against the "Constitution" and "United States," where the British force was inferior, applied equally to the "Frolic" against the "Wasp," where no inferiority could be shown. The British newspapers thenceforward admitted what America wished to prove, that, ship for ship, British were no more than the equals of Americans.

Society soon learned to take a more sensible view of the subject, but as the first depression passed away a consciousness of personal wrong took its place. The United States were supposed to have

^ James, App. No. 77.

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stabbed England in the back at the moment when her hands were tied, when her existence was in the most deadly peril and her anxieties were most heavy. England never could forgive treason so base and cowardice so vile. That Madison had been from the first a tool and accomplice of Bonaparte was thenceforward so fixed an idea in British history that time could not shake it. Indeed, so complicated and so
historical had the causes of war become that no one even in America could explain or understand them, while Englishmen could see only that America required England as the price of peace to destroy herself by abandoning her naval power, and that England preferred to die fighting rather than to die by her own hand. The American party in England was extinguished; no further protest was heard against the war; and the British people thought moodily of revenge.

This result was unfortunate for both parties, but was doubly unfortunate for America, because her mode of making the issue told in her enemy's favor. The same impressions which silenced in England open sympathy with America, stimulated in America acute sympathy with England. Argument was useless against people in a passion, convinced of their own injuries. Neither Englishmen nor Federalists were open to reasoning. They found their action easy from the moment they classed the United States as an ally of France, like Bavaria or Saxony; and they had no scruples of conscience, for the practical alliance was clear, and the fact proved sufficiently the intent.

This outbreak of feeling took place in the month of October, when the hopes of England were lowest. While Wellington retreated from Madrid and Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo; while Napoleon was supposed to be still victorious at Moscow, although his retreat began October 19, two days before Wellington abandoned the siege of Burgos; and while, October 18, the "Wasp" captured the "Frolic," and October 25 the "United States" captured the "Macedonian," —
in England public opinion broke into outcry against the temporizing conduct of the government toward America, and demanded vigorous prosecution of the war.

'^ In any other times than the present," said the "Times" of October 30, "it would appear utterly incredible that men should adopt so drivelling a line of conduct as to think of waging a war of conciliation and forbearance, and that with enemies whom they themselves represent as alike faithless and implacable."

The Government hastened to pacify these complaints. Orders were given to hurry an overwhelming force of ships-of-the-line and frigates to the American coast. Almost immediately England recovered from her dismay; for November 11 news arrived that the Russians were again masters of Moscow, and that Napoleon was retreating. Day after day the posts arrived from Russia, bringing accounts more and more encouraging, until when Parliament met, November 24, the hope that Napoleon might never escape from Russia had become strong.

Thus the new Ministry found themselves able to face opposition with unexpected strength. Madison's calculations, reasonable as they seemed to be, were overthrown, and the glow of English delight over the success of Russia made the burden of the American war seem easy to bear. In Parliament hardly a voice was raised for peace. The Marquess Wellesley in the debate on the King's speech attacked ministers, not because they had brought the country into war with America, but because they had been unprepared for it; "they ought as states-
men to have known that the American government had been long infected with a deadly hatred toward this country, and, if he might be allowed an unusual application of a word, with a deadly affection toward France."^ America had been suffered to carry on hostilities without danger to herself, and must be convinced of her folly and desperation. Lord Grenville also asserted that the American government was always hostile to England, but that only the conduct of ministers had enabled it to pluck up courage to show its enmity. ^ Canning, in the Commons, attacked still more sharply the forbearance of the Ministry and their silence toward America:

"It never entered into my mind that the mighty naval power of England would be allowed to sleep while our

1 Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 34; Nov. 30, 1812.
« Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 47, 48; Nov. 30, 1812.

1812. ENGLAND ANGRY. 11

commerce was swept from the surface of the Atlantic; and that at the end of six months' war it would be proclaimed in a speech from the throne that the time was now at length come when the long-withheld thunder of Britain must be launched against an implacable foe, and the fulness of her power at length drawn out. It never entered into my mind that we should send a fleet to take rest and shelter in our own ports in North America, and that we should then attack the American ports with a flag of truce." ^

Prom such criticisms Lord Castlereagh had no difficulty in defending himself. Whitbread alone maintained that injustice had been done to America, and that measures ought to be taken for peace.
This debate took place November 30, two days after the destruction of Napoleon’s army in passing the Beresina. From that moment, and during the next eighteen months, England had other matters to occupy her mind than the disagreeable subject of the American war. Napoleon arrived in Paris December 18, and set himself to the task of renewing the army of half a million men which had been lost in Russia, and of strengthening his hold on Germany, where a violent popular emotion threatened to break into open alliance with the Russian Czar. December 30 the Prussian corps of the Grand Army deserted to the Russians; and soon afterward the French abandoned Poland and the province of old Prussia, and with difficulty, no enemy attacking, held Berlin. The interest of England turned to the

1 Cobbett’s Debates, xxiv. 72; Nov. 30, 1812.

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negotiations and military movements of the Continent. After January 1, 1813, Englishmen never willingly thought of the American war, or gave attention to terms of peace. They regarded the result in America as dependent on the result in Germany; and they would have ignored the war altogether had not the American frigates and privateers from time to time compelled their attention.

With the prospect of a great trade about to open with the continent of Europe, as the French garrisons were driven out of Germany and Spain, English manufacturers could afford to wait with patience for better times; but although a nation so long accustomed to the chances of war could adapt itself quickly to changes in the course of trade, England felt more than it liked to admit the annoyance of
American hostilities on the ocean. During the first few months this annoyance was the greater because it was thought to be the result of official negligence.* December 30, a merchant writing to the "Times" declared that "the Americans have taken upward of two hundred sail of British merchantmen and three or four packets from the West Indies. Recent advices from the Windward Islands state that the Admiral is mortified at the depredations of the American privateers, it not being in his power to prevent them, most of the few cruisers under his orders having been out so long from England that their copper is nearly off, — so that the privateers remain unmolested, as they can sail round our ships whenever they think proper; they are in consequence become so daring as even to cut vessels out of harbors, though protected by batteries, and to land and carry off cattle from plantations. The accounts from Jamaica by the mail which arrived on Friday represent that island to be literally blockaded by American privateers."

When the press spoke at all of naval matters, it talked wildly about the American frigates. "Such fearful odds," said the "Morning Post" in regard to the "Macedonian," December 26, "would break the heart and spirit of our sailors, and dissolve that charm, that spell, which has made our navy invincible." "The land-spell of the French is broken, and so is our sea-spell," said the "Times." The American frigates were exaggerated into ships-of-the-line, and were to be treated as such, British frigates keeping out of their way. At first, the British naval officers hesitated to accept this view of a subject which had never before been suggested. Neither
Captain Dacres nor his court-martial attributed his defeat to this cause; but before long, nearly all England agreed to rate the American frigates as seventy-fours, and complained that the Americans, with their accustomed duplicity, should have deceived the British navy by representing the "Constitution and "United States" to be frigates. The "Times protested in vain against this weakness:

**Good God! that a few short months should have so altered the tone of British sentiments! Is it true?**

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or is it not, that our navy was accustomed to hold the Americans in utter contempt? Is it true, or is it not, that the 'Guerriere' sailed up and down the American coast with her name painted in large characters on her sails, in boyish defiance of Commodore Rodgers? Would any captain, however young, have indulged such a foolish piece of vain-boasting if he had not been carried forward by the almost unanimous feeling of his associates?

To the charge that the British Admiralty had been taken unprepared by the war, the Admiralty replied that its naval force on the American station at the outbreak of hostilities exceeded the American in the proportion of eighty-five to fourteen.

"We have since sent out more line-of-battle ships and heavier frigates," added the *'Times," January 4, 1813. "Surely the must now mean to smother the American navy... A very short time before the capture of the 'Guerriere' an American frigate was an object of ridi-
cule to our honest tars. Now the prejudice is actually setting the other way, and great pains seem to be taken by the friends of ministers to prepare the public for the surrender of a British seventy-four to an opponent lately 60 much contemned."

The loss of two or three thirty-eight gun frigates on the ocean was a matter of trifling consequence to the British government, which had a force of four ships-of-the-line and six or eight frigates in Chesapeake Bay alone, and which built every year dozens of ships-of-the-line and frigates to replace those lost or worn out; but although the ALmerican

^ The Times, Jan. 2, 1818.

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privateers wrought more injury to British interests than was caused or could be caused by the American navy, the pride of England cared little about mercantile losses, and cared immensely for its fighting reputation. The theory that the American was a degenerate Englishman, — a theory chiefly due to American teachings, — lay at the bottom of British politics. Even the late British minister at Washington, Foster, a man of average intelligence, thought it manifest good taste and good sense to say of the Americans in his speech of February 18, 1813, in Parliament, that " generally speaking, they were not a people we should be proud to acknowledge as our relations."^ Decatur and Hull were engaged in a social rather than in a political contest, and were aware that the serious work on their hands had little to do with England's power, but much to do with her manners. The mortification of England at the capture of her frigates was the measure of her previous arrogance.
The process of acquiring knowledge in such light as was furnished by the cannon of Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge could not be rendered easy or rapid. News of the American victories dropped in at intervals, as though American captains intentionally prolonged the enjoyment of their certain success, in order to keep England in constant ill temper. News of the "Java" arrived about the middle of March, and once more the press broke into a chorus of complaints. The "TimeB" renewed its outcry; the "Courier" abused the "Times" for its "tone of whining lamentation, of affected sensibility, and puerile grief," but admitted that the behavior of the American frigates seemed extraordinary; while the "Pilot," the chief naval authority, lamented in set periods the incomprehensible event:—

** The public will learn, with sentiments which we shall not presume to anticipate, that a third British frigate has struck to an American. This is an occurrence that calls for serious reflection,—this, and the fact stated in our paper of yesterday, that Loyd's list contains notices of upwards of five hundred British vessels captured in seven months by the Americans. Five hundred merchantmen and three frigates! Can these statements be true; and can the English people hear them unmoved? Any one who had predicted such a result of an American war this time last year would have been treated as a madman or a traitor. He would have been told, if his opponents had condescended to argue with him, that long ere seven months had elapsed the American flag would be swept from the seas, the contemptible navy of the United States
annihilated, and their maritime arsenals rendered a heap of ruins. Yet down to this moment not a single American frigate has struck her flag. They insult and laugh at our want of enterprise and vigor. They leave their ports when they please, and return to them when it suits their convenience; they traverse the Atlantic; they beset the West India Islands; they advance to the very chops of the Channel; they parade along the coasts of South America; nothing chases, nothing intercepts, nothing engages them but to yield them triumph.*

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The immediate moral drawn from these complaints was the necessity of punishing the United States; but no one could longer deny that the necessary punishment was likely to prove tedious and costly. February 18 Parliament took up the subject of the American war, and both Houses debated it. In the Lords, Bathurst made a temperate speech devoted to showing that America in claiming immunity from impressments claimed more than England could afford to yield,—"a right hitherto exercised without dispute, and of the most essential importance to our maritime superiority." Lord Lansdowne replied with tact and judgment, rather hinting than saying that the right was becoming too costly for assertion. 'Some time ago it was imagined on all hands that in the event of a war with America, the first operation would be the destruction of her navy. What the fact had turned out to be, he was almost ashamed to mention. Any one were asked what had been the success of our navy in this war, he would unfortunately find some difficulty in giving an answer." Lord Liverpool, while defending his administration from the charge of imbecility, tended to strengthen the prevailing impression by the tone of his complaints against America: "Although she might have had wrongs,
although she might have had grounds for complaint, although she might have had pressing provocations, yet she ought to have looked to this country as the guardian power to which she was indebted not only

^ CobbeU's Debates, xziv. 682.

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for her comforts, not only for her rank in the scale of civilization, but for her very existence." ^ Perhaps these words offered as good an explanation as the Prime Minister could give of the war itself, for apart from the unconscious sarcasm they contained, they implied that England assumed to act as guardian to the United States, and had hitherto denied to the United States the right to act independently.

Both Lord Holland and Lord Erskine gently glanced at this assumption; and Erskine went so far as to intimate that sooner or later England must give way. " It has been said that this war, if the Americans persist in their claims, must be eternal. If so, our prospects are disheartening. America is a growing country, — increasing every day in numbers, in strength, in resources of every kind. In a lengthened contest all the advantages are on her side, and against this country." The warning lost none of its point from Lord Eldon, who, always ready to meet any logical necessity by an equally logical absurdity, granted that " unless America should think proper to alter her tone, he did not see how the national differences could be settled."

Such a debate was little likely to discourage America. Every country must begin war by assert-
ing that it will never give way, and of all countries
England, which had waged innumerable wars, knew
best when perseverance cost more than concession.
Even at that early moment Parliament was evi-

^ Cobbett's Debates, zziv. 586.

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dently perplexed, and would willingly have yielded
had it seen means of escape from its naval fetich,
 impressment. Perhaps the perplexity was more evi*
dent in the Commons than in the Lords, for Castl-
reagh, while defending his own course with elaborate
care, visibly stumbled over the right of impressment.
Even while claiming that its abandonment would have
been " vitally dangerous if not fatal " to England's
security, he added that he " would be the last man in
the world to underrated the inconvenience which the
Americans sustained in consequence of our assertion
of the right of search." The embarrassment became
still plainer when he narrowed the question to one of
statistics, and showed that the whole contest was
waged over the forcible retention of some eight hun-
dred seamen among one hundred and forty-five thou-
sand employed in British service. Granting the
number were twice as great, he continued, " could the
House believe that there was any man so infatuated,
or that the British empire was driven to such straits,
that for such a paltry consideration as seventeen
hundred sailors, his Majesty's government would
needlessly irritate the pride of a neutral nation or
violate that justice which was due to one country
from another ? " If Liverpool's argument explained
the causes of war, Castlereagh's explained its inevita-
ble result, for since the war must cost England at
least ten million pounds a year, could Parliament be
so infatuated as to pay ten thousand pounds a year
for each American sailor detained in service, when

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one tenth of the amount, if employed in raising the wages of the British sailor, would bring any required number of seamen back to their ships? The whole British navy in 1812 cost twenty million pounds; the pay-roll amounted to only three million pounds; the common sailor was paid four pounds bounty and eighteen pounds a year, which might have been trebled at half the cost of an American war.

No one rose in the House to press this reasoning. Castlereagh completed his argument, showing, with more temper than logic, that England was wholly in the right and America altogether in the wrong; the American government and people were infatuated; they had an inordinate and insolent spirit of encroachment and unreasonable hostility; had prostituted their character and showed an unexampled degeneracy of feeling. "For America he confessed that he deeply lamented the injury which her character had sustained by the conduct of her government; it was conduct unworthy of any State calling itself civilized and free."

Castlereagh's invective had the merit of being as little serious as his logic, and left as little sting; but what Castlereagh could say without causing more than a smile, never failed to exasperate Americans like drops of vitriol when it came from the lips of George Ganning. Ganning had not hitherto succeeded better in winning the confidence of England than in curbing the insolence of America; he was still in oppo-
sition, while the man whom ux 1807 he could hardly condescend to consider a rival was Secretary for Foreign Affairs and leader of the House. Worst of all, Canning could not escape the necessity of supporting him, for Castlereagh's position in regard to America was strong, while Canning's own position was weak and needed constant excuse. In the debate of Feb. 18, 1813, he undertook the difficult task of appearing to attack Castlereagh while defending himself.

Canning's speech began by an argument so characteristic as to win the praise of John Wilson Croker, Secretary to the Admiralty, — a man less than most politicians prone to waste praise on opponents. Whitbread had quoted, in excuse of the American practice of naturalization, two Acts of Parliament, — one the 6th Anne, according to which any foreigner who served two years in any British vessel, military or merchant, without further condition or even oath, or more than the statement of the fact of service, became entitled to every protection of a natural subject of the realm. No words could be more emphatic than those of the statutes. "Such foreign mariner," said the 6th Anne, "shall to all intents and purposes be deemed and taken to be a natural-born subject of his Majesty's kingdom of Great Britain, and have and enjoy all the privileges, powers, rights, and capacities which a native could enjoy. Again, by the 13th George II. every foreign seaman who in time of war served two years on board an English ship by virtue of the king's proclamation was ipso
facto naturalized. Other naturalization laws existed, guaranteeing all the privileges of a natural-born subject to foreigners under certain conditions; but the Acts of Anne and George II. were most in point, as they referred to foreign sailors alone; and with these laws on the statute-book Parliament seemed to stand in an unfavorable position for disputing the right of America to adopt a similar system. Canning's argument on the meaning of these statutes was interesting, not only as an example of his own mind but as the only legal justification of a long war which England fought against America at prodigious expense,—a justification which she must attained for years to be sound.

"My construction of the Acts of Anne was altogether different," said Canning in reply to these quotations. "I understood that by it this country professed to give that only which it is competent to bestow without interfering in any degree with the rights or claims of other Powers; that it imparted to foreigners on certain conditions certain municipal privileges, but leaves untouched and unimpaired their native allegiance. . . . The enactments of this statute are a testimony of national gratitude to brave men of whatever country who may lend their aid in fighting the battles of Great Britain, but not an invitation to them to abandon the cause of their own country when it may want their aid; not an encouragement to them to deny or to undervalue the sacred and indestructible duty which they owe to their own sovereign and to their native soil."

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Something peculiarly sacred must have inhere in the statute of Anne which thus conferred natm^ali*
zation on Dutch or Swedish seamen as a testimony of national gratitude for fighting the battles of Great Britain for two years in the British merchant service in time of peace, and converted them into citizens enjoying all the privileges, powers, rights, and capacities of natural-born subjects of Great Britain, which consisted, according to Canning, only in certain municipal privileges in England, subject to the will of a foreign sovereign. Such a definition of the privileges, powers, rights, and capacities of a natural-born subject of his Majesty's kingdom of Great Britain seemed new to American lawyers; but it was received with applause by the House, and was further developed by Croker, who laid down the principle, new to the popular view of England's pride, that the naturalized citizen, who was by the law required to all intents and purposes to be deemed and taken to be a natural-born subject, was in fact by the Admiralty considered as having two countries, — the voluntary service of the one being looked upon as unable to debar the natural allegiance to the other.

The rest of Canning's speech consisted in defence of impressment and of paper blockades, and in panegyric upon European republics at the expense of the hard features of transatlantic democracy. While assailing the British government because the arm which should have launched the thunderbolt was occuped in guiding the pen, he expressed his deyont wish that the war might not be concluded until England had smothered in victories the disasters to which she was so little habituated. If an harangue of this character served in any degree to guide or aid the councils of England, it served much more
effectually the war-party of America, where Canning, was held in singular antipathy, and where every admission he made in regard to "the shock of consternation" caused by the American frigates gave pleasure more acute than any pain his sarcastic phrases could thenceforward inflict.

Alexander Baring spoke with his usual good sense, pointing out that Castlereagh's speech proved chiefly the greater interest of England to call for and court negotiation on the subject of impressments. Whitbread challenged public opinion by going to the verge of actual sympathy with America. The debate ended in an unopposed vote for a vigorous prosecution of the war, leaving the subject in truth untouched, except that England had avowed an extreme desire to punish America, and naturally felt an extreme irritation because America showed ability to bear punishment.

The spring came, bringing no new prospects. England refused to make a suggestion on which the governments could discuss terms of peace. She refused even to think upon the problem, but massed a huge armament in Chesapeake Bay and Delaware River to restore her naval invincibility. Yet reflection seemed still to be silently at work, for, March 22, the "Times" interrupted its outcry over the loss of the "Java" by publishing a temperate article on the new Foreign Seamen Bill of Congress, — an article in which the suggestion first appeared that peace might after all be restored by simply omitting in the pacification any mention of impressment. The idea found support nowhere; but while, insufficient as it seemed, the human imagination could hardly con-
ceive of any other expedient, at the same moment the uselessness of trying to obtain peace on any terms was made clear by the interference of the Russian Czar.

CHAPTER n.

Napoleon declared war against Russia June 22, four days after the American declaration against England; crossed the Niemen June 24, and August 1 was already at Vitebsk, about three hundred miles south of St. Petersburg, and about equally distant from the frontier and from Moscow. There, in the heart of Russia, he paused to collect his strength for some blow that should lay the Russian empire at his feet; and while he hesitated, the Czar, August 3, returned to his capital to wait. At that moment the chances of war favored Napoleon. Nothing was more likely than his success in destroying the Russian army, and in dictating terms of peace in St. Petersburg.

News of the American declaration of war reached St. Petersburg August 6, and added a new anxiety to the overburdened mind of Alexander. The American minister at that court found himself in a delicate position. His Government declared war against England and became for military purposes an ally of France at the moment when Russia entered into formal alliance with England and went to war with France. If Napoleon caught and crushed the Russian

1812. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 27

army and marched on St. Petersburg, the American minister would certainly be no favorite with Rus-
sians; if Napoleon were beaten, the American minister need expect no consideration, for in that case every influence at the Russian Court was certain to be English, and from England could come no favors.

At the moment when Brock, with his force of a few hundred men attacked Detroit, Napoleon with two hundred thousand men moved upon Smolensk and the Russian army. August 15, he celebrated his fete-day on the banks of the Dnieper; and while Hull was surrendering the fort of Detroit, the Russian army, hardly in better humor than the Ohio militia, were preparing to abandon Smolensk to save themselves from Hull's fate. Napoleon took possession of the town August 18, but failed to destroy the Russian army, and then, turning away from St. Petersburg, pursued his retreating enemy toward Moscow. The battle of Borodino, or Moscowa, followed, September 6, and the French army entered Moscow September 14. There it remained more than a month.

During these weeks of alarm and incessant fighting, the Czar still found time to think of American affairs. The influence of Count Roumanzoff, though lessening every day, still controlled the regular course of foreign relations. September 21 Roumanzoff sent, for Adams, and said that the Emperor had been much concerned to find the interests of his subjects defeated and lost by the new war, and it had occurred to him that perhaps an arrangement might be more easily made by an indirect than by a direct negotiation: he wished to know whether an offer of mediation on his part would meet with any difficulty on the part of the United States. Adams replied that
his Government could not fail to consider it as a new evidence of the Czar's friendship, but suggested that there was a third party to be consulted, '— the British government. Boumanzoff answered that he had already sounded the British minister, who had written to Lord Castlereagh on the subject.

The British minister, lately arrived in Russia, was not a person calculated to aid Boumanzoff. Lord Cathcart, who had been chosen by Castlereagh for the post of ambassador at St. Petersburg, was best known as the commander of the Copenhagen expedition in 1807. Some Americans might perhaps remember that he had served in America during the Revolutionary War. A well-informed writer in the London "Times," who belonged to the Wellesley interest, seemed to doubt Lord Cathcart's qualifications for his new post. "He is only better fitted for it than the horse he rides," was the criticism; * but the better he had been fitted for it, the worse he would have suited Boumanzoff's purpose, for his first object could be no other than to overthrow Boumanzoff and thwart his policy. No serious support of Russian mediation could be expected from him. He began his

1 Diary of J. Q. Adams, Sept. 21, 1812; ii. 401.

im. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 29

career by seeking access to the Emperor through other channels than the chancellor.^

Adams, September 80, advised his Government of the Czar's proposed mediation. October 15, Ron* manzoff announced that his proposal was ready, and would be sent at once to Washington, — which was actually done, before receiving a reply from London.
The step could hardly please the British government; but Roumanzoff seemed almost to take pleasure in disregarding England, and perhaps felt that the course of events must either remove him entirely from the government, or make him independent of British support. He clung to the American mediation as the last remnant of his anti-British policy.

The British government would have preferred to make no answer to the Russian offer of mediation. To English statesmen the idea was absurd that England could allow Russia, more than France or the United States themselves, to mediate on blockade and impressment, or upon points of neutrality in any form; but Castlereagh had every reason to conciliate the Czar, and rather than flatly reject a suggestion from such a source, he replied that he thought the time had not yet come, and that the offer would not be accepted by America.* So it happened that the offer of Russian mediation went to America without positive objection from England,

* Diary of J. Q. Adams, Oct. 21, 1812; ii. 414.

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finding its way slowly across the Atlantic during the winter months.

With it went the tale of Napoleon's immense disaster. October 23 he began his retreat; November 23 he succeeded in crossing the Beresina and escaping capture; December 5 he abandoned what was still left of his army; and December 19, after travelling secretly and without rest across Europe, he appeared suddenly in Paris, still powerful, but in
danger. Nothing could be better calculated to support the Russian mediation in the President's mind. The possibility of remaining without a friend in the world while carrying on a war without hope of success, gave to the Czar's friendship a value altogether new.

Other news crossed the ocean at the same time, but encouraged no hope that England would give way. First in importance, and not to be trifled with, was the British official announcement, dated December 26, 1812, of the blockade of the Chesapeake and Delaware. Americans held that this blockade was illegal, — a blockade of a coast, not of a port; a paper-blockade, one of the grievances against which the war was waged; but whatever they might choose to call it, they could not successfully disprove its efficiency, or deny that it made Chesapeake Bay, Delaware River, and the Vineyard Sound little better than British waters. Export of American produce from the Chesapeake and Delaware ceased.

^ Diary of J. Q. Adams, Feb. 1, 1813 ; ii. 44a

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The blockade, though serious beyond all other military measures, roused less attention and less protest than another measure of the British government which had the character of a profitable insult. A circular dated November 9, addressed to the governors of West Indian colonies by the British government, authorized them to issue licenses for importation of necessary supplies during the war, — a precaution commonly taken to meet the risk of famine in those regions. The Governor of the Bermudas, in issuing a proclamation January 14, 1813, published the circular, which contained one unusual
provision: ^—

'* Whatever importations are proposed to be made, under the order, from the United States of America, should be by your licenses confined to the ports in the Eastern States exclusively, unless you have reason to suppose that the object of the order would not be fulfilled if licenses are not also granted for the importations from the other ports in the United States."

Probably the discrimination was intended, like the exemption from blockade, as a favor to New England, and must have been meant to be more or less secret, since publication was likely to counteract its effect; but in time of war the British government was at liberty to seek supplies where it chose.

Madison thought differently. He sent to Congress, February 24, 1813, a special Message expressing indignation at the conduct of England.

1 State Papers, iii. 608.

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"The policy now proclaimed to the world," he charged, "^ introduces into her modes of warfare a system equally distinguished by the deformity of its features and the depravity of its character,—having for its object to dissolve the ties of allegiance and the sentiments of loyalty in the adversary nation, and to seduce and separate its component parts the one from the other. The general tendency of these demoralizing and disorganizing contrivances will be reprobated by the civilized world."

Although many persons shared Madison's view of war as a compulsory process of international law, Federalists and Republicans were at a loss to under-
stand his view of "deformity" and "depravity" in modes of warfare. The whole truth in regard to West and East Florida was not known, but so much was notorious, even in 1811, as to warrant the British minister in protesting "against an attempt so contrary to every principle of public justice, faith, and national honor." What the United States could do in Florida in time of peace, England could surely do in Massachusetts in time of war; but if England's conduct was in reality deformed and depraved, as charged, the celebrated proclamation of William Hull to the Canadians in 1812, inviting them to quit their allegiance and to "choose wisely" the side of the United States, should have been previously disavowed by the United States government. No little ridicule was caused by the contrast between Madison's attitude toward Canada and his denunciation of England's attitude toward Massachusetts.

^ Foster to Monroe, July 2, 1811; State Papers, iiL 648.

1813. BUSSIAN MEDIATION. 88

Taken together, the news from Europe in the last days of winter gave ground for deep reflection. With the overthrow of Napoleon's authority and the close alliance between Great Britain and Russia, the last chance of forcing concessions from England vanished. A long war, with no prospect of success, lay before the United States. New York harbor, the Delaware River, and Chesapeake Bay were already so nearly closed to commerce as to foreshadow complete stoppage; and if Boston was still open, its privileges must soon cease unless Great Britain deliberately intended to regard New England as neutral. All this, though alarming enough, might be met with courage; but against the pronounced disaffection of Massachusetts and Connecticut no defence existed;
and whenever those States should pass from stolid inertia into the stage of active resistance to the war, the situation would become hopeless. Under such circumstances England would have a strong motive for refusing peace on any terms.

The shadow of these fears lay over the Inaugural Address which the President pronounced March 4, 1813, after taking for a second time the oath of office at the Capitol. His speech contained only the defence of a war that needed no defence, and complaints against England which were drowned in the tumult of war, the loudest complaint that man could make. Every tone showed that Madison felt doubtful of support, and that in proving the war to be just he betrayed consciousness that it was not energetic. Perhaps the most characteristic sentence in the Address was that in which he congratulated the country "with a proud satisfaction," that in carrying on the war, "no principle of justice or honor, no usage of civilized nations, no precept of courtesy or humanity, have been infringed; the war has been waged on our part with scrupulous regard to all these relations, and in a spirit of liberality which was never surpassed." Madison's phrases were the more remarkable because at about the same time the British government announced its intention of making America feel what war meant. The courtesy and humanity of the war were to be all on the American side; while not a word in the Inaugural Address gave the pledge which could win victories, — the assurance that the President himself had energy and meant to exert it.
Besides the alarming difficulties which rose partly from failure of military calculations at home and abroad, but chiefly from want of national experience in the business of war, other annoyances surrounded the President, and could not fail to make him wish for peace. Armstrong had not been six weeks in the War Department before he set the members of Administration at odds. The factious days of Robert Smith returned, and the President found the task of maintaining discipline as great in the Cabinet as it was in the army. One of the strongest characters called into prominence by the war, who was himself destined to have charge of the War Department,

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spoke of Armstrong, four months later, in language hinting impatient consciousness of something too complicated to describe. "And Armstrong! — he was the devil from the beginning, is now, and ever will be."^ Only by studjring what Armstrong did, could the causes be understood of the passion which he excited in every man he crossed.

Monroe was the first to resent Armstrong's proceedings. Monroe's character, the opposite of Armstrong's, was transparent; no one could mistake his motives, except by supposing them to be complex; and in his relations with Armstrong his motives were simpler than usual, for Armstrong's views could not be carried into effect without loss of pride to Monroe. Already Monroe had surrendered the War Department to him, with the expectation that if any one was to have general command of the armies in the field, Monroe was to be the man. Down to the time when Armstrong took control, the idea was universal that the next campaign was to be fought by Monroe.
Jan. 18, 1818, Serurier wrote to his Government: *

"There is much talk of Mr. Monroe for the command of the army, and he has shown a zeal in organizing his Department which tends to confirm me in that belief. • • • Mr. Monroe is not a brilliant man, and no one expects to find a great captain in him; but he served through the War of Independence with much bravery under the orders and by the side of Washington. He is a man of great

1 Adams's Gallatin, p. 488.

'Semrier to Bassano, Jan. 13, 1813; Archives des AS. LtT» MSSi

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good sense, of the most austere honor, the purest patriotism, and the most universally admitted integrity. He is loved and respected by all parties, and it is believed that he would soon gain the hearts of all his officers and soldiers. He would be given a staff as good as possible, and with this assistance as well as all his own recognized resources, it is believed that he would be perfectly suited to carry on the campaign about to open against the last continental possession of England in America."

As acting Secretary of War, Monroe had urged Congress to increase the number of major-generals; and after Armstrong took charge of the Department Congress passed the Act of February 24, 1813, authorizing the increase. February 27 the nominations were sent to the Senate. In a letter to Jefferson, Monroe told the story: *

"On the day that the nomination of these officers was made to the Senate the President sent for me and stated that the Secretary of War had placed me in his list
of major-generals, at their head, and wished to know whether I would accept the appointment, intimating that he did not think I ought to do it, nor did he wish me to leave my present station. I asked where I was to serve. He supposed it would be with the Northern army under General Dearborn. I replied that if I left my present office for such a command it would be inferred that I had a passion for military life^ which I had not; that in such a station I could be of no service in any view to the general cause or to military operations, even perhaps with the army in which I might serve; that with a view to the public interest the commander ought to receive all ^ Monroe to Jefferson, June 7| 1813; Jefferson MSS.

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the support which the government could give him, and by accepting the station proposed, I might take from General Dearborn without aiding the cause by anything that I might add. I stated, however, that the grade made no difficulty with me, a desire to be useful being my only object; and that if the command was given me even with a lower grade than that suggested, admitting the possibility, I would accept it. The difficulty related to General Dearborn, who could not well be removed to an inactive station."

Monroe said, in effect, that he would have the command in chief or nothing. Armstrong said, in effect, that he meant to be commander-in-chief himself. The new major-generals were James Wilkinson, Wade Hampton, William R. Davy of South Carolina, Morgan Lewis of New York, William Henry Harrison of Indiana Territory, and Aaron Ogden of New Jersey. The command of the Northern army was left to Dearborn, and as the world knew Dearborn's incompetence to conduct a campaign, no one was surprised to learn that Armstrong meant to conduct it
as Secretary of War, at the army headquarters in the field, performing the duties of lieutenant-general.

No sooner was Monroe satisfied that Armstrong meant to follow this course than he took the unusual step of writing to the President a formal remonstrance against his colleague's supposed plan. The act appointing six major-generals was approved February 24. The same evening Monroe had a conversation on the subject with the President, and the next day, February 25, submitted the substance of his

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remarks in writing. His argument chiefly regarded the inconvenience and unconstitutionality of separating the War Department from the President and of mixing military with civil functions: —

** As soon as General Armstrong took charge of the Department at War, I thought I saw his plan; that is, after he had held it a few days. I saw distinctly that he intended to have no grade in the army which should be competent to a general control of military operations; that he meant to keep the whole in his own hands; that each operation should be distinct and separate, with distinct and separate objects, and of course to be directed by himself, not simply in outline but in detail. I anticipated mischief from this, because I knew that the movements could not be directed from this place. I did not then anticipate the remedy which he had in mind."

From that moment began a feud between the two Cabinet ministers. The cause was obvious. Armstrong had found that if a general command were to be created, it must be given to Monroe. Prob-
ably he felt no more confidence in Monroe's military abilities than in those of Dearborn; but determined that his hand should not be thus forced, Armstrong decided to retain Dearborn, although his opinion of Dearborn, as shown afterward, made the retention an act of grave responsibility. The decision once taken, he had no choice but to supply Dearborn's wants by his own presence with the army, — a course

^ Monroe to Madison, Feb. 26, 1813; Monroe MSS. State Department Archives; Oilman’s Monroe, p. 108.
* Armstrong's Notices of the War, i. 113-116.

1818. RUSSIAN MEDIATION. 39

certain to challenge attack from all Virginia. Had Armstrong been bent on destroying his rival by means which the world could have found no chance to oppose or criticise, he would have removed Dearborn, and would have sent Monroe to waste his reputation in the task of conquering and holding Canada. The retention of Dearborn was an unfortunate beginning for the new Secretary of War.

The first effect of Armstrong's administration was to turn Monroe into a vindictive enemy; the second was to alienate Gallatin. Of all the old Republican leaders, Gallatin cared least for office and most for consistency. Under any reasonable distribution of party favors, the Presidency should have fallen to him after Madison, not only because he was the fittest man, the oldest, ablest, and most useful member of the Executive government, but also because he represented Pennsylvania; and if any State in the Union had power to select a President, it was she. Madison would have been glad to secure for Gallatin the succession; he had no special love or admiration for Monroe, while his regard for Gallatin was strong and
constant; but Pennsylvania cared more for interests than for men, while Virginia cared so much for men that she became prodigal of interests. Pennsylvania allowed Virginia, through the agency of William B. Giles, Samuel Smith, and Michael Leib, to thrust Gallatin aside and to open the path for a third Virginian at the risk of the Union itself. Gallatin, too proud to complain, had no longer an object of

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ambition; and from the moment ambition ceased abstract ideas of duty alone remained to comitteract the disgusts of disappointment.

Gallatin's abstract ideas were those of 1801, — simplicity, economy, and purity. Financiering — the providing of money for wasteful expenditure — was his abhorrence. "I cannot consent to act the part of a mere financier," he wrote to Jefferson in 1809; "to become a contriver of taxes, a dealer of loans, a seeker of resources for the purpose of supporting useless baubles, of increasing the number of idle and dissipated members of the community, of fattening contractors, pursers, and agents, and of introducing in all its ramifications that system of patronage, corruption, and rottenness which you so justly execrate." These words were meant to apply only to a state of peace, but they applied equally well to a state of war from the moment war became useless. In the beginning of Madison's second term, no man of intelligence denied that the war had failed; that its avowed objects could not be gained; that every month of war increased the danger of disunion, brought national bankruptcy nearer, and fastened habits of extravagance and corruption on the country. From his post at the Treasury, Gallatin could see better than most men the dangers, both financial and
political, engendered by the war, while his acquaintance with European affairs showed him the need of rapid diplomacy.

^ Adams's Gallatin, p. 408.

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Armstrong represented everything antagonistic to Gallatin; his methods were arbitrary and underhand; his political training was that of the New York school, tempered by personal contact with the court of Napoleon; from him economy could hardly be expected. Yet perhaps the worst feature of his administration was likely to be his use of patronage. The number of Gallatin's personal enemies was small, and the use of patronage in a way that would outrage him seemed difficult; yet within a few weeks Armstrong offended him deeply. March 18, 1813, William Duane, of the "Aurora" newspaper, was appointed to the post of adjutant-general. The appointment was improper, and the motives to which it was sure to be attributed made it more scandalous than the unfitness of the person made it harmful to the service. Gallatin's anger was deep: "Duane's last appointment has disgusted me so far as to make me desirous of not being any longer associated with those who have appointed him."^

Into this embroil of national and personal difficulties Daschkoff, the Russian charge at Washington, suddenly dropped the Czar's offer to mediate a peace. Of its prompt acceptance, under such circumstances, no one could doubt, and on this point the Administration was united. Daschkoff's letter bore date March 8, and Monroe's reply was sent March 11. The letter of reply was a civil and somewhat flatter-
ing compliment to Alexander; the mission itself was a matter to be more deliberately arranged.

The next decision regarded the character of the mission. The necessary powers might have been sent, without further form, to Minister Adams at St. Petersburg, but the President and his advisers thought with reason that the addition of other negotiators to the mission would give more weight and political effect to the measure. They decided to send two new envoys to join Adams; and on the same reasoning to select prominent men. As a guaranty of their wish for peace, they decided that one of these men should be a Federalist, and they chose James A. Bayard of Delaware for the post. For the other, Monroe thought of naming some Western man, to secure the confidence of the Western country, and reconcile it to the result; but a different turn was given to the measure by Gallatin, who asked the appointment for himself. Gallatin's exceptional fitness for the task outweighed all objections. The President consented to appoint him; and Monroe, who had from the first attached himself to Gallatin, acquiesced, although he saw the consequences to the Cabinet and the Treasury.

A question less easy to decide was whether the new mission should be despatched at once, or should wait until England should formally accept the mediation. There again political motives dictated immediate ac-

1 State Papers, iii. 624.
'tion. If England should accept, much time might be saved if the mission were on the spot; if she did not accept, the peace-party in America would be more effectually silenced. In either case, Russia would be deeply pledged to support her own undertaking.

The President did not intend to lose Gallatin in the Treasury. Abundant precedents warranted the double employment of government officers. In 1794 John Jay, then chief-justice, had been sent to negotiate with England, and the Senate had approved the appointment. In 1799 Oliver Ellsworth, also chief-justice, was sent to negotiate with France, and the Senate had again approved. These were Federalist precedents, supposed to be binding, at least on the Federalist party. If the chief-justice, the head of an independent branch of government, could be sent abroad as an Envoy Extraordinary in Executive employment, no objection could exist to sending an Executive officer on a temporary service of the same kind, unless on the score of expediency. To prevent difficulty on that account, the Secretary of the Navy consented to act as head of the Treasury until Gallatin’s return. Gallatin himself inclined to look on his separation from the Treasury as final, but made his arrangement in agreement with the President’s views, which looked to his return in the autumn.

Before he could depart he was obliged to complete the necessary financial arrangements for the coming year, on which he was busily engaged at the moment

> Adams’s Gallatin, p. 483.
when Daachkoff’s letter arrived. First in importance was the loan of sixteen million dollars. March 12, subscription books were opened in all the principal towns, and the public was invited to take the whole amount at seven per cent interest, to be reduced to six per cent at the end of thirteen years. About four million dollars were offered on these terms. Proposals in writing were then invited by a Treasury circular, dated March 18, and after an active negotiation between Gallatin and three or four capitalists of New York and Philadelphia, — John Jacob Astor, Stephen Girard, David Parish, — the remainder of the loan was provided. In all about eighteen millions were offered. Fifteen and a half millions were taken, in the form of six per cent stock, issued at eighty-eight dollars for every hundred-dollar certificate, redeemable after the year 1825. About half a million was taken at par, with an annuity of 1 1/2 per cent for thirteen years, in addition to the six per cent interest.

Calculated as a perpetual annuity, as English borrowers would have viewed it, the rate of this loan was less than seven per cent; but if the nominal capital must or should be repaid after twelve years, the rate was about 7.50 per cent. In the end, the government paid 7.487 per cent, for the use of these sixteen millions for thirteen years. The terms were not excessive when it was considered that New England in effect refused to subscribe. Perhaps the loan could not have been taken at all, had not credit and cur-
rencj been already expanded to the danger-point, as the allotment showed; for while New England, where most of the specie was held, subscribed less than half a million, and Boston took but seventy-five thousand, Pennsylvania, where banking had become a frenzy, took seven million dollars. New York and Baltimore together contributed only half a million more than was given by Philadelphia alone. Ten million dollars were taken by Astor, Girard, and Parish, — three foreign-born Americans, without whose aid the money could not have been obtained on these terms, if at all. Doubtless they were bold operators; but Americana were supposed to be not wanting in the taste for speculation, and the question could not but rise how these men knew the secret of distributing the load which no native American dared carry.

The bargain was completed April 7. At that moment the Treasury was empty, and could not meet the drafts of the other departments; but with sixteen millions in hand, five millions of Treasury notes, and an estimated revenue of something more than nine millions, Gallatin collected about thirty million dollars, and April 17 wrote to the Secretaries of War and Navy,^ allotting to the one thirteen millions and a quarter, to the other four and a half millions, which could not be exceeded without the consent of Congress. This done, and every question having been settled that could be foreseen, — the tax-bills ready to be laid before Congress, and even the draft

^ Gallatdn's Writings, i. 535.

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for a new bank-charter prepared, — Gallatin bade farewell to the Treasury, and May 9 sailed from the Delaware River, with Bayard, for the Baltic.
Twelve years had passed since Gallatin took charge of the finances, and his retirement was an event hardly less serious than a change of President; for it implied that the political system he had done so much to create and support stood so near the brink of disaster as to call him from the chosen field of his duties into a new career, where, if anywhere, he could save it. As Monroe felt called to the army, so Gallatin turned naturally to diplomacy. He knew that after another year of war the finances must be thrown into disorder like that of the Revolutionary War, beyond the reach of financial skill; and he believed that if any one could smooth the path of negotiation, that person was likely to serve best the needs of the Treasury. Yet he took grave responsibility, of which he was fully aware, in quitting his peculiar post at a moment so serious. Success alone could save him from universal censure; and perhaps nothing in his career better proved the high character he bore, and the extraordinary abilities he possessed, than the ease with which he supported responsibility for this almost desperate venture.

The task he had set for himself was hopeless, not so much because of the concessions he was to require, as on account of the change in European affairs which made England indifferent for the moment to any injury the United States could inflict. Monroe's in-

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straction to the new commission, though long, consisted largely in arguments against the legality of impressment as a part of the jus gentium; although the legality of European war-measures had long ceased to be worth discussing. As the solution of the dispute, Monroe could offer only the new For-
eign Seamen Act, which England had refused from
the first to consider, and which was certainly open
to objections, — on the American side because it of-
ered too much ; on the British side because it offered
more than could in practice be performed. To make
the utmost possible concession, Monroe proposed that
no native-born British subject, thenceforward natural-
ized in America, should be allowed to serve either
in the national or the private vessels of the United
States, — a provision which carried one step further
the offer to naturalize no British seamen except on
condition of leaving the sea, and which went to the
uyerge of conceding the right of impressment. Not-
withstanding these concessions, the instructions were
still positive on the main point. Without a clear and
distinct stipulation against impressments, no treaty
was to be signed; negotiations must cease, and the
egotiators must return home.^

1 Monroe to the Plenipotentiaries, April 15, 1813 ; State
PaperB, ill. 695.

CHAPTER m.

During the winter the Republican legislature of
New York chose Rufus King, the chief Federalist in
the country, to succeed John Smith as United States
Senator. Some Republicans charged that this elec-
tion was the price paid by De Witt Clinton for
Federalist votes in the Presidential contest ; but
Clinton's friends declared it to be the price paid by
the Administration Republicans for Federalist aid in
granting a corrupt bank charter. That the choice
was due to a bargain of some kind no one denied,
and possibly both stories were true. Rufus King
himself stood above suspicion, and had been con-
sidered an opponent of the Federalist alliance with
Clinton ; but he was a powerful recruit to the opposi-
tion in the Senate, which numbered thenceforward nine votes, or precisely one fourth of the body. The annoyance to the Administration was the greater because King’s Republican colleague, Obadiah German, belonged to the Clintonian opposition, and voted with the Federalists. At the same time Charles Cutts of New Hampshire was succeeded by Jeremiah Mason, a very able and extreme Federalist. Three more senators — Giles, Samuel Smith, and Michael Leib —

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could be counted as personally hostile to the President. Jesse Franklin of North Carolina was succeeded by David Stone, an independent, opposed to the war. Already the opposition threatened to outweigh the votes on which the President could depend. Although legislation had become a matter of inferior importance, William H. Crawford of Georgia, the only vigorous Republican leader in the Senate, resigned his seat, and followed Gallatin to Europe. He was sent to take the place of Joel Barlow at Paris, and hurried to his post. In this condition of party weakness, the election of Bufus King and Jeremiah Mason to the Senate was a disaster to the Administration; and all the more anxiously the President feared lest the popular election in May should convert New York altogether into a Federalist State, and give Massachusetts the necessary strength to stop the war.

This election, on which the fate of the war was believed to turn, took place as usual, May 1, and began by a Federalist success in the city of New York, followed by another in Kings, Queens, and Westchester counties. These counties before the century ended had a voting population of near half a million, but in 1818 they cast in State elections about eight thousand votes, and gave a majority of eight
hundred for the Federalist candidate Stephen Van Bensselaer, the unfortunate general of the Niagara campaign. Throughout the eastern and central counties the election was disputed; three of the four districts into which the State was divided left the result

ToL.TII.'»4

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80 close — within about three hundred votes — that only the western counties of Cayuga, Seneca, and Onondaga turned the scale. Governor Tompkins was re-elected by the moderate majority of three thousand in a total vote of eighty-three thousand; but the Federalists obtained a majority of ten in the Assembly, and gained confidence with their strength. In this election, for the first time, the issue was distinct between those who supported and those who opposed the war. The chief towns. New York, Hudson, and Albany, were strong in opposition; the country districts tended to support.

In Massachusetts the Federalist governor Caleb Strong, who had made himself peculiarly obnoxious by refusing to call out the State's quota of militia, received nearly fifty-seven thousand votes, while Senator Varnum, the Republican candidate, received forty-three thousand. Considering that the population of Massachusetts was about one fourth smaller than that of New York, the vote of one hundred thousand persons in the smaller State, and only eighty-three thousand in the larger, seemed a proof of popular indifference; but in truth the vote of New York was larger than usual, and only one thousand less than at the next election of governor, in 1816. The difference was due to the unequal suffrage, which in New York State elections was re-
stricted to one hundred pound free-holds, while in Massachusetts all citizens worth sixty pounds were entitled to vote.

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At the same time John Randolph met with defeat, for the only time in his life. John W. Eppes, one of Jefferson's sons-in-law, took residence within Randolph's district for the purpose of contesting it; and after a struggle succeeded in winning the seat, on the war-issue, by a vote of eleven hundred and twelve to nine hundred and forty-three. This change of membership tended, like the New York election, to show that the people were yielding to the necessity of supporting the war. Yet the process was alarmingly slow. In the second year of hostilities, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey were Federal in all branches of their State governments; New York, Delaware, and Maryland were partly Republican and partly Federalist; of the eighteen States only ten were wholly Republican, and seven of these were Southern. In the United States Senate the Administration could count upon twenty-two votes, with reasonable certainty; the other fourteen senators were more or less lukewarm or hostile. In the House, one hundred and fourteen members supported the Administration, and sixty-eight opposed it. As far as concerned numbers, the Administration was strong enough in Congress; but the universal want of faith in its capacity to conduct a war of such consequence gave the Federalists an advantage beyond proportion to their numerical strength. The task of opposition was easy, and its force irresistible when the ablest and oldest Repub-

1 Niles, iv. 168.
lican in oflSce — the Secretary of the Treasury — felt himself helpless in face of the Government's inaptitude for war, and wrote to his closest intimates that no one could "expect much improvement in the manner of making it more efficient I think that there exists real incapacity in that respect, — an incapacity which must necessarily exhaust our resources within a very short time." i

Fortunately for the Government the same slowness of movement which counteracted its undertakings, affected equally its internal enemies in their hostility. The New England extremists wished and expected to act energetically against the war. Chief-Justice Parsons quieted Pickering in the autumn of 1812 by assuring him that the Massachusetts House of Representatives would act at its winter session; * yet the legislature met and adjourned without action. The party waited for the spring election of 1818, which was to give them control of New York. Their disappointment at the re-election of Governor Tompkins was extreme, and the temptation to wait until the national government should become bankrupt and disgraced became irresistible. Another campaign was likely to answer their purpose. While England grew stronger every day, America grew weaker; the struggle became more and more unequal, the result more and more certain; and the hope of peaceably

1 Gallatin to William Few, May 9, 1813; Gallatin MSS.
restoring the Federalist party to power diminished
the temptation to adopt measures of force.

Thus when the Thirteenth Congress met for its
extra session, May 24, the Government felt stronger
than on March 5, when the old Congress expired.
The elections were safely passed; the peace negoti-
ations might be considered as begun; taxation was
no longer a matter of taste. The majority liked
taxation as little in 1813 as they had liked it in 1812
or in 1801; but they could no longer dispute or even
discuss it. Gallatin had gone, leaving the bills for
them to pass; and Congress, which at any other
time would have rebelled, had no choice but to pass
them.

Once more Henry Clay was chosen Speaker, and
setting Cheves aside he placed John W. Eppes at the
head of the Ways and Means Committee. The House
missed John Randolph, but gained John Forsyth of
Georgia, and Daniel Webster, — a new member from
New Hampshire, of the same age as Calhoun and
Lowndes, but five years younger than Clay. Other-
wise the members varied little from the usual type,
and showed more than their usual faculty for dis-
cussing topics no longer worth discussion.

President Madison's Message of May 25 challenged
no angry comment. Its allusion to the Russian
mediation and the terms of peace had an accent of
eleft-excuse, as though he were anxious to convince
England of her true interests; its allusion to France
contained the usual complaint of delays "so unreal*
the finances was rather cheerful than cheering. Dar-
ing as Madison's policy had been, he commonly spoke in tones hardly to be called bold; and this Message had the disadvantage, which under the circumstances could not be called a fault, of addressing itself rather to Europe and to enemies, than to a spirited and united nation. It had also the merit of directing Congress strictly to necessary business; and Congress acted on the direction.

Nothing less than necessity could at that moment of early summer have induced the members of Congress to remain in session at all. Stout as the majority might be in support of the war, the stoutest were depressed and despondent. They saw themselves disappointed in every hope and calculation on which they had counted a year before. Even their unexpected naval glory was lost for the moment by the victory of Broke's frigate the "Shannon" over the "Chesapeake," June 1, as Congress began its work. Disaster after disaster, disgrace upon disgrace, had come and were every moment multiplying. Suffocated with heat, members were forced to sit day by day in the half-finished Capitol, with a Southern village about them, their nearest neighbor a British fleet. "Defeated and disgraced everywhere," said one of the stanchest war members describing the scene, "Congress was to impose the burden of taxes on a divided people, who had been taught by leaders of the war party to look upon a

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tax-gatherer as a thief, if not to shoot him as a burg-
lar."^ According to the same authority, "the coun-
try was at the lowest point of depression, where fear is too apt to introduce despair." In this condition of spirits, Gallatin's tax-bills were reported to the
House June 10, — measures such as the Republican party had, till very lately, not conceived as within the range of its possible legislation. They included a direct tax of three million dollars; taxes on salt, licenses, spirits, carriages, auctions, sugar refineries; a stamp tax, and a complete machinery for the assessment and collection of these odious and oppressive imposts.

At the same moment, Daniel Webster began his career in Congress by moving Resolutions which caused a long and unprofitable debate on the conduct of France and the character of the French repealing Decree of April 28, 1811, — a debate that could have no other result or object than to mortify and annoy the President, who had been, like so many other rulers, the victim of Napoleon’s audacity. Pending this debate, June 13, the President took to his bed with a remittent fever, and for five weeks his recovery was doubtful. Madison was still confined to his bed, when, July 15, messengers from the lower Potomac brought news that the British fleet, consisting of eight or ten ships-of-the-line and frigates, was in the river, sixty miles below, making its way up the difficult channel to Washington. 'A reasonable and well*

^ Ingersoll’s History, i. 120.

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grounded fear took possession of the city. July 21, Serurier wrote to his Government: ^ —

^* Every one is making ready to move. I know that they are secretly packing up at the Departments. I have as yet sent nothing away, in order not to show distrust of the Government’s power; but I have got ready my most valuable papers, and from the moment the President shall
quit his residence, I shall follow where he goes, with my principal portfolios in one of my carriages."

The British ships were approaching the city; the sound of their guns was believed to be heard; and the Government had little means of stopping them. Every man prepared for volunteer duty; other work was suspended. About three thousand militia and volunteers, among whom were all the Cabinet and many members of Congress, were mustered, and marched to Fort Washington, which was occupied by some six hundred regular troops, with the Secretary of War at their head; while the Secretary of the Navy took his post on the 28-gun frigate "Adams" in the river beneath, and the Secretary of State rode down the river shore with a cavalry scouting party to reconnoitre the British ships. July 15 and 16 the House of Representatives ordered a Fast, and went into secret session to consider modes of defence.

Unfortunately the motion for inquiry was made by a Federalist. The majority, determined to make no

^Serurier to Bassano, July 21, 1813; Archives des AIL £tr. HSS.

• National Intelligencer, July 17, 20, 22, 1813.

admifisions, referred the subject to the Military Committee, which reported the next day through its chairman, Troup of (Georgia, that the preparation was "in every respect adequate to the emergence." When a majority could benefit only its enemies by telling the truth, history showed that honorable men often preferred to tell what was untrue. In this case the British ships made their soundings, and obtained
whatever knowledge they sought; then left the river to visit other parts of the Bay, but never were so far distant that they might not, with energy and a fair wind, within four-and-twenty hours, have raided the defenceless village. They had but to choose their own time and path. Not a defensible fort or a picket-fence stood within ten miles of Washington, nor could a sufficient garrison be summoned in time for defence. Armstrong, Jones, and Monroe doubtless assured Con* gross that their means of defence were "in every respect adequate," but Congress took the responsi*bility on its own shoulders when it accepted their assurance.

Perhaps of all the incompetence shown in the war this example most exasperated patriotic citizens, because it was shared by every branch of the govern* ment. For six months the Administration and its friends had denounced Hull, Van Rensselaer, and Smyth for betraying the government, while the Clintonians and peace Democrats had denounced the President for imbecility; but in regard to the city of Washington the generals were not in question, for no.

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generals were there, while the President was dangerously ill in bed. The Legislature and Cabinet were chiefly responsible for whatever should happen, — the more because their warning was ample, even if under such circumstances warning was needed. K Jefferson assumed as a matter of course that William Hull was to be shot and Stephen Van Rensselaer broken for their mistakes, Republicans might properly ask what punishment should be reserved for Armstrong, Jones, and Monroe of the Cabinet, Troup of Georgia, Sevier of Tennessee, Wright of Maryland, and other members of the Military Committees of the House
and Senate for their neglect of the national capital.

The debate on Webster's Resolutions, and the report made in consequence by Monroe, July 12, tended to throw additional discredit on the Government. In no respect did Madison's Administration make an appearance less creditable than in its attitude toward Napoleon's Decrees, again and again solemnly asserted by it to have been repealed, in the face of proof that the assertion was unfounded. No Federalist rhetoric was necessary to make this mortification felt. Madison seldom expressed himself with more bitterness of temper than in regard to the Emperor's conduct, and with Monroe the subject drew forth recurrent outbursts of anger and disgust. His report tacitly admitted everything that the Federalists charged, except that the Administration had a secret engagement with France: it had deceived itself, but it had not wilfully deceived the public.

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While the House was busied with these unpleasant subjects, the Senate look up the President’s recent nominations. May 29, four names were sent to it for diplomatic appointments, — those of Albert Gallatin, J. Q. Adams, and James A. Bayard, to negotiate treaties of peace and commerce with Great Britain, and a treaty of commerce with Russia; that of Jonathan Russell to be Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden. Rufus King immediately began opposition by moving three Resolutions of inquiry in regard to the nature of the Russian appointments and the authority under which the Treasury was to be administered in the Secretary’s absence. The President replied, June 3, that the duties of the Secretary of the Treasury were discharged by the Secretary of the Navy under the provisions of the Act of 1792. The Senate, by a
vote of twenty to fourteen, referred the matter to
a committee consisting of Anderson of Tennessee,
Rufus King, Brown of Louisiana, and Bledsoe of
Kentucky. Anderson, the chairman, wrote to the
President and went to see him on behalf of the com-
mittee, but received only the answer that the Presi-
dent declined to discuss the matter with them in
their official character. The Senate then adopted a
Resolution that the functions of Secretary of the
Treasury and Envoy Extraordinary were incompati-
ble. The Federalists obtained on this vote the sup-
port of Giles, Leib, and Samuel Smith, German of
New York, and Gilman of New Hampshire, all of
whom were disaffected Republicans; but even with

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this aid they would have failed without the votes of
Anderson, Bledsoe, and the two Louisiana senators,
who joined the malcontents.

Madison was then slowly recovering strength, and
greatly harassed by anxieties. He would not sacri-
fice Gallatin to the Senate; he hoped that firm-
ness would carry the point,^ and at worst he could
throw upon senators the charge of factious oppo-
sition. This he succeeded in doing. July 16 the
Senate committee, naturally expecting Madison to
suggest some arrangement, once more sought and
obtained a conference, — "when the President was
pleased to observe," said their report, * "that he was
sorry that the Senate had not taken the same view
of the subject which he had done; and that he re-
gretted that the measure had been taken under cir-
cumstances which deprived him of the aid or advice
of the Senate. After the committee had remained
a reasonable time for the President to make any
other observations if he thought proper to do so,
and observing no disposition manifested by him to enter into further remarks, the committee retired without making any observations on the matter of the Resolutions, or in reply to those made by the President."

Finding itself thus defied, the Senate, without more discussion, rejected Gallatin\^s nomination by eighteen votes to seventeen, Anderson and the two Lou«

1 Madison to Qallatin, Aug. 2, 1813; Works, ii. 566. i Executive Journal\^ IL 388.

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isiana senators still adhering to the hostile interest. Adams and Bayard were then confirmed with little opposition.

After the passage of manj years, the propriety of the decision may still be left open to debate. As far as the Federalists were concerned, their votes contra-dicted their own precedents; and if they conceded, as their precedents required, that the question was not one of law but of expediency, they assumed re*sponsibility in acting as final judges. The incom-patibility asserted by them was a matter of dispute. Two successive chief-justices had been sent as en-voys abroad. No one could doubt that the Secre-tary of the Treasury, or any other member of the Executive or Judicial departments, might be appoint-ed to negotiate a treaty in Washington. Temporary absence from Washington had never implied incom-patibility. Every one knew that the Secretary of War meant in person to conduct the war on the frontier. No one could question the President's right to ap-point acting secretaries. If convenience alone was the point at issue, surely the President knew best
the demands of his own Executive departments, and
might be trusted with the responsibility which be-
longed to him. That he should fail to see, as soon
as the Senate could discover, an incompatibility that
would work only against himself, need not be taken
for granted by his own party, whatever might be the
case with the opposition.
. On the other hand every one might admit that as

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the country grew, Secretaries of the Treasury were
likely to find work in their own Department that
would effectually limit their capacity for foreign
travel; and if the Senate thought that stage to be
already reached, senators were right in insisting
upon the appointment of a new secretary in Gal-
latin's place. Unfortunately for their argument, their
power did not extend so far. Gallatin remained Sec-
retary of the Treasury, and continued to negotiate as
fluch, without paying attention to the Senate or its
theories.

The Senate further weakened its position in acting
on the nomination of Jonathan Russell as Minister
to Sweden. The subject was referred, June 2, to a
committee consisting of Senator Goldsborough of
JMaryland, together with Anderson and Rufus King.
Jonathan Russell had made himself obnoxious to the
peace party by eagerness shown, while he was in
charge at London, to bring on the war. The com-
mittee not only entered on an investigation of his
-doings at Paris, but also introduced a Resolution
declaring that any mission to Sweden at that time
was inexpedient, and by order of the Senate asked
a conference with the President. Monroe, angry at
this conduct, declared privately that a faction in the
Senate, counting on the death not only of President
Madison but of Vice-President Gterry, and the election of Giles as President of the Senate, were scheming to usurp the Executive power.^

1 Monroe to Jefferson, June 28, 1813; Adams's Gallatin, p484.

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In order to counteract their manoeuvre, and also to relieve the President, who was then dangerously ill, Monroe took the ground that the Executive would not confer with a co-ordinate branch of government except through an agent, because his dignity would not allow him to meet a committee except by a committee of his own. Monroe thus expressed this somewhat unRepublican doctrine: "A committee of the Senate ought to confer with a committee of the President through a head of a Department, and not with the Chief Magistrate; for in the latter case a committee of that House is equal to the President."^ As a necessary conclusion, Monroe's argument seemed to the Senate not beyond dispute; but they answered it, three days afterward, still less logically, by passing Goldsborough's Resolution that it was inexpedient at that time to send a Minister Plenipotentiary to Sweden.

Whatever might have been the case with Gallatin's rejection, no one could doubt that the vote on Russell's appointment was factious. When twenty-two senators, including Jeremiah Mason, Christopher Gore, Samuel Dana, Rufus King, and William B. GileSy declared that a minister resident in Sweden was inexpedient in the summer of 1813, they declared what every other well-informed man knew to be an error. If any American envoy was ever expedient, it wa&

* Monroe to Jefferson, June 28, 1813 ; Adams's Gallatin,
an envoy to Sweden in 1818; for in Sweden at that moment all that was left of American commerce centred after being driven from England, and the political interests of Sweden were greatly involved with those of the United States. The error was the less to be denied, because, only six months afterward, the Senate admitted itself in the wrong, and approved the appointment of Russell.

These votes of the Senate made a deep impression. In time of peace and safety the Senate might show factiousness without necessarily exciting public anger, although at no time was the experiment quite safe; but at a moment like July, 1813, when public opinion tended toward a serious temper, factiousness was out of place, and was the more dangerous because President Madison, though never showing great power as a popular leader, had still a clear perception of the moment when to strike an enemy. He rarely failed to destroy when he struck. The time had come when the Republican party, with one voice, would be obliged to insist that party discipline must be restored; and this result was precipitated by the Senate's conduct in regard to the diplomatic nominations.

An illustration of the dangers into which the spirit of faction at that excited moment led the factious, was furnished by the legislature of Massachusetts, which met. May 26, and after listening to a long speech from Governor Strong arraigning the national government for its injustice to England and
partiality to France, referred the subject to committees which lost no time in reporting. One of these reports, presented June 4 by Josiah Quincy of the State Senate, closed with a Resolution that the Act admitting Louisiana into the Union violated the Constitution, and that the Massachusetts senators in Congress should use their utmost endeavors to obtain its repeal. Another report, by a joint committee, contained a remonstrance addressed to Congress against the war, couched in terms of strong sectional hostility to the Southern States, and marked throughout by a covert argument for disunion. A third report, also by Josiah Quincy, on a naval victory lately won by Captain James Lawrence of the "Hornet," contained a phrase even longer remembered than Quincy's assertion that the Government could not be kicked into a war. The Government had in fact been kicked into the war, but Quincy was not the better pleased. He reported that in order not to give offence to many of the good people of the Commonwealth by appearing to encourage the continuance of an unjust, unnecessary, and iniquitous war, the Massachusetts senate while admiring Lawrence's virtues refrained from approving his acts, —

^^And to the end that all misrepresentations on this subject may be obviated, —

Resolvedly as the sense of the Senate of Massachusetts, that in a war like the present, waged without Justifiable cause, and prosecuted in a manner which indicates that conquest and ambition are its real motives, it is not

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becoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation of military or naval exploits which are not immediately connected with the defence of our sea-coast and soil."

Such tactics, whether in or out of Congress, were more dangerous to their authors than any blunders of the Administration could ever be to the party in power. If the nation should be successful in the war, it might perhaps in good nature leave unpunished the conduct of its malcontents; but if by their means the nation should be conquered or forced into a humiliating peace, the people would never forget, and never forego revenge. Mere opposition to foreign war rarely injured public men, except while the war-fever lasted. Many distinguished statesmen of Europe and America had been, at one time or another, in opposition to some special war, — as was the case with Talleyrand, Charles James Fox, Lord Grey, Jefferson, and Madison; but opposition became unpardonable when it took a form which could have no apparent object except national ruin. The Federalists who held the ideas expressed by the legislature of Massachusetts could explain or defend their future course only by the conviction that the inevitable and long-expected "crisis" was at hand, which must end either in disunion or in reconstruction of the Union on new ground. As "a moral and religious people," they separated from the common stock, and thenceforward, if the Union lasted, could expect no pardon.

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The extravagance of the Massachusetts Federalists
was counterbalanced by the same national disaste: which caused it. Nothing showed that the war was popular in any of the sea-board States; but the pressure of circumstances, little by little, obliged lukewarm and even hostile communities to support it. Virginia and the Southern States were drawn into relations toward the government which they had never intended to accept. Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Tennessee submitted to exactions that would at any previous stage of their history have produced a revolution. Perhaps the strongest proof of change in popular prejudices was furnished by the taxes. Tax-bills which were supposed to have already overthrown one great political party, — bills which inflicted the evils so hotly and persistently denounced by Jefferson, Gallatin, and John Randolph in opposition, and which had been long delayed by fear of their popular effect, — were passed by Congress quickly, by decided votes, and with less debate than was given to the discussion whether the President had or had not told all he knew about Bassano's Decree of April 28, 1811. From the time they were approved by the President, in July and August, 1813, to the time of their repeal, neither the President nor his party was troubled by popular discontent on account of the passage of these Acts. They were accepted as a necessary part of the national system; and of a war-policy.

The most curious symptom, and the one which

most perplexed the Federalists, was that this popular movement of concentration acted in direct resistance to the movement of rents. In every respect as the Federalists looked back at the past twelve years their prophecies had come true. The Republi-
can party, they argued, had proved itself incompetent, and had admitted the failure of its principles; it had been forced to abandon them in practice, to replace the government where the Federalists had put it, and to adopt all the Federalists' methods; and even then the party failed. Equally imbecile in peace and war, the democratic movement had ended in such disgrace and helplessness as few governments had ever outlived, and such as no nation with a near and powerful neighbor could have survived. In 1813 the evidence of downfall had become patent. The government was ruined in credit and character; bankrupt, broken, and powerless, it continued to exist merely because of habit, and must succumb to the first shock. All this the Federalists had long foreseen. Fisher Ames in the press, scores of clergymen in the pulpit, numberless politicians in Congress, had made no other use of their leisure than to point out, step by step, every succeeding stage in the coming decline. The catastrophe was no longer far away, it was actually about them,—they touched and felt it at every moment of their lives. Society held itself together merely because it knew not what else to do.

Under circumstances following each other in ne<

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cessity so stringent, no Federalist could doubt that society would pursue the predicted course; but it did not. Illogical and perverse, society persisted in extending itself in lines which ran into chaos. The threatened "crisis" had arrived, wanting no characteristic of those so long foretold; but society made no effort to save itself. A vaster ruin and still more terrible retribution lay beyond. The Federalists were greatly and naturally perplexed at discov-
ering the silent under-current which tended to grow in strength precisely as it encountered most resis-
tance from events. They tried to explain the phe-
nomenon in their own way, — the clergy according to reUgious conceptions, the politicians according to their ideas of popular character. The political theory was the more plausible and less respectable. A. C. Han-son, the extreme Maryland Federalist, mobbed and nearly killed in Baltimore in June, 1812, only to be elected to Congress in November, thought that the national movement of 1813 was due to military glory. Hanson wrote to Pickering on the subject, in the autumn:^ —

"The war is becoming more popular every day in this State [Maryland]. Our successes, and the weak man-
er in which it is conducted by the enemy make it so. ... It would seem that after a while, unless the British can gather the sense and courage to strike some severe blows, the war by its own generative powers will create the means for its support. The vanity of a people caa*

^ Hanson to Pickering, Oct. 16, 1813; Pickering MSS.

not bear these brilliant nayal victories, and there is no passion to which the rulers of a people can address them* selves with greater effect Even in my district the ac-
tive opposers of the war are falling off every day, and unless we shortly meet with some reverses, the Administra-
tion will shortly find more friends than enemies in this State by a great deal. . . . The impression is becoming universal that the enemy cannot harm us if he would. A few hard blows struck in the right place would be of great service to the country."

A people that could feel its vanity flattered by such
glories as the war gave in 1813 must have felt the want of flattery to an unusual degree. The idea was extravagant. Not so much the glories as the disgraces of the war roused public sympathy; not so much the love of victory as the ignominy of defeat, and the grinding necessity of supporting government at any cost of private judgment. At such a moment any success was keenly felt, and covered every failure. The slow conviction that come what would the nation must be preserved, brought one man after another into support of the war, until the Federalists found their feet in a quicksand. The "crisis" produced the opposite effect to that which Burke’s philosophy predicted.

Congress finished its work, and August 2 adjourned. Immediately afterward the President went to Montpelier to recover his strength in the air of the Blue Ridge. The session had not been unsatisfactory, for although the Senate refused to impose an embargo, wanted by the President in order to cut off illegitimate trade with England’s dependencies, and although the same body put its negative on the appointments of Gallatin and Jonathan Russell, yet Congress passed the tax-bills, authorized another loan of seven and a half millions, and made the business of trading under a British license a penal offence. The operations of war alone remained to burden the President’s mind.

CHAPTER IV.

The fall of Detroit and Chicago in August, 1812,
threw the American frontier back to the line of the Wabash and the Maumee, and threatened to throw it still farther back to the Indian boundary itself. The Miami or Maumee River was defended by Port Wayne; the Wabash had no other defence than the little fort or blockhouse which Harrison built during the Tippecanoe campaign, and named after himself. Port Harrison stood near the later city of Terre Haute, close to the border of Illinois; Port Wayne stood within twenty miles of the Ohio border. The width of Indiana lay between the two.

Had Brock been able, after the capture of Detroit, to lead his little army into Ohio, he might have cleared not only the Maumee River, but the whole western end of Lake Erie from American possession. Recalled in haste to defend Niagara, Brock left only two or three companies of troops as garrison at Detroit and Maiden. The Indians could do little without the aid of regular forces, but they tried to carry both Port Wayne and Port Harrison by stratagem. The attacks were made almost simultaneously a few days after September 1, and not without skill.

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In the case of Fort Harrison the Indians were nearly successful, not so much in fighting as in burning it. With great difficulty its young captain, Zachary Taylor, of the Seventh Infantry, succeeded in saving his post. Fort Wayne was held by Captain James Rhea of the First Infantry until reinforcements arrived, September 12. Except the usual massacres of scattered families, the Indians accomplished nothing.

Upon the State of Ohio, with its quarter of a million inhabitants, and of Kentucky with four hundred thousand, fell the immediate burden of defending the
border between the Ohio and the Lakes. Governor William Henry Harrison of the Indiana Territory leaving Vincennes June 19, the day after the declaration of war, was at Cincinnati when threatening news began to arrive from Detroit. Harrison had military knowledge and instincts. He saw that after the capture of Mackinaw Detroit must fall, and that Hull could save himself only by evacuating it. Harrison's ambition, which had drawn him to Tippecanoe, drew him also to lead the new crusade for the relief or recovery of Detroit. He went to Kentucky at the invitation of Governor Scott, and under the patronage of Scott and Henry Clay he took the direction of military affairs. August 24 news reached Kentucky that Hull was shut in Detroit, and must surrender unless immediately relieved. The Governor of Kentucky at once summoned what was then called

^ Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 10, 1812 ; Dawson, p. 273. * Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 28^ 1812 ; Dawson, p. 283.

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a caucus^ composed of himself, his successor elect Governor Shelby, Henry Clay, Justice Todd of the United States Supreme Court, Major-General Hopkins of the Kentucky militia, various Congressmen, judges, and other citizens,^ whose whole authority was needed to warrant giving to Harrison, who was not a citizen of Kentucky, the commission of major-general and the command of the expedition to Detroit. By general acclamation, and on the warm assurances of universal popular approval, the measure was taken; and Harrison started at once for Cincinnati and Detroit to organize the campaign. The news of Hull's surrender met him as he left Frankfort.
By this combination of skill and accident, Harrison reached the object of his ambition, — the conduct of war on a scale equal to his faith in his own powers; but the torrent of Western enthusiasm swept him forward faster than his secret judgment approved. Appointed by caucus the general of volunteers, he could keep his position only by keeping his popularity. Without deciding precisely where to march, or what military object to pursue, he talked and acted on the idea that he should recover Detroit by a coujhdde-main. He knew that the idea was baseless as a practical plan, and futile as a military measure; but nothing less would satisfy the enthusiasm of his Kentuckv volunteers, and the national government almost com-

1 Harrison to Eustis, Aug. 28, 1812 ; Dawson, p. 283.
* Dawson, p. 296.

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peled him to pretend what he did not at heart believe possible.

The confusion thus created was troublesome. First, Harrison insisted on commanding the troops marching to relieve Port Wayne, and obliged the good-natured (General Winchester, who outranked him, to yield the point. Then after a forced march with the Kentuckians down the St. Mary's River, having relieved Port Wayne, Harrison was obliged, September 19, to surrender the command to Winchester, who arrived with orders from the Secretary of War to take general charge of the northwestern army. Harrison then left Port Wayne for Piqua. Meanwhile the President and Eustis, learning what had been done in Kentucky, September 17, after much debate decided to give to Harrison the commission of brigadier-general, with the command of the north-
western army, to consist of ten thousand men, with unlimited means and no orders except to retake Detroit.* Brigadier-General Winchester, who was already at Port Wayne, was given the option of serving under Harrison, or of joining the army at Niagara.

These new orders reached Harrison September 26 at Piqua. Harrison then resumed command, and two days afterward, September 27, wrote to the secretary, announcing his plan for the autumn campaign. Three columns of troops, from widely distant quarters, were to move to the Maumee Rapids, — the right column, consisting of Virginia and Pennsylvania troops, by way of the Sandusky River; the centre column, of twelve hundred Ohio militia, by Hull's road; the left column, consisting of four Kentucky regiments and the Seventeenth U. S. Infantry, was to descend the Auglaize River to Fort Defiance on the Maumee, and thence to fall down that river to the point of junction with the two other columns.

Compared with Hull's resources, Harrison's were immense; and that he had no serious enemy to fear was evident from his dividing the army into three columns, which marched by lines far beyond supporting distance of each other. At the same time he ordered Major-General Hopkins of the Kentucky militia to march with two thousand men up the Wabash into the Indian country, and to destroy the Indian settlements on the Wabash and Illinois rivers.

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Had a British force been opposed to the Americans, its general would have had little difficulty in destroying some one of these four isolated columns, and driving Harrison back to central Ohio; but only bands of Indians, not exceeding five hundred at most, were to be feared before the army should cross the Maumee, and little anxiety existed on account of enemies, unless for the safety of Port Wayne.

Harrison's anxieties bore a different character. September 23 he wrote to the Secretary of War: "If the fall should be very dry, I will take Detroit before the winter sets in; but if we should have much rain, it will be necessary to wait at the rapids until the Miami of the Lakes is sufficiently frozen to bear the army and its baggage." The promise was rash. However dry the season might be, the task of marching an army with siege-artillery past Maiden to Detroit, and of keeping it supplied from a base two hundred miles distant, with the British commanding the Lake, was one which Harrison had too much sense to attempt. Nothing but disaster could have resulted from it, even if Detroit had been taken. In the actual condition of that territory, no army could be maintained beyond the Maumee River without controlling the Lake. Perhaps Harrison was fortunate that constant rains throughout the month of October brought the army to a halt long before it reached the Maumee. Only the left division of five Kentucky regiments succeeded in getting to the river, and camped in the neighborhood of old Fort Defiance, waiting for the other columns to reach the rapids. There the Kentuckians remained, under the command of General Winchester, without food, clothing, or sufficient shelter, in a state of increasing discontent.
and threatening mutiny, till the year closed.

Within a month after assuming command Harrison found himself helpless either to advance or to retreat, or to remain in any fixed position. The supplies required for ten thousand troops could not be sent forward by any means then known. October 22 the

^ Dawson, p. 312,

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left column, consisting of the Kentucky regiments and some regulars, was at Defiance on the Maumee; the central column of a thousand Ohio troops under General Tupper was on Hull's road, a hundred miles from the Maumee, unable to march beyond Urbana, where its supplies were collecting; the right column of Pennsylvanians and Virginians was still farther from the front, slowly approaching the Sandusky River from the southeast, but far out of reach. General Hopkins's expedition up the Wabash ended in failure, his troops becoming a mere mob, and at last disbanding, leaving their general to follow them home. Harrison himself was riding indefatigably through the mud, from one end to the other of his vast concave line, — now at Defiance, making speeches to pacify Winchester's Kentuckians; then at Piqua and Urbana with the Ohioans; soon a hundred miles away at the river Huron, east of Sandusky; next at Wooster, Delaware, or Franklinton, afterward Columbus, in the centre of Ohio, looking for his right wing; but always searching for a passable ridge of dry land, on which his supplies could go forward to the Maumee Rapids. The result of his search was given in a letter of October 22, from Franklinton, to the Secretary of War: —
I am not able to fix any period for the advance of the troops to Detroit. It is pretty evident that it cannot be done upon proper principles until the frost shall come so severe as to enable us to use the rivers and the margin of the Lake for transportation of the baggage and artillery upon the ice. To get them forward through a swampy wilderness of near two hundred miles, in wagons or on packhorses which are to carry their own provisions, is absolutely impossible.

The obstacle which brought Harrison's autumn campaign to this sudden close was the vast swamp that extended from the Sandusky River on his right to the Auglaize River on his left, and for the moment barred the passage of his necessary supplies as effectually as though it had been the Andes. Hull had crossed it, cutting a road as he went, and no one had then appreciated his effort; but he had marched with a small force in May and June. Harrison tried to transport supplies, heavy guns, military stores, and all the material for an army of ten thousand men on a long campaign, as the autumn rains set in. On the extreme right, with great effort and expense, a considerable quantity of rations was accumulated on the Sandusky River, to be sent to the Maumee Rapids whenever the frosts should harden the swamps. On the extreme left, desperate efforts were made to carry supplies to Winchester's army at Defiance by way of the Auglaize and St. Mary's rivers. Hull's road was impassable, and for that reason the column of Ohio troops and their supplies were stopped in the neighborhood of Urbana.

Throughout the months of October and November Harrison's army stood still, scattered over the State
of Ohio, while wagons and packhorses wallowed in mud toward the Maumee Rapids. None arrived.

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Sometimes the wagons were abandoned in the mud; sometimes the packhorses broke down; sometimes the rivers were too low for boats; then they froze and stopped water-transport. Universal confusion, want of oversight and organization, added to physical difficulties, gave play to laziness, incapacity, and dishonesty. No bills of lading were used; no accounts were kept with the wagoners; and the teams were valued so high, on coming into service, that the owners were willing to destroy them for the price to be received. The waste of government funds was appalling, for nothing short of a million rations at the Maumee Rapids could serve Harrison's objects, and after two months of effort not a ration had been carried within fifty miles of the spot. In Winchester's camp at Defiance the men were always on half rations, except when they had none at all. During the greater part of December they had no flour, but lived on poor beef and hickory roots. Typhus swept them away by scores; their numbers were reduced to about one thousand. The exact force which Harrison had in the field was matter of conjecture, for he sent no return of any description to the adjutant-general's office. The Government gave him carte blanche and he used it. Chaos and misconduct reigned in every department, while he, floundering through the

1 McAffee, p. 184.

' Armstrong to Harrison, April 4, 1813; Armstrong's Notices, L 245.

* Harrison to Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813; Dawson, p. 337.
mud along his line of two hundred miles front, sought in vain for a road.

For the train of errors and disasters in the north-west Secretary Eustis was chiefly responsible, and his resignation, Dec. 3, 1812, left the campaign in this hopeless condition. From Dec. 3, 1812, until Jan. 13, 1813, Monroe acted as Secretary of War; and to him Harrison next wrote from Delaware, December 12, a letter which not only disheartened the Government, but was calculated to create a prejudice against the writer in the mind of any Secretary of War who was not invincibly prejudiced in his favor.

"If there were not some important political reason," said Harrison, "urging the recovery of the Michigan Territory and the capture of Maiden as soon as those objects can possibly be effected, and that to accomplish them a few weeks sooner expense was to be disregarded, I should not hesitate to say that if a small proportion of the sums which will be expended in the quartermaster’s department in the active prosecution of the campaign during the winter was devoted to obtaining the command of Lake Erie, the wishes of the Government, in their utmost extent, could be accomplished without difficulty in the months of April and May. Maiden, Detroit, and Mackinaw would fall in rapid succession. On the contrary, all that I can certainly promise to accomplish during the winter, unless the strait should afford us a passage on the ice, is to recover Detroit. I must farther observe that no military man would think of retaining Detroit, Maiden being in possession of the enemy, unless his army

was at least twice as strong as the disposable force of the enemy. An army advancing to Detroit along a line of operation passing so near the principal force of the enemy as to allow them access to it whenever they think proper, must be covered by another army more considerable than the disposable force of the enemy. I mention this circumstance to show that the attack ought not to be directed against Detroit, but against Maiden; and that it depends upon the ice affording a safe passage across the strait, whether I shall be able to proceed in this way or not. Detroit is not tenable. Were I to take it without having it in my power to occupy the opposite shore, I should be under the necessity of hiding the army in the adjacent swamp to preserve it from the effects of the shot and shells which the enemy would throw with impunity from the opposite shore. This result is so obvious to every man who has the least military information, that it appears to me as extraordinary as any other part of General Hull's conduct that he should choose to defend Detroit rather than attack Maiden."

Hull could have asked no better apology for his surrender. Harrison did not know that the insubordination and refusal of the Ohio colonels to evacuate Detroit had forced Hull to remain there; but that Detroit was not tenable came at last to the surface as a self-evident truth of the campaign, — which Hull had always, seen, and which Harrison himself announced almost as clearly in August as in December, but which he ignored in the interval.

"If it should be asked," he continued, "why these statements were not made sooner, — I answer that al-
though I was always sensible that there were great difficulties to be encountered in the accomplishment of the wishes of the President in relation to the recovery of Detroit and the conquest of the adjacent part of Upper Canada in the manner proposed, I did not make sufficient allowance for the imbecility and inexperience of the public agents and the villany of the contractors. I am still, however, very far from believing that the original plan is impracticable. I believe on the contrary that it can be effected."

The excuse did not satisfy the Cabinet, who thought they saw that Harrison wished to throw upon Government the responsibility for a military failure fatal to himself. Perhaps a simpler motive guided Harrison, who from the first never had known precisely what to do, or had seen any clear path to success. He wrote, January 4, from Franklin ton, —

"When I was directed to take the command in the latter end of September, I thought it possible by great exertions to effect the objects of the campaign before the setting in of winter. . . The experience of a few days was sufficient to convince me that the supplies of provisions could not be procured for our autumnal advance; and even if this difficulty was removed, another of equal magnitude existed in the want of artillery. There remained then no alternative but to prepare for a winter campaign."

According to this account he had seen early in October that advance was impossible, yet he wasted millions of money and many of his best troops in attempting it. Winter had come, and he was pledged
to a winter campaign as impracticable as the autumn campaign had proved to be. Without the control of the Lake, any army beyond the Maumee must starve or surrender. The government had already paid a vast price in money and men in order to obtain this knowledge; yet Harrison proposed a winter campaign, with full persuasion of its uselessness.

December 20 he sent orders to Winchester to descend the Maumee River from Defiance to the rapids, there to prepare sleds for an expedition against Maiden, to be made by a choice detachment when the whole army should concentrate at the rapids. Early in January, the ground being at last frozen, provisions in large quantities were hurried to the Maumee River. Artillery was sent forward. The Pennsylvania and Virginia brigades moved to the Sandusky River, making an effective force of fifteen hundred men at that point. The whole effective force on the frontier amounted to six thousand three hundred infantry. Harrison intended to move his headquarters forward from the Sandusky, and to reach the Maumee Rapids January 20, to which point he supposed General Winchester already in motion from Defiance.

This was the situation January 12; and although

* Dawso, p. 454.

' Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813; Dawson, p. 339.

* Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813; Dawson, p. 339.
Harrison hinted in his reports of January 4 and 8 that his winter campaign would probably fail, and he showed the intention of advancing at least as far as the strait opposite Maiden, about thirty-five miles beyond the Maumee. This he might venture without much danger and if he reached that point, supposing the straits to be frozen, the enemy to show little sign of resistance, and the weather to favor, he might attack Maiden. Hull had been expected to take Maiden with twelve or fourteen hundred men, with an open river behind him, a British fleet on his flank, fifty miles of road to cover, and supplies for only a few days at Detroit; but Harrison with six thousand men, the river frozen and the British fleet frozen in it, a secure base, with a million rations close in his rear, and no Isaac Brock in his front, still spoke with extreme doubt of his prospects, and said that "most of the well-informed men who knew the character of the country" expected a suspension of operations for the winter.

Aware that from a military point of view no land-campaign could, except by accident, effect any result proportionate to its cost, Harrison had placed himself at the head of a popular movement so strong that he would have met the fate of Hull and Alexander Smyth, had he not made at least a demonstration

^ Hairison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 4, 1813; Daweon, p. 339.

* Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 8, 1813; Daweon, p. 339.
against an enemy whose face he had not yet seen. Forced by his own pledges and the public discontent to enter on an unmilitary campaign, he was anxious to risk as little as possible where he could hardly expect to gain anything; and he would probably have contented himself with his first scheme of a coup'de-main against Maiden or Detroit, without attempting to hold either place, had not his subordinate, General Winchester, rescued him from an awkward position by a blunder that relieved Harrison of further responsibility.

Brigadier-General Winchester was a planter of Tennessee, sixty-one years old, and formerly an officer in the Revolutionary War. Though outranking Harrison, he had allowed himself to be set aside by what he thought intrigue,^ and consented to conduct the left wing of the force under Harrison's command. Winchester was not a favorite with his Kentucky militia-men, who had no choice in electing him to their command. Their term of service was to expire in February; they had been imprisoned since September in a wilderness at Defiance—hungry, cold, sick, and mutinous, able to find no enemy willing to fight them, and disgusted with idleness. No sooner was the ground frozen and the general movement of concentration possible, than Winchester's orders, broke up their camp near Defiance and marched

to the rapids, where Hull's road crossed the Maumee. There they arrived January 10, as Harrison expected. They fortified themselves on the north bank, and waited for the arrival of Harrison, who intended to join them January 20.

Winchester's force included three regiments of Kentucky militia, numbering nine hundred effectives, and the Seventeenth United States Infantry, numbering three hundred men, also Kentuckians; Altogether he had under his command at the rapids about thirteen hundred men, — a force barely sufficient to hold the exposed position it had taken on the north bank of the river. The three Kentucky militia regiments were soon to go home. The other columns were not yet within supporting distance. If Colonel Proctor, who commanded at Maiden, were capable of imitating Brock's enterprise, he would hardly throw away an opportunity, which might never recur, to strike a blow at the Kentuckians, and by defeating them to drive Harrison's army behind the Sandusky River. Every military motive warned Winchester not to divide, detach, or expose his troops without caution. He was himself a detachment, and he had no support nearer than the Sandusky.

While the troops were busily engaged in building a store-house and throwing up log-works in an injudicious and untenable position, two Frenchmen came into camp, begging protection for the inhabitants of Frenchtown on the river Baisin, thirty miles in front,
and within the British lines. Thirty-three families, or about one hundred and fifty persons, were resident at Frenchtown, and the place was held by a few Canadian militia, supposed to consist of two companies, with about as many Indians, — in all, some three hundred men.* This force might easily be destroyed, and the loss to the British would be serious. Winchester's troops became eager to dash at them. A council of war decided, January 16, without a voice in remonstrance, that the movement should be made. The most ardent supporter of the adventure was Col. John Allen of the Kentucky Rifle regiment; but no one offered opposition, and Winchester agreed to the council's opinion.^

The next morning, Jan. 17, 1813, Col. William Lewis, of, the Fifth Kentucky militia, started for the river Raisin, with four hundred and fifty men.* A few hours afterward he was followed by Colonel Allen with one hundred and ten men. No reports told what regiments were taken, or where they were at any moment stationed; but Lewis and Allen probably led twelve companies, drawn from four Kentucky regiments, — the Seventeenth United States Infantry, recruited in Kentucky, commanded by Col. Samuel Wells; the Kentucky Rifles, Col. John Allen; the First Kentucky Infantry; and Colonel Lewis's

1 McAffee, p. 237.

' Winchester's Statement; Armstrong's Notices, i. 199.


regiment, the Fifth Kentucky Infantry, — in all, six hundred and sixty men, representing the flower of Kentucky.

They marched on the ice, along the shore of Maumee Bay and Lake Erie, until nightfall, when they camped, and at two o'clock the next afternoon January 18, reached without meeting resistance the houses on the south bank of the river Raisin. The north bank was occupied, according to British authority, by fifty Canadian militia and two hundred Indians. The British force opened fire with a three-pound howitzer. The action began at three o'clock and lasted till dark, when the enemy after an obstinate resistance was driven about two miles into the woods with inconsiderable loss. The action was sharp, and cost the Americans not less than twelve killed and fifty-five wounded, reducing their effective number to six hundred.

Colonel Lewis had orders to take possession of Frenchtown, and hold it. He reported his success to General Winchester at the rapids, and remained at Frenchtown waiting further orders. Winchester became then aware that the situation was hazardous. Six hundred men were with him in a half-fortified camp on the north bank of the Maumee; six hun-

Ames, i. 185: Eichardson, p. 74.
Eichardson, p. 75.

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dred more were thirty miles in advance, at the Raisin River; while fully two thousand — or, according to Harrison's estimate, four thousand enemies held two fortresses only eighteen miles beyond the Raisin. The Kentuckians at the Maumee, equally aware of
their comrades' peril, insisted on going to their aid. Winchester promptly started on the evening of January 19, and arrived at Prenchtown the next morning. Colonel Wells's Seventeenth United States Infantry, two hundred and fifty men, followed, arriving at Frenchtown in the evening.*

Winchester, before leaving the Maumee Rapids, sent a despatch to Harrison with a report of the battle of the 18th, which met Harrison on the road hurrying to the Mamnee Rapids. The next morning, January 20, Harrison arrived at the camp on the Maumee, and found there about three hundred Kentucky troops,* the remainder being all with Winchester at the river Raisin. Probably Harrison, whose own caution was great, felt the peril of Winchester's situation,* but he sent his inspector-general. Captain Hart, forward with orders to Winchester "to hold the ground we had got at any rate," ^ while he wrote to the Secretary of War:

^ Winchester's Statement; Armstrong's Notices, i. 198.


* Harrison to the Secretary of War, Jan. 26, 1813; Official Letters, p. 125.

^ Harrison to Governor Meigs, Jan. 19, 1813; "National Intelligencer," Feb. 11, 1813.

* McAffee, p. 210; Armstrong's Notices^ i. 200.

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"Upon my way to this place [Maumee Rapids] last evening, I received the letter from the General [Winchester] of which the enclosed is a copy, informing me of the com-
plete success of the enterprise in the defeat of the enemy
and taking the stores they had collected. The detach-
ment under Colonel Lewis remain at the river Raisin,
and Greneral Winchester very properly marched yesterday
with two hundred and fifty men to reinforce him and take
the command. ... It is absolutely necessary to main-
tain the position at the river Raisin, and I am assembling
the troops as fast as possible for the purpose." ^

Harrison added that his only fear was lest Win-
chester should be overpowered. He waited at the
Maumee Rapids two days, until at noon, January 22,
a messenger arrived with disastrous tidings from the
front.

Winchester afterward told the story of his own
proceedings with so much candor that his narrative
became a necessary part of any explanation of his
disaster: —

^* Suspecting that Proctor would make an attempt to
avenge this stroke, and knowing that our wounded men
could not be removed, I hastened to reinforce Colonel
Lewis with Wells’s regiment, two hundred and fifty men;
and set out myself to join him, and arrived on the morn-
ing of the 20th. The town, lying on the north side of
the river,^ was picketed on three sides, the longest facing
the north, and making the front. Within these pickets
Colonel Lewis’s corps was found. Not thinking the posi-

* Harrison to the Secretary of War, Feb. [Jan.] 20, 1818;
MSS. War Department Archives.

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tioB eligible, nor the pickets a sufScient defence against
artillery, I would have retreated but for the wounded, of
whom there were fifty-five ; but having no sufficient means
for transporting these, and being equally destitute of those necessary for fortifying strongly, I issued an order for putting the place in the best condition for defence that might be practicable, intending to construct some new works as soon as the means for getting out timber might be had. On the evening of the 20th Wells arrived, and was directed to encamp on the right, in an open field, immediately without the picketing. On the 21st a patrol as far as Brownstown [opposite Maiden] was sent out, and returned without seeing anything of an enemy. On the same day a man from Maiden came in who reported that the enemy were preparing to attack us; but knowing nothing of the kind or extent of the preparation made or making, what he brought was thought to be only conjecture and such as led to a belief that it would be some days before Proctor would be ready to do anything. . . . Neither night-patrol nor night-pickets were ordered by me, from a belief that both were matters of routine and in constant use. . . . Not to discommode the wounded men, ... I took quarters for myself and suite in a house on the southern bank, directly fronting the troops and only separated from them by the river, then firmly frozen, and but between eighty and a hundred yards wide."

The only educated oflicer under Harrison's command was Major E. D. Wood of the Engineers, one of the early graduates of West Point, and an officer of high promise. He was not with Winchester's division, but with the right wing on the Sandusky, and arrived at the Maumee Rapids some ten days afterward, where he built Fort Meigs, in February. During the campaign he kept a diary, and his criticisms of Winchester, Lewis, Allen, and their command were quoted with approval by the Kentucky
historian, as well as by Harrison's biographer: —

"The troops were permitted to select, each for himself, such quarters on the west side of the river as might please him best, whilst the general took his quarters on the east side, — not the least regard being paid to defence, order, regularity, or system, in the posting of the different corps. . . . With only one third or one fourth of the force destined for that service; destitute of artillery, of engineers, of men who had ever seen or heard the least of an enemy; and with but a very inadequate supply of ammunition, — how he ever could have entertained the most distant hope of success, or what right he had to presume to claim it, is to me one of the strangest things in the world. . . . Winchester was destitute of every means of supporting his corps long at the river Raisin; was in the very jaws of the enemy, and beyond the reach of succor. He who fights with such flimsy pretensions to victory will always be beaten, and eternally ought to be.*'

Defeat under such conditions was disgraceful enough; but defeat by Colonel Proctor was one of the worst misfortunes that happened to an American general. The Prince Regent took occasion, at the close of the war, to express his official opinion of this officer, then Majpr-General Proctor, in language of unusual severity. Yet Proctor's first movements at the Raisin River showed no apparent sign of his being "so extremely wanting in professional knowledge, and deficient in those active, energetic qualities which must be required of every officer" as his later career, in the Prince Regent's opinion, proved him to be. He had opposed Brock's bold movement on
Detroit; but he did not hesitate to make a somewhat similar movement himself. January 21 he marched with artillery across the river on the ice, to Browns-town opposite Maiden, in full view of any American patrol in the neighborhood. His force consisted of six hundred whites, all told, besides either four hundred and fifty, six hundred or eight hundred Indians, under the chief Round Head, Tecumthe being absent collecting reinforcements on the Wabash. This large body of more than a thousand men, without an attempt at concealment, crossed to Brownstown and marched twelve miles, January 21, camping at night within five miles of Prenchtown.* If the British historian James was correct, they numbered eleven hundred and eighty men, of whom five hundred and thirty were white, and the rest Indians; * but the official return reported the whites,

* Life of Sir George Prevost; App. xxv. p. 74. Christie, ii. 115.

* Return of the whole of the troopa engaged at Frenchtown, Jan. 22, 1813; MSS. Canadian Archives, c. 678, p. 18.

* Christie, ii. 69; James, i. 186; Richardson, p. 75.
* Proctor's Report of Jan. 25, 1813; James, L 418.

* James, i 185, 186.

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including every person present, at five hundred and ninety-seven men. Two hours before dawn, Janu* arj 22, thej again advanced, and before day-break approached within musket-shot of the picket-fence, and half-formed their line, before an alarm was given.
Had Proctor dashed at once on the defenceless Seventeenth regiment and the fence that covered the militia, he would probably have captured the whole without loss; but he preferred to depend on his three-pound guns, which gave the Eentuckians opportunity to use their rifles. In such fighting the Americans had much the advantage, especially as British regulars were opposite them. Within an hour the Forty-first regiment lost fifteen killed and ninety-eight wounded, and of the entire body of six hundred British troops not less than twenty-four were killed and one hundred and sixty-one wounded. Their three-pound guns were abandoned, so murderous were the Kentucky rifles. Had all the American troops been under cover, the battle would have been theirs; but Wells's Seventeenth regiment was a hundred yards away, on open ground outside the picket-fence on the right, where it was flanked by the Canadian militia and Indians and driven back toward the river, until Allen's Rifle regiment went out to help it. Gradually forced toward the rear, across the river, this part of the line was at last struck with a panic and fled, carrying with it Winchester himself, Colonel Allen, and Colonel Lewis; while six hundred Indians were in hot pursuit, or already in advance of them.

In the deep snow escape was impossible. Nearly a hundred Kentuckians fell almost side by side, and were scalped. Among these was Colonel Allen. General Winchester and Colonel Lewis were so fortunate as to fall into the hands of the chief Bound.
Head, who first stripped them and then took them to Proctor, who had for the time withdrawn his forces and ceased firing. By Proctor's advice, General Winchester sent an order to the men within the picket-fence to surrender.

By eight o'clock all resistance had ceased except from three hundred and eighty-four Kentuckians who remained within the picket-fence, under the command of Major Madison of the Rifle regiment. Surrounded by a thousand enemies, they had no chance of escape. Their ammunition was nearly exhausted; retreat was impossible; they could choose only between surrender and massacre, and they surrendered. The British officers looked at them with curiosity, as they came within the British line.

"Their appearance," said Major Richardson, "was miserable to the last degree. They had the air of men to whom cleanliness was a virtue unknown, and their squalid bodies were covered by habiliments that had evidently undergone every change of season, and were arrived at the last stage of repair. ... It was the depth of winter; but scarcely an individual was in possession of a great coat or cloak, and few of them wore garments of wool of any description. They still retained their summer dress, consisting of cotton stuff of various colors shaped into frocks, and descending to the knee. Their
trowsers were of the same material. They were covered with slouched hats, worn bare by constant use, beneath which their long hair fell matted and uncombed over their cheeks; and these, together with the dirty blankets wrapped round their loins to protect them against the inclemency of the season, and fastened by broad leathern belts, into which were thrust axes and knives of an enormous length, gave them an air of wildness and savagery which in Italy would have caused them to pass for brigands of the Apennines. The only distinction between the garb of the officer and that of the soldier was that the one, in addition to his sword, carried a short rifle instead of a long one, while a dagger, often curiously worked and of some value, supplied the place of the knife."

This description gave a lifelike idea of what Harrison justly thought the best material in the world for soldiery, had it been properly handled. Men who for four months had suffered every hardship, and were still unclothed, unfed, uncared for, and sacrificed to military incompetence, but hardened to cold, fatigue, and danger, had no reason to be ashamed of their misfortunes or of their squalor. Fortunately about five hundred were saved as prisoners, and thirty or forty escaped to the rapids; the rest, four hundred in number, were killed in battle, or massacred afterward.

Had Proctor acted with energy, he might have advanced to the rapids, and there have captured Harrison with his remaining force of nine hundred men, his artillery train and stores. Even with the
utmost celerity Harrison could hardly have escaped if an active pursuit had been made by Indians through the swamp which he had with extreme difficulty crossed two days before, and in the heavy rain which followed the battle; but Proctor had no wish for fighting. So far from thinking of attack, he thought only of escaping it, and hurried back to Maiden at noon the same day, leaving the wounded prisoners behind without a guard. Nothing excused such conduct, for Proctor knew the fate to which he was exposing his prisoners. That night the Indians, drunk with whiskey and mad with their grievances and losses, returned to Prenchtown and massacred the wounded. About thirty perished, some apparently burned. Fortunately for the United States the glamour of Proctor's victory hid his true character, and he was made a major-general, — the most favorable event of the war for the American armies he was to meet, and one which cost Great Britain even more in pride than in power.


CHAPTER V.

If Proctor was afraid of Harrison, with more military reason Harrison was afraid of Proctor; and while the British colonel, deserting his wounded prisoners, hurried from the field of battle, and felt himself in danger until the next day he was again entrenched at Maiden, at the same moment Harrison, burning the post at the Maumee Rapids and destroying such stores as were collected there, hastened back to the Portage or Carrying River some fifteen miles in the rear. Within thirty-six hours after the battle, the two enemies were sixty miles apart. At the Portage River Harrison remained a week, until he had collected a force of two thousand men. With these-
he returned to the rapids February 1, and began to construct a regularly fortified camp on the south bank of the river. Port Meigs, as it was called, did credit to the skill of Major Wood, the engineer officer who constructed it; but such a fortress seemed rather intended for defence than for the conquest of Canada.

In fact, Harrison had succeeded only in making the most considerable failure that had thus far marked the progress of the war; but while the public was still assuming treason and cowardice in William Hull, who had been sent with fifteen hundred men to hold Detroit and conquer Canada, and had been left unsupported to face destruction, — the same public admitted the excuses of Harrison, who with ten thousand men, unlimited means, and active support at Niagara, after four months of effort, failed even to pass the Maumee River except with a detachment so badly managed that only thirty-three men in a thousand escaped. This was the crowning misfortune which wrung from Gallatin the complaint that a "real incapacity" for war existed in the government itself, and must inevitably exhaust its resources without good result; but although it drove Gallatin to Europe, it left Harrison on the Maumee. Harrison would not take on himself the disgrace of admitting his inability to recapture Detroit, and the President would not, without his express admission, order him to desist. As Armstrong afterward explained: "The Cabinet, not inexpert at deciphering military diplomacy, and peculiarly shy of incurring any responsibility it could avoid, determined, with perhaps less of patriotism than of prudence, to leave the question of continuing the winter
campaign exclusively with the General." The General, not inclined to sink into obscurity or to admit failure, set himself to a third campaign ad hopeless as either of its predecessors. Ordering all the troops in his rear to join him, making a body of four thou-

1 Armstrong's Notices, L 85.

exposed to an active enemy. He called for more militia from Kentucky and Ohio, but the people no longer felt enthusiasm for war.

"I am sorry to mention," reported Harrison, March 17, the dismay and disinclination to the service which appear to prevail in the Western country; numbers must give that confidence which ought to be produced by conscious valor and intrepidity, which never existed in any army in a superior degree than amongst the greater part of the militia who were with me through the winter. The new drafts from this State [Ohio] are entirely of another character, and are not to be depended on."

In short, Harrison, who had in 1812 commanded ten thousand militia, seemed to think double the number necessary for 1813, besides regular troops and a fleet.

President Madison and two successive Secretaries of War had allowed themselves, for fear of displeasing Kentucky, to give Harrison carte blanche which Harrison had used without other limit than that of the entire resources of the West. The time at last came when such management must be stopped, and Secretary Armstrong, naturally impatient under the load of Eustis's and Monroe's failures, quickly decided to stop it. Harrison's letter of February 11,
announcing his failure, reached the Department March 1. March 6 the -secretary wrote to Harri-
son ordering him to maintain a threatenmg attitude,
but altering the mode of warfare. Henceforward

^ Aimstron^s Notices, i. 242. ^ Dawson^ p. 337.

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the army was to be made subordinate, — the navy
was to take the lead; and until the middle of May,
when the fleet on Lake Erie should be constructed,
Harrison was to maintain a strict defensive, and to
protect the line of the Maumee with six regular
regiments, only three of which had been yet partly
raised.

Meanwhile, Harrison had but a few hundred regu-
Iars and some Pennsylvania and Virginia militia, —
perhaps five hundred men in all, — to hold Port Meigs,
and mere squads of militia to guard eight other posts
which had cost the government some millions of
dollars. These five hundred troops, whose service
was mostly near its end, he left at Port Meigs, and in
the middle of March he set out for Chillicothe and
Cincinnati. Greatly annoyed at the summary manner
in which Armstrong had put an end to his campaign-
ing, he protested only against the inadequacy of his
force for the defence required of it, and insisted on a
temporary reinforcement of militia to garrison the
fortress that had cost him so much effort to construct
at the Maumee Rapids.

Then the value of General Proctor to his enemy
became immense. Between January 22, when he
attacked Winchester, and the end of April, when he
moved on Port Meigs, Proctor molested in no way
the weak and isolated American garrisons. With
hundreds of scouts and backwoodsmen at his com-
mand, he had not the energy or the knowledge to
profit by his opponents' exposed and defenceless con-

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dition. He allowed Major Wood to make Fort Meigs
capable of standing a siege; he let Harrison, unmo-
lested, pass a month away from his command; he
looked on while the Virginia militia marched home,
leaving only a handful of sickly men, under a major
of artillery, to defend the unfinished fort; he made
no attempt to waylay Harrison, who returned with
reinforcements by way of the Auglaize River; and
not until Harrison had enjoyed all the time necessary
to prepare for attack, did Proctor disturb him.

Harrison, expecting an assault, hurried back from
Cincinnati to Fort Meigs with some three hundred
men, leaving a brigade of Kentucky militia to follow
him. April 12 he reached the fort, but not till
April 28 did Proctor appear at the mouth of the
Maumee, with about five hundred regulars and nearly
as many militia, — nine hundred and eighty-three
whites, all told, and twelve hundred Indians under
Tecumthe and other chiefs. ^ Besides this large
force, he brought two twenty-four pound guns with
other artillery from Detroit, and two gunboats
supported the land-battery. While the guns were
placed in position on the north bank of the river,
the Indians crossed and surrounded the fort on
the south. May 1 the batteries opened, and dur-
ing four days kept up a heavy fire. Proctor, like
Harrison, moved in the wilderness as though he were
conducting a campaign on the Rhine; he liked regu-

^ Proctor's Report of May 4, 1813; Richardson, p. 94; James,
i. 196, 429.
lar modes of warfare, and with a force almost wholly irregular, after allowing Port Meigs to be built, he besieged it as though he could take it by battering its earthen ramparts. Untaught by his losses at the river Raisin, he gave once more advantage to the Kentucky rifle; and with every opportunity of destroying the reinforcement which he knew to be near, he allowed himself to be surprised by it.

The Kentucky brigade of twelve hundred men, under Brigadier-General Green Clay, had descended the Auglaize River in boats, and arrived at Defiance May 8, where they learned that Fort Meigs was invested. So neglectful of his advantages was Proctor that he not only failed to prevent General Clay from advancing, but failed to prevent communication between the besieged fort and the relief-column, so that Harrison was able to arrange a general attack on the investing lines, and came near driving the British force back to Maiden with the loss of all its artillery and baggage. At about nine o'clock on the morning of May 5, Clay's brigade descended the rapids, and eight hundred and sixty-six men under Colonel William Dudley,^ landing on the north side of the river, surprised and took possession of the British batteries, which were entirely unsupported. Had Clay's whole force been on the ground, and had it been vigorously pushed forward, the small British division which held the north bank must have abandoned all its positions; but Dudley's men were im-

^ Lossing, p. 486, note.
der no discipline, and though ready to advance were in no hurry to retreat, even when ordered. Three companies of the British Forty-first, and some of the Canadian militia soon gathered together; and although these could hardly have been half the number of Dudley's force,' yet with Tecumthe and a body of Indians they attacked the batteries, drove the Eentuckians out, dispersed them, and either captured or massacred the whole body, under the eyes of Harrison and Fort Meigs.

This affair, though little less fatal to the Americans than that of the river Raisin, was much less dearly bought by the British. Five hundred prisoners fell into Proctor's hands; two or three hundred more of the Kentucky brigade, including "the weak and obstinate but brave " ^ Dudley himself, must have been either killed in battle or massacred after surrender; only one hundred and seventy escaped; the boats with the baggage were captured; while the whole British loss on the north side of the river hardly exceeded fifty killed and wounded. A bitter feeling against Proctor was caused by the massacre of some forty American prisoners while under a British guard, and also, as was alleged, under the eyes of General Proctor, who did not interpose, although a

^ Richardson, p. 86 ; James, i. 198.

> Harrison to Armstrong, May 13, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Archives.

* Richardson, pp. 87, 88. Harrison to Armstrong, May 9^ 1813 ; MSS. War Department Archives.
fibldier of the Forty-first was murdered in trying to protect them. Probably all the prisoners would have been massacred had Tecumthe not ridden up at full speed, tomahawk in hand, and threatened to kill the first Indian who defied his authority.

On the south side Harrison had better fortime, and Colonel John Miller of the Nineteenth U. S. Infantry by a sortie gallantly captured a battery, with some forty prisoners; but neither on the north nor on the south did the fighting of May 5 decide any immediate military result. Besides losing on the north bank half the reinforcement brought by General Green Clay, Harrison had lost in the siege and in the sorties on the south bank nearly three hundred men in killed and wounded. If the numbers loosely reported in the American accounts were correct, the siege cost Harrison one thousand men, or fully half his entire force, including his reinforcements. After the fighting of May 6, he withdrew once more into the fort; the British batteries reopened fire, and the siege went on. No further attempt was made to trouble the enemy in open field. Harrison felt himself too weak for further ventures; yet never had his chance of a great success been so fair.

Proctor's siege of Fort Meigs was already a failure. Not only had the fort proved stronger than he expected, but the weather was bad; his troops were

^ Richardson, p. 88.

' Harrison to Armstrong, May 13, 1813; MSS. War Department Archives.

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without shelter; dysentery and loss in battle rapidly weakened them; half his militia went home, and, what was fatal to further action, his Indians could not be held together. Within three days after the battle of May 5, the twelve hundred Indians collected by Tecumthe's influence and exertions in the northwest territory dispersed, leaving only Tecumthe himself and a score of other warriors in the British camp. Proctor had no choice but to retire as rapidly as possible, and May 9 embarked his artillery and left his encampment without interference from Harrison, who looked on as a spectator while the movement was effected.

From that time until the middle of July Proctor remained quiet. Harrison moved his headquarters to Upper Sandusky and to Cleveland, and began to prepare for advance under cover of a naval force; but he was not allowed to rest, even though Proctor might have preferred repose. Proctor's position was difficult. Told by Sir George Prevost* that he must capture what supplies he needed from the Americans, and must seek them at Erie and Cleveland, since Lower Canada could spare neither food nor transport, he was compelled to look for support to the American magazines. He was issuing ten thousand rations a day to the Indian families at Maiden, and his re-

* Proctor's Report of May 14, 1813; James, i. 428; Richardson, pp. 93, 94.

^ Prevost to Proctor, July 11, 1813; Armstrong's Koticea i 228.

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sources were near an end.^ Leaving Maiden with either three hundred and ninety-one regulars, or about
five hundred regulars and militia, and by one British account nearly a thousand Indians, by another between three and four thousand, Proctor returned by water to the Maumee Rapids July 20, and tried to draw the garrison of Fort Meigs into an ambush. The attempt failed. General Green Clay, who was in command, had learned caution, and imposed it on his troops. Proctor then found that his Indians were leaving him and returning to Detroit and Amherstburg. To occupy them, Proctor took again to his boats and coasted the Lake shore as far as the Sandusky River, while the Indians who chose to accompany him made their way by land. August 1 the expedition effected a landing at the mouth of the Sandusky, and scattered panic into the heart of Ohio.

In truth, nothing could be more alarming than this movement, which threatened Harrison in all directions, — from Fort Meigs, on the Maumee, to Erie, or Presqu’isle, where Perry’s fleet was building. On Sandusky River Harrison had collected his chief magazines. All the supplies for his army were lying at Upper Sandusky, some thirty miles above the British landing-place, and he had only eight hundred raw recruits to defend their unfortified position. ^

^ Richardson, p. 111.

* James, i. 264, 265 ; Richardson, p. 104 ; Christie, p. 117*

* Dawson, p. 408.

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Nothing but an untenable stockade, called Fort Stephenson, on the Sandusky River, where the town of Fremont afterward grew, offered an obstacle to
the enemy in ascending; and Tecumthe with two thousand Indians was said to be moving from Fort Meigs by the direct road straight for the magazines, thus flanking Fort Stephenson and every intermediate position on the Sandusky.

In just panic for the safety of his magazines, the only result of a year's campaigning, Harrison's first thought was to evacuate Fort Stephenson in order to protect Upper Sandusky. The flank-attack from two thousand Indians, who never showed themselves, impelled him to retire before Proctor, and to leave the river open. July 29, after a council of war, he sent down a hasty order to young Major Croghan who commanded Fort Stephenson, directing him immediately to bum the fort and retreat up the river or along the Lake shore, as he best could, with the utmost haste. Croghan, a Kentuckian, and an officer of the Seventeenth U. S. regiment, refused to obey. ** We have determined to maintain this place, and by Heaven, we will," he wrote back.* Harrison sent Colonel Wells, of the same regiment, to relieve him; but Croghan went to headquarters, and by somewhat lame excuses carried his point, and resumed his command the next day. Harrison gave him only conditional orders to abandon the fort, *orders which Croghan clearly could not regard, and which Harrison seemed to feel no confidence in his wishing to follow. ^ In the face of British troops with cannon he was to retreat ; but ^ you must be aware that the attempt to retreat in the face of an Indian force would be vain." Proctor's main force was believed to be Indian.

Neither evacuating nor defending Fort Stephen-
son, Harrison remained at Seneca, ten miles behind it watching for Tecumthe and the flank attack, and arranging a plan of battle for his eight hundred men by which he could repel the Indians with dragoons in the open prairie. Croghan remained at Fort Stephenson with one hundred and sixty men, making every preparation to meet an attack. August 1 the woods were already filled with Indians, and retreat was impossible, when the British boats appeared on the river, and Proctor sent to demand surrender of the fort. Immediately on Croghan's refusal, the British howitzers opened fire and continued until it became clear that they were too light to destroy the stockade.

If experience had been of service to Proctor, he should have learned to avoid direct attack on Americans in fortified places; but his position was difficulty and he was as much afraid of Harrison as Harrison was afraid of him. Fearing to leave Croghan's little fort in the rear, and to seek Harrison himself, ten miles above, on the road to Upper Sandusky; fearing delay, which would discontent his Indian allies; fearing to go on to Cleveland or Erie without crippling Harrison; still more afraid to retire to Maiden without striking a blow,—Proctor again sacrificed the Forty-first regiment which had suffered at the river Raisin and had been surprised at Fort Meigs. On the afternoon of August 2 the Forty-first regiment and the militia, in three columns of about one hun-
dred and twenty men each,\(^1\) with the utmost gallantry marched to the pickets of Fort Stephenson, and were shot down. After two hours’ effort, and losing all its officers, the assaulting column retired, leaving twenty-six dead, forty-one wounded, and about thirty missing, or more than one fifth of their force. The same night the troops re-embarked and returned to Maiden.

Proctor’s report \(^\wedge\) of this affair was filled with complaints of the Indians, who could not be left idle and who would not fight. At Sandusky, he said, "we could not muster more hundreds of Indians than I might reasonably have expected thousands."

"I could not, therefore, with my very small force remain more than two days, from the probability of being out off, and of being deserted by the few Indians who had not already done so. . . . On the morning of the 2d inst. the gentlemen of the Indian department who have the direction of it, declared formally their decided opinion that unless the fort was stormed we should never be able to bring an Indian warrior into the field with us, and that they proposed and were ready to storm one face of the

1 Richardson, p. 105.

\(^\wedge\) Proctor to Prevost, Aug. 9\(^1\) 1813; MSS. Canadian Archives\(^*\)

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fort if we would attempt another. I have also to ob-
serve that in this instance my judgment had not that
weight with the troops I hope I might reasonably have
expected. . . . The troops, after the artillery had been
used for some hours, attacked two faces, and impos-
sibilities being attempted, failed. The fort, from which
the severest fire I ever saw was maintained during the
attack, was well defended. The troops displayed the
greatest bravery, the much greater part of whom reached
the fort and made every effort to enter; but the Indians
who had proposed the assault, and, had it not been as-
sented to, would have ever stigmatized the British char-
acter, scarcely came into fire before they ran out of its
reach. A more than adequate sacrifice having been made
to Indian opinion, I drew off the brave assailants."

Sir George Prevost seemed to doubt whether Proc-
tor's excuse for the defeat lessened or increased the
blame attached to it. The defeat at Sandusky ruined
Proctor in the esteem of his men. On the American
side, Harrison's conduct roused a storm of indignation.
Through the whole day, August 2, he remained at
Seneca with eight hundred men, listening to the can-
nonade at Fort Stephenson till late at night, when he
received an express from Croghan to say that the
enemy were embarking. The story ran, that as the
distant sound of Groghan's guns reached the camp at
Seneca, Harrison exclaimed: "The blood be on his
own head; I wash my hands of it." Whatever else

* Life of Prevost, p. 106, note.
* Governor Duncan's Report, 1834; Armstrong's Notices,
1230.

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might be true, his conduct betrayed an extravagant estimate of his enemy's strength. The only British eye-witness who left an accomit of the expedition reckoned Proctor's force, on its departure from Maiden, at about four hundred troops, and "nearly a thousand Indians."^ The Indians dispersed until those with Proctor at Fort Stephenson probably numbered two or three hundred,^ the rest having returned to Detroit and Maiden. Harrison reported the British force as five thousand strong, on the authority of General Green Clay.*

Whether the British force was large or small, Harrison's arrangements to meet it did not please Secretary Armstrong. "It is worthy of notice," he wrote long afterward,* "that of these two commanders, always the terror of each other, one [Proctor] was now actually flying from his supposed pursuer; while the other [Harrison] waited only the arrival of Croghan at Seneca to begin a camp-conflagration and flight to Upper Sandusky."

The well-won honors of the campaign fell to Major George Croghan, with whose name the whole country resounded. Whatever were the faults of the two generals. Major Croghan showed courage and intelligence, not only before and during the attack, but afterward in supporting Harrison against the outcry which for a time threatened to destroy the

Bichardson, p. 104. ' James, ii. 264.

^ Eichardson, p. 104. • Jam

* Dawson, p. 407; McAffee, p. 302.
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General's authority. Immediately after the siege of Fort Stephenson every energy of the northwest turned toward a new offensive movement by water against Maiden, and in the task of organizing the force required for that purpose, complaints of past failures were stifled. Secretary Armstrong did not forget them, but the moment was not suited for making a change in so important a command. Harrison organized, under Armstrong's orders, a force of seven thousand men to cross the Lake in boats, under cover of a fleet.

The fleet, not the army, was to bear the brunt of reconquering the northwest; and in nothing did Armstrong show his ability so clearly as in the promptness with which, immediately after taking office, he stopped Harrison's campaign on the Maumee, while Perry was set to work at Erie. Feb. 6, 1813, Armstrong entered on his duties. March 5 his arrangements for the new movements were already made. Harrison did not approve them, but he obeyed. The Navy Department had already begun operations on Lake Erie, immediately after Hull's surrender; but though something was accomplished in the winter, great difficulties had still to be overcome when February 17 Commander Perry, an energetic young officer on gunboat service at Newport, received orders from Secretary Jones to report to Commodore Chauncey on Lake Ontario. Chauncey ordered him to Presqu'isle, afterward

^ Armstrong's Notices, i. 166, note.

^ Haixison to Armstrong, March 17) 1813 ; Notices, L 242.
called Erie, to take charge of the vessels under construction on Lake Erie. March 27 he reached the spot, a small village in a remote wilderness, where timber and water alone existed for the supply of the fleets.

When Perry reached Presqu'isle the contractors and carpenters had on the stocks two brigs, a schooner, and three gunboats. These were to be launched in May, and to be ready for service in June. Besides these vessels building at Erie, a number of other craft, including the prize brig "Caledonia," were at the Black Rock navy-yard in the Niagara River, unable to move on account of the British fort opposite Buffalo and the British fleet on the Lake. Perry's task was to unite the two squadrons, to man them, and to fight the British fleet, without allowing his enemy to interfere at any stage of these difficult operations.

The British squadron under Commander Finnis, an experienced officer, had entire control of the Lake and its shores. No regular garrison protected the harbor of Presqu'isle; not two hundred men could be armed to defend it, nor was any military support to be had nearer than Buffalo, eighty miles away. Proctor or Prevost were likely to risk everything in trying to destroy the shipyard at Erie; for upon that point, far more than on Detroit, Fort Meigs, Sandusky, or Buffalo, their existence depended. If Perry were allowed to control the Lake, the British must not only evacuate Detroit, but also Maiden, must
abandon Tecumthe and the military advantages of three or four thousand Indian auxiliaries and must fall back on a difficult defensive at the Niagara River. That they would make every effort to thwart Perry seemed certain.

Superstition survived in nothing more obstinately than in faith in luck; neither sailors nor soldiers ever doubted the value of this inscrutable quality in the conduct of war. The "Chesapeake" was an unlucky ship to the luckiest commanders, even to the British captain who captured it. The bad luck of the "Chesapeake" was hardly steadier than the good luck of Oliver Perry. Whatever he touched seemed to take the direction he wanted. He began with the advantage of having Proctor for his chief enemy; but Harrison, also a lucky man, had the same advantage and yet suffered constant disasters. Commander Finnis was a good seaman, yet Finnis failed repeatedly, and always by a narrow chance, to injure Perry. Dearborn's incompetence in 1813 was not less than it had been in 1812; but the single success which in two campaigns Dearborn gained on the Niagara obliged the British, May 27, to evacuate Fort Erie opposite Buffalo, and to release Perry's vessels at Black Rock. June 6, at leisure, Perry superintended the removal of the five small craft from the navy-yard at Black Rock; several hundred soldiers, seamen, and oxen warped them up stream into the Lake. Loaded with stores, the little squadron sailed from Buffalo June 13; the

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wind was ahead; they were five days making eighty miles; but June 19 they arrived at Presqu'ile, and as the last vessel crossed the bar, Finnis and his squadron came in sight. Finnis alone could explain
how he, a first-rate seaman, with a strong force and a fair wind, in such narrow seas, could have helped finding Perry's squadron when he knew where it must be.

From June 19 to August 1 Perry's combined fleet lay within the bar at Presqu'isle, while Proctor, with a sufficient fleet and a military force superior to anything on the Lake, was planning expeditions from Maiden against every place except the one to which military necessity and the orders of his Government bade him go. August 4, Perry took out the armaments of his two brigs and floated both over the bar into deep water. Had the British fleet been at hand, such a movement would have been impossible or fatal; but the British fleet appeared just as Perry's vessels got into deep water, and when for the first time an attack could not be made with a fair hope of success.

These extraordinary advantages were not gained without labor, energy, courage, and wearing anxieties and disappointments. Of these Perry had his full share, but no more; and his opponents were no better off than himself. By great exertions alone could the British maintain themselves on Lake Ontario, and to this necessity they were forced to sacrifice Lake Erie. Sir George Prevost could spare

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only a new commander with a few officers and some forty men from the lower Lake to meet the large American reinforcements on the upper. When the commander, R. H. Barclay, arrived at Maiden in June, he found as many difficulties there as Perry found at Presqu'isle. Barclay was a captain in the British Royal Navy, thirty-two years old; he had lost
an arm in the service, but he was fairly matched as Perry's antagonist, and showed the qualities of an excellent officer.

Perry's squadron, once on the Lake, altogether overawed the British fleet, and Barclay's only hope lay in completing a vessel called the "Detroit," then on the stocks at Amherstburg. Rough and unfinished, she was laimched, and while Perry blockaded the harbor, Barclay, early in September, got masts and rigging into her, and armed her with guns of every calibre, taken from the ramparts. Even the two American twenty-four pound guns, used by Proctor against Fort Meigs, were put on board the "Detroit." Thus equipped, she had still to be manned; but no seamen were near the Lake. Barclay was forced to make up a crew of soldiers from the hardworked Forty-first regiment and Canadians unused to service. September 6 the "Detroit" was ready to sail, and Barclay had then no choice but to fight at any risk. "So perfectly destitute of provisions was the port that there was not a day's flour in store, and the crews of the squadron under my command were

^ Ridbaidson, p. 110; James, Naval Occurrences, p. 285.

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on half allowance of many things; and when that was done, there was no more." ^

Early on the morning of September 9 Barclay's fleet weighed and sailed for the enemy, who was then at anchor off the island of Put-in-Bay near the mouth of Sandusky River. The British squadron consisted of six vessels, — the "Detroit,* a ship of four hundred and ninety tons, carrying nineteen guns, commanded by Barclay himself; the "Queen
Charlotte "of seventeen guns, commanded by Finnis; the "Lady Prevost" of thirteen guns; the "Hunter" of ten; the "Little Belt" carrying three, and the "Chippewa" carrying one gun, — in all, sixty-three guns, and probably about four hundred and fifty men. The American squadron consisted of nine vessels, — the "Lawrence," Perry’s own brig, nearly as large as the "Detroit," and carrying twenty guns; the "Niagara," commander Jesse D. Elliott, of the same tonnage, with the same armament; the "Caledonia," a three-gun brig; the schooners "Ariel," "Scorpion," "Somers," "Porcupine," and "Tigress," carrying ten guns; and the sloop "Trippe," with one gun, — in all, fifty-four guns, with a nominal crew of five hundred and thirty-two men, and an effective crew probably not greatly differing from the British. In other respects Perry’s superiority was decided, as it was meant to be. The Americans had thirty-nine thirty-two pound carronades; the British had not a gun of that weight, and only fifteen twenty-four pound carronades. The lightest guns on the American fleet were eight long twelve-pounders, while twenty-four of the British guns threw only nine-pound shot, or less. The American broadside threw at close range about nine hundred pounds of metal; the British threw about four hundred and sixty. At long range the Americans threw two hundred and eighty-eight pounds of metal; the British threw one hundred and ninety-five pounds. In tonnage the Americans were superior as eight to seven. In short, the Navy Department had done everything reasonably necessary to insure success; and if the American crews, like
the British, were partly made up of landsmen, soldiers or volunteers, the reason was in each case the same. Both governments supplied all the seamen they had.

Between forces so matched, victory ought not have been in doubt; and if it was so, the fault certainly lay not in Perry. When, at daylight September 10, his look-out discovered the British fleet, Perry got his own squadron under way, and came down with a light wind from the southeast against Barclay's line, striking it obliquely near the head. Perry must have been anxious to fight at close range, where his superiority was as two to one, while at long range his ship could use only two long twelve-pounders—against the "Detroit's" six twelves, one eighteen, and two twenty-fours,—an inferiority amounting to helplessness. Both the **Lawrence** and the **Niagara** were armed for close fighting, and were intended for nothing else. At long range their combined broadside, even if all their twelve-pounders were worked on one side, threw but forty-eight pounds of metal; at short range the two brigs were able to throw six hundred and forty pounds at each broadside.

Perry could not have meant to fight at a distance, nor could Commander Elliott have thought it good seamanship. Yet Perry alone acted on this evident scheme; and though his official account showed that he had himself fought at close range, and that he ordered the other commanders to do the same, it gave no sufficient reasons to explain what prevented the whole fleet from acting together, and made the result doubtful. He did not even mention that he himself led the line in the "Lawrence," with two gunboats,
the "Ariel" and the "Scorpion," supporting him, the "Caledonia," "Niagara," and three gunboats following. The "Lawrence" came within range of the British Une just at noon, the wind being very light, the Lake calm, and Barclay, in the "Detroit," opposite. Perry's report began at that point:

"At fifteen minutes before twelve the enemy commenced firing; at five minutes before twelve the action commenced on our part. Finding their fire very destructive, owing to their long guns, and its being mostly directed to the "Lawrence," I made sail (at quarter-past twelve) and directed the other vessels to follow, for the purpose of closing with the enemy. Every brace and bowline being shot away, she became unmanageable.

notwithstanding the great exertions of the sailing-master. In this situation she sustained the action upwards of two hours, within canister-shot distance, until every gun was rendered useless, and a great part of the crew either killed or wounded. Finding she could no longer annoy the enemy, I left her in charge of Lieutenant Yarnall, who, I was convinced from the bravery already displayed by him, would do what would comport with the honor of the flag. At half-past two, the wind springing up, Captain Elliott was enabled to bring his vessel, the "Niagara," gallantly into close action. I immediately went on board of her, when he anticipated my wish by volunteering to bring the schooners, which had been kept astern by the lightness of the wind, into close action. ... At forty-five minutes past two the signal was made for "close action." The "Niagara" being very little injured, I determined to pass through the enemy's line; bore up, and passed ahead of their two ships and a brig, giving a raking fire to them from the starboard guns, and to a large schooner and sloop, from the larboard side,
at half pistol-shot distance. The smaller vessels at this
time having got within grape and canister distance, under
the direction of Captain Elliott, and keeping up a well-
directed fire, the two ships, a brig, and a schooner sur-
rendered, a schooner and sloop making a vain attempt
to escape."

From this reticent report, any careful reader could
see that for some reason, not so distinctly given as
would have been the case if the wind alone were at
fadt, the action had been very badly fought on the
American side. The British official account con-
firmed the impression given by Perry. Barclay's

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story was as well told as his action was well
fought: —

^^ At a quarter before twelve I commenced the action
by a few long guns; about a quarter-past, the American
commodore, also supported by two schooners, . . . came
to close action with the ^ Detroit.' The other brig [the
^Niagara'] of the enemy, apparently destined to engage
the ^ Queen Charlotte,' kept so far to windward as to
render the * Queen Charlotte's ' twenty-four pounder car-
ronades useless, while she was, with the ^ Lady Prevost,'
exposed to the heavy and destructive fire of the ^ Cale-
donia' and four other schooners, armed with heavy and
long guns. . . . The action continued with great fury
until half-past two, when I perceived my opponent [the
^ Lawrence '] drop astern, and a boat passing from him
to the ^ Niagara,' which vessel was at this time perfectly
fresh. The American commodore, seeing that as yet the
day was against him, . . . made a noble and, alas! too
successful an effort to regain it; for he bore up, and sup-
ported by his small vessels, passed within pistol-shot and
took a rakmg position on our bow. . . . The weather-
gage gave the enemy a prodigious advantage, as it enabled them not only to choose their position, but their distance also, which they [the ^ Caledonia,' ^ Niagara,' and the gunboats] did in such a manner as to prevent the carronades of the ^ Queen Charlotte ' and ^ Lady Prevost ' from having much effect, while their long ones did great execution, particularly against the ^ Queen Charlotte.' "

Barclay's report, agreeing with Perry's, made it clear that while Perry and the head of the American line fought at close quarters, the ^^ Caledonia,"

^^ Niagara," and the four gunboats supporting them preferred fighting at long range, — not because they wanted wind, but because the "Caledonia" and gunboats were armed with long thirty-two and twenty-four pounders, while the British vessels opposed to them had only one or two long twelve-pounders. Certainly the advantage in this respect on the side of the American brig and gunboats was enormous; but these tactics threw the "Niagara," which had not the same excuse, out of the battle, leaving her, from twelve o'clock till half-past two, firing only two twelve-pound guns, while her heavy armament was useless, and might as well have been left ashore.* Worse than this, the persistence of the " Caledonia," "Niagara," and their gunboats in keeping beyond range of their enemies' carronades nearly lost the battle, by allowing the British to concentrate on the "Lawrence" all their heavy guns, and in the end compelling the "Lawrence " to strike. On all these points no reasonable doubt could exist. The two reports were the only official sources of information on which an opinion as to the merits of the action could properly be founded. No other account, con
temporaneous tod authoritative, threw light on the subject, except a letter by Lieutenant Yarnall, second in command to Perry on the "Lawrence," written September 15, and published in the Ohio newspapers about September 29,—in which Yarnall said that if Elliott had brought his ship into action when the signal was given, the battle would have ended in

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much less time, and with less loss to the "Lawrence." This statement agreed with the tenor of the two official reports.

Furious as the battle was, a more furious dispute raged over it when in the year 1834 the friends of Perry and of Elliott wrangled over the action. With their dispute history need not concern itself. The official reports left no reasonable doubt that Perry's plan of battle was correct; that want of wind was not the reason it failed; but that the "Niagara" was badly managed by Elliott, and that the victory, when actually forfeited by this mismanagement, was saved by the personal energy of Perry, who, abandoning his own ship, brought the "Niagara" through the enemy's line, and regained the advantage of her heavy battery. The luck which attended Perry's career on the Lake saved him from injury, when every other officer on the two opposing flagships and four-fifths of his crew were killed or wounded, and enabled him to perform a feat almost without parallel in naval warfare, giving him a well-won immortality by means of the disaster unnecessarily incurred. No process of argument or ingenuity of seamanship could deprive Perry of the fame justly given him by the public, or detract from the splendor of his reputation as the hero of the war. More than any other battle of the time, the victory on Lake Erie was won by the
ourage and obstinacy of a single man.

Between two opponents such as Perry and Barclay, no one doubted that the ships were fought to their utmost. Of the "Lawrence" not much was left; ship, officers, and crew were shot to pieces. Such carnage was not known on the ocean, for even the cockpit where the sick and wounded lay, being above water, was riddled by shot, and the wounded were wounded again on the surgeon's board. Of one hundred and three effectives on the "Lawrence," twenty-two were killed and sixty-one wounded. The brig herself when she struck was a wreck, unmanageable, her starboard bulwarks beaten in, guns dismounted, and rigging cut to pieces. The British ships were in hardly better condition. The long guns of the gunboats had raked them with destructive effect. Barclay was desperately wounded; Finnis was killed; Barclay's first lieutenant was mortally wounded; not one commander or second in command could keep the deck; the squadron had forty-one men killed and ninety-four wounded, or nearly one man in three; the "Detroit" and "Queen Charlotte" were unmanageable and fell foul; the "Lady Prevost" was crippled, and drifted out of the fight. Perry could console himself with the thought that if his ship had struck her flag, she had at least struck to brave men.

CHAPTER VI.

General Harbison, waiting at Seneca on the Sandusky River, received, September 12, Perry's
famous despatch of September 10: "We have met
the enemy, and they are ours." The navy having
done its work, the army was next to act.

The force under Harrison's command was ample
for the required purpose, although it contained fewer
regular troops than Armstrong had intended. The
seven regular regiments assigned to Harrison fell
short in numbers of the most moderate expectations.
Instead of providing seven thousand rank-and-file,
the recruiting service ended in producing rather more
than twenty-five hundred.^ Divided into two bri-
gades under Brigadier-Generals McArthur and Lewis
Cass, with a light corps under Lieutenant-Colonel
Ball of the Light Dragoons, they formed only one
wing of Harrison's army.

To supply his main force, Harrison had still to
depend on Kentucky; and once more that State
made a great effort. Governor Shelby took the
field in person, leading three thousand volunteers,^*

^ McAffee, p. 334.

> Harrison to Meigs, Oct. 11, 1813; Official Letters, p. 239.

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organized in eleven regiments, five brigades, and
two divisions. Besides the militia, who volunteered
for this special purpose, Harrison obtained the ser-
ves of another Kentucky corps, which had already
proved its efSciency.

One of Armstrong's happiest acts, at the begin-
ning of his service as War Secretary,^ was to ac-
cept the aid of Richard M. Johnson in organizing
for frontier defence a mounted regiment of a thou-
sand men, armed with muskets or rifles, tomahawks, and knives. Johnson and his regiment took the field about June 1, and from that time anxiety on account of Indians ceased. The regiment patrolled the district from Fort Wayne to the river Raisin, and whether in marching or fighting proved to be the most efficient corps in the Western country. Harrison obtained the assistance of Johnson's regiment for the movement into Canada, and thereby increased the efficiency of his army beyond the proportion of Johnson's numbers.

While the mounted regiment moved by the road to Detroit, Harrison's main force was embarked in boats September 20, and in the course of a few days some forty-five hundred infantry were safely conveyed by way of Bass Island and Put-in-Bay to Middle Sister Island, about twelve miles from the Canadian shore. Harrison and Perry then selected a landing place, and the whole force was successfully set ashore, September 27, about three miles below Maiden.

Although Proctor could not hope to maintain himself at Maiden or Detroit without control of the Lake, he had still the means of rendering Harrison's possession insecure. According to the British account, he commanded at Detroit and Maiden a force

\^ Aimstiongy i. 171, note ; McAffee, p. 286.
* R. M. Johnson to AimBtrong, Dec. 22, 1834 ; Aimstrong, i232.

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the Canadian shore.\^ Harrison and Perry then selected a landing place, and the whole force was successfully set ashore, September 27, about three miles below Maiden.

Although Proctor could not hope to maintain himself at Maiden or Detroit without control of the Lake, he had still the means of rendering Harrison's possession insecure. According to the British account, he commanded at Detroit and Maiden a force
of nine hundred and eighty-six regulars, giving about eight hundred effectives. Not less than thirty-five hundred Indian warriors had flocked to Amherstburg, and although they greatly increased the British general's difficulties by bringing their families with them, they might be formidable opponents to Harrison's advance. Every motive dictated to Proctor the necessity of resisting Harrison's approach. To Tecumthe and his Indians the evacuation of Maiden and Detroit without a struggle meant not only the sacrifice of their cause, but also cowardice; and when Proctor announced to them, September 18, that he meant to retreat, Tecumthe rose in the council and protested against the flight, likening Proctor to a fat dog that had carried its tail erect, and now that it was frightened dropped its tail between its legs and ran. He told Proctor to go if he liked, but the Indians would remain.

^ Perry to Secretary Jones, Sept. 24, 1813; Official Letters, p. 216.

* James, i. 269. ' Richardson, p. 119*

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Proctor insisted upon retiring at least toward the Moravian town, seventy miles on the road to Lake Ontario, and the Indians yielded. The troops immediately began to bum or destroy the public property at Detroit and Maiden, or to load on wagons or boats what could not be carried away. September 24, three days before Harrison's army landed, the British evacuated Maiden and withdrew to Sandwich, allowing Harrison to establish himself at Maiden without a skirmish, and neglecting to destroy the bridge over the Canards River.
Harrison was surprised at Proctor's tame retreat

"Nothing but infatuation," he reported, could have governed General Proctor's conduct. The day that I landed below Maiden he had at his disposal upward of three thousand Indian warriors; his regular force reinforced by the militia of the district would have made his number nearly equal to my aggregate, which on the day of landing did not exceed forty-five hundred. . .

His inferior officers say that his conduct has been a series of continued blunders."

This crowning proof of Proctor's incapacity disorganized his force. Tecumthe expressed a general sentiment of the British army in his public denunciation of Proctor's cowardice. One of the inferior British officers afterward declared that Proctor's "marked inefficiency" and "wanton sacrifice" of the troops raised more than a doubt not only of his capacity but even of his personal courage, and

^ Hiffirson to Meigs, Oct. 11, 1813 ; Official Letters, p. 239.

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led to serious thoughts of taking away his authority. The British at Sandwich went through the same experience that marked the retreat of Hull and his army from the same spot, only the year before.

Harrison on his side made no extreme haste to pursue. His army marched into Maiden at four o'clock on the afternoon of September 27, and he wrote to Secretary Armstrong that evening: "I will pursue the enemy to-morrow, although there is no probability of my overtaking him, as he has upwards of a thousand horses, and we have not one
in the army."

The pursuit was not rapid. Sandwich, opposite Detroit, was only thirteen miles above Maiden, but Harrison required two days to reach it, arriving at two o'clock on the afternoon of September 29. From there, September 30, he wrote again to Secretary Armstrong that he was preparing to pursue the enemy on the following day; but he waited for R. M. Johnson's mounted regiment, which arrived at Detroit September 30, and was obliged to consume a day in crossing the river. Then the pursuit began with energy, but on the morning of October 2 Proctor had already a week's advance and should have been safe.

^ Richardson, pp. 126, 133, 134.

< Perry to Secretary Jones, Sept. 27, 1813 ; Official Letters^ p. 220.

* Harrison to Armstrong, Sept. 27, 1813 ; Dawson, p. 421.

^ Harrison to Armstrong, Oct. 9, 1813; Official Letters, p. '233.

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Proctor seemed to imagine that the Americans would not venture to pursue him. Moving, according to his own report, "by easy marches," neither obstructing the road in his rear nor leaving detachments to delay the enemy, he reached Dolson's October 1, and there halted his army, fifty miles from Sandwich, while he went to the Moravian town some twenty-six miles beyond. He then intended to make a stand at Chatham, three miles behind Dolson's.

"I had assured the Indians," said Proctor's report of October 23, "that we would not desert them, and it was my full determination to have made a stand at the Forks
(Chatham), by which our vessels and stores would be protected; but after my arrival at Dover [Dolson's] three miles lower down the river, I was induced to take post there first, where ovens had been constructed, and where there was some shelter for the troops, and had accordingly directed that it should be put into the best possible state of defence that situation and circumstances would admit of; indeed it had been my intention to have opposed the enemy nearer the mouth of the river, had not the troops contrary to my intention been moved, during my absence of a few hours for the purpose of acquiring some knowledge of the country in my rear."

The British army, left at Dolson's October 1, without a general or orders, saw the American army arrive in its front, October 8, and retired three miles to Chatham, where the Indians insisted upon fighting; but when, the next morning, October 4, the Americans advanced in order of battle, the Indians after a skirmish changed their minds and retreated. The British were compelled to sacrifice the supplies they had brought by water to Chatham for establishing their new base, and their retreat precipitated on the Moravian town the confusion of flight already resembling rout.

Six miles on their way they met General Proctor returning from the Moravian town, and as much dissatisfied with them as they with him. Pressed closely by the American advance, the British troops
made what haste they could over excessively bad roads until eight o'clock in the evening, when they halted within six miles of the Moravian town. The next morning, October 5, the enemy was again reported to be close at hand, and the British force again retreated. About a mile and a half from the Moravian town it was halted. Proctor had then retired as far as he could, and there he must either fight, or abandon women and children, sick and wounded, baggage, stores, and wagons, desert his Indian allies, and fly to Lake Ontario. Probably flight would not have saved his troops. More than a hundred miles of unsettled country lay between them and their next base. The Americans had in

1 Harrison's Report, Oct. 9, 1813; Official Letters, p. 234.
* Narrative of Lieutenant Bullock, Dec. 6, 1813; Richardson, p. 137.

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their advance the mounted regiment of R. M. Johnson, and could outmarch the most lightly equipped British regulars. Already, according to Proctor's report, the rapidity of the Americans had destroyed the efficiency of the British organization: ^ —

^^ In the attempt to save provisions we became encumbered with boats not suited to the state of navigation. The Indians and the troops retreated on different sides of the river, and the boats to which sufficient attention had not been given became particularly exposed to the fire of the enemy who were advancing on the side the Indians were retiring, and most unfortunately fell into possession of the enemy, and with them several of the men, provisions, and all the ammunition that had not been issued to the troops and Indians. This disastrous circumstance afforded the
enemy the means of crossing and advancing on both sides of the river. Finding the enemy were advancing too near I resolved to meet him, being strong in cavalry, in a wood below the Moravian town, which last was not cleared of Indian women and children, or of those of the troops, nor of the sick."

The whole British force was then on the north bank of the river Thames, retreating eastward by a road near the river bank. Proctor could hardly claim to have exercised choice in the selection of a battle-ground, unless he preferred placing his little force under every disadvantage. "The troops were formed with their left to the river," his report continued, **with a reserve and a six-pounder on the road, near


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the river; the Indians on the right." According to the report of officers of the Forty-first regiment, two lines of troops were formed in a thick forest, two hundred yards apart. The first line began where the six-pound field-piece stood, with a range of some fifty yards along the road. A few Canadian Light Dragoons were stationed near the gun. To the left of the road was the river; to the right a forest, free from underbrush that could stop horsemen, but offering cover to an approaching enemy within twenty paces of the British line. In the wood about two hundred men of the British Forty-first took position as well as they could, behind trees, and there as a first line they waited some two hours for their enemy to appear.

The second line, somewhat less numerous, two hundred yards behind the first, and not within sight,
was also formed in the wood; and on the road, in rear of the second line, Proctor and his staff stationed themselves. The Indians were collected behind a swamp on the right, touching and covering effectually the British right flank, while the river covered the left.

Such a formation was best fitted for Harrison's purposes, but the mere arrangement gave little idea of Proctor's weakness. The six-pound field-piece, which as he afterward reported "certainly should have produced the best effect if properly managed," had not a round of ammunition, and could not be

1 Richardson, pp. 122, 139.
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fired. The Forty-first regiment was almost mutinous, but had it been in the best condition it could not have held against serious attack. The whole strength of the Forty-first was only three hundred and fifty-six rank-and-file, or four hundred and eight men all told. The numbers of the regiment actually in the field were reported as three hundred and fifteen rank-and-file, or three hundred and sixty-seven men all told. The dragoons were supposed not to exceed twenty. This petty force was unable to see either the advancing enemy or its own members. The only efficient corps in the field was the Indians, who were estimated by the British sometimes at five hundred, at eight hundred, and twelve hundred in number, and who were in some degree covered by the swamp.

Harrison came upon the British line soon after two o'clock in the afternoon, and at once formed his army in regular order of battle. As the order was disregarded, and the battle was fought, as he reported, in a manner "not sanctioned by anything that I had seen or heard of," the intended arrangement mattered little. In truth, the battle was planned as well as fought by Richard M. Johnson, whose energy impressed on the army a new character from the moment he joined it. While Harrison drew up his

* Richardson, p. 136. * James, i. 278.

* Report of Lieutenant Bullock, Dec. 6, 1813; Richardson, p. 140.
infantry in order of battle, Johnson, whose mounted regiment was close to the British line, asked leave to charge, and Harrison gave him the order, although he knew no rule of war that sanctioned it.

Johnson's tactics were hazardous, though effective. Giving to his brother, James Johnson, half the regiment to lead up the road against the six-pound gun and the British Forty-first regiment, R. M. Johnson with the other half of his regiment wheeled to the left, at an angle with the road, and crossed the swamp to attack twice his number of Indians posted in a thick wood.

James Johnson, with his five hundred men, galloped directly through the British first line, receiving a confused fire, and passing immediately to the rear of the British second line, so rapidly as almost to capture Proctor himself, who fled at full speed.* As the British soldiers straggled in bands or singly toward the rear, they found themselves among the American mounted riflemen, and had no choice but to surrender. About fifty men, with a single lieutenant, contrived to escape through the woods; all the rest became prisoners.

B. M. Johnson was less fortunate. Crossing the swamp to his left, he was received by the Indians in

* Report of Lieutenant Bollock, Dec. 6, 1813; Richardson,
underbrush which the horses could not penetrate. Under a sharp fire his men were obliged to dismount and fight at close quarters. At an early moment of the battle, Johnson was wounded by the rifle of an Indian warrior who sprang forward to despatch him, but was killed by a ball from Johnson's pistol. The fighting at that point was severe, but Johnson's men broke or turned the Indian line, which was uncovered after the British defeat, and driving the Indians toward the American left, brought them under fire of Shelby's infantry, when they fled.

In this contest Johnson maintained that his regiment was alone engaged. In a letter to Secretary Armstrong, dated six weeks after the battle, he said: *

"I send you an imperfect sketch of the late battle on the river Thames, fought solely by the mounted regiment; at least, so much so that not fifty men from any other corps assisted. . . . Fought the Indians, twelve hundred or fifteen hundred men, one hour and twenty minutes, driving them from the extreme right to the extreme left of my line, at which last point we came near Governor Shelby, who ordered Colonel Simrall to reinforce me; but the battle was over, and although the Indians were pursued half a mile, there was no fighting."

Harrison's official report gave another idea of the relative share taken by the Kentucky infantry in the action; but the difference in dispute was trifling.
The entire American loss was supposed to be only about fifteen killed and thirty wounded. The battle lasted, with sharpness, not more than twenty minutes; and none but the men under Johnson’s command enjoyed opportunity to share in the first and most perilous assault.

The British loss was only twelve men killed and thirty-six wounded. The total number of British prisoners taken on the field and in the Moravian town or elsewhere on the day of battle, was four hundred and seventy-seven; in the whole campaign, six hundred. All Proctor’s baggage, artillery, small arms, stores, and hospital were captured in the Moravian town. The Indians left thirty-three dead on the field, among them one reported to be Tecumthe. After the battle several officers of the British Forty-first, well acquainted with the Shawnee warrior, visited the spot, and identified his body. The Kentuckians had first recognized it, and had cut long strips of skin from the thighs, to keep, as was said, for razor- straps, in memory of the river Raisin.

After Perry’s victory on Lake Erie, Tecumthe’s life was of no value to himself or his people, and his death was no subject for regret; but the manner chosen for producing this result was an expensive mode of acquiring territory for the United States. The Shawnee warrior compelled the government to pay for once something like the value of the lands.

^ Richardson, p. 125. Lewis Cass to Armstrong, Oct. 28, 1813; MSS. War Department Archives.
it took. The precise cost of the Indian war could not be estimated, being combined in many ways with that of the war with England; but the British counted for little, within the northwestern territory, except so far as Tecumthe used them for his purposes. Not more than seven or eight hundred British soldiers ever crossed the Detroit River; but the United States raised fully twenty thousand men, and spent at least five million dollars and many lives in expelling them. The Indians alone made this outlay necessary. The campaign of Tippecanoe, the surrender of Detroit and Mackinaw, the massacres at Fort Dearborn, the river Raisin, and Fort Meigs, the murders along the frontier, and the campaign of 1813 were the price paid for the Indian lands in the Wabash Valley.

No part of the war more injured British credit on the American continent than the result of the Indian alliance. Except the capture of Detroit and Mackinaw at the outset, without fighting, and the qualified success at the river Raisin, the British suffered only mortifications, ending with the total loss of their fleet, the abandonment of their fortress, the flight of their army, and the shameful scene before the Moravian town, where four hundred British regulars allowed themselves to be ridden over and captured by five hundred Kentucky horsemen, with hardly the loss of a man to the assailants. After such a disgrace the British ceased to be formidable in the northwest. The Indians recognized the hopelessness of their
course, and from that moment abandoned their de-
pendence on England.

The battle of the Thames annihilated the right
division of the British army in Upper Canada. When
the remnants of Proctor’s force were mustered, Octo-
ber 17, at Ancaster, a hundred miles from the battle-
field, about two hundred rank-and-file were assembled.\(^\)
Proctor made a report of the battle blaming his
troops, and Prevost issued a severe reprimand to the
unfortunate Forty-first regiment on the strength of
Proctor’s representations. In the end the Prince
Regent disgraced both officers, recognizing by these
public acts the loss of credit the government had
suffered; but its recovery was impossible.

So little anxiety did General Harrison thencefor-
ward feel about the Eighth Military District which he
commanded, that he returned to Detroit October 7; his army followed him, and arrived at Sandwich,
October 10, without seeing an enemy. Promptly dis-
charged, the Kentucky Volunteers marched homeward
October 14; the mounted regiment and its wounded
colonel followed a few days later, and within a fort-
night only two brigades of the regular army remained
north of the Maumee.

At Detroit the war was closed, and except for two
or three distant expeditions was not again a subject
of interest. The Indians were for the most part
obliged to remain within the United States juris-
diction. The great number of Indian families that

\(^\) Return of Right Division, RichaidBon, p. 129.

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had been collected about Detroit and Maiden were rather a cause for confidence than fear, since they were in effect hostages, and any violence committed by the warriors would have caused them, their women and children, to be deprived of food and to perish of starvation. Detroit was full of savages dependent on army supplies, and living on the refuse and offal of the slaughter-yard; but their military strength was gone. Some hundreds of the best warriors followed Proctor to Lake Ontario, but Tecumthe's northwestern confederacy was broken up, and most of the tribes made submission.

CHAPTER Vn.

The new Secretaries of War and Navy who took office in January, 1813, were able in the following October to show Detroit recovered. Nine months solved the problem of Lake Erie. The problem of Lake Ontario remained insoluble.

In theory nothing was simpler than the conquest of Upper Canada. Six months before war was declared, Jan. 2, 1812, John Armstrong, then a private citizen, wrote to Secretary Eustis a letter containing the remark, —

'* In invading a neighboring and independent territory like Canada, having a frontier of immense extent; destitute of means strictly its own for the purposes of defence; separated from the rest of the empire by an ocean, and having to this but one outlet, — this outlet forms your true object or point of attack."

The river St. Lawrence was the true object of attack, and the Canadians hardly dared hope to defend it.
"From St. Regis to opposite Kingston," said the Quebec Gazette in 1814, "the southern bank of the river belongs to the United States. It is well known that this river is the only communication between Upper and Lower Canada. It is rapid and narrow in many places. A few cannon judiciously posted, or even musketry, could render the communication impracticable without powerful escorts, wasting and parcelling the force applicable to the defence of the provinces. It is needless to say that no British force can remain in safety or maintain itself in Upper Canada without a ready communication with the lower province."

Closure of the river anywhere must compel the submission of the whole country above, which could not provide its supplies. The American, who saw his own difficulties of transport between New York and the Lakes, thought well of his energy in surmounting them; but as the war took larger proportions, and great fleets were built on Lake Ontario, the difficulties of Canadian transport became insuperable. Toward the close of the war, Sir George Prevost wrote to Lord Bathurst that six thirty-two-pound guns for the fleet, hauled in winter four hundred miles from Quebec to Kingston, would cost at least £2000 for transport. Forty twenty-four-pounders hauled on the snow had cost £4,800; a cable of the largest size hauled from Sorel to Kingston, two hundred and fifty-five miles, cost £1000 for transport. In summer, when the river was open, the difficulties were hardly less. The commissary-general reported that the impediments of navigation were incalculable, and the scarcity of workmen, laborers, and voyageurs not to be described.*
If these reasons for attacking and closing the river St. Lawrence had not been decisive with the United States government, other reasons were sufficient. The political motive was as strong as the military. Americans, especially in New England, denied that treasonable intercourse existed with Canada; but intercourse needed not to be technically treasonable in order to have the effects of treason. Sir George Prevost wrote to Lord Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1814, when the war had lasted two years, —

"Two thirds of the army in Canada are at this moment eating beef provided by American contractors, drawn principally from the States of Vermont and New York. This circumstance, as well as that of the introduction of large sums of specie into this province, being notorious in the United States, it is to be expected Congress will take steps to deprive us of those resources, and under that apprehension large droves are daily crossing the lines coming into Lower Canada."

This state of things had then lasted during three campaigns, from the beginning of the war. The Indians at Maiden, the British army at Niagara, the naval station at Kingston were largely fed by the United States. If these supplies could be stopped, Upper Canada must probably fall; and they could be easily stopped by interrupting the British line of transport anywhere on the St. Lawrence.
The task was not difficult. Indeed, early in the


war an enterprising officer of irregulars, Major Benjamin Forsyth, carried on a troublesome system of annoyance from Ogdensburg, which Sir George Prevost treated with extreme timidity.^ The British commandant at Prescott, Major Macdonnell, was not so cautious as the governor-general, but crossed the river on the ice with about five hundred men, drove Forsyth from the town, destroyed the public property, and retired in safety with a loss of eight killed and fifty-two wounded.2 This affair, Feb. 23, 1813, closed hostilities in that region, and Major Forsyth was soon ordered to Sackett’s Harbor. His experience, and that of Major Macdonnell, proved how easy the closure of such a river must be, exposed as it was for two hundred miles to the fire of cannon and musket.

The St. Lawrence was therefore the proper point of approach and attack against Upper Canada. Armstrong came to the Department of War with that idea fixed in his mind. The next subject for his consideration was the means at his disposal.

During Monroe’s control of the War Department for two months, between Dec. 3, 1812, and Feb. 5, 1813, much effort had been made to increase the army. Monroe wrote to the chairman of the Military Committee Dec. 22, 1812, a sketch of his ideas.^
He proposed to provide for the general defence by dividing the United States into military districts, and apportioning ninety-three hundred and fifty men among them as garrisons. For offensive operations he required a force competent to overpower the British defence, and in estimating his wants, he assumed that Canada contained about twelve thousand British regulars, besides militia, and three thousand men at Halifax.

"To demolish the British force from Niagara to Quebec," said Monroe, "would require, to make the thing secure, an efficient regular army of twenty thousand men, with an army of reserve of ten thousand. . . . If the government could raise and keep in the field thirty-five thousand regular troops, . . . the deficiency to be supplied even to authorize an expedition against Halifax would be inconsiderable. Ten thousand men would be amply sufficient; but there is danger of not being able to raise that force, and to keep it at that standard. . . . My idea is that provision ought to be made for raising twenty thousand men in addition to the present establishment."

Congress voted about fifty-eight thousand men, and after deducting ten thousand for garrisons, counted on forty-eight thousand for service in Canada. When Armstrong took control, Feb. 5, 1813, he began at once to devise a plan of operation for the army which by law numbered fifty-eight thousand men, and in fact numbered, including the staff and regimental
officers, eighteen thousand nine hundred and forty-

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five men, according to the returns in the adjutant-
general's office February 16, 1813. Before he had been a week in the War Department, he wrote, February 10, to Major-General Dearborn announcing that four thousand men were to be immediately collected at Sackett's Harbor, and three thousand at Buffalo. April 1, or as soon as navigation opened, the four thousand troops at Sackett's Harbor were to be embarked and transported in boats under convoy of the fleet across the Lake at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, thirty-five miles, to Kingston. After capturing Kingston, with its magazines, navy-yards, and ships, the expedition was to proceed up the Lake to York (Toronto) and capture two vessels building there. Thence it was to join the corps of three thousand men at Buffalo, and attack the British on the Niagara River.

In explaining his plan to the Cabinet, Armstrong pointed out that the attack from Lake Champlain on Montreal could not begin before May 1; that Kingston, between April 1 and May 15, was shut from support by ice; that not more than two thousand men could be gathered to defend it; and that by beginning the campaign against Kingston rather than against Montreal, six weeks' time would be gained before reinforcements could arrive from England.*

' Armstrong to Dearborn, Feb. 10, 1813; Armstrong's Notices^ i221.

' Note presented to Cabinet, Feb. 8, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxvi. ; State Papers, Military Affairs, L 43d.
Whatever defects the plan might have, Engston, and Kingston alone, possessed so much military importance as warranted the movement. Evidently Armstrong had in mind no result short of the capture of Kingston.

Dearborn received these instructions at Albany, and replied, February 18, that nothing should be omitted on his part in endeavoring to carry into effect the expedition proposed. Orders were given for concentrating the intended force at Sackett's Harbor. During the month of March the preparations were stimulated by a panic due to the appearance of Sir George Prevost at Prescott and Kingston. Dearborn hurried to Sackett's Harbor in person, under the belief that the governor-general was about to attack it.

Armstrong estimated the British force at Kingston as nine hundred regulars, or two thousand men all told; and his estimate was probably correct. The usual garrison at Kingston and Prescott was about eight hundred rank-and-file. In both the British and American services, the returns of rank-and-file were the ordinary gauge of numerical force. Rank-and-file included corporals, but not sergeants or commissioned officers; and an allowance of at least ten sergeants and officers was always to be made for every hundred rank-and-file, in order to estimate the true numerical strength of an army or garrison. Unless otherwise mentioned, the return excluded also.

^ State Papers; Military Affairs^ i. 440.
the sick and disabled. The relative force of every army was given in effectives, or rank-and-file actually present for duty.

In the distribution of British forces in GaniEida for 1812-1818, the garrison at Prescott was allowed three hundred and seventy-six rank-and-file, with fifty-two officers including sergeants. To Kingston three hundred and eighty-four rank-and-file were allotted, with sixty officers including sergeants. To Montreal and the positions between Prescott and the St. John's River about five thousand rank-and-file were allotted. At Prescott and Kingston, besides the regular troops, the men employed in ship-building or other labor, the sailors, and the local militia were to be reckoned as part of the garrison, and Armstrong included them all in his estimate of two thousand men.

The British force should have been known to Dearborn nearly as well as his own. No considerable movement of troops between Lower and Upper Canada could occur without his knowledge. Yet Dearborn wrote to Armstrong, March 9, 1818, from Sackett's Harbor —

"I have not yet bad the honor of a visit from Sir George Prevost. His whole force is concentrated at Kingston, probably amounting to six or seven thousand, — about three thousand of them regular troops. The ice

^ Distribution of Forces in Canada; Canadian Archives, Freer Papersy 1812-1813, p. 47.

* Dearborn to Armstrong, March 9, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 441.
is good, and we expect him every day. • • . As soon as the fall [fate?] of this place [Sackett's Harbor] shall be decided, we shall be able to determine on other measures. If we hold this place, we will command the Lake, and be able to act in concert with the troops at Niagara."

A few days later, March 14, Dearborn wrote again.^

"Sir George," he said, had concluded that it is too late to attack this place. . . . We are probably just strong enough on each side to defend, but not in sufficient force to hazard an offensive movement. The difference of attacking and being attacked, as it regards the contiguous posts of Kingston and Sackett's Harbor, cannot be estimated at less than three or four thousand men, arising from the circumstance of militia acting merely on the defensive."

Clearly Dearborn did not approve Armstrong's plan, and wished to change it. In this idea he was supported, or instigated, by the naval commander on the Lake, Isaac Chauncey, a native of Connecticut, forty years of age, who entered the service in 1798 and became captain in 1806. Chauncey and Dearborn consulted together, and devised a new scheme, which Dearborn explained to Armstrong about March 20: ^ —

"To take or destroy the armed vessels at York will give us the complete command of the Lake. Commodore Chauncey can take with him ten or twelve hundred troops to be commanded by Pike; take York; from thence pro-

^

Dearborn to Armstrongs March 9, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 442.

* State Papers, Military Affairs, L 442.
ceed to Niagara and attack Fort George by land and water, while the troops at Buffalo cross over and carry Forts Erie and Chippewa, and join those at Fort George; and then collect our whole force for an attack on Kingston. After the most mature deliberation the above was considered by Commodore Chauncey and myself as the most certain of ultimate success."

Thus Dearborn and Chauncey inverted Armstrong's plan. Instead of attacking on the St. Lawrence, they proposed to attack on the Niagara. Armstrong acquiesced. "Taking for granted," as he did on Dearborn's assertion, "that General Prevost . . . has assembled at Kingston a force of six or eight thousand men, as stated by you," he could not require that his own plan should be pursued. "The alteration in the plan of campaign so as to make Kingston the last object instead of making it the first, would appear to be necessary, or at least proper," he wrote to Dearborn, March 29.^

The scheme proposed by Dearborn and Chauncey was carried into effect by them. The contractors furnished new vessels, which gave to Chauncey for a time the control of the Lake. April 22 the troops, numbering sixteen hundred men, embarked. Armstrong insisted on only one change in the expedition, which betrayed perhaps a shade of malice, for he required Dearborn himself to conunand it,

^ Armstrong to Dearborn^ April 19, 1813 ; State Papers^ Military Affairs, i. 442.

' State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 442.
and Dearborn was suspected of shunning service in the field.

From the moment Dearborn turned away from the St. Lawrence and carried the war westward, the naval and military movements on Lake Ontario became valuable chiefly as a record of failure. The fleet and army arrived at York early in the morning of April 27. York, a village numbering in 1806, according to British account, more than three thousand inhabitants, was the capital of Upper Canada, and contained the residence of the lieutenant-governor and the two brick buildings where the Legislature met. For military purposes the place was valueless, but it had been used for the construction of a few war-vessels, and Chauncey represented, through Dearborn, that "to take or destroy the armed vessels at York will give us the complete command of the Lake." The military force at York, according to British account, did not exceed six hundred men, regulars and militia; and of these, one hundred and eighty men, or two companies of the Eighth or King's regiment, happened to be there only in passing.¹

Under the fire of the fleet and riflemen. Pike's brigade was set ashore; the British garrison, after a sharp resistance, was driven away, and the town capitulated. The ship on the stocks was burned; the ten-gun brig "Gloucester" was made prize; the stores were destroyed or shipped; some three hun-

¹ James, 1. 143, 149.
dred prisoners were taken; and the public buildings, including the houses of Assembly, were burned. The destruction of the Assembly houses, afterward alleged as ground for retaliation against the capitol at Washington, was probably the unauthorized act of private soldiers. Dearborn protested that it was done without his knowledge and against his orders.^

The success cost far more than it was worth. The explosion of a powder magazine, near which the American advance halted, injured a large number of men on both sides. Not less than three hundred and twenty Americans were killed or wounded in the battle or explosion,^ or about one fifth of the entire force. General Pike, the best brigadier then in the service, was killed. Only two or three battles in the entire war were equally bloody.^

Unfortunately the enemy's armed ship the *Prince Begent,* " reported Dearborn, " left this place for Kingston four days before we arrived."

Chauncey and Dearborn crossed to Niagara, while the troops remained some ten days at York, and were then disembarked at Niagara, May 8, according to Dearborn's report, "in a very sickly and depressed state; a large proportion of the officers and men

» Letter of Dearborn, Oct. 17, 1814; Niles, viii. 36.
• Niles, iv. 238.

s Table of Land Battles; Niles, z. 154.
^ Dearborn to Armstrong, April 28, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 443.
for the movement which was to drive the British from Fort George, and before active operations could begin, Dearborn fell ill. The details of command fell to his chief-of-staff, Colonel Winfield Scott.

The military organization at Niagara was at best unfortunate. One of Secretary Armstrong’s earliest measures was to issue the military order previously arranged by Monroe, dividing the Union into military districts. Vermont and the State of New York north of the highlands formed the Ninth Military District, under Major-General Dearborn. In the Ninth District were three points of activity, — Plattsburg on Lake Champlain, Sackett’s Harbor on Lake Ontario, and the Niagara River. Each point required a large force and a commander of the highest ability; but in May, 1818, Plattsburg and Sackett’s Harbor were denuded of troops and officers, who were all drawn to Niagara, where they formed three brigades, commanded by Brigadier-Generals John P. Boyd, who succeeded Pike, John Chandler, and W. H. Winder. Niagara and the troops in its neighborhood were under the command of Major-General Morgan Lewis, a man of ability, but possessing neither the youth nor the energy to lead an army in the field, while Boyd, Chandler, and Winder were competent only to command regiments.

Winfield Scott in effect assumed control of the army, and undertook to carry out Van Rensselaer’s plan of the year before for attacking Fort Creorge in the rear, from the Lake. The task was not very

^Dearborn to Armstrong, May 13, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i 444.
difficult. Chauncey controlled the Lake, and his fleet was at hand to transfer the troops. Dearborn's force numbered certainly not less than four thousand rank* and-file present for duty. The entire British regular force on the Niagara River did not exceed eighteen hundred rank-and-file, and about five hundred militia. At Fort George about one thousand regulars and three hundred militia were stationed, and the military object to be gained by the Americans was not so much the capture of Fort George, which was then not defensible, as that of its garrison.

Early on the morning of May 27, when the mist cleared away, the British General Vincent saw Chauncey's fleet, "in an extended line of more than two miles," standing toward the shore. When the ships took position, "the fire from the shipping so completely enfiladed and scoured the plains, that it became impossible to approach the beach," and Vincent could only concentrate his force between the Fort and the enemy, waiting attack. Winfield Scott at the head of an advance division first landed, followed by the brigades of Boyd, Winder, and Chandler, and after a sharp skirmish drove the British back along the Lake shore, advancing under cover of the fleet. Vincent's report continued: ^

^ James, L p. 151.

« Vincent to Sir George Prevost, May 28, 1813; James,! 407 ; Appendix no. 21.
my right flank. Having given orders for the fort to be evacuated, the guns to be spiked, and the ammunition destroyed, the troops under my command were put in motion, and marched across the country in a line parallel to the Niagara River, toward the position near the Beaver Dam beyond Queenston mountain. . . . Having assembled my whole force the following morning, which did not exceed sixteen hundred men, I continued my march toward the head of the Lake."

Vincent lost severely in proportion to his numbers, for fifty-one men were killed, and three hundred and five were wounded or missing, chiefly in the Eighth or King's regiment. Several hundred militia were captured in his retreat. The American loss was about forty killed and one hundred and twenty wounded. According to General Morgan Lewis, Col. Winfield Scott "fought nine-tenths of the battle." Dearborn watched the movements from the fleet.

For a time this success made a deep impression on the military administration of Canada, and the abandonment of the whole country west of Kingston was thought inevitable. The opportunity for achieving a decided advantage was the best that occurred for

^ RetuTD of killed, etc. ; James, L 410.

' Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, July 5, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Archives.

James, i. 203.

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The Americans during the entire war; but whatever might be said in public, the battle of Fort George was a disappointment to the War Department as well
as to the officers in command of the American army, who had hoped to destroy the British force. The chief advantage gained was the liberation of Perry's vessels at Black Rock above the Falls, which enabled Perry to complete his fleet on Lake Erie.

On Lake Ontario, May 31, Chauncey insisted, not without cause, on returning to Sackett's Harbor. Dearborn, instead of moving with his whole force, ordered Brigadier-General Winder, June 1, to pursue Vincent. Winder, with eight hundred or a thousand men marched twenty miles, and then sent for reinforcements. He was joined, June 5, by General Chandler with another brigade. Chandler then took command, and advanced with a force supposed to number in the aggregate two thousand men* to Stony Creek, within ten miles of Vincent's position at Hamilton, where sixteen hundred British regulars were encamped. There Chandler and Winder posted themselves for the night, much as Winchester and his Kentuckians had camped at the river Raisin four months earlier.

Vincent was not to be treated with such freedom.

^ Armstrong to Dearborn, June 19, 1813 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 449.

* Table of land battles ; Niles, z. 154.

* Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, June 14, 1813 ; Official Letters, p. 166. Chandler to Dearborn, June 18, 1813 ; Official Letters, p. 169.

Taking only seven hundred rank-and-file, ^ he led them himself against Chandler's camp. The attack
began, in intense darkness, at two o'clock in the morning of June 6. The British quickly broke the American centre and carried the guns. The lines became mixed, and extreme confusion lasted till dawn. In the darkness both American generals, Chandler and Winder, walked into the British force in the centre, and were captured. With difficulty the two armies succeeded in recovering their order, and then retired in opposite directions. The British suffered severely, reporting twenty-three killed, one hundred and thirty-four wounded, and fifty-five missing, or two hundred and twelve men in all; but they safely regained Burlington Heights at dawn.* The American loss was less in casualties, for it amounted only to fifty-five killed and wounded, and one hundred missing; but in results the battle at Stony Creek was equally disgraceful and decisive. The whole American force, leaving the dead unburied, fell back ten miles, where Major-General Lewis took command in the afternoon of June 7. An hour later the British fleet under Sir James Yeo made its appearance, threatening to cut off Lewis's retreat. Indians hovered about. Boats and baggage were lost. Dearborn

* Vincent to Prevost, June 6, 1813; James, i p. 431.

* Chandler's Report of June 18, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. p. 448.

* Report of Colonel Harvey, June 6, 1813; Oanadiana* April, 1889. Report of General Vincent, June 6, 1813; James, i p. 431.

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sent pressing orders to Lewis directing him to return, and on the morning of June 8 the division reached Fort George.
These mortifications prostrated Dearborn, whose strength had been steadily failing. June 8 he wrote to Armstrong: "My ill state of health renders it extremely painful to attend to the current duties; and unless my health improves soon, I fear I shall be compelled to retire to some place where my mind may be more at ease for a short time." June 10, his adjutant-general, Winfield Scott, issued orders devolving on Major-General Morgan Lewis the temporary command not only of the Niagara army but also of the Ninth Military district. "In addition to the debility and fever he has been afflicted with," wrote Dearborn's aid, S. S. Connor, to Secretary Armstrong, June 12, "he has, within the last twenty-four hours, experienced a violent spasmodic attack on his breast, which has obliged him to relinquish business altogether." "I have doubts whether he will ever again be fit for service," wrote Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, June 14; "he has been repeatedly in a state of convalescence, but relapses on the least agitation of mind." June 20 Dearborn himself wrote in a very despondent spirit both in regard to his health and

^ Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, June 14 (8 ?), 1813; Official Letters, p. 166.

* State Papers
' State Papers
^ State Papers

• State Papers

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Military Affairs, i. 445.
to the military situation: "I have been so reduced in strength as to be incapable of any command. Brigadier-General Boyd is the only general officer present." ^

The sudden departure of Morgan Lewis, ordered to Sackett’s Harbor, left General Boyd for a few days to act as the general in command at Niagara. Boyd, though well known for his success at Tippecanoe, was not a favorite in the army. "A compound of ignorance, vanity, and petulance," wrote his late superior Morgan Lewis, "with nothing to recommend him but that species of bravery in the field which is vaporizing, boisterous, stifling reflection, blinding observation, and better adapted to the bully than the soldier."

Galled by complaints of the imbecility of the army Boyd, with Dearborn’s approval, June 28, detached Colonel Boerstler of the Fourteenth Infantry with some four hundred men and two field-pieces, to batter a stone house at Beaver Dam, some seventeen miles from Fort George.* Early in the morning of June 24 Boerstler marched to Beaver Dam. There he found himself surrounded in the woods by hostile Indians, numbering according to British authority about two hundred. The Indians, annoying both front and rear, caused Boerstler to attempt retreat,

^ State Papers; Military Affairs, i. 449.

* Morgan Lewis to Armstrong, July 5, 1813; MSS. War Department Archives.
but his retreat was stopped by a few militia*inen^ said to number fifteen.^ A small detachment of one hundred and fifty men came to reinforce Boerstler, and Lieutenant Fitzgibbon of the British Forty-ninth regiment, with forty-seven men, reinforced the In« dians. Unable to extricate himself, and dreading dispersion and massacre, Boerstler decided to surren-der ; and his five hundred and forty men accord-ingly capitulated to a British lieutenant with two* hundred and sixty Indians, militia, and regulars.

Dearborn reported the disaster as " an unfortunate- and imaccountable event ; " * but of such events the list seemed endless. A worse disaster, equally due to Dearborn and Chauncey, occurred at the other end of the Lake. Had they attacked Kingston, as Arm- strong intended, their movement would have covered Sackett's Harbor ; but when they placed themselves a hundred and fifty miles to the westward of Sack- ett's Harbor, they could do nothing to protect it. Sackett's Harbor was an easy morning's sail from^ Kingston, and the capture of the American naval station was an object of infinite desire on the part of Sir Gteorge Prevost, since it would probably decide the result of the war.

Prevost, though not remarkable for audacity, could not throw away such an opportunity without ruining his reputation. He came to Kingston, and while*
Dearborn was preparing to capture Fort George in the night of May 26-27, Prevost embarked his whole regular force, eight hundred men all told, on Yeo's fleet at Kingston, set sail in the night, and at dawn of May 27 was in sight of Sackett's Harbor.*

Had Yeo and Prevost acted with energy, they must have captured the Harbor without serious resistance. According to Sir George's official report, "light and adverse winds" prevented the ships from nearing the Fort until evening.* Probably constitutional vacillation on the part of Sir James Yeo caused delay, for Prevost left the control wholly to him and Colonel Baynes.*

At Sackett's Harbor about four hundred men of different regular regiments, and about two hundred and fifty Albany volunteers were in garrison; and a general alarm, given on appearance of the British fleet in the distance, brought some hundreds of militia into the place; but the most important reinforcement was Jacob Brown, a brigadier-general of State militia who lived in the neighborhood, and had been requested by Dearborn to take command in case of an emergency. Brown arrived at the

^ James, i. 165; Colonel Baynes to Prevost, May 30, 1813; James, i. 413.

* Report of Sir George Prevost, June 1, 1813; MSS. British Archives.
Harbor in time to post the men in order of battle. Five hundred militia were placed at the point where the British were expected to land; the regulars were arranged in a second line; the forts were in the rear.

At dawn of May 28, under command of Colonel Baynes, the British grenadiers of the One Hundredth regiment landed gallantly under "so heavy and galling a fire from a numerous but almost invisible foe, as to render it impossible to halt for the artillery to come up." \(^\text{1}\) Pressing rapidly forward, without stopping to fire, the British regulars routed the militia and forced the second line back until they reached a block-house at the edge of the village, where a thirty-two pound gun was in position, flanked by log barracks and fallen timber. While Brown with difficulty held his own at the military barracks, the naval lieutenant in charge of the ship-yard, being told that the battle was lost, set fire to the naval barracks, shipping, and store-houses. Brown's indignation at this act was intense.

\(^\text{2}\) The burning of the marine barracks was as infamous a transaction as ever occurred among military men," he wrote to Dearborn.\(^*\) "The fire was set as our regulars met the enemy upon the main line; and if anything could have appalled these gallant men it would have been the flames in their rear. We have all, I presume, suffered in
the public estimation in consequence of this disgraceful

^ Report of Colonel Bajnfl, May 30, 1813; James, i. 413.
* Brown to Dearborn, July 25, 1813; Dearborn MSS.

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burning. The fact is, however, that the army is entitled
to much higher praise than though it had not occurred.
The navy are alone responsible for what happened on
Navy Point, and it is fortunate for them that they have
reputations sufficient to sustain the shock."

Brown's second line stood firm at the barracks,
and the British attack found advance impossible.
Sir George Prevost's report admitted his inability to
go farther: ^ —

** A heavier fire than that of musketry having become
necessary in order to force their last position, I had the
mortification to learn that the continuation of light and
adverse winds had prevented the co-operation of the
ships, and that the gunboats were unequal to silence the
enemy's elevated batteries, or to produce any effect on
their block houses. Considering it therefore impractica-
ble without such assistance to carry the strong works by
which the post was defended, I reluctantly ordered the
troops to leave a beaten enemy whom they had driven
before them for upwards of three hours, and who did not
venture to offer the slightest opposition to the re-embar-
kation, which was effected with proper deliberation and
in perfect order."

If Sir George was correct in regarding the Ameri-
cans as "a beaten enemy," his order of retreat to
his own troops seemed improper; but his language
showed that he used the word3 in a sense of his
own, and Colonel Baynes's report gave no warrant
for the British claim of a victory.*

1 Prevost's Report of June 1, 1813; MSS. British Archive!.
* James, L 176.

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** At this point," said Baynes,^ " the further energies
of the troops became unavailing. Their [American]
block-houses and stockaded battery could not be carried
by assault, nor reduced by field-pieces had we been pro-
vided with them. . . . Seeing no object within our reach
to attain that could compensate for the loss we were mo-
mentarily sustaining from the heavy fire of the enemy's
cannon, I directed the troops to take up the position we
had charged from. From this position we were ordered
to re-embark, which was performed at our leisure and in
perfect order, the enemy not presuming to show a single
soldier without the limits of his fortress."

Another and confidential report was written by
E. B. Brenton pf Prevost's staff to the governor's
military secretary, Noah Freer.^ After describing
the progress of the battle until the British advance
was stopped, Brenton said that Colonel Baynes came
to Sir George to tell him that the men could not
approach nearer the works with any prospect df
success : —

" It was however determined to collect all the troops
at a point, to form the line, and to make an attack im-
mediately upon the battery and barracks in front. For
this purpose the men in advance were called in, the line
formed a little without the reach of the enemy's mus-
ketry, and though evidently much fagged, was, after be-
ing supplied with fresh ammunition, again led in line.
At this time I do not think the whole force collected in
the lines exceeded five hundred men."
The attack was made, and part of the Hundred-and-fourth regiment succeeded in getting shelter behind one of the American barracks, preparing for a farther advance. Sir George Prevost, under a fire which his aid described as tremendous,—"I do not exaggerate when I tell you that the shot, both of musketry and grape, was falling about us like hail,"—watched the American position through a glass, when, "at this time those who were left of the troops behind the barracks made a dash out to charge the enemy; but the fire was so destructive that they were instantly turned by it, and the retreat was sounded. Sir George, fearless of danger and disregarding to run or to suffer his men to run, repeatedly called out to them to retire in order; many however made off as fast as they could."

These reports agreed that the British attack was totally defeated, with severe loss, before the retreat was sounded. Such authorities should have silenced dispute; but Prevost had many enemies in Canada, and at that period of the war the British troops were unused to defeat. Both Canadians and English attacked the governor-general privately and publicly, freely charging him with having disgraced the service, and offering evidence of his want of courage in the action. Americans, though not interested in the defence of Prevost, could not fail to remark that the British and Canadian authorities who condemned him, assumed a condition of affairs alto-
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Together different from that accepted by American authorities. The official American reports not only supported the views taken by Prevost and Baynes of the hopelessness of the British attack, but added particulars which made Prevost's retreat necessary. General Brown's opinion was emphatic: "Had not General Prevost retired most rapidly under the guns of his vessels, he would never have returned to Kingston." These words were a part of Brown's official report. Writing to Dearborn he spoke with the same confidence —

"The militia were all rallied before the enemy gave way, and were marching perfectly in his view towards the rear of his right flank; and I am confident that even then, if Sir George had not retired with the utmost precipitation to his boats, he would have been cut off."

Unlike the Canadians, Brown thought Prevost's conduct correct and necessary, but was by no means equally complimentary to Sir James Yeo, whom he blamed greatly for failing to join in the battle. The want of wind which Yeo alleged in excuse. Brown flatly denied. From that time Brown entertained and freely expressed contempt for Yeo, as he seemed also to feel little respect for Chaimcey. His experience with naval administration on both sides led him to expect nothing but inefficiency from either.

Whatever were the true causes of Prevost's failure, Americans could not admit that an expedition which

» Brown's Report of June 1, 1813; Niles, iv. 260.
« Brown to Dearborn, July 26, 1813; Dearborn MSS.
cost the United States so much, and which so nearly succeeded, was discreditable to the British governor-general, or was abandoned without sufficient reason. The British return of killed and wounded proved the correctness of Prevost, Baynes, and Brown in their opinion of the necessity of retreat. According to the report of Prevost's severest critics, he carried less than seven hundred and fifty rank-and-file to Sackett's Harbor. The returns showed forty-four rank-and-file killed; one hundred and seventy-two wounded, and thirteen missing, — in all, two hundred and twenty-nine men, or nearly one man in three. The loss in officers was relatively even more severe; and the total loss in an aggregate which could hardly have numbered much more than eight hundred and fifty men all told, amounted to two hundred and fifty-nine killed, wounded, and missing, leaving Prevost less than six hundred men to escape, in the face of twice their numbers and under the fire of heavy guns.*

The British attack was repulsed, and Jacob Brown received much credit as well as a commission of brigadier-general in the United States army for his success; but the injury inflicted by the premature destruction at the navy-yard was very great, and was sensibly felt. Such a succession of ill news could not but affect the Government. The repeated failures to destroy the British force at Niagiara; the

1 James, i. 166. « Return, etc. ; James, i. 417.

s Baynes's Report of May 30, 1813; James, i. 413.
disasters of Chandler, Winder, and Boerstler; the narrow and partial escape of Sackett's Harbor; the total incapacity of Dearborn caused by fever and mortification, — all these evils were not the only or the greatest subjects for complaint. The two commanders, Dearborn and Chauncey, had set aside the secretary's plan of campaign, and had substituted one of their own, on the express ground of their superior information. While affirming that the garrison at Kingston had been reinforced to a strength three or four times as great as was humanly possible, they had asserted that the capture of York would answer their purpose as well as the capture of Kingston, to "give us the complete command of the Lake." They captured York, April 27, but the British fleet appeared June 6, and took from them the command of the Lake. These miscalculations or misstatements, and the disasters resulting from them, warranted the removal of Chauncey as well as Dearborn from command; but the brunt of dissatisfaction fell on Dearborn alone. Both Cabinet and Congress agreed in insisting on Dearborn's retirement, and the President was obliged to consent. July 6, Secretary Armstrong wrote, —

"I have the President's orders to express to you the decision that you retire from the command of District No. 9, and of the troops within the same, until your health be re-established and until further orders."

CHAPTER Vm.

Abstbono's embarrassment was great in getting rid of the generals whom Madison and Eustis left on his hands. Dearborn was one example of what he
was obliged to endure, but Wilkinson was a worse. According to Armstrong's account, New Orleans was not believed to be safe in Wilkinson's keeping. The senators from Louisiana, Tennessee, and Kentucky remonstrated to the President, and the President ordered his removal. Armstrong and Wilkinson had been companions in arms, and had served with Gates at Saratoga. For many reasons Armstrong wished not unnecessarily to mortify Wilkinson, and in conveying to him, March 10, the abrupt order to proceed with the least possible delay to the headquarters of Major-General Dearborn at Sackett's Harbor, the Secretary of War added March 12, a friendly letter of advice:

^ Strictures on General Wilkinson's Defence; from the Albany Argus * Niles, ix. 425.

* Armstrong to Wilkinson, March 10, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 341.

* Armstrong to Wilkinson, March 12, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 342.
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Why should you remain in your land of cypress when patriotism and ambition equally invite to one where grows the laurel? Again, the men of the North and East want you; those of the South and West are less sensible of your merits and less anxious to have you among them. I speak to you with a frankness due to you and to myself, and again advise, Come to the North, and come quickly! If our cards be well played, we may renew the scene of Saratoga."

The phrase was curious. Saratoga suggested defeated invasion rather than conquest; the surrender of a British army in the heart of New York rather than the capture of Montreal. The request for Wilkinson's aid was disheartening. No one knew better than Armstrong the feebleness of Wilkinson's true
character. "The selection of this unprincipled im-
becile was not the blunder of Secretary Armstrong," said Winfield Scott long afterward;^ but the idea that Wilkinson could be chief-of-staff to Dearborn, — that one weak man could give strength to another, — was almost as surprising as the selection of Wil-
kkinson to chief command would have been. Arm-
strong did not intend that Wilkinson should command more than a division under Dearborn; ^ but he must have foreseen that in the event of Dearborn's illness or incapacity, Wilkinson would become by seniority general-in-chief.

Wilkinson at New Orleans received Armstrong's

^ Autobiography, p. 94, note,
' Strictures ; Niles, ix. 425.

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letter of March 10 only May 19, ^ and started, June 10, for Washington, where he arrived Julj 81, having consumed the greater part of the summer in the journey. On arriving at Washington, he found that Dearborn had been removed, and that he was himself by seniority in command of the Ninth Military Dis-

This result of Dearborn's removal was incal-
culably mischievous, for if its effect on Wilkinson's vanity was unfortunate, its influence on the army was fatal. Almost every respectable officer of the old ser-
vice regarded Wilkinson with antipathy or contempt. Armstrong's ill-fortune obliged him also to place in the position of next importance Wilkinson's pro-
nounced enemy. Wade Hampton. A major-general was required to take command on Lake Champlain, and but one officer of that rank claimed employment or could be employed; and Wade Hampton was ac-

^ Of all the major-
generals Hampton was probably the best; but his faults were serious. Proud and sensitive even for a South Carolinian; irritable, often harsh, sometimes unjust, but the soul of honor,* Hampton was rendered wholly intractable wherever Wilkinson was concerned, by the long-standing feud which had made the two generals for years the heads of hostile sec-

^ Wilkinson to Armstrong, May 23, 1813 ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 341.

* Armstrong's Notices, ii. 23.

* Armstrong's Notices, ii. 23.

^ Scott's Autobiography, p. 60.

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tions in the army. ^ Hampton loathed Wilkinson. At the time of his appointment to command on Lake Champlain he had no reason to expect that Wilkinson would be his superior; but though willing and even wishing to serve under Dearborn, he accepted only on the express understanding that his was a distinct and separate command, ^ and that his orders were to come directly from the War Department. Only in case of a combined movement uniting different armies, was he to yield to the rule of seniority. With that agreement he left Washington, June 16, and assumed command, July 3, on Lake Champlain.

Nearly a month afterward Wilkinson arrived in Washington, and reported at the War Department.* By that time Armstrong had lost whatever chance he previously possessed of drawing the army at Niagara back to a position on the enemy's line of supply. Three insuperable difficulties stood in his way, — the
season was too late; the army was too weak; and
the generals were incompetent. Armstrong found
his generals the chief immediate obstacle, and strug-
gled perseveringly and good-humoredly to overcome
it. Wilkinson began, on arriving at Washington,
by showing a fancy for continuing the campaign at
Niagara.' Armstrong was obliged to give an em-

* Scotf 8 Autobiography, p. 36.

* Hampton to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813; Wilkinson's Me-
moirs, iii. Appendix xzxvi.

* Memorandum by Armstrong, July 23, 1813; Wilkinson to
Armstrong, Aug. 6, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 463>
Armstrong's Notices, ii. 31.

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phatic order, dated August 8, that Kingston should
be the primary object of the campaign, but he left
Wilkinson at liberty to go there by almost any route,
even by way of Montreal.^^ Disappointed at the out-
set by finding Wilkinson slow to accept responsibility
or decided views,* he was not better pleased when the
new general began his duties in Military District No. 9.
Wilkinson left Washington August 11, and no
sooner did he reach Albany than he hastened to
write, August 16, two letters to General Hampton,
assuming that every movement of that general was
directly dependent on Wilkinson's orders.* Con-
sidering the relations between the two men, these
letters warranted the inference that Wilkinson in-
tended to drive Hampton out of his Military Dis-
trict, and if possible from the service. Hampton
instantly leaped to that conclusion, and wrote to
Armstrong, August 23, offering his resignation in
case Wilkinson's course was authorized by govern-
ment.* Wilkinson also wrote to the secretary August 30, substantially avowing his object to be what Hampton supposed: * —

"You have copies of my letters to Major-General Hampton, which I know he has received, yet I have no

^ Armstrong to Wilkinson, Aug. 8, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 464.

* Armstrong's Notices, ii. 32.

* Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. Appendix zxxv*

* Hampton to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813; Memoirs iii. Ap* pendix zxxvi.

* Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 358.

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answer. The reflection which naturally occurs is that if I am authorized to command he is bound to obey; and if he will not respect the obligation, he should be tamed out of the service."

Armstrong pacified Hampton by promising once more that all his orders and reports should pass through the Department. Hampton promised to serve cordially and vigorously through the campaign, but he believed himself intended for a sacrifice, and declared his intention of resigning as soon as the campaign was ended. ^ Wilkinson, after having at Albany provoked this outburst, started for Sackett's Harbor, where he arrived August 20.

At Sackett's Harbor Wilkinson found several general officers. Morgan Lewis was there in command,
Commodore Chauncey was there with his fleet. Jacob Brown was also present by virtue of his recent appointment as brigadier-general. The quartermaster-general, Robert Swartwout, a brother of Burr's friend who went to New Orleans, was posted there. Wilkinson summoned these officers to a council of war August 26, which deliberated on the different plans of campaign proposed to it, and unanimously decided in favor of one called by Armstrong "' No. 8 of the plans proposed by the government." ^

^ Hampton to Armstrong, Aug. 31, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Archives. Armstrong to Wilkinson, Sept. 6, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxxvii.

* Armstrong's Notices, ii. 33 ; Memorandum of July 23« 1813 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 463.

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As defined in Wilkinson's language^ the scheme was —

^^ To rendezvous the whole of the troops on the Lake in this vicinity, and in co-operation with our squadron to make a bold feint upon Kingston, slip down the St. Lawrence, lock up the enemy in our rear to starve or surrender, or oblige him to follow us without artillery, baggage, or provisions, or eventually to lay down his arms; to sweep the St. Lawrence of armed craft, and in concert with the division under Major-General Hampton to take Montreal."

Orders were given, August 25, for providing river transport for seven thousand men, forty field-pieces, and twenty heavy guns, to be in readiness by
September 15.

The proposed expedition closely imitated General Amherst's expedition against Montreal in 1760, with serious differences of relative situation. After Wolfe had captured Quebec and hardly twenty-five hundred French troops remained to defend Montreal, in the month of July Amherst descended the river from Lake Ontario with more than ten thousand men, chiefly British veterans, capturing every fortified position as he went. Wilkinson's council of war proposed to descend the river in October or November with seven thousand men, leaving a hostile fleet and fortresses in their rear, and running past every for-

\[\text{Minutes, etc. ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, ill. Appendix no. 1.}
\[\text{'Wilkinson to Swartwout, Aug. 25, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 61«}

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ified position to arrive in the heart of a comparatively well populated country, held by a force greater than their own, with Quebec to support it, while Wilkinson would have no certain base of supplies, reinforcements, or path of escape. Knowledge of Wilkinson's favorite Quintus Curtius or of Armstrong's familiar Jomini was not required to satisfy any intelligent private, however newly recruited, that under such circumstances the army would be fortunate to escape destruction.\]

Wilkinson next went to Niagara, where he arrived September 4, and where he found the army in a bad condition, with Boyd still in command, but restrained by the President's orders within a strict defensive. Wilkinson remained nearly a month at Port George making the necessary preparations for a movement.
He fell ill of fever, but returned October 2 to Sackett's Harbor, taking with him all the regular troops at Niagara. At that time Chauncey again controlled the Lake.

Secretary Armstrong also came to Sackett's Harbor, September 6, and established the War Department at that remote point for nearly two months. When Wilkinson arrived, October 2, Armstrong's difficulties began. Wilkinson, then fifty-six years old, was broken by the Lake fever. "He was so

^ Of. Wilkinson to Armstrong, Oct. 19, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 472.

^ Armstrong to Wilkinson, Sept. 6, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. Appendix xxxvii.

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much indisposed in mind and body," according to Brigadier-General Boyd, "that in any other service he would have perhaps been superseded in his command." According to Wilkinson's story, he told Secretary Armstrong that he was incapable of commanding the army, and offered to retire from it; but the secretary said there was no one to take his place, and he could not be spared. In private Armstrong was believed to express himself more bluntly, and Wilkinson was told that the secretary said: "I would feed the old man with pap sooner than leave him behind."* Wilkinson's debility did not prevent him from giving orders, or from becoming jealous and suspicious of every one, but chiefly of Armstrong.' Whatever was suggested by Armstrong was opposed by Wilkinson. Before returning to Sackett's Harbor, October 4, Wilkinson favored an attack on Kingston.* On
reaching Sackett's Harbor, finding that Armstrong also favored attacking Kingston, Wilkinson argued "against my own judgment" in favor of passing Kingston and descending upon Montreal.* Ten days afterward Armstrong changed his mind. Yeo had succeeded in returning to Kingston, bringing reinf orcements.

^ Testimony of Brigadier-General Boyd; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 80.

• Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 364.

• Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 357.

• Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 363.

• Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii 190 ; Paper A, note.

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'^ He will bring with him about fifteen hundred effective, wrote Armstrong; "^ *^ and thanks to the storm and our snail-like movements down the Lake, they will be there before we can reach it. The manoeuvre intended is lost, so far as regards Kingston. What we now do against that place must be done by hard blows, at some risk."

Accordingly, October 19, Armstrong wrote to Wilkinson a letter advising abandonment of the attack on Kingston, and an effort at "grasping the safer and the greater object below." ^

'^I call it the safer and greater object, because at Montreal you find the weaker place and the smaller force to encounter; at Montreal you meet a fresh, unexhausted, efficient reinforcement of four thousand men; at Mon-
treal you approach your own resources, and establish between you and them an easy and an expeditious intercourse; at Montreal you occupy a point which must be gained in carrying your attacks home to the purposes of the war, and which, if seized now, will save one campaign $ at Montreal you hold a position which completely severs the enemy’s line of operations, which shuts up the Ottawa as well as the St. Lawrence against him, and which while it restrains all below, withers and perishes all above itself."

As Armstrong veered toward Montreal Wilkinson turned decidedly toward Kingston, and wrote the

* Armstrong to Hampton, Oct. 16, 1813 ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii 361.

* Armstrong to Wilkinson, Oct. 19, 1813 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 472.

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game day to the secretary a letter ^ of remonstrance, closing by a significant remark: —

"Personal considerations would make me prefer a visit to Montreal to the attack of Kingston; but before I abandon this attack, which by my instructions I am ordered to make, it is necessary to my justification that you should by the authority of the President direct the operations of the army under my command particularly against Montreal."

The hint was strong that Wilkinson believed Armstrong to be trying to evade responsibility, as Armstrong believed Wilkinson to be trying to shirk it. Both insinuations were probably well-founded; neither Armstrong nor Wilkinson expected to cap-
ture Kingston, and still less Montreal. Wilkinson plainly said as much at the time. "I speak conjecturally," he wrote; "but should we surmount every obstacle in descending the river* we shall advance upon Montreal ignorant of the force arrayed against us, and in case of misfortune, having no retreat, the army must surrender at discretion." Armstrong's conduct was more extraordinary than Wilkinson's, and could not be believed except on his own evidence. He not only looked for no capture of Montreal, but before writing his letter of October 19 to Wilkinson, he had given orders for preparing winter quarters for the army sixty or eighty miles above Montreal, and did this

1 Wilkinson to Armstrong, Oct 19, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 472.

without informing Wilkinson. In later years he wrote:

"Suspecting early in October, from the lateness of the season, the inclemency of the weather, and the continued indisposition of the commanding general, that the campaign then in progress would terminate as it did, — * with the disgrace of doing nothing, but without any material diminution of physical power;" — the Secretary of War, then at Sackett's Harbor, hastened to direct Major-General Hampton to employ a brigade of militia attached to his command, in constructing as many huts as would be sufficient to cover an army of ten thousand men during the winter."

The order dated October 16 and addressed to the quartermaster-general,^ prescribed the cantonment of ten thousand men within the limits of Canada,
and plainly indicated the secretary's expectation that the army could not reach Montreal. In other ways Armstrong showed the same belief more openly.

All the available troops on or near Lake Ontario were concentrated at Sackett's Harbor about the middle of October, and did not exceed seven thousand effectives, or eight thousand men. "I calculate on six thousand combatants," wrote Wilkinson after

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Armstrong's Notices, iL 63/

- Armstrong to Swartwout, Oct. 16, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 70.


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starting, "exclusively of Scott and Randolph, neither of whom will, I fear, be up in season." The army was divided into four brigades under Generals Boyd, Swartwout, Jacob Brown, and Covington, — the latter a Maryland man, forty-five years old, who entered the service in 1809 as lieutenant-colonel of dragoons. The brigades of Boyd and Covington formed a division commanded by Major-General Morgan Lewis. The second division was intended for Major-General Hampton; a reserve under Colonel Macomb, and a park of artillery under Brigadier-General Moses Porter, completed the organization.

The men were embarked in bateaux, October 17, at Henderson's Bay, to the westward of Sackett's Harbor. The weather had been excessively stormy,
and continued so. The first resting-point to be reached was Grenadier Island at the entrance of the St. Lawrence, only sixteen or eighteen miles from the starting-point; but the bateaux were dispersed by heavy gales of wind, October 18, 19, and 20, and the last detachments did not reach Grenadier Island until November 3. "All our hopes have been nearly blasted," wrote Wilkinson October 24; but at length, November 6, the expedition, numbering nearly three hundred boats, having safely entered the river, began the descent from French Creek. That day they

» Wilkinson to Armstrong, Oct 28, 1813; MSS. War Department Archives.

^ General Order of Encampment; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 126; Order of October 9, Appendix ii.

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moved forty miles, and halted about midnight six miles above Ogdensburg. The next day was consumed in running the flotilla past Ogdensburg under the fire of the British guns at Prescott. The boats floated down by night and the troops marched by land. November 7 the army halted at the White House, about twenty miles below Ogdensburg. There Wilkinson called a council of war, November 8, to consider whether the expedition should proceed*Lewis, Boyd, Brown, and Swartwout voted simply in favor of attacking Montreal. Covington and Porter were of the opinion "that we proceed from this place under great danger, ... but ... we know of no other alternative." ^

More than any other cause, Armstrong's conduct warranted Wilkinson in considering the campaign at an end. If the attack on Montreal was seriously
intended, every motive required Armstrong to join Hampton at once in advance of Wilkinson's expedition. No one knew so well as he the necessity of some authority to interpose between the tempera and pretensions of these two men in case a joint campaign were to be attempted, or to enforce co-operation on either side. Good faith toward Hampton^ even more than toward Wilkinson, required that the secretary who had led them into such a situation should not desert them. Yet Armstrong, after waiting till Wilkinson was fairly at Grenadier Island^ began to prepare for return to Washington. From

^ Minutes etc. ; Wilkinson's Memoiis, iii. Appendix xxiv.

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the village of Antwerp, half way between Sackett's Harbor and Ogdensburg, the secretary wrote to Wilkinson, October 27, " Should my fever continue I shall not be able to approach you as I intended."

Three days later he wrote again from Denmark on the road to Albany, —

"' I rejoice that your difficulties are so far surmounted as to enable you to say with assurance when you will pass Prescott. I should have met you there ; but bad roads, worse weather, and a considerable degree of illness admonished me against receding farther from a point where my engagements call me about the 1st proximo. The resolution of treading back my steps was taken at Antwerp.""

Prom Albany Armstrong wrote, November 12, for
the last time, "in the fulness of my faith that you are in Montreal," ^ that he had sent orders to Hamp- 
ton to effect a junction with the river expedition. 
Such letters and orders, whatever Armstrong meant 
by them, were certain to impress both Wilkinson 
and Hampton with a conviction that the secretary 
intended to throw upon them the whole responsi-
bility for the failure of an expedition which he as 
well as they knew to be hopeless.

Doubtless a vigorous general might still have found

^ Annstrong to Wilkinson, Oct. 27, 1813 ; Wilkinson's Me-
moirs, iii. Appendix xli.

* Armstrong to Wilkinson, Oct. 30, 1813 ; State Papers, Mili-
tary Affairs, i. 474.

* Armstrong to Wilkinson, Nov. 12, 1813; State Papers, 
Military Affairs, I 474.

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means if not to take Montreal, at least to compel the 
British to evacuate Upper Canada; but Wilkinson 
was naturally a weak man, and during the descent 
of the river he was excessively ill, never able to 
make a great exertion. Every day his difficulties 
increased. Hardly had his flotilla begun its descent, 
when a number of British gunboats commanded by 
Captain Mulcaster, the most energetic officer in the 
British naval service on the Lake, slipping through 
Chauncey's blockade, appeared in Wilkinson's rear, 
and caused him much annoyance. Eight hundred 
British rank-and-file from Kingston and Prescott 
were with Mulcaster, and at every narrow pass of 
the river, musketry and artillery began to open on 
Wilkinson from the British bank. Progress became
slow. November 7, Macomb was landed on the north bank with twelve hundred men to clear away these obstructions. The day and night of November 8 were consumed at the White House in passing troops across the river. Brown's brigade was landed on the north shore to reinforce Macomb. The boats were delayed to keep pace with Brown's march on shore, and made but eleven miles November 9, and the next day, November 10, fell down only to the Long Saut, a continuous rapid eight miles in length. The enemy pressed close, and while Brown marched in advance to clear the bank along the rapid, Boyd was ordered to take all the other troops and protect the rear.

^ Journal etc.; State Papers, Military Affairs, L 477*
^^ vacillating and imbecile beyond all endurance as a chief under high responsibilities."

The opportunity to capture or destroy Mulcaster and his eight hundred men was brilliant, and warranted Wilkinson in turning back his whole force to accomplish it. Boyd actually employed three brigades, and made an obstinate but not united or well-supported attempt to crush the enemy. Colonel Ripley with the Twenty-first regiment drove in the British skirmishers, and at half-past two o'clock the battle became general. At half-past four, after a stubborn engagement. General Covington was killed; his brigade gave way, and the whole American line fell back, beaten and almost routed.

This defeat was the least creditable of the disasters suffered by American arms during the war. No excuse or palliation was ever offered for it.\(^\) The American army consisted wholly of regulars, and all the generals belonged to the regular service. Wilkinson could hardly have had less than three thousand men with him, after allowing for his detachments, and was alone to blame if he had not more. Boyd\(^\) according to his own account, had more than twelve hundred men and two field-pieces under his immediate command on shore.\(^\) The reserve, under Colonel Upham of the Eleventh regiment, contained six hundred rank-and-file,\(^\) with four field-pieces. Wilkinson's official report admitted that eighteen hundred

\(^\) Evidence of General Boyd; Wilkinson's Memoirs, ill. 84; Evidence of Doctor Bull; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 214.
\(^\) Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 364.
\(^\) Autobiography, pp. 93, 94.

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rank-and-file were engaged; Colonel Walbach, his adjutant-general, admitted two thousand,* while Swartwout thought that twenty-one hundred were in action. The American force was certainly not less than two thousand, with six field-pieces.

The British force officially reported by Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison of the Eighty-ninth regiment, who was in command, consisted of eight hundred rank-

* Wilkinson's Defence, Memoirs, iii. 461; Ripley's Evidence, Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 139.

* Evidence of General Boyd; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 85.

* Wilkinson to Armstrong, Nov. 18, 1813; Niles, v. 236.

^ Evidence of Colonel Walbach; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 151*

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and-file, and thirty Indians. The rank-and-file consisted of three hundred and forty-two men of the Forty-ninth regiment, about as many more of the Eighty-ninth, and some Canadian troops. They had three six-pound field-pieces, and were supported on their right flank by gunboats.^

On the American side the battle was ill fought both by the generals and by the men. Wilkinson and Morgan Lewis, the two major-generals, who were ill on their boats, never gave an order. Boyd, who commanded, brought his troops into action by detachments, and the men, on meeting unexpected resistance, broke and fled. The defeat was bloody as well as mortifying. Wilkinson reported one hundred and two killed, and two hundred and thirty-seven wounded, but strangely reported no miss-
ing, although the British occupied the field of battle, and claimed upward of one hundred prisoners.* Morrison reported twenty-two killed, one hundred and forty-eight wounded, and twelve missing. The American loss was twice that of the British, and Wilkinson's reports were so little to be trusted that the loss might well have been greater than Tie represented it. The story had no redeeming incident.

In three brigades, numbering two thousand men, were beaten at Ghristler's farm by eight hundred

* Morrison's Report of Nov. 12, 1813; James^ i. 461.

46^ 1813. WILKINSON'S CAMPAIGN. 191

British and Canadians, the chance that Wilkinson could capture Montreal, even with ten thousand men, was small. The conduct of the army showed its want of self-confidence. Late as it was, in the dusk of the evening Boyd hastened to escape across the river. "The troops being much exhausted," reported Wilkinson,^ "it was considered most convenient that they should embark, and that the dragoons with the artillery should proceed by land. The embarkation took place without the smallest molestation from the enemy, and the flotilla made a harbor near the head of the Saut on the opposite shore." In truth, neither Wilkinson nor his adjutant gave the order of embarkation,^ nor was Boyd willing to admit it as his.^ Apparently the army by common consent embarked without orders.
Early the next morning, November 12, the flotilla ran the rapids and rejoined Brown and Macomb near Cornwall, where Wilkinson learned that General Hampton had taken the responsibility of putting an end to an undertaking which had not yet entered upon its serious difficulties.

Four months had passed since Hampton took command on Lake Champlain. When he first reached

* Journal, Nov. 11, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 478.

* Evidence of Colonel Walbach; Wilkinson’s Memoirs, iii. 146; Evidence of Colonel Pinkney, iii. 311.

* Evidence of Brigadier-General Boyd; Wilkinson’s Memoirs.

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Burlington, July 8, neither men nor material were ready, nor was even a naval force present to cover his weakness. While he was camped at Burlington, a British fleet, with about a thousand regulars, entered the Lake from the Isle aux Noix and the Richelieu River, and plundered the American magazines at Plattsburg, July 31, sweeping the Lake clear of American shipping. Neither Hampton’s army nor McDonough’s small fleet ventured to offer resistance. Six weeks afterward, in the middle of September, Hampton had but about four thousand men, in bad condition and poor discipline.

Wilkinson, though unable to begin his own movement, was earnest that Hampton should advance on Montreal. Apparently in order to assist Wilkinson’s plans, Hampton moved his force, September 19, to the Canada line. Finding that a drought had
caused want of water on the direct road to Montreal, Hampton decided to march his army westward to the Chateaugay River, forty or fifty miles, and established himself there, September 26, in a position equally threatening to Montreal and to the British line of communication up the St. Lawrence. Armstrong approved the movement,* and Hampton remained three weeks at Chateaugay, building roads

^ James, i. 242; Oluistie, ii. d4.

* Wilkinson to Armstrong, Aug. 30, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 466.

* Armstrong to Hampton, Sept. 28, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 460. Of Armstrong's Notices, iL 25.

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and opening lines of communication while waiting for Wilkinson to move.

October 16 Armstrong ordered Hampton, in view of Wilkinson's probable descent of the river, to "approach the mouth of the Chateaugay, or other point which shall better favor our junction, and hold the enemy in check." ^ Hampton instantly obeyed, and moved down the Chateaugay to a point about fifteen miles from its mouth. There he established his army, October 22, and employed the next two days in completing his road, and getting up his artillery and stores.

Hampton's movements annoyed the British authorities at Montreal. Even while he was still within American territory, before he advanced from Chateaugay Pour Corners, Sir George Prevost reported, October 8, to his government,* —
The position of Major-General Hampton at the Four Comers on the Chateaugay River, and which he continued to occupy, either with the whole or a part of his force, from the latest information I have been able to obtain from thence, is highly judicious, — as at the same time that he threatens Montreal and obliges me to concentrate a considerable body of troops in this vicinity to protect it, he has it in his power to molest the communication with the Upper Province, and impede the progress of the supplies required there for the Navy and Army."

State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 461. Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 8, 1813; MSS. British Archive.

If this was the case, October 8, when Hampton was still at Chateaugay, fifty miles from its mouth, the annoyance must have been much greater when he advanced, October 21, to Spear's, within ten miles of the St. Lawrence on his left, and fifteen from the mouth of the Chateaugay. Hampton accomplished more than was expected. He held a position equally well adapted to threaten Montreal, to disturb British communication with Upper Canada, and to succor Wilkinson.

That Hampton, with only four thousand men, should do more than this, could not fairly be required. The defences of Montreal were such as required ten times his force to overcome. The regular troops defending Montreal were not stationed in the town itself, which was sufficiently protected by a broad river and rapids. They were chiefly at Chambly, St. John's, Isle aux Noix, or other points on the Richelieu River,
guarding the most dangerous line of approach from Lake Ohamplain; or they were at Coteau du Lac on the St. Lawrence about twenty miles northwest of Hampton's position. According to the general weekly return of British forces serving in the Montreal District under command of Major-General Sir R. H. Sheaffe, Sept. 15, 1818, the aggregate rank-and-file present for duty was five thousand seven hundred and fifty-two. At Montreal were none but sick, with the general staff. At Chambly were nearly thirteen hundred effectives; at St. John's nearly eight hundred; at Isle aux Noix about nine hundred. Ex-

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eluding the garrison at Prescott, and including the force at Goteau du Lac, Majpr-General Sheaffe commanded just five thousand effectives.^

Besides the enrolled troops, Prevost could muster a considerable number of sailors and marines for the defence of Montreal; and his resources in artillery, boats, fortifications, and supplies of all sorts were ample. In addition to the embodied troops, Prevost could count upon the militia, a force almost as good as regulars for the defence of a forested country where axes were as effective as musketry in stopping an invading army. In Prevost's letter to Bathurst of October 8, announcing Hampton's invasion, the governor-general said: —

^^ Measures had been in the mean time taken by Major-General Sir Roger Sheaffe commanding in this district, to resist the advance of the enemy by moving the whole of the troops under his command nearer to the frontier line, and by calling out about three thousand of the sedentary militia. I thought it necessary to increase this latter force to nearly eight thousand by embodying
the whole of the sedentary militia upon the frontier, this being in addition to the six battalions of incorporated militia amounting to five thousand men; and it is with peculiar satisfaction I have to report to your Lordship that his Majesty's Canadian subjects have a second time answered the call to arms in defence of their country with a zeal and alacrity beyond all praise "

' Weekly General Beton, Sept 16, 1813 ; MSS. Canadian Archives, FVeer Papers, 1813, p. 35.

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Thus the most moderate estimate of the British force about Montreal gave at least fifteen thousand rank-and-file under arms. Besides this large array of men, Prevost was amply protected by natural defences. If Hampton had reached the St. Lawrence at Gaughnawaga, he would still have been obliged to cross the St. Lawrence, more than two miles wide, under the fire of British batteries and gunboats. Hampton had no transports. Prevost had bateaux and vessels of every description, armed and imarmed, above and below the rapids, besides two river steamers constantly plying to Quebec.

Hampton's command consisted of four thousand infantry new to service, two hundred dragoons, and artillery. With such a force, his chance of suffering a fatal reverse was much greater than that of his reaching the St. Lawrence. His position at the Chateaugay was not less perilous than that of Harrison on the Maumee, and far more so than that which cost Dearborn so many disasters at Niagara.

The British force in Hampton's immediate front consisted at first of only three hundred militia, who
could make no resistance, and retired as Hampton advanced. When Hampton made his movement to Spear's, Lieutenant-Golonel de Salaberry in his front commanded about eight hundred men, and immedi-


' Hampton to Armstrong, Oct. 12, 1813; State Papers^ Military Affairs, i. 460.

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ately entrenched himself and obstructed the road with abattis.^ Hampton felt the necessity of dislodging Salaberry, who might at any moment be reinforced; and accordingly, in the night of October 25, sent a strong force to flank Salaberry's position, while he should himself attack it in front.

The flanking party failed to find its way, and the attack in front was not pressed.^ The American loss did not exceed fifty men. The British loss was reported as twenty-five. Sir George Prevost and his officers were greatly pleased by their success;’ but Prevost did not attempt to molest Hampton, who fell back by slow marches to Chateaugay, where he waited to hear from the Government. The British generals at Montreal showed little energy in thus allowing Hampton to escape; and the timidity of their attitude before Hampton's little army was the best proof of the incompetence alleged against Prevost by many of his contemporaries.

Hampton's retreat was due more to the conduct of Armstrong than to the check at Spear's or to the movements of Prevost. At the moment when he moved against Salaberry, October 25, a messenger
arrived from Sackett's Harbor, bringing instructions from the quartermaster-general for building huts for ten thousand men for winter quarters. These orders

^ James, i. 307.

* Hampton to Armstrong, Nov. 1, 1813 ; State Papers Military Affairs, i. 461.

• Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 30, 1813 ; James, L 462.

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naturally roused Hampton's suspicions that no serious movement against Montreal was intended.

^^ The papers sunk my hopes," he wrote to Armstrong, November 1, ^ ^^and raised serious doubts of receiving that efficacious support that had been anticipated. I would have recalled the column, but it was in motion, and the darkness of the night rendered it impracticable."

In a separate letter of the same date ^ which Hampton sent to Armstrong by Colonel King, assuming that the campaign was at an end, he carried out his declared purpose of resigning. "Events," he said, "have had no tendency to change my opinion of the destiny intended for me, nor my determination to retire from a service where I can neither feel security nor expect honor. The campaign I consider substantially at an end." The implication that Armstrong meant to sacrifice him was certainly disrespectful, and deserved punishment; but when Colonel King, bearing these letters, arrived in the neighborhood of Ogdensburg, he found that Armstrong had already done what Hampton reproached him for intending to do. He had retired to Albany, "suspecting . . . that the campaign . • • would terminate as it did."
A week afterward, November 8, Hampton received a letter from Wilkinson, written from Ogdensburg, asking him to forward supplies and march his troops

^ Hampton to Armstrong, Nov. 1, 1813 ; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 461.

' Hampton to Armstrong, Nov. 1, 1813 ; Wilkinson's Memoirs iii. Appendix Ixix.

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to some point of junction on the river below St. Regis. ^ Hampton replied from Chateaugay that he had no supplies to forward; and as, under such circumstances, his army could not throw itself on Wilkinson's scanty means, he should fall back on Plattsburg, and attempt to act against the enemy on some other road to be indicated. ^ Wilkinson received the letter on his arrival at Cornwall, November 12, the day after his defeat at Chrystler's farm; and with extraordinary energy moved the whole expedition the next day to French Mills, six or seven miles up the Salmon River, within the United States lines, where it went into winter quarters.

Armstrong and Wilkinson made common cause in throwing upon Hampton the blame of failure. Wilkinson at first ordered Hampton under arrest, but after reflection decided to throw the responsibility upon Armstrong. ^ The secretary declined to accept it, but consented after some delay to accept Hampton's resignation when renewed in March, 1814. Wilkinson declared that Hampton's conduct had blasted his dawning hopes and the honor of the army.* Armstrong sneered at Wilkinson for seizing
the pretext for abandoning his campaign. Both the generals believed that Armstrong had deliberately led them into an impossible undertaking, and deserted them, in order to shift the blame of failure from himself. Hampton behaved with dignity, and allowed his opinion to be seen only in his contemptuous silence; nor did Armstrong publicly blame Hampton's conduct until Hampton was dead. The only happy result of the campaign was to remove all the older generals—Wilkinson, Hampton, and Morgan Lewis—from active service.

The bloodless failure of an enterprise which might have ended in extreme disaster was not the whole cost of Armstrong's and Wilkinson's friendship and quarrels. In November nearly all the regular forces, both British and American, had been drawn toward the St. Lawrence. Even Harrison and his troops, who reached Buffalo October 24, were sent to Sackett's Harbor, November 16, to protect the navy. Not a regiment of the United State's army was to be seen between Sackett's Harbor and Detroit. The village of Niagara and Port George on the British side
were held by a few hundred volunteers commanded by Brigadier-General McClure of the New York militia. As long as Wilkinson and Hampton threatened Montreal, Niagara was safe, and needed no further attention.

After November 18, when Wilkinson and Hampton

^ Annstrong's Notices, ii 43.


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withdrawed from Canada, while the American army forgot its enemy in the bitterness of its own personal feuds, the British generals naturally thought of recovering their lost posts on the Niagara River. McClure, who occupied Port George and the small town of Newark under its guns, saw his garrison constantly diminishing. Volunteers refused to serve longer on any conditions. The War Department ordered no reinforcements, although ten or twelve thousand soldiers were lying idle at French Mills and Plattsburg. December 10 McClure had about sixty men of the Twenty-fourth infantry, and some forty volunteers, at Fort George, while the number of United States troops present for duty at Fort George, Fort Niagara, Niagara village. Black Bock, and Buffalo, to protect the people and the magazines, amounted to four companies, or three hundred and twenty-four men.

As early as October 4, Armstrong authorized McClure to warn the inhabitants of Newark that their town might suffer destruction in case the defence of Fort George should render such a measure proper. The War Department ordered no reinforcements, although ten or twelve thousand soldiers were lying idle at French Mills and Plattsburg. December 10 McClure had about sixty men of the Twenty-fourth infantry, and some forty volunteers, at Fort George, while the number of United States troops present for duty at Fort George, Fort Niagara, Niagara village. Black Bock, and Buffalo, to protect the people and the magazines, amounted to four companies, or three hundred and twenty-four men.

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edly advised that Fort George should be evacuated,®

^ McClure to Armstrong, Dec 10, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 486.

' Armstrong to McClure, Oct. 4, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 484.

* Wilkinson to Armstrong, Sept. 16, 1813; Sept. 20, 1813; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 467, 469.

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and Armstrong did nothing to protect it, farther than to issue a requisition from Albany, November 25, upon the Governor of New York for one thousand militia.^

The British, though not rapid in their movements, were not so slow as the Americans. Early in December Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond came from Kingston to York, and from York to the head of the Lake where the British had maintained themselves since losing the Niagara posts in May. Meanwhile General Vincent had sent Colonel Murray with five hundred men to retake Fort George. McClure at Fort George, December 10, hearing that Murray had approached within ten miles, evacuated the post and crossed the river to Fort Niagara; but before doing so he burned the town of Newark and as much as he could of Queenston, turning the inhabitants, in extreme cold, into the open air. He alleged as his motive the wish to deprive the enemy of winter quarters; yet he did not destroy the tents or military barracks,^ and he acted without authority, for Armstrong had authorized him to burn Newark only in case he meant to defend Fort George.
'\(^{^*}\) The enemy is much exasperated, and will make a
descent on this frontier if possible," wrote McClure from

\(^{^*}\) Armstrong to McClure, Nov. 25, 1813; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 486.

' McClure to Armstrong, Dec. 10 and 13, 1813 ; State Papers,
Military Affairs, i. 486.

• Jamea, ii. 77.

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the village of Niagara, December 13 ; '\(^{^*}\) bat I shall watch
them close with my handful of men until a reinforcement
of militia and volunteers arrives. ... I am not a little
apprehensive that the enemy will take advantage of the
exposed condition of Buffalo and our shipping there.
My whole effective force on this extensive frontier docB
not exceed two hundred and fifty men."

Five days passed, and still no reinforcements ar-
ived, and no regular troops were even ordered to
start for Niagara. " I apprehended an attack," wrote
McClure ; ^ and he retired thirty miles to Buffalo,
" with a view of providing for the defence." On the
night of December 18 Colonel Murray, with five
hundred and fifty regular rank-and-file, crossed the
river from Fort George unperceived ; surprised the
sentinels on the glacis and at the gates of Fort
Niagara ; rushed through the main gate ; and,
with a loss of eight men killed and wounded, cap-
tured the fortress with some three hundred and fifty
prisoners.

Nothing could be said on the American side in
defence or excuse of this disgrace. From Armstrong
at the War Department to Captain Leonard who
conmianded the fort, every one concerned in the
transaction deserved whatever punishment the law or
army regulations could inflict. The unfortunate peo-
ple of Niagara and Buffalo were victims to official
misconduct. The British, thinking themselves re-

^ McClare to Armstrong, Dec. 22, 1813 ; State Papers, Mill*-
tary Affairs, i. 487.

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leased from ordinary rules of war by the burning of
Newark and Queenston, showed unusual ferocity. In
the assault on Fort Niagara they killed sixty-seven
Americans, all by the bayonet, while they wounded
only eleven. Immediately afterward they "let loose" *
their auxiliary Indians on Lewiston and the country
around. On the night of December 29, Lieutenant-
General Drummond sent a force of fifteen hundred
men including Indians^ across the river above the
falls, and driving away the militia, burned Black
Rock and Buffalo with all their public stores and
three small war-schooners.*

These acts of retaliation were justified by Sir
George Prevost in a long proclamation^ dated Jan.
12, 1814, which promised that he would not "pursue
further a system of warfare so revolting to his own
feelings and so little congenial to the British character
unless the future measures of the enemy should com-
pel him again to resort to it." The Americans them-
selves bore Drummond's excessive severity with less
complaint than usual. They partly suspected that
the destruction effected on the Thames, at York and
at Newark, by American troops, though unauthorized
by orders, had warranted some retaliation; but they
felt more strongly that* their anger should properly
be vented on their own government and themselves,
who had allowed a handful of British troops to cap-

» Christie, ii. 140. « Jamee, ii. 20, 21.

* James, u. 23.

« Christie, ii. 143: Niles, y. 382.

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ture a strong fortress and to ravage thirty miles of frontier, after repeated warning, without losing two hundred men on either side, while thousands of regu-
lar troops were idle elsewhere, and the neighborhood ought without an effort to have supplied five thousand militia.

Fort Niagara, which thus fell into British hands, remained, like Mackinaw, in the enemy's possession until the peace.

CHAPTER IX

Military moyements in the Southern department attracted little notice, but were not the less important. The Southern people entered into the war in the hope of obtaining the Floridas. President Madison, like President Jefferson, gave all the support in his power to the scheme. Throughout the year 1812 United States troops still occupied Amelia Island and the St. Mary's River, notwithstanding the refusal of Congress to authorize the occupation. The President expected Congress at the session of 1812-1813 to approve the seizure of both Floridas, and took measures in advance for that purpose.
October 12, 1812, Secretary Eustis wrote to the Governor of Tennessee calling out fifteen hundred militia for the defence of the "lower country." The force was not intended for defence but for conquest; it was to support the seizure of Mobile, Pensacola, and St. Augustine by the regular troops. For that object every man in Tennessee was ready to serve; and of all Tennesseans, Andrew Jackson was the most ardent. Governor Blount immediately authorized Jackson, as major-general of the State militia, to call out two thousand volunteers. The call was

issued November 14; the volunteers collected at Nashville December 10; and Jan. 7, 1813, the infantry embarked in boats to descend the river, while the mounted men rode through the Indian country to Natchez.

"I have the pleasure to inform you/" wrote Jackson to Eustis in departing, "that I am now at the head of two thousand and seventy volunteers, the choicest of our citizens, who go at the call of their country to execute the will of the Government; who have no Constitutional scruples, and if the Government orders, will rejoice at the opportunity of placing the American eagle on the ramparts of Mobile, Pensacola, and Fort St. Augustine."

The Tennessee army reached Natchez, February 15, and went into camp to wait orders from Washington, which were expected to direct an advance on Mobile and Pensacola.

While Jackson descended the Mississippi, Monroe, then acting Secretary of War, wrote, January 13, to Major-General Pinckney, whose military department included Georgia: "It is intended to place under
your command an adequate force for the reduction of St. Augustine should it be decided on by Congress, before whom the subject will be in a few days." A fortnight later, January 30, Monroe wrote also to Wilkinson, then commanding at New Orleans: "The

^ Parton’s Jackson, i. 372.

* MoDToe to Pinckney, Jan. 13, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Records.

s Monroe to Wilkinson, Jan. 30, 1813; MSS. War Department Records.

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subject of taking possession of West Florida is now before Congress, and will probably pass. You will be prepared to carry into effect this measure should it be decided on."

Neither Madison nor Monroe raised objection to the seizure of territory belonging to a friendly power; but Congress showed no such readiness to act. Senator Anderson of Tennessee, as early as Dec. 10, 1812, moved, ^ in secret session of the Senate, that a committee be appointed to consider the expediency of authorizing the President " to occupy and hold the whole or any part of East Florida, including Amelia Island, and also those parts of West Florida which are not now in the possession and under the jurisdiction of the United States." After much debate the Senate, December 22, adopted the resolution by eighteen votes to twelve, and the committee, consisting of Anderson, Samuel Smith, Tait of Georgia, Vamum of Massachusetts, and Goodrich of Connecticut, reported a bill,* January 19, authorizing the President to occupy both Floridas, and to exercise
government there, "provided . . . that the section of country herein designated that is situated to the eastward of the river Perdido may be the subject of future negotiation."

The bill met opposition from the President's personal enemies, Giles, Leib, and Samuel Smifii, as well as from the Federalists and some of the Northern

1 Annals of Congress* 1813-1813, p. 124.

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Democrats. January 26, Samuel Smith moved to strike out the second section, which authorized the seizure of Florida east of the Perdido; and the Senate, February 2, by a vote of nineteen to sixteen, adopted Smith's motion. The vote was sectional. North and South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, and Louisiana supported the bill; Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island opposed it; Virginia, Kentucky, Ohio, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont were divided; New Jersey threw one vote in its favor, the second senator being absent. Had Leib not changed sides the next day, the whole bill would have been indefinitely postponed; but the majority rallied, February 6, and by a vote of twenty-one to eleven authorized the President to seize Florida west of the Perdido, or, in other words, to occupy Mobile. The House passed the bill in secret session February 9, and the President signed it February 12. *

In refusing to seize East Florida, the Senate greatly disarranged Madison's plans. Three days afterward, February 6, Armstrong took charge of the War Department, and his first orders were sent to Andrew
Jackson directing him to dismiss his force, "the causes of embodying and marching to New Orleans the corps under your command having ceased to exist." ^ Jackson, ignorant that the Administration was not to blame, and indignant at his curt dismissal,

1 Act of Feb. 12, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 339.  
• Partou's Jackson, i. 377.

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marched his men back to Tennessee, making himself responsible for their pay and rations. On learning these circumstances, Armstrong wrote, March 22, a friendly letter thanking him for the important services his corps would have rendered ^* had the Executive policy of occupying the two Floridas been adopted by the national legislature." ^

After the Senate had so persistently refused to support Madison's occupation of East Florida, he could hardly maintain longer the illegal possession he had held during the past year of Amelia Island. February 15, Armstrong wrote to Major-General Pinckney,* "The late private proceedings of Congress have resulted in a decision not to invade East Florida at present;" but not until March 7, did the secretary order Pinckney to withdraw the troops from Amelia Island and Spanish territory.^

The troops were accordingly withdrawn from Amelia Island, May 16; but nothing could restore East Florida to its former repose, and the anarchy which had been introduced from the United States could never be mastered except by the power that created it. Perhaps Madison would have retained
possession, as the least of evils, in spite of the Senate's vote of February 3, had not another cause,

1 Armstrong to Jackson, March 22, 1813 MSS. War Department Records.

< Armstrong to Pinckney, Feb. 15, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Records.

< Armstrong to Pinckney, March 7, 1813 ; MSS. War Department Records.

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independent of legislative will, overcome his repugnance to the evacuation. The Russian offer of mediation arrived while the President was still in doubt. The occupation of Florida, being an act of war against Spain, could not fail to excite the anger of England, and in that feeling of displeasure the Czar must inevitably share. From the moment their cause against Napoleon was common, Russia, England, and Spain were more than likely to act together in resistance to any territorial aggression upon any member of their alliance. The evacuation of East Florida by the United States evaded a serious diplomatic difficulty; and probably not by mere coincidence, Armstrong's order to evacuate Amelia Island was dated March 7, while DaschkofPs letter offering the Czar's mediation was dated March 8.

The Cabinet was so little united in support of the Executive policy that Madison and Monroe ordered the seizure of Mobile without consulting Gallatin, whose persistent hostility to the Florida intrigues was notorious. When Monroe in April gave to Gallatin and Bayard the President's instructions^ for the peace negotiations, among the rest he directed
them to assert "a right to West Florida by cession from France, and a claim to East Florida as an indemnity for spoliations." On receiving these instructions, Gallatin wrote to Monroe, May 2, asking.* —

* Gallatin's Works, i. 539, note,

< Gallatin to Monroe, May 2, 1813; Gallatin's Writings, i. 63d.

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"Where is the importance of, taking possession of Mobile this summer? We may do this whenever we please, and is it not better to delay every operation of minor importance which may have a tendency to impede our negotiations with Great Britain and Russia? You know that to take by force any place in possession of another nation, whatever our claim to that place may be, is war; and you must be aware that both Russia and Great Britain will feel disposed, if not to support the pretensions of Spain against us, at least to take part against the aggressor/"

Monroe quickly replied: ^ "With respect to West Florida, possession will be taken of it before you get far on your voyage. That is a question settled." In fact, possession had been taken of it three weeks before he wrote, in pursuance of orders sent in February, apparently without Gallatin's knowledge. Monroe added views of his own, singularly opposed to Gallatin's convictions.

"On the subject of East Florida," wrote Monroe to Gallatin, May 6, ^' I think I intimated to you in my last that Colonel Lear was under the most perfect conviction, on the authority of information from respectable sources at Cadiz, that the Spanish regency had sold that and the
other province to the British government, and that it had done so under a belief that we had, or should soon get, possession of it. My firm belief is that if we were possessed of both, it would facilitate your negotiations in favor of impressment and every other object, especially if

1 Monroe to Gallatin, May 6, 1813; Gallatin's Writings, i, 640.
* Monroe to Gallatin, May 6, 1813; Gallatin's Writings, i, 542.

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it was distinctly seen by the British ministers or minister that, instead of yielding them or any part of either, we would push our fortunes in that direction, and in Canada, if they did not hasten to accommodate."

Gallatin, on the eve of sailing for Russia, replied with good temper, expressing opinions contrary to those of the President and Secretary of State.

"On the subject of Florida," Gallatin said, «* I have always differed in opinion with you, and am rejoiced to have it in our power to announce the evacuation of the province. Let it alone until you shall, by the introduction of British troops, have a proof of the supposed cession. In this I do not believe. It can be nothing more than a permission to occupy it in order to defend it for Spain. By withdrawing our troops, we withdraw the pretence; but the impolitic occupancy of Mobile will, I fear, renew our difficulties. The object is at present of very minor importance, swelled into consequence by the representations from that quarter, and which I would not at this moment have attempted, among other reasons, because it was a Southern one, and will, should it involve us in a war with Spain, disgust every man north of Washington. You will pardon the freedom with which, on the eve of parting with you, I speak on this subject. It is intended as a general caution, which I think impor-
tant, because I know and see every day the extent of geographical feeling, and the necessity of prudence if we mean to preserve and invigorate the Union."

No sooner did the Act of February 12 become law than Armstrong wrote, February 16, to Wilkinson at

* Oallatin to Monroe, May 8, 1813; Gallatin's Writings, i. 544.

New Orleans, enclosing a copy of the Act, and ordering him immediately to take possession of Mobile and the country as far as the Perdido. Wilkinson, who had for years looked forward to that step, hastened to obey the instruction. When Gallatin remonstrated, the measure had been already taken and could not be recalled.

Since July 9, 1812, Wilkinson had again commanded at New Orleans. No immediate attack was to be feared, nor could a competent British force be collected there without warning; but in case such an attack should be made, Wilkinson had reason to fear the result, for his regular force consisted of only sixteen hundred effectives, ill equipped and without defences.* The War Department ordered him to depend on movable ordnance and temporary works rather than on permanent fortifications; ^ but with his usual disregard of orders he began the construction or the completion of extensive works at various points on the river and coast, at a cost which the government could ill afford.

While engaged in this task Wilkinson received, March 14, Armstrong's order of February 16 for the invasion of West Florida. When the government's orders were agreeable to Wilkinson, they reached him
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promptly and were executed with rapidity. Within three weeks he collected at Pass Christian a force of about six hundred men, supported by gunboats, and entered the Bay of Mobile on the night of April 10, while at the same time the garrison at Fort Stoddert descended the Tensaw River, and cut the communication by land between Mobile and Pensacola. At that time Mobile Point was undefended. The only Spanish fortress was Fort Charlotte at Mobile, garrisoned by one hundred and fifty combatants. Wilkinson summoned the fort to surrender, and the commandant had no choice but to obey, for the place was untenable and without supplies. The surrender took place April 15. Wilkinson then took possession of the country as far as the Perdido, and began the construction of a fort, to be called Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Point at the entrance of the Bay, some sixty miles below the town. ^

This conquest, the only permanent gain of territory made during the war, being effected without bloodshed, attracted less attention than it deserved. Wilkinson committed no errors, and won the President's warm approval. ^ Wilkinson was greatly pleased by his own success, and wished to remain at New Orleans to carry out his projected defences; but Armstrong


* Minutes of a Council of War, Aug. 4, 1813; Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. 498-503.

* Eustis to Wilkinson, April 15, 1812; Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. 495.
had written as early as March 10, ordering him to the Lakes. As so often happened with orders that


' Armstrong to Wilkinson, May 22, 1813 ; Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. 521.

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displeased the general, Armstrong's letter, though dated March 10, and doubtless arriving in New Orleans before April 10, was received by Wilkinson only on his return, May 19. After another delay of three weeks, he started northward, and travelled by way of Mobile through the Creek country to Washington.

Wilkinson's departure, June 10, and the evacuation of Amelia Island by General Pinckney May 16, closed the first chapter of the war in the South. Armstrong wrote to Wilkinson, May 27: ^ "The mission to Petersburg and the instructions to our envoys will put a barrier between you and Pensacola for some time to come at least, and permanently in case of peace." The sudden stop thus put by the Senate and the Russian mediation to the campaign against Pensacola and St. Augustine deranged the plans of Georgia and Tennessee, arrested the career of Andrew Jackson, and caused the transfer of Wilkinson from New Orleans to the Lakes. The government expected no other difficulties in the Southern country, and had no reason to fear them. If new perils suddenly arose, they were due less to England, Spain, or the United States than to the chance that gave energy and influence to Tecumseh.

The Southern Indians were more docile and less
warlike than the Indians of the Lakes. The Chickasaws and Choctaws, who occupied the whole extent of

ArmstroDg to WiUdnson, May 27, 1813; MSS. War Department Records.

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country on the east bank of the Mississippi River from the Ohio to the Gulf, gave little trouble or anxiety; and even the great confederacy of Muskogees, or Creeks, who occupied the territory afterward called the State of Alabama and part of Georgia, fell in some degree into a mode of life which seemed likely to make them tillers of the soil. In 1800 the Greeks held, or claimed, about three hundred miles square from the Tennessee River to the Gulf, and from the middle of Georgia nearly to the line which afterward marked the State of Mississippi. The Seminoles, or wild men, of Florida were a branch of the Muskogees, and the Creek warriors themselves were in the habit of visiting Pensacola and Mobile, where they expected to receive presents from the Spanish governor.

Two thirds of the Creek towns were on the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers in the heart of Alabama. Their inhabitants were called Upper Creeks. The Lower Creeks lived in towns on the Chattahooche River, the modern boundary between Alabama and Georgia. The United States government, following a different policy in 1799 from that of Jefferson toward the Northwestern Indians, induced the Creeks to adopt a national organization for police purposes;
it also helped them to introduce ploughs, to learn cotton-spinning, and to raise crops. The success of these experiments was not at first great, for the larger number of Indians saw no advantage in becoming laborers, and preferred sitting in the squares of the towns, or hunting; but here and there chiefs or half-breeds had farms, slaves, stock, orchards, and spinning-wheels.

Large as the Creek country was, and wild as it had ever been, it did not abound in game. A good hunter, passing in any direction through the three hundred miles of Alabama and Georgia, found difficulty in obtaining game enough for his support. For that reason the Seminoles left their old towns and became wild people, as their name implied, making irregular settlements in Florida, where game and food were more plenty. The mass of the Creek nation, fixed in the villages in the interior, clung to their habits of hunting even when obliged to cultivate the soil, and their semi-civilization rendered them a more perplexing obstacle to the whites than though they had obstinately resisted white influence.

Had the Indian problem been left to the people of Georgia and Tennessee, the Indians would soon have disappeared; but the national government established under President Washington in 1789 put a sharp curb on Georgia, and interposed decisively between the Georgians and the Creeks. President Washington in 1796 appointed Benjamin Hawkins of North Carolina as Indian agent among the Creeks, and Hawkins protected and governed them with devotion; but the result of his friendliness was the
same as that of others' greed. The Indians slowly lost ground.

The Creeks complained of grievances similar to those of the Northwestern Indians, and their position was even more helpless. They had no other outlet than Pensacola and Mobile. Except from the Spaniards they could expect no aid in case of trouble, and the Spanish governors of Florida, after the abdication of Carlos IV. in 1807, could scarcely maintain their own position, much less supply the Creeks with arms or gunpowder. While the Northwestern Indians could buy at Maiden all the weapons and ammunition they wanted, the Creeks possessed few firearms, and these in bad condition; nor were they skilful in using guns.

The United States government prevented the Georgians from compelling the Indians to sell their lands, but nothing could prevent them from trespass; and the Indian woods along the frontier were filled with cattle, horses, and hogs belonging to the whites, while white men destroyed the game, hunting the deer by firelight, and scaring the Indian hunters from their hunting-grounds. "Every cane-swamp where they go to look for a bear — which is part of their support — is near eat out by the stocks put over by the citizens of Georgia." [This complaint was made in 1796, and as time went on the Indian hunting-grounds were more rapidly narrowed. Not only from

^ Hawkins's Sketch, p. 24.

* U. S. Commissioners to Governor Irwin, July 1, 1796; State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 611.
Georgia but also from Fort Stoddert, along the course of the Tombigbee River, above Mobile, intruders pressed into the Creek country. The Indians had no choice but to sell their lands for annuities, and under this pressure the Creeks, in 1802 and 1803, were induced to part with the district between the Oconee and Ocmulgee in the centre of Georgia. They retained their towns on the Chattahoochee, where Hawkins's agency was established in the town of Coweta, on the edge of the Creek country.

Hawkins was satisfied with their behavior, and believed the chiefs to be well disposed. They showed none of the restlessness which characterized the Northwestern Indians, until Tecumthe conceived the idea of bringing them into his general league to check the encroachments of the whites. After Tecumthe's interview with Governor Harrison at Vincennes, in July, 1811, he made a long journey through the Chickasaw and Choctaw country, and arrived among the Creeks in October, bringing with him a score of Indian warriors. The annual council of the Creeks was held in that month at the village of Tuckaubatchee, — an ancient town of the Upper Creeks on the Tallapoosa. The rumor that Tecumthe would be present brought great numbers of Indians, even Cherokees and Choctaws, to the place, while Hawkins attended the council in his character as agent.

Tecumthe and his warriors marched into the centre of the square and took their places in silence. That
night they danced the dance of the Indians of the Lakes," which became thenceforward a political symbol of their party among the Creeks. Some nights afterward Tecumthe addressed the comicil. Versions more or less untrustworthy have been given of the speech; but the only official allusion to it by a person entitled to credit seemed to show that it was in substance the address made by Tecumthe at Vincennes. Hawkins, recalling to the Creek chiefs in 1814 the course of events which had caused their troubles, reminded them how "Tecumseh, in the square of Tuckaubatchee, . . . told the Creeks not to do any injury to the Americans; to be in peace and friendship with them; not to steal even a bell from any one of any color. Let the white people on this continent manage their affairs their own way. Let the red people manage their affairs their own way." Hawkins and the old chiefs would have certainly interfered had Tecumthe incited the Creeks to war or violence; but according to Hawkins the speech was a pacific "talk," delivered by Tecumthe in the name of the British. Indian tradition preserved another form of Tecumthe's rhetoric, which seemed to complete the identity with the Vincennes address. Unable to express himself in the Muskogee language, Tecumthe used pantomime familiar to Indians. Holding his war-club

^ Life of Sam Dale, p. 69.

* Hawkins to the Creek Chiefe, June 16» 1814; State Papexs, Indian Affairs, L 846.
with outstretched arm, he opened first the little finger, then the next and the next, till the club fell from his hand.

Indian union was unquestionably the chief theme of all Tecumthe's public addresses. Whether in private he taught other doctrines must be matter of surmise; but he certainly brought into the Creek nation a religious fanaticism of a peculiar and dangerous kind. Prophets soon appeared, chiefly among the Alabamas, a remnant of an ancient race, not of Creek blood, but members of the Creek confederacy. The prophets, with the usual phenomena of hysteria, claimed powers of magic, and promised to bring earthquakes to destroy an invading army. They preached the total destruction of everything, animate and inanimate, that pertained to civilization. As the nation generally was badly armed, and relied chiefly on their bows, arrows, and war-clubs for battle, the moral support of magic was needed to give them confidence.

So secret was the influence of Tecumthe's friends that no suspicion of the excitement reached Hawkins even when the war with England began; and the old chiefs of the nation — known to be devoted to peace and to the white alliance — were kept in ignorance of all that was done among the young warriors. The

^ Report of Alexander Cornell, June 22, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 845, 846.

' Hawkins to General Pinckney, July 9, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affairs, L 848.
Alabamas, or Coosadas, lived below the junction of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, on the west bank of the Alabama River, about eight miles above the modern town of Montgomery; they were considered by Hawkins the most industrious and best behaved of all the Creeks, whose fields were the granaries of the upper towns and furnished supplies even to Mobile. Their town was the last place in which Hawkins expected to see conspiracy, violence, or fanaticism. The young men "sang the song of the Indians of the Lakes, and danced the dance" in secret for eighteen months after Tecumth's visit, without public alarm^ and probably would have continued to do so except for an outbreak committed by some of their nation three hundred miles away.

In 1812 a band of six Indians led by the Little Warrior of Wewocau, a Creek town on the Coosa, was sent by the nation on a public mission to the Chickasaws.^ Listed of delivering their "talks" and returning, they continued their journey to the northern Lakes and joined Tecumth at Maiden. They took part in the massacre at the river Raisin, Jan. 22, 1813, and soon afterward began their return, bringing talks from the Shawanese and British and also a letter from some British officer at Maiden to the Spanish officials at Pensacola, from whom they hoped to obtain weapons and powder. According to common report, Tecumth told the Little Warrior

^ Hawkins to the Creek Chiefs, March 29, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 839.

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that he was about to aid the British in capturing Fort Meigs, and as soon as the fort was taken he would come to join the Creeks. ^ Until then his
friends were to increase their party by the secret means and magic that had proved so successful, but were not to begin open war.*

The Little Warrior and his party, including a warrior from Tuskegee, a Creek town at the fork of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, after crossing Indiana in the month of February reached the north bank of the Ohio River about seven miles above its mouth, where were two cabins occupied by white families.* Unable to resist the temptation to spill blood, the band murdered the two families with the usual Indian horrors. This outrage was committed February 9; and the band, crossing the Ohio, passed southward through the Chickasaw country, avowing the deed and its motive.*

The Little Warrior arrived at home about the middle of March, and reported that he brought talks from the Shawanese and British. The old chiefs of the Upper Creeks immediately held a council March 25, and after listening to the talks, reprimanded the Little Warrior and ordered him to leave the Council

^ Hawkins to Armstrong, Ang. 23, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affairs, i 851.

' Report of Alexander Cornells, June 23, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affidrs, i. 846.

• Letter from Kaskaskias, Feb. 27, 1813; Niles, iv. 135.

^ Hawkins to the Creek ChieSs, March 29, 1813; State Papers^ Indian Affairs, i. 839.

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HouBe.^ On the same day Hawkins wrote to them
from Coweta, demanding delivery of the Little Warrior and his six companions to answer for the murders they had committed. On hearing this demand, the old chiefs at Tuckaubatchee under the lead of the Big Warrior held another council, while the Little Warrior, the Tuskegee Warrior, and the murderers took to the woods. The old chiefs in council decided to execute the murderers, and sent out parties to do it. The Little Warrior was found, in the swamp, well armed, but was decoyed out and killed by treachery; "the first and second man's gun snapped at him, but the third man's gun fired and killed; • • • four men that had on pouches kept them shaking following after him, so that he could not hear the gun snap; if he had found out that, he would have wounded a good many with his arrows." ^

The Tuskegee warrior and four others were found in a house on the Hickory Ground at the fork of the rivers. As long as they had ammunition, they held the attack at a distance, but at last the house was fired. The Tuskegee Warrior being wounded, was burned in the house, while his two young brothers were taken out and tomahawked. One warrior broke away, but was caught and killed; two more were

^ Hawkins to Armstrong, March 25, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 840.

* Report of the Big Warrior, April 26, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 843.

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killed elsewhere. One escaped, and ^^ set out the
morning after to kill white people." Warriors were sent after him.

** He made battle, firing at the warriors, and was near killing one; the bullet passed near his ear. He then drew his knife and tomahawk, defended himself, and the warriors shot three balls through him. He fell retained the power of speech till next day, and died. He said he had been to the Shawanese helping of them and had got fat eating white people's flesh. Every one to the very last called on the Shawanese general Tecumseh."

Such political executions, in the stifled excitement of the moment, could not but rouse violent emotion throughout the Creek nation. The old chiefs, having given life for life, felt the stronger for their assertion of authority; but they knew nothing of the true situation. For several weeks no open outbreak occurred but the prophets were more active than ever. About June 4 the old chiefs at Tuckaubatchee, hearing that the prophets "kept as usual their fooleries," sent a runner to the Alabamas with a message:

"You are but a few Alabama people. You say that the Great Spirit visits you frequently; that he comes in the sun and speaks to you; that the sun comes down just above your heads. Now we want to see and hear what you say you have seen and heard. Let us have

1 Report of Nimiod Doyell, May 3, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 843.

' Report of Alexander Cornells, June 22, 1813; State Papers Indian Affairs, i. 846.
the same proof you have had, and we will beUeve what we see and hear. You have nothing to fear ; the people who committed murders have suffered for their crimes, and there is an end of it.*'

The runner who carried this message was one of the warriors who had aided in killing the seven murderers. The Alabamas instantly put him to death, and sent his scalp to their friends at the forks of the river. Then began a general uprising, and every warrior who had aided in killing the murderers was himself killed or hunted from the Upper Creek country. The chiefs of Tuckaubatchee with difficulty escaped to the agency at Coweta, where they were under the protection of Georgia.

The Lower Creek towns did not join the outbreak; but of the Upper Creek towns twenty-nine declared for war, and only five for peace. At least two thousand warriors were believed to have taken the war-club by August 1, and got the name of Bed Clubs, or Red Sticks, for that reason. Everywhere they destroyed farms, stock, and all objects of white civilization, and killed or drove away their opponents.^

With all this the Spaniards had nothing to do. The outbreak was caused by the Indian War in the Northwest, and immediately by the incompetence of General Winchester and by the massacre at the river Raisin. The Creeks were totally unprepared for war, except so far as they trusted to magic j.

^ Talosee Fijdco to Hawkins, July 6, 1813; State Papers Indian Affairs, i. 847.
reason they turned to the Spaniards, who could alone
supply them. When the Little Warrior was put to
death, the British letter which he carried from Mai-
den for the Spanish officials at Pensacola came into
the charge of another Creek warrior, Peter McQueen,
son, half-breed. In July, McQueen, with a large party
of warriors started for Pensacola, with the letter and
four hundred dollars, to get powder. On arriving
there they saw the Spanish governor, who treated
them civilly, and in fear of violence gave them, ac-
cording to McQueen's account,* "a small bag of pow-
der each for ten towns, and five bullets to each man."
With this supply, which the governor represented as
a friendly present for hunting purposes, they were
obliged to content themselves, and started on their
return journey.

News that McQueen's party was at Pensacola
instantly reached the American settlements above
Mobile, where the inhabitants were already taking
refuge in stockades. A large number of Americans,
without military organization, under several leaders,
one of whom was a half-breed named Dixon Bailey,
started July 26 to intercept McQueen, and succeeded
in surprising the Indians July 27 at a place called

^ Hawkins to Armstrong, July 20, 1813; State Papers, Indian
Affairs, i. 849.

* Hawkins to Armstrong, Aug. 23, 1813; State Papers, Indian
Affairs, i. 851.

* Carson to Claiborne, July 29, 1813; Life of Dale, p. 78.

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Burnt Com, about eighty miles north of Pensacola.
The whites at first routed the Indians, and captured
the pack-mules with the ammunition; but the Indians quickly rallied, and in their turn routed the whites, with a loss of two killed and fifteen wounded, — although they failed to recover the greater part of the pack-animals. With the small amount of powder left to him, McQueen then returned to his people.

Angry at the attack and eager to revenge the death of his warriors, McQueen summoned the warriors of thirteen towns, some eight hundred in number, and about August 20 started in search of his enemies. The Creek war differed from that on the Lakes in being partly a war of half-breeds. McQueen's strongest ally was William Weatherford, a half-breed, well known throughout the country as a man of property and ability, as nearly civilized as Indian blood permitted, and equally at home among Indians and whites. McQueen and Weatherford were bitterly hostile to the half-breeds Bailey and Beasley, who were engaged in the affair of Burnt Corn. Both Beasley and Bailey were at a stockade called Fort Mims, some thirty-five miles above Mobile, on the eastern side of the Alabama River, where about five hundred and fifty persons were collected, — a motley crowd of whites, half-breeds, Indians, and negroes, old and young, women and children, protected only by a

1 Hawkins to Floyd, Sept 30, 1813; State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 854.

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picket wall, pierced by five hundred loop-holes three and a half feet from the ground, and two rude gates. ^ Beasley commanded, and wrote, August 30, that he could ^^ maintain the post against any number of Indians." ^ To Fort Mims the Creek warriors turned,
for the reason that Beasley and Bailey were there, and they arrived in the neighborhood, August 29, without giving alarm. Twice, negroes tending cattle outside rushed back to the fort reporting that painted warriors were hovering about; but the horsemen when sent out discovered no sign of an enemy, and Beasley tied up and flogged the second negro for giving a false alarm.

At noon, August 30, when the drum beat for dinner no patrols were out, the gates were open, and sand had drifted against that on the eastern side so that it could not quickly be closed. Suddenly a swarm of Indians raising the warwhoop rushed toward the fort. Beasley had time to reach the gate, but could not close it, and was tomahawked on the spot. The Indians got possession of the loopholes outside, and of one inclosure. The whites, under Dixon Bailey, held the inner inclosure and fought with desperation; but at last the Indians succeeded in setting fire to the house in the centre, and the fire spread to the whole stockade. The Indians then effected an entrance, and massacred most of the inmates. Fifteen persons escaped, and

1 Pickett's Alabama, ii 264.
< life of Dale, 106.

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among these was Dixon Bailey mortally womided. Most of the negroes were spared to be slaves. Two hundred and fifty scalps became trophies of the Creek warriors, — a number such as had been seldom taken by Indians from the white people on a single day.
CHAPTER X.

The battle at Burnt Com was regarded by the Indians as a declaration of war by the whites. Till then they seemed to consider themselves engaged in a domestic quarrel, or civil war; but after the massacre at Fort Mims they could not retreat, and yet knew that they must perish except for supernatural aid. Their destiny was controlled by that of Tecumthe. Ten days after the massacre at Fort Mims, Perry won his victory on Lake Erie, which settled the result of the Indian wars both in the North and in the South. Tecumthe had expected to capture Fort Meigs, and with it Fort Wayne and the line of the Maumee and Wabash. On the impulse of this success he probably hoped to raise the war-spirit among the Chickasaws and Choctaws, and then in person to call the Creeks into the field. Proctor's successive defeats blasted Indian hopes, and the Creeks had hardly struck their first blow in his support when Tecumthe himself fell, and the Indians of the Lakes submitted or fled to Canada.

* Hawkiiis to ArmBtrong, July 20, 1813 ; State Papersi In* dian Affairs, i. 849.

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At best, the Creek outbreak would have been hopeless. Although the number of hostile Creek warriors was matter of conjecture, nothing showed that they could exceed four thousand. At Pensacola, Peter McQueen was said to have claimed forty-eight hundred " gun-men " on his side. At such a moment he probably exaggerated his numbers. The Big Warrior, who led the peace party, estimated the hostile Creeks, early in August, as numbering at least twenty-
five hundred warriors.^ If the number of gun-men 'was four thousand, the number of guns in their pos-
session could scarcely be more than one thousand.
Not only had the Creeks few guns, and those in
poor condition, but they had little powder or lead,
and no means of repairing their weapons. Their
guns commonly missed fire, and even after discharg-
ing them, the Creeks seldom reloaded, but resorted to
the bow-and-arrows which they always carried. As
warriors they felt their inferiority to the Shawanese
and Indians of the Lakes, while their position was
more desperate, for the Choctaws and Cherokees
behind them refused to join in their war.

Four thousand warriors who had never seen a
serious war even with their Indian neighbors, and
armed for the most part with clubs, or bows-and-
arrows, were not able to resist long the impact of

^ Hawkins to Floyd, Sept. 30, 1813 ; State Papers, Indian
Affairs, i. 854.

* Big Warrior to Hawkins, Aug. 4, 1813; State Papersy
Indian Affairs, i. 851.

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three or four armies, each nearly equal to their whole
force, coming from every quarter of the compass.
On the other hand, the military difficulties of conquer*
ing the Creeks were not trifling. The same obstacles
that stopped Harrison in Ohio, stopped Pinckney in
(Georgia. Pinckney, like Harrison, could set in mo-
tion three columns of troops on three converging
lines, but he could not feed them or make roads
for them. The focus of Indian fanaticism was the
Hickory Ground at the fork of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, about one hundred and fifty miles distant from
the nearest point that would furnish supplies for an American army coming from Georgia, Tennessee, or Mobile. Pinckney's natural line of attack was through Georgia to the Lower Creek towns and the American forts on the Chattahoochee, whence he could move along a good road about eighty miles to the Upper Creek towns, near the Hickory Ground. The next convenient line was from Mobile up the Alabama River about one hundred and fifty miles to the same point. The least convenient was the pathless, mountainous, and barren region of Upper Alabama and Georgia, through which an army from Tennessee must toil for at least a hundred miles in order to reach an enemy.

The State of Georgia was most interested in the Creek war, and was chiefly to profit by it. Georgia in 1813 had a white population of about one hundred and twenty-five thousand, and a militia probably numbering thirty thousand. Military District No. 6

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embracing the two Carolinas and Georgia, was supposed to contain two thousand regular troops, and was commanded by Major-General Pinckney. Under Pinckney's command, a thousand regulars and three thousand militia, advancing from Georgia by a good road eighty miles into the Indian country, should have been able to end the Creek war within six months from the massacre at Fort Mims; but for some reason the attempts on that side were not so successful as they should have been, and were neither rapid nor vigorous. Tennessee took the lead.

In respect of white population, the State of Tennessee was more than double the size of Georgia; but it possessed a greater advantage in Andrew Jackson,
whose extreme energy was equivalent to the addition of an army. When news of the Mims massacre reached Nashville about the middle of September, Jackson was confined to his bed by a pistol-shot, which had broken his arm and nearly cost his life ten days before in a street brawl with Thomas H. Benton. From his bed he issued an order calling back into service his two thousand volunteers of 1812; and as early as October 12, little more than a month after the affair at Fort Mims, he and his army of twenty-five hundred men were already camped on the Tennessee River south of Huntsville in Alabama. There was his necessary base of operations, but one hundred and sixty miles of wilderness lay between him and the Hickory Ground.

On the Tennessee River Jackson's position bore

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some resemblance to that of Harrison on the Manmee a year before. Energy could not save him from failure. Indeed, the greater his energy the more serious were his difficulties. He depended on supplies from east Tennessee descending the river; but the river was low, and the supplies could not be moved. He had taken no measures to procure supplies from Nashville. Without food and forage he could not safely advance, or even remain where he was. Under such conditions, twenty-five hundred men with half as many horses could not be kept together. Harrison under the same difficulties held back his main force near its magazines till it disbanded, without approaching within a hundred miles of its object. Jackson suffered nearly the same fate. He sent away his mounted men under General Coffee to forage on the banks of the Black Warrior River, fifty miles to the southwest, where no Creeks were
to be feared. He forced his infantry forward through rough country some twenty miles, to a point where the river made its most southern bend, and there, in the mountainous defile, he established, October 23, a camp which he called Deposit, where his supplies were to be brought when the river should permit.

Coffee's mounted men returned October 24. Then, October 26, in the hope of finding food as he went, Jackson plunged into the mountains beyond the river, intending to make a raid, as far as he could, into the Creek country. Except fatigue and famine, he had nothing to fear. The larger Creek towns were a

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hundred miles to the south, and were busy with threatened attacks nearer home. After a week's march Jackson reached the upper waters of the Coosa. Within a short distance were two or three small Creek villages. Against one of these Jackson sent his mounted force, numbering nine hundred men, under General Coffee. Early in the morning of November 8, Coffee surrounded and destroyed Talishatchee. His report represented that the Indians made an obstinate resistance. Not one of the warriors escaped to tell the news, — a circumstance unknown heretofore. According to Coffee's estimate, Talishatchee contained two hundred and eighty-four Indians of both sexes and all ages. If one in three could be reckoned as capable of bearing arms, the number of warriors was less than one hundred. Coffee's men after the battle counted one hundred and eightysix dead Indians, and estimated the total loss at two hundred. In every attack on an Indian village a certain number of women and children were necessarily victims, but the proportion at Talishatchee seemed large.
"I lost five men killed, and forty-one wounded," reported Coffee,—"none mortally, the greater part slightly, a number with arrows. Two of the men killed was with arrows; this appears to form a very principal part of the enemy's arms for warfare, every man having a bow with a bundle of arrows, which is used after the first fire with the gun until a leisure time for loading offers."

2 Report of General Coffee, Nov. 4, 1813 ; Niles, v. 218. »

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Meanwhile Jackson fortified a point on the Coosa, about thirty-five miles from his base on the Tennessee, and named it Fort Strother. There he expected to be joined by a division of east Tennessee militia under General Cocke, approaching from Chattanooga, as he hoped, with supplies; but while waiting, he received, November 7, a message from Talladega, a Creek village thirty miles to the southward, reporting that the town, which had refused to join the war-party, was besieged and in danger of capture by a large body of hostile warriors. Jackson instantly started to save Talladega, and marched twenty-four miles November 8, surrounding and attacking the besieging Creeks the next morning.

"The victory was very decisive," reported Jackson to Governor Blount,* November 11; "two hundred and ninety of the enemy were left dead, and there can be no doubt but many more were killed who were not found. ... In the engagement we lost fifteen killed, and eighty-five wounded."

Coffee estimated the number of Indians, on their own report,^ at about one thousand. Jackson mentioned no wounded Indians, nor the number of hostile
At Talladega Jackson was sixty miles from the

Hickory Ground, and still nearer to several large
Indian towns, but he had already passed the limit of
his powers. News arrived that the army of eastern
Tennessee had turned eastward toward the Tallapoosa,,
and that his expected supplies were as remote as.
ever. Returning to Fort Strother November 10, Jack*
son waited there in forced inactivity, as Harrison had
waited at Fort Meigs, anxious only to avoid the dis-
grace of retreat. For two weeks the army had lived
on the Indians. A month more passed m idle starva-
tion, until after great efforts a supply train was or-
ganized, and difficulties on that account ceased ; but
at the same moment the army claimed discharge.

The claim was reasonable. Enlisted Dec. 10, 1812^
for one year, the men were entitled to their discharge
Dec. 10, 1818. Had Jackson been provided with
fresh levies he would doubtless have dismissed the
old ; but in his actual situation their departure would
have left him at Fort Strother to pass the winter
alone. To prevent this, he insisted that the men had
no right to count as service, within the twelve months
for which they had enlisted, the months between "May
and October when they were dismissed to their homes.
The men, unanimous in their own view of the con-
tract, started to march home December 10 ; and
Jackson, in a paroxysm of anger, planted two small pieces of artillery in their path and threatened to fire on them. The men, with good-temper, yielded for the moment; and Jackson, quickly recognizing his helplessness, gave way, and allowed them to depart.

Fort Strother was then held for a short time by east Tennessee militia, about fourteen hundred in number, whose term of service was a few weeks longer than that of the west Tennesseans. Jackson could do nothing with them, and remained idle.

The Governor of Tennessee advised him to withdraw to the State frontier; but Jackson, while admitting that his campaign had failed, declared that he would perish before withdrawing from the ground he considered himself to have gained. Fortunately he stood in no danger. The Greeks did not molest him, and he saw no enemy within fifty miles.

While Jackson was thus brought to a stand-still, Major-General Cocke of east Tennessee, under greater disadvantages, accomplished only results annoying to Jackson. Gocke with twenty-five hundred three months militia took the field at Knoxville October 12, and moving by way of Ghattanooga reached the Coosa sixty or seventy miles above Gamp Strother. The nearest Greek Indians were the Hiilabees, on a branch of the Tallapoosa about sixty miles from Gocke's position, and the same distance from Jackson. The Hiilabees, a group of four small villages, numbered in 1800 one hundred and seventy warriors. Unaware that the Hiilabees were making
their submission to Jackson, and were to receive his promise of protection, Cocke sent a large detachment, which started November 12 into the Indian country, and surprised one of the Hillabee villages November 18, massacring sixty-one warriors, and capturing the other inmates, two hundred and fifty in number, without losing a drop of blood or meeting any resistance.

Jackson was already displeased with General Cocke's conduct, and the Hillabee massacre increased his anger. Cocke had intentionally kept himself and his army at a distance in order to maintain an independent command. Not until Jackson's troops disbanded and marched home, December 12, did Cocke come to Fort Strother. There his troops remained a month, guarding Jackson's camp, until January 12, 1814, when their three months' term expired.

While five thousand men under Jackson and Cocke wandered about northern Alabama, able to reach only small and remote villages, none of which were actively concerned in the outbreak, the Georgians organized a force to enter the heart of the Creek country. Brigadier-General John Floyd commanded the Georgia army, and neither Major-General Pinckney nor any United States troops belonged to it. Jackson's battle of Talladega was fought November 9; Cocke's expedition against the Hillabees started 1

1 Cocke to the Secretary of War, Nov. 28. 1813; Niles, v.
November 12, and surprised the Hillabee village November 18. Moyd entered the hostile country November 24. The Georgians though nearest were last to move, and moved with the weakest force. Floyd had but nine hundred and forty militia, and three or four hundred friendly warriors of the Lower Greek villages.

Floyd had heard that large numbers of hostile Indians were assembled at Autossee, — a town on the Tallapoosa River near Tuckaubatchee, in the centre of the Upper Greek country. He crossed the Ghattahoochee November 24 with five days rations, and marched directly against Autossee, arriving within nine or ten miles without meeting resistance. At half-past six on the morning of November 29 he formed his troops for action in front of the town.

The difference between the Northwestern Indians and the Greeks was shown in the battle of Autossee compared with Tippecanoe. Floyd was weaker than Harrison, having only militia and Indians, while Harrison had a regular regiment composing one third of his rank-and-file. The Greeks were probably more numerous than the Tippecanoe Indians, although in both cases the numbers were quite unknown. Probably the Creeks were less well armed, but they occupied a strong position and stood on the defensive. Floyd reported that by nine o'clock he drove the In-
diants from their towns and burned their houses,—
^ Floyd to Pinckney, Dec. 4, 1813; Kiles, v. 283.

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supposed to be four hundred in number. He es*
timated their loss at two hundred killed. His own
loss was eleven killed and fifty-four wounded. That
of Harrison at Tippecanoe was sixty-one killed or
mortally wounded, and one hundred and twenty-
seven not fatally injured. The Creeks hardly in-
flicted one fourth the loss caused by the followers
of the Shawnee Prophet.

General Floyd, — himself among the severely
wounded, — immediately after the battle ordered
the troops to begin their return march to the Chatt-
hoochee. The Georgia raid into the Indian coun-
try was bolder, less costly, and more effective than
the Tennessee campaign; but at best it was only a
raid, like the Indian assault on Fort Mims, and of-
fered no immediate prospect of regular military occu-
pation. Another attempt, from a third quarter, had
the same unsatisfactory result.

The successor of General Wilkinson at New Or-
leans and Mobile, and in Military District No. 7,
was Brigadier-General Thomas Floumoy. Under
his direction an expedition was organized from Fort
Stoddert, commanded by Brigadier-G^neral Claiborne
of the Mississippi volunteers. Claiborne was given
the Third United States Infantry, with a number of
militia, volunteers, and Choctaw Indians, — in all
about a thousand men. He first marched to a point
on the Alabama River, about eighty-five miles above
Fort Stoddert, where he constructed a military post,
called Fort Claiborne. Having established his base
there, he marched, December 13, up the river till he reached, December 23, the Holy Oromid, where the half-breed Weatherford lived. There Claiborne approached within about fifty miles of the point which Floyd reached a month before, but for want of cooperation he could not maintain his advantage. He attacked and captured Weatherford's town, killing thirty Indians, with a loss of one man; but after destroying the place he retreated, arriving unharmed at Fort Claiborne, on the last day of the year.

Thus the year 1813 ended without closing the Creek war. More than seven thousand men had entered the Indian country from four directions; and with a loss of thirty or forty Uves had kUled, according to their reports, about eight hundred Indians, or one fifth of the hostile Creek warriors; but this carnage had fallen chiefly on towns and villages not responsible for the revolt. The true fanatics were little harmed, and could offer nearly as much resistance as ever. The failure and excessive expense of the campaign were the more annoying, because they seemed beyond proportion to the military strength of the fanatics. Major-General Pinckney wrote to the War Department at the close of the year: ^ —

'^ The force of the hostile Creeks was estimated by the best judges to have consisted of three thousand five hundred warriors; of these it is apprehended that about one thousand have been put hors de combat"

* Pinckney to Armstrong, Dec 28, 1813; MSS. War Department Archives.
To Andrew Jackson, Pinckney wrote, Jan. 19, 1814,

"Your letter, dated December 26, did not reach me until the last evening. Your preceding dispatches of December 14 had led me to conclude what would probably soon be the diminished state of your force.* I therefore immediately ordered to your support Colonel Williams's regiment of twelve-months men, and wrote to the Governor of Tennessee urging him to complete the requisition of fifteen hundred for the time authorized by law. I learn from the person who brought your letter that Colonel Williams's regiment is marching to join you; if the fifteen hundred of the quota should also be furnished by Governor Blount, you will in my opinion have force sufficient for the object to be attained. The largest computation that I have heard of the hostile Creek warriors, made by any competent judge, is four thousand. At least one thousand of them have been killed or disabled; they are badly armed and supplied with ammunition; little doubt can exist that two thousand of our men would be infinitely superior to any number they can collect."

Jackson at Fort Strother on the departure of the east Tennesseans, January 14, received a reinforcement of sixty-day militia, barely nine hundred in number.2 Determined to use them to the utmost, Jackson started three days afterward to co-operate with General Floyd in an attack on the Tallapoosa villages, aiming at a town called Emuckfaw, some forty miles north of Tuckaubatchee. The move-

^ Pinckney to Jackson, Jan. 19, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

« Parton, i. 864. ,
ment was much more dangerous than any he had yet attempted. His own force was fresh, motley, and weak, numbering only nine hundred and thirty militia, including "a company of volunteer officers headed by General Coffee, who had been abandoned by his men," and assisted by two or three hundred friendly Creeks and Cherokees. The sixty-day militia were insubordinate and unsteady, the march was long, and the Creek towns at which he aimed were relatively large. Emuckfaw was one of seven villages belonging to Ocfuskee, the largest town in the Creek nation,—in 1800 supposed to contain four hundred and fifty warriors.^

As far as Enotachopco Creek, twelve miles from Emuckfaw, Jackson had no great danger to fear; but beyond that point he marched with caution. At daylight, January 22, the Indians, who were strongly encamped at about three miles distance, made an attack on Jackson's camp, which was repulsed after half an hour's fighting. Jackson then sent Coffee with four hundred men to burn the Indian camp, but Coffee returned without attempting it. "On viewing the encampment and its strength the General thought it most prudent to return to my encampment," reported Jackson. ^ Immediately after Coffee's return the Indians again attacked, and Coffee sallied out to turn their flank, followed by not more than fifty-four men. The Indians were again repulsed with

^ Hawkins's Sketch, p. 45.

* Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles, v. 427.

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a loss of forty-five killed, but Coffee was severely wounded, and Jackson "determined to commence a return march to Fort Strother the following day/

At that moment Jackson's situation was not unlike that of Harrison after the battle of Tippecanoe, and he escaped less happily. Fortifying his camp, he remained during the night of January 22 undisturbed. At half-past ten, January 23, he began his return march, "and was fortunate enough to reach Enotachopco before night, having passed without interruption a dangerous defile occasioned by a hurricane." Enotachopco Creek was twelve or fifteen miles from Emuckfaw Creek, and the Hillabee towns were about the same distance beyond.

At Enotachopco Jackson again fortified his camp. His position was such as required the utmost caution in remaining or moving. So hazardous was the passage of the deep creek and the defile beyond, through which the army had marched in its advance, that Jackson did not venture to return by the same path, but on the morning of January 24 began cautiously crossing the creek at a safer point: —

"The front guard had crossed with part of the flank columns, the wounded were over, and the artillery in the act of entering the creek, when an alarm-gun was heard in the woods. ... To my astonishment and mortification, when the word was given by Colonel Carrol to halt and form, and a few guns had been fired, I beheld the right and left columns of the rear guard precipitately

^ Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29^ 1814; Niles, v. 427.

^8 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. CalO.
give way. This Bhamefnl retreat was disaBtrons in the extreme; it drew along with it the greater part of the centre column, leaving not more than twenty-five men, who being formed by Colonel Carrol maintained their ground as long as it was possible to maintain it, and it brought consternation and confusion into the centre of the army, — a consternation which was not easily re* moved, and a confusion which could not soon be restored to order." *

The Indians were either weak or ignorant of warfare, for they failed to take advantage of the panic, and allowed themselves to be driven away by a handful of men. Jackson's troops escaped unharmed, or but little injured, their loss in the engagements of January 22 and 24 being twenty-four men killed and seventy-one wounded. Probably the Creek force consisted of the Ofuskee warriors, and numbered about half that of Jackson.^ Coffee supposed them to be eight hundred or a thousand in number, but the exaggeration in estimating Indian forces was always greater than in estimating white enemies in battle. An allowance of one third was commonly needed for exaggeration in reported numbers of European combatants; an allowance of one half was not unreasonable in estimates of Indian forces.

In letting Jackson escape from Emuckfaw the Creeks lost their single opportunity. Jackson never repeated the experiment. He arrived at Fort Strother

^ Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles, v. 427«< Pickett's Alabama, ii. 336.
better conditions.

General Floyd was no more successful. Jackson started from Port Strother for Emuckfaw January 17; Floyd left Fort Mitchell, on the Chattahoochee, January 18, for Tuscumbia, only forty miles south of Emuckfaw. Floyd’s army, like Jackson’s, was partly composed of militia and partly of Lower Greek warriors, in all about seventeen hundred men, including four hundred friendly Greeks. From the best information to be obtained at the time, the effective strength of the hostile Indians did not then exceed two thousand warriors, scattered along the Goosa and Tallapoosa rivers; while experience proved the difficulty of concentrating large bodies of Indians, even when supplies were furnished them. The British commissariat in Canada constantly issued from five to ten thousand rations for Indians and their families, but Proctor never brought more than fifteen hundred warriors into battle. The Creeks, as far as was known, never numbered a thousand warriors in any battle during the war. Floyd, with seventeen hundred well armed, was able to face the whole Creek nation, and meant to move forward, fortifying military posts at each day’s march, until he should establish himself on the Tallapoosa in the central

^ Jackson to Pinckney, Jan. 29, 1814; Niles v. 427.
* Letter from Milledgeville, March 16, 1814; "The War/" April 5, 1814.

250 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. Id.

of the Greek towns, and wait for a junction with Jackson.

When Jackson was repulsed at Emuckfaw January 22, Floyd was about forty miles to the south-
ward, expecting to draw the chief attack of the Indians. Having advanced forty-eight miles from the Chattahoochee he arrived at a point about seven or eight miles south of Tuckaubatchee, where he fortified, on Calibee Creek, a camp called Defiance. There, before daybreak on the morning of January 27, he was sharply attacked, as Harrison was attacked at Tippecanoe, and with the same result. The attack was repulsed, but Floyd lost twenty-two killed and one hundred and forty-seven wounded,—the largest number of casualties that had yet occurred in the Indian war. The Indians "left thirty-seven dead on the field; from the effusion of blood and the number of head-dresses and war-clubs found in various directions, their loss must have been considerable independent of their wounded." 

The battle of Calibee Creek, January 27, was in substance a defeat to Floyd. So decided were his militia in their determination to go home, that he abandoned all his fortified posts and fell back to the Chattahoochee, where he arrived February 1, four days after the battle.

* Floyd to Pinckney, Jan. 27, 1814; Nilea, v. 411.

« Floyd to Pinckney, Feb. 2, 1814; Military and Naval Letters, p. 306. Hawkins to Armstrong, June 7, 1814; State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 858.

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Six months had then elapsed since the outbreak of hostilities at Burnt Corn; a year since the Little Warrior murders on the Ohio River, yet not a post had been permanently occupied within eighty miles of the fanatical centre at the fork of the Coosa and Tallapoosa.
Pinckney was obliged to apply to the governors of North and South Carolina to furnish him with men and equipments. The Governor of Georgia also exerted himself to supply the deficiencies of the national magazines. By their aid Pinckney was able to collect an army with which to make another and a decisive movement into the Creek country: but before he could act, Jackson succeeded in striking a final blow.

Jackson's success in overcoming the obstacles in his path was due to his obstinacy in insisting on maintaining himself at Port Strother, which obliged Governor Blount to order out four thousand more militia in January for six months. Perhaps this force alone would have been no more effectual in 1814 than in 1813, but another reinforcement was decisive. The Thirty-ninth regiment of the regular army, authorized by the Act of January 29, 1818, had been officered and recruited in Tennessee, and was still in the State. Major-General Pinckney sent orders, Dec. 23, 1813, to its colonel, John Williams, to join Jackson.* The arrival of the Thirty-ninth regiment February 6, 1814, gave Jackson the means of coping with his militia. February 21 he wrote to his quartermaster, Major Lewis, that he meant to use his regulars first to discipline his own army. I am truly happy in having the Colonel [Williams] with me. His regiment will give strength to my

* Pinckney to the Governor of Georgia, Feb. 20, 1814; Niles, vi. 132.

> Pinckney to Colonel William, Dec. 23, 1813; MSS. War Department Archives.
arm, and quell mutiny." His patience with militia-men had been long exhausted, and he meant to make a warning of the next mutineer.

The first victim was no less a person than Major-Qenend Cocke of the east Tennessee militia. Cocke's division of two thousand men, mustered for six months, began January 17 its march from Enoxville to Fort Strother. Learning on the march that the west Tennessee division, mustered at the same time for the same service, had been accepted to serve only three months, Cocke's men mutinied, and Cocke tried to pacify them by a friendly speech. Jackson, learning what had passed, despatched a sharp order to one of Cocke's brigadiers to arrest and send under guard to Fort Strother every officer of whatever rank who should be found exciting the men to mutiny. Cocke was put under arrest when almost in sight of the enemy's country; his sword was taken from him, and he was sent to Nashville for trial. His division came to Fort Strother, and said no more about its term of service.

1 Parton's Jackson, i. 503.

* Parton's Jackson, i. 454.


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Haying dealt thus with the officers, Jackson selected at leisure a test of strength with the men. The conduct of the Payetteville company of the Twenty-eighth regiment of west Tennessee Hght infantry gave him ground for displeasure. Not only had they refused to obey the call for six months' ser-
vice and insisted on serving for three months or not at all, but they had halted on their march, and had sent their commanding officer to bargain with Jackson for his express adhesion to then* terms. Learning that Jackson made difficulties, they marched home without waiting for an official reply. Jackson ordered the whole body to be arrested as deserters, accompanying his order by an offer of pardon to such as returned to duty on their own understanding of the term of service. The company was again mustered, and arrived at Fort Strother not long after the arrival of the Thirty-ninth United States Infantry.

A few weeks later an unfortunate private of the same company, named Woods, refused to obey the officer of the day, and threatened to shoot any man who arrested him. Jackson instantly called a court-martial, tried and sentenced Woods, and March 14 caused him to be shot. The execution was a harsh measure; but Jackson gave to it a peculiar character by issuing a general order in which he misstated facts that made Wood's case exceptional,^ in order to let the company understand that their comrade was suffering the penalty which they all deserved.

^ Parton*8 Jackson, i. 511.

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Without giving his army time to brood over this severity, Jackson ordered a general movement, and within forty-eight hours after Woods's execution, all were well on their way toward the enemy. Jackson had with him about five thousand men, four fifths of whom expected their discharge in a month. He left them not a day's repose.

Two lines of advance were open to him in ap-
proaching the fork of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, which was always the objective point. He might descend the Coosa, or cross to the Tallapoosa by the way he had taken in January. He descended the Ooosa thirty miles, and then struck a sudden blow at the Tallapoosa towns.

The Ocfuskee Indians, elated by their success in January, collected their whole force, with that of some neighboring towns, in a bend of the Tallapoosa, where they built a sort of fortress by constructing Across the neck of the Horse-shoe a breastwork composed of five large logs, one above the other, with two ranges of port-holes. The interior was covered with trees and fallen timber along the river side, and caves were dug in the bank. Seven or eight hundred Indian warriors together with many women and children were within the enclosure of eighty or a hundred acres.

Jackson, after leaving a garrison at a new fort which he constructed on the Coosa, about half way

^ Col. Gideon Moi^gan to Gbvmor Blount, April I, 1814 ; IJiles. vi. 148.

to the Horsenshoe, had somewhat less than three thousand effectives. With these he camped, on the evening of March 28, about six miles northwest of the bend, and the next morning advanced to attack it. "Determined to exterminate them," he reported,* he detached Coffee with the mounted force of seven hundred men and six hundred friendly Indians ^ to surround the bend, along the river bank, while Jackson himself with all his infantry took position before the breastwork. At half-past ten
o'clock he planted his cannon about two hundred yards from the centre of the work, and began a rapid fire of artillery and musketry, which continued for two hours without producing apparent effect. Meanwhile the Cherokee allies swam the river in the rear of the Creek warriors, who were all at the breastwork, and seizing canoes, brought some two hundred Indians and whites into the Horse-shoe, where they climbed the high ground in the rear of the breastwork and fired on the Creeks, who were occupied in defending their front.

Jackson then ordered an assault on the breastwork, which was carried, with considerable loss, by the Thirty-ninth regiment, in the centre. The Creeks sought shelter in the thickets and under the bluffs, where they were hunted or burned out, and killed. "The slaughter was greater than all we had done before," wrote Coffee; it was continued all day and the next morning. When the Horse-shoe had been thoroughly cleared, five hundred and fifty-seven dead bodies were counted within the bend; many were killed in the river, and about twenty were supposed to have escaped. According to Coffee, "we killed not less than eight hundred
and fifty or nine hundred of them, and took about five hundred squaws and children prisoners." The proportion of squaws and children to the whole number of Indians showed the probable proportion of warriors among the dead. "I lament that two or three women and children were killed by accident," reported Jackson.^

Jackson's loss was chiefly confined to the Thirty-ninth regiment and the friendly Indians, who were most actively engaged in the storm. The Thirty-ninth lost twenty killed and fifty-two wounded. Among the severely wounded was Ensign Samuel Houston, struck by an arrow in the thigh. The major and two lieutenants were killed. The Cherokees lost eighteen killed and thirty-five wounded. The friendly Creeks lost five killed and eleven wounded. The Tennessee militia, comprising two thirds of the army, lost only eight killed and fifty-two wounded. The total loss was fifty-one killed and one hundred and forty-eight wounded.

^ Jackson to Governor Blount, March 31, 1814; Niles, vi. 147*

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Jackson's policy of extermination shocked many humane Americans, and would perhaps have seemed less repulsive had the Creeks shown more capacity for resistance. The proportion between two hundred casualties on one side and seven or eight hundred killed on the other would have been striking in any case, but was especially so where the advantages of position were on the side of the defence. A more serious criticism was that the towns thus exterminated were not the towns chiefly responsible for the outbreak. The Alabamas and the main body of fanatical Creeks escaped.
Jackson was obliged to return to his new fort on the Coosa, a march of five days; and was delayed five days more by preparations to descend the river. When at length he moved southward, scouring the country as he went, he could find no more enemies. He effected his junction with the Georgia troops April 15, and the united armies reached the fork of the Coosa and Tallapoosa April 18, where Major-General Pinckney joined them, April 20, and took command; but the Bed Sticks had then fled southward. A few of the hostile leaders, including Weatherford, made submission, but McQueen and the chief prophets escaped to continue the war from Florida. The friendly Creeks did not consider the war to be finished; they reported to Hawkins.

^ Jackson to Gk)yemor Blount, April 18, 1814; Niles, vi. 212. April 25, 1814; Nilea, vL 219.

* Hawkins to Pinckney, April 25, 1814; State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 858.

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*< They did not believe the hostile Indians were ready for peace, although a part of them had suffered so severely in battle against our armies. They were proud, haughty, brave, and mad by fanaticism. Those of the towns of Tallapoosa below Tuckaubatchee and Alabama had suffered the least, although they were the most culpable; and it was probable they would mistake our object in offering terms of peace to them."

The number of refugees was never precisely known, but Hawkins reported that eight of the Tallapoosa
towns had migrated in a body to Spanish territory, and probably a larger proportion of the Coosa and Alabama towns accompanied them. The Indians themselves gave out that a few more than a thousand Red Stick warriors survived, who meant to die fighting. In May the British admiral Cochrane sent Captain Pigot of the "Orpheus" to the Appalachicola to communicate with the refugee Creek Indians and supply them with arms. Pigot received ten of the principal chiefs on board his vessel May 20, and reported on their authority that "the number of the warriors of the Creek Nation friendly to the English and ready to take up arms was about twenty-eight hundred, exclusive of one thousand unarmed warriors who had been driven by the Americans from their towns into the marshes near Pensacola, and who were expected to rejoin the main body."* The Creek

* Abstract of Correspondence, Expedition to New Orleans, 1814-1815; MSS. British Archives.

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warriors friendly to the Americans were estimated at about twelve hundred, and the fugitive Red Sticks at one thousand. Whatever their number, they included the most fanatical followers of Tecumthe, and their obstinate outlawry caused long and costly difficulties to the United States government.

Meanwhile the whites were conquerors and could take as much of the Greek lands as suited them; but an irregularity of form could not be avoided. Secretary Armstrong first authorized General Pinckney to conclude a treaty of peace with the hostile Greeks,
containing a cession of land and other provisions. A few days later Armstrong saw reason to prefer that the proposed treaty with the Greeks should take a form altogether military, and be in the nature of a capitulation. His idea required a treaty with the hostile Greek chiefs; but the hostile Greeks were not a separate organization capable of making a treaty or granting lands of the Greek nation; and besides that difficulty the hostile chiefs had fled, and refused either to submit or negotiate. The friendly chiefs could hardly capitulate in "a form altogether military," because they had never been at war. They had fought in the United States service and

^ Armstrong to Pinckney, March 17, 1814; State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 836.

' Armstrong to Pinckney, March 20, 1814; State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 837.


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were entitled to reward as allies, not to punishment as enemies.

The solution of this legal problem was entrusted to Andrew Jackson, whose services in the war earned for him the appointment of major-general in the regular army, and the command of Military District No. 7, with headquarters at Mobile. Jackson met the Greek chiefs in July. The Indians, parties to the negotiation, were friendly chiefs, deputies, and war-riors, representing perhaps one third of the entire Greek nation. To these allies and friends Jackson presented a paper, originally intended for the hos-
tile Indians, entitled "Articles of Agreement and Capitulation," requiring as indemnity for war expenses a surrender of two thirds of their territory. They were required to withdraw from the southern and western half of Alabama, within the Chattahoochee on the east and the Coosa on the west. The military object of this policy was to isolate them from the Seminoles and Spaniards on one side, and from the Choctaws and Chickasaws on the other. The political object was to surround them with a white population.

Unanimously the Creeks refused to accept the sacrifice. Jackson told them in reply that their refusal would show them to be enemies of the United States; that they might retain their own part of the country, but that the part which belonged to the hostile Indians would be taken by the government; and that the chiefs who would not consent to sign the

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paper might join the Red Sticks at Pensacola, — although, added Jackson, he should probably overtake and destroy them before they could get there. Such arguments could not be answered. A number of the Greeks at last, after long resistance, signed the capitulation or agreement, although they continued to protest against it, and refused their aid to carry it out.

Jackson's capitulation of Aug. 9, 1814, which, without closing the Creek war, appropriated to the government the larger part of the Creek lands, was nearly simultaneous with a treaty signed July 22 by William Henry Harrison and Lewis Cass, at Greenville in Ohio, with chiefs of the Wyandots, Pelawares, Shawanese, Senecas, and Miamis. This treaty contained no land-cession, but established
peace between the parties, and obliged the Indian signers to declare war on the British. Neither Harrison's nor Jackson's treaty embraced the chief body of hostile Indians; but Harrison's treaty served another purpose of no small value in appearing to remove an obstacle to negotiation with England.

\(^*\) State Papers, Indian Affairs, i. 826.
\(^*\) State Papers, Indian Affairs, 1. 826.

CHAPTER XI.

Badly as the United States fared in the campaign of 1813, their situation would have been easy had they not suffered under the annoyances of a blockade continually becoming more stringent. The doctrine that coasts could be blockaded was enforced against America with an energy that fell little short of demonstration. The summer was well advanced before the whole naval force to be used for the purpose could be posted at the proper stations. Not until May 26 did Admiral Warren issue at Bermuda his proclamation of "a strict and rigorous blockade of the ports and harbors of New York, Charleston, Port Royal, Savannah, and of the river Mississippi," which completed the blockade of the coast, leaving only the ports of New England open to neutrals. From that time nothing entered or left the blockaded coast except swift privateers, or occasional fast-sailing vessels which risked capture in the attempt. Toward the close of the year Admiral Warren extended his blockade eastward. Notice of the extension was given at Halifax November 16, and by the blockading squadron off New London December 2\(^*\)

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thus closing Long Island Sound to all vessels of every description.

The pressure of the blockade was immediately felt. In August^ superfine flour sold at Boston for $11.87 a barrel, at Baltimore for $6.00, and at Richmond for $4.50. Upland cotton sold at Boston for twenty cents a pound; at Charleston for nine cents. Rice sold at Philadelphia for $12.00 a hundred weight; in Charleston and Savannah for $3.00. Sugar sold in Boston for $18.75 a hundred weight; in Baltimore for $26.50. Already the American staples were unsalable at the places of their production. No rate of profit could cause cotton, rice, or wheat to be brought by sea from Charleston or Norfolk to Boston. Soon speculation began. The price of imported articles rose to extravagant points. At the end of the year coffee sold for thirty-eight cents a pound, after selling for twenty-one cents in August. Tea which could be bought for $1.70 per pound in August, sold for three and four dollars in December. Sugar which was quoted at nine dollars a hundred weight in New Orleans, and in August sold for twenty-one or twenty-two dollars in New York and Philadelphia, stood at forty dollars in December.

More sweeping in its effects on exports than on imports, the blockade rapidly reduced the means of the people. After the summer of 1813, Georgia alone, owing to its contiguity with Florida, succeeded

^ Proclamation and Notice ; Niles, y. 264.
• Prices Current; Niles, v. 41.
New York, which exceeded $12,250,000 in 1811, fell to $209,000 for the year ending in 1814. The domestic exports of Virginia diminished in four years from $4,800,000 to $3,000,000 for 1812, $1,819,000 for 1813, and $17,681 for the year ending Sept 80, 1814. At the close of 1813 exports, except from Georgia and New England, ceased.^

On the revenue the blockade acted with equal effect. Owing to the increase of duties and to open ports, the New England States rather increased than diminished their customs receipts. Until the summer of 1818, when the blockade began in earnest. New York showed the same result; but after that time the receipts fell, until they averaged less than $50,000 a month instead of $500,000, which would have been a normal average if peace had been preserved. Philadelphia suffered sooner. In 1810 the State of Pennsylvania contributed more than $200,000 a month to the Treasury; in 1813 it contributed about $25,000 a month. Maryland, where was collected in 1812 no less than $1,780,000 of net revenue, paid only $182,000 in 1813, and showed an actual excess of expenditures in 1814. After the summer, the total net revenue collected in every port of the United States outside of New England did not exceed $150,000 a month, or at the rate of $1,800,000 a year.*

» Table No. 11.; Pitkin, p. 56.
« Table No. 1.; Pitkin, p. 415.

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No ordinary operations of war could affect the United States so severely as this inexorable blockade. Every citizen felt it in every action of his life. The farmer grew crops which he could not sell,
while he paid tenfold prices for every necessity. While the country was bursting with wealth, it was ruined. The blockade was but a part of the evil. The whole coast was systematically swept of the means of industry. Especially the Virginians and Marylanders felt the heavy hand of England as it was felt nowhere else except on the Niagara River. A large British squadron occupied Chesapeake Bay, and converted it into a British naval station. After the month of February, 1813, the coasts of Virginia and Maryland enjoyed not a moment's repose. Considering the immense naval power wielded by England, the Americans were fortunate that their chief losses were confined to the farm-yards and poultry of a few islands in Chesapeake Bay, but the constant annoyance and terror were not the less painful to the people who apprehended attack.

Fortunately the British naval officers showed little disposition to distinguish themselves, and their huge line-of-battle ships were not adapted to river service. The squadron under the general command of Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren seemed contented for the most part to close the bay to commerce. The only officer in the fleet who proved the energy and capacity to use a part of the great force lying idle at Lynnhaven Bay was Rear-Admiral Sir George Cockburn, whose efficiency was attested by the execration in which his name was held for fifty years in the United States. His duties were not of a nature to make him popular, and he was an admiral of the old school, whose boisterous energy seemed to take needless pleasure in the work.

Early in April, 1818, Admiral Warren sent Cock-
bum with a light flotilla to the head of Chesapeake Bay to destroy everything that could serve a warlike purpose, and to interrupt, as far as possible, communication along the shore. The squadron consisted of only one light frigate, the "Maidstone," thirty-six guns; two brigs, the "Fantome" and "Mohawk,"* and three or four prize schooners, with four or five hundred seamen, marines, and soldiers. With this petty force Cockburn stationed himself at the mouth of the Susquehanna River, and soon threw Maryland into paroxysms of alarm and anger. Taking possession of the islands in his neighborhood, he obtained supplies of fresh food for the whole British force in Chesapeake Bay. He then scoured every creek and inlet above his anchorage. He first moved into the Elk River, and sent his boats, April 28, with one hundred and fifty marines, to Frenchtown, — a village of a dozen buildings, which had acquired a certain importance for the traffic between Baltimore and Philadelphia since the stoppage of transit by sea. Without losing a man, the expedition drove


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away the few Americans who made a show of resistance, and burned whatever property was found, « consisting of much flour, a large quantity of army clothing, of saddles, bridles, and other equipments for cavalry, etc., together with various articles of merchandise," besides five vessels lying near the place. ^

Cockburn next sent the same force to destroy a battery lately erected at Havre de Grace. The attack was made on the morning of May 8, and like the attack on Frenchtown, met with only resistance
enough to offer an excuse for pillage. The militia took refuge in the woods; Cockburn's troops destroyed or carried away the arms and cannon, and set fire to the town of some sixty houses, "to cause the proprietors (who had deserted them and formed part of the militia who had fled to the woods) to understand and feel what they were liable to bring upon themselves by building batteries and acting toward us with so much useless rancor." While engaged in this work Cockburn was told that an extensive cannon-foundry existed about four miles up the Susquehanna River; and he immediately started for it in his boats. He met no resistance, and destroyed the foundry with several small vessels. His handful of men passed the day undisturbed on the banks of the Susquehanna, capturing fifty-one cannon, mostly heavy pieces, with one hun-

1 Warren's Report of May 28, 1813; London "Gazette."

* Cockburn to Warren, May 3, 1813; London "Gazette," July e, 1813.

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dred and thirty stand of small arms. The party then returned to their ships, "where we arrived at ten o'clock, after being twenty-two hours in constant exertion, without nourishment of any kind; and I have much pleasure in being able to add that, excepting Lieutenant Westphall's wound, we have not suffered any casualty whatever."

These expeditions cleared every inlet in the Upper Chesapeake except the Sassafras River on the eastern shore. During the night of May 5 Cockburn sent his boats into the Sassafras. Militia in consid-
erable numbers assembled on both banks and opened a fire which Cockburn described as "most heavy," aided by one long gun. Cockburn landed, dispersed the militia, and destroyed Fredericktown and Georgetown, with the vessels and stores he found there. This expedition cost him five men wounded, one severely. The next day, May 6, he reported to Admiral Warren, —

"I had a deputation from Charleston in the Northeast River to assure me that that place is considered by them at your mercy, and that neither guns nor militia-men shall be suffered there; and as I am assured that all the places in the upper part of Chesapeake Bay have adopted similar resolutions, and as there is now neither public property, vessels, nor warlike stores remaining in this neighborhood, I propose returning to you with the light squadron to-morrow morning."

Thus in the course of a week, and without loss of life on either side, Cockburn with a few boats and

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one hundred and fifty men terrorized the shores of the Upper Chesapeake, and by his loud talk and random threats threw even Baltimore into a panic, causing every one to suspend other pursuits in order to garrison the city against an imaginary attack. The people, harassed by this warfare, remembered with extreme bitterness the marauding of Cockburn and his sailors; but where he met no resistance he paid in part for what private property he took, and as far as was recorded, his predatory excursions cost the Marylanders not a wound.

For six weeks after Cockburn's return to Warren's station at Lynnhaven Bay, the British fleet remained
inactive. Apparently the British government aimed at no greater object than that of clearing from Chesapeake Bay every vessel not engaged in British interests under British protection. The small craft and privateers were quickly taken or destroyed; but the three chief depots of commerce and armaments — Norfolk, Baltimore, and Washington — required a greater effort. Of these three places Norfolk seemed most open to approach, and Admiral Warren determined to attack it.

The British navy wished nothing more ardently than to capture or destroy the American frigates. One of these, the "Constellation," lay at Norfolk, where it remained blockaded throughout the war. Admiral Warren could earn no distinction so great as the credit of capturing this frigate, which not only threatened to annoy British commerce should she escape to sea, but even when blockaded in port required a considerable squadron to watch her, and neutralized several times her force.

Another annoyance drew Warren's attention to Norfolk. June 20, fifteen gunboats issued from the harbor before daylight, and under cover of darkness approached within easy range of a becalmed British frigate, the "Junon" of forty-six guns. For half an hour, from four o'clock till half-past four, the gunboats maintained, according to the official report of Commodore Cassin who commanded them, "a heavy, galling fire at about three quarters of a mile distance." Their armament was not mentioned, but probably they, like the gunboats on the Lakes, carried in part long thirty-two and twenty-four-pound guns. The attack was intended to test the offensive
value of gunboats, and the result was not satisfactory. The fire of fifteen heavy guns for half an hour on a defenceless frigate within easy range should have caused great injury, but did not. "When a breeze rose and enabled the 'Junon' and a neighboring frigate, the "Barrosa," to get under weigh, the gunboats were obliged to retire with the loss of one man killed and two wounded. The "Junon" also had one man killed, but received only one or two shots in her hull.^

The "Constellation" lay, under the guns of two forts and with every possible precaution, five miles up the

^ Cassin to Secretary Jones, June 21, 1813; Niles, iv. 291. 'James, ii. 55.

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Elizabeth River, at the Portsmouth navy-yard. The utmost pains had been taken to provide against approach by water. Whatever incompetence or neglect was shown elsewhere, Norfolk was under the command of able officers in both services, who neglected no means of defence. General Wade Hampton had fortified the interior line immediately below the town, where two strong forts were constructed under the direction of Captain Walker Keith Armistead of the Engineers, the first graduate of the West Point Academy in 1803. Five miles below these forts, where the river widened into Hampton Roads, Brigadier-General Robert Taylor of the Virginia militia, and
Captain John Cassin commanding at the navy-yard established a second line of defence, resting on Craney Island on the left, supported by fifteen or twenty gun-boats moored across the channel. A battery of seven guns was established on the island covering the approach to the gunboats, so that the capture of the island was necessary to the approach by water. The force on the island consisted of about seven hundred men, of whom less than a hundred were State troops. The rest were infantry of the line, riflemen, seamen, and marines. The town and forts were strongly garrisoned, and a large body of State militia was constantly on service.

To deal with the defences of Norfolk, Admiral Warren brought from Bermuda, according to newspaper account, a detachment of battalion marines—Report of Robert Taylor, July 4, 1813; Niles, iv. 324.

eighteen hundred strong; three hundred men of the One Hundred-and-second regiment of the line, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Charles James Napier, afterward a very distinguished officer; two hundred and fifty chasseurs, or French prisoners of war who had entered the British service; and three hundred men of the royal marine artillery, — in all, two thousand six hundred and fifty rank-and-file, or about three thousand men all told, besides the sailors of the fleet. At that time no less than thirteen sail of British ships, including three ships-of-the-line and five frigates, lay at anchor within thirteen miles of Craney Island.

The attack was planned for June 22. The land forces were commanded by Sir Sydney Beckwith, but the general movement was directed by Admiral War-
ren.2 The main attack, led by Major-General Beckwith in person, was to land and approach Craney Island from the rear, or mainland; the second division, under command of Captain Pechell of the flagship "San Domingo," 74, was to approach the island in boats directly under fire of the American guns on the island, but not exposed to those in the gunboats.

The plan should have succeeded. The island was held by less than seven hundred men in an open earthwork easily assaulted from the rear. The water was so shallow as to offer little protection against energetic attack. The British force was more than twice the American, and the plan of attack took from the gunboats the chance of assisting the land battery.

At daylight on the morning of June 22 Beckwith^
with about eight hundred men, landed on the main shore outside of Craney Island, and pushed forward to take the island in the rear. Soon afterward Captain Pechell, with about seven hundred men in fifteen boats, approached the island from the northwest along the shore, far out of the reach of the gun-boats. Toward eleven o'clock the British boats came within range of the American battery on the island. Contrary to the opinions of several officers. Captain Pechell insisted on making the attack independently of Beckwith's approach, and pushed on. Two or three hundred yards from land the leading boats grounded in shoal water. Apparently the men might have waded ashore; but "one of the seamen, having plunged his boat-hook over the side, found three or four feet of slimy mud at the bottom;" the leading officer's boat being aground was soon struck by a six-pound shot, the boat sunk, and himself and his crew, with those of two other launches, were left in the water. The other boats took a part of them in, and then quickly retired.

The affair was not improved by the fortunes of Sir Sydney Beckwith, who advanced to the rear of Craney Island, where he was stopped by creeks which he reported too deep to ford, and accordingly re-embarked.

^ James, ii. 59. *

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his troops without further effort; but the true causes of the failure seemed not to be understood. Napier thought it due to the division of command between three heads, Warren, Cockbum, and Beckwith; but incompetence was as obvious as the division of com-
mand. Admiral Warren's official report seemed to admit that he was also overmatched:* —

"Upon approaching the island, from the extreme shallowness of the water on the seaside and the difficulty of getting across from the land, as well as the island itself being fortified with a number of guns and men from the frigate ['Constellation'] and the militia, and flanked by fifteen gunboats, I considered, in consequence of the representation of the officer commanding the troops of the difficulty of their passing over from the land, that the persevering in the attempt would cost more men than the number with us would permit, as the other forts must have been stormed before the frigate and dockyard could be destroyed. I therefore directed the troops to be re-embarked."

On neither side were the losses serious. The American battery inflicted less injury than was to be expected. Fifteen British boats containing at least eight hundred men, all told, remained some two hours under the fire of two twenty-four-pound and four six-pound guns, at a range differently estimated from one hundred to three hundred yards, but certainly beyond musket fire, for the American troops had

1 Napier's Life, i. 221.


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to wade out before firing. Three boats were sunk; three men were killed, and sixteen were wounded. The sixty-two men were reported missing, twenty-two of whom came ashore from the boats, while forty deserted from Beckwith's land force. The Americans
suffered no loss.

To compensate his men for their check at Craney Island, Admiral Warren immediately afterward devised another movement, which proved, what the Craney Island affair suggested, that the large British force in the Chesapeake was either ill constructed or ill led. Opposite Craney Island, ten miles away on the north shore of James River, stood the village of Hampton, a place of no importance either military or commercial. Four or five hundred Virginia militia were camped there, covering a heavy battery on the water's edge. The battery and its defenders invited attack, but Admiral Warren could have no military object to gain by attacking them. His official report said that the enemy having a post at Hampton defended by a considerable corps commanding the communication between the upper part of the country and Norfolk, I considered it advisable, and with a view to cut off their resources, to direct it to be attacked." Hampton could not fairly be said to "command" communication with Norfolk, a place which lay beyond ten miles of water wholly commanded by

* Warren's Report of June 27, 1813; James, ii 414.  

3 Colonel Beatt's Report of June 25, 1813; Niles, iv. 324.

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the British fleet; but Warren was not obliged to excuse himself for attacking wherever he pleased, and Hampton served his object best.

At dawn of June 25, Beckwith's troops were set ashore about two miles above the village, and moved
forward to the road, taking Hampton in the rear, while Cockburn's launches made a feint from the front. The militia, after resistance costing Beckwith a total loss of nearly fifty men, escaped, and the British troops entered the town, where they were allowed to do what they pleased with property and persons. Lieutenant-Colonel Napier of the One Hundred-and-second regiment, who commanded Beckwith's advance, wrote in his diary that Sir Sydney Beckwith "ought to have hanged several villains at Little Hampton; had he so done, the Americans would not have complained; but every horror was perpetrated with impunity, — rape, murder, pillage, — and not a man was punished." The British officers in general shared Napier's disgust, but alleged that the English troops took no part in the outrages, which were wholly the work of the French chasseurs.

Warren made no attempt to hold the town; the troops returned two days afterward to their ships, and the Virginia militia resumed their station; but when the details of the Hampton affair became known, the story roused natural exasperation throughout the country, and gave in its turn incitement to more violence in Canada. Admiral Warren and Sir Sydney Beckwith did not deny the wrong; they dismissed their Frenchmen from the service, and the United States had no further reason to complain of that corps; but the double mortification seemed to lower the British officers even in their own eyes to the level of marauders.

After the failure to destroy the "Constellation," Admiral Warren could still indulge a hope of destroying the twenty-eight-gun frigate "Adams," and
the navy-yard at Washington; for the defence of the Potomac had been totally neglected, and only one indifferent fort, about twelve miles below the Federal city, needed to be captured. July 1 the British squadron entered the Potomac; but beyond rousing a panic at Washington it accomplished nothing, except to gain some knowledge of the shoals and windings that impeded the ascent of the river. Leaving the Potomac, Warren turned up Chesapeake Bay toward Annapolis and Baltimore, but made no attempt on either place. During the rest of the year he cruised about the bay, meeting little resistance, and keeping the States of Virginia and Maryland in constant alarm.

Cockburn was more active. In the month of July he was detached with a squadron carrying Napier's One Hundred-and-second regiment, and arrived, July 12, off Ocracoke Inlet, where he captured two fine privateers, — the "Atlas" and "Anaconda." Thence he sailed southward, and established himself for the winter on Cumberland Island, near the Florida boundary, where he vexed the Georgians. Besides the

property consumed or wasted, he gave refuge to many fugitive slaves, whom he assisted to the West Indies or Florida. "Strong is my dislike," wrote Napier, ** to what is perhaps a necessary part of our job: namely, plundering and ruining the peasantry. We drive all their cattle, and of course ruin them. My hands are clean; but it is hateful to see the poor Yankees robbed, and to be the robber."*

Compared with the widespread destruction which war brought on these regions half a century afterward, the injury inflicted by the British navy in
1813 was trifling, but it served to annoy the Southern people, who could offer no resistance, and were har- assed by incessant militia-calls. To some extent the same system of vexation was pursued on the Northern coast. The Delaware River was blockaded and its shores much annoyed. New York was also block- aded, and Nantucket with the adjacent Sounds became a British naval station. There Sir Thomas Hardy, Nelson's favorite officer, commanded, in his flag-ship the " Ramillies." Hardy did not encourage marau- ding such as Cockburn practised, but his blockade was still stringent, and its efficiency was proved by the failure of Decatur's efforts to evade it.

Decatur commanded a squadron composed of the " United States," its prize frigate the " Macedonian," and the sloop-of-war " Hornet," which lay in the harbor of New York, waiting for a chance to slip out. Impatient at the steady watch kept by the British fleet off Sandy Hook, Decatur brought his three ships through the East River into Long Island Sound. He reached Montauk Point, May 29, only to find Hardy's squadron waiting for him. June 1 he made an at- tempt to run out, but was chased back, and took refuge in the harbor of New London. A large British squadron immediately closed upon the harbor, and Decatur not only lost hope of getting to sea but became anxious for the safety of his ships. He with- drew them as far as he could into the river, five miles above the town, and took every precaution to repel attack. The British officers were said to have de-clared that they would get the " Macedonian " back " even if they followed her into a cornfield." They did not make the attempt, but their vigilance never relaxed, and Decatur was obliged to remain all sum-
mer idle in port. He clung to the hope that when 
winter approached he might still escape; but in the 
month of December the country was scandalized by 
the publication of an official letter from Decatur to 
the Secretary of the Navy, charging the people of 
New London with the responsibility for his failure.

"Some few nights since," he wrote, \(^\text{1} \text{Niles, V. 302.}\)
^\text{1} \text{Niles, V. 302.}\)

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cesaful exertions have been made to detect those who 
communicated with the enemy by signal. . . . Notwith-
standing these signals have been repeated, and have 
been seen by twenty persons at least in this squadron, 
there are men in New London who have the hardihood 
to affect to disbelieve it, and the effrontery to avow 
their disbelief."

Decatur's charge roused much ill feeling, and re-
mained a subject of extreme delicacy with the people 
of New London. Perhaps Decatur would have done 
better not to make such an assertion until he could 
prove its truth. That blue lights, as well as other 
lights, were often seen, no one denied; but whether 
they came from British or from American hands, or 
were burned on sea or on shore, were points much 
disputed. The town of New London was three miles 
from the river's mouth, and Decatur's squadron then
lay at the town. At that distance the precise position of a light in line with the British fleet might be mistaken. Decatur's report, if it proved anything, proved that the signals were concerted, and were burnt from "both the points at the river's mouth."* If the British admiral wanted information, he could have found little difficulty in obtaining it; but he would hardly have arranged a system of signals as visible to Decatur as to himself. Even had he done so, he might have employed men in his own service as well as Americans for the purpose. Decatur's letter admitted that he had made great exertions to detect the culprits, but without success.

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The rigor of the British blockade extended no-farther north than the Vineyard and Nantucket. Captain Broke in the "Shannon," with a companion frigate, cruised off Boston harbor rather to watch for ships-of-war than to interfere with neutral commerce. Along the coast of Maine an illicit trade with the British provinces was so actively pursued that one of the few American sloops-of-war, the "Enterprise,"* cruised there, holding smugglers, privateers, and petty marauders in check. On no other portion of the coast would an armed national vessel have been allowed to show itself, but the "Enterprise," protected by the bays and inlets of Maine, and favored by the absence of a blockade, performed a useful service as a revenue cutter. She was not a first-rate vessel. Originally a schooner, carrying twelve guns and sixty men, she had taken part in the war with Tripoli. She was afterward altered into a brig, and crowded with sixteen guns and a hundred men. In 1813 she was commanded by Lieutenant William Burrows, a Pennsylvanian, who entered the navy in 1799, and, like all the naval heroes, was young, —
not yet twenty-eight years old.

On the morning of September 5, as the "Enterprise" was cruising eastward. Burrows discovered in a bay near Portland a strange brig, and gave chase. The stranger hoisted three English ensigns, fired several guns, and stood for the "Enterprise." Perhaps escape would have been impossible; but the British captain might, without disgrace, have declined to

fight, for he was no match for the American. The "Enterprise" measured about ninety-four feet in length; the "Boxer," as the British brig was named, measured about eighty-four. The "Enterprise" was nearly twenty-four feet in extreme width; the "Boxer" slightly exceeded twenty-two feet. The "Enterprise" carried fourteen eighteen-pound carronades and two long-nines; the "Boxer" carried twelve eighteen-pound carronades and two long-sixes. The "Enterprise" had a crew of one hundred and two men; the "Boxer" had only sixty-six men on board. With such odds against him, the British captain might have entertained some desperate hope of success, but could not have expected it.

The behavior of Captain Blyth of the "Boxer" showed consciousness of his position, for he nailed his colors to the mast, and told his men that they were not to be struck while he lived. The day was calm, and the two brigs manoeuvred for a time before coming together; but at quarter-past three in the afternoon they exchanged their first broadside within a stone's throw of one another. The effect on both vessels was destructive. Captain Blyth fell dead, struck full in the body by an eighteen-pound shot. Lieutenant Burrows fell, mortally wounded, struck by
a canister shot. After another broadside, at half-past three the "Enterprise" ranged ahead, crossed the "Boxer's" bow, and fired one or two more broadsides, until the "Boxer" hailed and surrendered, her colors still nailed to the mast.

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Considering the disparity of force, the two brigs Bufferd nearly in equal proportion. The "Boxer" lost seven men killed or mortally wounded; the "Enterprise" lost four. The "Boxer" had thirteen wounded, not fatally; the "Enterprise" had eight. The "Boxer's" injuries were not so severe as to prevent her captors from bringing her as a prize to Portland; and no incident in this quasi-civil war touched the sensibilities of the people more deeply than the common funeral of the two commanders, — both well known and favorites in the service, buried, with the same honors and mourners, in the graveyard at Portland overlooking the scene of their battle.

Neither the battle between the "Enterprise" and "Boxer," nor any measures that could be taken by sea or land, prevented a constant traffic between Halifax and the New-England ports not blockaded. The United States government seemed afraid to interfere with it. The newspapers asserted that hundreds of Americans were actually in Halifax carrying on a direct trade, and that thousands of barrels of flour were constantly arriving there from the United States in vessels carrying the Swedish or other neutral flag. In truth the government could do little to enforce its non-intercourse, and even that little might prove mischievous. Nothing could be worse than the spirit of the people on the frontier. Engaged in a profitable illicit commerce, they could only be controlled by force, and any force not overwhelming
merely provoked violence or treason. The Navy

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Department had no vessels to send there, and could not have prevented their capture if vessels in any number had been sent. The Secretary of War had abandoned to the State governments the defence of the coast. When Armstrong allotted garrisons to the various military districts, he stationed one regiment, numbering three hundred and fifty-two effective, besides two hundred and sixty-three artillerists, in Military District No. 1, which included the whole coast north of Cape Cod, with the towns of Boston, Marblehead, Salem, Gloucester, Portsmouth, Portland, and Eastport. Such a provision was hardly sufficient for garrisoning the fort at Boston. The government doubtless could spare no more of its small army, but for any military or revenue purpose might almost as well have maintained in New England no force whatever.

CHAPTER XII

During the month of April, ISIS, four American frigates lay in Boston Harbor fitting for sea. The "President" and "Congress" returned to that port Dec. 31, 1812. The "Constitution," after her battle with the "Java," arrived at Boston February 27, 1813. The "Chesapeake" entered in safety April 9, after an unprofitable cruise of four months. The presence of these four frigates at Boston offered a chance for great distinction to the British officer stationed off the port, and one of the best captains in the service was there to seize it. In order to tempt the American frigates to come out boldly, only
two British frigates, the "Shannon" and "Tenedos," remained off the harbor. They were commanded by Captain P. B. V. Broke of the "Shannon." Broke expected Rodgers with his ships, the "President" and "Congress," to seize the opportunity for a battle with two ships of no greater force than the "Shannon" and "Tenedos;" but either Rodgers did not understand the challenge or did not trust it, or took a different view of his duties, for he went to sea on the night of April 80, leaving Broke greatly chagrined and inclined to be somewhat indignant with him for escaping.

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After May 1, Broke on the watch outside, as he ran in toward Nahant, could see the masts of only the "Constitution" and "Chesapeake" at the Charlestown navy-yard, and his anxiety became the greater as he noticed that the "Chesapeake" was apparently ready for sea. May 25 Broke sent away his consort, the "Tenedos," to cruise from Cape Sable southward, ostensibly because the two frigates cruising separately would have a better chance of intercepting the "Chesapeake" than if they kept together. His stronger reason was to leave a fair field for the "Chesapeake" and "Shannon," as he had before kept all force at a distance except the "Shannon" and "Tenedos" in order to tempt Rodgers to fight. That there might be no second misunderstanding, he sent several messages to Captain Lawrence commanding the "Chesapeake," inviting a combat.

Nothing showed so clearly that at least one object of the war had been gained by the Americans as the habit adopted by both navies in 1813 of challenging ship-duels. War took an unusual character when
officers like Hardy and Broke countenanced such a practice, discussing and arranging duels between matched ships, on terms which implied that England

^ Broke to Lawrence, June 1, 1813; Bioke's life, 159. Niles, V. 29.

• Broke's life, pp. 150, 151. « Broke's Life, p. 156.


admitted half-a-dozen American frigates to be equal in value to the whole British navy. The loss of a British frigate mattered little to a government which had more than a hundred such frigates actually at sea, not to speak of heavier ships; but the loss of the "Chesapeake" was equivalent to destroying nearly one fourth of the disposable American navy. Already the "Constellation" was imprisoned at Norfolk; the "United States" and "Macedonian" were blockaded for the war; the "Congress" though at sea was unseaworthy and never cruised again; the "Adams" was shut in the Potomac; the "Essex" was in the Pacific. The United States Navy consisted, for active service on the Atlantic, of only the "President," 44, at sea; the "Constitution," 44, replacing her masts at the Charlestown navy-yard; the "Chesapeake," 38, ready for sea; and a few sloops-of-war. Under such circumstances, British officers who like Broke considered every American frigate bound to offer them equal terms in a duel, seemed to admit that the American service had acquired the credit it claimed.

The first duty of a British officer was to take risks; the first duty of an American officer was to avoid
them, and to fight only at his own time, on his own terms. Rodgers properly declined to seek a battle with Broke's ships. Captain James Lawrence of the "Chesapeake" was less cautious, for his experience in the war led him to think worse of the British navy than it deserved. Lawrence commanded the "Hornet" in

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Bainbridge's squadron at the time of the "Java's" capture. Bainbridge and Lawrence blockaded the "Bonne Citoyenne," a twenty-gun sloop-of-war at San Salvador in Brazil. Lawrence sent a message to the captain of the "Bonne Citoyenne" inviting him to come out and meet the "Hornet." The British captain declined, doubtless for proper reasons; but the reason he gave seemed to Lawrence insufficient, for it was merely that Commodore Bainbridge, in spite of his pledged word, might interfere. Bainbridge sailed about Christmas, and was absent till January 8, capturing the "Java" in the interval. January 6 he sailed for Boston, leaving Lawrence in the "Hornet" still blockading the "Bonne Citoyenne," which showed no more disposition to fight the "Hornet" in Bainbridge's absence than before, although the British captain's letter had said that "nothing could give me greater satisfaction than complying with the wishes of Captain Lawrence" if the single alleged objection were removed.

The conduct of the "Bonne Citoyenne" — a vessel at least the equal of the "Hornet" — gave Lawrence a low opinion of the British service, and his respect was not increased by his next experience. A British seventy-four arrived at San Salvador, January 24, and obliged the "Hornet" to abandon the "Bonne Citoyenne." During the next month the little vessel cruised northward along the Brazil coast, making a
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few prizes, until February 24 off the mouth of Demerara River, at half-past three o'clock in the afternoon, Captain Lawrence discovered a sail approaching him. Within the bar at the mouth of the river, seven or eight miles distant, he saw another vessel at anchor. Both were British sloops-of-war. The one at anchor was the "Espigle," carrying eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades. The other, approaching on the "Hornet’s" weather-quarter, was the "Peacock," carrying eighteen twenty-four-pound carronades, two long-sixes, and one or two lighter pieces.

The "Peacock," according to British report, had long been " the admiration of her numerous visitors," and was remarkable for the elegance of her fittings; but in size she was inferior to the "Hornet." Lawrence reported his ship to be four feet the longer, but the British believed the "Hornet" to measure one hundred and twelve feet in length, while the "Peacock" measured one hundred. Their breadth was the same. The "Hornet" carried eighteen thirty-two-pounders, while the British captain, thinking his sloop too light for thirty-twos, had exchanged them for twenty-fours, and carried only sixteen. The American crew numbered one hundred and thirty-five men fit for duty; the British numbered one hundred and twenty men and boys.

At ten minutes past five, Lawrence tacked and
stood for the brig. Fifteen minutes afterward the two vessels, sailing in opposite directions, passed each other and exchanged broadsides within a stone's throw. The British fire, even at point-blank range of forty or fifty feet, did no harm, while the "Hornet's" broadside must have decided the battle; for although both vessels instantly wore, and Lawrence at thirty-five minutes past five ran his enemy close aboard, the "Peacock" almost immediately struck at thirty-nine minutes past five in a sinking condition, and actually went down immediately afterward, carrying with her nine of the "Peacock's" wounded and three of the "Hornet's" crew.

The ease of this victory was beyond proportion to the odds. The British captain and four men were killed outright, thirty-three officers and men were wounded, and the brig was sunk in an action of less than fifteen minutes; while the "Hornet" lost one man killed and two wounded, all aloft, and not a shot penetrated her hull. If the facility of this triumph satisfied Lawrence of his easy superiority in battle, the conduct of the "Espigle" convinced him that the British service was worse than incompetent. Lawrence, expecting every moment to see the "Espigle" get under weigh, made great exertions to put his ship in readiness for a new battle, but to his astonishment the British brig took no notice of the action. * Subsequent investigation showed that the "Espigle" knew nothing of the battle until the next day; but

* Lawrence's Report of March 19, 1813; Niles, iv. 84.
Lawrence, assuming that the British captain must have seen or heard, or at least ought to have suspected what was happening, conceived that cowardice was a trait of the British navy.

When Lawrence reached New York he became famous for his victory, and received at once promotion. The "Hornet," given to Captain Biddle, was attached to Decatur's squadron and blockaded at New London, while Lawrence received command of the "Chesapeake." Lawrence was then thirty-two years old; he was born in New Jersey in 1781, entered the navy in 1798, and served in the war with Tripoli. He was first lieutenant on the "Constitution," and passed to the grade of commander in 1810, commanding successively the "Vixen," the "Wasp," the "Argus," and the "Hornet." His appointment to the "Chesapeake" was an accident, owing to the ill health of Captain Evans, who commanded her on her recent cruise. The "Chesapeake's" reputation for ill luck clung to her so persistently that neither officers nor men cared greatly to sail in her, and Lawrence would have preferred to remain in the "Hornet;" but his instructions were positive, and he took command of the "Chesapeake" about the middle of May. Most of the officers and crew were new. The old crew on reaching port, April 9, had been discharged, and left the ship, dissatisfied with their share of prize-money, and preferring to try the
privateer service. The new crew was unequal in quality and required training; they neither knew their officers nor each other.

Lawrence's opponent, Captain Broke of the "Shannon," was an officer whose courage could as little be questioned as his energy or skill. Among all the commanders in the British service Broke had profited most by the lessons of the war. More than seven years' experience of his ship and crew gave him every advantage of discipline and system. Nearly every day the officers at the Charlestown navy-yard could see the "Shannon" outside, practising her guns at floating targets as she sailed about the bay. Broke's most anxious wish was to fight the "Chesapeake," which he considered to be of the same size with the "Shannon." The two frigates were the same length within a few inches, — between one hundred and fifty, and one hundred and fifty-one feet. Their breadth was forty feet within a few inches. The "Chesapeake" carried eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades on the spar-deck; the "Shannon" carried sixteen. Each carried twenty-eight long eighteen-pounders on the gun-deck. The "Chesapeake" carried also two long twelve-pounders and a long eighteen-pounder, besides a twelve-pound carronade. The "Shannon" carried four long nine-pounders, a long six-pounder, and three twelve-pound carronades. The "Chesapeake's" only decided advantage was in the number of her crew, which con-

^ Broke's Life, p. 33a
Bisted of three hundred and seventy-nine men, while the "Shannon" carried three hundred and thirty-all told.

Broke sent the "Tenedos" away May 25, but Lawrence was not aware of it, and wrote. May 27, to Captain Biddle of the "Hornet" a letter, showing that till the last moment he hoped not to sail in the "Chesapeake": "

"In hopes of being relieved by Captain Stewart, I neglected writing to you according to promise; but as I have given over all hopes of seeing him, and the 'Chesapeake' is almost ready, I shall sail on Sunday, provided I have a chance of getting out clear of the 'Shannon' and 'Tenedos,' who are on the look-out."

Sunday, May 30, the ship was ready, though the crew was not as good or as well disciplined as it should have been, and showed some discontent owing to difficulties about prize-money. On the morning of June 1 the frigate was lying in President's Roads, when between eight and nine o'clock the second lieutenant, George Budd, reported a sail in sight. Captain Lawrence went up the main rigging, and having made out the sail to be a large frigate, ordered the crew to be mustered, and told them he meant to fight. At midday he stood down the harbor and out to sea. The "Shannon," outside, stood off under easy sail, and led the way until five o'clock, when she luffed and waited till the "Chesapeake" came up. As the wind was westerly, Lawrence had the

1 Cooper's Naval History, ii. 247.
choice of position, but he made no attempt to profit by his advantage, although it might have been decisive. Bringing the "Chesapeake" with a fresh breeze directly down on the "Shannon's" quarter, at half-past five he luffed, at about fifty yards distance, and ranged up abeam on the "Shannon's" starboard side.

The "Shannon" opened fire as her guns began to bear, but discharged only her two stemmost guns when the "Chesapeake" replied. The two ships ran on about seven minutes, or about the length of time necessary for two discharges of the first guns fired, when, some of the "Shannon's" shot having cut away the "Chesapeake's" foretopsail tie and jibn^heet, the ship came up into the wind and was taken aback. Lying with her larboard quarter toward the "Shannon's" side, at some forty or fifty yards distance, she began to drift toward her enemy. None of the "Chesapeake's" guns then bore on the "Shannon," and the American frigate wholly ceased firing.

From the moment the "Chesapeake" was taken aback she was a beaten ship, and the crew felt it. She could be saved only by giving her headway, or by boarding the "Shannon;" but neither expedient was possible. The effort to make sail forward was tried, and proved futile. The idea of boarding was also in Lawrence's mind, but the situation made it impracticable. As the "Chesapeake" drifted stem-foremost toward the "Shannon," every gun in the British broadside swept the American deck diagonal from stem to stem, clearing the quarter-deck and beating in the stern-ports, while the musketry from the "Shannon's" tops killed the men at the
"Chesapeake's" wheel, and picked off every officer, sailor, or marine in the after-part of the ship. Boarders could not be rallied under a fire which obliged them to seek cover. The men on the spar-deck left their stations, crowding forward or going below.

Nevertheless, Lawrence ordered up his boarders, — he could do nothing else; but the affair hurried with such rapidity to its close that almost at the same instant the "Chesapeake's" quarter touched the "Shannon" amidships. From the moment when the "Chesapeake" was taken aback until the moment when she fell foul, only four minutes were given for Lawrence to act. Before these four minutes were at an end, he was struck and mortally wounded by a musket-ball from the "Shannon." His first lieutenant, Ludlow, had already been carried below, wounded. His second lieutenant, Budd, was stationed below. His third lieutenant. Cox, improperly assisted Lawrence to reach the gun-deck. Not an officer remained on the spar-deck, and neither an officer nor a living man was on the quarter-deck when the "Chesapeake's" quarter came against the
^ Shannon's "^ gangway, as though inviting the British captain to take possession.

As the ships fouled, Broke ran forward and called for boarders. With about twenty men he stepped on the "Chesapeake's" quarter-deck, and was followed by thirty more before the ships parted. The error should have cost him his life and the lives of all who were with him, for the Americans might easily have killed every man of the boarding-party in spite of the fire from the "Shannon." For several moments Broke was in the utmost peril, not only from the American crew but from his own. His first lieutenant, Watt, hastening to haul down the American ensign, was killed by the discharge of a cannon from the "Shannon;" and when Broke, leaving the "Chesapeake's" quarter-deck, went forward to clear the forecastle, enough of the American crew were there to make a sharp resistance. Broke himself was obliged to take part in the scuffle. According to his report, he "received a severe sabre-wound at the first onset, whilst charging a part of the enemy who had rallied on their forecastle." According to another British account he was first knocked down with the butt-end of a musket, and then was cut by a broadsword. Of his fifty boarders, not less than thirty-seven were killed or wounded.^

Had the American crew been in a proper state of discipline, the struggle would have taken an extraordinary character, and the two ships might have re-

^ Life of Broke, p. 203.
newed the combat, without officers, and in a more or less unmanageable condition. Fortunately for Broke, his fifty men outnumbered the Americans on the spar-deck, while the men below, for the most part, would not come up. About a score of sailors and marines were on the forecastle, and about a dozen more rushed up from below, led by the second lieutenant, George Budd, as soon as he, at his station on the main-deck, learned what was happening above; but so rapidly did the whole affair pass, that in two minutes the scuffle was over, the Americans were killed or thrown down the hatchway, and the ship was helpless, with its spar-deck in the hands of Broke's boarders. The guns ceased firing, and the crew below surrendered after some musket-shots up and down the hatchways.

The disgrace to the Americans did not consist so much in the loss of a ship to one of equal force, as in the shame of suffering capture by a boarding-party of fifty men. As Lawrence lay wounded in the cockpit, he saw the rush of his men from the spar-deck down the after-ladders, and cried out repeatedly and loudly, "Don't give up the ship! blow her up!" He was said to have added afterward: "I could have stood the wreck if it had not been for the boarding."

Doubtless the "Shannon" was the better ship, and deserved to win. Her crew could under no circumstances have behaved like the crew of the "Chesapeake." In discipline she was admittedly superior; but the question of superiority in other respects was not decided. The accident that cut the "Chesapeake's "jibHsheet and brought her into the wind was
the only decisive part of the battle, and was mere ill luck, such as pursued the "Chesapeake" from the beginning. As far as could be seen, in the favorite American work of gunnery the "Shannon" showed no superiority.

On that point the reports agreed. The action began at half-past five o'clock in the afternoon at close range. In seven minutes the "Chesapeake" forged ahead, came into the wind and ceased firing, as none of her guns could be made to bear. Seven minutes allowed time at the utmost for two discharges of some of her guns. No more guns were fired from the "Chesapeake" till she drifted close to the "Shannon." Then her two sternmost guns, the thirteenth and fourteenth on the main deck, again bore on the enemy, and were depressed and fired by Lieutenant Cox while the boarders were fighting on the spar-deck. Thus the number of discharges from the "Chesapeake's" guns could be known within reasonable certainty. She carried in her broadside nine thirty-two-pounders and fourteen or fifteen eighteen-pounders, besides one twelve-pounder, — twenty-five guns. Assuming them to have been all discharged twice, although the forward guns could scarcely have been discharged more than once, the "Chesapeake" could have fired only fifty-two shot, including the

^ EvideDce of Midshipman Edmund Russell; Court- Martial of Lieutenant Cox. MSS. Navy Department Archives.

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two eighteen-pounders fired by Lieutenant Cox at the close.

According to the official report nearly every shot must have taken effect. The "Shannon" was struck
by thirteen thirty-two-pound shot; the "Chesapeake" fired only eighteen, if she discharged every gun twice. The "Shannon" was struck by twelve eighteen-pound shot, fourteen bar-shot, and one hundred and nineteen grape-shot; the "Chesapeake's" fifteen eighteen-pounders could hardly have done more in the space of seven minutes. In truth, every shot that was fired probably took effect.

The casualties showed equal efficiency of fire, and when compared with other battles were severe. When the "Guerriere" struck to the "Constitution" in the previous year, she had lost in half an hour of close action twenty-three killed or mortally wounded and fifty-six more or less injured. The "Shannon" seems to have lost in eleven minutes, before boarding, twenty-seven men killed or mortally wounded and nineteen more or less injured.^

The relative efficiency of the "Shannon's" gunnery was not so clear, because the "Shannon's" battery continued to fire after the "Chesapeake" ceased. As the "Chesapeake" drifted down on the "Shannon" she was exposed to the broadside of the British frigate, while herself imable to fire a gun.

"The shot from the "Shannon's" aftermost guns now had a fair range along the "Chesapeake's" decks," said

^ last of killed and wounded^ Life of Broke, p. 203.

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"The British account," ^^ beating in the stem-ports and sweeping the men from their quarters. The shots from the foremost guns at the same time entering the ports from the mainmast aft did considerable execution."
Broke's biographer^ said that the ^^ Chesapeake " fired but one broadside, and then coming into the wind drifted down, "^" exposed while making this crippled and helpless movement to the " Shannon's " second and most deliberate broadside." The " ^^ Chesapeake" was very near, almost touching the British frigate during the four or five minutes of this fire, and every shot must have taken effect. Broke ordered the firing to cease when he boarded, but one gun was afterward discharged, and killed the British first lieutenant as he was lowering the American flag on the " Chesapeake's " quarter-deck.

The " Shannon's " fire lasted eleven or twelve minutes. She carried twenty-five guns in broadside.* Eight of these were thirty-two-pound carronades, and the official report showed that the " Chesapeake" was struck by twenty-five thirty-two-pound shot, showing that three full broadsides were fired from the " Shannon," and at least one gun was discharged four times. The " Shannon's " broadside also carried fourteen eighteen-pounders, which threw twenty-nine shot into the " Chesapeake," besides much canister and grape. Considering that at least half the " Shannon's " shot were fired at so close a range that they could not fail to take effect^ nothing proved that her guns were better served than those of the " Chesapeake." The " Shannon," according to the British account, fired twice as many shot under twice as favorable conditions, but the injury she inflicted was not twice the injury inflicted in

1 James, p. 216. • life of Broke, p. 170.

* Broke's letter of challenge; James, Appendix, p. 36.
return. Setting aside the grape-shot, the "Chesa-
apeake" struck the "Shannon" thirty-nine times; the
"Shannon" struck the "Chesapeake" fifty-seven
times. Including the grape-shot, which Broke used
freely, the "Shannon" probably did better, but even
with a liberal allowance for grape and canister,
nothing proved her superiority at the guns.

The loss in men corresponded with the injury to
the ships. The "Shannon" lost eighty-three killed
and wounded; the "Chesapeake" lost one hundred
and forty-six. Thirty-three of the "Shannon's" men
were killed or died of their wounds; sixty-one of
the "Chesapeake's" number were killed or mortally
wounded.

The injuries suffered by the "Chesapeake" told the
same story, for they were chiefly in the stem, and
were inflicted by the "Shannon's" second and third
broad sides, after the "Chesapeake" ceased firing.
The "Chesapeake's" bowsprit received no injury, and
not a spar of any kind was shot away. The "Shan-
on" carried her prize into Halifax with all its masts
standing, and without anxiety for its safety.

The news of Broke's victory was received in Eng-
land and by the British navy with an outburst of

pleasure that proved the smart of the wound inflicted
by Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge. The two offi-
cial expressions of Broke's naval and civil superiors
probably reflected the unexaggerated emotion of the
service.

^^At this critical moment," wrote Admiral Warren^
by a curious coincidence the day before his own some-
what less creditable defeat at Craney Island, ^^ you could not have restored to the British naval service the preeminence it has always preserved, or contradicted in a more forcible manner the foul aspersions and calumnies of a conceited, boasting enemy, than by the brilliant act you have performed."

A few days later he wrote again : *—

^^ The relation of such an event restores the history of Ancient times, and will do more good to the service than it is possible to conceive."

In Parliament, July 8, John Wilson Croker iaid : '^^ The action which he [Broke] fought with the * Chesa-
peake ' was in every respect unexampled. It was not — and he knew it was a bold assertion which he made — to be surpassed by any engagement which graced the naval annals of Great Britain."

The Government made Broke a baronet, but gave him few other rewards, and his wound was too sen-
ous to permit future hard service. Lawrence died June 5, before the ships reached Halifax. His first lieutenant, Ludlow, also died. Their bodies were brought to New York and buried September 16, with formal services at Trinity Church.

By the Americans the defeat was received at first with incredulity and boundless anxiety, followed by
extreme discouragement. The news came at a dark moment, when every hope had been disappointed and the outlook was gloomy beyond all that had been thought possible.

^^ I remember," wrote Richard Bush in later life, — ^ "what American does not! — the first rumor of it. I remember the startling sensation. I remember at first ' the universal incredulity. I remember how the post-offices were thronged for successive days by anxious< thousands ; how collections of citizens rode out for miles< on the highway, accosting the mail to catch something by anticipation. At last, when the certainty was known, I remember the public gloom ; funeral orations and badges of mourning bespoke it. ' Don't give up the ship I ' — the dying words of Lawrence — were on every tongue."

Six weeks afterward another American naval cap* tain lost another American vessel-of-war by reason of the same over-confidence which caused Lawrence's mistakes, and in a manner equally discreditable to the crew. The " Argus " was a small brig, built in 1803, rating sixteen guns. Li the summer of 1813 she was commanded by Captain W. H. Allen, of Rhode Island, who had been third officer to Barron when he was attacked in the " Chesapeake " by the " Leop^ ard." Allen was the officer who snatched a coal from the galley and discharged the only gun that was fired that day. On leaving the ^^ Chesapeake/^
fully bringing the " Macedonian " to port. Promoted to the rank of captain, he was put in command of the " Argus," and ordered to take William Henry Crawford to his post as Minister to France.

On that errand the " Argus " sailed, June 18, and after safely landing Crawford, July 11, at Lorient in Brittany, Captain Allen put to sea again, three days afterward, and in pursuance of his instructions cruised off the mouth of the British Channel. During an entire month he remained between the coast of Brittany and the coast of Ireland, destroying a score of vessels and creating a panic among the ship-owners and underwriters of London. Allen performed his task with as much forbearance as the duty permitted, making no attempt to save his prizes for the sake of prize-money, and permitting all passengers to take what they claimed as their own without inspection or restraint. The English whose property he destroyed spoke of him without personal ill-feeling.

The anxiety and labor of such a service falling on a brig of three hundred tons and a crew of a hundred men, and the impunity with which he defied danger, seemed to make Allen reckless. On the night of August 13 he captured a brig laden with

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wine from Oporto. Within sight of the Welsh coast and within easy reach of Milford Haven, he burned his prize, not before part of his crew got drunk on the wine. The British brig * Pelican," then cruising in search of the "Argus," guided by the light of the burning prize, at five o'clock on the morning of August 14 came down on the American brig ; and Captain Allen, who had often declared that he would run from no two-masted vessel, waited for his enemy.
According to British measurements, the "Argus" was ninety-five and one-half feet long; the "Pelican," one hundred. The "Argus" was twenty-seven feet, seven and five-eighths inches in extreme breadth; the "Pelican" was thirty feet, nine inches. The "Argus" carried eighteen twenty-four-pound carronades, and two long twelve-pounders; the "Pelican" carried sixteen thirty-two-pound carronades, four long six-pounders, and a twelve-pound carronade. The number of the "Argus's" crew was disputed. According to British authority, it was one hundred and twenty-seven, while the "Pelican" carried one hundred and sixteen men and boys.

At six o'clock in the morning, according to American reckoning, — at half-past five according to the British report, — the "Argus" wore, and fired a broadside within grape-distance, which was returned


* James, pp. 276-282.

* Report of Lieutenant Watson, March 2, 1815; Kiles, viii. 43.

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with cannon and musketry. Within five minutes Captain Allen was struck by a shot which carried away his left leg, mortally wounding him; and five minutes afterward the first lieutenant was wounded on the head by a grape-shot. Although the second lieutenant fought the brig well, the guns were surprisingly inefficient. During the first fifteen minutes
the "Argus" had the advantage of position, and at
eighteen minutes after six raked the "Pelican" at
close range, but inflicted no great injury on the ene-
my's hull or rigging, and killed at the utmost but
one man, wounding only five. According to an Eng-
lish account, "the *Argus' fought well while the can-
onading continued, but her guns were not levelled
with precision, and many shots passed through the
*Pelican's' royals." The "Pelican," at the end of
twenty-five minutes, succeeded in cutting up her op-
ponent's rigging so that the "Argus" lay helpless
under her guns. The "Pelican" then took a po-
sition on her enemy's starboard quarter, and raked
her with eight thirty-two-pound carronades for nearly
twenty minutes at close range, without receiving a
shot in return except from musketry. According to
the report of the British captain, the action "was
kept up with great spirit on both sides forty-three
minutes, when we lay her alongside, and were in the
act of boarding when she struck her colors." *

1 Niles, V. 118.

James, Appendix no. 42.

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This "Argus" repeated the story of the "Chesa-
apeake/" except that the action lasted three quarters
of an hour instead of fifteen minutes. During that
time, the "Pelican" should have fired all her broad-
side eight or ten times into the "Argus" at a range
so close that no shot should have missed. Sixty
thirty-two-pound shot fired into a small brig less
than one hundred feet long should have shivered it
to atoms. Nine thirty-two-pound shot from the "Hor-
et " seemed to reduce the "Peacock " to a sinking
condition in fifteen minutes; yet the "Argus" was neither sunk nor dismasted. The British account of her condition after the battle showed no more injury than was suffered by the "Peacock," even in killed and wounded, by one or at the utmost two broadsides of the "Hornet."

"The *Argus* was tolerably cut up in her hull. Both her lower masts were wounded, although not badly, and her fore-shrouds on one side nearly all destroyed; but like the 'Chesapeake,' the 'Argus' had no spar shot away. Of her carronades several were disabled. She lost in the action six seamen killed; her commander, two midshipmen, the carpenter, and three seamen mortally, her first lieutenant and five seamen severely, and eight others slightly wounded, — total twenty-four; chiefly, if not wholly by the cannon-shot of the *Pelican.*" *"*

The "Pelican" lost seven men killed or wounded, chiefly by musketry. On both sides the battle showed little skill with the guns; but perhaps the

^James, p. 27a

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^Pelican/" considering her undisputed superiority during half the combat, showed even less than the "Argus/" As in the "Chesapeake's" battle, the discredit of the defeated ship lay in surrender to boarders.

Two such defeats were calculated to shake confidence in the American navy. That Allen should have been beaten in gunnery was the more strange, because his training with the guns gave him his chief credit with Decatur. Watson, the second lieutenant of the "Argus," attributed the defeat to the fatigue
of his crew. Whatever was the immediate cause, no one could doubt that both the "Chesapeake" and "Argus" were sacrificed to the over-confidence of their commanders.

CHAPTER Xm.

The people of the Atlantic coast felt the loss of the "Chesapeake" none too keenly. Other nations had a history to support them in moments of mortification, or had learned by centuries of experience to accept turns of fortune as the fate of war. The American of the sea-coast was not only sensitive and anxious, but he also saw with singular clearness the bearing of every disaster, and did not see with equal distinctness the general drift of success. The loss of the "Chesapeake" was a terrible disaster, not merely because it announced the quick recovery of England's pride and power from a momentary shock, but also because it threatened to take away the single object of American enthusiasm which redeemed shortcomings elsewhere. After the loss of the "Chesapeake," no American frigate was allowed the opportunity to fight with an equal enemy. The British frigates, ordered to cruise in company, gave the Americans no chance to renew their triumphs of 1812.

Indeed, the experience of 1813 tended to show that the frigate was no longer the class of vessel best suited to American wants. Excessively expensive compared with their efficiency, the "Constitution,"
they were ready for sea, they could not easily evade a blockading squadron. The original cost of a frigate varied from two hundred thousand dollars to three hundred thousand; that of a sloop-of-war, like the *Hornet,* "Wasp," or "Argus," varied between forty and fifty thousand dollars. The frigate required a crew of about four hundred men; the sloop carried about one hundred and fifty. The annual expense of a frigate in active service was about one hundred and thirty-four thousand dollars; that of the brig was sixty thousand. The frigate required much time and heavy timber in her construction; the sloop could be built quickly and of ordinary material. The loss of a frigate was a severe national disaster; the loss of a sloop was not a serious event.

For defensive purposes neither the frigate nor the brig counted heavily against a nation which employed ships-of-the-line by dozens; but even for offensive objects the frigate was hardly so useful as the sloop-of-war. The record of the frigates for 1813 showed no results equivalent to their cost. Their cruises were soon told. The "President," leaving Boston April 30, ran across to the Azores, thence to the North Sea, and during June and July haunted the shores of Norway, Scotland, and Ireland, returning to Newport September 27, having taken thirteen prizes. The "Congress," which left Boston with the "President" cruised nearly eight months in the Atlantic,

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and returned to Boston December 14, having captured but four merchantmen. The "Chesapeake,"* which sailed from Boston Dec. 13, 1812, cruised four months in the track of British commerce, past Madeira and Cape de Verde, across the equator, and round through the West Indies, returning to Boston
April 9, having taken six prizes; at the beginning of her next cruise, June 1, the "Chesapeake" was herself captured. The adventures of the "Essex* in the Pacific were such as might have been equally well performed by a sloop-of-war, and belonged rather to the comparative freedom with which the frigates moved in 1812 than to the difficult situation that followed. No other frigates succeeded in getting to sea till December 4, when the "President" sailed again. The injury inflicted by the frigates on the Atlantic was therefore the capture of twenty-three merchantmen in a year. At the close of 1818, the *" President" and the "Essex* were the only frigates at sea; the "Constitution"* sailed from Boston only Jan. 1, 1814; the "United States" and "Macedonian" were blockaded at New London; the "Constellation" was still at Norfolk; the "Adams" was at Washington, and the "Congress" at Boston.

When this record was compared with that of the sloops-of-war, the frigates were seen to be luxuries. The sloop-of-war was a single-decked vessel, rigged sometimes as a ship, sometimes as a brig, but never as a sloop, measuring about one hundred and ten feet in length by thirty in breadth, and carrying usually

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eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades and two long twelve-pounders. Of this class the American navy possessed in 1812 only four examples,—the "Hornet," the "Wasp," the "Argus," and the "Syren." The "Wasp" was lost Oct. 18, 1812, after capturing the "Frolic." The "Syren" remained at New Orleans during the first year of the war, and then came to Boston, but saw no ocean service of importance during 1818. The "Hornet" made three prizes, including the sloop-of-war "Peacock," and was then
blockaded with the "United States" and "Macedonian;" but the smaller vessel could do what the frigates could not, and in November the "Hornet" slipped out of New London and made her way to New York, where she waited an opportunity to escape to sea. The story will show her success. Finally, the "Argus" cruised for a month in the British Channel, and made twenty-one prizes before she was captured by the "Pelican."

The three frigates, "President," "Congress," and "Chesapeake," captured twenty-three prizes in the course of the year, and lost the "Chesapeake." The two sloops, the "Hornet" and "Argus," captured twenty-four prizes, including the sloop-of-war "Peacock," and lost the "Argus."

The government at the beginning of the war owned four smaller vessels, — the "Nautilus" and "Vixen" of fourteen guns, and the "Enterprise" and "Viper" of twelve. Another brig, the "Rattlesnake," sixteen, was bought. Experience seemed to prove that these were of little use. The "Nautilus" fell into the hands of Broke's squadron July 16, 1812, within a month after the declaration of war. The "Vixen" was captured Nov. 22, 1812, by Sir James Yeo. The "Viper," Jan. 17, 1813, became prize to Captain Lumley in the British frigate "Narcissus." The "Enterprise" distinguished itself by capturing the "Boxer," and was regarded as a lucky vessel, but was never a good or fast one. The "Rattlesnake," though fast, was at last caught on a lee shore by the frigate "Leander," July 11, 1814, and carried into Halifax.
In the enthusiasm over the frigates in 1812, Congress voted that six forty-fours should be built, besides four ships-of-the-line. The Act was approved Jan. 2, 1813. Not until March 8 did Congress pass an Act for building six new sloops-of-war. The loss of two months was not the only misfortune in this legislation. Had the sloops been begun in January, they might have gone to sea by the close of the year. The six sloops were all launched within eleven months from the passage of the bill, and the first of them, the "Frolic," got to sea within that time, while none of the frigates or line-of-battle ships could get to sea within two years of the passage of the law. A more remarkable oversight was the building of only six sloops, when an equal number of forty-fours and four

^ Lieutenant Creighton to Secretary Jones, March 9, 1814^ Niles, vi. 69. « NUES, vi 391.

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seventy-fours were ordered. Had Congress voted twenty-four sloops, the proportion would not have been improper; but perhaps the best policy would have been to build fifty such sloops, and to prohibit privateering. The reasons for such a course were best seen in the experiences of the privateers.

The history of the privateers was never satisfactorily written. Neither their number, their measurements, their force, their captures, nor their losses were accurately known. Little ground could be given for an opinion in regard to their economy. Only with grave doubt could any judgment be reached even in regard to their relative efficiency compared with government vessels of the same class. Yet their experience was valuable, and their services were very
great.

In the summer of 1812 any craft that could keep the sea in fine weather set out as a privateer to intercept vessels approaching the coast. The typical privateer of the first few months was the pilot-boat, armed with one or two long-nine or twelve-pound guns. Of twenty-six privateers sent from New York in the first four months of war, fifteen carried crews of eighty men or less. These small vessels especially infested the West Indies, where fine weather and light breezes suited their qualities. After the seas had been cleared of such prey as these petty marauders could manage, they were found to be unprofitable, — too small to fight and too light to escape. The typical privateer of 1813 was a larger vessel, — a brig or schooner of two or three hundred tons, armed with one long pivot-gun, and six or eight lighter guns in broadside; carrying crews which varied in number from one hundred and twenty to one hundred and sixty men; swift enough to escape under most circumstances even a frigate, and strong enough to capture any armed merchantman.

After the war was fairly begun, the British mercantile shipping always sailed either under convoy or as armed "running ships" that did not wait for the slow and comparatively rare opportunities of convoy, but trusted to their guns for defence. The
new American privateer was adapted to meet both chances. Two or three such craft hanging about a convoy could commonly cut off some merchantman, no matter how careful the convoying man-of-war might be. By night they could run directly into the fleet and cut out vessels without even giving an alarm, and by day they could pick up any craft that lagged behind or happened to stray too far away. Yet the "running ships" were the chief objects of their search, for these were the richest prizes; and the capture of a single such vessel, if it reached an American port in safety, insured success to the cruise. The loss of these vessels caused peculiar annoyance to the British, for they sometimes carried considerable amounts of specie, and usually were charged with a mail which was always sunk and lost in case of capture.

As the war continued, experience taught the own*

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era of privateers the same lesson that was taught to Hie government. The most efficient vessel of war corresponded in size with the "Hornet" or the new sloops-of-war building in 1818. Tonnage was so arbitrary a mode of measurement that little could be learned from the dimensions of five hundred tons commonly given for these vessels; but in a general way they might be regarded as about one hundred and fifteen or one hundred and twenty feet long on the spar-deck and thirty-one feet in extreme breadth. Unless such vessels were swift sailers, particularly handy in working to windward, they were worse than useless; and for that reason the utmost effort was made both by the public and private constructors to obtain speed. At the close of the war the most efficient vessel afloat was probably the American
sloop-of-war, or privateer, of four or five hundred tons, rigged as a ship or brig, and carrying one hundred and fifty or sixty men, with a battery varying according to the ideas of the captain and owners, but in the case of privateers almost invariably including one "long Tom," or pivot-gun.

Yet for privateering purposes the smaller craft competed closely with the larger. For ordinary service no vessel could do more effective work in a more economical way than was done by Joshua Barney's "Rossie" of Baltimore, or Boyle's "Comet" of the same port, or Champlin's "General Armstrong" of New York, — schooners or brigs of two or three hundred tons, "uxcoitifortable to their officers and crews.

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bat most dangerous enemies to merchantmen. Vessels of this class came into favor long before the war, because of their speed, quickness in handling, and economy during the experience of twenty years in blockade-running and evasion of cruisers. Such schooners could be built in any Northern sea-port in six weeks or two months at half the cost of a government cruiser.

The government sloop-of-war was not built for privateering purposes. Every government vessel was intended chiefly to fight, and required strength in every part and solidity throughout. The frame needed to be heavy to support the heavier structure; the quarters needed to be thick to protect the men at the guns from grape and musketry; the armament was as weighty as the frame would bear. So strong were the sides of American frigates that even thirty-two-pound shot fired at forty or fifty feet distance sometimes failed to penetrate, and the British com-
plained as a grievance that the sides of an Ameri-
can forty-four were thicker than those of a British
seventy-four. The American ship-builders spared no
pains to make all their vessels in every respect — in
size, strength, and speed — superior to the vessels
with which they were to compete; but the govern-
ment ship-carpenter had a harder task than the pri-
vate ship-builder, for he was obliged to obtain greater
speed at the same time that he used heavier material
than the British constructors. As far as the navy

^ James, p. 18.

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carpenters succeeded in their double object, they did
so by improving the model and increasing the pro-
portions of the spars.

The privateer was built for no such object. The
last purpose of a privateer was to fight at close range,
And owners much preferred that their vessels, being
built to make money, should not fight, at all unless
much money could be made. The private armed ves-

el was built rather to fly than to fight, and its value
•depended far more on its ability to escape than on
its capacity to attack. If the privateer could sail
-close to the wind, and wear or tack in the twinkling
of an eye; if she could spread an immense amount
•of canvas and run off as fast as a frigate before the
wind ; if she had sweeps to use in a calm, and one
long-range gun pivoted amidships, with plenty of men
in case boarding became necessary, — she was perfect.
To obtain these results the builders and sailors ran
excessive risks. Too lightly built and too heavily
sparred, the privateer was never a comfortable or a
safe vessel. Beautiful beyond anything then known
in naval construction, such vessels roused boundless
admiration, but defied imitators. British constructors could not build them, even when they had the models; British captains could not sail them; and when British admirals, fascinated by their beauty and tempted by the marvellous qualities of their model, ordered such a prize to be taken into the service, the first act of the carpenters in the British navy-yards was to reduce to their own standard the long masts.

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and to strengthen the hull and sides till the vessel should be safe in a battle or a gale. Perhaps an American navy-carpenter must have done the same; but though not a line in the model might be altered, she never sailed again as she sailed before. She could not bear conventional restraints.

Americans were proud of their privateers, as they well might be; for this was the first time when in competition with the world, on an element open to all, they proved their capacity to excel, and produced a creation as beautiful as it was practical. The British navy took a new tone in regard to these vessels. Deeply as the American frigates and sloops-of-war had wounded the pride of the British navy, they never had reduced that fine service to admitted inferiority. Under one pretext or another, every defeat was excused. Even the superiority of American gunnery was met by the proud explanation that the British navy, since Trafalgar, had enjoyed no opportunity to use their guns. Nothing could convince a British admiral that Americans were better fighters than Englishmen; but when he looked at the American schooner he frankly said that England could show no such models, and could not sail them if she had them. In truth, the schooner was a wonderful invention. Not her battles, but her escapes won for
her the open-mouthed admiration of the British captains, who saw their prize double like a hare and slip through their fingers at the moment when capture was sure. Under any ordinary condition of wind

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and weather, with an open sea, the schooner, if only she could get to windward, laughed at a frigate.

As the sailing rather than the fighting qualities of the privateer were the chief object of her construction, those were the points best worth recording; but the newspapers of the time were so much absorbed in proving that Americans could fight, as to cause almost total neglect of the more important question whether Americans could sail better than their rivals. All great nations had fought, and at one time or another every great nation in Europe had been victorious over every other; but no people, in the course of a thousand years of rivalry on the ocean, had invented or had known how to sail a Yankee schooner. Whether ship, brig, schooner, or sloop, the American vessel was believed to outsail any other craft on the ocean, and the proof of this superiority was incumbent on the Americans to furnish. They neglected to do so. No clear evidence was ever recorded of the precise capacities of their favorite vessels. Neither the lines of the hull, the dimensions of the spars, the rates of sailing by the log in different weather, i.e., points of sailing, — nothing precise was ever set down.

Of the superiority no doubts could be entertained. The best proof of the American claim was the British admission. Hardly an English writer on marine affairs — whether in newspapers, histories, or novels — failed to make some allusion to the beauty and speed
of American vessels. The naval literature of Great Britain from 1812 to 1860 was full of such material. The praise of the invention was still commonly accompanied by some expression of dislike for the inventor, but even in that respect a marked change followed the experiences of 1812-1814. Among the Englishmen living on the island of Jamaica, and familiar with the course of events in the West Indies from 1806 to 1817, was one Michael Scott, born in Glasgow in 1789, and in the prime of his youth at the time of the American war. In the year 1829, at the age of forty, he began the publication in "Blackwood's Magazine" of a series of sketches which rapidly became popular as "Tom Cringle's Log." Scott was the best narrator and probably the best informed man who wrote on the West Indies at that period; and his frequent allusions to the United States and the war threw more light on the social side of history than could be obtained from all official sources ever printed.

"I don't like Americans," Scott said; "I never did and never shall like them. I have seldom met an American gentleman in the large and complete sense of the term. I have no wish to eat with them, drink with them, deal with or consort with them in any way; but let me tell the whole truth,—nor fight with them, were it not for the laurels to be acquired by overcoming an enemy so brave, determined, and alert, and every way so worthy
of one's steel as they have always proved."

The Americans did not fight the War of 1812 in order to make themselves loved. According to Scott's

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testimony they gained the object for which they did fight. ^^ In gunnery and small-arm practice we were as thoroughly weathered on by the Americans during the war as we overtopped them in the bull-dog courage with which our boarders handled those genuine English weapons, — the cutlass and the pike." Superiority in the intellectual branches of warfare was conceded to the Americans; but even in regard to physical qualities, the British were not inclined to boast.

*^In the field/* said Scott, '^'or grappling m mortal combat on the blood-slippery quarter-deck of an enemy's vessel, a British soldier or sailor is the bravest of the brave. No soldier or sailor of any other country, saving and excepting those damned Yankees, can stand against them."

Had English society known so much of Americans m 1807, war would have been unnecessary.

Yet neither equality in physical courage nor superiority in the higher branches of gunnery and small-arms was the chief success of Americans in the war. Beyond question the schooner was the most conclusive triumph. Readers of Michael Scott could not forget the best of his sketches, — the escape of the little American schooner "Wave" from two British cruisers, by running to windward under the broadside
of a man-of-war. With keen appreciation Scott de-
tailed every motion of the vessels, and dwelt with peculiarity emphasis on the apparent desperation of the attempt. Again and again the thirty-two-pound shot,

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as he described the scene, tore through the slight vessel as the two crafts raced through the heavy seas within musket-shot of one another, until at last the firing from the corvette ceased. "The breeze had taken off, and the "Wave," resuming her superiority in light winds, had escaped." Yet this was not the most significant part of "Tom Cringle's" experience. The "Wave," being afterward captured at anchor, was taken into the royal service and fitted as a ship-of-war. Cringle was ordered by the vice-admiral to command her, and, as she came to report he took a look at her: —

'^ When I had last seen her she was a most beautiful little craft, both in hull and rigging, as ever delighted the eye of a sailor; but the dock-yard riggers and carpenters had fairly bedevilled her, at least so far as appearances went. First they had replaced the light rail on her gunwale by heavy solid bulwarks four feet high, surmounted by hammock nettings at least another foot; so that the symmetrical little vessel that formerly floated on the foam light as a sea-gull now looked like a clumsy, dish-shaped Dutch dogger. Her long, slender wands of masts which used to swing about as if there were neither shrouds nor stays to support them were now as taut and stiff as church-steeples, with four heavy shrouds of a side, and stays and back-stays, and the Devil knows what all."

"If them heave-emtaughts at the yard have not taken the speed out of the little beauty I am a
Dutchman” was the natural comment, — as obvious as it was sound.

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The reports of privateer captains to their owners were rarely published, and the logs were never printed or deposited in any public office. Occasionally, in the case of a battle or the loss of guns or spars or cargo in a close pursuit, the privateer captain described the causes of his loss in a letter which found its way into print; and from such letters some idea could be drawn of the qualities held in highest regard, both in their vessels and in themselves. The first and commonest remark was that privateers of any merit never seemed to feel anxious for their own safety so long as they could get to windward a couple of gunshots from their enemy. They would risk a broadside in the process without very great anxiety. They chiefly feared lest they might be obliged to run before the wind in heavy weather. The little craft which could turn on itself like a flash and dart away under a frigate's guns into the wind’s eye long before the heavy ship could come about, had little to fear on that point of sailing; but when she was obliged to run to leeward, the chances were more nearly equal. Sometimes, especially in light breezes or in a stronger wind, by throwing guns and weighty articles overboard privateers could escape; but in heavy weather the ship-of-war could commonly outcarry them, and more often could drive them on a coast or into the clutches of some other man-of-war.

Of being forced to fly to leeward almost every priva* teer could tell interesting stories. A fair example of
such tales was an adventure of Captain George Coggeshall who afterward compiled, chiefly from newspapers, an account of the privateers, among which he preserved a few stories that would otherwise have been lost. Coggeshall commanded a two-hundred-ton schooner, the "David Porter," in which he made the run to France with a cargo and a letter-of-marque. The schooner was at Bordeaux in March, 1814, when Wellington's army approached. Afraid of seizure by the British if he remained at Bordeaux, Coggeshall sailed from Bordeaux for La Rochelle with a light wind from the eastward, when at daylight March 15, 1814, he found a large ship about two miles to windward. Coggeshall tried to draw his enemy down to leeward, but only lost ground until the ship was not more than two gunshots away. The schooner could then not run to windward without taking the enemy's fire within pistol-shot, and dared not return to Bordeaux. Nothing remained but to run before the wind. Coggeshall got out his square-sail and studding-sails ready to set, and when everything was prepared he changed his course and bore off suddenly, gaining a mile in the six or eight minutes lost by the ship in spreading her studding-sails. He then started his water-casks, threw out ballast, and drew away from his pursuer, till in a few hours the ship became a speck on the horizon.

Apparently a similar but narrower escape was made by Captain Champlin of the "Warrior," a famous privateer-brig of four hundred and thirty tons, mount*
ing twenty-one guns and carrying one hundred and fifty men. Standing for the harbor of Fayal, Dec. 15, 1814, he was seen by a British man-of-war lying there at anchor. The enemy slipped her cables and made sail in chase. The weather was very fresh and squally, and at eight o'clock in the evening the ship was only three miles distant. After a run of about sixty miles, the man-of-war came within grape-shot distance and opened fire from her two bow-guns. Champlin luffed a little, got his long pivot-gun to bear, and ran out his starboard guns as though to fight, which caused the ship to shorten sail for battle. Then Champlin at two o'clock in the morning threw overboard eleven guns, and escaped. The British ship was in sight the next morning, but did not pursue farther.

Often the privateers were obliged to throw everything overboard at the risk of capsizing, or escaped capture only by means of their sweeps. In 1813 Champlin commanded the "General Armstrong," a brig of two hundred and forty-six tons and one hundred and forty men. Off Surinam, March 11, 1815, he fell in with the British sloop-of-war "Goquette," which he mistook for a letter-of-marque, and approached with the intention of boarding. Having come within pistol-shot and fired his broadsides, he discovered his error. The wind was light, the twa vessels had no headway, and for three quarters of an hour, if Champlin’s account could be believed, he lay within pistol-shot of the man-of-war. He was struck by a musket-ball in the left shoulder; six of his crew were killed and fourteen wounded; his rigging

^ Extract of letter from Captain Champlin; NileB, yiii. 110.
was cut to pieces; his foremast and bowsprit injured, and several shots entered the brig between wind and water, causing her to leak; but at last he succeeded in making sail forward, and with the aid of his sweeps crept out of range. The sloop-of-war was unable to cripple or follow him.

Sometimes the very perfection of the privateer led to dangers as great as though perfection were a fault. Captain Shaler of the "Governor Tompkins," a schooner, companion to the "General Armstrong," chased three sail Dec. 25, 1812, and on near approach found them to be two ships and a brig. The larger ship had the appearance of a government transport; she had boarding-nettings almost up to her tops, but her ports appeared to be painted, and she seemed prepared for running away as she fought. Shaler drew nearer, and came to the conclusion that the ship was too heavy for him; but while his first officer went forward with the glass to take another look, a sudden squall struck the schooner without reaching the ship, and in a moment, before the light sails could be taken in, and almost before I could turn roimd, I was under the guns, not of a transport, but of a large frigate, and not more than a quarter of a mile from her. With impudence that warranted punishment,

^ Extract from log, March 11, 1813; Niles, iv. 133.

Shaler fired his little broadside of nine or twelve pounders into the enemy, who replied with a broadside of twenty-four-pounders, killing three men, wounding five, and causing an explosion on deck that threw confusion into the crew; but the broadside did no serious injury to the rigging. The schooner was then just abaft the ship's beam, a quarter of a mile away,
holding the same course and to windward. She could not tack without exposing her stem to a raking fire, and any failure to come about would have been certain destruction. Shaler stood on, taking the ship's fire, on the chance of outsailing his enemy before a shot could disable the schooner. Side by side the two vessels raced for half an hour, while twenty-four-pound shot fell in foam about the schooner, but never struck her, and at last she drew ahead beyond range. Even then her dangers were not at an end. A calm followed; the ship put out boats; and only by throwing deck-lumber and shot overboard, and putting all hands at the sweeps, did Shaler "get clear of one of the most quarrelsome companions that I ever met with." 1

The capacities of the American privateer could to some extent be inferred from its mishaps. Notwithstanding speed, skill, and caution, the privateer was frequently and perhaps usually captured in the end. The modes of capture were numerous. April 8, 1818, Admiral Warren's squadron in the Chesapeake captured by boats, after a sharp action, the privateer


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"Dolphin" of Baltimore, which had taken refuge in the Rappahannock River. April 27 the "Tom" of Baltimore, a schooner of nearly three hundred tons, carrying fourteen guns, was captured by his Majesty's ships "Surveillante" and "Lyra" after a smart chase. Captain Collier of the "Surveillante" reported: "She is a remarkably fine vessel of her
class, and from her superior sailing has already escaped from eighteen of his Majesty's cruisers." May 11, the "Holkar" of New York was driven ashore off Rhode Island and destroyed by the "Orpheus" frigate. May 19, Captain Gordon of the British man-of-war "Ratler," in company with the schooner "Bream," drove ashore and captured the "Alexander" of Salem, off Kennebunk, "considered the fastest sailing privateer out of the United States," according to Captain Gordon's report. ^ May 21, Captain Hyde Parker of the frigate "Tenedos," in company with the brig "Curlew," captured the "Enterprise" of Salem, pierced for eighteen guns. May 28, the "Paul Jones," of sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty men, fell in with a frigate in a thick fog off the coast of Ireland, and being crippled by her fire surrendered. July 13, Admiral Cockburn captured by boats at Ocracoke Inlet the fine privateer-brig "Anaconda" of New York, with a smaller letter-of-marque. July 17, at sea, three British men-of-war, after a chase of four hours, captured the "Yorktown" of twenty guns and one hundred and forty men. The schooner

a London Gazette for 1813, p. 1674.

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"Orders in Council" of New York, carrying sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty men, was captured during the summer, after a long chase of five days, by three British cutters that drove her under the guns of a frigate. The "Matilda," privateer of eleven guns and one hundred and four men, was captured off San Salvador by attempting to board the British letter-of-marque "Lyon" under the impression that she was the weaker ship.

In these ten instances of large privateers captured
or destroyed in 1813, the mode of capture happened to be recorded; and in none of them was the privateer declared to have been outsailed and caught by any single British vessel on the open seas. Modes of disaster were many, and doubtless among the rest a privateer might occasionally be fairly beaten in speed, but few such cases were recorded, although British naval officers were quick to mention these unusual victories. Unless the weather gave to the heavier British vessel-of-war the advantage of carrying more sail in a rough sea, the privateer was rarely outsailed.

The number of privateers at sea in 1813 was not recorded. The list of all private armed vessels during the entire war included somewhat more than five hundred names. Most of these were small craft, withdrawn after a single cruise. Not two hundred were so large as to carry crews of fifty men. Nearly two hundred and fifty, or nearly half the whole number of privateers, fell into British hands. Prob-

^ Emmons's Navy of the United States, pp. 170-197.

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ably at no single moment were more than fifty seagoing vessels on the ocean as privateers, and the number was usually very much less; while the large privateer-brigs or ships that rivalled sloops-of-war in size were hardly more numerous than the sloops themselves.

The total number of prizes captured from the British in 1818 exceeded four hundred, four fifths of which were probably captured by privateers, national cruisers taking only seventy-nine. If the privateers succeeded in taking three hundred and fifty prizes, the whole number of privateers could scarcely have
exceeded one hundred. The government cruisers "President," "Congress," "Chesapeake," "Hornet," and "Argus" averaged nearly ten prizes apiece. Privateers averaged much less; but they were ten times as numerous as the government cruisers, and inflicted four times as much injury.

Such an addition to the naval force of the United States was very important. Doubtless the privateers contributed more than the regular navy to bring about a disposition for peace in the British classes most responsible for the war. The colonial and shipping interests, whose influence produced the Orders in Council, suffered the chief penalty. The West India colonies were kept in constant discomfort and starvation by swarms of semi-piratical craft darting in and out of every channel among their islands; but the people of England could have borne with patience the punishment of the West Indies had not the American cruisers inflicted equally severe retribution nearer home.

Great Britain was blockaded. No one could deny that manifest danger existed to any merchant-vessel that entered or left British waters. During the summer the blockade was continuous. Toward the close of 1812 an American named Preble, living in Paris, bought a small vessel, said to have belonged in turn to the British and French navy, which he fitted as a privateer-brig, carrying sixteen guns and one hundred and sixty men. The "True-Blooded Yankee," commanded by Captain Hailey, sailed from Brest March 1, 1818, and cruised thirty-seven days on the coasts of Ireland and Scotland, capturing-twenty-seven valuable vessels; sinking coasters in
the very bay of Dublin; landing and taking possession of an island off the coast of Ireland, and of a town in Scotland, where she burned seven vessels in the harbor. She returned safely to Brest, and soon made another cruise. At the same time the schooner "Fox" of Portsmouth burned or sunk vessel after vessel in the Irish Sea, as they plied between Liverpool and Cork. In May, the schooner "Paul Jones" of New York^ carrying sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty men, took or destroyed a dozen vessels off the Irish coast, until she was herself caught in a fog by the frigate "Leonidas," and captured May 23 after a chase in which five of her crew were wounded.

While these vessels were thus engaged, the brig

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** Rattlesnake " of Philadelphia, carrying sixteen guns and one hundred and twenty men, and the brig "Scourge " of New York, carrying nine guns and one hundred and ten men, crossed the ocean and cruised all the year in the northern seas off the coasts of Scotland and Norway, capturing some forty British vessels, and costing the British merchants and ship-owners losses to the amount of at least two million dollars. In July the "Scourge " fell in with Commodore Rodgers in the "President," and the two vessels remained several days in company off the North Cape, while the British admiralty sent three or four squadrons in search of them without success. July 19, after Rodgers had been nearly a month in British waters, one of these squadrons drove him away, and he then made a circuit round Ireland before he turned homeward. At the same time, from July 14 to August 14, the "Argus " was destroying vessels in the British Channel at the rate of nearly one a day. After
the capture of the "Argus," August 14, the "Grand Turk" of Salem, a brig carrymg sixteen guns and one hundred and five men, cruised for twenty days in the mouth of the British Channel without being disturbed. Besides these vessels, others dashed into British waters from time to time as they sailed forward and back across the ocean in the track of British commerce.

No one disputed that the privateers were a very important branch of the American navy; but they suffered under serious drawbacks, which left doubt-

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fill the balance of merits and defects. Perhaps their chief advantage compared with government vessels was their lightness, — a quality which no government would have carried to the same extent. The long-range pivot-gun was another invention of the privateer, peculiarly successful and easily adapted for government vessels. In other respects, the same number or even half the number of sloops-of-war would have probably inflicted greater injury at less cost. The "Argus" showed how this result could have been attained. The privateer's first object was to save prizes; and in the effort to send captured vessels into port the privateer lost a large proportion by recapture. Down to the moment when Admiral Warren established his blockade of the American coast from New York southward, most of the prizes got to port. After that time the New England ports alone offered reasonable chance of safety, and privateering received a check. During the war about twenty-five hundred vessels all told were captured from the British. Many were destroyed; many released as cartels; and of the remainder not less than seven hundred and fifty, probably one half the
number sent to port, were recaptured by the British navy. Most of these were the prizes of privateers, and would have been destroyed had they been taken by government vessels. They were usually the most valuable prizes, so that the injury that might have

^ Memorid of Baltimore merchants, Feb. 19, 1814; State Papers, Naval Affairs, p. 300.

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been inflicted on British commerce was diminished nearly one half by the system which encouraged private war as a money-making speculation.

Another objection was equally serious. Like all gambling ventures, privateering was not profitable. In the list of five hundred privateers furnished by the Navy Department,^ three hundred were recorded as having never made a prize. Of the remainder, few made their expenses. One of the most successful cruises of the war was that of Joshua Barney on the Baltimore schooner "Rossie" at the outbreak of hostilities, when every prize reached port. Barney sent in prizes supposed to be worth fifteen hundred thousand dollars; but after paying charges and duties and selling the goods, he found that the profits were not sufficient to counterbalance the discomforts, and he refused to repeat the experiment. His experience was common. As early as November, 1812, the owners of twenty-four New York privateers sent to Congress a memorial declaring that the profits of private naval war were by no means equal to the hazards, and that the spirit of privateering stood in danger of extinction unless the government would consent in some manner to grant a bounty for the capture or destruction of the enemy's property.
If private enterprise was to fail at the critical moment, and if the government must supply the deficiency, the government would have done better to undertake the whole task. In effect, the government

1 Emmons's Navy of the XJoited States.

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in the end did so. The merchants asked chiefly for a reduction of duties on prize-goods. Gallatin pointed out the serious objections to such legislation, and the little probability that the measure would increase the profits of privateering or the number of privateers. The actual privateers, he said, were more than enough for the food offered by the enemy's trade, and privateering, like every other form of gambling, would always continue to attract more adventurers than it could support.^

Congress for the time followed Gallatin's advice, and did nothing; but in the summer session of 1813, after Gallatin's departure for Europe, the privateer owners renewed their appeal, and the acting Secretary of the Treasury, Jones, wrote to the chairman of the Naval Committee July 21, 1818,*—

^

* The fact is that • • • privateering is nearly at an end; and from the best observation I have been enabled to make, it is more from the deficiency of remuneration in the net proceeds of their prizes than from the vigilance and success of the enemy in recapturing."

In deference to Jones's opinion. Congress passed an Act, approved Aug. 2, 1818, reducing one third the duties on prize-goods. Another Act, approved August 8, granted a bounty of twenty-five dollars for every prisoner captured and delivered to a United States agent by a private armed vessel. A third Act,
approved August 2, authorized the Secretary of the Navy to place on the pension list any privateersman who should be Wounded or disabled in the line of his duty.

These complaints and palliations tended to show that the privateer cost the public more than the equivalent government vessel would have cost. If instead of five hundred privateers of all sizes and efficiency, the government had kept twenty sloops-of-war constantly at sea destroying the enemy's commerce, the result would have been about the same as far as concerned injury to the enemy, while in another respect the government would have escaped one of its chief difficulties. Nothing injured the navy so much as privateering. Seamen commonly preferred the harder but more profitable and shorter cruise in a privateer, where fighting was not expected or wished, to the strict discipline and murderous battles of government ships, where wages were low and prize-money scarce. Of all towns in the United States, Marblehead was probably the most devoted to the sea; but of nine hundred men from Marblehead who took part in the war, fifty-seven served as soldiers, one hundred and
twenty entered the navy, while seven hundred and twenty-six went as privateersmen. Only after much delay and difficulty could the frigates obtain crews. The "Constitution" was nearly lost by this cause at the beginning of the war; and the loss of the "Chesapeake" was supposed to be chiefly due to the deter-

^ Roads's Marblehead, p. 255.

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mination of the old crew to quit the government service for that of the privateers.

Such drawbacks nused reasonable doubts as to the balance of advantages and disadvantages offered by the privateer system. Perhaps more careful inquiry might show that, valuable as the privateers were, the government would have done better to retain all military and naval functions in its own hands, and to cover the seas with small cruisers capable of pursuing a system of thorough destruction against the shipping and colonial interests of England.

CHAPTER XIV.

Oallatin and Bayard, having sailed from the Delaware May 9, arrived at St. Petersburg July 21, only to find that daring the six months since the C^ar offered to mediate, Russia had advanced rapidly in every direction except that of the proposed mediation. Napoleon after being driven from Russia in December, 1812, passed the winter in Paris organizing a new army of three hundred thousand men on
the Elbe, between Dresden and Magdeburg, while a second army of more than one hundred thousand was to hold Hamburg and Bremen. Russia could not prevent Napoleon from reconstructing a force almost as powerful as that with which he had marched to Moscow, for the Russian army had suffered very severely and was unfit for active service; but the Czar succeeded in revolutionizing Prussia, and in forcing the French to retire from the Vistula to the Elbe, while he gained a reinforcement of more than one hundred thousand men from the fresh and vigorous Prussian army. Even with that assistance the Czar could not cope with Napoleon, who, leaving Paris April 17, during the month of May fought furiously battles at Liitzen and Bautzen, which forced the allied Russian and Prussian armies back from the Elbe to the Oder.

At that point Austria interfered so energetically as to oblige Napoleon to accept an armistice for the purpose of collecting new forces. During the armistice the Czar stationed himself at Gitschin in Bohemia, nine hundred miles from St. Petersburg, and about the same distance from London by the path that couriers were obliged to take. When Gallatin and Bayard reached St. Petersburg, July 21, the armistice, which had been prolonged until August 10, was about to expire, and the Czar could not be anxious to decide subordinate questions until the issue of the coming campaign should be known.

Meanwhile the government of England had in May, with many friendly expressions, declined the Russian mediation. Castlereagh probably hoped that this quiet notification to Lieven, the Russian envoy,
in London, would end the matter; but toward the month of July news reached London that the American commissioners, Gallatin and Bayard, had arrived at Gothenburg on their way to Russia, and Castlereagh then saw that he must be more explicit in his refusal. Accordingly he took measures for making the matter clear not only to the Russian government but also to the American commissioners.

With the Russian government he was obliged by the nature of their common relations to communicate officially, and he wrote instructions to Lord Cathcart, dated July 5, directing communication to be made.

"I am afraid," said Castlereagh's letter, "this tender of mediation which on a question of maritime right cannot be listened to by Great Britain, however kindly and liberally intended, will have had the unfortunate effect of protracting the war with the United States. It is to be lamented that the formal offer was made to America before the disposition of the British government was previously sounded as to its acceptance of a mediation. It has enabled the President to hold out to the people of America a vague expectation of peace, under which he may reconcile them with less repugnance to submit to the measures of the Government. This evil, however, cannot now be avoided, and it only remains to prevent this question from producing any embarrassment between Great Britain and Russia."

Embarrassment between Great Britain and Russia was no new thing in European politics, and com-
monly involved maritime objects for which the United States were then fighting. Castlereagh had much reason for wishing to avoid the danger. The most fortunate result he could reasonably expect from the coming campaign was a defeat of Bonaparte that should drive him back to the Rhine. Then Russia and Austria would probably offer terms to Napoleon; England would be obliged to join in a European Congress; Napoleon would raise the question of mari-

1 Castlereagh to Cathcart. - 5, 1813; MSS. British Archives.

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time rights, and on that point he would be supported by Russian sympathies. Napoleon and Russia might insist that the United States should take part in the Congress, and in that case England might be obliged to retire from it. Castlereagh felt uneasy at the prospect, and ordered Gathcart to "press the Emperor of Russia in the strongest manner not to push his personal interference on this point further." Cathcart was to use his utmost endeavors to persuade the Czar "pointedly to discountenance a design so mischievously calculated to promote the views of France."

Another week of reflection only increased Castlereagh's anxieties, and caused the British government to take a step intended to leave the Czar no opening for interference. July 18 Castlereagh wrote Cathcart new instructions, directing him to present a formal note acquainting the Czar that the Prince Regent was "ready immediately to name plenipotentiaries to meet and treat with the American plenipotentiaries in the earnest desire " of peace,
either in London or at Gothenburg; although he could not consent that these discussions should be carried on in any place which might be supposed to imply that they were in any way connected with any other negotiations." He wrote privately to Cathcart that the mere knowledge of the intervention of a third power in any arrangement with the

1 Castlereagli to Cathcart, July 13, 1813; MSS. British Archives.

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United States would probably decide the British people against it.

Thus in July, 1813, when the war was barely a year old, Castlereagh reached the point of offering to negotiate directly with the United States. This advantage was gained by the Russian offer of mediation, and was intended not to pacify America but to silence Alexander and Roumanzoff. Castlereagh was frank and prompt in his declarations. His offer of direct negotiation was dated July 13, at a time when Alexander Baring received a letter from Gallatin announcing his arrival at Gothenburg and inviting assistance for the proposed mediation. Baring consulted Castlereagh, and wrote, July 22, a long letter to Gallatin, to inform the American commissioners what the British government had done and was willing to do. "Before this reaches you," said Baring, "you will have been informed that this mediation has been refused, with expressions of our desire to treat separately and directly here; or, if more agreeable to you, at Gothenburg." To leave no room for misunderstanding, Baring added that if the American commissioners were obliged by their instructions to adhere pertinaciously to the American demands in
respect to impressments, he should think negotiation useless.

^ CasdeTeagli to Cathcart, July 14, 1813; Castlereagh Papers, Third Series, L 35.

s Baring to Gallatin, July 22, 1813; Gallatin's Writings^ i. 546.

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In regular succession all these expressions of British policy were received at St. Petersburg in the Czar's absence, and in the doubtful state of mind which followed the battles of Lützen and Bautzen. Alexander had left Count Roumanzoff at St. Petersburg, continuing to act as Chancellor of the Empire and Foreign Secretary; but in truth the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as far as the Czar then required such an officer, was Count Nesselrode, who attended Alexander in person and received his orders orally. Nesselrode at that tune was rather an agent than an adviser; but in general he represented the English alliance and hostility to Napoleon, while Roumanzoff represented the French alliance and hostility to England.

Of English diplomacy Americans knew something, and could by similarity of mind divine what was not avowed. Of French diplomacy they had long experience, and their study was rendered from time to time more easy by Napoleon's abrupt methods. Of Russian diplomacy they knew little or nothing. Thus far Minister Adams had been given his own way. He had been allowed to seem to kindle the greatest war of modern times, and had been invited to make use of Russia against England; but the Czar's reasons for granting such favor were mysterious even to Adams, for while Napoleon occasionally avowed mo-
tives, Alexander never did. Russian diplomacy moved wholly in the dark.

Only one point was certain. For reasons of his own, the Czar chose to leave Roumanzoff nominally

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in ofSce until the result of the war should be decided, although Roumanzoff was opposed to the Czar's policy. The chancellor did not stand alone in his hostility to the war; probably a majority of the Russian people shared the feeling. Even the army and its old General Koutousoff, though elated with an immense triumph, grumbled at being obliged to fight the battles of Germany, and would gladly have returned to their own soil. The Czar himself could not afford to break his last tie with the French interest, but was wise to leave a path open by which he could still retreat in case his war in Germany failed. If Napoleon should succeed once more in throwing the Russian army back upon Russian soil, Alexander might still be obliged to use Roumanzoff's services if not to resume his policy. Such a suspicion might, not wholly explain Alexander's course toward Roumanzoff and Koutousoff, but no one could doubt that it explained the chancellor's course toward the Czar. Indeed, Roumanzoff made little concealment of his situation or his hopes. Adams could without much difficulty divine that the failure of the Czar in Germany would alone save Roumanzoff in St. Petersburg, and that the restoration of Roumanzoff to power was necessary to reinvigorate the mediation.

Castlereagh's first positive refusal to accept the mediation was notified to Count Lieven in May, and was known to Roumanzoff in St. Petersburg about the middle of June. Early in July the Czar received it,
and by his order Nesselrode, in a despatch to Lieven

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dated July 9, expressed "the perfect satisfaction which his Imperial Majesty felt in the reasons which actuated the conduct of this [British] government on a point of so much delicacy and importance." The Czar was then in the midst of difficulties. The result of the war was doubtful, and depended on Austria.

Just as news of the armistice arrived in St. Petersburg, Minister Adams went to Roumanzoff, June 22, to inform him of Gallatin's and Bayard's appointment. Roumanzoff in return gave Adams explicit information of England's refusal to accept the Czar's offer. Adams immediately recorded it in his Diary:* —

"He [Roumanzoff] said that he was very sorry to say he had received since he had seen me [June 15] further despatches from Count Lieven, stating that the British government, with many very friendly and polite assurances that there was no mediation which they should so readily and cheerfully accept as that of the Emperor of Russia, had however stated that their differences with the United States of America involving certain principles of the internal government of England were of a nature which they did not think suitable to be settled by a mediation."

Adams expected this answer, and at once assumed it to be final; but Roumanzoff checked him. "It would now be for consideration," he continued, "whether, after the step thus taken by the American

^ Castleieagh to Cathcart, Sept. 1, 1813 ; MSS. Britiah Archives.
government [in sending commissioners to St. Peters-
burg], it would not be advisable to renew the propo-
sition to Great Britain; upon which he should write
to the Emperor." Not because of any American re-
quest, but wholly of his own motion, Roumanzoff pro-
posed to keep the mediation alive. His motives were
for Adams to fathom. The chancellor did not avow
them, but he hinted to Adams that the chances of
war were many. "Perhaps it might be proper not
to be discouraged by the ill success of his first ad-
ances. After considerations might produce more
pacific dispositions in the British government. Un-
expected things were happening every day; *and in
our own affairs,' said the count, 'a very general re-
port prevails that an armistice has taken place.' " A
Congress had been proposed, and the United States
were expressly named among the Powers to be invited
to it.

Adams reported this conversation to his Govern-
ment in a despatch dated June 26,^ and waited for his
two new colleagues, who arrived July 21. Personally
the colleagues were agreeable to Adams, and the pro-
posed negotiation was still more so, for the Presi-
dent sent him official notice that in case the nego-
tiations were successful, Adams's services would be
required as minister in London; but with the strong-
est inducements to press the mediation, Adams could
not but see that he and his colleagues depended on

^ Adams to Monroe, June 26, 1813; MSS. State Department
Archives.
Bomnanzoff, and that Boumanzoff depended not on Alexander, but on Napoleon. Bomnanzoff's only chance of aiding them was by clinging to office until the Czar should be weary of war.

Unwilling as Gallatin was to be thus made the sport of imperial policy, he was obliged, like his colleagues, to submit. Two days after their arrival, Boumanzoff told them that he meant, if possible, to begin the whole transaction anew.

"The count said he regretted much that there was such reason to believe the British would decline the mediation; but on transmitting the copy of the credential letter to the Emperor, he would determine whether to renew the proposal, as the opposition in England might make it an embarrassing charge against the Ministry if they should under such circumstances reject it."^

Boumanzoff had written soon after June 22 to ask the Czar whether, on the arrival of the American commissioners, the offer of mediation should be renewed. The Czar, overwhelmed with business, wrote back, about July 20, approving Boumanzoff's suggestion, and authorizing him to send a despatch directly to Count Lieven in London renewing the offer. The Czar's letter was communicated to Adams August 10 by Boumanzoff, who was evidently much pleased and perhaps somewhat excited by it.

Such a letter warranted some excitement, for Boumanzoff could regard it only as a sign of hesitation.

» Diary of J. Q. Adams, July 23, 1813, ii. 489.
« Diary of J. Q. Adams, July 23, 1813, ii. 601. ..
and anxiety. Alexander was in a degree pledged to England to press the mediation no further. While he assured England through Nesselrode, July 9, that he was perfectly satisfied with the British reasons for refusing his offer of mediation "on a point of so much delicacy and importance," he authorized BoumanzoF only ten days afterward to annoy England a second time with an offer which he had every reason to know must be rejected; and he did this without informing Nesselrode.

Gallatin and Bayard found themselves, August 10, condemned to wait two or three months for the British answer, which they knew must be unfavorable, because Gallatin received August 17 Baring's letter announcing the determination of Castlereagh to negotiate separately. Roumanzoffs conduct became more and more mysterious to the commissioners. He did not notify them of Castlereagh's official offer to negotiate directly. He confounded Adams, August 19, by flatly denying his own information, given two months before, that England rejected mediation in principle because it involved doctrines of her internal government. Boumanzoff insisted that England had never refused to accept the mediation, although he held in his hands at least two despatches from Lieven, written as late as July 13, officially communicating England's determination to negotiate directly or not at all. Castlereagh, foreseeing the possibility of misunderstanding, had read to Lieyen the instructions of July 13 for communication to Boumanzoff,
besides authorizing Cathcart to show them in extenso to the Czar. ^ In denying that such instructions had been given, Boumanzoff could not have expected the American commissioners to believe him.

The motive of Roumanzoff's persistence might be open to the simple explanation that the chancellor hoped to recover power, and within a few months to re-establish his policy of antagonism to England. Alexander's conduct could be explained by no such obvious interest. When Castlereagh's letters of July 13 and 14 reached Cathcart at the Czar's headquarters in Bohemia about August 10, they arrived at the most critical moment of the war. On that day the armistice expired. The next day Austria declared war on Napoleon. The combined armies of Russia, Prussia, and Austria concentrated behind the mountains, and then marched into Saxony. While starting on that campaign, August 20, the Czar was told by Lord Cathcart the reasons why his offer of mediation was rejected, and answered at once that in this case he could do nothing more. ^ Cathcart wrote to Nesselrode a formal note on the subject August 23 or 24, but did not at once communicate it, ^ because the campaign had then begun; the great battle of Dresden was fought August 26 and 27, and the allies, again beaten, retired into Bohemia August 28. The

^ Castlereagh to Cathcart, July 14, 1813 ; Castlereagh's Papera, Third Series, i. 35.
« Diary of J. Q. Adams, Nov. 23, 1813, ii. 639, 642.
• Diary of J. Q. Adams, April 2, 1814, ii. 693.

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Czar saw his best military adviser Moreau killed by his side at Dresden, and he returned to Toplitz in
no happy frame of mind.

At Toplitz, September 1, Cathcart delivered to Nesselrode his formal note, refusing Russian mediation and communicating the offer of England to negotiate directly. In an ordinary condition of government Nesselrode should have taken care that the British note should be made known without delay to the American commissioners at St. Petersburg, but the Czar kept in his own hands the correspondence with Roumanzoff and the Americans, and neither he nor Nesselrode communicated Cathcart's act to Roumanzoff. Possibly their silence was due to the new military movements. August 29 the French marshal Vandamme with forty thousand men, pursuing the allies into Bohemia, was caught between the Prussians and Austrians August 30 and crushed. During the month of September severe fighting, favorable to the allies, occurred, but no general advance was made by the allied sovereigns.

Alexander next received at Toplitz toward September 20 a letter from Roumanzoff enclosing a renewal of the offer of mediation, to be proposed in a despatch to Lieven, read by Roumanzoff to the American commissioners August 24, and sent to London August 28. The Czar must have known the futility of this new step, as well as the mistake into which Roumanzoff

^ Cathcart to Nesselrode, Sept. 1, 1813 ; State Papers, iii 622. < Diary of J. Q. Adams, April 2° 1814, ii. 699.

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had been led, and the awkward attitude of the American commissioners. Only a fortnight before, he had received Cathcart's official note, and a few days earlier he had assured Cathcart that he should do no more
in the matter. Yet, September 20, Alexander wrote with his own hand a note of four lines to Boumanzoff, approving his despatch to Lieven, and begging him to follow up the affair as he had begun it.

The Czar's letter of September 20 completed the embroglio, which remained unintelligible to every one except himself. Cathcart was the most mystified of all the victims to the Czar's double attitude. At the time when Alexander thus for the second time authorized Roumanzoff to disregard the express entreaties of the British government, Cathcart was making an effort to explain to Castlereagh the Czar's first interference. If Castlereagh understood his minister's ideas, he was gifted with more than common penetration.

"I believe the not communicating the rescript of the Emperor concerning the American plenipotentiaries to have been the effect of accident," wrote Cathcart from Toplitz September 25; "but what is singular is that notwithstanding his [Nesselrode's] letter of the ninth [July], by the Emperor's command, to Count Lieven, this communication from and instruction to Roumanzoff was not known to Count Nesselrode till this day, when I mentioned it to him, having received no caution to do otherwise, and he was not at all pleased with it. It was during the advance to Dresden. But I cannot help thinking that there must have been some policy of Roumanzoff's stated in regard to keeping hold of the mediation, which, whether it was detailed or not, would not

1 Diary of J. Q. Adams, Sept. 10, 1813, ii. 531.
> Cathcart to Castlereagh, Sept. 25, 1813; MSS. British Archives.

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escape the Emperor's penetration, and upon which he may have been induced to act as far as sanctioning the proposal of treating at London under Russia's mediation, which the Prince Regent's government might accept or reject as they pleased; and that not wishing to go at that time into a discussion of maritime rights with either Nesselrode or me, he afterward forgot it."

Cathcart's style was involved, but his perplexity was evident. His remarks related only to the Czar's first letter to Roumanzoff, written about July 20, not " during the advance to Dresden." He knew nothing of the Czar's second letter to Roumanzoff, dated September 20, renewing the same authority, only five days before Cathcart's labored attempt to explain the first. Of the second letter, as of the first, neither Nesselrode nor Cathcart was informed.

The Czar's motive in thus ordering each of his two ministers to act in ignorance and contradiction of the other's instructions perplexed Roumanzoff as it did Cathcart. Lieven first revealed to Roumanzoff the strange misunderstanding by positively refusing to present to Castlereagh the chancellor's note of August 28 renewing the offer of mediation. Roumanzoff was greatly mortified. He told Gallatin that the mediation had been originally the Czar's own idea; that it had been the subject of repeated dis-

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cussions at his own motion, and had been adopted notwithstanding Boumanzoff's hints at the possibility of English reluctance. ^ The chancellor sent Lieven's despatch immediately to the Czar without comment, requesting the Czar to read it and give his orders.
The British officials, unwilling to blame Alexander, attacked Boumanzo£F. Lord Walpole, who came directly from Bohemia to St. Petersburg to act as British ambassador, said "he was as sure as he was of his own existence, and he believed he could prove it, that Roumanzoff had been cheating us all."* Cathcart wrote, December 12, to Castlereagh,—

"I think Nesselrode knows nothing of the delay of communicating with the American mission; that it was an intrigue of the chancellor's, if it is one; and that daring the operations of war the Emperor lost the dew to it, so that something has been unanswered." *

Perhaps the Czar's conduct admitted of several interpretations. He might wish to keep the mediation alive in order to occupy Boumanzo£F until the campaign should be decided; or he might in his good nature prefer to gratify his old favorite by allowing him to do what he wished; or he took this method of signifying to Roumanzoff his disgrace and the propriety of immediate retirement. Apparently Roumanzoff took the last view, for he sent his resignation to the Czar, and at the close of the year quitted his

» Diary of J. Q. Adams, Nov. 3, 1813, ii. 541.
« Diary of J. Q. Adams, April 2, 1814, ii. 691.
* Cathcart to Castlereagh, Dec. 12, 1813; Castlereagh Fpem

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official residence at the Department of Foreign Affairs, telling Gallatin that he remained in office only till he should receive authority to close the American mission.

The American commissioners in private resented Alexander's treatment, but were unable to leave Rus-
sia without authority. Gallatin learned, October 19, that the Senate had refused to confirm his appointment, but he remained at St. Petersburg, chiefly in deference to Roumanzoff's opinion, and probably with ideas of assisting the direct negotiation at London or elsewhere. Meanwhile the campaign was decided October 18, by Napoleon's decisive overthrow at Leipzig, which forced him to retreat behind the Rhine. Still the Czar wrote nothing to Roumanzoff, and the American commissioners remained month after month at St. Petersburg. Not until Jan. 25^ 1814, did Gallatin and Bayard begin their winter journey to Amsterdam, where they arrived March 4 and remained a month. Then Gallatin received, through Baring, permission to enter England, and crossed the Channel to hasten if he could the direct negotiation which Castlereagh had offered and Madison accepted.

The diplomatic outlook had changed since March, 1813, when the President accepted the offer of Russian mediation; but the change was wholly for the worse. England's triumphs girdled the world, and found no check except where Perry's squadron blocked the way to Detroit. The allied armies crossed the Rhine in December and entered France on the east. At the same time Wellington after a long campaign drove Joseph from Spain, and entering France from the south pressed against Bordeaux. The government and people of England, in their excitement and exultation at daily conquests, thought as little as they could of the American war. Society rarely mentioned it. Newspapers alone preserved a record of British feelings toward the United States during the year 1813. The expressions of newspapers, like
those of orators, could not be accepted without allowance, for they aimed at producing some desired effect, and said either more or less than the truth; as a rule, they represented the cool opinion neither of the person who uttered nor of the audience who heard them; but in the absence of other records, public opinion was given only in the press, and the Xiondon newspapers alone furnished evidence of its character.

The "Morning Chronicle" — the only friend of the United States in the daily press of England — showed its friendship by silence. Whatever the liberal opposition thought in private, no one but Cobbett ventured in public to oppose the war. Cobbett having become a radical at the time of life when most men become conservative, published in his "Weekly Register" many columns of vigorous criticism on the American war without apparent effect, although in truth he expressed opinions commonly held by intelligent people. Even Lord Castlereagh, Cobbett's antipathy, shared

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some of Cobbett's least popular opinions in the matter of the American war.

English society, whatever shades of diversity might exist, was frank and free in expressing indifference or contempt. Of the newspapers which made a duty of reflecting what was believed to be the prevailing public opinion, the "Times," supposed to favor the interests of Wellesley and Canning, was probably the ablest. During the early part of the war, the "Times" showed a disposition to criticise the Ministry rather than the Americans. From the "Times" came most of the bitter complaints, widely copied by the American press, of the naval defeats suffered
by the "Guerriere," the "Java," and the "Macedonian." British successes were belittled, and abuse of Americans was exaggerated, in order to deprive ministers of credit. "The world has seen President Madison plunge into a war from the basest motives, and conduct it with the most entire want of ability," said the "Times" of February 9, 1813. "The American government has sounded the lowest depth of military disgrace, insomuch that the official records of the campaign take from us all possibility of exulting in our victories over such an enemy." The "Times" found in such reflections a reason for not exulting in ministerial victories, but it bewailed defeats the more loudly, and annoyed the Ministry by the violence of its attacks on naval administration.

As the year passed, and England's triumph in

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Europe seemed to overshadow the world, the "Times,* probably recognizing the uselessness of attacking the Ministry, showed worse temper toward the United States. The Americans were rarely mentioned, and always with language of increasing ill humor. "Despicable in the cabinet, ridiculous in the field," the Americans disappeared from sight in the splendor of victory at Vittoria and Leipzig. No wish for peace was suggested, and if the "Times" expressed the true feelings of the respectable middle class, as it was supposed to aim at doing, no wish for peace could be supposed to exist.

Of the ministerial papers the "Courier" was the best, and of course was emphatic in support of the American war. The Ministry were known to be lukewarm about the United States, and for that rea-
son they thought themselves obliged to talk in public as strongly as the strongest against a peace. When the Russian mediation called for notice. May 13, the "Courier" at once declared against it: —

*^ Before the war commenced, concession might have been proper; we always thought it unwise. But the hour of concession and compromise is passed. America has rushed unnecessarily and unnaturally into war, and she must be made to feel the effects of her folly and in* justice; peace must be the consequence of punishment, and retraction of her insolent demands must precede negotiation. The thunders of our cannon must first strike terror into the American shores."

1 The Times, Oct 17, 1813.

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The "Courier" felt that Americans were not Englishmen, and could not forgive it, but was unable to admit that they might still exercise a considerable influence on human affairs: —

^^ They have added nothing to literature, nothing to any of the sciences; they have not produced one good poet, not one celebrated historian! Their statesmen are of a mixed breed, — half metaphysicians, half politicians; all the coldness of the one with all the cunning of the other. Hence we never see anything enlarged in their conceptions or grand in their measures." ^^

These reasons were hardly sufficient to prove the right of impressing American seamen. The literary, metaphysical, or social qualities of Americans, their "enlarged conceptions," and the grandeur or littleness of their measures, had by common consent ceased to enter into discussion, pending a settlement
of the simpler issue, whether Americans could fight. For a long time the English press encouraged the belief that Americans were as incapable of fighting as of producing poets and historians. Their naval victories were attributed to British seamen. Perhaps the first turn of the tide was in November, 1818, when news of Perry's victory on Lake Erie crossed in London the news of Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig. Perry's victory, like those of Hull, Decatur, and Bainbridge, was too complete for dispute: "It may, however, serve to diminish our vexation at this occurrence to learn that the flotilla in question was not

> The Courier, July 27, 1813.

any branch of the British navy, . . . but a local force, a kind of mercantile military."

By a curious coincidence, Castlereagh's official letter to Monroe, offering direct negotiation, was dated the same day, November 4, when news of the victory at Leipzig met in London news of the defeat on Lake Erie, and Castlereagh probably meant to allow no newspaper prejudices to obstruct a peace; but public opinion was slow to recover its balance. When news arrived that the Americans had captured Maiden, recovered Detroit, and destroyed Proctor's army on the Thames, the "Courier" showed the first symptom of change in opinion by expressing a somewhat simple-minded wish to hear no more about the Americans: —

"* The intelligence is unpleasant, but we confess that we do not view, and have never from the beginning of the war viewed, the events in America with any very powerful interest. The occurrences in Europe will no
doubt produce a very decisive effect upon the American government; and unless it is more obstinate and stupid in its hostility than even we think it, it will do as the other allies of Bonaparte have done, — abandon him."

If the national extravagance could be expected to show its full force in one direction rather than in another, naturalized Americans taken in arms were certain to produce it. The issue was regularly raised after Van Rensselaer's defeat at Queenston in 1812. When the American prisoners arrived at Quebec,

» The Courier, Nov. 4, 1813.

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they were mustered, and twenty-three native-born subjects of Great Britain, belonging to the First, Sixth, and Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, were taken from the ranks and shipped to England to be put on trial as British subjects for bearing arms against their king. The American agent in London reported to the President that the men had arrived there for the reason given. Secretary Armstrong, May 15, 1813, then ordered twenty-three British soldiers into close confinement as hostages. The British government directed Sir George Prevost to put double the number of Americans in close confinement, and Sir George, in giving notice of this measure to General Wilkinson, October 17, 1813, added: —

**I have been further instructed by his Majesty's government to notify to you for the information of the government of the United States that the commanders of his Majesty's armies and fleets on the coasts of America have received instructions to prosecute the war with unmitigated severity against all cities, towns, and villages belonging to the United States, and against the inhabi-
tants thereof, if, after this communication shall have been made to you, and a reasonable time given for its being transmitted to the American government, that government shall unhappily not be deterred from putting to death any of the soldiers who now are or who may hereafter be kept as hostages for the purposes stated in the letter from Major-General Dearborn."

* Prevost to Wilkinson, Oct 17, 1813 ; State Papers, Foreign Relations, iii. 635. Bathurst to Prevost, Aug. 12, 1813; State Papers, Foreign Belations, iii. 641.

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The limit of retaliation was soon reached, for the number of prisoners was small on both sides. The British government somewhat carefully refrained from committing itself too far; but the press treated the matter as though 'it were vital.

** If Mr. Madison," said the "Courier" of July 24, "dare to retaliate by taking away the life of one English prisoner in revenge for a British subject fully proved to be such being taken in the act of voluntarily bearing arms against his country, America puts herself out of the protection of the law of nations, and must be treated as an outlaw. An army and navy acting against her will then be absolved from all obligation to respect the usages and laws of war. Hostilities may be carried on against her in any mode until she is brought to a proper sense of her conduct."

The "Morning Post" of December 28 called for the execution of British subjects taken in arms, and for retaliation on retaliation in defiance of "the brutal wretches who, after betraying, are still suffered to govern America." The "Times" of May 24 spoke with hardly less vehemence. Probably such talk was
not shared by the government, for the government never tested its sincerity by bringing the men to trial; but at the close of 1813 public opinion in England was supposed to be tending toward extreme measures against the United States. The approaching fall of Napoleon threatened to throw America outside the pale of civilization. Englishmen seemed ready to accept the idea that Madison and Napoleon

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should be coupled together, and that no peace should be made which did not include the removal of both from office and power. Of all periods in American history this was probably the least adapted to negotiation, but while England was at the moment of her most extravagant sense of power, President Madison received and accepted Castlereagh's offer to negotiate, and Gallatin went with Bayard to London to hasten the approach of peace.

CHAPTER XV.

GoNOBESS assembled Dec. 6, 1813, at a time of general perplexity. The victories of Perry and Harrison, September 10 and October 5, had recovered Detroit and even conquered a part of West Canada, but their successes were already dimmed by the failures of Wilkinson and Hampton before Montreal, and the retreat of both generals November 18 within United States territory. In the Creek country the Georgians had failed to advance from the east, and Jackson was stopped at Fort Strother by want of supplies and men. At sea the navy was doing little, while the British blockade from New London southward was becoming more and more ruinous to the
Southern and Middle States, and through them to the government. Abroad the situation was not yet desperate. The latest news from Europe left Napoleon at Dresden, victorious for the moment, before the great battles of October. From the American commissioners at St. Petersburg no news had arrived, but England's refusal to accept mediation was unofficially known. With this material the President was obliged to content himself in framing his Annual Message.

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The Message sent to Congress December 7 began by expressing regret that the British government had disappointed the reasonable anticipation of discussing and, if possible, adjusting the rights and pretensions in dispute. From France nothing had been received on the subjects of negotiation. Madison congratulated Congress on the success of the navy upon the ocean and the Lakes, and the victory won by Harrison and B. M. Johnson in Canada. He mentioned briefly the failure of the armies on the St. Lawrence, and at greater length the success of Jackson on the Coosa; and he entered in detail into the retaliatory measures taken on either side in regard to naturalized soldiers. The finances were treated with more show of confidence than was warranted by the prospects of the Treasury; and the Message closed by a succession of paragraphs which seemed written in a spirit of panegyric upon war: —

"The war has proved moreover that our free government like other free governments, though slow in its early movements, acquires in its progress a force proportioned to its freedom; and that the Union of these States, the guardian of the freedom and safety of all and of each, is strengthened by every occasion that puts it to
the test. In fine, the war with its vicissitudes is illustrating the capacity and the destiny of the United States to be a great, a flourishing, and a powerful nation."

The rule that feeble and incompetent governments acquire strength by exercise, and especially in war, had been as well understood in 1798 as it was in 1813, and had been the chief cause of Republican antipathy to war; but had Madison publicly expressed the same sentiment in 1798 as in 1813, he would have found himself in a better position to enforce the rights for which he was struggling when the extreme discontent of nearly one third of the States contradicted his congratulations on "the daily testimony of increasing harmony throughout the Union." Whatever the ultimate result of the war might be, it had certainly not thus far strengthened the Union. On the contrary, public opinion seemed to be rapidly taking the shape that usually preceded a rupture of friendly relations between political societies. Elections in the Middle States showed that the war, if not actually popular, had obliged the people there to support the government for fear of worse evils. New Jersey by a small majority returned to its allegiance, and the city of New York elected a Republican to represent it in Congress; but the steady drift of opinion in the Middle States toward the war was simultaneous with an equally steady drift in the Eastern States against it.

The evidences of chronic discontent in the Eastern States were notorious. Less than a month before Madison wrote his Annual Message, Governor Chittenden of Vermont, by proclamation November 10, recalled the State militia from national service:
He cannot conscientiously discharge the trust reposed in him by the voice of his fellow-citizens, and by the

Proclamation of Nov. 10, 1813; Niles, v. 212.

1813. THE LAST EMBARGO. 86T

Constitution of this and the United States, without an unequivocal declaration that in his opinion the military strength and resources of this State must be reserved for its own defence and protection exclusively, excepting in cases provided for by the Constitution of the United States, and then under orders derived only from the commander-in-chief."

The intercourse between the Eastern States and the enemy was notorious. The Federalist press of Massachussetts, encouraged by Russian and English success in Europe, discussed the idea of withdrawing the State from all share in the war, and making a separate arrangement with England. The President's first act, after sending to Congress his Annual Message, was to send a special Message incidentally calling attention to the want of harmony that paralyzed the energy of the government.

The special and secret Message of December 9 asked Congress once more to impose an embargo. Considering the notorious antipathy of the Eastern States to the system of embargo, the new experiment was so hazardous as to require proof of its necessity. That it was directed against the commerce of the New England States was evident, for the blockade answered the purposes of embargo elsewhere. The Message seemed to propose that all commerce should cease because any commerce must favor the enemy; in effect, it urged that New England should be for-
bidden to sell or buy so long as the rest of the country was prevented from doing so.

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<^ The tendency of our commercial and navigation laws in their present state to favor the enemy/', said Madison, ^^ and thereby prolong the war, is more and more developed by experience. Supplies of the most essential kinds find their way not only to British ports and British armies at a distance, but the armies in our neighborhood with which our own are contending derive from our ports and outlets a subsistence attainable with difficulty if at all from other sources. Even the fleets and troops infesting our coasts and waters are by like supplies accommodated and encouraged in their predatory and incursive warfare. Abuses having a like tendency take place in our import trade. British fabrics and products find their way into our ports under the name and from the ports of other countries, and often in British vessels disguised as neutrals by false colors and papers. ... To shorten as much as possible the duration of the war, it is indispensable that the enemy should feel all the pressure that can be given to it."

Although Madison pointed to the notorious supply of food for the British forces in Canada as one of the motives for imposing an embargo, no one supposed that motive to be decisive. Other laws already forestalled and punished such communication with the enemy; and experience proved that a general embargo would be no more effective than any special prohibition. The idea that England could be distressed by an embargo seemed still less likely to influence Government. Congress knew that Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden and Norway, Spain, and

1 Message of Dec 9, 1813; AmuJs, 1813-1814, p. 2031.
South America were already open to English commerce, and that a few days must decide whether Napoleon could much longer prevent Great Britain from trading with France. The possibility of distressing England by closing Boston and Salem, New Bedford and Newport to neutral ships was not to be seriously treated.

Whatever was the true motive of the President's recommendation, Congress instantly approved it. The next day, December 10, the House went into secret session, and after two days of debate passed an Embargo Act by a vote of eighty-five to fifty-seven, which quickly passed the Senate by a vote of twenty to fourteen, and received the President's approval December 17, being the first legislation adopted at the second session of the Thirteenth Congress. The Act was at once enforced with so much severity that within a month Congress was obliged to consider and quickly adopted another Act* relieving from its operation the people of Nantucket, who were in a state of starvation, all communication with the main land having been forbidden by the law; but nothing proved that the illicit comminication with Canada ceased.

This beginning of legislation at a time when the crisis of the war could be plainly seen approaching suggested much besides want of harmony. The em-

> Act laying an Embargo, Dec. 17, 1813; Annals, 1813-1814, p» 2781.

s Act of Jan. 25, 1814; Annals, 1813-1814, p. 2788.
bargo strengthened the antipathy of New England to the war, — a result sufficiently unfortunate; but it also led to a number of other consequences that were doubtless foreseen by the Administration, since they were prophesied by the Federalists. The Act was approved December 17. Hardly had it gone into operation when the British schooner "Bramble" arrived at Annapolis, December 80, bringing a letter from Gastlereagh to Monroe offering to negotiate directly, though declining mediation. Important as this news was, it did not compare with that in the newspapers brought by the "Bramble." These contained official reports from (Germany of great battles fought at Leipzig October 16, 18, and 19, in which the allies had overwhelmed Napoleon in defeat so disastrous that any hope of his continuing to make head against them in Germany was at an end. Except France, the whole continent of Europe already was open to British commerce, or soon must admit it. From that moment the New England Federalists no longer doubted their own power. Their tone rose; their opposition to the war became more threatening; their schemes ceased to be negative, and began to include plans for positive interference; and the embargo added strength to their hatred of Madison and the Union.

Madison was seldom quick in changing his views, but the battle of Leipzig was an event so portentous that optimism could not face it. Other depressing news poured in. Fort George was evacuated; Fort
Niagara was disgracefully lost; Lewiston, Black Rock, and Buffalo were burned, and the region about Niagara was laid waste; blue lights were seen at New London. Every prospect was dark, but the battle of Leipzig was fatal to the last glimmer of hope that England could be brought to reason, or that New England could be kept quiet. A change of policy could not safely be delayed.

Castlereagh's offer was instantly accepted. January 5 Monroe replied, with some complaint at the refusal of mediation, that the President acceded to the offer of negotiating at Gothenburg. The next day Madison sent the correspondence to Congress, with a warning not to relax "vigorous preparations for carrying on the war." A week afterward, January 14, he nominated J. Q. Adams, J. A. Bayard, Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell as commissioners to negotiate directly with Great Britain, and the Senate confirmed the nominations, January 18, with little opposition except to Jonathan Russell's further nomination as Minister to Sweden, which was confirmed by the narrow vote of sixteen to fourteen. Three weeks later, February 8, Albert Gallatin was added to the commission, George W. Campbell being nominated to the Treasury.

The prompt acceptance of Castlereagh's offer, the addition of Henry Clay to the negotiators, and the removal of Gallatin from the Treasury showed that diplomacy had resumed more than its old importance. The hope of peace might serve to quiet New England
for a time, but mere hope with so little to nourish it could not long pacify any one, if the embargo was to remain in force. Several signs indicated there also a change of policy. Besides the embargo, and in support of its restrictions, Madison had recommended the passage of bills prohibiting collusive captures, ransoming vessels captured by the enemy, and interference by the courts, as well as the introduction of British woollens, cottons, and spirits. The bill prohibiting woollens and other articles was reported to the Senate December 80, the day when the "Bramble" reached Annapolis. The Senate waited nearly a month, till January 27, and then passed the bill, January 31, by a vote of sixteen to twelve. The House referred it to the Committee on Foreign Relations February 3, where it remained. On the other hand, the bill prohibiting ransoms was introduced in the House December 80, and passed January 26 by a vote of eighty to fifty-seven. The Senate referred it January 28 to the Committee on Foreign Relations, which never reported it. The fate of these measures foreshadowed the destiny of the embargo.

Yet the President clung to his favorite measure with a degree of obstinacy that resembled desperation. Congress showed by its indifference to the two supplementary bills that it had abandoned the President's system as early as January, but the embargo continued throughout the winter, and the month of March passed without its removal. The news from Europe at the close of that month left no doubt that

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Napoleon could offer little effectual resistance even
in France to the allies, whose armies were known to have crossed the Rhine, while Wellington advanced on Bordeaux. Holland was restored to her ancient independence, and Napoleon was understood to have accepted in principle, for a proposed Congress at Mannheim, the old boundaries of France as a basis of negotiation. In theory, the overthrow of Napoleon should have not essentially affected the embargo or the Non-importation Acts, which were expected to press upon England independently of Napoleon's Continental system; but in practice the embargo having produced no apparent effect on Europe during the war, could not be expected to produce an effect after England had succeeded in conquering France, and had abandoned her blockades as France had abandoned her decrees. For that reason avowedly Madison at last yielded, and sent a Message to Congress March 81, recommending that the system of commercial restriction should cease:

**Taking into view the mutual interests which the United States and the foreign nations in amity with her have in a liberal commercial intercourse, and the extensive changes favorable thereto which have recently taken place; taking into view also the important advantages which may otherwise result from adapting the state of our commercial laws to the circumstances now existing,**

Taking into view only these influences, Madison seemed to ignore the supposed chief motive of the embargo in stopping supplies for Canada, and to admit that embargo was an adjunct of Napoleon's Continental system; but in truth Madison's motives, both political and financial, were deeper and more decisive

8T4 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch. 15.
than any he alleged. His retreat was absolute. He recommended that Congress should throw open the ports, and should abandon all restriction on commerce beyond a guaranty of war duties for two years after peace as a measure of protection to American manufactures. The failure of the restrictive system was not disguised.

The House received the Message with a mixed sense of relief and consternation, and referred it to Calhoun’s committee, which reported April 4 a bill for repealing the Embargo and Non-importation Acts, together with the reasons which led the committee to unite with the Executive in abandoning the restrictive system.

Calhoun had always opposed the commercial policy of Jefferson and Madison. For him the sudden Executive change was a conspicuous triumph; but he showed remarkable caution in dealing with the House. Instead of attempting to coerce the majority, according to his habit, by the force of abstract principles, he adopted Madison’s reasoning and softened his own tone, seeming disposed to coax his Southern and Western friends from making a display of useless ill-temper. "Men cannot go straight forward," he said, "but must regard the obstacles which impede their course. Inconsistency consists in a change of conduct when there is no change of circumstances which justify it." The changes in the world's circumstances required a return to free trade; but the manufactures would not be left unprotected, — on the contrary, "he hoped at all times and under every policy they would be protected with due care."
As an example of political inconsistency, as Calhoun defined it, his pledge to protect American manufactures deserved to be remembered; but hardly had Calhoun's words died on the echoes of the House when another distinguished statesman offered a prospective example even more striking of what Calhoun excused. Daniel Webster rose, and in the measured and sonorous tones which impressed above all the idea of steadfastness in character, he pronounced a funeral oration over the restrictive system:—

^^ It was originally offered to the people of this country as a kind of political faith; it was to be believed, not examined; ... it was to be our political salvation, nobody knew exactly how; and any departure from it would lead to political ruin, nobody could tell exactly why."

Its opponents had uniformly contended that it was auxiliary to Napoleon's Continental system, in cooperation with Napoleon's government; and its abandonment with the fall of Napoleon showed the truth. While thus exulting in the overthrow of the first «American system," Webster qualified his triumph by adding that he was," generally speaking," not the

1 Annals, 1813-1814, p. 1965.

876 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.11.

enemy of manufactures; he disliked only the rearing them in hot-beds:—

^^ I am not in haste to see Sheffields and Birminghams in America. ... I am not anxious to accelerate the approach of the period when the great mass of American labor shall not find its employment in the field; when the young men of the country shall be obliged to shut their
eyes upon external Nature, — upon the heavens and the earth, — and inmierse themselves in close and unwholesome workshops; when they shall be obliged to shut their ears to the bleatings of their own flocks upon their own hills, and to the voice of the lark that cheers them at the plough, that they may open them in dust and smoke and steam, to the perpetual whirl of spools and spindles and the grating of rasps and saws."

Potter of Rhode Island, where the new manufactures centred, spoke hotly against the change. Much Federalist capital had been drawn into the manufacturing business as well as into speculation in all articles of necessity which the blockade and the embargo made scarce. At heart the Federalists were not unanimous in wishing for a repeal of the restrictive system, and Potter represented a considerable class whose interests were involved in maintaining high prices. He admitted that the average duties would still give American manufactures an advantage of thirty-six per cent, without including freight and marine risks, but he insisted that the bill was intended to encourage importations of British goods ** that we do not want and can do very well without.

IBli. THE LAST EMBARGO. 377

in order to raise a revenue from the people in an indirect way."

Probably Potter's explanation of the change in system was correct. The necessities of the Treasury were doubtless a decisive cause of Madison's step; but these necessities were foreseen by the Federalists when Madison recommended the embargo, and the neglect to give them due weight exposed the Administration to grave reproach. **A government which cannot administer the affairs of a nation," said Web-
ster, without producing so frequent and such violent alterations in the ordinary occupations and pursuits of private life, has in my opinion little claim to the regard of the community."

The Republicans made no attempt to defend themselves from such criticisms. Among the small number who refused to follow Calhoun was Macon, who sat in his seat during the debate writing to his friend Judge Nicholson.

"Those who voted the embargo so very lately," he said, "and those or him who recommended it must, I think, feel a little sore under Webster's rubs. ... I have not for a long time seen the Feds look in so good humor. They have all a smile on their countenances, and look at each other as if they were the men which had brought this great and good work about. . . . The Republicans have not the most pleasing countenances. Those who support the bill do not look gay or very much delighted with their majority, and those who expect to be in the minority have a melancholy gloom over their faces."

^ Macon to Nicholson, April 6, 1814 ; Nicholson MSS.

That the system of commercial restrictions had failed was admitted, but the failure carried no conviction of error to its friends. Physical force had also apparently failed. The Southern Republicans had no choice but to adopt strong measures, giving to the government powers which in their opinion they had no constitutional right to confer; but they remained unshaken in their opinions.

"I confess to you," wrote Macon, "that the parties seem by their acts to be approaching each other, and I
fear that tough times is a strong argument with many of us to stretch the Constitution; and the difference between expediency and constitutionality becomes every day less. Notwithstanding this, I do not despair of the republic, because my dependence has always been on the people; and their influence was felt in laying the embargo, and probably that of the Executive in repealing it."

No one understood or represented so well as Macon the instincts and ideas of the Southern people at that time, and he never represented them more truly than in the matter of the embargo. Virginia and the Carolinas were with him at heart. Macon's hopes for the republic depended on his confidence in the people; and that confidence in its turn depended on his belief that the people were still true to a dogma which the Government had abandoned as impossible. The belief was well founded, as the course of events proved. The House, April 7, by a vote of one hundred and fifteen to thirty-seven, passed the bill re-

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pealing the Embargo and Non-importation Acts; the Senate also passed it, April 12, by a vote of twenty-six to four; the President, April 14, approved it; and from that day the restrictive system, which had been the cardinal point of Jefferson's and Madison's statesmanship, seemed to vanish from the public mind and the party politics of the country. Yet so deeply riveted was the idea of its efficacy among the Southern people, that at the next great crisis of their history they staked their lives and fortunes on the same belief of their necessity to Europe which had led them into the experiment of coercing Napoleon and Canning by commercial deprivations; and their second experiment had results still more striking than those which
attended their first.

The explanation of this curious popular trait certainly lay in the nature of Southern society; but the experience was common to the whole Union. When the restrictive system was abandoned of necessity in April, 1814, it had brought the country to the verge of dissolution. The Government could neither make war nor peace; the public seemed indifferent or hostile; and the same traits which characterized the restrictive system continued to paralyze the efforts of Congress to adopt more energetic methods.

"I will yet hope we may have no more war," wrote Mrs. Madison to Mrs. Gallatin Jan. 7, 1814. » "If we do, alas! alas! we are not making ready as we ought

1 Gallatin MSS.

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to do. Congress trifle away the most precious of their days, — days that ought to be devoted to the defence of their divided country/

Mrs. Madison doubtless echoed the language she heard used at the White House; yet the leaders of Congress were neither triflers nor idlers, and they did all that public opinion permitted. Within a week after Mrs. Madison's complaint, the military committee of the House reported a bill for encouraging enlistments. Viewed as a means of embodying the whole military strength of the republic to resist the whole military strength of Great Britain, about to be released from service in Europe, Troup's bill ^ was not an efficient measure; but it terrified Congress.
During the campaign of 1813, as the story has shown, the Government never succeeded in placing more than ten thousand effective rank-and-file in the field in a single body. About as many more were in garrison, and the sick-list was always large. Armstrong reported to the Ways and Means Committee that the aggregate strength of the army in February, 1813, was 18,945; in June, 27,609; in December, 34,325; and Jan. 17, 1814, it was 83,822. Discouraging as this report was, it concealed the worst part of the situation. In truth, the abstract furnished by the adjutant-general's office gave the number of regular troops in service for January, 1814, not as 83,822, but as 23,614; and to the return a note was appended, explaining that although the numerical force in January, 1814, was 23,614, the actual strength of the army at that time was less than half that number, arising from the expiration of the term of service of the troops raised in 1809 and enlisted for five years, and of the twelve and eighteen-months men enlisted in 1812-1813. The establishment consisted of 58,254 men authorized by law; but the legal establishment was not half filled. The European news showed that England would soon be able to reinforce her army in Canada and take the offensive. Instead of sixty thousand men, Armstrong needed twice that number for a moderately safe defense, since every part of the sea-coast stood at the enemy's mercy, and no adequate defense was possible which did not include an offensive return some-
where on the Canadian frontier. Needing more than one hundred thousand, — authorized by law to enlist sixty thousand, — he could depend on less than thirty thousand men. Yet so far from attempting to increase the establishment, Armstrong hoped only to fill the ranks.

Troup's bill aimed at that object, purporting to be "A Bill making further provision for filling of the ranks of the regular army." No system of draft was suggested. Troup's committee proposed to treble the bounty rather than raise the pay, — a system

^ Note to abstract of regular troops in service, January, 1814 ^ adjutant-general's office. MSS. War Department Archives.

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—which might be economical in a long war ; but if the war should last only one year, the soldier must gain four fifths of his bounty without return. Troup first suggested one hundred dollars as bounty, which Congress raised to one hundred and twenty-four dollars, together with three hundred and twenty acres of land as already fixed. The pay of privates remained at ten dollars. Twenty-four dollars of the bounty was to be paid only on the soldier's discharge. Recruiting-agents were to receive eight dollars for each recruit.

Such a provision for filling the ranks could not be called excessive. Even if the whole bounty were added to the pay, and the soldier were to serve but twelve months, he would receive only twenty dollars a month and his land-certificate. If he served his whole term of five years, he received little more than
twelve dollars a month. The inducement was not
great in such a community as the United States.
The chance that such a measure would fill the ranks
was small; yet the measure seemed extravagant to
a party that had formerly pledged itself against mer-
cenary armies.

If the bill showed the timidity of the Republicans,
it called out worse qualities in the Federalists. The
speeches of the opposition were for the most part
general in their criticisms and denunciations, and de-
served little attention; but that of Daniel Webster
was doubly interesting, because Webster was not only
the ablest but among the most cautious of his party.

mi. THE LAST EMBARGO. 88&

His speech suggested much of the famous eloquence
of his later oratory, but dwelt on ideas to which his.
later life was opposed, and followed lines of argument
surprising in a statesman of his great intellectual
powers. His chief theme was the duty of govern-
ment to wage only a defensive war, except on the
ocean. "Give up your futile projects of invasion.
Extinguish the fires that blaze on your inland fron-
tiers." He wished the government to use its forces
only to repel invasion.

^^ The enemy, as we have seen, can make no permanent
stand in any populous part of the country. Its citizens
will drive back his forces to the line; but at that line
where defence ceases and invasion begins, they stop.
They do not pass it because they do not choose to pass
it. Offering no serious obstacle to their actual power, it
rises like a Chinese wall against their sentiments and
their feelings."

This advice, which echoed a Federalist idea rea-
sonable or excusable in 1812, was out of place in January, 1814. The battles of Leipzig and Vittoria had settled the question of offensive and defensive in Canada. The offensive had passed into British hands, and a successful defence was all that the United States could hope. The interests of New England as well as of New York and of the whole Union required that the defensive campaign should, if possible, be fought on Canadian soil rather than at Plattsburg, Washington, or New Orleans; and even the most ex-

^ Annals, 1813-1814, p. 940.

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treme Federalist could scarcely be believed blind to an idea so obvious.

Moderate as the bill was, fifty-eight members voted against it, while ninety-seven voted in its favor. In the Senate the bill passed without a division, and received, January 27, the President's approval. Meanwhile the Senate passed bills for converting the twelve-months regiments into regiments enlisted for the war, as well as for raising three rifle regiments for the same term, and any number of volunteers that in the President's opinion the public service required, offering to all recruits for these corps the same inducements as to the regular regiments. These bills produced another and a longer debate, but were passed without serious opposition. No further addition was made to the regular army, and no other effort to obtain recruits.

Thus organized, the army consisted of forty-six regiments of infantry enlisted for five years, — four rifle regiments; an artillery corps and a regiment of light artillery; a regiment of dragoons; the engineer
corps, the rangers, and searrencibles, — an aggregate of 62,773 men authorized by law, an increase of only five thousand men over that of the previous year.

The appropriations for the military establishment amounted to nearly twenty-five million dollars, the Federalists alone voting against them. The naval appropriations amounted to seven millions, and were voted without opposition. The Secretary of the Navy discouraged the building of more cruisers, owing to want of timber and seamen; but Congress showed more than ordinary sagacity by appropriating half a million dollars for the construction of floating batteries with steam-power.

Such provision for the coming campaign offered little evidence of increasing energy to make head against the vastly increased military and naval power of England; but the financial outlook was much worse than the military, and Congress dared not face it. The acting Secretary of the Treasury, William Jones, sent his annual report to the House January 8, and so far as his balance-sheet went, no difficulties were apparent. He had disbursed thirty million dollars during the past fiscal year, and needed nearly forty millions for the current year. These sums were not excessive when compared with the wealth of the country or its exertions at other periods of national danger. Half a century afterward the people of the Southern States, not much more numerous than the people of the Union in 1812, and with a far larger proportion of slaves, supported during four years the burden of an army numbering nearly five hundred thousand men. For the same period the Northern people, not much exceeding twenty millions in num-

1814. THE LAST EMBARGO. 885
ber, lent their government more than five hundred million dollars a year. The efforts of 1864, proportioned to the population, were nearly ten times as great as those of 1814, when Secretary Jones looked with well-founded alarm at the prospect of borrowing thirty millions for the year, and of maintaining

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an anny which could scarcely be expected to number forty thousand rank-and-file.

The United States, with a proper currency and untouched resources, should have found no serious difficulty in borrowing thirty or even fifty millions a year in 1814; but they were in reality on the verge of bankruptcy, although the national resources were probably ample. The amount of private capital available for loans was uncertain, and the amount of circulating medium was equally doubtful. Timothy Pitkin of Connecticut, perhaps the best authority in Congress, thought that the paid bank capital of the United States did not much exceed sixty millions, and that the notes of these banks in circulation did not reach thirty millions. His estimate of paid bank capital was probably liberal, but his estimate of the circulation was eight or ten millions too small. Had the Treasury been able to count on the use of these resources, they might have answered all necessary purposes; but between the mistakes of the government and the divisions of the people, the Treasury was left with no sound resources whatever.

The first and fatal blow to the Treasury was the loss of the Bank of the United States, which left the government without financial machinery or a sound
bank-note circulation. The next blow, almost equally severe, was the loss of the Massachusetts and Connecticut banks, which were the strongest in the Union.

1 Speech of Timothy Pitkin, Feb. 10, 1814 ; Annals, 1813« 1814, p. 1297.

Whether the responsibility for the loss rested on the Executive, Congress, or the two States might be a subject for dispute; but whoever was responsible, the effect was ruinous. The New England banks were financial agents of the enemy. The bank capital of Massachusetts including Maine was about twelve and a quarter million dollars; that of Connecticut exceeded three millions. The whole bank capital of New England reached eighteen millions, or nearly one third of the paid bank capital of the whole country, if Pitkin’s estimate was correct. That nearly one third of the national resources should be withdrawn from the aid of government was serious enough; but in reality the loss was much greater, for New England held a still larger proportion of the specie on which the bank circulation of other States depended.

The system of commercial restrictions was responsible for thus, at the most critical moment of the war, throwing the control of the national finances into the hands of the Boston Federalists. Against the protests of the Federalists, manufactures had been forced upon them by national legislation until New England supplied the Union with articles of necessary use at prices practically fixed by her own manufacturers. From the whole country specie began to flow toward Boston as early as the year 1810, and with astonishing rapidity after the war was declared. The British blockade stimulated the movement, and the embargo
of December, 1818, which lasted till April, 1814, cut off every other resource from the Southern and Western States. Unable longer to send their crops even to New England for a market, they were obliged to send specie, and they soon came to the end of their supply. The Massachusetts banks, which reported about $820,000 in specie in 1809, returned more than $8,680,000 in June, 1812; which rose to $5,780,000 in June, 1813, and reached nearly $7,000,000 in June, 1814. In five years the Massachusetts banks alone drew more than six million dollars in specie from the Southern and Middle States, besides what they sent to Canada in payment for British bills.

No one knew how much specie the country contained. Gallatin afterward estimated it at seventeen million dollars, and of that amount the banks of New England in 1814 probably held nearly ten millions. The Massachusetts banks, with seven millions in specie, had a bank-note circulation of less than three millions. The Middle, Southern, and Western States must have had a bank-note circulation approaching forty millions in paper, with seven or eight millions in specie to support it, while the paper was constantly increasing in quantity and the specie constantly diminishing. Bank paper, as was believed, could not with safety exceed the proportion of three paper dol-
lars to every specie dollar in the bank vaults; but the banks in 1814 beyond New England were circulating at least four paper dollars to every silver or gold dollar, and in many cases were issuing paper without specie in their possession.

Already the banks of New England were pressing their demands on those of New York, which in their turn called on Philadelphia and Baltimore. The specie drained to New England could find its way back only by means of government loans, which New England refused to make in any large amount. On the other hand, Boston bought freely British Treasury notes at liberal discount, and sent coin to Canada in payment of them. Probably New England lent to the British government during the war more money than she lent to her own. The total amount subscribed in New England to the United States loans was less than three millions.

This situation was well understood by Congress. In the debate of February, 1814, the approaching dangers were repeatedly pointed out. The alarm was then so great that the Committee of Ways and Means reported a bill to incorporate a new national bank with a capital of thirty million dollars, while Macon openly advocated the issue of government paper,* declaring that "paper money never was beat."** Con-
gress after a diffuse debate passed only a loan bill for twenty-five millions, and an Act for the issue of

» Gallatin's Writings, iii. 284.
« Annals, 1813-1814, p. 1787.

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five million interest-bearing Treasury notes leaving with the President the option to issue five millions more in case he could not borrow it. The legislation was evidently insufficient, and satisfied no one. **You have authorized a loan for twenty-five millions/' said Orundy in the debate of April 2, ^^ and have provided for the expenditure of so much money. Where is the money?"

Without attempting to answer this question, April 18 Congress adjourned.

CHAPTER XVI.

While Congress was thus employed, much occurred behind the scenes that bore directly on the movements of war. The French minister, Serurier, alone made official reports, and his letters became less interesting as his importance diminished; but occasionally he still threw a ray of light on Madison's troubles. At midsummer in 1813 he was in high spirits.

"Within the past week," Serurier wrote, July 21, 1813,* ** we have received^ one after another, news of the fresh successes at the beginning of the campaign, — the battle of Lützen, the offer of armistice, and the battle of Bautzen. These events, so glorious for France, have
been so many thunder-strokes for the enemy in America. Their consternation is equal to their previous confidence, which had no bounds. The Republicans of Congress, on the other hand, have received these news in triumph. All have come to congratulate me, and have told me that they, not less than we, had been victorious at Lützen. The ascendency, henceforth irresistible, which his Majesty is acquiring over his enemies, will, I hope, supply a little tone and vigor to this Government, which had need of them."

When the President returned to Washington, Oct. 25, 1813, Serurier reported with less enthusiasm, but still with confidence, that Madison remained firm:

"He expressed himself in very proper, though very measured, terms on the monstrous coalition that has been renewed against his Majesty. I remarked to him that among our advantages we must doubtless count the fact that the coalition had ten heads, while France had but one. "And what a powerful head!" replied the President, instantly, with less grace than conviction in his whole countenance."

The vigor of Napoleon postponed for a few months the total downfall of Serurier's influence, but it slowly waned, and he became more and more grateful for consideration shown him. The President's Annual Message, December 7, met his approval. "All agree that nothing more energetic or more warlike has yet come from Mr. Madison's Cabinet." ^ The secret Message of December 9 and the embargo pleased

1 Serurier to Bassano, July 21, 1813; Archives des Aff., MSS.

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him more.

"Mr. Monroe assured me three days ago," continued Serurier, writing December 10, "that the Government had been informed of supplies to the extent of nearly thirty thousand barrels of flour furnished to Canada from ports of the United States. A rigorous embargo can alone prevent such criminal speculations, and give the war a decisive character which will shorten its duration and assure its success. ... In this affair is seen a new proof of Mr. Madison's obstinacy (roideur) which prevents him from abandoning a measure he has once put forward, and judges to be for the public interest."

The arrival of the "Bramble" with news of the battle of Leipzig, and with Castlereagh's offer to negotiate, left Serurier helpless. "In this state of things," he wrote,^ January 14, "it would have been difficult for the Executive to refuse to negotiate; and I cannot but think that he accedes to it only with regret and without illusions." In deference to Serurier's opinion, the President appointed Henry Clay as commissioner to treat for peace rather than Crawford, then American envoy to Napoleon; but in the last week of March news arrived from Bordeaux to February 10, announcing that the allies had reached Troyes and were advancing on Paris, while Napoleon had accepted their conditions of negotiation.

"For the moment the public believed everything to be lost," reported Serurier, April 15.* *"I ought in justice to say that the President and his Cabinet showed more
coolness and did not share the universal alarm, and that they continued to show me great confidence in the Emperor's genius. I did not find them excessively disturbed by the march of the allies, or doubtful of our power to

^ Serurier to Bassano, Jan. 14, 1814; Archives des Aff. ttT. MSS.

^ Serurier to Bassano, April 15, 1814; Archives des A& ttr. MSS.

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repulse them; bat I know th^t his Majesty's adhesion to the preliminary conditions of the allies, and yet more the Congress of Chatillon, and the irresistible influence necessarily acqaired for the British minister, greatly (vivement) alarmed Mr. Madison. He thought he saw, in the announcement of our adoption of those conditions, our renunciation of every kind of power and control over Spain and Germany, where England was to rule. He believed that a peace, dictated by Lord Castlereagh, must already have been signed, and that the United States were to remain alone on the field of battle. It was then that Mr. Madison, abruptly and without having in any way prepared the public for it, addressed to Congress the Message recommending an immediate repeal of the embargo and a partial repeal of the non-importation."

While Serurier explained the suddenness of Madison's action by the need of conciliating the Continental powers and the manufacturing cities of England, he added that domestic difficulties had a large share in the decision. Contraband trade had become general in the Eastern States. A sort of civil war, he said, was beginning between the officers of customs and the smugglers; the Govern-
ment also felt serious anxiety for the success of its loan, and began to doubt its ability to maintain payments for the army and navy. Revenue had become necessary. Such was the terror caused by the French news that the capitalists who had offered to contract for the loan began to withdraw their offers and to say that it was no longer practicable. "Analyze it as you please," said Serurier, "you will still find that it was the passage of the Rhine and the progress of the allies in France which, in spite of all I could say, decided this retrograde movement of a Government which I have hitherto always found firm, wise, and consequent. But fear does not reason."

Serurier failed even to obtain permission for French letters-of-marque to be received with their prizes in American ports. The President recommended it to Congress, but Monroe told Serurier that the committee of Congress had not dared to make a report, being persuaded that it would be rejected. "Mr. Monroe agreed to all I said; granted that Congress was in the wrong, and I entirely in the right; but nevertheless Congress has adjourned without considering the question." Serurier was disposed to advise the withdrawal by France of the liberties granted to American privateers, — a measure which, he might almost have foreseen, was likely in any case soon to be taken.

With the repeal of the embargo ended the early period of United States history, when diplomatists played a part at Washington equal in importance to that of the Legislature or the Executive. The statecraft of Jefferson and Madison was never renewed. Thenceforward the government ceased to balance be-
tween great foreign Powers, and depended on its own resources. As far as diplomacy had still a part to

^ Serurier to Bassano, April 25, 1814; Archives des Aff. £tr. MSS.

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play in the year 1814, its field of action was in Europe; and there the ablest men in civil life were sent. Gallatin, Bayard, J. Q. Adams, and Crawford were already on the spot; and Henry Clay, after resigning the Speaker's chair, Jan. 19, 1814, sailed for Gothenburg to take part in the negotiation.

President Madison sought in vain for men of equal ability to supply the gaps made by transferring so many of his strongest supporters to Europe. The House of Representatives, January 19, elected Langdon Cheves Speaker; but the choice was a defeat for Madison, whose friends supported Felix Grundy. The Federalists, joining those Republicans who were hostile to commercial restrictions, numbered ninety-four against fifty-nine votes for Grundy, — and the success of Cheves foreshadowed the overthrow of the embargo. In providing for other vacancies the President fared worse. Cheves was a man of ability, and in general policy was a friend of the Administration; but most of the other material upon which the President must depend was greatly inferior to Cheves. The Cabinet needed partial reconstruction, and Madison was at a loss for choice.

The President's favorite candidate for the Treasury, after Gallatin showed his determination to remain abroad, was Alexander James Dallas of Pennsylvania. Dallas was one of Gallatin's strongest personal friends, an old Republican, and a lawyer of
undoubted ability. Born in Jamaica in 1759, like Gallatin and Hamilton he had become a citizen of

the United States before the Constitution or the confederation was adopted. He had been a leader of the Republican party in Federalist times, and was made district-attorney of Pennsylvania by Jefferson; but Duane and the "Aurora" destroyed his influence and left him isolated. In Pennsylvania Dallas commanded no support. Both the senators, Leib and Lacock, opposed his appointment to the Treasury, and were able to procure his rejection had Madison ventured to make it.^

Obliged to abandon Dallas, the President offered the appointment to Richard Rush, the comptroller, who declined it. At last Madison pitched upon G. W. Campbell, of Tennessee. Since Crawford's departure Campbell had represented the Administration in the Senate, but neither as senator nor as representative had he won great distinction. Best known for his duel with Barent Gardenier, his physical courage was more apparent than his financial fitness. Campbell brought no strength to the Administration, and rather weakened its character among capitalists; but Madison could think of no one better qualified for the place. The Republicans were at a loss for leaders. "I do not complain that Campbell is unfit," wrote Macon to Nicholson; ^ "indeed, if the choice of secretary must be made out of Congress, I do not know that a better could be made." Yet the selection was unfortunate.

^ Ingersoll's History, ii. 253.
> Macon to Nicholson, Feb. 8, 1814; Nicholson MSS.
Madison was also obliged to select a new attorney-general in place of William Pinkney. Till then the attorney-general had not been regarded as standing on the same footing with other members of the Cabinet. The Secretaries of State and Treasury were paid five thousand dollars a year; those of the War and Navy were paid forty-five hundred; but the attorney-general was paid only three thousand. He had neither office-room nor clerks, and was not required to reside permanently at Washington, but pursued the private business of his profession where he liked, attending to the business of government rather as a counsel under general retainer than as a head of Department. Pinkney lived in Baltimore, and his abilities were so valuable that the President was glad to employ them on any terms, and was not inclined to impose conditions of residence which Pinkney could not accept without a greater sacrifice than he was ready to make. Congress was not so forbearing as the President. John W. Taylor, a member from New York, moved a resolution January 6, directing the Judiciary Committee to inquire into the expediency of requiring the attorney-general to reside in Washington during the session of Congress. The committee reported a bill, January 22, requiring permanent residence from the attorney-general, with an increase of salary. The bill failed to become law, but Pinkney at once resigned.

Madison offered the post to Richard Bush, who

1 Madison to Pinkney, Jan. 29, 1814; Works, ii. 581.
accepted it. Bush's abilities were more than respectable, and caused regret that he had not accepted the Treasury, for which he was better fitted than Campbell; but these changes did not improve the Cabinet. "His predecessor, Pinkney, I believe considered him the best lawyer in the nation," wrote Macon; ^ "but that Campbell and Rush are equal to Gallatin and Pinkney is not, I imagine, believed by any one who knows them." In the case of Pinkney and Bush, the advantages of permanent residence balanced in part the loss of ability; but no such consideration affected the change of Campbell for Gallatin.

Fortunately Madison lost enemies as well as friends. Time worked steadily in his favor. The old Smith faction, the Clinton party, and the "Aurora" were already broken. Senators who claimed too much independence of action found public opinion setting strongly against them. Samuel Smith and Giles were near the end of their terms, and had no chance of re-election. The legislature of North Carolina, in December, 1818, censured so severely the conduct of Senator Stone that the senator resigned his seat. ^ At the same time, Pennsylvania succeeded in ridding herself of Senator Leib, and Madison was able to punish the postmaster-general, Gideon Granger, whose friendship for Leib made him obnoxious to his party.

1 Macon to Nicholson, Feb. 17, 1614; Nicholson MSS. 
^ Report and Resolution of Dec. 16^ 1814; Niles, v. 356. '
Granger was not a member of the Cabinet, but his patronage was the more important because at that time, by some anomaly in the law, it was not subject to approval by the Senate. Early in January one of his best post-ofices, that of Philadelphia, became vacant. One senator of the United States had already resigned his seat to become postmaster of New York; and the Pennsylvanians had reason to fear that Leib, whose term was about to expire, would resign to become postmaster of Philadelphia, and that Granger wished to gratify him. Immediately all the Administration Republicans, including members of Congress and of the State legislature, joined in recommending another man, and warned Granger in private that his own removal from office would follow the appointment of Leib.\(^\text{C. J. Ingersoll — a young member from Pennsylvania, among the warmest supporters of Madison and the war — reinforced the threat by moving the House, January 7, for a committee to amend the laws with a view to making postmasters subject to the usual rule of confirmation. The committee, was appointed.}

Irritated by this treatment, Granger in defiance of President and party appointed Michael Leib to the office, and Leib instantly resigned his seat and hastened to assume the duties of his new post. In this transaction Madison was the chief gainer. Not only did he rid himself of Leib, but he gained a warm

\(^\text{Granger to John Todd, February, 1814; New England ("Palladium") March 4, 1814.}\)
ally in the person of Leib's successor; for the Pennsylvania legislature, February 28, transferred Jonathan Roberts from the House to take Leib's place in the Senate. Madison's advantage was not limited by Leib's departure or Roberts's accession. He was able also to punish Granger in a manner at that time almost or quite without parallel. Executive offices ran, as a rule, during good behavior; and although Jefferson made removals of party enemies, neither he nor Madison had ventured to remove party friends, except in cases of misbehavior. Granger's conduct exasperated the Pennsylvanians to a point where no rules were regarded. Eighty-six members of the Pennsylvania legislature joined in addressing a memorial to the President demanding the removal of Granger as the only means of getting rid of Leib, who had not only opposed Madison's election, but who, "when entrusted with one of the highest offices in the gift of the State, . . . acted in direct hostility to her wishes and interests, and aided as far as possible her political enemies." Madison needed little urging. February 25 he nominated to the Senate as postmaster-general the governor of Ohio, Return Jonathan Meigs. After some little delay, the Senate confirmed the appointment, March 17, without a division.

Scarcely was this matter settled, when Congress yielded to Madison's opinion in another instance where for ten years the House had obstinately resisted his wishes. The Yazoo bill became law. For this concession several reasons combined. The Su-
preme Court, through Chief-Justice Marshall, by an elaborate decision in February, 1810, settled the law in favor of the claimants. John Randolph's defeat removed from Congress the chief obstacle to the proposed agreement. The threatening attitude of New England made every palliative necessary. Under these inducements, the Senate passed the bill, February 28, by a vote of twenty-four to eight, and the House passed it, March 26, by a vote of eighty-four to seventy-six.

Little by little the pressure of necessity compelled Congress and the country to follow Madison's lead. Whether for good or for evil, he had his way. His enemies were overcome and driven from the field; his friends were rewarded, and his advice followed. Of revolt within the party he stood no longer in fear. Already political intrigue and factiousness began to take a direction which concerned him only so far as he felt an interest in the choice of his successor. Three years more would complete Madison's public career, and in all probability if another President of the United States were ever elected, he would be one of Madison's friends; but many persons doubted whether the country would reach another Presidential election, and the jealousy which actuated New England against the South was not the only ground for that opinion. In Madison's immediate circle of friends, the jealousy between Virginia and New York threatened to tear the government in pieces. These States did not, like Massachusetts, threaten to leave

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the Union, but their struggles for power promised to bring government to a standstill.
The antipathy of New York for Virginia was not lessened by the success of Virginia in overthrowing Aaron Burr and DeWitt Clinton. The Republican party in New York quickly produced two new aspirants to the Presidency, whose hopes were founded on public weariness of Virginian supremacy. One of the two candidates was Governor Daniel D. Tompkins, whose services as war-governor of New York were great, and were rewarded by great popularity. Governor Tompkins was too remote from the capital to annoy Madison by direct contact with factions or activity in intrigue; but the other rival stood at the centre of Executive patronage. John Armstrong was a man capable of using power for personal objects, and not easily to be prevented from using it as he pleased.

Armstrong was an unusual character. The local influences which shaped Americans were illustrated by the leaders whom New York produced, and by none better than by Armstrong. Virginians could not understand, and could still less trust, such a combination of keenness and will, with absence of conventional morals as the Secretary of War displayed. The Virginians were simple in everything; even their casuistry was old-fashioned. Armstrong's mind belonged to modern New York. The Virginians were a knot of country gentlemen, inspired by faith in rural virtues, and sustained by dislike for the city tendencies of Northern society. Among themselves they were genial, reluctant to offend, and eager to remove causes of offence. The domestic history of the government at Washington repeated the Virginian traits. Jefferson and his friends passed much
time in making quarrels, and more in making peace. Unlike Pennsylvania, New York, and New England, Virginia stood stoutly by her own leaders; and however harsh Virginians might be in their judgment of others, they carried delicacy to an extreme in their treatment of each other. Even John Randolph and W. B. Giles, who seemed to put themselves beyond the social pale, were treated with tenderness and regarded with admiration.

The appearance of a rough and harshly speaking friend in such a society was no slight shock, and for that reason William Henry Crawford was regarded with some alarm; but Crawford was socially one of themselves, while Armstrong belonged to a different type and class. The faculty of doing a harsh act in a harsh way, and of expressing rough opinions in a caustic tone, was not what the Virginians most disliked in Armstrong. His chief fault in their eyes, and one which they could not be blamed for resenting, was his avowed want of admiration for the Virginians themselves. Armstrong's opinion on that subject, which was but the universal opinion of New York politicians, became notorious long before he entered the Cabinet, and even then annoyed Madison.¹

¹ Madison to Jefferson, April 19, 1811; Works, ii. 483.

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The newspapers gossiped about the mean estimate which Armstrong expressed for the capacities of the Virginia statesmen. So old and fixed was the feud, that from the first the Virginians lost no opportunity to express their opinion of Armstrong, especially in the Senate, whenever he was nominated for office. Madison unwillingly selected him for the post of secretary after Crawford refused it, but neither of the Virginia senators voted on the question of con-
firmation. In appointing Armstrong, Madison bestowed on him neither respect nor confidence. He afterward declared the reasons that caused him to invite a person whom he distrusted into a position of the highest importance.

^^ Should it be asked," wrote Madison ten years after the war,* "why the individual in question was placed, and after such developments of his career continued, at the head of the War Department, the answer will readily occur to those best acquainted with the circumstances of the period. Others may be referred for an explanation to the difficulty, which had been felt in its fullest pressure, of obtaining services which would have been preferred, several eminent citizens to whom the station had been offered having successively declined it. It was not imknown at the time that objections existed to the person finally appointed, as appeared when his nomination went to the Senate, where it received the reluctant sanction of a scanty majority [eighteen to fifteen]. Nor was the President unaware or unwarned of the temper and turn of mind ascribed to him, which might be uncongenial

1 Works, iii. 384.

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with the official relations in which he was to stand. But these considerations were sacrificed to recommendation from esteemed friends; a belief that he possessed, with known talents, a degree of military information which might be useful; and a hope that a proper mixture of conciliating confidence and interposing control would render objectionable peculiarities less in practice than in prospect."

Possibly Armstrong took a different view of Madison's conduct, and regarded his own acceptance of
the War Department in January, 1818, as proof both of courage and disinterestedness. He knew that he could expect no confidence from Virginians; but apparently he cared little for Virginian enmity, and was chiefly fretted by what he thought Virginian incompetence. No one could fail to see that he came into the Government rather as a master than a servant. According to General Wilkinson, he was quite as much feared as hated. "I am indeed shocked," wrote Wilkinson in his Memoirs, "when I take a retrospect of the evidence of the terror in which that minister kept more than one great man at Washington." Wilkinson, who hated Madison even more than he hated Armstrong, evidently believed that the President was afraid of his secretary. Madison himself explained that he thought it better to bear with Armstrong's faults than to risk another change in the Department of War.

In that decision Madison was doubtless right*

* Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. 762.

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Whatever were Armstrong's faults, he was the strongest Secretary of War the government had yet seen. Hampered by an inheritance of mistakes not easily corrected, and by a chief whose methods were unmilitary in the extreme, Armstrong still introduced into the army an energy wholly new. Before he had been a year in office he swept away the old generals with whom Madison and Eustis had encumbered the service, and in their place substituted new men. While Major-Generals Dearborn, Pinckney, and Morgan Lewis were set over military districts where active service was unnecessary, and while Major-General Wilkinson was summoned to the last of his many
courts of inquiry, the President sent to the Senate, January 21 and February 21, the names of two new major-generals and six brigadiers of a totally different character from the earlier appointments.

The first major-general was George Izard of South Carolina, born at Pais in 1777, his father Ralph Izard being then American commissioner with Franklin and Deane. Returning to America only for a few years after the peace, George Izard at the age of fifteen was sent abroad to receive a military education in England, Germany, and France in the great school of the French Revolution. As far as education could make generals, Izard was the most promising officer in the United States service. Appointed in March, 1812, colonel of the Second Artillery, promoted to brigadier in March, 1813, he served with credit under Hampton at Chateaugay, and received his promotion over the heads of Chandler, Boyd, and one or two other brigadiers his seniors. He was intended to succeed Hampton on Lake Champlain.

The second new major-general was Jacob Brown, who after receiving an appointment of brigadier, July 19, 1818, was suddenly promoted to major-general at the same time with Izard. The selection was the more remarkable because Brown had no military education, and was taken directly from the militia. Born in Pennsylvania in 1775 of Quaker parentage, Brown began life as a schoolmaster. At the instance of the Society of Friends, he taught their public school in New York city for several years with credit. He then bought a large tract of land near Sackett’s Harbor, and in 1799 undertook to found a town of Brownville. He soon became a leading citizen in that part.
of New York, and in 1809 was appointed to the command of a militia regiment. In 1811 he was made a brigadier of militia, and at the beginning of the war distinguished himself by activity and success at Ogdensburg. His defence of Sackett’s Harbor in 1813 won him a brigade in the regular service, and his share in Wilkinson's descent of the St Lawrence led to his further promotion.

Wilkinson, who regarded Brown as one of his enemies, declared that he knew not enough of military duty to post the guards of his camp,^ and that he compelled his battery to form in a hollow for the advance of elevating the pieces to fire at the opposite heights.^ Winfield Scott, who was one of Brown's warmest friends, described him as full of zeal and vigor, but not a technical soldier, and but little acquainted with organization, tactics, police, and camp duties in general.^ The promotion of an officer so inexperienced to the most important command on the frontier, gave a measure of Armstrong's boldness and judgment.

The six new brigadiers were also well chosen. They were Alexander Macomb, T. A. Smith, Daniel Bissell, Edmund P. Gaines, Winfield Scott, and Meazer W. Ripley, all colonels of the regular army, selected for their merits. Armstrong supplied Brown's defects of education by giving him the aid of Winfield Scott and Ripley, who were sent to organize brigades at Niagara.
The energy thus infused by Armstrong into the regular army lasted for half a century; but perhaps his abrupt methods were better shown in another instance, which brought upon him the displeasure of the President. Against Harrison, Armstrong from the first entertained a prejudice. Believing him to be weak and pretentious, the Secretary of War showed the opinion by leaving him in nominal command in the northwest, but sending all his troops in different directions, without consulting him even in regard to movements within his own military department.

^ Wilkinson's Memoirs, iii. 65.
* Autobiography, p. 118.

Harrison, taking just offence, sent his resignation as major-general, May 11, 1814, but at the same time wrote to Grovernor Shelby of Kentucky a letter which caused the governor to address to the President a remonstrance against accepting the resignation.^ At that moment Armstrong and Madison were discussing the means of promoting Andrew Jackson in the regular service for his success in the Creek campaigns. No commission higher than that of brigadier was then at their disposal, and a commission as brigadier was accordingly prepared for Jackson May 22, with a brevet of major-general. ^ Harrison's resignation had been received by Armstrong two days before issuing Jackson's brevet, and had been notified to the President, who was then at Montpelier.* The President replied May 25, suggesting that in view of Harrison's resignation, the better way would be to send a commission as major-general directly to Jackson:
"I suspend a final decision, however, till I see you, which will be in two or three days after the arrival of
this." * No sooner did Armstrong receive the letter, than without waiting for the President's return he wrote to Jackson, May 28: "Since the date of my letter of the 24th Major-General Harrison has resigned

* Dawson, p. 436; Lossing, p. 663.

' Armstrong to Jackson, May 23, 1814; Madison's Works, iii. 376.

< Armstrong to Madison, May 20, 1814; Madison's Works, iii. 375.

* Madison's Works, iii. 375.

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his commission in the army, and thus is created a vacancy in that grade, which I hasten to fill with your name." ^

Armstrong's course was irregular^ and his account to Jackson of the circumstances was incorrect; for Harrison's resignation had been received before, not after, Armstrong's letter of the 24th. Madison believed that Armstrong wished to appear as the source of favor to the army. Armstrong attributed Madison's hesitation to the wish of Madison and Monroe that Harrison, rather than Jackson, should take command of Mobile and New Orleans. ^ Both suspicions might be wrong or right; but Armstrong's conduct, while betraying the first motive, suggested the fear that the President might change his mind; and Harrison believed that the President would have done so, had not Armstrong's abrupt action made it impossible. "The President expressed his great regret," said Harrison's biographer, ^8 "that the letter of Governor Shelby had not been received earlier, as in that
case the valuable services of General Harrison would have been preserved to the nation in the ensuing campaign."

Little as the President liked his Secretary of War, his antipathy was mild when compared with that of Monroe. The failure of the Canada campaign gave a

* Madison's Works, iii. 377.


- Dawson, p. 436. ^,

serious blow to Armstrong; but he had still recovered Detroit, and was about to finish the Creek war. BGs hold upon the army was becoming strong. His enemies charged him with ambition; they said he was systematically engaged in strengthening his influence by seducing the young officers of talents into his personal support, teaching them to look for appreciation not to the President but to himself, and appointing to office only his own tools, or the sons of influential men. He was believed to favor a conscription, and to aim at the position of lieutenant-general. These stories were constantly brought to Monroe, and drove him to a condition of mind only to be described as rabid. He took the unusual step of communicating them to the President, ^ with confidential comments that, if known to Armstrong, could hardly have failed to break up the Cabinet.

"It is painful to me to make this communication to you," wrote the Secretary of State Dec. 27, 1813; * "nor should I do it if I did not most conscientiously believe
that this man, if continued in office, will ruin not you
and the Administration only, but the whole Republican
party and cause. He has already gone far to do it, and
it is my opinion, if he is not promptly removed, he will
soon accomplish it. Without repeating other objections
to him, if the above facts are true, • • • he wants a
head fit for his station. Indolent except to improper
purposes, he is incapable of that combination and activ-
ity which the times require. My advice to you, there*
fore, is to remove him at once. The near prospect of a
conscription, adopted and acted on without your appro-
bation or knowledge, is a sufficient reason. The burn-
ing of Newark, if done by his orders, is another. The
failure to place troops at Fort George is another. In
short there are abundant reasons for it. His removal
for either of the three would revive the hopes of our
party now desponding, and give a stimulus to measures.
I do not however wish you to act on my advice, — con-
sult any in whom you have confidence. Mr. A. has, as
you may see, few friends, and some of them cling to
him rather as I suspect from improper motives, or on
a presumption that you support him."

Armstrong's faults were beyond dispute, but his
abilities were very considerable; and the President
justly thought that nothing would be gained by dis-
missing him, even to restore Monroe to the War De-
partment. Armstrong, struggling with the load of
incapable officers and insufficient means, for which
Madison and Congress were responsible, required the

\(^{\text{^ Qilman's Monroe, p. 114.}}\)

* Monroe to Madison, Dec 27, 1813; Monroe MSS. State
Department Archives.

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firm support of his chief and his colleagues, as well as of the army and of Congress, to carry the burden of the war; but he had not a friend to depend upon. Secretary Jones was as hostile as Monroe. Pennsylvania and Virginia equally distrusted him, and the fate of any public man distrusted by Pennsylvania and Virginia was commonly fixed in advance. Armstrong was allowed to continue his preparations for the next campaign, but Monroe remained actively hostile. In a private letter to Crawford, written prob-

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ably about the month of May, 1814, and preserved with a memorandum that it was not sent, Monroe said: ^ —

"There is now no officer free to command to whom the public looks with any sort of confidence or even hope. Izard stands next, but he is as you see otherwise engaged [on a court of inquiry on Wilkinson]. Thus the door is left open for some new pretender, and Mr. Armstrong is that pretender. This has been his object from the beginning. . . . The whole affair is beyond my control."

Thus the elements of confusion surrounding Armstrong were many. A suspicious and hesitating President; a powerful and jealous Secretary of State; a South Carolinian major-general, educated in the French engineers, commanding on Lake Ohamplain; a Pennsylvania schoolmaster, of Quaker parentage, without military knowledge, commanding at Sackett's Harbor and Niagara; a few young brigadiers eager to distinguish themselves, and an army of some thirty thousand men, — these were the elements with which Armstrong was to face the whole military power of England; for Paris capitulated March 81, and the
war in Europe was ended.

In one respect, Armstrong's conduct seemed inconsistent with the idea of selfishness or intrigue. The duty of organizing a court martial for the trial of William Hull fell necessarily upon him. Hull's defence must inevitably impeach Hull's superiors;

^ Monroe MSS. State Department Archives.

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his acquittal was possible only on the ground that the Department had been criminally negligent in supporting him. As far as Armstrong was interested in the result, he was concerned in proving the incapacity of his predecessor Eustis, and of the President, in their management of the war. He could have had no personal object to gain in procuring the conviction of Hull, but he might defend his own course by proving the imbecility of Dearborn.

The President ordered a court martial on Hull before Armstrong entered the War Department. A. J. Dallas drew up the specifications, and inserted, contrary to his own judgment, a charge of treason made by the Department. The other charges were cowardice, neglect of duty, and unofficer-like conduct. Monroe, while temporarily at the head of the Department, organized the first court to meet at Philadelphia Feb. 25, 1818. Major-General Wade Hampton was to preside.

Before the trial could be held, Armstrong came into office, and was obliged to order the members of the court to active service. Hampton was sent to Lake Champlain, and when his campaign ended in November, 1813, he returned under charges resem-
bling those against HuU. Finding that neither Wilkinson nor Armstrong cared to press them, and satisfied that no inquiry could be impartial, Hampton


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determined to settle the question by once more sending in his resignation, which he did in March, 1814, when it was accepted. Armstrong in effect acquitted Hampton by accepting his resignation, and never publicly affirmed any charge against him until after Hampton's death, when he attributed to the major-general "much professional error and great moral depravity." Hampton's opinion of Armstrong could be gathered only from his conduct and his letters to the Secretary of War, but was not materially different from Armstrong's opinion of Hampton.

Meanwhile Hull waited for trial. During the summer of 1818 he saw nearly all his possible judges disgraced and demanding courts martial like himself. Hampton was one; Wilkinson another; Dearborn a third. Dearborn had been removed from command of his army in face of the enemy, and loudly called for a court of inquiry. Instead of granting the request, the President again assigned him to duty in command of Military District No. 3, comprising the city of New York, and also made him President of the court martial upon General Hull.

The impropriety of such a selection could not be denied. Of all men in the United States, Dearborn was most deeply interested in the result of Hull's trial, and the President, next to Dearborn, would be
inost deeply injured by Hull's acquittal. The judg-

^ Defence of General Hampton; "National InteUigeneory* 
June 7, 1814.

* Notices, etc., iL 26.
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ment of Dearborn, or of any court over which Dear-
born presided, in a matter which affected both court 
and government so closely could not command re-
spect. That Armstrong lent himself to such a meas-
ure was a new trait of character never explained ; but 
that Madison either ordered or permitted it showed 
that he must have been unconscious either of Dear-
bom's responsibility for Hull's disaster, or of his 

Hull offered no objection to his court, and the trial 
began at Albany, Jan. 3, 1814, Dearborn presiding, 
and Martin Yan Buren acting as special judge-advo-
cate. March 26 the court sentenced Hull to be shot 
to death for cowardice, neglect of duty, and unofficer-
like conduct. April 25 President Madison approved 
the sentence, but remitted the execution, and Hull's 
name was ordered to be struck from the army roll.

That some one should be punished for the loss of 
Detroit was evident, and few persons were likely to 
complain because Hull was a selected victim; but 
many thought that if Hull deserved to be shot, other 
men, much higher than he in office and responsi-
bility, merited punishment ; and the character of the 
court-martial added no credit to the Government, 
which in effect it acquitted of blame.
HISTORY
or THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DURING THE SECONd ADMINISmITION OF
JAMES MADISON
By henry ^ADAMS
Vol. II.
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
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HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.

CHAPTER L

At the beginning of the year 1814, the attitude of New England pleased no one, and perhaps annoyed most the New England people themselves, who were conscious of showing neither dignity, power, courage, nor intelligence. Nearly one half the people of the five New England States supported the war, but were paralyzed by the other half, which opposed it. Of the peace party, one half wished to stop the war, but was paralyzed by the other half, which threatened to desert their leaders at the first overt act of treason. In this dead-lock every one was dissatisfied, but no one seemed disposed to yield.

Such a situation could not last. In times of revolution treason might be necessary, but inert perversity could at no time serve a useful purpose. Yet like Massachusetts Federalists professed only a wish to remain inert. Josiah Quincy, who fretted at restraints, and whose instincts obliged him to act as energetically as he talked, committed his party to
the broad assertion that "a moral and religious people" could not express admiration for heroism displayed in a cause they disapproved. They would defend Massachusetts only by waiting to be invaded; and if their safety depended on their possessing the outlet of Lake Champlain, they would refuse to seize it if in doing so they should be obliged to cross the Canadian line. With one accord Massachusetts Federalists reiterated that until their territory should be actually invaded, they would not take arms. After January 1, 1814, when news of the battle of Leipzig arrived, the dreaded invasion of New England became imminent; but the Federalists, officially and privately, insisted on their doctrine of self-defence.

"In the tumult of arms," said Governor Strong in his speech to the legislature, January 12, 1814, "the passions of men are easily inflamed by artful misrepresentations; they are apt to lose sight of the origin of a contest, and to forget, either in the triumph of victory or the mortification of defeat, that the whole weight of guilt and wretchedness occasioned by war is chargeable upon that government which unreasonably begins the conflict, and upon those of its subjects who, voluntarily and without legal obligation, encourage and support it."

The Massachusetts Senate echoed the sentiment in language more emphatic: —

"Beyond that submission which laws enacted agreeably to the Constitution make necessary, and that self-defence which the obligation to repel hostile invasions justifies, a people can give no encouragement to a war..."
of saoh a character without becoming partakers in its guilt, and rendering themselves obnoxious to those just retributions of Divine vengeance by which, sooner or later, the authors and abettors of such a war will be assuredly overtaken."

The House of Representatives could see but one contingency that warranted Massachusetts in making voluntary exertion: —

"^It is only after the failure of an attempt to negotiate, prosecuted with evidence of these dispositions on the part of our Administration, that any voluntary support of this unhappy war can be expected from our constituents."

In thus tempting blows from both sides, Massachusetts could hardly fail to suffer more than by choosing either alternative. Had she declared independence, England might have protected and rewarded her. Had she imitated New York in declaring for the Union, probably the Union would not have allowed her to suffer in the end. The attempt to resist both belligerents forfeited the forbearance of both. The displeasure of Great Britain was shown by a new proclamation, dated April 26, 1814, including the ports of New England in the blockade; so that the whole coast of the Union, from New Brunswick to Texas, was declared to be closed to commerce by "a naval force adequate to maintain the said blockade in the most rigorous and effective manner." ^

^ Proclamation of Admiral Cochiamey April 25, 1814; Niles, vL182.

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However annoying the blockade might be, it was
a trifling evil compared with other impending dangers from Great Britain. Invasion might be expected, and its object was notorious. England was known to regret the great concessions she had made in the definitive treaty of 1788. She wished especially to exclude the Americans from the fisheries, and to rectify the Canadian boundary by recovering a portion of Maine, then a part of Massachusetts. If Massachusetts by her neutral attitude should compel President Madison to make peace on British terms, Massachusetts must lose the fisheries and part of the District of Maine; nor was it likely that any American outside of New England would greatly regret her punishment.

The extreme Federalists felt that their position could not be maintained, and they made little concealment of their wish to commit the State in open resistance to the Union. They represented as yet only a minority of their party; but in conspiracies, men who knew what they wanted commonly ended by controlling the men who did not. Pickering was not popular; but he had the advantage of following a definite plan, familiar for ten years to the party leaders, and founded on the historical idea of a New England Confederation. For Pickering, disunion offered no terrors. "On the contrary," he wrote, July 4, 1813, "I believe an immediate separation


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I

would be a real blessing to the ^good old thirteen States/ as John Randolph once called them." ^ His
views on this subject were expressed with more or less fidelity and with much elaboration in a pamphlet published in 1818 by his literary representative, John Lowell. His policy was as little disguised as his theoretical opinions; and in the early part of the year 1814, under the pressure of the embargo, he thought that the time had come for pressing his plan for a fourth time on the consideration of his party. Without consulting his old associates of the Essex Junto, he stimulated action among the people and in the State legislature.

The first step was, as usual, to hold town-meetings and adopt addresses to the General Court. Some forty towns followed this course, and voted addresses against the embargo and the war. Their spirit was fairly represented by one of the most outspoken, adopted by a town-meeting at Amherst, over which Noah Webster presided Jan. 8, 1814.* The people voted —

"That the representatives of this town in the General Court are desired to use their influence to induce that honorable body to take the most vigorous and decisive measures compatible with the Constitution to put an end to this hopeless war, and to restore to us the blessings of peace. What measures it will be proper to take, we

1 Pickering to George Logan, July 4, 1813; New England Federalism, p. 391.

* Thoughts in Answer to a Question respecting the Division of the States; by a Massachusetts Farmer.

• The Palladium, Feb. 1, 1814.

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pretend not to prescribe; but whatever measures they shall think it expedient to adopt, either separately or in conjunction with the neighboring States, they may rely upon our faithful support.

The town of Newbury in Essex County made itself conspicuous by adopting, January 81, a memorial inviting bloodshed:—

"We remember the resistance of our fathers to oppressions which dwindle into insignificance when compared with those which we are called on to endure. The rights which we have received from God we will never yield to man. We call on our State legislature to protect us in the enjoyment of those privileges to assert which our fathers died, and to defend which we profess ourselves ready to resist unto blood. We pray your honorable body to adopt measures immediately to secure to us especially our undoubted right of trade within our State. We are ourselves ready to aid you in securing it to us to the utmost of our power, peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must; and we pledge to you the sacrifice of our lives and property in support of whatever measures the dignity and liberties of this free, sovereign, and independent State may seem to your wisdom to demand."

The voters of Newbury were constituents of Pickering. Their address could not have reached him at Washington when a few days afterward he wrote to Samuel Putnam, an active member of the General Court, then in session, urging that the time for re-

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monstrances had passed, and the time for action had come:—
^Declarations of this sort by Massachusetts, especially if concurred in by the other New England States^ would settle the business at once. But though made now by Massachusetts alone, you surely may rely on the co-operation of New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and I doubt not of Vermont and New York. With the executives and legislatures of most, and the representatives of all of them, you can freely communicate. Ought there not to be a proposal of a convention of delegates from those six States?"

The project of a New England convention was well understood to violate the Constitution, and for that reason alone the cautious Federalists disliked and opposed it. Doubtless a mere violence done to the law did not necessarily imply a wish for disunion. The Constitution was violated more frequently by its friends than by its enemies, and often the extent of such violations, measured the increasing strength of the Union. In such matters intent was everything; and the intent of the proposed New England convention was made evident by the reluctance with which the leaders slowly yielded to the popular demand.

The addresses of the towns to the General Court were regularly referred to a committee, which reported February 18,^ in a spirit not altogether satisfactory to the advocates of action: —


' Report of Committee; Nilea, Vol. 4.8.

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** Whenever the national compact is violated and the
citizens of this State are oppressed by cruel and un-
authorized laws, the legislature is bound to interpose its
power and wrest from the oppressor his victim. This
is the spirit of our Union, and thus it has been explained
by the very man who now sets at defiance all the prin-
ciples of his early political life. ... On the subject of
a convention, the committee observe that they entertain
no doubt of the right of the legislature to invite other
States to a convention and to join it themselves for the
great purposes of consulting for the general good, and
of procuring Amendments to the Constitution whenever
they find that the practical construction given to it by
the rulers for the time being is contrary to its true spirit
and injurious to their immediate constituents. • • • This
was the mode proposed by Mr. Madison^ in answer to
objections made as to the tendency of the general gov-
ernment to usurp upon that of the States."

The argument ad personam commonly proved
only weakness. Madison's authority on these points
had always been rejected by the Federalists when
in power; and even he had never asserted the right
of States to combine in convention for resistance to
measures of the national government, as the (eneral
Court was asked to do. So revolutionary was the
step that the committee of both Houses shrank from
it: "They have considered that there are reasons
which render it inexpedient at the present moment
to exercise this power." They advised that the sub-
ject should not be immediately decided, but should

^ Federalist no. 46.

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be referred to the representatives soon to be returned
for the next General Court, who would " come from
the people still more fully possessed of their views
and wishes as to the all-important subject of obtaining by future compact, engrafted into the present Constitution, a permanent security against future abuses of power, and of seeking effectual redress for the grievances and oppressions now endured."

To the people, therefore, the subject of a New England convention was expressly referred. The issue was well understood, and excluded all others in the coming April election. So serious was the emergency, and so vital to the Administration and the war was the defeat of a New England convention, that the Republicans put forward no party candidate, but declared their intention to vote for Samuel Dexter, a Federalist, — although Dexter, in a letter dated February 14, reiterated his old opinions hostile to the embargo, and professed to be no further a Republican than that he offered no indiscriminate opposition to the war. His Federalism was that of Rufus King and Bayard.

"What good is to be expected," he asked,* "from creating division when engaged in war with a powerful nation that has not yet explicitly shown that she is willing to agree to reasonable terms of peace? Why make publications and speeches to prove that we are absolved from allegiance to the national government" and hint

* Dexter to the Electors of Massachusetts, Feb. 14, 1814; Niles, vi. d.

that an attempt to divide the empire might be justified?

• • • The ferocious contest that would be the effect of attempting to skulk from a participation of the burdens of war would not be the greatest calamity."
Under such circumstances the load of the embargo became too heavy for the Massachusetts Republicans to carry. They tried in every manner to throw it off, as persistently as President Madison tried to hold it on. Their candidate, Dexter, argued strongly against the restrictive system in his letter consenting to stand. They drew a distinction between the restrictive system and the war; but even in regard to the war they required not active support, but only abstinence from active resistance. The Federalists used the embargo to stimulate resistance to the war, and advocated a New England convention under cover of the unpopularity of commercial restrictions.

With the pertinacity which was his most remarkable trait, Madison hung to the embargo all winter in face of overwhelming motives to withdraw it. A large majority in Congress disliked it. England having recovered her other markets could afford to conquer the American as she had conquered the European, and to wait a few months for her opportunity. The embargo bankrupted the Treasury, threatened to stop the operations of war, and was as certain as any ordinary antecedent of a consequent result to produce a New England convention. Yet the President maintained it until the news from Europe caused a panic in Congress.

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The Massachusetts election took place in the first days of April, while Congress was engaged in repealing the embargo and the system of commercial restrictions. The result showed that Dexter might have carried the State and defeated the project of a New England convention, had the embargo been repealed a few weeks earlier. A very large vote, about one hundred and two thousand in aggregate, was
cast. The Federalists, whose official vote in 1813 was 66,764, threw 66,374 votes; while the Republicans, who cast 42,789 votes in 1813, numbered 46,369 in 1814.

The reduction of the Federalist majority from fourteen thousand to eleven thousand was not the only reason for believing that Dexter might have carried Massachusetts but for the embargo. At the same time William Plumer, supported like Dexter by the Republicans, very nearly carried New Hampshire, and by gaining a majority of the executive council, precluded the possibility that New Hampshire as a State could take part in a New England convention. The President's Message recommending a repeal of the embargo was sent to Congress March 31, and the Act of Repeal was signed April 14. Two weeks later, April 28, the New York election took place. To this election both parties anxiously looked. The Administration press admitted that all was lost if New York joined Massachusetts, and the New England Federalists knew that a decisive defeat in New York would leave them to act alone. The returns were watched with such anxiety as had seldom attended a New York election, although no general State officer was to be chosen.

In May, 1813, Governor Tompkins carried the State by a majority of only 8,506, and the Federalists in the House of Assembly numbered sixty, while the Republicans numbered fifty-two. The city of New York and the counties of Queens, Westchester, Dutchess, Columbia, Rensselaer, and Washington —
the entire range of counties on the east shore of the Hudson — were then Federalist. The counties of Albany, Montgomery, Oneida, Otsego, Madison, and Ontario in the centre of the State were also Federalist. At the congressional election of 1812, twenty Federalists and six Republicans had been chosen. The May election of 1814 was for the State Assembly and for Congress. No opportunity was given for testing the general opinion of the State on a single issue, but no one could mistake what the general opinion was. City and State reversed their political character. The Republicans recovered possession of the Assembly with a large majority of seventy-four to thirty-eight, and the Congressional delegation numbered twenty-one Republicans and only six Federalists.

The result was supposed to be largely due to a dislike of the New England scheme and to a wish among New York Federalists that it should be stopped. The energy of the demonstration in New York marked 1814. MASSACHUSETTS DECIDES. 13

the beginning of an epoch in national character; yet the change came too late to save Massachusetts from falling for the first time into the hands of the extreme Federalists. The towns of Massachusetts chose as their representatives to the General Court a majority bent on taking decisive action against the war. Connecticut and Rhode Island were controlled by the same impulse, and the discouraged Republicans could interpose no further resistance. A New England convention could be prevented only by a treaty of peace.

The effect of the attitude of New England was felt throughout the Union, and, combined with the news
from Europe, brought a general conviction that peace must be made. No man in the Union was more loyal to the war than Governor Shelby of Kentucky, but Shelby already admitted that peace had become necessary,

"I may in confidence confess to you," wrote Shelby, April 8, \(^ {\text{\textdegree}} \) \(^ {\text{\textdegree}} \) that I lament over my country that she has in her very bosom a faction as relentless as the fire that is unquenchable, capable of thwarting her best interests, and whose poisonous breath is extending to every corner of the Union. There is but one way to cure the evil, and that is an awful and desperate one; and in the choice of evils we had better take the least. Were we unanimous I should feel it less humiliating to be conquered, as I verily believe that the Administration will be driven to peace on any terms by the opposition to the war."

1 Shelby to J. J. Crittenden, April 8, 1814; Life of Crittenden, p. 31.

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If Governor Shelby had reached this conclusion before he knew the result of the Massachusetts election, the great mass of citizens who had been from the first indifferent to the war felt that peace on any terms could no longer be postponed. Mere disunion was not the result chiefly to be feared. That disunion might follow a collapse of the national government was possible; but for the time, Massachusetts seemed rather disposed to sacrifice the rest of the Union for her own power than to insist on a separation. Had the Eastern States suffered from the hardships of war they might have demanded disunion in despair; but in truth New England was pleased at the contrast between her own prosperity and the sufferings of her neighbors. The blockade and the embargo brought
wealth to her alone. The farming and manufacturing industries of New England never grew more rapidly than in the midst of war and commercial restrictions. "Machinery for manufactures, etc., and the fruits of household industry increase beyond calculation," said a writer in the "Connecticut Herald" in July, 1813. "Wheels roll, spindles whirl, shuttles fly. We shall export to other States many more productions of industry than ever were exported in any one former season." Manufactures were supposed to amount in value to fifteen or twenty million dollars a year. The Federalists estimated the balance due by the Southern States to New England at six million dollars a year.


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year. ^ The New England banks were believed to draw not less than half a million dollars every month from the South.

^* We are far from rejoicing at this state of things," wrote a Connecticut Federalist;* "and yet we cannot but acknowledge the hand of retributive justice in inflicting the calamities of war with so much more severity on that section of the Union which has so rashly and so unmercifully persisted in their determination to commence hostilities. The pressure of this balance is sensibly felt, and will continue to increase as long as the war continues."

John Lowell declared^ that "the banks are at their wits' end to lend their capital, and money is such a drug . • • that men against their consciences, their honor, their duty, their professions and promises, are willing to lend it secretly to support the very
measures which are intended and calculated for their ruin." To avoid the temptation of lending money to support Madison's measures, many investors bought British government bills of exchange at twenty to twenty-two per cent discount. These bills were offered for sale in quantities at Boston; and perhaps the most legitimate reason for their presence there was that they were taken by New England contractors in payment for beef and flour furnished to the British commissariat in Canada.

1 The Palladium, July 16, 1814.
 « The Palladium, July 16, 1814.
 • Road to Ruin, No. 6; The Examiner, Jan. 5, 1814.

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While New England thus made profits from both Bides, and knew not what to do with the specie that flowed into her banks, the rest of the comitry was already insolvent, and seemed bent on bankruptcy. In March, 1814, the legislature of Pennsylvania passed a bill for the creation of forty-one new banks. March 19 Governor Snyder vetoed it.^

^ ^ It is a fact well ascertained," said Governor Snyder, *^ that immense sums of specie have been withdrawn from the banks in Pennsylvania and certain other States to pay balances for British goods which Eastern mercantile cupiditity has smuggled into the United States. The demand for specie has in consequence been and is still so great that the banks in Philadelphia and in some other parts have stopped discounting any new paper. I ask a patriotic legislature, Is this an auspicious era to try so vast an experiment? Shall we indirectly aid our internal and external enemies to destroy our funds and embarrass the government by the creating of forty-one new banks which must have recourse for specie to
that already much exhausted source? Is there at this
time an intelligent man in Pennsylvania who believes
that a bank-note of any description is the representative
of specie?"

The Pennsylvania legislature instantly overrode
Governor Snyder's veto and chartered the new banks,
which were, according to the governor, insolvent
before they had legal existence. In ordinary times
such follies punished and corrected themselves in
regular course; but in 1814 the follies and illusions

» Niles, vi. 94.

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of many years concentrated their mischiefe on the
national government) which was already imequal to
the burden of its own. The war was practically at
an end as far as the government conducted it. The
army could not show a regiment with ranks more
than half full. The first three months of the year
produced less than six thousand recruits. The gov-
ernment could defend the frontier only at three or
four fortified points. On the ocean government ves-
sels were scarcely to be seen. The Treasury was as
insolvent as the banks, and must soon cease even
the pretence of meeting its obligations.

The Secretary of the Treasury, authorized by law
to borrow twenty-five millions and needing forty,
offered a loan for only ten millions shortly before
Congress adjourned. In Boston the government bro-
kers advertised that the names of subscribers should
be kept secret, while the Boston " Gazette * of April
14 declared that any man who lends his money
to the government at the present time will forfeit
all claim to common honesty and common courtesy
among all true friends to the country." The offers, received May 2, amounted to thirteen millions, at rates varying from seventy-five to eighty-eight. Jacob Barker, a private banker of New York, offered five million dollars on his single account. The seo-

1 Scots Autobiography, pp. 114, 118, 121.
' Return, etc. ; State Papers, Military Affairs^ L 521.

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retary knew that Barker's bid was not substantial, but he told the President that if it had been refused we could not have obtained the ten millions without allowing terms much less favorable to the government." The terms were bad at best. The secretary obtained bids more or less substantial for about nine millions at eighty-eight, with the condition that if he should accept lower terms for any part of the sixteen millions still to be offered, the same terms should be conceded to Barker and his associates. The operation was equivalent to borrowing nine millions on an understanding that the terms should be fixed at the close of the campaign. Of this loan Boston offered two millions, and was allotted about one million dollars.

The event proved that Campbell would have done better to accept all solid bids without regard to rate, for the government could have afforded to pay two dollars for one within a twelve-month, rather than stop payments; but Campbell was earnest to effect his loan at eighty-eight, and accordingly accepted only four million dollars besides Barker's offer. With
these four millions, with whatever part of five millions could be obtained from Barker, with interest-bearing Treasury notes limited to ten million dollars,^ and with the receipts from taxes, the Treasury was to meet demands aggregating about forty millions

^ Secretary Campbell to Madison, May 4, 1814; Madison MSS.y State Department Archives.

> Act of March 4, 1814 ; Annals, 1813-1814, p. 2795.

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for the year ; for the chance was small that another loan could succeed, no matter what rate should be offered.

For this desperate situation of the government New England was chiefly responsible. In pursuing their avowed object of putting an end to the war the Federalists obtained a degree of success surprising even to themselves, and explained only by general indifference toward the war and the government. No one could suppose that the New England Federalists, after seeing their object within their grasp, would desist from effecting it. They had good reason to think that between Madison's obstinacy and their own, the national government must cease its functions, — that the States must resume their sovereign powers, provide for their own welfare, and enter into some other political compact ; but they could not suppose that England would forego her advantages, or consent to any peace which should not involve the overthrow of Madison and his party.

In such conditions of society morbid excitement was natural. Many examples in all periods of history could be found to illustrate every stage of a
The excitement of the time was not confined to New England. A typical American man-of-the-world was Gouverneur Morris. Cool, easy-tempered, incredulous, with convictions chiefly practical, and illusions largely rhetorical, Morris delivered an oration on the overthrow of Napoleon to a New York audience, June 29, 1814.

"And thou too, Democracy! savage and wild!" began Morris’s peroration, — "thou who wouldst bring down the virtuous and wise to the level of folly and guilt! thou child of squinting envy and self-tormenting spleen! thou persecutor of the great and good! — see! though it blast thine eyeballs, — see the objects of thy deadly hate! See lawful princes surrounded by loyal subjects! . . . Let those who would know the idol of thy devotion seek him in the island of Elba!"

The idea that American democracy was savage and wild stood in flagrant contrast to the tameness of its behavior; but the belief was a part of conservative faith, and Gouverneur Morris was not ridiculed, even for bad taste, by the society to which he belonged, because he called by inappropriate epithets the form of society which most of his fellow-citizens preferred. In New England, where democracy was equally reviled, kings and emperors were not equally admired. The austere virtue of the Congregational Church viewed the subject in a severer light, and however extreme might be the difference of conviction between clergymen and democrats, it was not a subject for ridicule.

To men who believed that every calamity was a Divine judgment, politics and religion could not be made to accord. Practical politics, being commonly
an affair of compromise and relative truth, — a himian attempt to modify the severity of Nature's processes, — could not expect sympathy from the absolute and abstract behests of religion. Least of all could war^
the fruits of their own labors. This was a powerful

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motive for them to dissolve their connection with the Ancient Dominion. Though their fathers had found their union with Egypt pleasant and profitable, though they had been the most opulent section in Egypt, yet since the change of the administration their schemes had been reversed, their employments changed, their prosperity destroyed, their vexations increased beyond all sufferance. They were tortured to madness at seeing the fruit of their labors torn from them to support a profligate administration. . . . They became discouraged; they were perplexed. Moses and others exhorted them not to despair, and assured them that one mode of relief would prove effectual. Timid, trembling, alarmed, they hardly dared to make the experiment. Finally they dissolved the Union: they marched; the sea opened; Jordan stopped his current; Canaan received their triumphant banners; the trees of the field clapped their hands; the hills broke forth into songs of joy; they feasted on the fruits of their own labors. Such success awaits a resolute and pious people."

Although Parish's rhetoric was hardly in worse taste than that of Gouverneur Morris, such exhortations were not held in high esteem by the great body of the Congregational clergy, whose teachings were studiously free from irreverence or extravagance in the treatment of political subjects. A poor and straitened but educated class, of whom not one in four obtained his living wholly from his salary, the New England ministers had long ceased to speak with the authority of their predecessors,

^ Defence of the Clergy; Concord, July, 1814.
and were sustained even in their moderate protest against moral wrong rather by pride of class and sincerity of conviction than by sense of power. Some supported the war; many deprecated disunion; nearly all confined their opposition within the limits of non-resistance. They held that as the war was unnecessary and unjust, no one could give it voluntary aid without incurring the guilt of blood.

The attitude was clerical, and from that point of view commanded a degree of respect such as was yielded to the similar conscientiousness of the Friends; but it was fatal to government and ruinous to New England. Nothing but confusion could result from it if the war should continue, while the New England church was certain to be the first victim if peace should invigorate the Union.

CHAPTER II

After the close of the campaign on the St. Lawrence, in November, 1813, General Wilkinson's army, numbering about eight thousand men, sick and well, went into winter-quarters at French Mills, on the Canada line, about eight miles south of the St. Lawrence. Wilkinson was unfit for service, and asked leave to remove to Albany, leaving Izard in command; but Armstrong was not yet ready to make the new arrangements, and Wilkinson remained with the army during the winter. His force seemed to stand in a good position for annoying the enemy and interrupting communications between Upper and Lower Canada; but it lay idle between November 13 and February 1, when, under orders from Armstrong, it
was broken up.\(^\) Brigadier-General Brown, with two thousand men, was sent to Sackett's Harbor. The rest of the army was ordered to fall back to Plattsburg, — a point believed most likely to attract the enemy's notice in the spring.\(^\)

\(^\) Armstrong to Wilkinson, Jan. 20, 1814; Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. 625.

* Armstrong's Notices, IL 64.

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Wilkinson obeyed, and found himself, in March, at Plattsburg with about four thousand effectives. He was at enmity with superiors and subordinates alike; but the chief object of his antipathy was the Secretary of War. From Plattsburg, March 27, he wrote a private letter to Major-General Dearborn,\(^\) whose hostility to the secretary was also pronounced: "I know of his [Armstrong's] secret underworkings, and have therefore, to take the bull by the horns, demanded an arrest and a court-martial. . . . Good God! I am astonished at the man's audacity, when he must be sensible of the power I have over him." Pending the reply to his request for a court-martial, Wilkinson determined to make a military effort. "My advanced post is at Champlain on this side. I move to-day; and the day after to-morrow, if the ice, snow, and frost should not disappear, we shall visit the Lacoue, and take possession of that place. This is imperiously enjoined to check the reinforcements he [Prevost] continues to send to the Upper Province." \(^\)

The Lacoue was a small river, or creek, emptying into the Sorel four or five miles beyond the boundary. According to the monthly return of the troops
commanded by Major-General de Rottenburg, the British forces stationed about Montreal numbered, Jan. 22, 1814, eight thousand rank-and-file present for duty. Of these, eight hundred and eighty-five

^ Wilkinson to Dearborn, March 27, 1814; Dearborn MSS.
* Wilkinson to Dearborn, March 27, 1814; Dearborn MSS.

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were at St. John's; six hundred and ninety were at Isle aux Noix, with outposts at Lacadie and Lacolle of three hundred and thirty-two men.^

Wilkinson knew that the British outpost at the crossing of Lacolle Creek, numbering two hundred men all told,^ was without support nearer than Isle aux Noix ten miles away; but it was stationed in a stone mill, with thick walls and a solid front. He took two twelve-pound field-guns to batter the mill, and crossing the boundary, March 30, with his four thousand men, advanced four or five miles to Lacolle Creek. The roads were obstructed and impassable, but his troops made their way in deep snow through the woods until they came within sight of the mill. The guns were then placed in position and opened fire; but Wilkinson was disconcerted to find that after two hours the mill was unharmed. He ventured neither to storm it nor flank it; and after losing more than two hundred men by the fire of the garrison, he ordered a retreat, and marched his army back to Champlain.

With this last example of his military capacity-Wilkinson disappeared from the scene of active life, where he had performed so long and extraordinary a part. Orders arrived, dated March 24, relieving him from duty under the form of granting his request for
a court of inquiry. Once more he passed the ordeal

^ State of the Left Division, Jan. 22, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archivea. Freer Papers, 1814, p. 17.
s James, ii. 82, 83.

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of a severe investigation, and received the verdict of acquittal; but he never was again permitted to resume his command in the army.

The force Wilkinson had brought from Lake OntariOy though united with that which Wade Hampton had organized, was reduced by sickness, expiration of enlistments, and other modes of depletion to a mere handful when Major-Oeneral Izard arrived at Plattsburg on the first day of May. Izard's experience formed a separate narrative, and made a part of the autumn campaign. During the early summer the war took a different and imexpected direction, following the steps of the new Major-General Brown; for wherever Brown went, fighting followed.

General Brown marched from French Mills, February 13, with two thousand men. February 28, Secretary Armstrong wrote him a letter suggesting an attack on Kingston, to be covered by a feint on Niagara. ^ Brown, on arriving at Sackett's Harbor, consulted Chauncey, and allowed himself to be dissuaded from attacking Kingston. "By some extraordinary mental process," Armstrong tjiought,* Brown and Chauncey "arrived at the same conclusion, — ^that the main action, an attack on Kingston, being impracticable, the ruse, intended merely to mask it, might do as well." Brown immediately marched with two thousand men for Niagara.
When the secretary learned of this movement, al-

* Armstrong to Brown, Feb. 28, 1814; Notices, ii. 213. t Armstrong's Notices, ii. 66.

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though it was contrary to his ideas of strategy, he wrote an encouraging letter to Brown, March 20: ^

"* You have mistaken my meaning. . . . K you hazard anything by this mistake, correct it promptly by returning to your post. If on the other hand you left the Harbor with a competent force for its defence, go on and prosper. Good consequences are sometimes the result of mistakes."

The correspondence showed chiefly that neither the secretary nor the general had a distinct idea, and that Brown's campaign, like Dearborn's the year before, received its direction from Chauncey, whose repugnance to attacking Kingston was invincible.

Brown was shown his mistake by Gaines, before reaching Buffalo March 24, and leaving his troops, he hurried back to Sackett's Harbor, "the most unhappy man alive." ^ He resumed charge of such troops as remained at the Harbor, while Winfield Scott formed a camp of instruction at Buffalo, and, waiting for recruits who never came, personally drilled the officers of all grades. Scott's energy threw into the little army a spirit and an organization strange to the service. Three months of instruction converted the raw troops into soldiers.

Meanwhile Brown could do nothing at Sackett's Harbor. The British held control of the Lake, while Commodore Chauncey and the contractor Eckford
were engaged in building a new ship which was to

^ Lossing, p. 793.

* Brown to ArmBtrong, March 24, 1814; Lowing, p. 793.

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be ready in July. The British nearly succeeded in
prerenting Chauncey from appearing on the Lake
during the entire season, for no sooner did Sir
James Yeo sail from Kingston in the spring than
he attempted to destroy the American magazines.
Owing to the remote situation of Sackett's Harbor
in the extreme northern corner of the State, all
supplies and war material were brought first from
the Hudson River to Oswego by way of the Mohawk
River and Oneida Lake. About twelve miles above
Oswego the American magazines were established,
and there the stores were kept until they could be
shipped on schooners, and forwarded fifty miles along
the Lake-shore to Sackett's Harbor, — always a haz-
ardous operation in the face of an enemy's fleet.
The destruction of the magazines would have been
fatal to Chauncey, and even the capture or destruc-
tion of the schooners with stores was no trifling
addition to his difficulties.

Sir James Yeo left Kingston May 4, and appeared
off Oswego the next day, bringing a large body of
troops, numbering more than a thousand rank-and-
file.* They found only about three hundred men to
oppose them, and having landed May 6, they gained
possession of the fort which protected the harbor of
Oswego. The Americans made a resistance which
caused a loss of seventy-two men killed and wounded
to the British, among the rest Captain Mulcaster of
the Royal Navy, an active officer, who was danger*
ously wounded. The result was hardly worth the loss. Four schooners were captured or destroyed, and some twenty-four hundred barrels of flour, pork, and salt, but nothing of serious importance. Yeo made no attempt to ascend the river, and retired to Kingston after destroying whatever property he could not take away.

Although the chief American depot escaped destruction, the disgrace and discouragement remained, that after two years of war the Americans, though enjoying every advantage, were weaker than ever on Lake Ontario, and could not defend even so important a point as Oswego from the attack of barely a thousand men. Their coastwise supply of stores to Sackett's Harbor became a difficult and dangerous undertaking, to be performed mostly by night. Ghaimcey remained practically blockaded in Sackett's Harbor; and without his fleet in control of the Lake the army could do nothing effectual against Kingston.

In this helplessness, Armstrong was obliged to seek some other line on which the army could be employed against Upper Canada; and the idea occurred to him that although he had no fleet on Lake Ontario he had one on Lake Erie, which by a little ingenuity might enable the army to approach the heart of Upper Canada at the extreme western end of Lake Ontario. "Eight or even six thousand men," Arm*

^ Report of Sir James Yeo; Jamesy ii. 428-430.
fitrong wrote ^ to the President, April 80, "landed in the bay between Point Abino and Port Erie, and operating either on the line of the Niagara, or more directly if a more direct route is found, against the British post at the head of Burlington Bay, cannot be resisted with effect without compelling the enemy 80 to weaken his more eastern posts as to bring them within reach of our means at Sackett's Harbor and Plattsburg."

Armstrong's suggestion was made to the President April 80. Already time was short. The allies had entered Paris March 81; the citadel of Bayonne capitulated to Wellington April 28. In a confidential despatch dated June 8, Lord Bathurst notified the governor-general of Canada that ten thousand men had been ordered to be shipped immediately for Quebec* July 5, Major-General Torrens at the Horse-guards informed Prevost that four brigades, — Brisbane's, Kempt's, Power's, and Robinson's; fourteen regiments of WelUngton's best troops, — had sailed from Bordeaux for Canada. ^ Prevost could afford in July to send westward every regular soldier in Lower Canada, sure of replacing them at Montreal by the month of August.

"A discrepancy in the opinions of the Cabinet,"* according to Armstrong,* delayed adoption of a plan

' Armstrong's Notices, iL 216.

* M. T. Woolsey to Chaancey, June 1, 1814; Niles, vi 266.

* Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

* Torrens to Prevost, July 5, 1805; MSS. Canadian Archives.
tni June, when a compromise scheme was accepted,' but not carried out.

^^Two causes prevented its being acted upon in ea> tensoj' Armstrong afterward explained,* — **the one, a total failure in getting together by militia calls and volunteer overtures a force deemed competent to a campaign of demonstration and manoeuvre on the peninsula; the other, an apprehension that the fleet, which had been long inactive, would not yet be found in condition to sustain projects requiring from it a vigorous co-operation with the army.'

Brown might have been greatly strengthened at Niagara by drawing from Detroit the men that could be spared there; but the Cabinet obliged Armstrong to send the Detroit force — about nine hundred in number — against Mackinaw. Early in July the Mackinaw expedition, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Croghan, started from Detroit, and August 4 it was defeated and returned. Croghan's expedition did not even arrive in time to prevent a British expedition from Mackinaw crossing Wisconsin and capturing, July 19, the distant American post at Prairie du Chien.*

Armstrong did not favor Croghan's expedition, wishing to bring him and his two batteries to reinforce Brown, but yielded to the Secretary of the Navy,

1 Armstrong to Izard, June 11, 1814; Izard's Correspondence, p. 33.

^ Armstrong's Notices, ii 82.
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who wished to capture Mackinaw, and to the promises of Commodore Chauncey that on or before July 1 he would sail from Sackett's Harbor, and command the Lake. In reliance on Chauncey, the Cabinet, except Monroe, decided that Major-General Brown should cross to the Canadian side, above the Falls of Niagara, and march, with Chauncey's support, to Burlington Heights and to York.

This decision was made June 7, and Armstrong wrote to Brown, June 10, describing the movement intended.* The Secretary of the Navy, he said, thought Chauncey could not be ready before July 16:

"To give, however, immediate occupation to your troops, and to prevent their blood from stagnating, why not take Fort Erie and its garrison, stated at three or four hundred men? Land between Point Abino and Erie in the night; assail the Fort by land and water; push forward a corps to seize the bridge at Chippawa; and be governed by circumstances in either stopping there or going farther. Boats may follow and feed you. If the enemy concentrates his whole force on this line, as I think he will, it will not exceed two thousand men."

Brown had left Sackett's Harbor, and was at Buffalo when these orders reached him. He took immediate measures to carry them out. Besides his regular

Madison to the Secretary of Navy, May A^ 1814; Madison's Works, iii. 396.
force, he called for volunteers to be commanded by Peter B. Porter; and he wrote to Chauncey, June 21, an irritating letter, complaining of having received not a line from him, and giving a sort of challenge to the navy to meet the army before Port George, by July 10. The letter showed that opinion in the army ran against the navy, and particularly against Chauncey, whom Brown evidently regarded as a sort of naval Wilkinson. In truth, Brown could depend neither upon Chauncey nor upon volunteers. The whole force he could collect was hardly enough to cross the river, and little exceeded the three thousand men on whose presence at once in the boats Alexander Smyth had insisted eighteen months before, in order to capture Port Erie.

So famous did Brown’s little army become, that the details of its force and organization retained an interest equalled only by that which attached to the frigates and sloops-of-war. Although the existence of the regiments ceased with the peace, and their achievements were limited to a single campaign of three or four months, their fame would have insured them in any other service extraordinary honors and sedulous preservation of their identity. Two small brigades of regular troops, and one still smaller brigade of Pennsylvania volunteers, with a corps of artillery, composed the entire force. The first brigade
was commanded by Brigadier-General Winfield Scott^ Brown to Chauncey, June 21, 1814; enclosed in Brown to Armstrong, June 22, 1814; MSS. War Department Archivea.

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and its monthly return of June 80, 1814, reported its organization and force as follows:^ — 

Strength of the Firsts or Scott* $^ Brigade.


Non-oom. Offlcen, Ofloen. PtMent and

imnfc«nd-AIe. absent.

Ninth Regiment . . •
Eleventh Regiment • •
Twenty-second Regiment
Twenty-fifth Regiment .
General Staff ....

Total

332 16 642
416 17 577
217 12 287
The Ninth regiment came from Massachusetts, and in this campaign was usually commanded by its lieutenant-colonel, Thomas Aspinwall, or by Major Henry Leavenworth. The Eleventh was raised in Vermont, and was led by Major John McNeil. The Twenty-second was a Pennsylvania regiment, commanded by its colonel, Hugh Brady. The Twenty-fifth was enlisted in Connecticut, and identified by the name of T. S. Jesup, one of its majors. The whole brigade, officers and privates, numbered thirteen hundred and eighty-four men present for duty on the first day of July, 1814.

The Second, or Ripley's, brigade was still smaller, and became even more famous. Meazar Wheelock Ripley was born in New Hampshire, in the year 1782. He became a resident of Portland in Maine, and was sent as a representative to the State legislature at

^ Monthly Returns, etc., MSS. War Department Archives.

BoBton, where he was chosen speaker of the Maflaa-
chusetts House of Representatives, Jan. 17, 1812, on
the retirement of Joseph Story to become a Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States. A few
weeks afterward, March 12, 1812, Ripley took the
commission of lieutenant-colonel of the Twenty-first regiment, to be enlisted in Massachusetts. A year afterward he became colonel of the same regiment, and took part in the battle of Ghrystler's Field. Secretary Armstrong made him a brigadier-general April 15, 1814, his commission bearing date about a month after that of Winfield Scott. Both the new brigadiers were sent to Niagara, where Scott formed a brigade from regiments trained by himself; and Ripley was given a brigade composed of his old regiment, the Twenty-first, with detachments from the Seventeenth and Nineteenth and Twenty-third. The strength of the brigade, July 1, 1814, was reported in the monthly return as follows:

Strength of the Second, or Ripley's, Brigade.

PmiSBIT FOB

DUTT.

AoeiMAti.

Twenty-first Regiment •
Twenty-third Regiment •
General stftff • • *

Non-eom. Offloen,
xmnk-and-flle.

• . 651
• . 341
Ripley’s old regiment, the Twenty-first, was given to Colonel James Miller, who had served in the Tippecanoe campaign as major in the Fourth In*
fantrj, and had shared the misfortune of that regiment at Detroit. The other regiment composing the brigade — the Twenty-third — was raised in New York, and was usually commanded by one or another of its majors, McFarland or Brooke. Ripley's brigade numbered one thousand and twenty-seven men present for duty, on the first day of July.

The artillery, under the command of Major Hindman, was composed of four companies.

Stren^ of Hindman^s BcUtalion of ArtXUery.

PBC8BHT FOB DUTT. AOCnMATB.

Towson't Company 89 101
Biddle'a Company 80 104
Ritchie's Company 96 183
Williams's Company _62 73

Total 327 413

The militia brigade was commanded by Peter B* Porter, and consisted of six hundred Pennsylvania volunteer militia, with about the same number of Indians, comprising nearly the whole military strength of the Six Nations.^

Strength of MaJoT'Oenerdl Brown* s Army, Buffalo^ July 1, 1814.

PRBSSin FOR DOTT. AGOaOATI.

ArtiHexy. • •
Scott's Brigade.
Ripley's Brigade
Porter's Brigade

Total.

Non-oom. Offloen, OIBo«m, PreMnt and
xmnk-aiid-flie. abacntl.

330 15 413
1312 65 2122
992 36 1415
710 43 830

3344 159 4780


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Thus the whole of Brown's army consisted of half-
a^ozen skeleton regiments, and including every offi-
cer, as well as all Porter's volunteers, numbered barely
thirty-five hundred men present for duty. The ag-
gregate, including sick and absent, did not reach
five thousand.

The number of effectives varied slightly from week
to week, as men joined or left their regiments; but
the entire force never exceeded thirty-five hundred
men, exclusive of Indians.
According to the weekly return of June 22, 1814, Major-deneral Riall, who commanded the right division of the British army, had a force of four thousand rank-and-file present for duty; but of this number the larger part were in garrison at York, Burlington Heights, and Fort Niagara. His headquarters were at Fort George, where he had nine hundred and twenty-seven rank-and-file present for duty. Opposite Fort George, in Fort Niagara on the American side, five hundred and seventy-eight rank-and-file were present for duty. At Queenston were two hundred and fifty-eight; at Chippawa, four hundred and twenty-eight; at Fort Erie, one hundred and forty-six. In all, on the Niagara River Riall commanded two thousand three hundred and thirty-seven rank-and-file present for duty. The officers, musicians, etc., numbered three hundred and thirty-two. At that time only about one hundred and seventy men were on the sick list. All told, sick and well, the regular force numbered two thousand eight hundred and forty men. They belonged chiefly to the First, or Boyal Scots; the Eighth, or King's; the Hundredth, the Hundred-and-third regiments, and the Artillery, with a few dragoons.

As soon as Porter's volunteers were ready, the whole American army was thrown across the river. The operation was effected early in the morning of July 8; and although the transport was altogether insufficient, the movement was accomplished without accident or delay. Scott's brigade with the artillery landed below Fort Erie; Ripley landed above; the Indians gained the rear; and the Fort, which was an open work, capitulated at five o'clock in the after-
noon. One hundred and seventy prisoners, including officers of all ranks,^ being two companies of the Eighth and Hundredth British regiments were sur>
rendered by the major in command.

The next British position was at Ghippawa, about sixteen miles below. To Chippawa Major-General Biall hastened from Fort George, on hearing that the American army had crossed the river above; and there, within a few hours, he collected about fifteen hundred regulars and six hundred militia and Indians, behind the Chippawa River, in a position not to be assailed in front. The American army also hastened toward Chippawa. On the morning of July 4 Scott's brigade led the way, and after an ex-

1 Weekly Distribution Betoin, June 22, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives, Freer Papers, 1814, p. 53.
* James, IL 117.

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hausting inarch of twelve hours, the enemy tearing up the bridges in retiring, Scott reached Ghippawa plain toward sunset, and found Biall's force in po-
sition beyond the Chippawa River. Scott could only retire a mile or two, behind the nearest water, — a creek, or broad ditch, called Street's Greek, — where he went into camp. Brown and Ripley, with the second brigade and artillery, came up two or three hours later, at eleven o'clock in the night.^ Porter followed the next morning.

Brown, knowing his numbers to be about twice those of Riall, was anxious to attack before Riall could be reinforced; and on the morning of July 6, leaving Ripley and Porter's brigades encamped in the rear, he reconnoitred the line of the Ghippawa
River, and gave orders for constructing a bridge above Riall's position. The bridge was likely to be an affair of several days, and Riall showed a disposition to interfere with it. His scouts and Indians crossed and occupied the woods on the American left, driving in the pickets and annoying the reconnoitring party, and even the camp. To dislodge them, Porter's volunteers and Indians were ordered forward to clear the woods; and at about half-past four o'clock in the afternoon. Porter's advance began to drive the enemy's Indians back, pressing forward nearly to the Ghippawa River. There the advancing volunteers and Indians suddenly became aware that the whole British army was in the act of crossing the Ghippawa Bridge on their flank. The surprise was complete, and Porter's brigade naturally broke and fell back in confusion.

No one could have been more surprised than Brown, or more incredulous than Scott, at Riall's extraordinary movement. The idea that a British force of two thousand men at most should venture to attack more than three thousand, with artillery, covered by a deep, miry creek, had not entered their minds. Riall drew up his little army in three columns on the Chippawa plain, — the King's regiment four hundred and eighty strong in advance, supported by the Royal Scots five hundred strong, and the Hundredth four hundred and fifty strong, with a troop of dragoons and artillerists; in all about fifteen hundred regular troops, with two twenty-four-pound field-pieces and a five-and-a-half inch howitzer. Six hundred militia and Indians occupied the woods.
The whole force advanced in order of battle toward Street's Creek.

Brown was at the front when this movement was made. Porter was routed. Ripley with the second brigade was in the rear. Scott, having rested his brigade in the morning and given them a dinner to celebrate the Fourth of July, had ordered a grand parade \(^\text{^\^}\) to keep his men in breath," as he said ; and while Riall's regular force, fifteen hundred strong, formed on the Chippawa plain a mile away, Scott's


- Biall'B Report of July 6, 1814 ; James^ ii 431.

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brigade — which a week before had been reported as containing thirteen hundred men present for duty, and if all its details had been called in could hardly have exceeded thirteen hundred men in the ranks on the afternoon of July 5 — was forming, before crossing the little bridge over Street's Creek to parade on the plain already occupied by the British. Owing to the brushwood that lined the creek Scott could not see the plain, and received no notice of danger until he approached the bridge at the head of his brigade. At that moment General Brown in full gallop from the front rode by, calling out in passing, "You will have a battle!" ^ Scott remarked that he did not believe he should find three hundred British to fight, and crossed the bridge.

If Riall was unwise to attack, Scott tempted destruction by leaving his secure position behind the creek ; but at that moment he was in his tiappiest temper. He meant to show what he and his brigade
could do. As his thin column crossed the bridge, the British twenty-four-pound guns opened upon it; but the American line moved on, steady as veterans, and formed in order of battle beyond. Towson's three twelve-pounders were placed in position near the river on the extreme right, and opened fire on the heavier British battery opposite. The infantry deployed in three battalions, — the right, under Major Leavenworth of the Ninth; the centre, under Major McNeil of the Eleventh; the left, under Major Jesup of the

^ Scott's Autobiography, p. 128.

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Twenty-1Sth. Throwing the flanks obliquely forward, and extending Jesup's battalion into the woods on the left to prevent outflanking, Scott ordered an advance; and at the same time Riall directed the Royal Scots and the Hundredth to charge. ^ The two lines advanced, stopping alternately to fire and move forward, while Towson's guns, having blown up a British caisson, were turned on the British column. The converging American fire made havoc in the British ranks, and when the two lines came within some sixty or seventy paces of each other in the centre, the flanks were actually in contact. Then the whole British line broke and crumbled away. ^ Ripley's brigade, arriving soon afterward, found no enemy on the plain. The battle had lasted less than an hour. Riall's report made no concealment of his defeat.*

** I placed two light twenty-four-pounders and a five-and-a-half inch howitzer," he said, "against the right of the enemy's position, and formed the Royal Scots and Hundredth regiment with the intention of making a movement upon his left, which deployed with the greatest regularity and opened a very heavy fire. I
immediately moved up the King's regiment to the right, while the Royal Scots and Hundredth regiments were directed to charge the enemy in front, for which they advanced with the greatest gallantry under a most destructive fire. I am sorry to say, however, in this at-

1 Riairs Report, July 6, 1814; James, ii. 432.


* James, iL 432.

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tempt they suffered so severely that I was obliged to withdraw them, finding their farther efforts against the euperior numbers of the enemy would be unavailing."

For completeness, Scott's victory at Ghippawa could be compared with that of Isaac Hull over the *' Guerriere;" but in one respect Scott surpassed Hull. The ^^Constitution" was a much heavier ship than its enemy; but Scott's brigade was weaker, both in men and guns, than Biall's force. Even in regulars, man against man, Scott was certainly outnumbered. His brigade could not have contained, with artil-lerists, more than thirteen hundred men present on the field,^ while Biall officially reported his regulars at fifteen hundred, and his irregular corps at six hundred. Scott's flank was exposed and turned by the rout of Porter. He fought with a creek in his rear, where retreat was destruction. He had three twelve-pound field-pieces, one of which was soon dis-mounted, against two twenty-four-pounders and a five-and-a-half inch howitzer. He crossed the bridge and deployed under the enemy's fire. Yet the rela-tive losses showed that he was the superior of his
enemy in every respect, and in none more than in the efficiency of his guns.

Riall reported a total loss in killed, wounded, and missing of five hundred and fifteen men, not including Indians. Scott and Porter reported a total loss of two hundred and ninety-seven, not including Indians. Biall's regular regiments and artillery lost

1 Mansfield's Scott, p. 112. * James ii. 434.

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one hundred and thirty-seven killed, and three hundred and five wounded. Scott's brigade reported forty-eight killed and two hundred and twenty-seven wounded. The number of Riall's killed was nearly three times the number of Scott's killed, and proved that the battle was decided by the superior accuracy or rapidity of the musketry and artillery fire, other military qualities being assumed to be equal.

The battle of Chippawa was the only occasion during the war when equal bodies of regular troops met face to face, in extended lines on an open plain in broad daylight, without advantage of position; and never again after that combat was an army of American regulars beaten by British troops. Small as the affair was, and unimportant in military results, it gave to the United States army a character and pride it had never before possessed.

Biall regained the protection of his lines without further loss; but two days afterward Brown turned his position, and Biall abandoned it with the whole peninsula except Fort George. Leaving garrisons in Fort George and Fort Niagara, he fell back toward Burlington Bay to await reinforcements. Brown fol-
lowed as far as Queenston, where he camped July 10, doubtful what next to do. Fretting under the enforced delay, he wrote to Commodore Chauncey, July 13, a letter that led to much comment:

1 Biall to Drummond, July 8, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.

* Brown to Chauncey, July 13, 1814; Niles viL 38.

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** I have looked for your fleet with the greatest anxiety since the 10th. I do not doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the field, and to march in any direction over his country, your fleet carrying for me the necessary supplies. • • • There is not a doubt resting in my mind but that we have between us the command of sufficient means to conquer Upper Canada within two months, if there is a prompt and zealous co-operation and a vigorous application of these means."

Brown, like Andrew Jackson, with the virtues of a militia general, possessed some of the faults. His letter to Chauncey expressed his honest belief; but he was mistaken, and the letter tended to create a popular impression, that Chauncey was wholly to blame. Brown could not, even with Chauncey's help, conquer Upper Canada. He was in danger of being himself destroyed; and even at Queenston he was not safe. Biall had already received, July 9, a reinforcement of seven hundred regulars; ^ at his camp, only thirteen miles from Brown, he had twenty-two hundred men; in garrison at Fort George and Niagara he left more than a thousand men; Lieutenant-General Drummond was on his way from Kingston with the Eighty-ninth regiment four hundred strong, under Colonel Morrison, who had won the battle of
Chrystler's Field, while still another regiment, De-Watteville's, was on the march. Four thousand men were concentrating on Port George, and Chauncey, although he might have delayed, could not have prevented their attacking Brown, or stopping his advance.

^ James, ii. 132.

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Brown was so well aware of his own weakness that he neither tried to assault Fort George nor to drive Riall farther away, although Ripley and the two engineer officers McRee and Wood advised the attempt. ^ After a fortnight passed below Queenston, he suddenly withdrew to Chippawa July 24^ and camped on the battle-field. Riall instantly left his camp at eleven o'clock in the night of July 24, and followed Brown's retreat with about a thousand men, as far as Lundy's Lane, only a mile below the Falls of Niagara. There he camped at seven o'clock on the morning of July 25, waiting for the remainder of his force, about thirteen hundred men, who marched at noon, and were to arrive at sunset.

The battle of Chippawa and three weeks of active campaigning had told on the Americans. According to the army returns of the last week in July, Brown's army at Chippawa, July 25, numbered twenty-six hundred effectives.^

Strength of Major^Oeneral Brawn^s Army^ Chippawoj Jtdy 25, 1814.

PBMBIT POB DdT. AflSBMAll.

Non-^om. Ofloen Pnflent and
and PriTatea. abaent.

tScotf 8 Brigade 1072 1422
Biplej's Brigade 895 1198
Porter's Brigade 441 538
Artillerj . ., 286 260

Total 2644 3418

^ Ripley's ** Facts relative to the Campaign on the Niagara,** p. 8. Jesnp's Narrative ; Ingersoll, ii. 106.

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Thus Brown at Gippawa bridge, on the morning of July 25, with twenty-six hundred men present for duty, had Biall within easy reach three miles away at Lundy's Lane, with only a thousand men; but Brown expected no such sudden movement from the enemy, and took no measures to obtain certain information. He was with reason anxious for his rear. His position was insecure and unsatisfactory except for attack. From the moment it became defensive, it was unsafe and needed to be abandoned.

The British generals were able to move on either bank of the river. While Riall at seven o'clock in the morning went into camp within a mile of Niagara Falls, Lieutenant-General Gordon Drummond with the Eighty-ninth regiment disembarked at Fort Gtorge, intending to carry out a long-prepared movement on the American side.^

Gordon Drummond, who succeeded Major-General
de Bottenburg in the command of Upper Canada in December, 1813, and immediately distinguished himself by the brilliant capture of Fort Niagara and the destruction of Buffalo, was regarded as the ablest military officer in Canada. Isaac Brock's immediate successors in the civil and military government of Upper Canada were Major-Generals Sheaffe and De Bottenburg. Neither had won distinction; but Gordon Drummond was an officer of a different character. Born in 1772, he entered the army in 1789 as

» Harvey to Lieut-Colonel Tucker, July 23, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.

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an ensign in the First regiment, or Royal Scots, and rose in 1794 to be lieutenant-colonel of the Eighth, or King's regiment. He served in the Netherlands, the West Indies, and in Egypt, before being ordered to Canada in 1808. In 1811 he became lieutenant-general. He was at Kingston when his subordinate officer, Major-General Riall, lost the battle of Chip* pawa and retired toward Burlington Heights. Having sent forward all the reinforcements he could spare, Drummond followed as rapidly as possible to take command in person.

No sooner did Drummond reach Fort George than in pursuance of orders previously given, he sent a detachment of about six hundred men across the river to Lewiston. Its appearance there was at once made known to Brown at Chippawa, only six or seven miles above, and greatly alarmed him for the safety of his base at Fort Schlosser, Black Rock, and Buffalo. Had Drummond advanced up the American side with fifteen hundred men, as he might have done, he would have obliged Brown to recross the
river, and might perhaps have destroyed or paralyzed him; but Drummond decided to join Riall, and accordingly, recalling the detachment from Lewiston at four o'clock in the afternoon, he began his march up the Canadian side with eight hundred and fifteen rank-and-file to Lundy's Lane.\

At five o'clock, July 25, the British army was near concentrated. The advance under Riall at Lundy's Lane numbered nine hundred and fifty rank-and-file, with the three field-pieces which had been in the battle of Chippawa, and either two or three six-pounders. Drummond was three miles below with eight hundred and fifteen rank-and-file, marching up the river; and Colonel Scott of the One Hundred-and-third regiment, with twelve hundred and thirty rank-and-file and two more six-pound field-pieces, was a few miles behind Drummond. By nine o'clock in the evening the three corps, numbering three thousand rank-and-file, with eight field-pieces, were to unite at Lundy's Lane.

At a loss to decide on which bank the British generals meant to move, Brown waited until afternoon, and then, in great anxiety for the American side of the river, ordered Winfield Scott to march, his brigade down the road toward Queenston on the Canadian side, in the hope of recalling the enemy from the American side by alarming him for the safety of his rear. Scott, always glad to be in motion, crossed Chippawa bridge, with his brigade and
Towson's battery, soon after five o'clock, and to his great surprise, in passing a house near the Falls, learned that a large body of British troops was in sight below. With his usual audacity he marched directly upon them, and reaching Lundy's Lane, deployed to the left in line of battle. Jesup, Brady, Leavenworth, and McNeil placed their little battalions, numbering at the utmost a thousand rank-and-file.

^ James, ii. 139. * James, ii. 144.

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file, in position, and Towson opened with his three guns. The field suited their ambition. The sun was setting at the end of a long, hot, midsummer day. About a mile to their right the Niagara River flowed through its chasm, and the spray of the cataract rose in the distance behind them.

At the first report that the American army was approaching, Riall ordered a retreat, and his advance was already in march from the field when Drummond arrived with the Eighty-ninth regiment, and countermanded the order. ^ Drummond then formed his line, numbering according to his report sixteen hundred men, but in reality seventeen hundred and seventy rank-and-file, ^ — the left resting on the high road, his two twenty-four-pound brass field-pieces, two six-pounders, and a five-and-a-half-inch howitzer a little advanced in front of his centre on the sunumiit of the low hill, and his right stretching forward so as to overlap Scott's position in attacking. Lundy's Lane, at right angles with the river, ran close behind the British position. Hardly had he completed his formation, when, in his own words, "the whole front was warmly and closely engaged."
With all the energy Scott could throw into his blow, he attacked the British left and centre. Drummond's left stopped slightly beyond the road, and was assailed by Jesup's battalion, the Twenty-fifth regiment, while Scott's other battalions attacked

^ Drommond's Report of July 27, 1814; James, ii. 436.
* James, ii. 143.

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in front. So vigorous was Jesup's assault that he forced back the Boyal Scots and Eighty-ninth, and got into the British rear, where he captured Major* General Biall himself, as he left the field seriously wounded. "After repeated attacks," said Drummond's report, "the troops on the left were partially forced back, and the enemy gained a momentary possession of the road." In the centre also Scott attacked with obstinacy; but the British artillery was altogether too strong and posted too high for Towson's three guns, which at last ceased firing. ^ There the Americans made no impression, while they were overlapped and outnumbered by the British right.

Prom seven till nine o'clock Scott's brigade hung on the British left and centre, charging repeatedly close on the enemy's guns; and when at last with the darkness their firing ceased from sheer exhaustion, they were not yet beaten. Brady's battalion, the Ninth and Twenty-second, and McNeil's, the Eleventh, were broken up; their ammunition was exhausted, and most of their officers were killed or wounded. The Eleventh and Twenty-second regiments lost two hundred and thirty men killed, wounded, and missing, or more than half their number; many of the men left the field, and only with difficulty could a battalion be organized from
the debris. McNeil and Brady were wounded, and

1 Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815; Ripley's "Facts," p. 21.


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Major Leavenworth took command of the remnant. With a small and exhausted force which could not have numbered more than six hundred men, and which Drummond by a vigorous movement might have wholly destroyed, Scott clung to the enemy's flank until in the darkness Ripley's brigade came down on the run. The American line was also re-inforced by Porter's brigade; by the First regiment, one hundred and fifty strong, which crossed from the American side of the river; and by Ritchie's and Riddle's batteries.

At about the same time the rest of Riall's force, twelve hundred and thirty rank-and-file, with two more six-pound guns, appeared on the field, and were placed in a second line or used to prolong the British right. If Scott had lost four hundred men from the ranks Drummond had certainly lost no more, for his men were less exposed. Rrown was obliged to leave details of men for camp duty; Drummond brought three thousand rank-and-file on the field. At nine o'clock Drummond could scarcely have had fewer than twenty-six hundred men in Lundy's Lane, with seven field-pieces, two of which were twenty-four-pounders. Rrown could scarcely have had nineteen hundred, even allowing Porter to have brought five hundred of his volunteers into battle. He had also Towson's, Ritchie's, and Riddle's batteries, — seven
twelve-pound field-pieces in all.

1 Strength of the Army, July 26, 1814 ; Ripley's *' Facts,** Appendix.

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As long as the British battery maintained its fire in the centre, victory was impossible and escape difficult. Ripley's brigade alone could undertake the task of capturing the British guns, and to it the order was given. Colonel Miller was to advance with the Twenty-first regiment against the British battery in front. Ripley himself took command of the Twenty-third regiment on the right, to lead it by the road to attack the enemy's left flank in Lundy's Lane. According to the story that for the next fifty years was told to every American school-boy as a model of modest courage, General Brown gave to Miller the order to carry the enemy's artillery, and Miller answered, "I'll try!"*

The two regiments thus thrown on the enemy's centre and left numbered probably about seven hundred men in the ranks, according to Ripley's belief. The Twenty-first regiment was the stronger, and may have contained four hundred and fifty men, including officers; the Twenty-third could scarcely have brought three hundred into the field. In a few minutes both battalions were in motion. The Twenty-third, advancing along the road on the right, instantly attracted the enemy's fire at about one hundred and fifty yards from the hill, and was thrown back. Hipley reformed the column, and in five minutes it

^ Mansfield's Scott, p. 129 ; note 2.

s Miller's Letter in the Boston <« Patriot/' Sept 4, 1814 ;
advanced again. While the Twenty-third was thus engaged on the right, the Twenty-first silently advanced in front, covered by shrubbery and the darkness, within a few rods of the British battery undiscovered, and with a sudden rush carried the guns, bayoneting the artillery-men where they stood.

So superb a feat of arms might well startle the British general, who could not see that less than five hundred men were engaged in it; but according to the British account the guns stood immediately in front of a British line numbering at least twenty-six hundred men in ranks along Lundy's Lane. Drummond himself must have been near the spot, for the whole line of battle was but five minutes walk; apparently he had but to order an advance, to drive Miller's regiment back without trouble. Yet Miller maintained his ground until Ripley came up on his right. According to the evidence of Captain McDonald of Ripley's staff, the battle was violent during fifteen or twenty minutes:

*Having passed the position where the artillery had been planted, Colonel Miller again formed his line facing the enemy, and engaged them within twenty paces distance. There appeared a perfect sheet of fire between the two lines. While the Twenty-first was in this situation, the Twenty-third attacked the enemy's flank, and advanced within twenty paces of it before the first volley was discharged, — a measure adopted by command of General Ripley, that the fire might be effectual and more
completely destructive. The movement compelled the enemy's flank to fall back immediately by descending the hill out of sight, upon which the firing ceased."

Perhaps this feat was more remarkable than the surprise of the battery. Ripley's Twenty-third regiment, about three hundred men, broke the British line, not in the centre but on its left, where the Eighty-ninth, the Royal Scots, King's, and the Forty-first were stationed, and caused them to retire half a mile from the battle-field before they halted to reform.

When the firing ceased, Ripley's brigade held the hill-top, with the British guns, and the whole length of Lundy's Lane to the high-road. Porter then brought up his brigade on the left; Hindman brought up his guns, and placed Towson's battery on Ripley's right, Ritchie's on his left, while Biddle's two guns were put in position on the road near the corner of Lundy's Lane. Jesup with the Twenty-fifth regiment was put in line on the right of Towson's battery; Leavenworth with the remnants of the Ninth, Eleventh, and Twenty-second formed a second line in the rear of the captured artillery; and thus reversing the former British order of battle, the little army stood ranked along the edge of Lundy's Lane, with the British guns in their rear.

The British force was then in much confusion, a part of it marching into the American line by mis-

J Evidence of Captain McDonald; Ripley's « Facts/» p. 13.
* Drummond's Report; James, iL 143.
take, and suffering a destructive fire; a part of it firing into the regiment on its own right, and keeping up the fire persistently. ^ In order to recover their artillery they must assault, without guns, a steep hill held by an enemy with several field-pieces. Had Brown been able to put a reserve of only a few hundred men into the field, his victory was assured; but the battle and exhaustion were rapidly reducing his force. He had at ten o'clock not more than fifteen hundred men in the ranks, and almost every officer was wounded.

After a long interval the British line was reformed, and brought to the attack. General Drummond's report said nothing of this movement, but according to the American account the two lines were closely engaged their whole length at a distance of ten or twelve yards. In the darkness the troops could aim only at the flash of the muskets. "We having much the advantage of the ground, the enemy generally fired over our heads," said Captain McDonald of Ripley's staff; "but the continual blaze of light was such as to enable us distinctly to see their buttons." After a sharp combat of some twenty minutes the enemy retreated. Three times, at intervals of half an hour or more, the British line moved up the hill, and after the exchange of a hot fire retired; between the attacks, for half an hour at a time, all was darkness and silence, hardly interrupted by a breath of air. Brown and Scott were with Porter on the

^ James, iL 145.
extreme left. In the centre, by the captured cannon, Ripley sat on his horse, ten or twelve paces in rear of his line. Two bullets passed through his hat, but he was unhurt. Captain Ritchie was killed at his battery on the left; Jesup was wounded on the right. Each attack sorely diminished the number of men in the ranks, until at the close of the third about seven hundred rank-and-file, with few of officers, were believed to remain in position.

Scott, with Leavenworth's consolidated battalion, after ranging somewhat wildly the entire length of the line in the attempt to turn the enemy's flank, and receiving the fire of both armies, joined Jesup's Twenty-fifth regiment on the right, and was at last severely wounded. At about the same time Brown was wounded on the extreme left, where Porter's volunteers held the line. Major Leavenworth, with the remnants of the first brigade, moving from the left to reinforce Jesup on the right after the third repulse of the enemy, met Scott retiring from the field, and soon afterward was hailed by General Brown, who was also returning to camp severely wounded. The time was then about eleven o'clock, and everyone felt that the army must soon retreat. Farther in the rear General Brown met Major Hindman of

1 Evidence of Captain McDonald; Ripley's "Facts," p. 16.

a Cf. Wilkinson's Memoirs, i. 712.


the artillery, who was bringing up his spare ammunition wagons. Brown ordered Hindman to collect his artillery as well as he could, and retire immediately; "we shall all march to camp." He said that they had done as much as they could do; that nearly all their officers were killed or wounded; that he was himself wounded, and he thought it best to retire to camp. Hindman on arriving at the hill, firing having wholly ceased, immediately began to withdraw the guns. Ripley first learned the order to withdraw by discovering the artillery to be already gone. Next came a peremptory order to collect the wounded and retire.* The order was literally obeyed. The enemy in no way molested the movement; and at about midnight the wearied troops marched for camp, in as good order and with as much regularity as they had marched to the battle-field.

Hindman withdrew his own guns, and having with some difficulty procured horses to haul off the British pieces, on returning to the hill after Ripley's withdrawal found the enemy again in possession, and some men and wagons captured.* He left the field at once, with the British in possession of their guns, and followed the retreating column.

1 Ripley's ** Facts," Appendix.


^ Colonel Hindman's statement; Ripley's ** Facts," p. 43.
Lieutenant-General Drummond's report of the battle, though silent as to the repeated British repulses, declared that the Americans fought with uncommon gallantry: —

"In so determined a manner were the attacks directed against our guns that our artillery-men were bayoneted by the enemy in the act of loading, and the muzzles of the enemy's guns were advanced within a few yards of ours. The darkness of the night during this extraordinary conflict occasioned several uncommon incidents; our troops having for a moment been pushed back, some of our guns remained for a few minutes in the enemy's hands."

Drummond's "few minutes" were three hours. According to the British account, the One-Hundred-and-third regiment, with its two field-pieces, arrived on the field just at nine, and "passed by mistake into the centre of the American army now posted upon the hill." ^ The regiment "fell back in confusion" and lost its two field-pieces, which were captured by Miller, with Rials' five pieces. By British report. Miller was at nine o'clock "in possession of the crest of the hill and of seven pieces of captured artillery."* Drummond admitted that in retiring "about midnight" the Americans carried away one of his light pieces, having limbered it up by mistake and leaving one of their own. During the entire action after nine o'clock Drummond did not fire a cannon, although, according to Canadian authority, the fighting was desperate: —

^ James, ii. 144-145. * James, iL 146.
The officers of the army from Spain who have been engaged in Upper Canada have acknowledged that they never saw such determined charges as were made by the Americans in the late actions. ... In the action on the 25th July the Americans charged to the very muzzles of our cannon, and actually bayoneted the artillery-men who were at their guns. Their charges were not once or twice only, but repeated and long, and the steadiness of British soldiers alone could have withstood them.*

~ Letter in Halifax newspaper; Niles, vii. 410

CHAPTER m.

The battle of Lundy's Lane lasted five hours, and Drummond believed the American force to be five thousand men. In truth, at no moment were two thousand American rank-and-file on the field.~ The loss sustained by the enemy in this severe action,' reported Drummond,~ cannot be estimated at less than fifteen hundred men, including several hundred prisoners left in our hands." Drummond’s estimate of American losses, as of American numbers, was double the reality. Brown reported a total loss, certainly severe enough, of eight hundred and fifty-three men, — one hundred and seventy-one killed, five hundred and seventy-two wounded, one hundred and ten missing*

Drummond reported a total loss of eight hundred and seventy-eight men, — eighty-four killed, five hundred and fifty-nine wounded, one hundred and ninety-three missing, and forty-two prisoners. On both sides the battle was murderous. Brown and Scott were both badly wounded, the latter so severely that he could

~ Strength of the American army; Bipley’s "Facts," Appendix.
Drommond's Report of July 27, 1814; James, ii. 438.

not resume his command during the war. Drummond and Biall were also wounded. On both sides, but especially on the American, the loss in officers was very great.

The effect of the British artillery on Scott's brigade, while daylight lasted, had been excessive, while at that period of the battle the British could have suffered comparatively little. Among Scott's battalions the severest loss was that of Brady's Twenty-second regiment, from Pennsylvania, — at the opening of the campaign two hundred and twenty-eight strong, officers and men. After Lundy's Lane the Twenty-second reported thirty-six killed, ninety wounded, and seventeen missing. The Ninth, Leavenworth's Massachusetts regiment, which was returned as number-inning three hundred and forty-eight officers and men June 31, reported sixteen killed, ninety wounded, and fifteen missing at Lundy's Lane. The Eleventh, McNeil's Vermont battalion, which numbered three hundred and four officers and men June 31, returned twenty-eight killed, one hundred and two wounded, and three missing. The Twenty-fifth, Jesup's Connecticut corps, numbering three hundred and seventy officers and men at the outset, reported twenty-eight killed, sixty-six wounded, and fifteen missing. These four regiments, composing Scott's brigade, numbered thirteen hundred and eighty-eight officers and men June 31, and lost in killed, wounded, and missing at Lundy's Lane five hundred and six men, after losing two hundred and fifty-seven at Chippawa.
Ripley's brigade BufiPered less; but although, after the British guns were captured, the Americans were exposed only to musketry fire, the brigades of Ripley and Porter reported a loss of two hundred and fifty-eight men, killed, wounded, and missing. The three artillery companies suffered a loss of forty-five men, including Captain Ritchie. The total loss of eight hundred and fifty-three men was as nearly as possible one third of the entire army, including the unengaged pickets and other details.

When Ripley, following the artillery, arrived in camp toward one o'clock in the morning,^ Brown sent for him, and gave him an order to return at day-break to the battle-field with all the force he could collect, "and there to meet and beat the enemy if he again appeared."^ The order was impossible to execute. The whole force capable of fighting another battle did not exceed fifteen or sixteen hundred effectives, almost without officers, and exhausted by the night battle.^ The order was given at one o'clock in the morning; the army must employ the remainder of the night to reorganize its battalions and replace its officers, and was expected to march at four o'clock to regain a battle-field which Brown had felt himself unable to maintain at midnight, although he then

1 Letter of Capt McDonald, March 20, 1815 ; Ripley's "Facts," p. 29.


* Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 15, 1815 ; Ripley's "Facts," p. 27.
occupied it, and held all the enemy's artillery. The order was futile. Major Leavenworth of the Ninth regiment, who though wounded commanded the first brigade after the disability of Scott, Brady, Jesup, and McNeil, thought it "the most consummate folly to attempt to regain possession of the field of battle," and declared that every officer he met thought like himself."

Yet Ripley at dawn began to collect the troops, and after the inevitable delay caused by the disorganization, marched at nine o'clock, with about fifteen hundred men, to reconnoitre the enemy. At about the same time Drummond advanced a mile, and took position in order of battle near the Falls, his artillery in the road, supported by a column of infantry. A month earlier Drummond, like Riall, would have attacked, and with a force greater by one half could hardly have failed to destroy Ripley's shattered regiments; but Chippawa and Lundy's Lane had already produced an effect on the British army. Drummond believed that the Americans numbered five thousand, and his own force in the ranks was about twenty-two hundred men. He allowed Ripley to retire unmolested, and remained at the Falls the whole day.

Ripley returned to camp at noon and made his report to Brown. The question requiring immediate decision was whether to maintain or abandon the line

* Letter of Major Leavenworth, Jan. 16, 1816; Ripley's "Facts," p. 27.
of the Chippawa River. Much could be said on both sides, and only officers on the spot could decide with certainty how the enemy could be placed under most disadvantage, and how the army could be saved from needless dangers. Ripley, cautious by nature, recommended a retreat to Fort Erie. With the assent, as he supposed, of Brown and Porter, Ripley immediately broke up the camp at Chippawa, and began the march to Fort Erie, sixteen miles in the rear. Although complaint was made of the retreat as confused, hasty, and unnecessary, it was conducted with no more loss or confusion than usual in such movements, and its military propriety was to be judged by its effects on the campaign.

The same evening, July 26, the army arrived at Fort Erie and camped. Brown was taken from Chippawa across the river to recover from his wound. Scott was also removed to safe quarters. Ripley was left with the remains of the army camped on a plain, outside the unfinished bastions of Fort Erie, where the destruction of his entire force was inevitable in case of a reverse. Ripley favored a withdrawal of the army to the American side; but Brown, from his sick bed at Buffalo, rejected the idea of a retreat, and fortunately Drummond's reinforcements arrived slowly. The worst result of the difference in opinion was to make Brown harsh toward Ripley, who — although

excellent, and uniformly Successful service — leaned toward caution, while Brown and Scott thought chiefly of fighting. The combination produced admirable results; but either officer alone might have failed.

Distrusting Ripley, and angry at losing the British cannon at Lundy's Lane as well as at the retreat from Chippawa, Brown wrote, August 7, to the Secretary of War a report containing an improper implication, which he afterward withdrew, that Ripley was wanting either in courage or capacity. He also summoned Brigadier-General Gaines from Sackett's Harbor to command the army. Gaines arrived, and as senior brigadier assumed command at Fort Erie, August 4, while Ripley resumed command of his brigade. During the week that elapsed before Gaines's arrival, the army, under Ripley's orders, worked energetically to intrench itself in lines behind Fort Erie; and after Gaines took command the same work was continued without interruption or change of plan, under the direction of Major McRee, Major Wood, and Lieutenant Douglass of the Engineers.

The result was chiefly decided by Drummond's errors. Had he followed Ripley closely, and had he attacked instantly on overtaking the retreating army at Fort Erie or elsewhere, he would have had the


' Brown's Diary; IngersoU's History, iL 105.

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chances in his favor. Had he crossed the river and moved against Buffalo, he would have obliged Brown
to order the instant evacuation of Fort Erie, and would have recovered all the British positions without the loss of a man. Drummond took neither course. He waited two days at Chippawa before he moved up the river within two miles of Fort Erie. About August 1 his reinforcements arrived, — DeWatteville's regiment from Kingston, and the Forty-first from Fort George, — replacing his losses, and giving him three thousand one hundred and fifty rank-and-file; but he seemed still undecided what course to adopt. The battles of Chippawa and Limdy's Lane had given the British army respect for American troops, and Drummond hesitated to assault the unfinished works at Fort Erie, although he was fully one half stronger in men than Gaines and Ripley, who had barely two thousand rank-and-file after obtaining such reinforcements as were at hand.

Strength of Scotfs Brigade^ Fort Erie, July 81, 1814.

Pbisiht IOB Dcrr. AessMAN.

A.


Ninth Regiment 139 8 569

Eleventh Regiment . . • • 293 11 624

Twenty-second Regiment « . 218 10 408

Twenty-fifth Regiment . . 255 7 676

General Staff j4 4^

Total 905 40 2281
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Strength of Ripley's Brigade.

First Regiment 141 6 220

Twenty-first Regiment . . 441 20 849

Twenty-third Regiment • . 292 12 713

General Staff 4 4

Total 874 42 1786

Monthly return of troops under Majors General Broum^ Fort Erie,

July 81, 1814.

Bombardiers, etc .... 58 2 69

light Dragoons 47 1 64

Artillery Corps 241 12 364

First Brigade 905 40 2281

Second Brigade 874 42 1786

Total of Brown's army . 2125 97 4564

Drummond began operations by ordering a detachment of six hundred men to cross the river and destroy the magazines at Black Rock and Buffalo. ^

During the night of August 3 Colonel Tucker of the Forty-first, with four hundred and sixty rank-and-file of his own and other regiments, ^ landed two or three
miles below Black Rock, and advanced against it. They were met at the crossing of a creek by two hundred and forty men of Morgan's Rifles, then garrisoning Black Rock, with some volunteers. The effect of the rifles was so deadly that the British troops refused to face them, and Tucker returned after losing twenty-five men. This repulse, as creditable in its way to the American army as the battles

1 Drummond to Prevost, Aug. 4^ 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.

' James, ii. 162, 163.

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at Chippawa and Lund/s Lane, caused much annoyance to Drummoad, who issued an order, August 5, expressing "the indignation excited by discovering that the failure of an expedition, the success of which . . . would have compelled the enemy's forces to surrender or . . . encounter certain defeat, was attributable to the misbehavior of the troops employed."^ The only success achieved by British detachments was the cutting out of two American schooners which covered the approach to Fort Erie, near the shore.

Drummond having decided not to assault the lines of Fort Erie until he had made an impression on the works, next sent for guns of heavy calibre.* Ten days were passed in opening trenches and constructing batteries. Gaines and Ripley employed the time in completing their defences. Of these, the so-called Fort Erie was the smallest part, and made only the salient angle toward Drummond's approaches. As the British had constructed the fort, it was a small, unfinished work, about one hundred and fifty yards from the
Lake-shore, open in the rear, and mounting three guns. The American engineers completed its rear bastions, and constructed an earthwork seven feet high, with a ditch, to the shore, where a small stone-work completed the defence on that side, and brought

^ Ingersoll's History, ii. 145. Of. Beport of Major Moigan, Aug. 6, 1814 ; Niles, vi. 437.

* Dunmond to Pievost, Aug. 4, 1814 ; MSS. Canadian Archives.

The lines to the water's edge. The stone-work was called the Douglass battery, after the lieutenant of engineers who built it. Fort Erie, Battery Douglass^ and their connecting breastwork secured the camp on the right. A similar breastwork, nearly at right angles with the first, was extended three hundred and fifty yards westward parallel with the Lake-shore, then turning slightly ran Hiree hundred and fifty yards farther till it neared the Lakeshore, where it was finished on Snake Hill by a projecting battery called Towson's. Traverses were constructed, and a strongly intrenched camp, about seven hundred yards by two hundred and fifty, was thus formed, open on its rear to the Lake.

Hindman had general charge of the artillery. Battery Douglass mounted one gun ; another was mounted on the neighboring line ; Fort Erie contained six, ^ under Captain Williams ; Biddle's and Fanning's (Ritchie's) four guns were placed on the long line in the front; and Towson had six field-pieces at the extreme left.* Scott's brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinwall, was posted on the right; Porter's volunteers and the First Rifles occupied the
centre; and Ripley with the Twenty-first and Twenty-third regiments defended the left.

Drummond opened with six guns, August 13, and prepared for assault the following day. His arrange-

\[\text{\textsuperscript{**}}\text{Charges of Lieutenant-Colonel Trimble against Gtoeial Gaines; Niles, zi. 219.}\]

\[\text{'Beport of General Qaines, August, 1S14; Niles, vii. 19.}\]

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ments were somewhat complicated. He divided the attacking force into three columns, retaining another division in reserve. The strongest column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer of DeWatteville's regiment, was composed of portions of four regular regiments, and numbered about thirteen hundred men; these were to assault Towson and Ripley on Snake Hill. The centre column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond of the One-Hundred-and-fourth, numbered only one hundred and ninety rank-and-file, including a party of seamen and marines; these were to attack Fort Brie. The third column, under Colonel Scott of the One-Hundred-and-third regiment, numbered six hundred and fifty rank-and-file; these were to assault the breastworks between Fort Erie and Battery Douglass.* According to these numbers, Drummond meant to assault with twenty-one hundred and forty rank-and-file, or about twenty-four hundred men all told. His reserve numbered one thousand men.* Some further number must have been detailed in camp duty.

Drummond's instructions, dated August 14, to
Colonel Fischer were minute.* Fischer's column was to march immediately, in order to pass through the woods before dark, and halt for the night opposite

1 James, ii. 170, 171.


James, ii. 178.

^ Instractions to Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer, Aug. 14, 1814; HSS. Canadian Archives.

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the point of attack, with every precaution against discovery: -

^^You are to advance to the attack precisely at two o'clock. You are to enter the enemy's position between Snake Hill and the Lake, which is represented to be sufficiently open; but this is not to prevent your making your arrangements for assaulting any other part of the position by means of the short ladders and hay-bags with which you will be furnished. In order to insure success the Lieutenant-General most strongly recommends that the flints be taken out of the firelocks, with the exception of a reserve of select and steady men who may be permitted to retain their flints, if you think it necessary or advisable, not exceeding one third of your force. This reserve, with the detachment of artillery, should take post on Snake Hill."

A demonstration was to be made a few minutes before two o'clock against the American pickets opposite the centre of the line.
Drummond's general orders concluded by encouraging his men to consider their task easy: "—

"The Lieutenant-General most strongly recommends a free use of the bayonet. The enemy's force does not exceed fifteen hundred fit for duty, and those are represented as much dispirited."

The British general underestimated Gaines's force, which probably contained at least two thousand rank-and-file fit for duty August 14, who though possibly overworked and inclined to grumble, were ready to

^ Lieutenant-General Drummond's Order for attack [Secret]; Kiles, vii. 21.

fight. Neither Gaines nor Ripley, nor any of the excellent officers of engineers and artillery who defended the lines of Port Erie, were likely to allow themselves to be surprised or even approached by a force no greater than their own without ample resistance. They kept strong pickets far in advance of their lines, and were alive to every sign of attack. Soon after midnight of August 14 the fire of the British siege-guns slackened and ceased. At the same moment Gaines left his quarters and Ripley ordered his brigade to turn out. Both officers looked for an assault, and were not mistaken. At two o'clock the pickets fired and fell back, and at half-past two o'clock Colonel Fischer's advancing column moved against Snake Hill.

There at the breastworks were Towson's guns and the Twenty-first regiment commanded by Major Wood of the Engineers, only two hundred and fifty strong, but as steady as at Lundy's Lane. A part
of Fischer's brigade marched gallantly up to the abattis, bayonets charged and guns without flints, and approached within ten feet of the breastwork, but failed to reach it. The other column, DeWatteville's regiment at its head, "marching too near the Lake," according to Colonel Fischer's report, * "found themselves entangled between the rocks and the


* Beport of lieutenant-Colonel Fischer, Aug. 16, 1814; James, ii. 45a

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water, and by the retreat of the flank companies were thrown in such confusion as to render it impossible to give them any kind of formation during the darkness of the night, at which time they were exposed to a most galling fire of the enemy's battery." A part of DeWatteville's regiment waded through the water round the American line, and came into the camp on the flank, but found there two companies posted to meet such an attempt, and were all captured, so that Colonel Fischer, writing his report the next day, seemed ignorant what had become of them.

The attack and repulse of Colonel Fischer on the extreme American left were soon over, and the story was easy to understand; but the attack on Fort Erie and the extreme right was neither quickly ended nor easily understood. There a column of more than seven hundred men, all told, under Colonel Scott of the One-Hundred-and-third, was to attack the Douglass battery. Another column, numbering somewhat more than two hundred men, all told, under Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond of the One-Hundred-and-
fourth, was to assault Fort Erie. The American line between Battery Douglass and Fort Erie was held by the Ninth regiment and the volunteers, and was covered by the battery. Fort Erie was defended by about one hundred and eighteen men of the Nineteenth regiment under Major Trimble, and about sixty artillerists under Captain Williams.

The most intelligible account of the battle at the eastern end of the lines was given neither in Gaines's nor Drummond's reports, but in some charges after-Ward brought against Gaines by Major Trimble, who was angry at the language of Gaines's report. Trimble's charges were judged to be frivolous, but his story of the battle was more precise than any other.

According to Major Trimble, Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond's column was directed against the north curtain of the fort, and was repulsed, but continued the assault. Colonel Scott's column at the same time advanced within about sixty yards of the Douglass battery, but deterred by the fire of the guns served under the direction of Major McRee and Lieutenant Douglass of the Engineers, and by the loss of its commanding officer Colonel Scott, who fell before the American line, the column moved quickly to the right, gained the ditch of the northeast bastion of Fort Erie, and under cover of the smoke and darkness entered the bastion. There they were joined by Drummond's men. They surprised the artillerists, and in the scuffle Captain Williams and his lieutenants — McDonough, Fontaine, and Watmough — were killed or disabled.
Without support the British columns could do no more, and Lieutenant-General Drummond did not come to their support. None of the reports mentioned the time at which the bastion was captured; but the small British force, which could not have exceeded six or seven hundred men, remained for more than two hours in or about the bastion, exposed to the American fire, to which they could not reply with effect, and waiting for Drummond and the reserve, which the Americans also expected and trained their guns to enfilade. The British in the bastion repeatedly attempted to advance from the bastion to gain possession of the Fort, and twice tried to force the door of the stone mess-house from which the men of the Nineteenth regiment kept up a destructive fire. They repulsed the attacks made by reinforcements ordered by Gaines into the Fort to recover the bastion; yet their destruction was inevitable as soon as the dawn should arrive, for they could neither advance nor escape, nor remain where they were, under the guns of the garrison.

After maintaining themselves till five o'clock in this difficult position, the British soldiers and sailors in the bastion were panic-struck by the explosion of an ammunition-chest under the platform. According to General Drummond's official report, * Some ammunition, which had been placed under the platform, caught fire from the firing of guns in the rear, and a most tremendous explosion followed, by which almost all the troops which had entered the place were dreadfully mangled. Panic was instantly communicated to the troops, who could not be persuaded that the explosion was accidental; and the enemy at the same time pressing forward and commencing a
heavy fire of musketry, the Fort was abandoned, and our troops retreated toward the battery."

The explosion merely hastened the rout. Probably

the attacking columns would have fared still worse, had they remained. Even their panic-stricken flight saved only a remnant. Of Drummond's column, said to number one hundred and ninety rank-and-file, one hundred and eighty-eight officers and men were reported as missing, wounded, or killed. Of Scott's column, said to number six hundred and fifty* rank-and-file, — the Royal Scots and the One-Hundred-and-third regiments, — four hundred and ninety-six officers and men were returned as killed, wounded, or missing. Of the whole rank-and-file engaged under Fischer, Scott, and Drummond, numbering two thousand one hundred and fifty men, if the British report was correct, seven hundred and eighty were officially reported among the casualties. The loss in officers was equally severe. Colonel Scott was killed before the lines. Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond was killed in the bastion. One major, ten captains, and fifteen lieutenants were killed, wounded, or missing. The total British loss was nine hundred and five among some twenty-four hundred engaged. The total American loss was eighty-four men.¹

General Drummond was excessively mortified by his failure, in truth the severest blow that British arms could suffer at that moment. For the fourth time in six weeks a large body of British troops met a bloody and unparalleled check, if not rout, from an inferior force. In a private letter to Prevost, dated

¹ British Betom; James, ii. 454. American Betoni; Niles,
August 16, Drummond attributed the disaster to the misconduct of DeWatteville's regiment, a foreign corps, which was struck by panic:

"It appears that part of the forlorn hope and about half of Watteville's Light Company, by wading through the water, though the footing was excessively rough and rocky along the Lake-shore, turned the left flank of an abattis which extended from the enemy's battery on Snake Hill, the left of their position, to the Lake, and part penetrated through the abattis itself, and thereby gained the rear of the enemy's works. The fire of the enemy at this time being extremely heavy both from artillery and musketry, it would seem as if a simultaneous shock of panic pervaded the greater part of those not in immediate advance; and the forlorn hope, not finding itself sufficiently supported, was reluctantly under the necessity of relinquishing the advantages they had gained, and of retuing again through the water under a most galling fire. They lost many men, and DeWatteville's Light Company nearly half their number. The Light Company of the Eighty-ninth, notwithstanding they were almost overwhelmed by the grenadiers of DeWatteville in the precipitancy of their retreat, was the only body that preserved its order and remained firm upon its ground. By this act of steadiness they fortunately lost scarcely a man. The main body of DeWatteville's regiment retreated in such confusion that they carried the King's regiment before them like a torrent. Thus by the misconduct of this foreign corps has the opportunity been totally lost."

^ Drummond to Prevost | Aug. 16, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archivok
The mortification of Drummond was acute in having to charge both his attacking columns with being panic-stricken: ^^ The agony of mind I suffer from the present disgraceful and unfortunate conduct of the troops committed to my superintendence, wounds me to the soul! " Yet he offered no evidence to show that his troops fled before they were beaten, nor did he explain why he had thought it useless to order the reserve to their support after they had captured the bastion. In reality the battle of Fort Erie was more creditable to the British than the battles of Chippawa or Lundy's Lane, and the Americans could not admit that in either of the three the conduct of Drummond's troops was " disgraceful."

The defeat so much weakened Drummond that he could no longer keep the field without support, and immediately sent for two more regiments, — the Sixth and the Eighty-second from Burlington and York, — numbering about one thousand and forty rank-and-file, and making good his losses.^

At that time Chauncey was in control of Lake Ontario. The anxieties and delays in fitting out his new ship had ended in a fi\~ver, under which he was still suffering when he received General Brown's challenge of July 13 to meet him opposite Port George. Chauncey did not immediately reply except by message through General Gaines. July 31, everything being at last ready, he was carried on board his

^ James, ii. 814. Drummond to Prevoet, Aug. 16, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.
ship, and the next day he sailed, arriving August 5 off Port George. Brown's army was then besieged in Fort Erie, and could not approach the fleet. This situation gave to Chauncey the opportunity of writing a letter to Brown, repaying the harshness that Brown had shown to him.

"Was it friendly or just or honorable," asked Chauncey, "not only to furnish an opening for the public, but thus to assist them to infer that I had pledged myself to meet you on a particular day at the head of the Lake, for the purpose of co-operation, and in case of disaster to your army, thus to turn their resentment from you, who are alone responsible, upon me, who could not by any possibility have prevented, or retarded even, your discomfiture? You well know, sir, that the fleet could not have rendered you the least service during your late incursion upon Upper Canada. You have not been able to approach Lake Ontario on any point nearer than Queenston."

Brown's quarrel with Chauncey made much noise in its day, and, like the less defensible quarrel with Ripley, proved that Brown was unnecessarily aggressive; but in the situation of the United States, aggressiveness was the most valuable quality in the service. That Brown might have become a great general was possible, had his experience been larger; but whatever was his merit as a general, his qualities as a fighter were more remarkable than those of any other general officer in the war. Except immediately

1 Chauncey to Brown, Aug. 10, 1814; Niles vii. 38.
after receiving his wound at Lundj's Lane, when his army was exhausted by four hours of extreme effort, he never seemed satiated with fighting. Among all the American major-generals, he alone made raw troops as steady as grenadiers, and caused militia to storm entrenched lines held by British regulars.

Brown might have been well satisfied to let Drummond exhaust his strength in attacking Fort Erie. From a military point of view. Port Erie was worthless for any other purpose than to draw the enemy to the extreme end of their line, where they could with difficulty obtain supplies, and could take no part in the serious campaigning intended on Lake Champlain. For that object, no more pitched battles were needed. Drummond's force was wasting away by sickness and exposure.

After the battle of August 15, the British continued to bombard Fort Erie. No great damage was done; but a shell exploded in Gaines's quarters August 29, injuring him severely and obliging him to relinquish command. Brown was still unfit for service, but was bent upon more fighting, and knew that Ripley preferred to abandon Fort Erie altogether. Accordingly he resumed command at Buffalo, September 2, and set himself to study the situation.

The situation was uncomfortable, but in no way "perilous. The lines of Fort Erie were stronger than ever, and beyond danger of capture from any British force that could be brought to assault them,

^ James, ii. 230.
until Drummond should discover some new means of supplying troops with subsistence. The army return of August 81 gave the precise strength of the garrison.

Strength of the Army at Fort Erie, Aug. 81, 1814.

Prkutt for DcttT. AooBiOAn.


Dragoons ••••• 27 1 48
Bombardiers, etc 34 51
ArtiUery Corps 206 10 369
First Brigade 725 39 2311
Second Brigade 698 42 1646
Porter's Brigade 220 16 599
First and Fourth Rifles . . 217 11 504
Total . 2127 119 5528

The regular force in Port Erie numbered two thousand and thirty-three effectives^ September 4, and
though annoyed by the enemy's fire and worn by hard work, they were in both these respects better situated than the besiegers. Sooner or later the British would be obliged to retreat; and Brown was informed by deserters that Drummond was then contemplating withdrawal.* Brown estimated the British force very loosely at three or four thousand; * and it was in fact about the smaller number.

Drummond's situation was told in his reports to

* Brown to Izard, Sept 10, 1814; Izard's Correspondence p. 86.

Sir George Prevost. September 8 he wrote ^ that he should not fail to seize any favorable opportunity to attack; ^^ but should no such opportunity present itself, I feel it incumbent on me to prepare your Excellency for the possibility of my being compelled by sickness or suffering of the troops, exposed as they will be to the effects of the wet and unhealthy season which is fast approaching, to withdraw them from their present position to one which may afford them the means of cover. Sickness has, I am sorry to say, already made its appearance in several of the corps." Three days afterward, September 11,^ Drummond was warned by several signs that his lines were 'to be attacked by Brown, although "whether the account which is invarially given by deserters of his intention to act offensively ... be correct, I have not yet been able accurately to ascertain." Drummond's
batteries had been almost silent for several days for want of ammunition, and he could do nothing till the arrival of reinforcements, — the Ninety-seventh regiment, — unaccountably delayed. Rain had begun, and he dreaded its effect on the troops. In his next despatch, dated September 14, * he said that the rain had been incessant, and "as the whole of the troops are without tents, and the huts in which they

^ Drummond to Prevost, Sept. 8y 1814 ; MSS. Canadian Archives.

' Drummond to Prevost, Sept. 11, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives.

* Drummond to Prevost, Sept. 14, 1814 ; MSS. Canadian Archives.

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are placed are wholly incapable of affording shelter against such severe weather, their situation is most distressing." The roads were impassable; the nearest depot of supplies was Port Gtorge, and Drummond had not cattle enough to move a third of his heavy ordnance if a sudden movement should be necessary. The enemy seemed about to cross the river in his rear, and the Ninety-seventh regiment had not yet arrived: —

^^ In the mean tune I have strong grounds for thinking that the enemy will risk an attack, — an event which though from the necessity of defending my batteries in the first instance with the pickets alone I shall have to meet under every possible disadvantage, yet I am very much disposed to hope may be the most fortunate circumstance which can happen, as it will bring us in contact with the enemy at a far cheaper rate than if we were
While Drummond struggled between the necessity of retreat and the difficulty of retreating, Brown was bent on attacking his lines. The plan was open to grave objections, and a council of war, September 9, discouraged the idea. Brown was much disappointed and irritated at the result of the council, especially with Ripley; but while giving the impression that he acquiesced, he brought over all the volunteers he could obtain. The number was never precisely given, but according to the official reports of General Peter B. Porter who commanded them, and of General Brown himself, they did not exceed one thousand. With these, and an equal number of regular troops, Brown undertook to assault Drummond's entrenchments.

The nearest British line was about six hundred yards from old Fort Erie. From the first British battery on the Lake-shore, to Battery No. 3 in the woods, the line extended nearly half a mile, covered by abattis, but defended only by the brigade of troops on actual duty. If carried, the first line could not be held without capturing the second line, about fifty yards distant, and a third line, farther in the rear; while the main British force was encamped, for reasons of health and comfort, a mile behind, and was supposed to number at least three thousand six hundred men, or quite sufficient to recover their works. Brown professed no intention of fighting the British army. He proposed only "to storm the batteries, destroy the cannon, and roughly handle the brigade upon duty, before those in reserve could be brought
into action."

Although Drummond expected and wished to be attacked, he kept no proper pickets or scouts in the woods, and all day of September 16 American fatigue parties were at work opening a path through the forest the distance of a mile, from Snake Hill on the extreme left to the extremity of the British line in the woods. So little precaution had Drummond's


* Brown's Report of Sept. 29, 1814; Niles, viL 100.

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engineers taken that they left the dense forest standing within pistol-shot of the flank and rear of their Battery No. 8 on their extreme right, and the American parties opened a path within one hundred and fifty yards of the flank of the British line without being discovered.

At noon, September 17, General Porter led a column of sixteen hundred men — of whom one thousand were militia volunteers, and a part were the Twenty-third regiment — along the path through the woods, in three divisions, commanded by Colonel Gibson of the Fourth Rifles, Colonel E. D. Wood of the Engineers, and Brigadier-General Davis of the New York militia. At three o'clock, under cover of heavy rain, the whole force fell suddenly on the blockhouse which covered the flank and rear of the British battery No. 8, and succeeded in capturing the blockhouse and mastering the battery held by DeWatteville's regiment. While detachments spiked the guns and blew up the magazine, the main column ad-
vanced on Battery No. 2, while at the same time General Miller, promoted to the command of Scott's old brigade, moved with "the remains of the Ninth and Eleventh Infantry and a detachment of the Nineteenth" from a ravine in front of Battery No. 3 to pierce the centre of the British line between Battery No. 8 and Battery No. 2.^

Within half an hour after the first gun was fired, Porter and Miller had effected their junction within


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the British lines, had captured Battery No. 2, and moved on Battery No. 1, by the Lake-shore. There the success ended. Battery No. 1 could not be carried. By that time the Boyal Scots, the Eighty-ninth, the Sixth, and the Eighty-second British regiments had arrived, — probably about one thousand men.^

A sharp engagement followed before Brown, after ordering his reserve under Ripley to the assistance of Porter and Miller, could disengage his troops. The three commanders of Porter's divisions — Gibson, Wood, and Davis — were killed or mortally wounded, — Gibson at the second battery, Davis and Wood in assaulting the shore battery. Ripley was desperately wounded at the same time. General Porter, Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Aspinwall of the Ninth, and Major Trimble of the Nineteenth, as well as a number of other officers, were severely wounded. That the last action was sharp was proved by the losses suffered by the British reinforcements. According to the British official return, the four regiments which came last into the field — the Royal Scots, Sixth, Eighty-second, and Eighty-ninth — lost thirty-six killed, one hundred and nine wounded, and fifty-four missing, —
a total of two hundred men, in a short action of half an hour at the utmost, without artillery.

The American forces were recalled by Brown and Miller as soon as their progress was stopped, and they retired without serious pursuit beyond the British

^ James, ii. 232, 233. Report of Major-General DeWatteville^ Sept. 19, 1814; James, ii. 469.

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lines. Their losses were very severe, numbering five hundred and eleven killed, wounded, and missing, or about one fourth of their number. Among them were several of the best officers in the United States service, including Ripley, Wood, and Gibson. Drummond's loss was still more severe, numbering six hundred and nine,^ probably almost one man in three of the number engaged. The British killed numbered one hundred and fifteen. The Americans reported seventy-nine killed, — sixty regulars, and nineteen militia.

The next day Drummond issued a general order claiming a victory over an American force of "not less than five thousand men, including militia;" but his situation, untenable before the sortie, became impossible after it. Three out of six battering cannon were disabled;^ he had lost six hundred men in battle, and his losses by sickness were becoming enormous. "My effective numbers are reduced to considerably less than two thousand firelocks," he reported, September 21. Immediately after the sortie, although reinforced by the Ninety-seventh regiment, he made his arrangements to retreat.

"Within the last few days," he wrote to Prevost, Sep-
tember 21, ^ the sickness of the troops has increased to such an alarming degree, and their situation has really become one of such extreme wretchedness from the tor-

^ James, ii. 234. ^ James, it. 236.

- Drummond to Prevost, Sept. 21, 1814; MSS. Canadian ArchiveB.

CHAPTER IV.

Weak as was the army at Niagara, it was relatively stronger than the defence at any other threatened point. Sackett's Harbor contained only seven hundred effectives. ^ On Lake Champlain, Major-General Izard tried to cover Plattsburg and Burlington with about five thousand regular troops. ^ Already Armstrong knew that large British reinforcements from Wellington's army were on their way to Canada; ^ and within a few weeks after the battle of Lundy'a Lane eleven thousand of the best troops England ever put in the field were camped on or near the Sorel River, about to march against Izard's five thousand raw recruits.
They could march nowhere else. Not only was the line of Lake Champlain the natural and necessary path of an invading army, but the impossibility of supplying any large number of troops in Upper Canada made Lake Champlain the only region in

* Chatmcey to Jones, Aug. 10, 1814; Niles, vii. 37.

* Izard to ArmBtrong, July 19, 1814; Izard's Correspondence p. 54.

* Armstrong to Izaid, July 2, 1814 ; Izard's Correspondence p. 51.

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which a large British force could exist. Sir George Prevost had reached the limit of his powers in defending Upper Canada. His commissary-general, W. H. Robinson, wrote to him, August 27, expressing "the greatest alarm" on account of deficient supplies at Burlington Heights and Niagara, where instead of nine thousand rations daily as he expected, he was required to furnish fourteen thousand, half of them to Indians. Much as Prevost wanted to attack Sackett's Harbor, and weak as he knew that post to be, he could not attempt it, although he had thirteen or fourteen thousand rank-and-file idle at Montreal. In October he went to Eangston expressly to arrange such an attack, and found it impossible.

^^ An investigation of the state of the stores at this post," he wrote to Lord Bathurst October 18, "proved that the articles for the armament and equipment for a ship of the class of the ^ St. Lawrence,' carrying upward of one hundred guns, had absorbed ahnost the whole of
the summer transport-service from Montreal, leaving the materials for an undertaking of the magnitude of the destruction of Sackett's Harbor still at the extremity of the line of communication; and now, by giving precedence to that supply of provisions and stores without which an army is no longer to be maintained in Upper Canada, its removal is inevitably postponed until the winter roads are established."

1 W. H. Robmson to Sir Q. Prevoet, Aug. 27, 1814; MS& British Archives.

* Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 18^ 1814 ; MSS. British

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Not only were military operations on a large scale impossible in Upper Canada, but for the opposite reason occupation of Lake Champlain by a British force was necessary. Northern New York and Vermont furnished two thirds of the fresh beef consumed by the British armies. General Izard reported to Armstrong, July 31,^ —

*^ From the St. Lawrence to the ocean, an open disregard prevails for the laws prohibiting intercourse with the enemy. The road to St. Regis is covered with droves of cattle, and the river with rafts, destined for the enemy. The revenue officers see these things, but acknowledge their inability to put a stop to such outrageous proceedings. On the eastern side of Lake Champlain the high roads are found insufficient for the supplies of cattle which are pouring into Canada. like herds of buffaloes they press through the forest, making paths for themselves.

. . . Nothing but a cordon of troops from the French Mills to Lake Memphramagog could effectually check the evil. Were it not for these supplies, the British forces in Canada would soon be suffering from famine,
or their government be subjected to enormous expense for their maintenance."

After Chauncey, August 1, regained possession of Lake Ontario, any British campaign against Sackett's Harbor or Detroit became doubly impossible, and the occupation of Lake Champlain became doubly necessary. Prevost wrote to Bathurst, August 27, «—

^ Izaid’s Correspondence, p. 57.

* Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 27, 1814 1 MSS. British

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<^ In fact, my Lord, two thirds of the army in Canada are at this moment eating beef provided by American contractors, drawn principally from the States of Vermont and New York. This circumstance, as well as that of the introduction of large sums in specie into this province, being notorious in the United States, it is to be expected that Congress will take steps to deprive us of those resources; and under that apprehension large droves are daily crossing the lines coming into Lower Canada."

The fear that Izard might at any moment take efficient measures to cur off the British supplies gave double force to the reasons for occupying Lake Champlain, and forcing the military frontier back beyond Plattsburg and Burlington.

The political reasons were not less strong or less notorious than the military. England made no secret of her intention to rectify the Canadian frontier by lopping away such territory as she could conquer. July 5, the day of the battle of Chippawa,
Lieutenant-Colonel Pilkington sailed from Halifax, and under the naval protection of Sir Thomas Hardy in the "Ramillies," landed at Eastport, July 11, with the One-Hundred-and-second regiment, some engineers and artillery,—a detachment of six hundred men,—and took possession of Moose Island. Port Sullivan, with six officers and eighty men, capitulated, and Great Britain took permanent possession of the place.

^ Lieut.-Colonel Pilkington to Lieut.-General Sherbrooke^ July 12, 1814; James, ii. 472.

Moose Island was disputed territory, and its occupation was not necessarily conquest; but the next step showed wider views. August 26, Lieutenant-General Sir J. C. Sherbrooke, the British governor of Nova Scotia, set sail from Halifax with a powerful fleet, carrying near two thousand troops, and arrived September 1 at the Penobscot. At his approach, the American garrison of the small battery at Castine blew up their fort and dispersed. In all Massachusetts, only about six hundred regular troops were to be found, and beyond the Penobscot, in September, 1814, hardly a full company could have been collected. The able-bodied, voting, male population of the counties of Ennepkeck and Hancock, on either side of the Penobscot River, capable of bearing arms, was at that time about twelve thousand, on an estimate of one in five of the total population; but they offered no resistance to the British troops.

One misfortune led to another. A few days before Sherbrooke's arrival at Castine the United States ship "Adams," a heavy corvette carrying twenty-
eight guns, having escaped from Chesapeake Bay and cruised some months at sea struck on a reef on the Isle of Haut, and was brought into the Penobscot in a sinking condition. Captain Morris, who commanded her, took the ship up the river about twenty-five miles, as far as Hampden near Bangor, and removed her guns in order to repair her. Sherbrooke,

^ Sherbrooke to Bathuist, Sept. IB, 1814; James, iL 475.

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on occupying Castine, sent a detachment of some six hundred men in boats up the river to destroy the ship, while he occupied Belfast with another regiment. ^ Captain Morris hastily put his guns in battery, and prepared to defend the ship with his crew, numbering probably more than two hundred men, relying on the militia to cover his flanks. On the morning of September 3, in a thick fog, the enemy's boats approached and landed their infantry, which attacked and routed the militia, and obliged Captain Morris to set fire to the "Adams," abandon his guns, and disperse his men. a The British force then marched to Bangor, which they occupied without opposition. Their entire loss was one man killed and eight wounded. ^ At Bangor they remained nearly a week, destroying vessels and cargoes; but Sir John Sherbrooke had no orders to occupy the country west of the Penobscot, and his troops returned September 9 to Castine.

At Castine the British remained, while another detachment occupied Machias. All the province of Maine east of the Penobscot was then in Sherbrooke's hands. The people formidably submitted. One hundred miles of Massachusetts sea-coast passed quietly under the dominion of the King of England. The
male citizens were required to take, and took, the oath of allegiance to King George,* and showed no

^ Sherbrooke to Bathurst, Sept. 18, 1814 ; James, 11. 476.
^ Morris to Jones, Sept. 20, 1814 ; Niles, vil. 03.
* Jamesy ii. 482. ^ Lossing, p. 903, note.

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unwillingness to remain permanently British subjects* After September 1 the United States government had every reason to expect that Great Britain would require, as one condition of peace, a cession of the eastern and northern portions of Maine.

For this purpose the British needed also to occupy Lake Champlain, in order to make their conquests respectable. The British general might move on Plattsburg or on Burlington ; but in order to maintain his position he must gain naval possession of the Lake. In such a case the difficulties of the American government would be vastly increased, and the British position would be impregnable. Armstrong knew these circumstances almost as well as they were known to Sir George Prevost.

In May the British flotilla entered Lake Champlain from the Sorel River, and cruised. May 9, as far southward as Otter Creek, terrifying Vermont for the safety of the American flotilla under Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough at Vergennes. Irritated and alarmed by this demonstration, Armstrong ordered Izard to seize and fortify Rouse's Point, or the mouth of LacoUe River, or Ash Island, and so close the entrance to the Lake. ^ Apparently Armstrong gave the order in ignorance that LacoUe River and Ash Island were strongly fortified British positions,
and that a battery established at Rouse's Point, in the relative situation of forces, must have fallen into British hands. On this point the opinion of Izard was more valuable than that of Armstrong; and Izard, after much study and inquiry, decided to erect his fortifications at Plattsburg. He preferred the task of taking a position, which he could certainly hold, although it would not prevent the enemy from passing if they chose to leave it behind them. At Plattsburg, therefore, he collected his troops, amounting to five or six thousand men, and constructed strong forts, while Macdonough's fleet took position in the bay.

While thus occupied, Izard cast anxious glances westward, doubting whether, in case of a reverse at Niagara or Sackett's Harbor, he ought not to move on the St. Lawrence and threaten the British communications between Montreal and Kingston. The same idea occurred to Armstrong, who in a letter dated July 27 recommended Izard to carry it out. The letter reached Izard August 10, when he had advanced with his army to Chazy, and had learned enough of the concentration of British troops in his front to be assured that they meant to direct their serious attack against Lake Champlain. He wrote Armstrong a letter, August 11, which failed only in
saying too little, rather than too much, of the dangers risked in obeying Armstrong's order:

"I will make the movement you direct, if possible; but I shall do it with the apprehension of risking the force under my command, and with the certainty that everything in this vicinity but the lately erected works at Plattsburg and Cumberland Head will in less than three days after my departure be in the possession of the enemy. He is in force superior to mine in my front; he daily threatens an attack on my position at Champlain; we are in hourly expectation of a serious conflict. That he has not attacked us before this time is attributable to caution on his part, from exaggerated reports of our numbers, and from his expectation of reinforcements. ... It has always been my conviction that the numerical force of the enemy has been under-rated. I believe this to be the strong point of our frontier for either attack or defence, and I know that a British force has been kept in check in Lower Canada for many weeks past, greatly superior to that which I could oppose to it."

Izard was right. Every week new British forces poured into Quebec and were forwarded to Montreal. The arrival of the first division at Quebec was announced in the American newspapers early in August. Within a few weeks three brigades arrived and were sent to the front. When Izard wrote, he was probably faced by ten thousand veteran British troops.
within twenty or thirty miles of his position, and more were known to be on their way. At such a moment

Izard to Armstrong, Aag. 11, 1814; Izard's Correspondence.

the danger of attempting a diversion was great; but Armstrong refused to believe it. Irritated by Izard's remonstrance, the secretary not only persisted in his own opinion, but, abandoning the idea of a movement against the British communications along the St. Lawrence, ordered Izard to march his army to Sackett's Harbor, and from there to operate either directly in force against Kingston, or to go on to Niagara and assist Brown, then hard pressed at Fort Erie. "It is very distinctly my opinion," wrote the secretary August 12, - "that it has become good policy on our part to carry the war as far to the westward as possible, particularly while we have an ascendency on the Lakes."

Izard obeyed. His troops, numbering four thousand men, began their march August 29 for Sackett's Harbor, and for several weeks at the crisis of the campaign ceased to exist for military purposes. Within the fortifications at Plattsburg Izard left a miscellaneous body of three thousand, three hundred men, without an organized battalion except four companies of the Sixth regiment. Brigadier-General Alexander Macomb, who as senior officer was left in command, reported his force as not exceeding fifteen hundred effectives.*

Armstrong to Izard, July 27, 1814; Izard's Correspondence, p. 64.

* Armstrong to Izard, Aug. 12, 1814; Izard's Correspondence.
Armstrong's policy of meeting the enemy's main attack by annihilating the main defence never received explanation or excuse. At times Armstrong seemed to suggest that he meant to rely on the navy, and indeed nothing else, except Izard's forts, was left to rely upon; but in truth he rather invited the invasion of a British army into New York to "renew the scene of Saratoga." As Izard predicted, the enemy crossed the frontier at once after his departure, occupying Ohazy September 3, and approaching, September 5, within eight miles of Plattsburg.

Great Britain had never sent to America so formidable an armament. Neither Woke nor Amherst, neither Burgoyne nor Comwallis, had led so large or so fine an army as was under the command of Sir George Prevost. According to his proposed arrangement, the light brigade, under Major-General Robinson, contained four battalions of the Twenty-seventh, Thirty-ninth, Seventy-sixth, and Eighty-eighth foot, with artillery, and numbered two thousand eight hundred and eighty-four rank-and-file. The second brigade, under Major-General Brisbane, contained battalions of the Eighth, Thirteenth, and Forty-ninth, De Meuron's regiment and Canadian voltigeurs and chasseurs, numbering four thousand and forty-eight rank-and-file. The third brigade, under Major-General Power, contained battalions of the Third, Fifth,
Twenty-seventh, and Fifty-eighth, and numbered three thousand eight hundred and one rank-and-file. The reserve, under Major-General Kempt, contained battalions of the Ninths Thirty-seventh, Fifty-seventh, and Eighty-first, numbering three thousand five hundred and forty-nine rank-and-file. Finally, fourteen hundred and eighty-eight men of the Sixteenth and Seventieth regiments, under the command of Major-General DeWatteviUe, were stationed between Coteau du Lac and Gananoque on the St. Lawrence.

Thus the left division of the British army in Canada numbered fifteen thousand seven hundred and seventy effective, or, including officers, probably eighteen thousand men, without reckoning the Canadian militia, either incorporated or sedentary. Two lieutenant-generals and five major-generals were in command. Amply provided with artillery and horses, every brigade well equipped, they came fresh from a long service in which the troops had learned to regard themselves as invincible. As they were at last organized, four brigades crossed the border, numbering not less than "eleven thousand men with a proportionate and most excellent tram of artillery, commanded in chief by Sir George Prevost, and under by officers of the first distinction in the service." A reserve of about five thousand men remained behind.

The fleet was almost as formidable as the army.

* Proposed Distribution of the Forces in the Left Division; MSS. Canadian Archives, Freer Papers, 1812-1813, p. 107.
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As the force of the flotilla was reported to Prevost, it consisted of a thirty-six-gun ship, the "Confiance;" an eighteen-gun brig, the "Linnet;" two ten-gun sloops and twelve gunboats, carrying sixteen guns, all commanded by Captain Downie, of the Royal Navy, detached by Sir James Yeo for the purpose.

Such an expedition was regarded with unhesitating confidence, as able to go where it pleased within the region of Lake Champlain. About every other undertaking in America the British entertained doubts but in regard to this affair they entertained none.* Every movement of the British generals showed conviction of their irresistible strength. Had Prevost doubted the result of attacking Plattsburg, he could have advanced by St. Albans on Burlington, which would have obliged Macomb and Macdonough to leave then-positions. So little did his army apprehend difficulty, that in advancing to Plattsburg in face of Macomb's skirmishers they did not once form in line, or pay attention to the troops and militia who obstructed the road. "The British troops did not deign to fire on them except by their flankers and advanced patrols," reported Macomb.* "So undaunted was the enemy that he never deployed in his whole inarch, always pressing on in column."

* Christie, ii. 221, 222.

- Montreal Herald, Sept 24, 1814.

^ Comparative Force of the Flotillas; MSS. Canadian Archives* Freyost's Report; James, ii. 462; Christie, ii. 211, note,
The fleet felt the same certainty. According to the best Canadian authority, *"the strongest confidence prevailed in the superiority of the British vessels, their weight of metal, and in the capacity and experience of their officers and crews."

Captain Downie informed Sir George Prevost's staff-officer that he considered himself with the "Confiance" alone a match for the whole American squadron. *Taking the British account of the "Confiance" as correct, she was one hundred and forty-six feet long on the gun-deck, and thirty-six feet broad; she carried a crew of three hundred officers and men; 'her armament was thirty-seven guns, — twenty-seven long twenty-four-pounders, six thirty-two-pound carronades, and four twenty-four-pound carronades, — throwing in all nine hundred and thirty-six pounds.* The American account, which was more trustworthy because the "Confiance" became better known in the American than in the British service, gave her thirty-one long twenty-four-pounders and six carronades.*

Macdonough's best ship was the "Saratoga." Her dimensions were not recorded. Her regular complement of men was two hundred and ten, but she fought with two hundred and forty; she carried eight twenty-four-pounders, twelve thirty-two and six forty-two-pound carronades, — or twenty-six guns, throwing

1 Christie, ii. 212. • Christie, ii. 212.


* James, p. 413. * Cooper's Naval History ii 429.
eight hundred and twenty-eight pounds. Her inferiority to the "Confiance" at long range was immense, and within carronade range it was at least sufficient to satisfy Captain Downie. He believed that 9, few broadsides would dispose of the "Saratoga" and that the other American vessels must then surrender.

Assuming Sir George Prevost's report to have been correct, the two fleets compared as follows:

**Force of British Fleet,**

**Qns.**

**Jioig, Short'**

**Loiur Short Weight of**
metal metal metal

Confiance • •

37

31

6

744

192

936

Linnet ....

16

16

192
192

Chubb ....

U

1

10

6

180

186

Finch ....

10

4

6

24
Twelve Gunboats

16
8
8
8
162
256
418
Total . . .

90
60
30
1128
736

1864

Force

of American Fleet,

Vesieli.

Qnnfl.

Long.

A ■

Long metal.

Short metal.
Weight of metal

Saratoga ... 26
Eagle .... 20
Ticonderoga . . 17
Preble .... 7
Ten Gunboats . 16
Total ... 86

8
8

12
7
10

45

18
12
S
6
41
In this calculation the possible error consists only in one disputed eighteen-pound columbiad on the


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FinCV and three disputed guns — one long and two short — on the British gunboats. In one case the British would have thrown about nineteen hundred pounds of metal,— in the other, about eighteen hundred. A glance at the two tables shows that in one respect Downie held a decisive superiority in his guns. He had no less than sixty long-range pieces, while Macdonough had but forty-five. Downie's long-range guns threw at least eleven hundred pounds of metal; Macdonough’s threw but seven hundred and sixty. If Downie chose his own distance beyond range of the thirty-two-pound carronades, and fought only his long guns, nothing could save Macdonough except extreme good fortune, for he had but fourteen twenty-four-pound guns against Downie's thirty-four. Firing by broadsides, Downie could throw from his single Ship, the "Confiance," sixteen twenty-four-pound shot, to which Macdonough could reply only with eight, even if he used all his long guns on the same side.

The Americans had a decided advantage only in their commander. Thomas Macdonough, born in Delaware in 1783, was thirty years old when this responsibility fell upon him. He had been educated, like most of the naval heroes, in the hard service of the Tripolitan war, and had been sent to construct and command the naval force on Lake Champlain in the spring of 1818. Macdonough’s superiority over ordinary commanders consisted in the intelligent forethought with which he provided for the chances of

PLATTSBURG

FV>silion of vessels
20 M. after anchoring
battle. His arrangement showed that he foresaw, and as far as possible overcame in advance, every conceivable attack. He compelled the enemy to fight only as pleased himself.

Macdonough anchored his four large vessels across Plattsburg Bay, where it was a mile and a half wide, and placed his gimboats in their rear to fill the gaps. Cumberland Head on his left and front, and Crab Island on his right obliged the enemy to enter in a line so narrow that Downie would find no room to anchor on his broadside out of carronade range, but must sail into the harbor under the raking fire of the American long guns, and take a position within range of the American carronades. As the battle was to be fought at anchor, both squadrons would as a matter of course be anchored with springs on their cables; but Macdonough took the additional precaution of laying a kedge off each bow of the "Saratoga," bringing their hawsers in on the two quarters, and letting them hang in bights under water. This arrangement enabled him to wind his ship at any time without fear of having his cables cut by the enemy's shot, and to use his larboard broadside if his starboard guns should be disabled. In effect, it doubled his fighting capacity.

Sir George Prevost and the army were ready to move before Downie's fleet could be prepared. Marching directly forward with the utmost confidence, Sir
George turned the advanced American position at Dead Creek Bridge and drove away the gunboats that covered it. He reached the Saranac River September 6, and saw beyond it a ridge "crowned with three strong redoubts and other field-works, and block-houses armed with heavy ordnance, with their flotilla at anchor out of gunshot from the shore." The description was not exaggerated. Izard was himself a trained engineer, and the works built by him, under the direction of Major Totten of the Engineer Corps, were believed capable of resisting for three weeks a combined attack by land and water, even if the British fleet were victorious. Three good companies of artillery manned the guns. Excellent officers of every arm were in command.

Prevost properly halted, and declined to assault without the co-operation of the fleet. He waited five days impatiently for Downie to appear. Not till seven o'clock on the morning of September 11 did the British flotilla sail round Cumberland Head. At the same time Prevost ordered his troops to cross the Saranac and storm the American works.

Downie intended, without regarding his superiority in long-range guns, to sail in and to lay the "Confiance" alongside of the "Saratoga"; but the wind was light and baffling, and his approach was so slow that he could not long bear the raking fire of the American guns. As he came within carronade range
the wind baffling, he was obliged to anchor at two cables* lengths,^ or three hundred yards,^ and begin action. With the same discipline that marked the movements of the troops on shore, Downie came to, anchored, made everything secure, and then poured a full broadside into Macdonough's ship. The "Saratoga" shivered under the shock of sixteen twenty-four-pound shot and canister charges striking her hull; almost one-fifth of her crew were disabled; but she stood stoutly to her work, and the whole line was soon hotly engaged.

Americans usually had a decided advantage in their better gunnery, but three hundred yards was a long range for thirty-two-pound caronades, which at point-blank carried less than two hundred and fifty yards, and lost accuracy in proportion to elevation.8 Macdonough was slow to prove superiority. Early in the battle the British suffered a severe, and perhaps in the experience of this war a decisive, loss in their commander, Captain Downie, instantly killed by one of his own guns thrown off its carriage against him by a solid shot. Yet at the end of two hours' combat the British squadron was on the whole victorious, and the American on the point of capture. Of the three smaller American vessels, the "Preble" on the extreme right was driven out of the engagement, and

^ Report of Captain Pring, Sept. 12, 1814; James, Appendix no. 90.

* Report of Commodore Macdonough, Sept. 13, 1814; Niles,
the British gunboats, turning the American flank, attacked the "Ticonderoga," which maintained a doubtful battle. The American left was also turned, the "Eagle" having been driven to take refuge between the "Saratoga" and "Ticonderoga," in the centre. Macdonough's ship was then exposed to the concentrated fire of the "Confiance" and "Linnet," and his battery was soon silenced. The "Saratoga" could no longer use a gun on the engaged side, and the battle was nearly lost.

Then Macdonough's forethought changed the impending defeat into victory. His fire had nearly silenced the "Confiance," and disregarding the "Linnet," he ceased attention to the battle in order to direct the operation of winding ship. Little by little hauling the ship about, he opened on the "Confiance" with one gun after another of the fresh broadside, as they bore; and the "Confiance," after trying in vain to effect the same operation, struck her colors. Then the British fleet was in the situation which Downie had anticipated for the Americans in the event of silencing the "Saratoga." The three smaller vessels were obliged to surrender, and the gunboats alone escaped. The battle had lasted from quarter past eight till quarter before eleven.

By land, the British attack was much less effective than by water. The troops were slow in reaching their positions, and had time to make no decisive movement. A column under Major-General Robinson was ordered to move round by the right flank to a
ford previously reconnoitred, some distance up the Saranac, in order to gain a position whence they could reverse the American works and carry them by assault; but Robinson's column missed its way, and before reaching the ford heard the cheers of the American troops, and halted to ascertain its cause. The remainder of the army waited for Robinson's column to assault. The casualties showed that nothing like a serious engagement took place. The entire loss of the British army from September 6 to September 14 was officially reported as only thirty-seven killed and one hundred and fifty wounded, and of this loss a large part occurred previous to the battle of September 11. The entire American loss was thirty-seven killed and sixty-two wounded.

In the naval battle, Macdonough reported fifty-two killed and fifty-eight wounded, among about eight hundred and eighty men. The British reported fifty-seven killed and seventy-two wounded, in crews whose number was never precisely known, but was probably fully eight hundred. In neither case was the loss, though severe, as great relatively to the numbers as the severity of the action seemed to imply. The "Saratoga" lost twenty-eight killed in a crew of two hundred and forty. In Perry's battle on Lake Erie, the "Lawrence" lost twenty-two men killed in a crew of one hundred and thirty-one. About one man in eight was killed on Macdonough's ship; about one man in six on Perry's.

1 Christie, u. 215, 216.
With needless precipitation, Prevost instantly retreated the next day to Ghampain, sacrificing stores to a very great amount, and losing many men by desertion. The army was cruelly mortified, and Prevost lost whatever military reputation he still preserved in Canada. In England the impression of disgrace was equally strong. "It is scarcely possible to conceive the degree of mortification and disappointment," said the "Annual Register," "which the intelligence of this defeat created in Great Britain." Yeo brought official charges of misconduct against Prevost, and Prevost defended himself by unusual arguments.

** With whatever sorrow I may think of the unfortunate occurrences to which I allude," he wrote to Bathurst, three weeks later, **"I consider them as light and trivial when compared to the disastrous results which, I am solemnly persuaded, would have ensued had any considerations of personal glory, or any unreflecting disregard of the safety of the province, or of the honor of the army committed to my charge, induced me to pursue those offensive operations by land, independent of the fleet, which it would appear by your Lordship's despatch were expected of me. Such operations, my Lord, have been attempted before, and on the same ground. The history of our country records their failure; and had they been undertaken again with double the force placed under my command, they would have issued in the discomfiture of his Majesty's arms, and in a defeat not more disastrous than inevitable."

1 Annual Register for 1814, p. 332.

s Prevost to Bathurst, Oct. 6, 1814; Christie, ii. 395.
The Duke of Wellington was not so severe as other critics, and hesitated to say that Prevost was wrong; \(^^\) though of this I am certain, he must equally have returned... after the fleet was beaten; and I am inclined to think he was right. I have told the ministers repeatedly that a naval superiority on the Lakes is a sine qua non of success in war on the frontier of Canada, even if our object should be wholly defensive.\(^\) Yet the Duke in conversation seemed to think that his army in Canada was also at fault. "He had sent them some of his best troops from Bordeaux," he said five-and-twenty years afterward, "but they did not turn out quite right; they wanted this iron fist to command them."

Meanwhile Major-General Izard, by Armstrong's order, marched his four thousand men as far as possible from the points of attack. Starting from Champlain, August 29, the army reached Sackett's Harbor September 17, having marched about two-hundred and eighty miles in twenty days. At Sackett's Harbor Izard found no orders from the government, for the government at that time had ceased to perform its functions; but he received an earnest appeal from General Brown to succor Fort Erie. "I will not conceal from you," wrote Brown, September 10,\(^\) that I consider the fate of this army very doubtful.

1 Wellington to Sir George Murray, Dec. 22, 1814; Despatches, zii. 224.

\(^\) Stanhope's Conversations, p. 252.

\(<\) Brown to Izard, Sept. 10, 1814; Izard's Correspondence, p. 86.,

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unless speedy relief is afforded." Izard, who had no means of testing the correctness of this opinion, decided to follow Brown's wishes, and made, September 17, the necessary preparations. Violent storms prevented Chamicey from embarking the troops until September 21; but September 27 the troops reached Batavia, and Izard met Brown by appointment. The army had then been a month in movement. The distance was more than four hundred miles, and no energy could have shortened the time so much as to have affected the result of the campaign. At one end of the line Sir George Prevost retreated from Plattsburg September 12; at the other end, Lieutenant-General Drummond retreated from Fort Erie September 21; and Izard's force, constituting the largest body of regular troops in the field, had been placed where it could possibly affect neither results

Izard was a friend of Monroe, and was therefore an object of Armstrong's merciless criticism. Brown was a favorite of Armstrong, and shared his prejudices. The position of Izard at Buffalo was calculated to excite jealousy. He had implicitly obeyed the wishes of Armstrong and Brown; in doing so, he had sacrificed himself,—yielding to Macomb the credit of repulsing Prevost, and to Brown, who did not wait for his arrival, the credit of repulsing Drummond. As far as could be seen, Izard had acted with loyalty toward both Armstrong and Brown; yet both dis-

» Notices, ii. 102-107.
trusted him. Brown commonly inclined toward severity, and was the more sensitive because Izard, as the senior officer, necessarily took command.

Until that moment Izard had enjoyed no chance of showing his abilities in the field, but at Niagara he saw before him a great opportunity. Drummond lay at Chippawa, with an army reduced by battle and sickness to about twenty-five hundred men. Izard commanded fifty-five hundred regular troops and eight hundred militia. He had time to capture or destroy Drummond's entire force before the winter should set in, and to gather the results of Brown's desperate fighting. Brown was eager for the attack, and Izard assented. October 13 the army moved on Chippawa, and stopped. October 16, Izard wrote to the War Department, —

"I have just learned by express from Sackett's Harbor that Commodore Chauncey with the whole of his fleet has retired into port, and is throwing up batteries for its protection. This defeats all the objects of the operations by land in this quarter. I may turn Chippawa, and should General Drummond not retire, may succeed in giving him a good deal of trouble; but if he falls back on Fort George or Burlington Heights, every step I take in pursuit exposes me to be cut off by the large reinforcements it is in the power of the enemy to throw in twenty-four hours upon my flank or rear."

^ Izard to Monroe, Oct 16, 1814; Izard's Correspondence, p. 100.

' Izard to Momoe, Oct. 16^ 1814; Izard's Correspondence^ p. 103.
In this state of mind, notwithstanding a successful skirmish, October 19, between BissellFs brigade and a strong detachment of the enemy, Izard made a decision which ruined his military reputation and destroyed his usefulness to the service. He reported to the Department, October 23,^ —

*' On the 21st, finding that he [Drummond] still continued within his works, which he had been assiduously engaged in strengthening from the moment of our first appearance, the weather beginning to be severe, and a great quantity of our officers and men suffering from their continued fatigues and exposure, at twelve at noon I broke up my encampment, and marched to this ground [opposite Black Bock] in order to prepare winter quarters for the troops."

Nothing remained but to break up the army. Brown was sent at his own request to Sackett's Harbor, where the next fighting was expected. A division of the army went with him. The remainder were placed in winter quarters near Buffalo. Fort Erie was abandoned and blown up, November 6, and the frontier at Niagara relapsed into repose.

Izard felt the mortification of his failure. His feelings were those of a generous character, and his tone toward Brown contrasted to his advantage both in candor and in temper with Brown's language toward

him; but great energy generally implied great faults, and Brown's faults were better suited than Izard's virtues for the work of an American general at Niagara. Greatly to Izard's credit, he not only saw his own inferiority, but advised the government of it. He wrote to the Secretary of War, November 20, ^ —

^> The success of the next campaign on this frontier will in a great measure depend on concert and good understanding among the superior officers. . . . General Brown is certainly a brave, intelligent, and active officer. Where a portion of the forces is composed of irregular troops, I have no hesitation in acknowledging my conviction of his being better qualified than I to make them useful in the public service."

So sensitive was Izard to the public feeling and his loss of standing that he sent his resignation to the secretary, December 18, ^ in terms which betrayed and even asserted his consciousness of shrinking under the weight of responsibility: —

*^ I am fully aware that attempts have been made to lessen the confidence of government as well as of the public in my ability to execute the important duties intrusted to me, — duties which were imposed unexpectedly and much against my inclination. It is therefore not improbable that my voluntary retirement will relieve the Department of War from some embarrassment, and that my individual satisfaction will accord with the public

^ Izard to Monroe, Nov. 20, 1814; Izard's Correspondence^ p. 119.

' Izard to Monroe, Dec. 18, 1814; Izard's Correspondence^ p. 130.
advantage, — especially as my view of the connection between military command and responsibility differs materially from that entertained by persons in high authority."

A man who showed so little confidence in himself could not claim the confidence of others, and in contact with stronger characters like Armstrong, Brown, Scott, or Andrew Jackson could play no part but that of a victim. His resignation was not accepted, but his career was at an end. When he relieved the pressure kept by Brown constantly applied to the extremity of the British line, the movement of war necessarily turned back to its true object, which was Sackett's Harbor. Drummond no sooner flaw Fort Erie evacuated and his lines re-established, November 5, than he hurried on board ship with a part of his troops, and reached Kingston, November 10, where Sir George Prevost had already prepared for an attack on Sackett's Harbor as soon as supplies could be brought from Quebec to Kingston over the winter roads. Soon afterward Sir George Prevost Vras recalled to England, and a new conunander-In-chief, Sir George Murray, supposed to be a man of higher capacity, was sent to take direction of the next campaign. Reinforcements continued to arrive. About twenty-seven thousand regular troops, including officers, were in Canada; a seventy-four-gun ship and a new frigate were launched at Kingston; and

^ James, iL 241. ' James, ii. 393.

* MSS. Canadian Archives. Freer Papers, 1814, p. 31.
no one doubted that, with the springy Sackett's Harbor would be formally besieged. Izard remained at Buffalo, doing nothing, and his only influence on the coming as on the past campaign was to leave the initiative to the enemy.

CHAPTER V.

ARAiSTBONa's management of the Northern campaign caused severe criticism; but his neglect of the city of Washington exhausted the public patience. For two years Washington stood unprotected; not a battery or a breastwork was to be found on the river bank except the old and untenable Fort Washington, or Warburton. A thousand determined men might reach the town in thirty-six hours, and destroy it before any general alarm could be given. Yet no city was more easily protected than Washington, at that day, from attack on its eastern side; any good engineer could have thrown up works in a week that would have made approach by a small force impossible. Armstrong neglected to fortify. After experience had proved his error, he still argued in writing to a committee of Congress* that fortifications would have exhausted the Treasury; "that

* Lieutenant Edwards's Beport of July 26, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 545.

* Winder to Armstrong, July 9, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 543.

* Letter of Secretary Armstrong, Oct. 17, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 538.
bayonets are known to form the most efficient barriers; and that there was no reason in this case to doubt beforehand the willingness of the comity to defend itself," — as though he believed that militia were most efficient when most exposed! He did not even provide the bayonets.

In truth, Armstrong looking at the matter as a military critic decided that the British having no strategic object in capturing Washington, would not make the attempt. Being an indolent man, negligent of detail, he never took unnecessary trouble; and having no proper staff at Washington, he was without military advisers whose opinion he respected. The President and Monroe fretted at his indifference, the people of the District were impatient under it, and every one except Armstrong was in constant terror of attack; but according to their account the secretary only replied: "No, no! Baltimore is the place, sir; that is of so much more consequence."^ Probably he was right, and the British would have gone first to Baltimore had his negligence not invited them to Washington.

In May the President began to press Armstrong for precautionary measures.* In June letters arrived from Gallatin and Bayard in London which caused the President to call a Cabinet meeting. June 23

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1 Letter of J. P. Van Ness, Nov. 23, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 681.

' Madison to Armstrong, May 20, 1814; Madison's Works, iii. 399.
and 24 the Cabinet met and considered the diplomatic situation. The President proposed then for the first time to abandon impressment as a sine qua non of negotiation, and to approve a treaty that should be silent on the subject. Armstrong and Jones alone supported the idea at that time, but three days afterward, June 27, Monroe and Campbell acceded to it. The Cabinet then took the defences of Washington in hand, and July 1 decided to organize a corps of defence from the militia of the District and the neighboring States. July 2, the first step toward efficient defence was taken by creating a new military district on the Potomac, with a military head of its own. Armstrong wished to transfer Brigadier-General Moses Porter from Norfolk, to command the new Potomac District; but the President selected Brigadier-General Winder, because his relationship to the Federalist governor of Maryland was likely to make co-operation more effective.

Political appointments were not necessarily bad; but in appointing Winder to please the governor of Maryland Madison assumed the responsibility, in Armstrong's eyes, for the defence of Washington. The Secretary of War seemed to think that Madison and Monroe were acting together to take the defence of Washington out of his hands, and to put it in hands in which they felt confidence. Armstrong placed Winder instantly in command, and promptly issued

^ Madison's Works, ill. 408, 409.
' Notices, ii. 140.
the orders arranged in Cabinet; but he left further measures to Winder, Monroe, and Madison. His conduct irritated the President; but no one charged that the secretary refused to carry out the orders, or to satisfy the requisitions of the President or of General Winder. He was merely passive.

Winder received his appointment July 6, and went to Washington for instructions. He passed the next month riding between Washington, Baltimore, and points on the lower Potomac and Patuxent, obtaining with great fatigue a personal knowledge of the country. August 1 he established his permanent headquarters at Washington, and the entire result of his labors till that time was the presence of one company of Maryland militia at Bladensburg. No line of defence was selected, no obstructions to the roads were prepared, and not so much as a ditch or a breastwork was marked out or suggested between Annapolis and Washington. Another fortnight passed, and still Winder was not further advanced. He had no more men, arms, fortifications, and no more ideas, on the 18th of August than on the 6th of July. "The call for three thousand militia under the requisition of July 4 had produced only two hundred and fifty men at the moment the enemy landed at Benedict." ^

^ Madison's Works, iii. 422, 426.

* Winder to Armstrong, July 27, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 546.

* Winder's letter of Sept. 26, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 552.
Winder had then been six weeks in command of the Washington defences.

Meanwhile a British expedition under command of Major-General Robert Ross, a distinguished officer of the Peninsula army, sailed from the Gironde, June 27, to Bermuda. Ross was instructed "to effect a diversion on the coasts of the United States of America in favor of the army employed in the defence of Upper and Lower Canada." The point of attack was to be decided by Vice-Admiral Cochrane, subject to the general's approval; but the force was not intended for "any extended operation at a distance from the coast," nor was Ross to hold permanent possession of any captured district.^

^

'When the object of the descent which you may make on the coast is to take possession of any naval or military stores, you will not delay the destruction of them in preference to the taking them away, if there is reasonable ground of apprehension that the enemy is advancing with superior force to effect their recovery. If in any descent you shall be enabled to take such a position as to threaten the Inhabitants with the destruction of their property, you are hereby authorized to levy upon them contributions in return for your forbearance; but you will not by this understand that the magazines belonging to the government, or their harbors, or their shipping, are to be included in such an arrangement. These, together with their contents, are in all cases to be taken away or destroyed."

1 Bathuist to Boss, 1814; War Office Despatches, MSS. British Archives.

1jB14.
Negroes were not to be encouraged to rise upon their masters, and no slaves were to be taken away as slaves; but any negro who should expose himself to vengeance by joining the expedition or lending it assistance, might be enlisted in the black corps, or carried away by the fleet.

Nothing in these orders warranted the destruction of private or public property, except such as might be capable of military uses. Ross was not authorized, and did not intend, to enter on a mere marauding expedition; but Cochrane was independent of Boss, and at about the time when Ross reached Bermuda Cochrane received a letter from Sir George Prevost which gave an unexpected character to the Chesapeake expedition. A small body of American troops had crossed Lake Erie to Long Point, May 15, and destroyed the flour-mills, distilleries, and some private houses there. The raid was not authorized by the United States government, and the officer commanding it was afterward court-martialed and censured; but Sir George Prevost, without waiting for explanations, wrote to Vice-Admiral Cochrane, June 2, suggesting that he should "assist in inflicting that measure of retaliation which shall deter the enemy from a repetition of similar outrages."^ 

When Cochrane received this letter, he issued at Bermuda, July 18, orders to the ships under his command, from the St. Croix River to the St. Mary's,

^ Cochrane to Prevost, July 22, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives. C. 684, p. 221.
directing general retaliation. The orders were interesting as an illustration of the temper the war had taken.

"You are hereby required and directed," wrote the Vice-Admiral to the British blockading squadrons, to destroy and lay waste such towns and districts upon the coast as you may find assailable. You will hold strictly in view the conduct of the American army toward his Majesty's unoffending Canadian subjects, and you will spare merely the lives of the unarmed inhabitants of the United States. For only by carrying this retributory justice into the country of our enemy can we hope to make him sensible of the impropriety as well as of the inhumanity of the system he has adopted. You will take every opportunity of explaining to the people how much I lament the necessity of following the rigorous example of the commander of the American forces. And as these commanders must obviously have acted under instructions from the Executive government of the United States, whose intimate and unnatural connection with the late government of France has led them to adopt the same system of plunder and devastation, it is therefore to their own government the unfortunate sufferers must look for indemnification for their loss of property."

This ill-advised order was to remain in force until Sir George Prevost should send information that the United States government have come under an obligation to make full remuneration to the injured and

1 Orders of Vice-Admiral Cochrane, July 18, 1814; MSS. Canadian Archives, C. 684, p. 204.
unoffending inhabitants of the Canadas for all the outrages their troops have committed." Cochrane further wrote to Prevost that "as soon as these orders have been acted upon" a copy would be sent to Washington for the information of the Executive government.

Cochrane's retaliatory order was dated July 18, and Boss's transports arrived at Bermuda July 24. As soon as the troops were collected and stores put on board, Cochrane and Ross sailed, August 3, for Chesapeake Bay. They arrived a few days in advance of the transports, and passing up the bay to the mouth of the Potomac, landed, August 16, with Bear Admiral Cockburn, to decide on a plan for using to best effect the forces under their command.

Three objects were within reach. The first and immediate aim was a flotilla of gunboats, commanded by Captain Joshua Barney, which had taken refuge in the Patuxent River, and was there blockaded. The next natural object of desire was Baltimore, on account of its shipping and prize-money. The third was Washington and Alexandria, on account of the navy-yard and the vessels in the Potomac. Baltimore was the natural point of attack after destroying Barney's flotilla; but Cockburn, with a sailor's recklessness, urged a dash at Washington. Boss hesitated, and postponed a decision till Barney's flotilla should be disposed of.

^ James, ii. 275, 276; Cockburn to Cochrane, Aug. 27, 1814; Boss to Bathurst, Aug. 30, 1814; James, ii. 492-499.
Two days afterward, August 17, the troops arrived, and the squadron, commanded by Vice-Admiral Cochrane, moved twenty miles up the bay to the mouth of the Patuxent, — a point about fifty miles distant from Annapolis on the north, and from Washington on the northwest. Having arrived there August 18, Cochrane wrote, or afterward ante-dated, an official letter to Secretary Monroe: — 

"Having been called on by the Governor-General of the Canadas to aid him in carrying into effect measures of retaliation against the inhabitants of the United States for the wanton destruction committed by their army in Upper Canada, it has become imperiously my duty, conformably with the nature of the Governor-General's application, to issue to the naval force under my command an order to destroy and lay waste such towns and districts upon the coast as may be found assailable."

The notice was the more remarkable because Cochrane's order was issued only to the naval force. The army paid no attention to it. Ross's troops were landed at Benedict the next day, August 19; but neither there nor elsewhere did they destroy or lay waste towns or districts. They rather showed unusual respect for private property.

At Benedict, August 19, the British forces were organized in three brigades, numbering, according to different British accounts, four thousand five hun-

1 Cochrane to Monroe, Aug. 18, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Affairs, iii. 693.
dred, or four thousand rank-and-file.* Cockburn
with the boats of the fleet the next day, August 20,
started up the river in search of Barney's flotilla;
while the land force began its march at four o'clock
in the afternoon abreast of the boats, and camped
four miles above Benedict without seeing an enemy,
or suffering from a worse annoyance than one of the
evening thunder-storms common in hot weather.

The next day at dawn the British army started
again, and marched that day, Sunday, August 21,
etwelve miles to the village of Nottingham, where it
camped. The weather was hot, and the march re-
sembled a midsummer picnic. Through a thickly
wooded region, where a hundred militia-men with
axes and spades could have delayed their progress
for days, the British army moved in a solitude ap-
parently untenanted by human beings, till they
reached Nottingham on the Patuxent, — a deserted
town, rich in growing crops and full barns.

At Nottingham the army passed a quiet night, and
the next morning, Monday, August 22, lingered till
eight o'clock, when it again advanced. Among the
officers in the Eighty-fifth regiment was a lieutenant
named Gleig, who wrote afterward a charming nar-
rative of the campaign under the title, "A Subaltern
in America." He described the road as remarkably
good, running for the most part through the heart of
thick forests, which sheltered it from the rays of the


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sun. During the march the army was startled by the
distant sound of several heavy explosions. Barney
had blown up his gunboats to prevent their capture.
The British naval force had thus performed its part
in the enterprise, and the army was next to take the
lead. Ross halted at Marlboro after a march of only
seven miles, and there too he camped, undisturbed
by sight or sound of an armed enemy, although the
city of Washington was but sixteen miles on his left,
and Baltimore thirty miles in his front. Boss had
then marched twenty or twenty-one miles into Mary-
land without seeing an enemy, although an Ameri-
can army had been close on his left flank, watching
Mm all day.

At Marlboro Boss was obliged to decide what he
should next do. He was slow in forming a con-
clusion. Instead of marching at daybreak of August
23, and moving rapidly on Baltunore or Washington,
the army passed nearly the whole day at Marlboro
idleness, as though it were willing to let the
Americans do their utmost for defence. "Having
advanced within sixteen miles of Washington," Boss
officially reported, "and ascertained the force of the
enemy to be such as might authorize an attempt to
carry his capital, I determined to make it, and ac-
CO Jngly put the troops in movement on th; evening
of the 23d." More exactly, the troops moved at two
o'clock in the afternoon, and marched about six miles
on the road to Washington, when they struck Ameri-


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can outposts at about five o'clock, and saw a force
posted on high ground about a mile in their front.
As the British formed to attack, the American force disappeared, and the British army camped about nine miles from Washington by way of the navy-yard bridge over the Eastern Branch.

Thus for five days, from August 18 to August 28, a British army, which though small was larger than any single body of American regulars then in the field, marched in a leisurely manner through a long-settled country, and met no show of resistance before coming within sight of the Capitol. Such an adventure resembled the stories of Cortez and De Soto; and the conduct of the United States government offered no contradiction to the resemblance.

News of the great fleet that appeared in the Patuxent August 17 reached Washington on the morning of Thursday, August 18, and set the town in commotion. In haste the President sent fresh militia requisitions to the neighboring States, and ordered out the militia and all the regular troops in Washington and its neighborhood. Monroe started again as a scout, arriving in the neighborhood of Benedict at ten o'clock on the morning of August 20, and remaining there all day and night without learning more than he knew before starting. Winder was excessively busy, but did, according to his own account, nothing. "The innumerably multiplied orders, letters, consultations, and demands which crowded upon me at the moment of such an alarm can more easily be conceived than described, and occupied me nearly day and night, from Thursday

^ Monroe to Madison, Aug. 20 and 21, 1814; State Papery Military Affiedis, i. 537. Winder's Nanative, Ibid. 554.
the 18th of August till Sunday the 21st, and had nearly broken down myself and assistants in preparing, dispensing, and attending to them." Armstrong, at last alive to the situation, made excellent suggestions, but could furnish neither troops, means, nor military intelligence to carry them out; and the President could only call for help. The single step taken for defence was taken by the citizens, who held a meeting Saturday evening, and offered at their own expense to erect works at Bladensburg. Winder accepted their offer. Armstrong detailed Colonel Wadsorth, the only engineer officer near the Department, to lay out the lines, and the citizens did such work as was possible in the time that remained.

After three days of confusion, a force was at last evolved. Probably by Winder's order, although no such order was preserved, a corps of observation was marched across the navy-yard bridge toward the Patuxent, or drawn from Bladensburg, to a place called the Woodyard, twelve miles beyond the Eastern Branch. The force was not to be despised. Three hundred infantry regulars of different regiments, with one hundred and twenty light dragoons, formed the nucleus; two hundred and fifty Maryland militia, and about twelve hundred District volunteers or militia, with twelve six-pound field-pieces, composed a body of near two thousand men, from whom General Brown or Andrew Jackson would have got good service. Winder came out and took command Sunday evening, and Monroe, much exhausted, joined them that night.

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militia, and about twelve hundred District volunteers or militia, with twelve six-pound field-pieces, composed a body of near two thousand men, from whom General Brown or Andrew Jackson would have got good service. Winder came out and took command Sunday evening, and Monroe, much exhausted, joined them that night.
There the men stood Monday, August 22, while the British army marched by them, within sight of their outposts, from Nottingham to Marlboro. Winder rode forward with his cavalry and watched all day the enemy's leisurely movements close in his front, but the idea of attack did not appear to enter his mind. "A doubt at that time," he said, "was not entertained by anybody of the intention of the enemy to proceed direct to Washington." At nine o'clock that evening Monroe sent a note to the President, saying that the enemy was in full march for Washington; that Winder proposed to retire till he could collect his troops; that preparations should be made to destroy the bridges, and that the papers in the government offices should be removed.* At the same time Monroe notified Serurier, the only foreign minister then in Washington, that the sin-

* Winder's Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 554. General W. Smith's Statement; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 563.

- Winder's Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 554. General W. Smith's Statement, i. 563.

^ Winder's Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 555. ^ State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 538.

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gle hope of saving the capital depended on the very doubtful result of an engagement, which would probably take place the next day or the day after, at Bladensburg.^

At Bladensburg of necessity, the engagement must take place, unless Winder made an attack or waited for attack on the road. One of two courses
was to be taken, — Washington must be either de-
fended or evacuated. Perhaps Winder would have
done better to evacuate it, and let the British take
the undefended village; but no suggestion of the
sort was made, nor did Winder retreat to Bladens-
burg as was necessary if he meant to unite his troops
and make preparations for a battle. Instead of re-
treating to Bladensburg as soon as he was satisfied —
at noon of Monday, August 22 — that the British were
going there, he ordered his troops to fall back, and
took position at the Old Fields, about five miles in
the TQBX of the Woodyard, and about seven miles by
road from the navy-yard. Another road led from
the Old Fields to Bladensburg about eight miles
away. The American force might have been united
at Bladensburg Monday evening, but Winder camped
at the Old Fields and passed the night.

That evening the President and the members of
the Cabinet rode out to the camp, and the next
morning the President reviewed the army, which
had been reinforced by Commodore Barney with four

^ Serorier to Talleyrand, Aug. 22, 1814; Archives des AS»
tt. MSS.

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hundred sailors, the crews of the burned gunboats.
Winder then had twenty-five hundred men, of whom
near a thousand were regulars, or sailors even better
fighting troops than ordinary regulars. Such a force
vigorously led was sufficient to give Ross's army a
sharp check, and at that moment Boss was still hesi-
tating whether to attack Washington. The loss of a
few hundred men might have turned the scale at any
moment during Tuesday, August 23; but Winder
neither fought nor retreated, but once more passed
the day on scout. At noon he rode with a troop of cavalry toward Marlboro. Satisfied that the enemy was not in motion and would not move that day, he started at one o'clock for Bladensburg, leaving his army to itself. He wished to bring up a brigade of militia from Bladensburg.

Winder had ridden about five miles, when the British at two o'clock suddenly broke up their camp and marched directly on the Old Fields. The American army hastily formed in line, and sent off its baggage to Washington. Winder was summoned back in haste, and arrived on the field at five o'clock as the British appeared. He ordered a retreat. Every military reason required a retreat to Bladensburg. Winder directed a retreat on Washington by the navy-yard bridge.

The reasons which actuated him to prefer the navy yard to Bladensburg, as explained by him, consisted

* Winder's Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, pp. 565, 55&

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in anxiety for the safety of that "direct and important pass," which could not without hazard be left unguarded. In order to guard a bridge a quarter of a mile long over an impassable river covered by the guns of war-vessels and the navy-yard, he left unguarded the open high-road which led through Bladensburg directly to the Capitol and the White House. After a very rapid retreat that "literally became a run of eight miles," * Winder encamped in Washington near the bridge-head at the navy-yard at eight o'clock that night, and then rode three miles to the White House to report to the President. On
returning to camp, he passed the night until three or four o’clock in the morning making in person arrangements to destroy the bridge "when necessary," assuring his officers that he expected the enemy to attempt a passage there that night. Toward dawn he lay down, exhausted by performing a subaltern’s duty all day, and snatched an hour or two of sleep.

The British in their camp that evening were about eight miles from Bladensburg battle-field. Winder was about five miles distant from the same point. By a quick march at dawn he might still have arrived there, with six hours to spare for arranging

^ Winder's Narrative ; State Papers, Military Affairs, pp. 566, 667.

* Statement of John Law ; State Papers, Military Affairs, L 686.

* Winder's Narrative ; State Papers, MiHtaiy Affedrs, L 667.

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his defence. He preferred to wait till he should know with certainty that the British were on their way there. On the morning of Wednesday, August 24, he wrote to Armstrong: ^ —

^^ I have found it necessary to establish my headquar- ters here, the most advanced position convenient to the troops, and nearest information. I shall remain station- ary as much as possible, that I may be the more readily found, to issue orders, and collect together the various detachments of militia, and give them as rapid a con- solidation and organization as possible. . . . The news up the river is very threatening. Barney's or some
other force should occupy the batteries at Greenleaf's Point and the navy-yard. I should be glad of the assistance of counsel from yourself and the Government. If more convenient, I should make an exertion to go to you the first opportunity."

This singular note was carried first to the President, who, having opened and read it, immediately rode to headquarters. Monroe, Jones, and Bush followed. Armstrong and Campbell arrived last. Before Armstrong appeared, a scout arrived at ten o'clock with information that the British army had broken up its camp at daylight, and was probably more than half way to Bladensburg.*

Winder's persistence in remaining at the navy-yard was explained as due to the idea that the enemy might move toward the Potomac, seize Fort

^ State Papers, Military Affairs, L 548.
* Captain Burch's Statement, Oct. 12, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 574.

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Washington or Warburton, secure the passage of his ships, and approach the city by the river. ^ The general never explained how his presence at the navy-yard was to prevent such a movement if it was made.

The whole eastern side of Washington was covered by a broad estuary called the Eastern Branch of the Potomac, bridged only at two points, and impassable, even by pontoons, without ample warning. From the Potomac River to Bladensburg, a distance of about seven miles, the city was effectually protected. Bladensburg made the point of a right angle. There the
Baltimore road entered the city as by a pass; for beyond, to the west, no general would venture to enter, leaving an enemy at Bladensburg in his rear. Roads were wanting, and the country was difficult. Through Bladensburg the attacking army must come; to Bladensburg Winder must go, unless he meant to retreat to Georgetown, or to re-cross the Eastern Branch in the enemy's rear. Monroe notified Servier Monday evening that the battle would be fought at Bladensburg. Secretary Jones wrote to Commodore Rodgers, Tuesday morning, that the British would probably "advance to-day toward Bladensburg." * Every one looked instinctively to that spot.

* Rush's Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 542. Winder's Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 557.

William Pinkney's Statement; State Papers, Military Affairs^ I 572.

jet Winder to the last instant persisted in watching the navy-yard bridge, using the hours of Wednesday morning to post Barney's sailors with twenty-four-pound guns to cover an approach where no enemy could cross.

No sooner did Winder receive intelligence at ten o'clock Wednesday morning that the British were in march to Bladensburg, than in the utmost haste he
started for the same point, preceded by Monroe and followed by the President and the rest of the Cabinet and the troops. Barney's sailors and their guns would have been left behind to guard the navy-yard bridge had Secretary Jones not yielded to Barney's vigorous though disrespectful remonstrances, and allowed him to follow.*

In a long line the various corps, with their military and civil commanders, streamed toward Bladensburg, racing with the British, ten miles away, to arrive first on the field of battle. Monroe was earliest on the ground. Between eleven and twelve o'clock he reached the spot where hills slope gently toward the Eastern Branch a mile or more in broad incline, the little straggling town of Bladensburg opposite, beyond a shallow stream, and hills and woods in the distance. Several militia corps were already camped on the ground, which had been from the first desig-

* Secretary Jones's Report, Oct. 3, 1814; State Papers, Military AEaiT8, i. 576.

* Armstrong's Letter; State Papers^ Military Affidrs, L 540. IngersoU's History, ii. 173.

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nated as the point of concentration. A Baltimore brigade, more than two thousand strong, had arrived there thirty-six hours before. Some Maryland regiments arrived at the same time with Monroe. About three thousand men were then on the field, and their officers were endeavoring to form them in line of battle. General Stansbury of the Baltimore brigade made such an arrangement as he thought best. Monroe, who had no military rank, altered it without Stansbury's knowledge. General Winder arrived at
noon, and rode about the field. At the same time
the British light brigade made its appearance, and
wound down the opposite road, a mile away, a long
column of redcoats, six abreast, moving with the
quick regularity of old soldiers,* and striking directly
at the American centre; They reached the village on
one side of the stream as Winder's troops poured
down the hill on the other; and the President with
two or three of his Cabinet officers, considerably in
advance of all their own troops, nearly rode across
the bridge into the British line, when a volunteer
scout warned them of their danger.^

Much the larger portion of the American force
arrived on the ground when the enemy was in sight,
and were hastily drawn up in line wherever they

* Stansbury's Report; Monroe's Letter; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 561, 536.

* Gleig's Subaltern, p. 68.

* Letter of William Simmons; State Papers, Military Affairs,
L 596.

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could be placed.^ They had no cover. Colonel
Wadsworth's intrenchments were not used,* except
in the case of one field-work which enfiladed the
bridge at close range, where field-pieces were placed.
Although some seven thousand men were present, no-
thing deserving the name of an army existed. "A
few companies only," said the Subaltern, "perhaps
two or at the most three battalions, wearing the blue
jacket which the Americans have borrowed from the
French, presented some appearance of regular troops.
The rest seemed country-people, who would have
been much more appropriately employed in attending to their agricultural occupations than in standing with muskets in their hands on the brow of a bare, green hill." Heterogeneous as the force was, it would have been sufficient had it enjoyed the advantage of a commander.

The British light brigade, some twelve or fifteen hundred men, under Colonel Thornton of the Eighty-fifth regiment, without waiting for the rear division, dashed across the bridge, and were met by a discharge of artillery and musketry directly in their face. Checked for an instant, they pressed on, crossed the bridge or waded the stream, and spread to the right and left, while their rockets flew into the American lines. Almost instantly a portion of the American line gave way; but the rest stood firm, and

^ Winder's Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, L 557. Stansbory'B Report; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 562. * Van Ness^B Letter; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 580.

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drove the British skirmishers back under a heavy fire to the cover of the bank with its trees and shrubs. Not until a fresh British regiment, moving well to the right, forded the stream and threatened to turn the American left, did the rout begin. Even then several strong corps stood steady, and in good order retired by the road that led to the Capitol; but the mass, struck by panic, streamed westward toward Georgetown and B)ckville.

Meanwhile Bamey'd sailors, though on the run, could not reach the field in time for the attack, and halted on the hillside, about a mile from Bladensburg, at a spot just outside the District line. The rout had
then begun, but Barney put his five pieces in position and waited for the enemy. The American infantry and cavalry that had not fled westward moved confusedly past the field where the sailors stood at their guns. Winder sent Barney no orders, and Barney, who was not acting under Winder, but was commander-in-chief of his own forces under authority of the Navy Department, had no idea of running away. Four hundred men against four thousand were odds too great even for sailors, but a battle was not wholly disgraceful that produced such a commander and such men. Barney's account of the Combat was as excellent as his courage:

"At length the enemy made his appearance on the main road in force and in front of my battery, and on

* Barney's Report of Aug. 29, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 579.

seeing as made a halt. I reserved oar fire. In a few minutes the enemy again advanced, when I ordered an eighteen-poonder to be fired, which completely cleared the road; shortly after, a second and a third attempt was made by the enemy to come forward, but all were destroyed. They then crossed over into an open field, and attempted to flank our right. He was met there by three twelve-pounders, the marines under Captain Miller, and my men acting as infantry, and again was totally cut up. By this time not a vestige of the American fumy remained, except a body of five or six hundred posted on a height on my right, from which I expected much support from their fine situation."

Such a battle could not long continue. The British turned Barney's right; the corps on the height broke
and fled, and the British, getting into the ear, fired down upon the sailors. The British themselves were most outspoken in praise of Barney's men. "Not only did they serve their guns with a quickness and precision that astonished their assailants," said the Subaltern, "but they stood till some of them were actually bayonetted with fuses in their hands; nor was it till their leader was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers, that they left the field." Barney held his position nearly half an hour, and then, being severely wounded, ordered his officers to leave him where he lay. There he was taken by the British advance, and carried to their hospital at Bladensburg. The British officers, admiring his gallantry, treated him, he said, " with

'Colonel Beall's Statement; State Papers MHitaey AfEiAiia^ L 671.

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the most marked attention, respect, and politeness as if I was a brother," — as though to show their opinion that Barney instead of Winder should have led the American army.

After the sailors retired, at about four o'clock, the British stopped two hours to rest. Their victory, easy as it seemed, was not cheaply bought. General Ross officially reported sixty-four killed and one hundred and eighty-five wounded. A loss of two hundred and fifty men among fifteen hundred said to be engaged * was not small; but Gleig, an officer of the light brigade, himself wounded, made twice, at long intervals, an assertion which he must have intended as a contradiction of the official report. "The loss on the part of the English was severe," he said,© "since out of two thirds of the army which
were engaged upward of five hundred men were killed and wounded." According to this assertion, Ross lost five hundred men among three thousand engaged, or one in six. Had Winder inflicted that loss while the British were still oji the Patuxent, Ross would have thought long before risking more, especially as Colonel Thornton was among the severely injured. The Americans reported only twenty-six killed and fifty-one wounded.

At six o'clock, after a rest of two hours, the British troops resumed their march; but night fell before

1 James, ii. 499.

' Cockburn to Cochiante, Aug. 27, 1814; James, ii. 493.
' Campaigns, p. 67; Cf. Barney to the National Intelligencer*
Niles, vii. Supplement, p. 159.

1814. BLADENSBURG. 1,4^ thej reached the first houses of the town. As Robs and Cockburn, with a few ofScers, advanced before the troops, some men, supposed to have been Barney's sailors, fired on the party from the house formerly occupied by Gallatin, at the northeast comer of Capitol Square. Boss's horse was killed, and the general ordered the house to be burned, which was done. The army did not enter the town, but camped at eight o'clock a quarter of a mile east of the Capitol. Troops were then detailed to burn the Capitol,, and as the great building burst into flames, Ross and Cockburn, with about two hundred men, marched silently in the darkness to the White House, and set fire to it. At the same time Commodore Tingey, by order of Secretary Jones, set fire to the navy-yard and the vessels in the Eastern Branch. Before mid-' night the flames of three great conflagrations made
the whole country light, and from the distant hills of Maryland and Virginia the flying President and Cabinet caught glimpses of the ruin their incompetence had caused. I

Serurier lived then in the house built, by John Tayloe in 1800, called the Octagon, a few hundred yards from the War and Navy Departments and the White House. He was almost the only civil official left in Washington, and hastened to report the event to Talleyrand:*

^ Benjamin Ogle Tayloe. In Memoriam, p. 164.
* Seniiiet to Talleyiand, Aug. 212 and 27, 1814. Archives des Aff. Étr. MSS.

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^* I never saw a scene at once more terrible and more magnificent. Your Highness, knowing the picturesque nature and the grandeur of the surroundings, can form an idea of it. A profound darkness reigned in the part of the city that I occupy, and we were left to conjectures and to the lying reports of negroes as to what was passing in the quarter illuminated by these frightful flames. At eleven o’clock a colonel, preceded by torches, was seen to take the direction of the White House, which is situated quite near mine; the negroes reported that it was to be burned, as well as all those pertaining to government offices. I thought best, on the moment, to send one of my people to the general with a letter, in which I begged him to send a guard to the house of the Ambassador of France to protect it. . . . My messenger found General Ross in the White House, where he was collecting in the drawing-room all the furniture to be found, and was preparing to set fire to it. The general
made answer that the King's Hotel should be respected as, much as though his Majesty were there in person; that he would give orders to that effect; and that if he was still in Washington the next day, he would have the pleasure to call on me."

Boss and Cockbum alone among military officers, during more than twenty years of war, considered their duty to involve personal incendiarism. At the time and subsequently various motives were attributed to them, — such as the duty of retaliation, — none of which was alleged by either of them as their warranty. They burned the Capitol, the White House, and the Department buildings because they thought it proper, as they would have burned a negro kraal or a den of pirates. Apparently they assumed as a matter of course that the American government stood beyond the pale of civilization; and in truth a government which showed so little capacity to defend its capital, could hardly wonder at whatever treatment it received.

A violent thunder-storm checked the flames; but the next morning, Thursday, August 25, fresh detachments of troops were sent to complete the destruction of public property. Without orders from his Government, Ross converted his campaign, which till then had been creditable to himself and flattering to British pride, into a marauding raid of which no sensible Englishman spoke without mortification. Gockbum amused himself by revenging his personal grievances on the press which had abused him. Mounted on a brood mare, white, uncurried, with a black foal trotting by her side, the Admiral attacked the office
of the "National Intelligencer," and superintended the destruction of the types. "Be sure that all the C's are destroyed," he ordered, "so that the rascals cannot any longer abuse my name." ^ Boss was anxious to complete the destruction of the public buildings with the least possible delay, that the army might retire without loss of time; * and the work was pressed with extreme haste. A few private buildings were burned, but as a rule private property was respected, and no troops except small detachments were allowed to leave the camp.

Soon after noon, while the work was still incomplete, a tornado burst on the city and put an end to the effort. An accidental explosion at the navy-yard helped to check destruction. Boss could do no more, and was in haste to get away. No sooner had the hurricane, which lasted nearly two hours and seemed especially violent at the camp, passed over, than Ross began preparations to retire. With precautions wholly unnecessary, leaving its camp-fires burning, the British column in extreme silence, after nine o'clock at night, began its march. Passing Bladensburg, where the dead were still unburied, Ross left his wounded in the hospital to American care, and marched all night till seven o'clock Friday morning, when the troops, exhausted with fatigue, were allowed a rest. At noon they were again in motion, and at night-fall, after marching twenty-five miles within twenty-four hours, they arrived at Marlboro. Had the advance from Benedict been equally

* Ingersoll's History, ii. 189.

* Boss's Report of Aug. 30, 1814; James, ii. 496.»

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respected, and no troops except small detachments were allowed to leave the camp.
rapid, Ross would have entered Washington without a skirmish.

CHAPTER VI.

While Bobs and Cockburn were hastily burning the White House and the Department buildings, anxious only to escape, and never sending more than two hundred soldiers beyond Capitol Square, the President, his Cabinet, his generals, and his army were performing movements at which even the American people, though outraged and exasperated beyond endurance, could not but laugh.

The President, after riding over the battle-field until the action began, remarked to Monroe and Armstrong that "it would be now proper for us to retire in the rear, leaving the military movement to military men," which they did. A moment afterward the left of the line gave way, and the panic stricken militia poured along the road leading westward toward the point which in later times became known as the Soldier's Home. The President retired with them, "continuing to move slowly toward the city," according to Monroe, in company with Attorney-General Rush. The slowness of movement, on which Monroe seemed to lay stress, was compensated by steadiness. The President left Bladensburg

* Monroe's Letter, Nov. 13, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 637.
battle-field toward two o'clock. He had already ridden in the early morning from the White House to the navy-yard, and thence to Bladensburg, — a distance of eigLt miles at the least. He had six miles to ride, on a very hot August day, over a road encumbered by fugitives. He was sixty-three years old, and had that day already been in the saddle since eight o'clock in the morning, probably without food. Soon after three o'clock he reached the White House, where all was confusion and flight. ^ He had agreed with his Cabinet, in case of disaster, to meet them at Frederick in Maryland, fifty miles away, but he did not go toward Frederick. Before six o'clock he crossed the Potomac in a boat from the White House grounds, and started by carriage westward, apparently intending to join his wife and accompany her to his residence at Montpelier in Loudoun County, adjoining Frederick County, on the south side of the Potomac. Secretary Jones, Attorney-General Bush, and one or two other gentlemen accompanied him. In the midst of a troop of fugitives they travelled till dark, and went about ten miles, passing the night at a house ^^ a few miles above the lower falls." a

The next morning, August 25, the President trav-

^ Mn. Madison to her sister, Aug. 24, 1814; Memoiis and Letters of Dolly Madison, p. 108.

' Memorandum of Colonel Monioe ; MSS. State Department Archives.

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elled about six miles and joined his wife at an inn on the same road, where he remained during the tor-

nado, subjected to no little discomfort and some in*
suit from fugitives who thought themselves betrayed. Although far beyond reach of the British troops and some twenty miles from their camp, the panic was still so great as to cause an alarm on the following night, which drove Madison from his bed for refuge in the Virginia woods, at the time when Ross's army, more than twenty miles distant, was marching at the utmost speed in the opposite direction.

Of all the rulers, monarchical or republican, whose capitals were occupied by hostile armies in the Napoleonic wars, Madison was personally the most roughly treated. Monroe's adventures were not less mortifying. As a scout the Secretary of State's services were hardly so valuable as those of a common trooper, for he was obliged to be more cautious; as a general, his interference with the order of battle at Bladensburg led to sharp criticisms from General Stansbury, whose arrangements he altered, and to the epithet of "busy and blundering tactician" from Armstrong. After the battle he was not less busy, and opinions greatly differed whether he was less blundering. He did not return to the White House

^ IngersoU's History, ii. 208; Memoirs and Letters of Dolly Madison, p. 116.

' Beporfc of General Stansbury, Nov. 15, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 560.

* Notices, IL 148.

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with Madison, but joined Winder and rode with him to the Capitol, where he assented to an evacuation, and retired after the flying troops through Georgetown, passing the night on the Maryland side of the
Potomac. The next morning, August 25, he crossed the river and overtook the President. After an interview with him, Monroe recrossed the river to Winder's headquarters at Montgomery Court House, where he resumed military functions.

The Secretary of the Treasury, G. W. Campbell, on the morning of the battle went to the Cabinet meeting at the navy-yard, but his health, which had become much affected, obliged him to return to his lodgings instead of riding to Bladensburg. In parting from Madison, Campbell lent him a pair of pistols, which the President put in his holsters. Federalists were curious to know whether the pistols were the same with which he shot Barent Gardenier, but learned only that they were fine duelling pistols, and that they were stolen from the President's holsters during his short stay at the White House after the battle. The secretary's duelling pistols became the best known of all the weapons unused that day; but the secretary himself made no further appearance on the scene. He went to Frederick. The Secretary of the Navy and the Attorney-General accompanied the President, and shared his fortunes.

Although ridicule without end was showered on the President and the other civilians, their conduct was on the whole creditable to their courage and character; but of the commanding general no kind word could be said. Neither William Hull, Alexander Smyth, Dearborn, Wilkinson, nor Winchester showed such incapacity as Winder either to organize, fortify, fight, or escape. When he might have prepared defences, he acted as scout; when he might have fought, he still scouted; when he retreated, he
retreated in the wrong direction; when he fought, he thought only of retreat; and whether scouting, re- treating, or fighting, he never betrayed an idea. In the brief moment of his preparations on the field at Bladensburg he found time to give the characteristic order to his artillery: "When you retreat, take notice that you must retreat by the (Georgetown road."

When he left the field of Bladensburg he rode past Barney’s sailors, at their guns, and sent his aid to Colonel Beall, on the hill covering Barney’s right, with an order to retreat. "After accompanying the retreating army within two miles of the Capitol, I rode forward for the purpose of selecting a position." He reached the Capitol first, and was presently joined there by Monroe and Armstrong. Having decided not to fight at the Capitol, or at any point between the Capitol and Georgetown, he rode to Georgetown. Behind Rock Creek his army would

^ Statement of John Law, Nov. 10, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 585.

' Wilkinson's Memoirs, L 786.

* Winder’s Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 668.

* Armstrong’s Notices, ii. 231; Appendix no. 28. Winder’s Narrative; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 659.

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have been safe, and be could certainly baye rallied more than a thousand men to stop the panic; but be thought a farther retreat necessary, and went on to the heights. On the heights nothing could reach him without hours of warning, but be rode three miles farther to Tenallytown. At Tenallytown his exhausted men stopped a moment from inability to
run farther, yet he seemed angry at their faAigue. Struck by a fresh panic at the glare of the burning city, he pressed his men on at midnight. "After waiting in this position [Tenallytown] until I supposed I collected all the force that could be gathered, I proceeded about five miles farther on the river road which leads a little, wide to the left of Montgomery Court House, and in the morning gave orders for the whole to assemble at Montgomery Court House." The river road was the road that led farthest from the enemy westward, when every motive required retreat toward Baltimore if anywhere. The next morning Winder returned to the Rockville road, till he reached Rockville, or Montgomery Court House, sixteen miles from Washington, where at last he paused.

From the beginning to the end of the campaign Winder showed no military quality. In other respects his conduct tallied with his behavior in the field. He lost no opportunity of throwing responsibility on the President and on his troops, and he so far succeeded as to save himself from public anger by encouraging the idea that the President and the Cabinet had directed the campaign. Universal as

that belief was, and continued to be, it was without foundation. While Winder courted advice from every quarter, and threw on the President at every instant the responsibility for every movement, neither the President nor the Cabinet showed a disposition to interfere with his authority in any way except to give the support he asked. Under the strongest temptation they abstained even from criticism.

More than all the rest, Armstrong refrained from interference with the movements of Winder. Of all
the unfortunate or incapable generals of the war. Winder was the one whom Armstrong treated with least bitterness, although he was not Armstrong’s choice, and was the direct cause of the secretary’s ruin. So careful was Armstrong not to interfere, that his non-interference became the chief charge against him. At one moment the President told the secretary that he interfered too much, at another moment that he should interfere more; but in truth Armstrong was the only man connected with the defence of Washington whom no one charged with being ridiculous. After August 20 his conduct was not open to reproach. He was cool when others were excited; he tried to check the panic; his suggestions were sensible; he gave all possible aid both to Winder and to the citizens; he attended the President in his expeditions, used wisely such power as he had, and indulged in few words.^


’ Madison’s Memorandum^ Aug. 24, 1814; Works, iii*. 422.

166 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.<. At the President’s request he went to Bladensburg to support and assist Winder; at the President’s order he retired after the battle began. He returned, after Winder, to the Capitol, hoping to convert that strong building into a fortress,— a measure not unreasonable, if the regulars and sailors were rallied to make a stand there. When Winder decided to retire to Georgetown, the secretary acquiesced without a word. Then, in pursuance of a Cabinet decision made a few hours before, he set out in company with Secretary Campbell for Frederick, and arrived there in the course of the next day.
Armstrong and Campbell were at Frederick when the British army began its retreat Thursday night; the President was in Virginia, sixteen miles up the river; Winder and Monroe, with the remaining troops, were at Montgomery Court House sixteen miles from Washington. There they learned, Friday morning, that the British had marched toward Bladensburg, probably going to Baltimore; and at about ten o'clock in the morning Winder marched from Montgomery Court House toward Brookville and Baltimore with all his force. Passing through Brookville, they camped, Friday night, "about half way between Montgomery Court House and Ellicott's upper mills," and Winder there left them, starting late that evening alone for Baltimore, and leaving Monroe and Stansbury in command, with directions to follow.

^ Stansbury's Report; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 562.

Meanwhile the President had crossed the Potomac that morning, expecting to find Winder and Monroe at Montgomery Court House; but on arriving there at six o'clock in the evening, and learning that the army had marched toward Baltimore, he followed as far as Brookville, about ten miles, where he passed the night. ^ Attorney-General Rush was with him. Saturday morning, August 27, the President sent notes to all his Cabinet requesting them to unite in Washington. ^ The same afternoon he returned with Monroe and Rush to the city, which they reached at about six o'clock, after three days' absence.

Armstrong and Campbell, ignorant of the change in plan, waited at Frederick for the President's arrival, while the President and Monroe, Sunday,
August 28, began the task of restoring the functions of government. The task was difficult, not so much on account of the British ravages, which had been confined to public property, as on account of the general irritation and the continued panic. Hardly had Ross's army disappeared when a squadron of British war-vessels, under Captain Gordon of the frigate "Seahorse," worked its way up the river, approaching Fort Washington or Warburton August 27. The commander of that post, misunderstanding his orders, abandoned it and crossed the river with his men. Grordon's squadron reached Alexandria the next day, and the town capitulated, since it could not resist. Until August 31 the frigates remained at Alexandria, loading such vessels as were there with the tobacco and other produce which the warehouses contained.

The citizens of Washington and Georgetown, expecting to be visited in their turn, and conscious of their inability to resist, talked of a capitulation. Public feeling ran strong against the President. Armstrong was absent. Winder was at Baltimore. Monroe alone was in a position to act, and upon Monroe the President was obliged to depend.

Under these circumstances," said Monroe in the only authentic account of the event which remains," the President requested Mr. Monroe to take charge of the Department of War and command of the District ad
interim^ with which he immediately complied. On the 28th, in the morning, the President with Mr. Monroe and the Attorney-General visited the navy-yard, the arsenal at Greenleaf 's Point, and passing along the shore of the Potomac up toward Georgetown. Mr. Monroe, as Secretary of War and military commander, adopted measures under sanction of the President for the defence of the city and of Georgetown."

Colonel W[adsworth?] who was placing some guns on the opposite shore refused to obey an order of Monroe to change their position. Monroe rode across the bridge and gave the order in person. The

^ Report of Captain Gordon, Sept 9, 1814 ; James, Appendix no. 84.

' Monroe's Memorandum; Oilman's Monroe, p. 119.

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colonel replied that he did not know Mr. Monroe as Secretary of War or commanding general. Monroe ordered him to obey or leave the field, and the colonel left the field.

Monroe's act, whether such was his intention or not, was a coup 3^ Stat. The citizens, unable to punish the President, were rabid against Armstrong. No one could deny that they had reason for their anger, although the blame for their misfortunes was 80 evenly distributed between every officer and every branch of government that a single victim could not justly be selected for punishment. Monroe, instead of giving to Armstrong in his absence such support as might have sustained him, took a position and exercised an authority that led necessarily to his overthrow. The influence of such acts on the citizens was
obvious. That evening the first brigade of militia held a meeting, and passed a formal and unanimous resolution that they would no longer serve under the orders or military administration of General Armstrong, whom they denounced as the willing cause of the fate of Washington. This mutinous resolution, adopted in the immediate presence of the enemy, was taken to the President by two officers of the brigade, one of whom at least was a strong friend of Monroe.

The resolution of the first brigade was communicated to the President the next morning, Monday,

^ Williams; Capture of Washington, p. 105.
' McEenney's Memoirs, p. 47.

August 29. All the President's recorded acts and conversation for months after the capture of Washington implied that he was greatly shaken by that disaster. He showed his prostration by helplessness. He allowed Monroe for the first time to control him; but he did not dismiss Armstrong. At one o'clock on the afternoon of the same day the Secretary of War arrived in Washington. The President that evening rode to his lodgings. Madison preserved a memorandum of their conversation, and Armstrong also immediately afterward recorded what passed. The President described to the secretary the violent prejudices which existed in the city against the Administration, and especially against himself and the Secretary of War. Before his arrival there was less difficulty, as Mr. Monroe, who was very acceptable to them, had, as on preceding occasions of his absence, though very reluctantly on this, been the medium for the functions of Secretary of War;"
but since Armstrong had returned, something must be done.

Armstrong replied that he was aware of the excitement, and knew its sources; that evidently he could not remain if his functions were exercised by any one else; that he would resign, or retire from Washington at once, as the President preferred.

Madison deprecated resignation, and recommended


"a temporary retirement, as he suggested," and after some further conversation, in which the President complained of the secretary's mistakes, they parted with the understanding that Armstrong should leave Washington the next morning. Armstrong behaved with dignity and with his usual pride; but he understood, if Madison did not, the necessary consequences of his retirement, and on reaching Baltimore sent his resignation to the President. At the same time he announced it to the public in a letter, dated September 3, containing comments on the weakness of Madison's conduct calculated to close their relations.

Between conscious intrigue and unconscious instinct no clear line of division was ever drawn* Monroe, by the one method or the other, gained his point and drove Armstrong from the Cabinet; but the suspicion that he had intrigued for that object troubled his mind to the day of his death. ^ Even
after Armstrong's departure, the dangers and disadvantages of appointing Monroe his successor were so great that for three weeks the post remained unfilled, until, after many doubts and hesitations, Monroe wrote to Madison a letter claiming the appointment of Secretary of War.

^^ I have thought much of the state of the Departments at this time," he informed the President, September 25,'

^ McKenney'B Memoirs, p. 44.

- Monroe to Madison, Sept. 25, 1814; Madison MSS. State Department Archives.

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*^ and of the persons whom it may be proper to place in them, and have concluded that whatever may be the arrangement with respect to other Departments, the Department of War ought to be immediately filled. I think also that I ought to take charge of it. . . . By taking charge of the Department twice, and withdrawing from it a second time, it may be inferred that I shrink from the responsibility from a fear of injuring my reputation; and this may countenance the idea that the removal of the others was an affair of intrigue in which I partook, especially in the latter instance, from selfish and improper motives, and did not proceed from his incompetency or misconduct. It seems due, therefore, to my own reputation to go through with the undertaking by accepting permanently a trust which I have not sought, never wished, and is attended with great responsibility and hazard. By taking the place, all clamor will be silenced. It is known, here at least, that I was put into it when the
other could no longer hold it. Those who wished it in the first instance will be satisfied, and I shall go on with your support and a favorable expectation of the public that I shall discharge to advantage its duties."

While Monroe in private communications with Madison thus treated Armstrong's retirement as a "removal," due to his "incompetency or misconduct," and Madison apparently acquiesced in that view, in public Madison seemed inclined to convey the idea that Armstrong was not removed or meant to be removed from office, but rather deserted it. Whichever view was correct, Madison certainly dreaded the political effect of appearing to remove Armstrong;

and while he gave to Monroe the appointment of Secretary of War, he wrote, September 29, to Governor Tompkins of New York, offering him the State Department.

Governor Tompkins declined the offer. Apart from the great need of his services as governor, the experience of Northern men in Virginia Cabinets was not calculated to encourage any aspirant to the Presidency in seeking the position. Monroe remained Secretary of State as well as Secretary of War. As Secretary of State he had little or nothing to do, which was partly the cause of his activity in military matters; but as Secretary of War he was obliged to undertake a task beyond the powers of any man.

During an entire month after the appearance of the British in the Patuxent, the United States government performed few or none of its functions. The war on the frontiers was conducted without
orders from Washington. Every energy of the government was concentrated on its own immediate dangers, as though Washington were a beleaguered fortress. Slowly the tide of war ebbed from the Potomac and Chesapeake, and not until it had wholly subsided could men cease to dread its possible return.

Captain Gordon's squadron began its descent of the river September 1, greatly annoyed by batteries erected on the banks by Commodore Rodgers, Perry, and Porter, who were sent from Baltimore, by order of Secretary Jones, for the purpose. Not until September 6 did Captain Gordon escape from his perilous position and rejoin the fleet. Meanwhile the shores of Chesapeake Bay continued to be ravaged with all the severity threatened by Cochrane. Frederick Chamier, afterward the author of several popular sea stories, was then a lieutenant on the "Menelaus" in Cochrane's squadron, and his recollections in "The Life of a Sailor" gave a lively picture of the marauding in which he took part. Like Napier, Chamier was too tender-hearted for his work. "I am willing to make oath," he wrote, in reply to Captain Scott's contradictions, "that on the day that the 'Menelaus' entered the Potomac, three houses were burning at the same time on the left-hand bank of the river. We burnt more than five ourselves."

War was commonly accompanied by destruction, but the war in the Chesapeake was remarkable for the personal share taken by the highest officers, especially by Cockburn and Ross, in directing the actual opera-
tion of setting fire to private and public property.*

At last the practice caused a disaster that cost the British navy a life more valuable than all the property it could destroy or carry away. The "Menelaus," commanded by Sir Peter Parker, was sent up


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Chesapeake Bay to divert attention from the general movement of troops and ships on the Potomac. ^ The "Menelans" took position off the Sassafras River, which Cockburn had cleared of vessels the year before. Nothing in the river could injure the navy, but the "Menelaus" was ordered to make a diversion; and Sir Peter Parker learned from negroes that two hundred militia, encamped behind a wood half a mile from the beach, intended to cross the bay for the protection of Baltimore.* One hundred and twenty-four men were landed at eleven o'clock on the night of August 30, and went in search of the militia. Instead of half a mile, they were led by their guides three or four miles, and at last found the militia drawn up, ready to receive them. Sir Peter Parker ordered an attack, and while cheering it on in the moonlight was struck by a buckshot, which severed the femoral artery. The sailors carried him back to the ship, but he died long before reaching it.® His party escaped with a loss of thirteen killed and twenty-seven wounded besides their captain.

The Americans regretted only that the punishment
had fallen on the wrong person, for Cochrane and Cockburn rather than Parker were the true marauders; but the lesson was effectual, and the British

^ James, ii. 276.


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became more cautious after Parker's death. Indeed, their activity in the Chesapeake centred thence-forward in an effort to capture Baltimore, which required all their strength.

Baltimore should have been first attacked, but Cockburn's influence by diverting Ross to Washington gave the larger city time to prepare its defence. The citizens themselves, headed by the mayor, took charge of the preparations; and their first act, contrary to the course pursued by Armstrong and Winddr at Washington, was to construct intrenchments round the city, and to erect semi-circular batteries at a number of points, mounted with cannon and connected by a line of works. After the capture of Washington the citizens toiled still more earnestly at their task, until a formidable line of redoubts protected the town, and, though not wholly finished, gave cover to the militia. The batteries were manned by sailors, commanded by officers of the navy. The harbor was protected by Fort McHenry, small but capable of defence, and occupied by a strong force of regular troops, sailors, and volunteer artillerists numbering about one thousand, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Armistead of the Artillery."
These precautions made the capture of Baltimore impossible by such a force as had taken Washington, even though aided by the fleet. The precise number of troops present in the city, according to the official

^ Report of LieutenaatrColonel Aimiestead, Sept. 24, 1814; Niles, viL 40.

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return for September 10, waB twelve thousand nine hundred and ninety-one men present for duty, with eight hundred and ninety-seven officers. The aggregate of present and absent was sixteen thousand eight hundred and five men. ^ The force was ample to man the works, but the fortifications chiefly decided the result. No army on either side during the war succeeded in stonning works in face, except by surprise; and to tuim the works of Baltimore a larger army was required than Boss had at his command.

' The militia major-general commanding at Baltimore was no other than Samuel Smith, senator of the United States. He had lately passed his sixty-second year. The brigadier-general in the United States service who commanded the military district was W. H. Winder, whose defence of Washington ended abruptly August 24, and who left that neighborhood on the evening of August 26 to take command of the defences of Baltimore. Winder was a Baltimore lawyer, only three years Smith's junior, when Eustis and Madison gave him a regiment in March, 1812. Smith was not disposed to accept the idea of subordination to a man of inferior rank, military and civil, who knew no more of war than Smith knew^ and whose career had been twice marked by unusual ridicule. Winder on arriving in Baltimore notified
Smith that he should take command, and was as-

^ Army Betoms ; MSS. AdjutantrGeneral's office^ War Department

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stonished when the senator declined to surrender iis authority. Winder appealed to the President and to the governor of Maryland, his cousin Levin Winder; but nothing could be done to assist him, and in the end he submitted. Samuel Smith re-

mained in command.

The British leaders having succeeded in turning their demonstration up the Patuxent into an attack on Washington, next decided to make " a demonstra-

tion upon the city of Baltimore, which might be con-

verted into a real attack should circumstances appear to justify it," ^ and sailed from the Potomac Septem-

ber 6 for the Patapsco River. They anchored Sep-

tember 11 off its mouth. From that point Boss's axmy when landed had only fourteen miles to march, and no water in their way, while Cochrane's fleet had but twelve miles to sail. Compared with the ap-

proaches to Washington, the approach to Baltimore was easy.

Boss's troops were all landed at daylight on the northern point, and were in motion by eight o'clock September 12, without firing a shot. Their numbers were differently given by British authorities, — one reporting them at three thousand two hundred and seventy rank-and-file;* the other reckoning them at upward of five thousand. ^ Boss made on the Patap-

1 Cochrane's Report of Sept. 17^ 1814; James, ii. Appendix no. 73.
8Co no such leisurely movements as on the Patuxent, but began his march at once, and proceeded about five miles without meeting resistance. The light brigade with the Eighty-fifth regiment was in advance; the second brigade, under Colonel Brooke of the Forty-fourth, followed; and the third brigade, under Colonel Patterson of the Twenty-first, formed the rear. At the same time the fleet moved up the channel toward Port Henry.

The city was naturally excited at the news that the British had arrived. General Smith, on receiving the intelligence September 11, detached a brigade of Baltimore militia, under General Strieker, to check the enemy if possible, and Strieker advanced that evening about seven miles toward North Point. His force numbered about three thousand two hundred men; and with that body of raw militia, a part of whom had been routed at Bladensburg only a fortnight before, General Strieker attempted to fight a battle with five thousand old soldiers. On the morning of September 12 he formed his troops in three lines three hundred yards apart, apparently in close order, without cover or protection of any kind, standing in fields more or less open, and with an exposed flank. Of all his arrangements, the only one which showed ordinary caution was to send a detachment of cavalry and riflemen a mile or two in his front. As the Brit-

* Drawing of line of battle; Lossing, p. 953. Report of Col-
ish advance approached, the American outposts fell back, and General Strieker sent forward some four hundred men, partly rifles, as skirmishers. The British advanced guard coming up, the skirmishing party fired, but was soon driven back. Boss and Cockburn were walking together with the advance, and after the firing ceased, Boss turned back alone to order up the light companies in anticipation of more serious resistance. On his way he was shot through the breast from the wood, and fell in the road, where he lay till he was found by the light companies hurrying forward to the scene of the firing. He barely spoke afterward.

The loss of their commanding general was the second heavy penalty paid by the British for their contempt of militia. Colonel Brooke immediately took command, and the advance was not checked; but the loss was not the less serious. When Brooke saw Strieker’s line stretching across the field, he did not dash at them at once with the light brigade as Thornton had attacked the larger force and stronger position at Bladensburg, but deployed the whole army and formed a regular order of battle. Although his force easily overlapped and outflanked the American, the engagement that followed was sharp, and the Americans were not routed without considerable loss to the British, who reported forty-six killed and two hundred and seventy-three wounded, — or more than they reported at Bladensburg. The Americans, though routed,

^ James, ii. 315.
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suffered less, losing only twenty-four lolled, one hundred and thirty-nine wounded, and fifty prisoners, with two field-pieces.

This spirited little battle detained the British so long that they bivouacked on the field, and passed the night in a drenching rain, resuming their march the next morning, September 13, when they found the roads obstructed, and were obliged to move so slowly that evening arrived before they came in sight of Baltimore. When at last they saw on the distant heights the long line of intrenchments that surrounded Baltimore on the side of their approach they stopped short. Colonel Brooke had gone forward with the advance, and was engaged all day, at about a mile and a half distance, in studying the American lines. He made arrangements for a night attack, hoping to avoid the effects of the American artillery, and then waited for the fleet to support him.

The fleet all day bombarded the forts and batteries that covered the entrance to the harbor, and continued the bombardment till past midnight. Unlike most naval engagements during the war, this battle was harmless to either party. The heavier British ships feared to approach within range, owing to a barrier of sunken vessels, covered by the guns on shore and by gunboats. Without the heavy ships, the

^ Cleig's Campaigns, p. 102.

' Brooke's Report of Sept 17, 1814; James, ii. Appendix no. 71, p. 608.
lighter vessels could not maintain a position. The
fort sustained no great injury, and only four men
were killed and twenty-four wounded. The fleet as
far as was reported sustained no injury whatever.
The firing ceased toward midnight, and Admiral
Cochrane sent word to Colonel Brooke that he could
do no more.

"Under these circumstances," reported Colonel Brooke,
"and keeping in view your Lordship's instructions, it was
agreed between the Vice-admiral and myself that the cap-
ture of the town would not have been a sufficient equiv-
alent to the loss which might probably be sustained in
storming the heights."

Sir George Prevost at Plattsburg only two days be-
fore, with three times the number of troops and a
much smaller number of opponents, came to the same
conclusion. That both officers were probably wise
was shown by the experience of Lieutenant-Gener-al
Drummond, a month earlier, in attempting to storm
the lines of Fort Erie. Brooke and Prevost followed
the same course in another respect, for Brooke with-
drew his army so rapidly that at noon of Septem-
ber 14 it had already passed the battle-field of two
days before, and in another day the whole force was
re-embarked.*

As soon as the wind allowed, the fleet returned to
the lower Chesapeake; and September 19 Admiral

* Armistead's Report, Sept 24, 1814; Niles, vii. 40.

* Cochrane's Report of Sept. 17, 1814; James, ii. 514.

* Subaltern, chap. xiii.
Cochrane sailed for Halifax to prepare for a new expedition. The troops remained till October 14 in their transports in the baj, and then set sail for Jamaica, leaving Virginia and Maryland to a long repose, which the vexed shores sorely needed.

CHAPTER Vn.

After balancing gains and losses, the result of the campaign favored Great Britain by the amount of plunder which the navy obtained in Alexandria, and by the posts which Governor Sherbrooke occupied between the Penobscot and the Passamaquoddy in Maine. Considering the effort made and the waste of money, the result was a total disappointment to the British people; but even these advantages on land could not be regarded as secure until the British navy and mercantile marine had summed up their profits and losses on the ocean.

At the beginning of the year 1814 the American navy had almost disappeared. Porter in the "Essex" still annoyed British interests in the Pacific; but of the five large frigates only the "President" was at sea. January 1 the "Constitution," Captain Charles Stewart, left Boston and cruised southward, making a few prizes and destroying a British fourteen-gun schooner, but fighting no battle and effecting no object equivalent to her cost. In returning to Boston, April 3, she narrowly escaped capture by the two British frigates blockading the port, and with difficulty got into Marblehead harbor. The "Constitu-
Hon" did not again go to sea until December 17.. During her cruise of three months, from January 1 to April 8, she made four prizes. '

The " President " regained New York February 18, and was blockaded during the rest of the year. The " United States " and " Macedonian " remained blockaded at New London. The " Constellation " remained blockaded at Norfolk. The corvette " Adams," twenty-eight guns, ran the blockade of Chesapeake Bay January 18, and cruised until August 17, making nine prizes and several narrow escapes before striking on the Isle of Haut and taking refuge in the Penobscot as the British forces occupied Castine. The story of her destruction has been told. Her fate was the same she would have met had she remained in Washington, where a week earlier the new forty-four-gun frigate " Columbia " and the new twenty-two-gun sloop-of-war " Argus " were burned to prevent them from falling prize to the British army.

This short abstract accounted for all the frigates except the " Essex," whose fortune was no happier than that of the larger ships. October 27, 1812, the " Essex," Captain David Porter, left the Delaware, intending to meet Bainbridge and form part of a squadron under his command. Failing to meet Bainbridge, though constantly near him. Porter at last decided to sail southward; and when Bainbridge in the " Constitution " reached Boston February 27, 1813, the " Essex " had already passed Cape Horn, and was running up the western coast of South
America to Valparaiso.

At Valparaiso Porter arrived March 14, 1818, to the consternation of commerce. Chili had recently asserted independence of Spain, and as yet no English war-vessels were stationed in the Pacific. The chief British interest was the whale fishery which centred in the Galapagos Islands, — a group lying under the equator, about a thousand miles from Panama. Although the influence of England was supreme, on account of her naval power, her commerce, and her political alliance with the Spanish people, and although Porter had neither a harbor of his own, nor the support of a diplomatic officer on the Pacific, he had nothing to fear. He was well received at Valparaiso, where since 1811 J. R. Poinsett had held the post of United States Consul-General for Buenos Ayres, Chili, and Peru; but the "Essex" tarried only for supplies, and soon sailed for the Galapagos Islands. There she arrived in April, 1818, and in the course of the summer captured all the British whalers known to be in those seas. These were twelve in number, and after sending some of them away. Porter still had a fleet of five armed ships besides his own, and nothing more to do.

The "Essex" had then been a year at sea, and needed repairs. Porter determined to take his entire fleet of six vessels about three thousand nules to the Marquesas Islands, — as though to make a voyage of discovery, or to emulate the mutineers of the

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"Bounty." The squadron sailed three weeks over the southern seas, until, October 23, the Marquesas Islands were sighted. There Porter remained seven weeks, amusing himself and his crew by interven-
tion in native Marquesan politics, ending in his con-
quest of the principal tribes, and taking possession
of the chief island in the name of his Government.
That he should have brought away his whole crew
after such relaxation, without desertion, was surpris-
ing. The men were for a time in a state of mutiny
on being ordered to sea; but they did not desert, and
the squadron sailed, Dec. 12, 1818, for Valparaiso.

Porter would have done better to sail for the China
seas or the Indian Ocean. He knew that British
war-vessels were searching for him, and that Valpa-
raiso was the spot where he would be directly in their
way. He arrived February 3, and five days after-
ward two British vessels of war sailed into the
harbor, making directly for the "Essex" with the
appearance of intending to attack and board her.
The crew of the "Essex" stood at quarters ready to
fire as the larger ship ran close alongside, until her
yards crossed those of the "Essex," and Porter
probably regretted to the end of his life that he did
not seize the opportunity his enemy gave him; but
the British captain, from his quarter-deck only a few
feet away, protested that the closeness of his approach
was an accident, and that he intended no attack.
The moment quickly passed, and then Porter found
himself overmatched.

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The British frigate "Phoebe/f thirty-gix guns, had
sailed from England in March, 1813, under secret
orders to break up the United States fur-establish-
ment on the Columbia River. At Rio Janeiro the
"Phoebe" was joined by the "Cherub," a sloop-of-war
rated at eighteen guns, and both sailed in search
of the "Essex." The "Phoebe" was one hundred and forty-three and three quarters feet in length, by thirty-eight and a quarter in breadth; the "Essex" was one hundred and thirty-eight and a half feet in length, and thirty-seven and a quarter in breadth. The "Phoebe" carried a crew of three hundred men and boys; the "Essex" carried two hundred and fifty-five. The "Essex" was the better sailer, and the result of an action depended on her ability to use this advantage. The broadside of the "Essex" consisted of seventeen thirty-two-pound carronades and six long twelve-pounders; the "Phoebe" showed only eight carronades, but had thirteen long eighteen-pounders, one long twelve-pounder, and one long nine-pounder. At close range, Porter's battery would overpower the "Phoebe's" long guns, but the "Phoebe's" thirteen long-range eighteen-pounders could destroy her enemy without receiving a shot in return. Porter knew all this, and knew also that he could not depend on Chilian protection. No British captain in such a situation could afford to be delicate in regard to the neutrality of Chili, which was not even a recognized nation. At most

^ James, p. 305.

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Porter could hope for immunity only in the port of Valparaiso.

Captain Hillyar of the "Phoebe" made no mistakes. During an entire month he blockaded the "Essex" with his two vessels, acting with extreme caution. At last Porter determined to run out, trusting to a chase to separate the blockading cruisers; and March 28, 1814, with a strong southerly wind, he got under way. As he rounded the outermost point a
violent squall carried away his maintopmast. The loss threw on Porter a sudden emergency and a difficult, instantaneous decision. He decided to return to harbor. A young midshipman, David Farragut, who made his first cruise in the "Essex," gave his high authority in after years to the opinion that Porter's decision was wrong. "Being greatly superior in sailing powers," said Farragut, "we should have borne up, and run before the wind." The chance of outsailing the "Phoebe," or separating her from her consort, was better than that of regaining the anchorage.

The wind did not allow of a return to port, and the "Essex" was run into a small bay three miles from Valparaiso, and anchored within pistol-shot of the shore. There Hillyar had her wholly at his mercy. At first he attacked somewhat timidly. Although Porter could bring only three long twelve-pounders to bear, he damaged the "Phoebe's" rigging until Hillyar, in half an hour, hauled off to repair the injury, — or, according to Hillyar's account, the

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"Phoebe" was prevented by the freshness of the wind from holding a position. Finally the "Phoebe" anchored, and began firing her broadsides of long eighteen-pounders into the "Essex's" quarter. The "Cherub" kept under way, using only her bow guns. Reply was impossible. The crew of the "Essex" fired what guns would bear, and got the ship under way; but the "Phoebe" kept her distance, throwing thirteen eighteen-pound shot into the "Essex" every five or ten minutes, until the "Essex" was cut to pieces and her decks were shambles.

The last attack continued, according to Captain
Hillyar, from 5.35 till 6.20 P. M., when the "Essex" struck. The entire battle lasted from four o'clock until the surrender. The carnage was frightful and useless. Porter declared that fifty-eight of his crew were killed. Hillyar claimed one hundred and nineteen unwounded prisoners, while Porter declared the number of unwounded prisoners to be seventy-five. The British ships, with five hundred men, lost only fifteen killed and wounded.

The loss of the "Essex," like the loss of the "Chesapeake" and "Argus," was unnecessary. Porter need not have gone to Valparaiso, or might have tried to run out at night, or might have fought, even after the loss of his maintopmast, under less disadvantage. The disaster completed the unfortunate record of the frigates for the year. They made some six-

^ Report of Captain Hillyar; James, ii. Appendix no. 71*
Naval History, vi. 163.

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teen prizes and busied many British cruisers, but won no victories and suffered one bloody defeat.

The sloops told a different story. Early in 1814 three of the new sloops-of-war were ready for sea, — the "Frolic," the "Peacock," and the "Wasp."^ They were heavy vessels of their class, about one hundred and twenty feet long on the main-deck, and thirty-two feet in extreme breadth; carrying crews of about one hundred and sixty men, with an armament of twenty thirty-two-pound carronades and two long eighteen-pounders. Although only one third the tonnage of the forty-four-gun frigates, and carrying only one third the crew, the new sloops-of-war threw nearly half the weight of metal, — for the broadside
of the "Constitution" commonly exceeded but little the weight of seven hundred pounds, while the sloops threw three hundred and thirty-eight. The difference was due not to the weight, but to the range. The frigates carried thirty long twenty-four-pounders; the sloops carried only two long eighteen-pounders. The sloops were rigged as ships, and built with the usual solidity of war-vessels, costing about seventy-five thousand dollars each.

The first to sail was the "Frolic," from Boston, in February. She captured only two prizes before she was herself taken, April 20, off Matanzas, after a chase by the thirty-six-gun British frigate "Orpheus," assisted by a twelve-gun schooner.

The second sloop-of-war, the "Peacock," commanded by Lewis Warrington, sailed from New York in March. Warrington was a Virginian, thirty-two years old and fourteen years in the service, with the rank of master-commandant in 1813. Cruising down the coast, the "Peacock" first ran into St. Mary's on the Florida frontier; and then continuing southward, on the morning of April 29, off the Indian River Inlet, she discovered a small convoy on its way from Havana to Bermuda, under charge of the British eighteen-gun brig "Epervier." The British brig was no match for the American ship. She was smaller, and carried only sixteen thirty-two and two eighteen-pound carronades, with a crew of one hundred and three men and fifteen boys. The inferiority was something like four to three; but Captain Wales of the "Epervier" gallantly brought his vessel into action at the usual close-range of these murderous combats.
Captain Wales told the result in an official report, dated May 8, to Vice-Admiral Cochrane. The report was not published, the British Admiralty having become sensitive to the popular outcry against their naval management.

"At eight A. M.," reported Captain Wales, "the wind being about east-south-east, I saw a strange sail in the southwest apparent in chase of us; at nine, perceiving her to near very fast and to be a square-rigged vessel-of-war, I shortened sail and hauled to the wind on the lar-

^ Commander R. W. Wales to Sir Alexander Cochrane, May 8, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

' Commander B. W. Wales to Sir Alexander Cochrane, May 8, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

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board tack to be between her and the convoy, being rather ahead of them. The wind at this time' veering round to the southward enabled the stranger to lay up for us. . . . At 9.50 A. M. we weathered her and exchanged broad-sides; having passed her beam, we tacked, shortened sail, and continued in close action until eleven a.m., when — five of our larboard guns being disabled by the breeching-bolts giving way, and three others by shot, and unable to manoeuvre so as to get the starboard guns to bear in consequence of the rigging and sails being cut to pieces in the early part of the action by star-shot, the main boom shot away, the foremast wounded in several places, and several shot between wind and water, with four-and-a-half feet of water in the hold, and the enemy seemingly in a state to continue the action — I deemed it prudent to surrender."
The giving way of the breeching-bolts did not wholly disable the guns, for Captain Wales specially commended "Mr. Lawrence Kennedy the Purser, who rendered much service in his exertions at the after-guns by getting them in a fighting state again when unshipped by the fighting-bolts coming out of their places."

At the close of the battle the "Peacock's" hull had not been touched; aloft, her foreyard was disabled and a few upper stays were cut away; of her crew, two men were slightly wounded,—but this was all the injury sustained in running for three quarters of an hour under the close fire of nine heavy guns. The "Epervier" was reported by Cap-

^ James's Naval History, vi. 160.

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tain Warrington aa showing forty-five shot-holea in her hull; masts and rigging much cut up, and twenty-three men killed or wounded in a crew of one hundred and twenty-eight. The difference between the force of the two vessels amply accounted for the capture; but the Admiralty might well show unwillingness to admit the bad condition of the vessels-of-war to which it intrusted the duty of convoying British mercantile shipping. So complete was the Epervier's disaster that no excuse was offered for it, except the plea that she was in almost every respect inferior to the standard that British vessels of her class were supposed to maintain.

Captain Warrington saved the "Epervier" and brought her into Savannah in spite of two British frigates encountered on the way. He sailed again early in June, and passed the months of July and
August in British waters or in the track of British commerce from the Faroe Islands to the Canaries. He burned or sunk twelve prizes, besides making cartels of two more, and brought his ship through the blockade into New York harbor, October 30, without injury, with only one man lost and the crew in fine health.^

The third new sloop was named the " Wasp ** after the famous victor over the " Hornet.**' The new " Wasp " sailed from Portsmouth, New Hampshire, May 1, under command of Johnston Blakeley. Bom

^ James, pp. 342-347.


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in Ireland in 1781, Blakeley was from infancy a North Carolinian. He became in 1800 an officer in the navy. Blakeley and the " Wasp " of 1814, like Jones and the "Wasp" of 1818, ran a career in which tragedy gave a deeper tinge than usual to the bloody colors they won; but their success was on the whole greater than that of any other national cruiser from the beginning to the end of the war. Merely as a story of adventure Blakeley’s career was exciting, but romance was its smallest interest. For several reasons the sloop battles and cruises afforded one of the best relative tests of American character and skill among all that were furnished in the early period of the national history; and among the sloops, Blakeley’s " Wasp " was the most distinguished.

Blakeley ran directly across the ocean into soundings at the mouth of the British Channel. There he
remained during the month of June, searching every vessel that passed. The number of neutrals constantly diverting his attention kept him actively employed, and led him farther into the Channel than was intended; but although three British frigates and fourteen sloops were at sea for the protection of British waters, the "Wasp" continued to burn and sink such British merchantmen as she met,—the first, June 2, and subsequently June 18, 28, and 26,—until on the morning of June 28 a man-of-war brig appeared to windward, and bore down on the American ship.

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The day was warm and overcast. During the whole morning the two vessels approached each other slowly that each had more than time to study his opponent. Once more the foresight of the American ship-builders secured a decisive advantage. The British brig, the "Reindeer," was altogether unequal to the contest. In tonnage she resembled the "Epervier," and her armament was even lighter. Captain Manners, her commander, had substituted twenty-four* pound carronades for the usual thirty-two-pounders, and his broadside of ten guns threw only two hundred and ten pounds of metal,^ while the "Wasp's" eleven guns threw three hundred and thirty-eight pounds. The American crew numbered one hundred and seventy-three men; the British numbered one hundred and eighteen. Contest under such conditions was a forlorn hope, but the "Reindeer's" crew were the pride of Portsmouth, and Manners was the idol of his men. They might cripple the "Wasp" if they could not capture her; and probably the fate of the "Argus," a year before, encouraged the hope that the "Reindeer" could do at least as well as the « Pelican."
Each captain manoeuvred for the weather-gauge, but the Englishman gained it, and coming up on the "Wasp's" weather-quarter, repeatedly fired his light twelve-pound bow-carronade, filled with round and grape shot, into the American ship. Blakeley, "finding the enemy did not get sufficiently on the beam to enable us to bring our guns to bear, put the helm a-lee/* and fired as his guns bore. The firing began at 3.26 p.m. and lasted until 3.40, fourteen minutes, at close range. In that space of time each gun in the broadside could be fired at the utmost three times. Apparently Manners felt that he had no chance with his guns, for he brought his vessel's bow against the "Wasp's" quarter and repeatedly attempted boarding. Early in the action the calves of his legs were shot away; then a shot passed through both his thighs; yet he still climbed into the rigging to lead his boarders, when two balls at the same moment struck him in the head. His fall ended the battle; and such had been the lessees of his company that the highest officer remaining unhurt on the British brig to surrender the vessel was said to be the captain's clerk. At 3.46 the "Reindeer's" flag was struck, — the whole action, from the "Wasp's" first gun, having lasted nineteen minutes.

Had every British vessel fought like the "Reindeer," Englishmen would have been less sensitive to defeat. In this desperate action the "Wasp" suffered severely. Her foremast was shot through; her rigging and spars were much injured; her hull was

1 Blakeley, Report of July 8, 1814; Niles, vii. 114.
struck by six round shot and much grape; eleven men were killed and fifteen wounded, or nearly one man in six, "chiefly in repelling boarders," reported Blakeley. The "Reindeer" was a wreck, and was blown up as soon as the wounded could be

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removed. Of her crew, numbering one hundred and eighteen, thirty-three lost their lives; thirty-four were wounded, — in all, sixty-seven, or more than half the brig's complement.

Ten days afterward Blakeley ran into Lorient, where his ship was well received by the French, whose British antipathies were increased rather than lessened by their enforced submission. After refitting, the "Wasp" sailed again August 27, and four days later cut out a valuable ship from a convoy under the eyes of a seventy-four. The same evening, September 1, at half-past six, Blakeley sighted four vessels, two on either bow, and hauled up for the one most to windward. At 9.26 at night the chase, a brig, was directly under the "Wasp's" lee-bow, and Blakeley began firing a twelve-pound bow-carronade, which he must have taken from the "Reindeer," for no such gun made part of his regular armament.

The battle in the dark which followed has been always deeply interesting to students of naval history, the more because the British Admiralty suppressed the official reports, and left an air of mystery over the defeat which rather magnified than diminished its proportions. The British brig was the sloop-of-war "Avon," commanded by Captain James Arbuthnot, and carrying the usual armament of sixteen thirty-two-pound carronades with two long six-pounders.
Her crew was reported as numbering one hundred and four men and thirteen boys. Captain Arbuth-

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not's official report ^ said that the " Avon " had been cruising in company with the sloop-of-war " Castili-
an," when at daylight, September 1, he " discovered an enemy's schooner in the rear of the Kangaroo convoy," and gave chase. The " Castilian " also gave chase, and at seven o'clock the twenty-gun ship " Tartarus " was signalled, also in chased All day the three British sloops-of-war chased the privateer schooner, until at half-past six o'clock in the evening the " Castilian's " superiority in sailing free left the " Avon " out of sight, nine miles astern. The posi-
tion of the " Tartarus " was not mentioned in the reports, but she could hardly have been ahead of the " Castilian." The three British sloops were then within ten miles of each other, under full sail, with a ten-knot wind. The weather was hazy, and neither the " Castilian " nor the " Tartarus " could see that the " Avon " was signalling the " Castilian " a recall. The " Avon " saw at four o'clock a large sail on her weather-beam standing directly for her, and know-
ing that the " Wasp " was cruising in these waters. Captain Arbuthnot felt natural anxiety to rejoin his consort.

Captain Arbuthnot's report continued: —

" The stranger closing with us fast, I kept away and set the weather studding-sails In hopes of nearing the

^ Report of Captain James Arbuthnot, Sept. 1, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

Castilian ' or ' Tartarus/ the latter of which I had only
lost sight of at 3 p. m. At 7.30 p. m. the stranger had
approached within hail, and being unable to get a satisf-
factory answer I had not a doubt of her being an enemy's
corvette. At 8.30 he fired a shot over us which was in-
stantly returned with a broadside. He then bore up and
endeavored to rake us, but was prevented. The action
then became general within half pistol-shot, and contin-
ued without intermission until 10.30 p. m., when — having
seven feet of water in the hold, the magazine drowned;
tiller, foreyard, main-boom, and every shroud shot away,
and the other standing and the running rigging cut to
pieces; the brig quite unmanageable, and the leak gain-
ing fast on the pumps; with forty killed and wounded,
and five of the starboard guns dismounted; and con-
ceiving further resistance only would cause a useless
sacrifice of lives — I was under the painful necessity
of ordering the colors to be struck to the American cor-
vette ' Wasp,' the mainmast, almost immediately after^
going over the side.'

Lieutenant George Lloyd, commanding the " Cas-
tilian," reported September 2 the circumstances at^
tending the loss of the " Avon," as far as they con-
cerned his share in the matter. ^ At nine o'clock the
" Castilian " heard a very heavy firing in the north-
northeast, and immediately wore and made all pos-
sible sail in that direction, burning blue lights. At
quarter past ten the firing ceased, " and on coming
up I had the mortification to observe the * Avon' a

^ lieutenant Lloyd to Vice-Admiral Sawyer, Sept 2, 1814;
MSS. British Archives.
totally dismantled and ungovernable wreck, with her mainmast gone, — the enemy, apparently a large ship corvette, lying to, to leeward of her, who on my closing made all sail, and evinced every wish to avoid a contest with us."

^^ I immediately used means to enable me to bring her to close action; and from our superior sailing I had in a few minutes the gratification to be within half a cable's length on her weather quarter. But I lament to state at this anxious crisis the 'Avon's' situation became most alarming; she had commenced firing minute guns, and making every other signal of distress and of being in want of immediate assistance. I must here (as my pen can but Inadequately describe) leave you, sir, to judge the feelings of myself, officers, and crew, as, from the confusion which evidently prevailed on board the enemy, the damage she had sustained, and her bad steerage, together with the cool and steady conduct of the officers and men I have the honor to command, I had no doubt of her falling an easy prey could we have persisted in attacking her, but which was not to be done without sacrificing the lives of the surviving gallant crew of our consort. Thus situated ... I was obliged ... to leave the flying enemy to escape; but I feel somewhat gratified the situation of the 'Castilian' enabled me to give him a raking, and I doubt not from the closeness of the vessels a most destructive broadside, which he did not return even with a single gun,—a circumstance that, I trust, cannot fail to prove how destructive the 'Avon's' fire must have been."

Lieutenant Lloyd did not explain how his enemy was to bring gims to bear under the circumstances.
the "Castilian" tacking under the "Wasp's" stem at half a cable's length distance, and immediately standing in the opposite direction, nor did he say what had become of the "Tartarus." Doubtless the "Wasp" steered badly, her rigging being much damaged; and Blakeley was chiefly intent on keeping off till he could reeve new braces. The "Castilian's" broadside cut the "Wasp's" rigging and sails, and shot away a lower main cross-tree, but did no other serious damage.

The "Avon" lost ten men killed and thirty-two wounded, besides being reduced to a sinking condition in an hour of night action in a ten-knot wind, with two more ships-of-war in sight and hearing. The "Wasp" lost two men killed and one wounded, four round shot in the hull, and the "rigging and sails suffered a great deal."  

Blakeley had done enough, and could hardly do more. Besides two eighteen-gun brigs, he made in his cruise fourteen prizes, which he destroyed, several of great value. In that year all the frigates in the United States service had not done as much. With a single-decked ship of five hundred tons, armed with carronades, Blakeley blockaded the British Channel for two months, capturing vessels in sight of ships-of-the-line, and destroying two sloops -of-war in rapid succession, without serious injury to himself, and to the consternation of the British marine.

After sinking the "Avon," September 1, Blakeley

1 Blakeley's Report, Sept 11, 1814; Niles, viL 191.
held on his course toward Madeu'a, and there, September 21, captured the brig "Atlanta," which he sent to Savannah. Still later, October 9, near the Cape de Verde Islands, he spoke a Swedish brig, which reported him. After that day no word of tidings was ever received from the "Wasp." Somewhere under the waters of the Atlantic, ship and crew found an unknown grave.

Besides the large sloops-of-war, three smaller vessels — the "Syren," "Enterprise," and "Rattlesnake" — went to sea in 1814. The "Syren" was captured after a chase of eleven hours, nearly on a wind, by the "Medway," seventy-four; her sixteen guns, and everything else that could be spared, were thrown overboard during the chase. The "Rattlesnake" and "Enterprise" cruised in company toward the West Indies, and made some prizes. The "Rattlesnake" was fast, the "Enterprise" a very dull sailer; but after repeated hairbreadth escapes, the "Rattlesnake" was caught, July 11, by the frigate "Leander," with Cape Sable to windward, and was obliged to surrender. The "Enterprise," with her usual good fortune, was never taken, but became a guardship.

After November 1 the United States government had not a ship at sea. In port, three seventy-fours were building, and five forty-fours were building or blockaded. Three thirty-six-gun frigates were laid up or blockaded. Four sloops-of-war were also in port, the "Peacock" having just returned from her long

* Letter from the Purser, July 29, 1814; Niles, vi. 391.
cruise. Such a result could not be called satisfactory. The few war-vessels that existed proved rather what the government might have done than what the British had to fear from any actual or probable American navy. The result of private enterprise showed also how much more might easily have been done by government.

The year 1814 was marked by only one great and perhaps decisive success on either side, except Macdonough's victory. This single success was privateering. Owners, captains, and crews had then learned to build and sail their vessels, and to hunt their prey with extraordinary skill. A few rich prizes stimulated the building of new vessels as the old were captured, and the ship-yards turned them out as rapidly as they were wanted. In the neighborhood of Boston, in the summer of 1814, three companion ships were built, — the "Reindeer," "Avon," and "Blakeley"; and of these the "Reindeer" was said to have been finished in thirty-five working days, and all three vessels were at sea in the following winter. No blockade short of actual siege could prevent such craft from running out and in. Scores of them were constantly on the ocean.

On the Atlantic privateers swarmed. British merchantmen were captured, recaptured, and captured again, until they despaired of ever reaching port. One British master who was three times taken and as often retaken, reported that he had seen ten American privateers crossing his course. A letter from Halifax...
printed in the London " Times " of December 19 said : ** There are privateers of this harbor which plunder every vessel coming in or going out, notwithstanding we have three line-of-battle ships, six frigates, and four sloops here." The West Indies and the Canaries were haunted by privateers. The " Rambler," " Hyder Ali," and " Jacob Jones " of Boston penetrated even the Chinese seas, and carried prize-goods into Macao and Canton. Had these pests confined their ravages to the colonies or the ocean, the London clubs and the lobbies of Parliament would have thought little about them ; but the privateer had discovered the weakness of Great Britain, and frequented by preference the narrow seas which England regarded as her own. The quasi-blockade of the British coasts which American cruisers maintained in 1813 became a real and serious blockade in 1814. Few days passed without bringing news of some inroad into British waters, until the Thames itself seemed hardly safe.

The list of privateers that hung about Great Britain and Ireland might be made long if the number were necessary to the story, but the character of the blockade was proved by other evidence than that of numbers. A few details were enough to satisfy even the English. The " Siren," a schooner of less than two hundred tons, with seven guns and seventy-five men, had an engagement with her Majesty's cutter " Landrail " of four guns, as the cutter was crossing the British Channel with despatches. The "Landrail"

^ James, p. 361^
victory was not remarkable, but the place of capture was very significant; and it happened July 12, only a fortnight after Blakeley captured the "Reindeer" farther westward. The "Siren" was but one of many privateers in those waters. The "Governor Tompkins" burned fourteen vessels successively in the British Channel. The "Young Wasp" of Philadelphia cruised nearly six months about the coasts of England and Spain and in the course of West India commerce. The "Harpy" of Baltimore, another large vessel of some three hundred and fifty tons and fourteen guns, cruised nearly three months off the coast of Ireland, in the British Channel and in the Bay of Biscay, and returned safely to Boston filled with plunder, including, as was said, upward of £100,000 in British Treasury notes and bills of exchange. The "Leo," a Boston schooner of about two hundred tons, was famous for its exploits in these waters, but was captured at last by the frigate "Tiber" after a chase of eleven hours. The "Mammoth," a Baltimore schooner of nearly four hundred tons, was seventeen days off Cape Clear, the southernmost point of Ireland. The most mischievous of all was the "Prince of Neufchatel" of New York, which chose the Irish Channel as its favorite haunt, where during the summer it made ordinary coasting traffic impossible. The most impudent was probably the "Chasseur," commanded by Captain Boyle, who cruised three months, and amused himself, when off the British coast, by sending to be posted at Lloyd's a "Proclamation of Blockade" of "all the ports, harbors, bays, creeks, rivers, inlets, outlets, islands, and sea-coast of the United Kingdom." The jest at that moment was too sardonic to amuse the British public.
As the announcement of these annoyances, recurring day after day, became a practice of the press, the public began to grumble in louder and louder tones. "That the whole coast of Ireland, from Wexford round by Cape Clear to Carrickfergus," said the "Morning Chronicle" of August 31, "should have been for above a month under the unresisted dominion of a few petty 'fly-by-nights' from the blockaded ports of the United States, is a grievance equally intolerable and disgraceful." The Administration mouthpiece, the "Courier," admitted, August 22, that five brigs had been taken in two days between the Smalls and the Tuskar, and that insurance on vessels trading between Ireland and England had practically ceased. The "Annual Register" for 1814 recorded as "a most mortifying reflection," that with a navy of nearly a thousand ships of various sizes, and while at peace with all Europe, "it was not safe for a vessel to sail without convoy from one part of the English or Irish Channel to another." Such insecurity had not been known in the recent wars.

As early as August 12, the London Assurance Corporations urged the government to provide a naval force competent to cope with the privateers. In September the merchants of Glasgow, Liverpool, and Bristol held meetings, and addressed warm remonstrances to government on the want of protection given to British commerce. The situation was serious, and the British merchants did not yet know all. Till that time the East India and China trade had suffered little, but at last the American privateers had penetrated even the Chinese seas; and while they were driving the British flag into port there, they
attacked the East India Company's ships, which were really men-of-war, on their regular voyages. In August the "Countess of Harcourt" of more than five hundred tons, carrying six heavy guns and ninety men, was captured in the British Channel by the privateer "Sabine" of Baltimore, and sent safely to America. The number and value of the prizes stimulated new energy in seeking them, and British commerce must soon yield to that of neutral nations if the war continued.

The merchants showed that a great change had come over their minds since they incited or permitted the Tories to issue the Impressment Proclamation and the Orders in Council seven years before. More than any other class of persons, the ship-owners and West India merchants were responsible for the temper which caused the war, and they were first to admit their punishment. At the Liverpool meeting, where Mr. Gladstone, who took the chair, began by declaring that some ports, particularly Milford, were under actual blockade, a strong address was voted; and at a very numerous meeting of merchants, manufacturers, ship-owners, and underwriters at Glasgow, September 7, the Lord Provost presiding, resolutions were unanimously passed —

"That the number of American privateers with which our channels have been infested, the audacity with which they have approached our coasts, and the success with which their enterprise has been attended, have proved injurious to our commerce, humbling to our pride, and discreditable to the directors of the naval power of the British nation, whose flag till of late waved over every sea and triumphed over every rival.
'^ That there is reason to believe, in the short space of twenty-four months, above eight hundred vessels have been captured by the Power whose maritime strength we have hitherto impulsively held in contempt.*'

The war was nearly at an end, and had effected every possible purpose for the United States, when such language was adopted by the chief commercial interests of Great Britain. Yet the Glasgow meeting expressed only a part of the common feeling. The rates of insurance told the whole story. The press averred that in August and September underwriters at Lloyd's could scarcely be induced to insure at any rate of premium, and that for the first time in history a rate of thirteen per cent had been paid on risks to cross the Irish Channel. Lloyd's list then showed eight hundred and twenty-five prizes lost to

1 Morning Chronicle, Sept. 6, 1814.

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the Americans, and their value seemed to increase rather than diminish.

Weary as the merchants and shipowners were of the war, their disgust was not so intense as that of the navy. John Wilson Croker, Secretary of the Admiralty Board, whose feelings toward America were at best unkind, showed a temper that passed the limits of his duties. When the London underwriters made their remonstrance of August 12, Croker assured them, in a letter dated August 19, that at the time referred to "there was a force adequate to the purpose of protecting the trade both in St. George's Channel and the Northern Sea." The news that arrived during the next two weeks threw ridicule
on this assertion; and Croker was obliged to reply to a memorial from Bristol, September 16, in a different tone.\textsuperscript{1} He admitted that the navy had not protected trade, and could not protect it; but he charged that the merchants were to blame for losing their own ships. His letter was a valuable evidence of the change in British sentiment: —

\textsuperscript{1} Their Lordships take this opportunity of stating to you, for the information of the memorialists, that from the accounts which their Lordships have received of the description of vessels which had formed the largest proportion of the captures in the Irish and Bristol channels, it appears that if their masters had availed themselves of the convoys appointed for their protection from foreign ports, or had not in other instances deserted from the convoys under whose protection they had sailed, before the final conclusion of the voyage, many of the captures would not have been made. It is their Lordships' determination, as far as they may be enabled, to bring the parties to punishment who may have been guilty of such illegal acts, and which are attended with such injurious consequences to the trade of the country."

Little by little the Americans had repaid every item of the debt of insult they owed, and after Croker's letter the account could be considered settled. Even the "Times" was not likely to repeat its sneer of 1807, that the Americans could hardly cross to Staten Island without British permission. Croker's
official avowal that no vessel could safely enter or leave one port in the British Islands for another except under guard of a man-of-war, was published on the same page with the memorialists' assertion that the rate of insurance had gradually risen till it exceeded twofold the usual rates prevailing during the wars on the Continent.

The spirit of exasperation shown by Croker extended through the navy, The conduct of Cochrane and Cockbum has been already told. That of Captain HiUyar at Valparaiso was equally significant. Under the annoyance of their mortifications the British commanders broke through ordinary rules. Captain Lloyd of the "Plantagenet," seventy-four, on arriving in the harbor of Fayal, September 26, saw a large brig in the roads, which he must have known to

be an American privateer. He was so informed by his pilot. It was the "General Armstrong/' Captain Samuel G. Beid, a brig which for two years had fretted and escaped the British navy. The "Plantagenet," with two other ships-of-war, appeared at sunset. Beid dared not run out to sea, and the want of wind would in any case have prevented success. A little after dusk, Beid, seeing the suspicious movements of the enemy, began to warp his vessel close under the guns of the castle. While doing so, at about eight o'clock four boats filled with men left the ships and approached him. As they came near he repeatedly hailed and warned them off, and at last fired. His fire was returned, but the boats withdrew with the loss of a number of men.

Captain Lloyd, in a somewhat elaborate report to explain the propriety of his conduct, enclosed affi-
davits to prove that the Americans had violated the neutrality of the port. The affidavits proved that, knowing the character of the vessel, he sent two boats from his own ship to assist the boats of the "Carnation" to "watch" the privateer. His report told the story as he wished it to be understood: *

^^ On the evening of the 26th instant I put into this port for refreshments, previous to my return to Jamaica. In shore was discovered a suspicious vessel at anchor. I ordered Captain Bentham of the "Carnation" to watch her movemens, and sent the pinnace and cutter of this ship to assist him on that service; but on his perceiving her under way, he sent Lieut Robert Faussett in the pinnace, about eight o'clock, to observe her proceedings. On his approaching the schooner, he was ordered to keep off or they would fire into him, upon which the boat was immediately backed off; but to his astonishment he received a broadside of round, grape, and musketry, which did considerable damage. He then repeatedly requested them to leave off firing, as he was not come to molest them; but the enemy still continued his destructive fire until they had killed two men and wounded seven, without a musket being returned by the boat."

Lieutenant Paussett's affidavit threw more light on this curious story of British naval management. He deposed —

^^ That on Monday, the 26th instant, about eight o'clock in the evening, he was ordered to go in the pin-
nace as guard-boat unarmed on board her Majesty's brig "Carnation," to know what armed vessel was at anchor in the bay, when Captain Bentham of said brig ordered him to go and inquire of said vessel (which by information was said to be a privateer). When said boat came near the privateer, they hailed (to say, the Americans), and desired the English boat to keep off or they would fire into her; upon which said Mr. Faussett ordered his men to back astern, and with a boat-hook was in the act of so doing, when the Americans in the most wanton manner fired into said English boat, killed two men and wounded seven, some of them mortally, — and this notwithstanding said Faussett frequently called out not to murder them, that they struck and called for quarter. Said Faussett solemnly declares that no resistance of any kind was made, nor could (ziewy do it, not having any arms, nor of course sent to attack said vessel."

Lieutenant Faussett's affidavit proved that the '^ General Armstrong " had good reason for firing into the British boats. The "Carnation" had anchored within pistol-shot of the privateer; four boats of the "Plantagenet" and "Carnation,"* filled with men, were on the water watching her in the moonlight; every act of the British squadron pointed to an attack, when Captain Bentham ordered the pinnace "to go and inquire " of the vessel, known to be an American privateer, what armed vessel it was. If Captain Bentham did not intend to provoke a shot from the privateer, his order was wanting in intelligence. Lieutenant Faussett accordingly approached in the pinnace, the other boats being not far behind. That his men were unarmed was highly improbable to the privateer, which affirmed that their fire kiUed
one of the American crew and wounded the first lieutenant; but their armament had little to do with the matter. They approached as enemies, in the night, with a large armed force immediately behind them. The privateer repeatedly warned them off. Instead of obeying the order, Lieutenant Faussett came alongside. When he was fired on, he was so near that by his own account he shoved off with the boat.


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Considering who and where he was, he had reason to be thankful that any of his boat's-crew escaped.

Captain Lloyd's report continued: —

^^ This conduct, in violating the neutrality of this port, I conceive left me no alternative but that of destroying her. I therefore repeatedly ordered Captain Bentham to tow in the bng and take that step immediately. All the boats of this ship and the 'Rota' were sent under his orders to tow him alongside or assist him in the attack, as circumstances might require; but from continued light baffling winds and a lee tide he was not able, as he informed me, with his utmost exertions to put my orders in execution.**

Meanwhile Captain Reid of the "General Arm-strong" warped his vessel close to the beach, under the fort, and made all his preparations for the attack which he knew must come. The people of the town, with the governor among them, lined the shore, and witnessed the affair. Captain Lloyd's report told the result: —

** Finding the privateer was warping under the fort
very fast. Captain Bentham Judged it prudent to lose no time, and about twelve o'clock ordered the boats to make the attack. A more gallant, determined one never was made, led on by Lieutenants Matterface of the 'Rota' and Bowerbank of this ship; and every officer and man displayed the greatest courage in the face of a heavy discharge of great guns and musketry. But from her side being on the rocks (which was not known at the time), and every American in Fayal, exclusive of part of the crew, being armed and concealed in these rocks, which were immediately over the privateer, it unfortunately happened when these brave men gained the deck they were under the painful necessity of returning to their boats, from the very destructive fire kept up by those above them from the shore, who were in complete security,—and I am grieved to add, not before many lives were lost exclusive of the wounded."

As far as the accounts agree, the boats were twelve in number, with about two hundred men. The privateersmen numbered ninety. As the boats approached, the guns opened on them; and when they came alongside the privateer they found the boarding-nettings up, with a desperate crew behind. So vigorously did the British seamen attack, that they gained the forecastle for a time. All three American lieutenants were killed or disabled, and Captain Reid fought his brig alone; but the deck was at last cleared, and the surviving assailants dropped into their boats or into the water.

Proverbially, an unsuccessful boat-attack was the most fatal of all services. The British loss was excessive. According to their report at the time, "Lieutenants Bowerbank, Coswell, and Rogers of the
* Rota ' were killed, as well as thirty-eight seamen, and eighty-three wounded; the first, fourth, and fifth lieutenants of the * Plantagenet ' were wounded, and twenty-two seamen killed, and twenty-four wounded. \(^1\)


- Kilea^ vii. 255.

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According to the official report, thirty-four were killed and eighty-six were wounded. The "Guerriere" in her battle with the "Constitution" lost only seventy-eight men altogether. The "Macedonian" lost only one hundred and four. The attack on the "General Armstrong" was one of the bloodiest defeats suffered by the British navy in the war. Not only was the privateer untaken, but she lost few of her crew, — nine in all, killed and wounded.

Captain Lloyd then declared that he would destroy the privateer if he had to destroy Fayal in doing it, and ordered Captain Bentham of the "Carnation" to attack her with his "uns. Reid abandoned and scuttled the "General Armstrong," taking his men off shore. The "Carnation's" shot inflicted some injury on the town, before the privateer was set on fire by the "Carnation's" boats. \(^1\)

If the British navy cared to pay such a price for the shell of an old privateer brig, which had already cost British commerce, as Captain Lloyd believed, a million dollars, \(^1\) the privateers were willing to gratify the wish, as was shown a few days afterward when the "Endymion" tried to carry the "Prince of Neuf-
chatel " by boarding. This privateer had made itself peculiarly obnoxious to the British navy by the boldness of its ravages in British waters. It was coming


s Report of Captain Lloyd, Oct. 4, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

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to America filled with plunder, and with a prize in company, when off Gay Head the "Endymion" was sighted, October 11, and gave chase.

Captain Hope of the "Endymion" made an official report, explaining with much detail that he chased the privateer till evening, when the wind failed, and he then sent out his boats:

^^ I sent all the boats under command of Lieutenants Hawkins, Ormond, and Fanshaw. In approaching the ship an alarm was fired. The boats had been previously rowing up under a shoal, and had not felt the effects of a rapid tide which they almost instantaneously became exposed to. The second barge in taking the station assigned by Lieutenant Hawkins on the schooner's starboard bow, having her larboard oars shot away, unfortunately was swept by the stream athwart the first barge; thereby all the boats became entangled; and it is with extreme concern I acquaint you that the attack was in consequence at this moment only partially made. Notwithstanding this disadvantage at the first onset, every exertion that human skill could devise was resorted to to renew the contest; and they succeeded in again getting alongside, but not in the position intended. Their failure, therefore, is to be ascribed in the first instance to the velocity
of the tide, the height of the vessel's side, not having channel plates to assist the men in getting on her deck, and her very superior force (a schooner of the largest dimensions, the 'Prince of Neufchatel,' three hundred and twenty tons, eighteen guns, long-nine and twelve* pounders, with a complement of one hundred and forty

^ Captain Hope to Bear Admiral Hotham, Oct 11, .1814 ;
MSS. British Archives.

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men of all nations, commanded by Mons. Jean Ordronauz). The boats' painters being now shot away, they again fell astern without ever being able to repeat the attack, and with great difficulty regained the ship, with the exception of the second barge."

Captain Ordronaux of the privateer had a crew of less than forty men then at quarters, and they suffered severely, only nine men escaping injury. The boarders gained the deck, but were killed as fast as they mounted ; and at last more than half the British party were killed or captured. According to the British account, twenty-eight men, including the first lieutenant of the "Endymion," were killed ; and thirty-seven men, including the second lieutenant, were wounded. This report did not quite agree with that of the privateer, which claimed also twenty-eight prisoners, including the second lieutenant, who was unhurt. In any case, more than seventy men of the "Endymion's" crew, besides her first and second lieutenant, were killed, wounded, or captured ; and the "Prince of Neufchatel" arrived in safety in Boston.

In the want of adjacent rocks lined with armed
Americans, such as Captain Lloyd alleged at Fayal, Captain Hope was reduced to plead the tides as the cause of his defeat. These reports, better than any other evidence, showed the feelings of the British naval service in admitting discomfiture in the last resort of its pride. Successively obliged to plead

^ James's Naval History, vi. 527«

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inferiority at the guns, inferiority in sailing qualities, inferiority in equipment, the British service saw itself compelled by these repeated and bloody repulses to admit that its supposed pre-eminence in hand-to-hand fighting was a delusion. Within a single fortnight two petty privateers, with crews whose united force did not amount to one hundred and fifty men, succeeded in repulsing attacks made by twice their number of the best British seamen, inflicting a loss, in killed and wounded, officially reported at one hundred and eighty-five.

Such mortifying and bloody experiences made even the British navy weary of the war. Valuable prizes were few, and the service, especially in winter, was severe. Undoubtedly the British cruisers caught privateers by dozens, and were as successful in the performance of their duties as ever they had been in any war in Europe. Their blockade of American ports was real and ruinous, and nothing pretended to resist them. Yet after catching scores of swift cruisers, they saw scores of faster and better vessels issue from the blockaded ports and harry British
commerce in every sea. Scolded by the press, worried by the Admiralty, and mortified by their own want of success, the British navy was obliged to hear language altogether strange to its experience.

“^The American cruisers daily enter in among our convoys,” said the "Times" of February 11, 1815, "seize prizes in sight of those that should afford protection, and if pursued put on their sea-wings' and

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laugh at the clumsy English pursuers. To what is this owing? Cannot we build ships? ... It must indeed be encouraging to Mr. Madison to read the logs of his cruisers. If they fight, they are sure to conquer; if they fly, they are sure to escape."

CHAPTER Vm.

In the tempest of war that raged over land and ocean during the months of August and September, 1814, bystanders could not trust their own judgment of the future; yet shrewd observers, little affected either by emotion or by interest, inclined to the belief that the United States government was near exhaustion. The immediate military danger on Lake Champlain was escaped, and Baltimore was saved; but the symptoms of approaching failure in government were not to be mistaken, and the capture of Washington, which was intended to hurry the collapse, produced its intended effect.

From the first day of the war the two instruments
necessary for military success were wanting to Madison,—money and men. After three campaigns, the time came when both these wants must be supplied, or the national government must devolve its duties on the States. When the President, preparing his Annual Message, asked his Cabinet officers what were the prospects of supplying money and men for another campaign, he received answers discouraging in the extreme.

First, in regard to money. In July, Secretary Campbell advertised a second loan, of only six million dollars. He obtained but two and a half millions at eighty. His acceptance of this trifling sum obliged him to give the same terms to the contractors who had taken the nine millions subscribed in the spring at eighty-eight. Barker found difficulty in making his payments, and from both loans the Treasury could expect to obtain only $10,400,000, owing to the contractors' failures. The authorized loan was twenty-five millions. The secretary could suggest no expedient, except Treasury notes, for filling the deficit.

Bad as this failure was,—though it showed Secretary Campbell's incapacity so clearly as to compel his retirement, and obliged the President to call a special session of Congress,—the Treasury might regard it as the least of its embarrassments. Commonly governments had begun their most desperate efforts only after ordinary resources failed; but the United States government in 1814 had so inextricably involved its finances that without dictatorial powers of seizing property its functions could not much longer be
continued. The general bankruptcy, long foreseen, at length occurred.

The panic caused by the capture of Washington, August 24, obliged the tottering banks of Philadelphia and Baltimore to suspend specie payments. The

> Report of Secretary Campbell, Sept. 26, 1814; State Papers, Finance, IL 840.

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banks of Philadelphia formally announced their suspension, August 31, by a circular explaining the causes and necessity of their decision.* The banks of New York immediately followed, September 1; and thenceforward no bank between New Orleans and Albany paid its obligations except in notes. Only the banks of New England maintained specie payments, with the exception of those in least credit, which took the opportunity to pay or not pay as they pleased. The suspension was admitted to be permanent. Until the blockade should be raised and domestic produce could find a foreign market, the course of exchange was fixed, and specie payments could not be resumed. The British navy and the Boston Federalists held the country firmly bound, and peace alone could bring relief.

Suspension mattered little, and had the National Bank been in existence the failure might have been an advantage to the government; but without a central authority the currency instantly fell into confusion. No medium of exchange existed outside of New England. Boston gave the specie standard, and soon the exchanges showed wide differences. New York money stood at twenty per cent discount, Philadelphia at twenty-four per cent, Baltimore at
thirty per cent. Treasury notes were sold in Boston at twenty-five per cent discount, and United States six-per-cents stood at sixty in coin.* The Treasury

^ Niles, vii. ; Supplement, p. 176.
' Niles, vii. ; Supplement, p. 176.

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had no means of transferring its bank deposits from one part of the country to another. Unless it paid its debts in Treasury notes, it was unable to pay them at all. No other money than the notes of suspended banks came into the Treasury. Even in New England, taxes, customs-duties, and loans were paid in Treasury notes, and rarely in local currency. Thus, while the government collected in the Middle and Southern States millions in bank-notes, it was obliged to leave them in deposit at the local banks where the collection was made, while its debts in Boston and New York remained unpaid. The source of revenue was destroyed. The whole South and West, and the Middle States as far north as New York, could contribute in no considerable degree to the support of government.

The situation was unusual. The government might possess immense resources in one State and be totally bankrupt in another; it might levy taxes to the amount of the whole circulating medium, and yet have only its own notes available for payment of debt; it might borrow hundreds of millions and be none the better for the loan. All the private bank-notes of Pennsylvania and the Southern country were useless in New York and New England where they must chiefly be used. An attempt to transfer such deposits in any quantity would have made them quite worthless. The Treasury already admitted bank-
ruptcy. The interest on the national obligations could not be paid.

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The President's second inquiry r^arded men. The new Secretary of War, Monroe, gave him such information as the Department possessed on the numbers of the army. A comparative account showed that in June, 1813, the regular troops numbered 27,609; in December, 34,325. In January, 1814, the number was nominally 33,822; in July the aggregate was 31,603, the effectives being 27,010.« Since July the recruits had declined in numbers. The three months of March, April, and May produced 6,996 recruits; the three months of July, August, and September were reported as furnishing 4,477. The general return of September 30 reported the strength of the army at 34,029 men.* The government was not able to provide the money necessary to pay bounties due for the last three months' recruiting.* The Secretary of War admitted the failure of the recruiting service, and attributed it to the high bounties given for substitutes in the militia detached for United States service.*

^ Armstrong to Eppes, Feb. 10, 1814; Niles, vi. 94. See anUf vol. vii. p. 381.

* Report; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 535.

* Return of Enlistments, Nov. 2, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 521. Letter of Assistant Inspector-General, Oct. 22, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 518.

^ The Inspector-General's Letter of Nov. 2, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 520.
The smallness of the armies in the field showed worse results than were indicated by the returns. Macomb at Plattsburg claimed to have only fifteen hundred effectives. Izard carried with him to Buffalo only four thousand men. Brown's effectives at Fort Erie numbered two thousand. Apparently these three corps included the entire force in the field on the Canada frontier, and their combined effective strength did not exceed eight thousand men. The year before, Wilkinson and Hampton commanded fully eleven thousand effectives in their movements against Montreal. Nothing showed that the victories at Niagara and Plattsburg had stimulated enlistments, or that the army could be raised above thirty thousand effectives even if the finances were in a condition to meet the expense.

Much was said of the zeal shown by the State militia in hastening to the defence of their soil, and the New England Federalists were as loud as the Kentucky and Tennessee Democrats in praise of the energy with which the militia rose to resist invasion; but in reality this symptom was the most alarming of the time. Both in the military and in the political point of view, the persistence in depending on militia threatened to ruin the national government.

The military experience of 1814 satisfied the staunchest war Democrats that the militia must not
be their dependence. In Maine the militia allowed themselves with hardly a show of resistance to be

made subjects of Great Britain. At Plattsburg volunteers collected in considerable numbers, but the victory was won by the sailors and the engineers. At Niagara, Brown never could induce more than a thousand volunteers to support him in his utmost straits. Porter's efforts failed to create a brigade respectable in numbers, and at Ghippawa his Indians outnumbered his whites. Four days after the repulse of Drummond's assault on Fort Erie, at the most anxious moment of the Niagara campaign, Major-General Brown wrote to Secretary Armstrong, —

"I very much doubt if a parallel can be found for the state of things existing on this frontier. A gallant little army struggling with the enemies of their country, and devoting their lives for its honor and its safety, left by that country to struggle alone, and that within sight and within hearing."

A month afterward Brown succeeded in obtaining a thousand volunteers, and by some quality of his own made them assault and carry works that old soldiers feared to touch. The feat was the most extraordinary that was performed on either side in the remarkably varied experience of the war; but it proved Brown's personal energy rather than the merits of a militia system. At Washington the militia were thoroughly tested; their rout proved chiefly the incompetence of their general, but the system was shown, before the battle, to be more defective

1 Brown to Armstrong, July [August] 19, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.
than the army it produced. At Baltimore the militia were again routed, and the town was saved chiefly by the engineers and sailors. In Virginia, where more than forty thousand militia were in the field, they protected nothing, and their service was more fatal to themselves than though they had fought severe battles. Nearly all the Virginia militia summoned for the defence of Norfolk suffered from sickness, and the mortality when compared with that of the regular service was enormous; five militia-men sickened and died where one regular soldier suffered. In Tennessee and Georgia the experience was equally unfortunate; the Georgia militia could do nothing with the Creeks, and Andrew Jackson himself was helpless until he obtained one small regiment of regulars.

Besides its military disadvantages the militia service was tainted with fraud. Habitually and notoriously in New England and New York, the militia-men when called out attended muster, served a few days in order to get their names on the pay-roll, and then went home. The United States government wasted millions of dollars in pay and pensions for such men. Another source of waste was in the time required to place them in the field. The government struggled to avoid a call of militia, even though risking great disasters by the neglect.

The worst of all evils lay still further in the background. The militia began by rendering a proper

* Niles, vii. ; Supplement, p. 188.
army impossible, and ended by making government a form. The object of Massachusetts in praising the conduct of militia, and in maintaining its own at a high state of efficiency, was notorious. The Federalists knew that the national government must sooner or later abandon the attempt to support an army. When that time should come, the only resource of the government would lie in State armies, and Massachusetts was the best equipped State for that object. Her militia, seventy thousand strong, well-armed, well-drilled, and as yet untouched by war, could dictate to the Union. Whenever Massachusetts should say the word, the war must stop; and Massachusetts meant to say the word when the government fairly ceased to possess either money or arms.

That moment, in the belief of the Massachusetts "Federalists, had come. Their course in the summer and autumn of 1814 left no doubt of their intentions. No act of open rebellion could be more significant than their conduct when Sherbrooke's expedition occupied Castine. Then at last Governor Strong consented to call out the militia, which he refused to do two years before, because, he asserted, Castine and the other coast towns were sufficiently defended; but the governor was careful to avoid the suspicion that these troops were in the national service. He acted independently of the national government in

\^ Strong to Eustisy Aug. 5^ 1812 ; State Papers, Military AfEiEuiSy i 6ia

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the terms of his general order of September, 1814,^ placing his militia under the command of a major-general of their own, and making only a bare inquiry of the Secretary of War whether their expenses would be reimbursed,^ — an inquiry which Monroe at once answered in the negative.\^ The force was a State army, and could not fail to cause the President more anxiety than it was likely ever to cause the Prince Regent.

At the same time the governor of Connecticut withdrew from the command of Brigadier-General Cushing the brigade of State militia then in the national service, and placed it under a major-general of State militia, with injunctions to obey no orders except such as were issued by State authority.* The evil of these measures was greatly aggravated by coinciding with the crisis which stopped the course of national government. Connecticut withdrew her militia, August 24; Washington was captured the same day; the Philadelphia banks suspended payment August 29; Castine was taken August 81; and Governor Strong called out the Massachusetts militia September 6. The government was prostrate,

\^ Qeneial Orders, Sept. 6, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 613.

• Strong to the Secretary of War, Sept. 7, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 613.

• Monroe to Strong, Sept. 17, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 614.

4 Cashing to the Secretary of War, Sept. 12, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, p. 620.
and New England was practically independent when Sir George Prevost crossed the frontier, September 8. So complete was the paralysis that Governor Chittenden of Vermont, on receiving official notice that the British army and navy were advancing on Lake Champlain, refused to call out the militia, because neither the Constitution nor the laws gave him authority to order the militia out of the State.* He could only recommend that individuals should volunteer to assist in the defence of Plattsburg. Chittenden's conduct was the more suggestive because of his undoubtedly honesty and the absence of factious motive for his refusal.

The full meaning of Governor Strong's course was avowed a few days afterward. Having called a special meeting of the State legislature for October 5, he addressed to it a message narrating the steps he had taken, and the refusal of the President to assume the expenses of the militia called into service for the defence of the State.

"The situation of this State is peculiarly dangerous and perplexing," said Governor Strong; "we have been led by the terms of the Constitution to rely on the government of the Union to provide for our defence. We have resigned to that government the revenues of the State with the expectation that this object would not be neglected. • • . Let us then, relying on the sup-

^ Macomb to Chittenden, Sept. 4, 1814; Niles, vii. 102.
< Chittenden to General Newell, Sept 5, 1814; Nilea, viL 108.
• Message of Oct 5, 1814; Niles, vii. 113.
port and direction of Providence, unite in each mea-
sures for our safety as the times demand and tie prin-
ciples of justice and the law of self-preservation will justify."

The sense which this invitation was intended to
bear could be best understood by appreciating the
temper of the body thus addressed and the time
when the appeal was made. The national goyem-
ment had for practical purposes ceased. The Boston
"Oentinel," a newspaper of large circulation, said
to reach six thousand copies, announced September
10, 1814, that the Union was already practically
dissolved, and that the people must rise in their
majesty, protect themselves, and compel their un-
worthy servants to obey their will. Governor Strong
knew that the legislature was controlled by extreme
partisans of the Pickering type, who wished, to use
his phrase, to "let the ship run aground." Even
Josiah Quincy, one of the most vehement Federal-
ists, was aware that the members of the General
Court stood in danger of doing too much rather than
too little.^

Strong's message of October 5 was echoed by Pick-
ering from Washington, October 12, in a letter which
closed with the exhortation to seize the national
revenues: —

^^As, abandoned by the general government except
for taxing us, we must defend ourselves, so we ought to
secure and hold fast the revenues indispensable to main-

* Quincy's Life of Quincy, p. 367.

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tain the force necessary for our protection against the foreign enemy and the still greater evil in prospect,—domestic tyranny."*

The Massachusetts legislature could not fail to understand Governor Strong's message as an invitation to resume the powers with which the State had parted in adopting the Constitution.

The legislature referred the message to a committee, which reported only three days afterward through its chairman, Harrison Gray Otis: *

"The state of the national Treasury as exhibited by the proper officer requires an augmentation of existing taxes; and if in addition to these the people of Massachusetts, deprived of their commerce and harassed by a formidable enemy, are compelled to provide for the indispensable duty of self-defence, it must soon become impossible for them to sustain this burden. There remains to them therefore no alternative but submission to the enemy, or the control of their own resources to repel his aggressions. It is impossible to hesitate in making the election. This people are not ready for conquest or submission; but being ready and determined to defend themselves, they have the greatest need of those resources derivable from themselves which the national government has hitherto thought proper to employ elsewhere."

The report further showed that the United States Constitution had failed to secure to New England


* Report of Oct. 8, 1814; Niles, vii. 149.
the rights and benefits expected from it, and required immediate change. The prescribed mode of amendment was insufficient: —

^^When this deficiency becomes apparent, no reason can preclude the right of the whole people who were parties to it to adopt another. . . . But as a proposition for such a convention from a single State would probably be unsuccessful, and our danger admits not of delay, it is recommended by the committee that in the first instance a conference should be invited between those States the affinity of whose interests is closest.'^

Thus, after ten years' delay, the project of a New England Convention was brought forward by State authority, through the process of war with England, which George Cabot from the first declared to be the only means of producing it. ^ As Otis's committee presented the subject, the conference was in the first place to devise some mode of common defence; and, in the second, "to lay the foundation for a radical reform in the national compact by inviting to a future convention a deputation from all the States in the Union." The report closed by offering seven Resolutions, recommending the enlistment of a State army of ten thousand men, a loan of a million dollars at six per cent, and the appointment of delegates "to meet and confer with delegates from the States of New England or any of them" on the defence of those States and the redress of their grievances.

See cmte^ voL ii. p. 166.
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The Senate committee also made a strenuous argument against the President's decision that State militia were in State service unless called for by a United States officer and placed under his direction, and recommended that the subject should be referred to the next session. To the proposition for a conference of the New England States, and to Otis's other Resolutions, the Senate and House assented, October 13, by large majorities, varying in numbers, but amounting to two hundred and sixty against ninety in the case of the proposed convention. The minority in both Houses presented protests, charging the majority with intending more than was avowed. "The reasoning of the report," said the Protest signed by seventy-six members of the House, "is supported by the alarming assumption that the Constitution has failed in its objects, and the people of Massachusetts are absolved from their allegiance, and at Berkeley to adopt another. In debate it has been reiterated that the Constitution is no longer to be respected, and that revolution is not to be deprecated." The House refused to receive the Protest, as disrespectful. The minority withdrew from further share in these proceedings; and the majority then, October 19, chose twelve delegates "to meet and confer on the 15th December next with such as may be chosen by any or all of the other New England States upon our public grievances and concerns." The choice was marked

1 Senate Report of Oct. 18, 1814; Kiles, viL 151.
* NileSf vii 164.

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by a conservative spirit not altogether pleasing to Timothy Pickering. George Cabot and Harrison Gray Otis stood at the head of the delegation.
The remonstrances and threats of the minority made the majority cautious, but did not check them. The legislature of Connecticut immediately appointed seven delegates to meet those of Massachusetts at Hartford, December 15, for the purpose of recommending such measures for the safety and welfare of these States as may consist with our obligations as members of the national Union."^ In this clause the legislature intended to draw a distinction between obligations to the Union and obligations to the Constitution. To the former the people avowed no hostility; to the latter they thought the war had put an end. On that point the committee's report was clear.^

Besides Massachusetts and Connecticut the legislature of Rhode Island, by a vote of thirty-nine to twenty-three, appointed, November 5, four delegates to confer at Hartford upon the measures which might be in their power to adopt to restore their rights under the Constitution, "consistently with their obligations."^ These three States alone chose delegates. The governor and legislature of New Hampshire would probably have joined them had not the Republican council stood in the way. The legislature of Vermont, including its Federalist minority, unanimously declined the invitation.


• Niles, vii. 181.

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Immediately after these steps were taken, the autumn elections occurred. Members of Congress were to be chosen, and the people were obliged to vote for or against the Hartford Convention as the
issue expressly avowed. President Madison might safely assume that no man voted for Federalist Congressmen in November, 1814, unless he favored the project of a New England Convention. The result was emphatic. Massachusetts chose eighteen Federalists and two Republicans; Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut chose only Federalists. In all, New England chose thirty-nine Federalist Congressmen and two Republicans for the Fourteenth Congress. In the Thirteenth Congress, chosen in 1812, when the feeling against the war was supposed to be strongest, the Federalist members from New England numbered thirty, the Republicans eleven.

Beyond New England the autumn elections were less significant, but were still unsatisfactory to the Administration. New Jersey returned to her true sympathies, and as far as her Congressmen expressed her opinions gave unanimous support to the war; but Pennsylvania, owing to local quarrels, elected five Federalist members; and Maryland elected five Federalists and four Republicans. In spite of the great loss in Federalist members which had occurred in the spring elections in New York, the Federalists numbered sixty-five in the Fourteenth Congress; in the Thirteenth they numbered sixty-eight. The Administration had hoped, and freely asserted, that a strong reaction in favor of the war had followed the burning of Washington and the avowal of England's designs against Maine and the Northwestern territory. The elections showed no such reaction. The war was no more popular than before.
The public apathy was the more alarming because whatever was the true object of the Hartford Convention, all Republicans believed it to be intended by step to dissolve the Union, and they supported the Administration chiefly because Madison represented the Union. Federalists might deceive themselves.

Probably the men who voted for the Hartford Convention saw its necessary consequences less clearly than they were seen by the men who voted against it. The Republican vote represented the strength of Union sentiment more closely than the disunion sentiment was represented by the Federalist vote. Yet the States from Maryland to Maine chose a majority of Congressmen who were not Republicans. The New England States, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland returned much more than half the members of Congress, — one hundred and eight in one hundred and eighty-two; and of these fifty-seven were Federalists, while only fifty-one were Republicans. The unpopularity of the Administration was not easily overestimated when Madison could win no more support than this, at a


time when the public believed a vote for Federalism to be a vote for disunion.

^^ I give you the most serious assurance/' wrote Randolph in an open letter to James Lloyd, of Massachusetts, ^ remonstrating against the Convention, ' that nothing less than the shameful conduct of the enemy and the completion of certain occurrences to the eastward could have sustained Mr. Madison after the disgraceful affair at Washington. The public indignation would have overwhelmed In one common ruin himself and his hireling newspapers.**
Randolph's political judgments were commonly mistaken, but in this instance he proved himself to be at least partially right; for at the next election, six months later, when the current had turned decidedly in Madison's favor, Randolph after a sharp contest defeated Eppes and recovered control of his district. Virginia could hardly have chosen a representative less calculated to please Madison.

The President himself betrayed unusual signs of distress. Nothing in Madison's character was more remarkable than the placidity with which he commonly met anxieties that would have crushed a sensitive man; but the shock of defeat at Bladensburg, the flight from Washington, and the anxieties that followed broke him down. William Wirt visited Washington October 14, before the action of the Massachusetts legislature was yet completed. After viewing the ruins of the White House, a

1 Randolph's Letter to Lloyd, Dec 15, 1814; Niles, vii. 268.

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"monmfal monument of American imbecility and im-providence," he called upon the President at Colonel Tayloe's Octagon House, which Serurier had occupied, but which Madison took for his residence after his return.

"p and I called on the President," wrote Wirt in

a private letter. "He looks miserably shattered and woe-begone. In short, he looked heart-broken. His mind is full of the New England sedition. He introduced the subject and continued to press it, painful as it obviously was to him. I denied the probability, even the possibility, that the yeomanry of the North could be in-
duced to place themselves under the power and protection of England, and diverted the conversation to another topic; but he took the first opportunity to return to it, and convinced me that his heart and mind were painfully full of the subject."

No misconduct of New England alone would have unmanned a Virginia President. Madison's worst troubles lay nearer home; Massachusetts made only the last straw in his burden. Jefferson, with his usual kindliness, tried to console and encourage him; but Jefferson's consolations proved only the difficulty of finding words or arguments to warrant satisfaction with the past or hope for the future.

"In the late events at Washington,** wrote Jefferson, September 24,* "I have felt so much for you that I cannot withhold the expression of my sympathies. For

1 Kennedy's Life of Wirt, i. 339.

* Jefferson to Madison, Sept. 24, 1814; Works, vi. 385.

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although every reasonable man must be sensible that all you can do is to order, — that execution must depend on others, and failures be imputed to them alone, — yet I know that when such failures happen they affect even those who have done everything they could to prevent them. Had general Washington himself been now at the head of our affairs, the same event would probably have happened."

Jefferson's estimate of Washington's abilities was lower than that commonly accepted; and his rule that President's responsibility ceased after giving an order, besides ignoring the President's responsibility
for the selection of agents, seemed to destroy the foundation of the public service. "I never doubted that the plans of the President were wise and sufficient," wrote Jefferson to Monroe. * "Their failure we all impute, (1) to the insubordinate temper of Armstrong, and (2) to the indecision of Winder." The rule that an administrator might select any agent, however incompetent, without incurring responsibility for the agent's acts, was one which in private affairs Jefferson would hardly have accepted.

Yet Jefferson's opinions probably expressed Republican sentiment in Virginia, and showed better than any other evidence the course of thought among Madison's friends. In that respect his expressions retained permanent value. The Virginians were willing to throw off responsibility for public disaster; and they naturally threw it on New England, since

1 Jefferson to Monroe, Jan. 1, 1816 ; Works, vi. 407.

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New England challenged it. Writing to his friend William Short, Jefferson spoke of the threatening attitude of Massachusetts:^ —

^^ Some apprehend danger from the defection of Massachusetts. It is a disagreeable circumstance, but not a dangerous one. If they become neutral, we are sufficient for one enemy without them, and in fact we get no aid from them now."

Probably most Virginians shared this belief, at least so far as concerned the aid rendered by Massachusetts to the war. In truth, Massachusetts gave little aid, and made a profession of her wish to give none at all; but the difficulty did not end there. Massachusetts
and Virginia were States of the first class. The census of 1810 allotted to Massachusetts, including Maine, a population of about seven hundred thousand; to Virginia, a white population of five hundred and fifty-one thousand, and a colored population of four hundred and twenty-three thousand, — nine hundred and seventy-four thousand in all. In the ratio of representation Massachusetts counted for twenty, Virginia for twenty-three. The quota of Massachusetts in the direct tax was $316,000; that of Virginia was $369,000. On the scale furnished by these data, Virginia should have contributed in support of the war about one eighth or one seventh more men and money than were required from Massachusetts. The actual result was different.

^ Jefferson to Short, Nov. 28, 1814; Works, vi. 398.

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The amount of money contributed by Massachusetts could not be compared with that contributed by Virginia, partly because of the severe blockade which closed the Virginian ports. The net revenue from customs derived from Virginia in 1814 was $4,000; that from Massachusetts was $1,600,000.^ Unlike the customs revenue, the receipts from internal revenue were supposed to be reasonably equalized, so that each State should contribute in due proportion. According to the official return, dated Nov. 24, 1815, the total internal duties which had then been paid to the collectors for the year 1814 in Massachusetts was $1,198,400; in Virginia it was $1,193,500. The total amount then paid to the Treasury was $178,400 in Massachusetts, and $157,300 in Virginia.* The direct tax was fixed by Congress and was assumed by the State in Virginia, but regularly assessed in Massachusetts. One paid $316,000; the other, $369,000. The
total revenue derived from Massachusetts was therefore $2,114,400 in the year 1814; that from Virginia, $566,500. Of the loans effected in the same year, Massachusetts took a small part considering her means, — hardly a million dollars. Virginia took still less, — only two hundred thousand.^

In money, Massachusetts contributed four times as much as Virginia to support the war, and her contributions were paid in Treasury notes or paper

1 Seybert, p. 436; Pitkin, p. 416.

^ Statement, etc.; State Papers, Finance, iii. 44-48«

* State Papers; Finance, ii. 846, 847.

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equivalent to coin, — not in the notes of banks worthless beyond the State. In men, the estimate was affected by the inquiry whether the militia were to be considered as protecting the national government or the State. Owing to the presence of the British in the Chesapeake, Virginia kept a large force of militia on foot, some of which were in garrison at Norfolk, and a few were on the field of Bladensburg. Massachusetts also was obliged to call out a considerable force of militia to protect or garrison national posts.

The relative numbers of regular troops were also somewhat doubtful; but the paymaster of the army reported Oct. 26, 1814, that he had distributed in bounties during the year $237,400 for Massachusetts, and $160,962 for Virginia.^ During the year, six regular regiments — the Ninth, Twenty-first, Thirty-third, Thirty-fourth, Fortieth, and Forty-fifth — recruited in
Massachusetts. Three — the Twelfth, Twentieth, and Thirty-fifth — recruited in Virginia. Perhaps the military aid furnished by the different sections of the seaboard could be better understood by following the familiar divisions. New England furnished thirteen regiments. New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania furnished fifteen. The Southern States, from Delaware to South Carolina inclusive, furnished ten. Of all the States in the Union New York alone supplied more regular soldiers than Mas-

^ Letter of Paymaster Brent, Oct. 26, 1814; State papers, Mill-
taiy AffiaiiB, L 519.

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fiachusetts, and Massachusetts supplied as many as were furnished by Virginia and the two Carolinas together.

Judged by these standards, either Massachusetts had done more than her share, or Virginia had done less than hers. The tests were material, and took no moral element in account; but in moral support the relative failure of Massachusetts was not beyond dispute. Public opinion in* New England was almost equally divided, and the pronounced opposition to the war was much greater in the Eastern States than in the Southern; but in the serious work of fighting. New England claimed a share of credit. In the little army at Niagara New York supplied the Major-Gen-
eral, Virginia and Massachusetts the two brigadiers; but Winfield Scott’s brigade was chiefly composed of New England men; and when, nearly half a century afterward, Scott in his old age was obliged to choose between his allegiance to his State and allegiance to the Union, the memory of the New England troops who had won for him his first renown had its influ-
ence in raising his mind above the local sympathies which controlled other Virginia officers. Without reflecting on Virginia courage or patriotism, the New England Republicans were warranted in claiming that not the Virginia regiments, but the Massachusetts Ninth, the Vermont Eleventh, the Massachusetts Twenty-first, and the Connecticut Twenty-fifth routed the Royal Scots at Chippawa, and bayoneted the British artillerymen at Lundy's Lane, and stormed

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Drummond's intrenchments at Fort Erie. They could add that without their sailors the war might have been less successful than it was; and they would have been justified had they asked Jefferson to glance at his latest newspaper as he wrote that Massachusetts gave no aid to the war, and read the despatch of Johnston Blakeley reporting that the New England crew of the "Wasp" had sunk the "Avon" in the middle of a British fleet. Virginians did not take kindly to the ocean; and on land, owing to the accidents of war, no Virginia regiment was offered a chance to win distinction.

These comparisons were of little weight to prove that New England was either better or worse than other parts of the Union, but they showed that the difficulties that depressed Madison's mind were not merely local. He might have disregarded the conduct of the State governments of Massachusetts and Connecticut had he enjoyed the full support of his own great Republican States, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina. Except New York, Kentucky, Tennessee, and perhaps Ohio, no State gave to the war the full and earnest co-operation it needed. Again and again, from the beginning of the troubles with England, Madison had acted on the conviction that at
last the people were aroused; but in every instance he had been disappointed. After the burning of Washington, he was more than ever convinced that the moment had come when the entire people would

1 Niles's Register, Nov. 26, 1814.

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rally in their self-respect; but he was met by the Hartford Convention and the November elections. If the people would not come to the aid of their government at such a moment, Madison felt that nothing could move them. Peace was his last hope.

CHAPTER IX.

Congress was summoned to meet in extra session September 19, by a proclamation issued August 8, before the capture of Washington. On the appointed day the members appeared, but found their building in ashes, and met like vagrants, without a shelter they could call their own. The President caused the only public office that had been spared, to be fitted for their use. Partly owing to the exertions of Dr. Thornton, the head of the Bureau of Patents, partly owing to the tornado of August 25, the building used as Post and Patent Office was not burned. There Congress was obliged to hold its sessions, ill such discomfort as it had never before known.

The President sent his Annual Message September 20, which informed Congress that it had been specially summoned to supply "any inadequacy in
the existing provision for the wants of the Treasury," as well as to be ready for whatever result might be reached by the negotiation at Ghent. Two thirds of the Message related to the operations of war, and the President seemed rather disposed to suppress than to avow his difficulties, but the little he said of them was heavy with anxiety. He announced that July 1 five million dollars remained in the Treasury, and that " large sums " must be provided; but he did not add that the loan had failed, or that the banks and Treasury had suspended specie payments. He did not say that the regular army and the militia system were inadequate to national defence; but he declared "the necessity of immediate measures for filling the ranks of the regular army," and of giving "the requisite energy and efficiency" to the militia:

" From this view of the national affairs Congress will be urged to take up, without delay, as well the subject of pecuniary supplies as that of military force, and on a scale commensurate with the extent and the character which the war has assumed. It is not to be disguised that the situation of our country calls for its greatest efforts. • • • . From such an adversary, hostility in its greatest force and in its worst forms may be looked for."

The President threw on the Secretaries of the Treasury and of War the ungrateful task of announcing the details of their need. Secretary Campbell was first to address Congress, and the tone of his report on the state of the finances received emphasis from the resignation which he sent at the same time to the President. Campbell's annual report of
September 23 was an admission of incompetence. He had paid, he said, nearly twenty millions from the Treasury between January and July; twenty-

seven millions more were payable between July and the following January. For the year 1816 the Treasury would require at least as much as for 1814. Congress must therefore speedily provide at least seventy-four millions for the service between July 1^\textsuperscript{st} 1814, and Dec. 31, 1815. He ventured to suggest no means of obtaining this sum, or any amount approaching it.

July 1 the Treasury contained $4,722,000. From its various sources of revenue it could expect $4,840,000 during the remainder of the year; from loans already contracted, $4,820,000. In all, $13,822,000 might be considered as in hand, which was one half the sum immediately required. For the year 1816 the revenue in all its branches might produce $8,200,000, leaving $39,000,000 to be provided. Twenty-two millions were the extent of Campbell's resources, but fifty-two million dollars more must be raised merely to carry on the government as it had been administered in the past year.

The plan of finance adopted by Gallatin at the outset of the war assumed that all deficits could be covered by loans.

"The experience of the present year," said Campbell, "furnishes ground to doubt whether this be practicable, at least in the shape in which loans have hitherto been attempted. Nor is it even certain that the establishing and pledging of revenues adequate to the punctual payment of the interest and eventual reimbursement
of the principal of the sums which will be required for

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the year 1815, would enable the Treasury to obtain
them through the medium of loans effected in the ordi
nary way."

Loans being impracticable, Campbell discussed the
possibility of using Treasury notes. Eight millions
were already in issue, and of these more than
four millions would fall due before December 81.
Campbell considered that six millions in Treasury
notes was about as large a sum as could easily
be circulated, but by issuing notes of small de-
nominations he hoped to raise the amount to ten
millions.

From all sources Campbell hoped to obtain about
twenty-four million dollars of the seventy-four mil-
lions required. For the remaining fifty millions he
had no suggestion to offer. The means for new and
extraordinary exertions, he said, "ought to be pro-
vided." He declared that the resources of the na-
tion were ample, — which was true, but was also the
most discouraging symptom of the time; for if the
people, with ample resources, as he asserted, refused
to come to the support of their own government on
any terms, their decision must be accepted as final.
Besides throwing upon Congress all these difficulties,
without a suggestion of his own, Campbell added that
Congress would be required to exert its powers to
remedy the evils of the currency and the suspension
of specie payments.

Congress on hearing this financial statement re-
garded the situation as desperate. ^^Tell Dr. Madi-

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son/' Senator Lacock was reported ^ to have said to the President's private secretary, " that we are now willing to submit to his Philadelphia lawyer for head of the Treasury. The public patient is so very sick that we must swallow anything, however nauseous." Dallas was nominated October 5, and confirmed the next day without opposition, as Secretary of the Treasury. No stronger proof could have been given of the helplessness of Congress, for Dallas was a man who under no other circumstances could have obtained a ray of popular favor.

Dallas's character was high, his abilities undoubted, his experience large; but for ten years he had been one of the least popular men in Pennsylvania, the target of newspaper abuse and the champion of political independence. The people reasonably required that their leaders should more or less resemble some popular type, and if the result was monotonous the fault was in the society, not in its politics or its politicians; but Dallas was like no ordinary type in any people. His tone of intellectual and social superiority, his powdered hair, old-fashioned dress and refined manners, his free habits of expense, and the insubordination even more than the vivacity of his temper irritated the prejudices of his party. ^ He had little respect for Presidents, and none for Congress. For Jefferson and Virginia doctrines he felt distrust, which was returned. Earnest in temper and

* Ingersoll's History, ii. 253.
s Ingeisoll's History, ii. 254, 257.
emphatic in tone, even to the point of tears and tropical excitability, Dallas came to Washington as though to lead a forlorn hope, — caring little for parties and less for ambition, but bent upon restoring to the government the powers that his friend Gallatin, too easily as he thought, had allowed to slip from its grasp.

The difficulties of the Treasury when Dallas took charge of it were not easily exaggerated. His own description, ^ given some six weeks afterward, made no disguise of them. " The Treasury," he said, " was suffering under every kind of embarrassment. The demands upon it were great in amount, while the means to satisfy them were comparatively small, precarious in collection, and difficult in their application. . • • The means consisted, first, of the fragment of an authority to borrow money when nobody was disposed to lend, and to issue Treasury notes which none but necessitous creditors or contractors in distress ... seemed willing to accept;" second, of bank-credits, chiefly in the South and West, rendered largely useless by the suspension of specie payments; third, of the current receipts of taxes, also useless because paid chiefly in Treasury notes. The Treasury was bankrupt. The formal stoppage of payments in interest on the debt was announced, November 9, by an official letter from the secretary, notifying holders of government securities in Boston that the

^ Dallas to William Lowndes, Nov. 27, 1814 ; State Papers, Finance^ ii 872

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Treasury could not meet its obligations, and that "the government was unable to avert or to control this course of events." After that date the Treasury made no further pretence of solvency.

From this situation the government could be rescued only by a great effort; and obviously the currency must be first restored, for until some system of exchange could be established, every increase of taxation would merely increase unavailable bank deposits. Fifty millions of Southern bank-notes, locked in the vaults of Southern banks, would not pay the over-due interest on government bonds at Boston.

To this subject every one turned, but the schemes that seemed to have a chance of adoption were only two. The first came from President Jefferson, and was strongly pressed by the South. As Jefferson explained it, the plan seemed as simple as his plans were apt to be; he proposed to issue twenty millions in promissory notes every year as long as might be necessary. "Our experience," he told the President, "has proved it [a paper currency] may be run up to two or three hundred millions without more than doubling what would be the prices of things under a sufficient medium, or say a metallic one." His plan included an increase of taxation by two million dollars every year to redeem the same amount of Treasury issues.

Dallas to the Commissioner of Loans at Boston, Nov. 9, 1814; Niles, vii. 270.

* Jefferson to Madison, Oct. 15, 1814; Works, yi. 391.

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Obviously the insuperable obstacle to this plan was
the paper money of the State banks, which already stood at discounts varying from ten to fifty per cent in specie, and in any large quantity could not be discounted at all. Until private paper should be abolished, public or government paper could not be brought into common use. Jefferson’s views on this, as on the whole subject, were interesting.

"The banks have discontinued themselves," he explained. "We are now without any medium; and necessity, as well as patriotism and confidence, will make us all eager to receive Treasury notes if founded on specific taxes. Congress may now borrow of the public, without interest, all the money they may want, to the amount of a competent circulation, by merely issuing their own promissory notes of proper denominations for the larger purposes of circulation, but not for the small. Leave that door open for the entrance of metallic money.

. . . The State legislatures should be immediately urged to relinquish the right of establishing banks of discount. Most of them will comply on patriotic principles, under the convictions of the moment; and the non-complying may be crowded into concurrence by legitimate devices."

Instead of "banks of discount," Jefferson probably meant to say banks of issue, although the Virginia school was hostile to all banks, and possibly he wished to destroy the whole system. If the scheme were adopted, twenty million dollars in paper money would not supply the wants of the Treasury, which required

* Jefferson to Thomas Cooper, Sept. 10, 1814; Works, vi. 375.

at least fifty millions within a year. The resource was limited, even if the States could be compelled to stop the issue of private notes, — which was ex-
tremely doubtful in the temper of Massachusetts and with the leanings of Chief-Justice Marshall. Jefferson did not touch upon legal tender; but the assumption of power implied in the issue of paper moneys seemed to require that the government should exercise the right of obliging its creditors to accept it.* The actual interest-bearing Treasury notes stood then at a discount of about twenty per cent. The proposed paper money could hardly circulate at a better rate, and coin was not to be obtained. Under such conditions the notes must be a forced currency if they were to circulate at all.

The scheme was reported to the House by the Committee of Ways and Means through its chairman, John W. Eppes, Jefferson's son-in-law. For the report Eppes was alone responsible, and the plan in his hands varied in some points from that of Jefferson. Starting from the admitted premise that loans were not to be obtained, and that money could not be transferred from one point to another in any existing medium at the disposition of government, Eppes proposed to issue Treasury notes "in sums sufficiently small for the ordinary purposes of society," which were not to be made payable on demand in coin, but might at any time be exchanged for eight per cent bonds, and were to be received "in all pay-


ments for public lands and taxes." Nothing was said of legal tender, or of driving bank-notes from circulation; but Eppes proposed to double the taxes at one stroke.

Eppes's scheme lost the advantages of Jefferson's without gaining any of its own. It abandoned the
hope of abolishing bank paper; and in want of such a restraint on private issues, the proposed government paper would merely add one more element of confusion to the chaos already existing. Eppes further altered Jefferson’s plan by adding some ten millions instead of two millions to the burden of taxation; but even Jefferson protested that this part of the scheme was impracticable.

"This is a dashing proposition," he wrote to Monroe; "but if Congress pass it, I shall consider it sufficient evidence that their constituents generally can pay the tax. No man has greater confidence than I have in the spirit of the people to a rational extent. Whatever they can, they will. But without either market or medium, I know not how it is to be done. All markets abroad and all at home are shut to us, so that we have been feeding our horses on wheat. Before the day of collection, bank notes will be but as oak-leaves; and of specie there is not within all the United States one half of the proposed amount of the taxes."

This was the situation of the Virginia scheme when Dallas took the matter in hand. Immediately after entering into office, Dallas wrote to Eppes an official letter, dated October 17, expressing views wholly at variance with the Virginia plan.

"Under favorable circumstances and to a limited extent," he said, "an emission of Treasury notes would probably afford relief; but Treasury notes are an expensive and precarious substitute either for coin or for bank-notes, charged as they are with a growing interest,
productive of no countervailing profit or emolument, and exposed to every breath of popular prejudice or alarm. The establishment of a national institution operating upon credit combined with capital, and regulated by prudence and good faith, is after all the only efficient remedy for the disordered condition of our circulating medium. While accomplishing that object, too, there will be found under the auspices of such an institution a safe depository for the public treasure and a constant auxiliary to the public credit. But whether the issues of a paper currency proceed from the national Treasury or from a national Bank, the acceptance of the paper in a course of payments and receipts must be forever optional with the citizens. The extremity of that day cannot be anticipated when any honest and enlightened statesman will again venture upon the desperate expedient of a tender-law."

Without a tender-law the Virginia scheme would hardly answer the purposes required, since the government must restrain the issue of paper within a limit too narrow for usefulness. Dallas did not press this point, but developed his own scheme, which required,

^ Dallas to Eppes, Oct. 17, 1814 ; State Papers, Fmance^
^ iL866.

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like that of Eppes', a duplication of taxes to pro^duce twenty-one million dollars, and the creation of a national Bank with a capital of fifty million dollars.

Either Eppes's or Dallas's plan might answer the immediate object of providing a currency, and both required the exercise of implied powers by Congress. Apparently Congress had only to choose, but in truth choice was most difficult. The House readily adopted
Dallas's recommendation in principle, and voted, October 24, by sixty-six to forty, that it was expedient to establish a national Bank; but the problem of establishing a specie-paying bank without specie passed its powers. Dallas abandoned the attempt at the outset. He proposed a bank of fifty millions capital, of which forty-four millions might be subscribed in government bonds and Treasury notes and six millions in coin. The bank was at once to lend to government thirty millions, — of course in bank-notes, -^ and no one denied that an immediate suspension of specie payments must follow such an issue. To any bank, strong or weak, the old Virginia influence represented by Eppes was hostile; and to a bank insolvent from the start the Federalists also were opposed.

When the bill, reported November 7, was printed, it was found to contain a provision authorizing the suspension of specie payments at the President's discretion. The discussion began November 14, and every successive day revealed objections and increased the opposition. Calhoun complicated the subject

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still further by bringing forward, November 16, a plan of his own, requiring the capital to consist 'Vone tenth in specie, and the remainder in specie or in Treasury notes to be hereafter issued,'^ and taking away all government control. Ingham of Pennsylvania, representing Dallas, combated Calhoun with force, but could not make his own measure agreeable to the House. His phrase in regard to the suspension of specie payments was significant Congress, he said, would be to blame for '^ frantic enthusiasm " if it did not provide for the case. " It may happen, and probably will happen, that their specie payments
cannot be continued, and what will then be the situation of the bank? Failing to fulfil the purposes designed, its credit is blighted, its operations are stopped, and its charter violated; and if this should take place before your Treasury notes are sold, the government will scarce obtain a moment's relief.*

That the new bank could not pay specie was obvious. The Bank of England itself could not pay specie, and had not attempted to do so for nearly twenty years.

The House in committee adopted Calhoun's amendment by a majority of about sixty, in spite of Ingham's opposition; and thus substituted for Dallas's scheme a large private bank, over which the government was to exercise no control, with a capital of fifty millions, nine tenths of which were to be Treasury notes. The House then discovered so many unforeseen difficulties, that November 25 it recommitted

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the bill to a select committee, of which Lowndes, Calhoun, Ingham, Forsyth, and two Federalists were members.

Dallas was obliged openly to enter the lists against Calhoun, and wrote to the committee a letter, dated November 27, * sounding like a defiance: "The dividend on the funded debt has not been punctually paid; a large amount of Treasury notes has already been dishonored; and the hope of preventing further injury and reproach in transacting business with the Treasury is too visionary to afford a moment's consolation." Calhoun's scheme, he plainly intimated, was impracticable and mischievous.

The next day, November 28, Lowndes brought back
Calhoun’s bill to the House, together with Dallas’s letter, and told the House that the committee could come to no agreement. Upon this admission of helplessness, Hanson addressed the House in a speech which seemed to carry Federalist exultation to the extremest point. Protesting his anxiety to defend the country, Hanson uttered a cry of triumph over the destruction of the government: —

'^ Not only had government bills been dishonored and the interest of the public debt remained unpaid, but • • • so completely empty was the Treasury and destitute of credit, that funds could not be obtained to defray the current ordinary expenses of the different Departments. Disgraceful, humiliating as the fact was, it ought not to be concealed from the nation, and he felt

^ Dallas to Lowndes, Nov. 27, 1814 ; State Papers, ii. 872.

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it his duty to state to the House that the Department of State was so bare of money as to be unable to pay even its stationery bill. The government was subsisting upon the (trainings of unchartered banks in the District, which felt themselves compelled to contribute their means lest the rod in terrorem which was held over them should be applied, and an Act of incorporation refused."

No one contradicted or answered Hanson. The House wavered in incapacity that suggested dissolution. At last Richard M. Johnson, in order to force a decision right or wrong, moved the previous question and brought the House to a vote. Then the majority turned against Calhoun, as they had before turned against Dallas, and rejected the bill by a vote of one hundred and four to forty-nine.
The Southern preference for government paper currency lay at the bottom of Calhoun's scheme as of Jefferson's, and seemed to Dallas to combine ignorance with dishonesty. Treasury notes bearing interest could not be made to serve as a currency, and were useless as a foundation for government paper. "What use is there," asked IngersoU, "in such a mass of banking machinery to give circulation to some millions of Treasury notes? Why not issue them at once without this unwieldy, this unnecessary medium?" Yet when Boiling Hall of Georgia, in pursuance of Macon's aphorism that "paper money never was beat," moved, November 12, Resolutions


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authorizing the issue of Treasury notes as legal tender, the House refused to consider it by a vote of ninety-five to forty-two. Eppes did not vote; Calhoun voted against it, and of the twenty-five Southern members who supported it Macon and Stanford were the most prominent.

Nothing could be plainer than that the House must ultimately come to inconvertible government paper, whether issued by the Treasury or by a Bank. Dallas, Eppes, and Calhoun were all agreed on that point, if on no other; but after Congress had sat two months and a half, the House was no nearer a decision than when it met. The Federalists, voting at one time with Calhoun, at another with Dallas, were able to paralyze action. Eppes wrote to Dallas, December 2, inviting further information; and Dallas wrote back the same day, recounting the needs of the Treasury for the current month, merely oh
account of the national debt. Dallas reported that $5,726,000 in Treasury notes and dividends were due, or would fall due by January 1; and that including unavailable bank-credits, and subject to possible contingencies, the Treasury might contain resources to meet these demands to the amount of $8,972,000. Eppes could do no more for immediate relief than report a bill for the issue of some ten millions more of interest-bearing Treasury notes, which was passed without debate and became law, December 26, with but improving the situation.

^ Dallas to Eppes, Dec 2, ^814; State Papers, Finance, ii. 877.

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The House also passed the heavy tax-bills without much opposition except from Federalists who wished to stop military operations on the part of the government. Between thirty and forty members, or about one half of the Federalists, carried their opposition to that point. The bill raising the direct tax to six million dollars passed the House, December 22, by a vote of one hundred and six to fifty-three, and passed the Senate, January 5, 1815, by twenty-three to seven. Dallas and Eppes hoped to raise about twenty million dollars through the new taxation, or twice what had been previously attempted. Jefferson held that these taxes could not be paid, and expressed his opinion without reserve.

^^ If anything could revolt our citizens against the war," wrote Jefferson, November 28, \(^8\) " it would be the extravagance with which they are about to be taxed. • • . The taxes proposed cannot be paid. How can a people who cannot get fifty cents a bushel for their wheat, while they pay twelve dollars a bushel for their salt, pay five times the amount of taxes they ever paid
before? Yet this will be the case in all the States south of the Potomac."

If any conclusion was intended to be drawn from the official return sent to Congress, October 18, of internal taxes received to that date in each State, the evil predicted by Jefferson seemed already to exist. In Massachusetts, of taxes to the amount of

* Jefferson to Short, Nov. 28. 1814; Works, vi. 398.
' Statement, etc.; State Papers, Finance, ii. 861.

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$200,000, accrued for the first two quarters of the year, $170,000 had been received before October 10. In New York $898,000 had accrued, and $808,000 had been received; thus New York was nearly one fourth in arrears. Pennsylvania was worse; of $470,000 accrued the government had received $280,000,—leaving two fifths in arrears. Virginia was in somewhat worse condition than Pennsylvania; of $247,000 accrued $186,000 had been paid,—leaving four ninths in arrears.

Yet Pennsylvania and Virginia paid taxes in their own depreciated bank paper, while New York and New England paid chiefly in Treasury notes. The new taxes were still to be paid in the same medium, although the laws gave no express authority for it. In the next Congress, when the subject was discussed, Wright of Maryland said: "When Congress passed the revenue laws and imposed the six million and three million land tax, did they contemplate the payment of specie? No! they knew the people had it not, and of course could not pay it.... Does any man doubt that Congress intended these taxes being paid in bank paper? Nay,
has not the Secretary of the Treasury . . . sealed this construction of the law by taking the bank paper in discharge for these taxes?" That the bank paper was worth less than Treasury notes was shown by the Southern States paying their taxes in such paper, when they might equally well have paid them in Treasury notes except for the difference in value.

The medium of depreciated and depreciating bank paper in which the taxes were to be paid, secured the States outside of New England from intolerable pressure by giving the means of indefinite depreciation; but to the government such a resource meant merely a larger variety of bank-credits, which were of no certain value even in the towns where the banks existed, and were of no value at all elsewhere. The burden of taxation would be thrown chiefly on New England; and if the Hartford Convention did nothing else, it was sure to take measures for sequestering the proceeds of taxation in New England for military purposes. The hope of restoring the finances by taxation was faint. Until the currency could be established and exchanges made secure, the government was helpless.

The House having broken down November 28, the Senate next took the matter in hand. Bufus King reported, December 2, a bill to incorporate a bank, which was in effect the bill recommended by Dallas. After a week's consideration the Senate passed the bill, December 9, by the vote of seventeen to fourteen, — King and the Federalists, with four Republi-
can senators, voting against it. The House referred it to the Committee of Ways and Means, which reported it, December 14, with amendments. The debate began December 28, and was cut short December 27 by C. J. Ingersoll, who by the close vote of seventy-

two to seventy obliged the House to call for the previous question, and order the bill to its third reading. This energy was followed by a reaction; the bill was recommitted for amendment, again reported, and vehemently attacked.

Never had the House shown itself more feeble. The Federalists took the lead in debate; and January 2 Daniel Webster, in a speech that placed him at the head of the orators of the time, dictated the action of Congress:—

“What sort of an institution, sir, is this? It looks less like a bank than like a department of government. It will be properly the paper-money department. Its capital is government debts; the amount of issues will depend on government necessities; government in effect absolves itself from its own debts to the bank, and by way of compensation absolves the bank from its own contracts with others. This is indeed a wonderful scheme of finance. The government is to grow rich because it is to borrow without the obligation of repaying, and is to borrow of a bank which issues paper without the liability to redeem it. • • • They provide for an unlimited issue of paper in an entire exemption from payment. They found their bank in the first place on the discredit of government, and then hope to enrich government out of the insolvency of the bank."
Webster was a master of antithesis, and the proposed bank was in effect what he described; but had he been a member of the British Parliament he might have made the same objections, with little alteration, to the Bank of England. The Hartford Convention was in session while he spoke. Every word of his speech was a shock to the government and the Union, for his only suggestion was equivalent to doing nothing. He moved to instruct the committee to report a bill creating a bank with thirty millions of capital, composed one fourth of specie and three fourths of government securities; without power to suspend specie payments, and without obligation to lend three fifths of its capital to the government. To such a bank he would give his support, "not as a measure of temporary policy, or an expeditious to find means of relief from the present poverty of the Treasury," but as an institution most useful in times of peace.

The House came to a vote the same day, and divided eighty-one to eighty. Then the Speaker, Langdon Cheves, rose, and after denouncing the proposed bank as "a dangerous, unexampled, and he might almost say a desperate resort," gave his casting vote against the bill.

No sooner had the House struck this blow at Dallas than it shrank back. The next day, amid complaints and objections, it reconsidered its matured decision by the sudden majority of one hundred and seven to fifty-four. Once more the bill was recommitted, and once more reported, January 6, in the form that Webster proposed. Weary of their own instability, the majority hastened to vote. Most of
the Federalists supported the bill; but Grosvenor of New York, one of the ablest, frankly said what everyone felt, that the proposed institution could not be

a specie bank, or get a million of its notes into circulation. "The government relying on it would be disappointed, and ruin soon stare them in the face." With this understanding the House passed the bill, January 7, by a vote of one hundred and twenty to thirty-eight; and the Senate, after a struggle with the House, accepted it, January 20, by a vote of twenty to fourteen.

Dallas was not a man to be easily daunted even in so desperate a situation. After ten days deliberation, the President sent to Congress a veto message.

"The most the bank could effect," said Madison, "and the most it could be expected to aim at, would be to keep the institution alive by limited and local transactions • • until a change from war to peace should enable it, by a flow of specie into its vaults and a removal of the external demand for it, to derive its contemplated emoluments from a safe and full extension of its operations."

"I hope this will satisfy our friends," wrote Webster to his brother, "that it was not a bank likely to favor the Administration. Either with or without such a bank, the Administration was equally helpless. The veto left the Treasury, February 1, without a resource in prospect. The unsatisfied demands reached nearly twenty millions. The cash balance, chiefly in bank-credits, was little more than six millions. A further deficit of forty millions re-
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remained to be provided above the estimated revenue of 1815. United States six-per-cents commanded only a nominal price, between fifty and sixty cents on the dollar, and were quoted in Boston at a discount of forty cents. Treasury notes being in demand for taxes, were worth about seventy-five cents in the dollar. Dallas had no serious hope of carrying on the government. In a letter to the Committee of Ways and Means, dated January 17, he could only propose to add six millions more to the taxes, issue fifteen millions in Treasury notes, and borrow twenty-five millions on any terms that could be obtained. In making these recommendations he avowed in grave words his want of confidence in their result: —

'^ In making the present communication I feel, sir« that I have performed my duty to the Legislature and to the country; but when I perceive that more than forty millions of dollars must be raised for the service of the year 1815, by an appeal to public credit through the medium of the Treasury notes and loans, I am not without sensations of extreme solicitude."

Young George Ticknor of Boston happened to be in the gallery of the House of Representatives when Eppes read this letter, January 21, and the next day he wrote,* —


* Niles, vii. ; Supplement, p. 176.
The last remarkable event in the history of this remarkable Congress is Dallas's report. You can imagine nothing like the dismay with which it has filled the Democratic party. All his former communications were but emollients and palliations compared with this final disclosure of the bankruptcy of the nation. Mr. Eppes as Chancellor of the Exchequer, or Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, read it in his place yesterday, and when he had finished, threw it upon the table with expressive violence, and turning round to Mr. Gaston, asked him with a bitter levity between jest and earnest, —

"** * Well, sir! will your party take the government if we will give it up to them? *"

"' No, sir! ' «aid Gaston; . . . * No, sir I Not unless you will give it to us as we gave it to you I * "

CHAPTER X.

While Dallas struggled with Congress to obtain the means of establishing a currency in order to pay the army, Monroe carried on a similar struggle in order to obtain an army to pay. On this point, as on the financial issue, Virginian ideas did not accord with the wishes of Government. The prejudice against a regular army was stimulated by the evident impossibility of raising or supporting it. Once
more Jefferson expressed the common feeling of his Virginia neighbors.^

"We must prepare for interminable war," he wrote to Monroe, October 16. "To this end we should put our house in order by providing men and money to an indefinite extent. The former may be done by classing our militia, and assigning each class to the description of duties for which it is fit. It is nonsense to talk of regulars. They are not to be had among a people so easy and happy at home as ours. We might as well rely on calling down an army of angels from heaven."

As Jefferson lost the habits of power and became once more a Virginia planter, he reverted to the opinions and prejudices of his earlier life and of the society in which he lived. As Monroe grew accustomed to the exercise and the necessities of power, he threw aside Virginian ideas and accepted the responsibilities of government. On the same day when Jefferson wrote to Monroe that it was nonsense to talk of regulars, Monroe wrote to Congress that it was nonsense to talk of militia. The divergence between Monroe and Jefferson was even greater than between Dallas and Eppes.

"It may be stated with confidence," wrote Monroe to Congress, "that at least three times the force in militia has been employed at our principal cities, along the coast and on the frontier, in marching to and returning thence, that would have been necessary in regular troops; and that the expense attending it has been more than proportionately augmented from the difficulty if not the
impossibility of preserving the same degree of system in
the militia as in the regular service.

In Monroe's opinion a regular force was an object
"of the highest importance." He told, the Senate
committee that the army, which was only thirty-four
thousand strong on the first of October, should be
raised to its legal limit of sixty-two thousand, and
that another permanent army^ of forty thousand men
should be raised for strictly defensive service. In
the face of Jef^rson's warning that he might as well
call down an army of angels from heaven, Monroe
called for one hundred thousand regular troops, when

1 Monroe to Giles, Oct. 17, 1814; State Papers, Military
Affairs, i. 514

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no exertions had hitherto availed to keep thirty thou-
sand effectives on the rolls.

The mere expression of such a demand carried
with it the train of consequences which the people
chiefly dreaded. One hundred thousand troops could
be raised only by draft. Monroe affirmed the power
as well as the need of drafting. "Congress have a
right by the Constitution," he said, "to* raise regjilar
armies, and no restraint is imposed on the exercise of
it. . . . It would be absurd to suppose that Congress
could not carry this power into effect otherwise than
by accepting the voluntary service of individuals." Absurd as it was, such had been the general impres-
sion, and Monroe was believed to have been one of
the most emphatic m maintaining it. "Ask him,"
suggested Randolph, "what he would have done,
whUe governor of Virginia and preparing to resist
Federal usurpation, had such an attempt been made
by Mr. Adams and his ministers, especially in 1800. He can give the answer." Doubtless the silence of the Constitution in respect to conscription was conclusive to some minds in favor of the power; but the people preferred the contrary view, the more because militia service seemed to give more pay for less risk.

The chance of carrying such a measure through Congress was not great, yet Monroe recommended it as his first plan for raising men. He proposed to enroll the free male population between eighteen and forty-five years of age into classes of one hundred,

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The Senate committee immediately summoned Monroe to an interview. They wished an explanation of the failure in the recruiting service, and were told by Monroe that the failure was chiefly due to the competition of the detached militia for substitutes.* The military committee of the House then joined with the military committee of the Senate in sounding the members of both bodies in order to ascertain the most rigorous measure that could be
passed. According to the report of Troup of Georgia, chairman of the House committee, they found that no efficacious measure, calculated certainly and promptly to fill the regular army, could be effectually

^ Explanatory Observations, State Papers, Military Affairs, i. 616.

* Monroe to Giles, Oct. 26, 1814; State Papers, Military Affairs, i 618.


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Measures were matured and proposed by the [House] committee, but were not pressed on the House, from the solemn conviction that there was no disposition in the Legislature to act finally on the subject.**

Yet the issue was made at a moment of extreme anxiety and almost despair. In October, 1814, the result of the war was believed to depend on the establishment of an efficient draft. The price of United States six-per-cents showed better than any other evidence the opinion of the public; but the military situation, known to all the world, warranted deep depression. Sir George Prevost, about to be succeeded by an efficient commander, — Sir George Murray, — was then at Kingston organizing a campaign against Sackett’s Harbor, with an army of twenty thousand regular troops and a fleet that controlled the Lake. Another great force, military and naval, was known to be on its way to New Orleans; and the defences of New Orleans were no stronger than those of Washington. One half the province of Maine, from Eastport to Castine, was already in
British possession.

To leave no doubt of England's intentions, despatches from Ghent, communicating the conditions on which the British government offered peace, arrived from the American commissioners and were sent, October 10, to Congress. These conditions assumed rights of conquest. The British negotiators demanded four territorial or proprietary concessions,

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and all were vital to the integrity of the Union, first, the whole Indian Territory of the Northwest, including about one third of the State of Ohio, two thirds of Indiana, and nearly the entire region from which the States of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan were afterward created, was to be set aside forever as Indian country under British guaranty. Second, the United States were to be excluded from military or naval contact with the Lakes. Third, they had forfeited their rights in the fisheries. Fourth, they were to cede a portion of Maine to strengthen Canada.

These demands, following the unparalleled insult of burning Washington, foreshadowed a war carried to extremities, and military preparations such as the Union had no means ready to repel. Monroe's recommendations rested on the conviction that the nation must resort to extreme measures. Dallas's financial plan could not have been suggested except as a desperate resource. Congress understood as well as the Executive the impending peril, and stood in even more fear of it.

Under these circumstances, when Troup's committee refused to act, Giles reported, on behalf of the
Senate committee, two military measures. The first, for filling the regular army, proposed to extend the age of enlistment from twenty-one to eighteen years; to double the land-bounty; and to exempt from militia duty every militia-man who should furnish a recruit for the regular service.

The second measure, reported the same day, November 5, purported to authorize the raising an army of eighty thousand militia-men by draft, to serve for two years within the limits of their own or an adjoining State. The provisions of this measure were ill-conceived, ill-digested, and unlikely to answer their purpose. The moment the debate began, the bill was attacked so vigorously as to destroy whatever credit it might have otherwise possessed.

Of all the supporters of the war, Senator Varnum of Massachusetts was one of the steadiest. He was also the highest authority in the Senate on matters pertaining to the militia. When Giles's bill came under discussion November 16, Varnum began the debate by a speech vehemently hostile to the proposed legislation. He first objected that although the bill purported to call for an army of eighty thousand men, "yet in some of the subsequent sections of it we find that instead of realizing the pleasing prospect of seeing an ample force in the field, the force is to be reduced to an indefinite amount, — which contradiction in terms, inconsistency in principle, and uncertainty in effect, cannot fail to produce mortification and chagrin in every breast." Varnum objected to drafting men from the militia for two years' service because the principle of nine months' service was already established by the common law. If the nation wanted a regular force, why not make it a part of the regular
army without a system of drafting militia "unnecessary, unequal, and unjust?" The machinery of classification and draft was "wholly impracticable/*. The limit of service to adjoining States abandoned the objects for which the Union existed. The proffered bounties would ruin the recruiting service for the regular army; the proffered exemptions and reductions in term of duty left no permanency to the service. The bill inflicted no penalties and charged no officers with the duty of making the draft "I consider the whole system as resolving into a recommendation upon the patriotism of the States and Territories and upon the patriotism of the classes."

The justice of Vannum's criticism could not fairly be questioned. The bill authorized the President "to issue his orders to such officers of the militia as he may think proper," and left the classification and draft in the hands of these militia officers. * Every drafted man who had performed any tour of duty in the militia since the beginning of the war was entitled to deduct a corresponding term from his two years of service; and obviously the demand created for substitutes would stop recruiting for the regular army.

Hardly had Vannum sat down when Senator Daggert of Connecticut spoke.

"The bill," said the Connecticut senator, "is incapable of being executed, as well as unconstitutional and unjust. It proceeds entirely upon the idea that the State governments will lend their aid to carry it into
effect. If they refuse, it becomes inoperative. Now

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air, will the Executives, who believe it a violation of the Constitution, assist in its execution? I tell you they wni not,"

Every member of the Senate who heard these words knew that they were meant to express the will of the convention which was to meet at Hartford within a month. The sentiment thus avowed was supported by another New England senator, whose State was not a party to the Convention. Jeremiah Mason of New Hampshire was second to no one in legal ability or in personal authority, and when he followed Daggett in the debate, he spoke with full knowledge of the effect his words would have on the action of the Hartford Convention and of the State executives.

"In my opinion," he said, "this system of military conscription thus recommended by the Secretary of War is not only inconsistent with the provisions and spirit of the Constitution, but also with all the principles of civil liberty. In atrocity it exceeds that adopted by the late Emperor of France for the subjugation of Europe. • • • Such a measure cannot, it ought not to be submitted to. If it could in no other way be averted, I not only believe but I hope, it would be resisted."

Mason pointed to the alternative, — which Massachusetts was then adopting, as the necessary consequence of refusing power to the government, — that the States must resume the powers of sovereignty:

"Should the national defence be abandoned by the general government, I trust the people, if still retaining
a good portion of their resources, may rally under their State governments against foreign invasion, and rely with confidence on their own courage and virtue."

At that time the State of Massachusetts was occupied for one hundred miles of its sea-coast by a British force, avowedly for purposes of permanent conquest; and the State legislature, October 18, refused to make an inquiry, or to consider any measure for regaining possession of its territory, or to cooperate with the national government for the purpose, but voted to raise an army of ten thousand men. The object of this State army was suggested by Christopher Gore, the Federalist senator from Massachusetts who followed Mason in the debate. In personal and political influence Gore stood hardly second to Mason, and his opinions were likely to carry the utmost weight with the convention at Hartford. With this idea necessarily in his mind, Gore told the Senate, —

"This [bill] is the first step on the odious ground of conscription, — a plan, sir, which never will and never ought to be submitted to by this country while it retains one idea of civil freedom; a plan, sir, which if attempted will be resisted by many States, and at every hazard. In my Judgment, sir, it should be resisted by all who have any regard to public liberty or the rights of the several States."

These denunciations were not confined to New England. Senator Goldsborough of Maryland, also a

^ Message of Goveumor Strong, with documents, Jan. 18, 1815;
Federalist, affirmed that the sentiment of abhorrence for military duty was almost universal: —

"Sir, you dare not — at least I hope you dare not — attempt a conscription to fill the ranks of your regular army. When the plan of the Secretary of War made its appearance, it was gratifying to find that it met with the abhorrence of almost every man in the nation; and the merit of the bill before you, if such a measure can be supposed to have merit at all, is that it is little else, as regards the militia, than a servile imitation of the secretary's plan."

Nevertheless, when Goldsborough took his seat the Senate passed the Militia Bill by a vote of nineteen to twelve, — Anderson of Tennessee and Varnum of Massachusetts joining the Federalists in opposition. The Regular Army Bill, which was in effect a bill to sacrifice the regular army, passed November 11, without a division. Both measures then went to the House and were committed, November 12, to the Committee of the Whole.

Ordinarily such a measure would have been referred to the Military Committee, but in this instance the Military Committee would have nothing to do with the Senate bill. Troup, the chairman, began the debate by denouncing it. The measure, he said, was inadequate to its object. "It proposed to give you a militia force when you wanted, not a militia, but a regular force . . . You have a deficiency of twenty-


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odd thousand to supply. How will you supply it? Assuredly the [Regular . Army] bill from the Senate will not supply it. No, sir, the recruiting system has failed." On the nature of the force necessary for the next campaign Troup expressed his own opinion and that of his committee, as well as that of the Executive, in language as strong as he could use at such a time and place. ^^ If, after what has happened, I could for a moment believe there could be any doubt or hesitation on this point, I would consider everything as lost; then indeed there would be an end of hope and of confidence.** Yet on precisely this point Congress showed most doubt. Nothing could induce it to accept Troup's view of the necessity for providing a regular army. "The bill from the Senate," remonstrated Troup, "instead of proposing this, proposes to authorize the President to call upon the States for eighty thousand raw militia; and this is to be our reliance for the successful prosecution of the war! Take my word for it, sir, that if you do rely upon it (the military power of the enemy remaining undivided) defeat, disaster, and disgrace, must follow."

The House refused to support Troup or the President. Calhoun was first to yield to the general unwillingness, and declared himself disposed to accept the Senate bill as a matter of policy. Richard M. Johnson, though sympathizing with Troup, still preferred to accept the bill as the only alternative to nothing: ** If it was rejected, they would have no dependence
for defence but on six months' militia/*^ On the other hand) Thomas K. Harris of Tennessee protested that if the British government had it in their power to control the deliberations of Congress, they could not devise the adoption of a measure of a military character better calculated to 'serve their purposes. The people, he said, were in his part of the country prepared to make every sacrifice, and expected Congress, after the news from Ghent, to do its share; but Congress was about to adopt a measure of all others the best calculated to prolong the war.2

While the friends of the government spoke in terpas of open discouragement and almost despair of the strongest military measure which Congress would consent to consider, the Federalists made no concealment of their wishes and intentions. Daniel Webster used similar arguments to those of his friend Jeremiah Mason in the Senate, affirming that the same principle which authorized the enlistment of apprentices would equally authorize the freeing of slaves,* and echoing pathetic threats of disunion.* Other Federalists made no professions of sadness over the approaching dissolution of government. Artemas Ward of Massachusetts spoke December 14, the day before

1 Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, iii. 974.
2 Annals of Congress, 1814-1816, iii. 891, 896.
3 Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, iii. 734.
* Speech of C. J. IngeisoU, Dec. 9, 1814; Annals* 1814-1816* iii. 809.

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the Hartford Convention was to meet, and announced the course which events were to take: —

^^ That the Treasury is empty I admit; that the ranks of the regular army are thin I believe to be true; and that our country must be defended in all events, I not only admit but affirm. But, sir, if all the parts of the United States are defended, of course the whole will be defended. If every State in the Union, with such aid as she can obtain from her neighbors, defends herself, our whole country will be defended. In my mind the resources of the States will be applied with more economy and with greater effect in defence of the country under the State governments than under the government of the United States."

Such avowals of the intent to throw aside Constitutional duties were not limited to members from New England. Morris S. Miller of New York made a vehement speech on the failure of national defence, and declared the inevitable result to be ^^ that the States must and will take care of themselves; and they will preserve the resources of the States for the defence of the States."^^ He also declared that conscription would be resisted, and echoed the well-remembered declamation of Edward Livingston against the Alien Bill in 1798, when the Republican orator prayed to God that the States would never acquiesce in obedience to the law.

**This House,** replied Duvall of Kentucky, "has

^ AimalB of Congress, 1814-1815, iii. 907.


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heard discord and rebellion encouraged and avowed from more than one quarter." Indeed, from fully one fourth of its members the House heard little else. Under the shadow of the Hartford Convention the Federalist members talked with entire frankness. "This great fabric seems nodding and tottering to its fall," said Z. E. Shipherd of New York, December 9; "and Heaven only knows how long before the mighty ruin will take place." J. O. Moseley of Connecticut "meant no improper menace" by predicting to the House, "if they were determined to prosecute the war by a recourse to such measures as are provided in the present bill, that they would have no occasion for future committees of investigation into the causes of the failure of their arms." The latest committee of investigation had recently made a long report on the capture of Washington, carefully abstaining from expressing opinions of its own, or imputing blame to any one, and Moseley's remark involved a double sneer. None of these utterances were resented. Richard Stockton of New Jersey was allowed unanswered to denounce in measured terms the mild Militia Bill then under debate, from which the committee had already struck the term of two years' service by substituting one year; and Stockton concluded his fine-drawn arguments by equally studied menace:

1 Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, iii. 829.
• Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, iii 848.

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^^ This bill also attacks the right and sovereignty of the State governments. Congress is about to usurp their undoubted rights, — to take from them their militia. By this bill we proclaim that we will have their men, as many as
we please, when and where and for as long a time as we see fit, and for any service we see proper. Do gentlemen of the majority seriously believe that the people and the State governments will submit to this claim? Do they believe that all the States of this Union will submit to this usurpation? Have you attended to the solemn and almost unanimous declaration of the legislature of Connecticut? Have you examined the cloud arising in the East? Do you perceive that it is black, alarming, portentous?"

The Resolution of the Connecticut legislature to which Stockton referred was adopted in October, and authorized the governor in case of the passage of the Militia Bill to convocate the General Assembly forth* with, to consider measures " to secure and preserve the rights and liberties of the people of this State, and the freedom, sovereignty, and independence of the flame."* Stockton’s speech was made December 10, and " the cloud arising in the East," as he figured the Hartford Convention, was to take form December 15. The Republican speakers almost as earnestly used the full influence of these national fears to rouse the energies of the House. They neither denied nor disguised the helplessness of government. All admitted dread of approaching disaster. Perhaps C. J. Ingersoll was the only member who declared that the war.

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had been successful, and that Americans need no longer blush to be Americans; but Ingersoll disliked the Militia Bill as cordially as it was disliked by Troup or Varnum, and voted for it only because "something must be done."

" When our army," said Samuel Hopkins of Kentucky,
in closing the debate, "is composed of a mere handful of men, and our treasury empty so that it cannot provide for this gallant handful; when an enemy, powerful and active, is beating against our shores like the strong wave of the ocean; when everything is at stake, — . . . surely such is not the moment for parsimonious feelings in raising taxes, or for forced constructions to defeat the means for raising men."

Notwithstanding every effort of the war-leaders, the opposition steadily won control over the House. Daniel Webster during his entire lifetime remembered with satisfaction that he shared with Eppes the credit of overthrowing what he called Monroe's conscription. December 10, at Eppes's motion, the House voted by a majority of sixty-two to fifty-seven to reduce the term of service from two years to one. A motion made by Daniel Webster to reduce the term to six months was lost by only one voice, the vote standing seventy-eight to seventy-nine. The bill passed at last, December 14, by a vote of eighty-four to seventy-two, in a House where the true war majority was

^ Annals of Congress, 1814-1815, iii. 808.

* Curtis's Life of Webster, i. 139.


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forty-six. When the Senate insisted on its provision of two years* service, Troup, in conference committee, compromised on eighteen months. Then the House, December 27, by a vote of seventy-three to sixty-four, rejected the report of its conference committee. The
next day, December 28, in the Senate, Bufus King made an impremeditated motion for indefinite postponement. Some members were absent; no debate occurred. The question was immediately put, and carried by a vote of fourteen to thirteen. The effect of this action was to destroy the bill.

With this failure the attempt to supply an army was abandoned, and Congress left the government to conduct the war in 1815, as in 1814, with thirty thousand regular troops and six months' militia. Monroe's effort to fill the ranks of the army ended in doubling the land-bounty; in authorizing the enlistment of minors, who had till then been enlisted without authorization; and in exempting from militia duty such persons as should furnish a recruit for the regular army. The prospect was remote that such inducements could do more than repair the waste of the actual force; but the government was unable to pay a larger number even if the force could be raised, and Monroe was obliged to prepare for the next campaign with such slight means of defence as remained to him. The last effort to induce the House to consider a serious method of raising troops was made

^ CurtiB's Life of Webster, L 139 note.


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February 6, and was referred to the Committee of the Whole, with a tacit understanding that the ordinary process of recruiting was not to be disturbed. According to the returns in the adjutant-general's office, the whole number of men — non-commissioned officers, privates, musicians, and artificers, present or absent, sick or well — in the regular army Feb. 16,
1815, was thirty-two thousand one hundred and sixty. During the previous two months it had remained stationary, the returns of December, 1814, reporting thirty-two thousand three hundred and sixty men. Nothing showed a possibility of greatly increasing the force by the means prescribed by Congress.

The navy requiring little new legislation, readily obtained the little it asked. Almost the first Act of the session, approved Nov. 15, 1814, authorized the purchasing or building of twenty sixteen-gun sloops-of-war. Another Act of Feb. 7, 1815, created a Board of Commissioners for the navy to discharge all the ministerial duties of the secretary, under his superintendence.

This legislation, with the various tax-bills, comprised all that was accomplished by Congress between the months of September and February toward a vigorous prosecution of the war. For the navy the prospect of success in the coming year was sufficiently fair, and privateering promised to be more active than ever; but the army was threatened with many perils. The most serious of all dangers to

^ AnnaU of Congress, 1814-1815, pp. 1125-1130.

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the military service of the Union weua supposed by Federalists to be the establishment of armies by the separate States. The attempt to establish such an army by Massachusetts in time of peace had been one of the causes which led to the Constitution of 1789; ^ and at the close of 1814, when Massachusetts voted to raise an army of ten thousand men, the significance of the step was more clearly evident than in the time of the Confederation.
The State of Massachusetts might be supposed to act in a spirit of hostility to the Constitution; but no such motive actuated States outside of New England. If they followed the same course, they did so because the national government was believed to be incompetent to the general defence. Of all the States Massachusetts alone possessed considerable resources, and could command both credit and specie; yet the creation of a State army of ten thousand men overburdened her finances, and obliged her to claim her share of the national revenues. No other State could expect to support an army without immediate financial trouble. Yet Governor Tompkins of New York recommended to the legislature in September the establishment of a State army of twenty thousand men,* and the legislature passed Acts for the purpose. The legislature of Pennsylvania took a similar measure into consideration. The legislature of Maryland passed an Act for raising five thousand State troops.

* Madison's Debates, ii. 712.

« Message of Sept. 30, 1814 ; Naes, viL 97.

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Virginia decided also to create a State army, with two major-generals. South Carolina passed a law for raising a brigade of State troops, and appointed the officers. Kentucky took measures for raising a State army of ten thousand men.

The national government, unable to create an efficient army of its own, yielded to necessity, and looked already to the State armies as levies to be taken into the national service in case of need. The States, on their side, unable to bear the expense of
separate armies, expected to be relieved of the burden by the national government. Yet for the moment the States, however deficient their means might be^ seemed better able than the general government not only to raise men but to support them. In January^ 1815, the financial resources of the government were exhausted, so that the Treasury could not meet the drafts drawn by Major-General Jackson and the pressing demands of the paymaster at New Orleans. The Secretary of War was obliged to go from bank to bank of Washington and Georgetown asking, as a personal favor, loans of their bank-notes already depreciated about fifty per cent. So desperate, according to Monroe's account, was the situation that his success depended on adding his own guaranty to that of the government.\(^ At no time of his life were Monroe's means sufficient to supply his private needs, and nothing could express so strongly his sense of

\(^ {\text{Monroe's Memoir; Deposition of Tench Ringgold, Feb. 14^ 1826» pp. 13, 68.}}

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national bankruptcy as the assertion that his credit was required to support that of the United States.\(^ The State armies were the natural result of such a situation. Congress could not resist the movement, and passed an Act, approved Jan. 27, 1815, authorizing the President to receive into the national service a certain proportion of the State troops, not exceeding forty thousand men in the aggregate. Little was said in debate on the bearings of the Act, which seemed to concede the demand of Massachusetts that the States should be allowed to raise troops at the expense of the United States. The Hartford Convention had then met, deliberated, and adjourned. Its report had been published, and among its demands
was one that "these States might be allowed to assume their own defence." The Federalists considered the Act of Jan. 27, 1815, as a "full and ample" concession of the demand.* Senator Gore wrote to Governor Strong, January 22, while the measure was before the President, commenting on the financial and military expedients of Dallas and Monroe: ^

^^ These appear to me the spasms of a dying government. • • • The bill authorizing the raising of State troops by the States, and at the expense of the United States, according to the plan sent you some time since, has passed both Houses. Thus one part of the recom-

^ Eulogy of James Monroe by J. Q. Adams, p. 75. 

• Lodge's Cabot^ p. 661.

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mendation of the Hartford Convention seems to be adopted. The other, — that to authorize the States to receive the taxes, — will probably be more difficult to be attained. The accession to this seems not to accord with Mr. Monroe's intimation in your letter, or rather in his letter to you. Indeed, if they have fears of the State governments, one can hardly account for this government's authorizing the States to raise and keep in pay, at the expense of the United States, troops which may be used for purposes hostile to, or not conformable with, the views of the paymaster.*

The accession to the principle of State armies which surprised Gore could be explained only by the government's consciousness of helplessness. Gore was somewhat careful to express no opinion of the
probable consequences, but other Federalists spoke with entire candor. Timothy Pickering expected a division of the Union. Less extreme partisans looked only to a dissolution of government. A year afterward, in the calmer light of peace and union, Joseph Hopkinson, a very distinguished Federalist of Philadelphia, not deluded like the New Englanders by local pride or prejudice, declared publicly in Congress the common conviction of his party on the probable consequences of another year of war:*

* ^The federal government was at the last gasp of existence. But six months longer and it was no more.


* Debate of Jan. 29^ 1S16; Annals of Congreaa, 1815-181(^ p. 795.

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• • • The general government would have dissolved into its original elements; its powers would have returned to the States from which they were derived; and they doubtless would have been fully competent to their defense against any enemy. Does not everybody remember that all the great States, and I believe the small ones too, were preparing for this state of things, and organizing their own means for their own defence? *

Calhoun contradicted Hopkinson and denied his assertions; but on that subject Hopkinson was at least an equal authority. Calhoun knew well his own State, but he knew little of New England; and he had yet to learn, perhaps to his own surprise, how easily a section of the Union could be wrought to treason.
CHAPTER XT.

The Massachusetts legislature issued, October 17, its invitation to the New England States for a conference, and on the same day the newspapers published the despatches from Ghent, to August 20, containing British conditions of peace, — which required, among greater sacrifices, a cession of Massachusetts territory, and an abandonment of fisheries and fishing rights conceded with American independence. Two counties of the State beyond the Penobscot were then in British military possession, and a third, Nantucket, was a British naval station. Yet even under these circumstances the British demands did not shock the Federalist leaders. Governor Strong, after reading the Ghent documents October 17, wrote to Pickering at Washington, —

^^ If Great Britain had discovered a haughty or grasping spirit, it might naturally have excited irritation; but I am persuaded that in the present case there is not a member of Congress who, if he was a member of Parliament, would have thought that more moderate terms ought in the first instance to have been offered."


The argument seemed to prove only that members of Congress could also be haughty and grasping; but Governor Strong thought the British demands reasonable, and began at once to sound his friends in
regard to the proposed concessions. The following day he wrote that the Essex people expected to lose the fisheries, but were ready to give up a portion of Maine to retain them.

Pickering wrote in reply, acquiescing in the proposed barter of territory for fisheries, and also in the more extravagant British demands for the Indians and the Lakes. "I was gratified," said Pickering, "to find my own sentiments corresponding with yours." The leading Federalists united with Pickering and Strong in blaming the American negotiators and the government for rejecting the British offers. The same view was taken by the chief Federalist newspaper of the State, the Boston "Centinel."

Thus in the November election, a few weeks later, two issues were impressed on the people of New England. In regard to neither issue did the Federalist leaders attempt concealment. The people were invited, as far as the press of both parties could decide the points of dispute, to express their opinion,—first, whether the British conditions of peace should

^ Lodge's Memoir of Strong; Proceedings of Massachusetts Historical Society, 1879.

* Pickering to Strong, Oct. 29, 1814; Lodge's Cabot, p. 535.

- Boston Centinel Oct. 19, 1814.

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have been taken into consideration; second, whether the States should be represented at the Hartford Convention. The popular response was emphatic. Everywhere in New England the Republican candi-
dates were defeated; and the Federalists, encouraged by the result, — believing the Hartford Convention to be the most popular action taken by Massachusetts since the State adopted the Federal Constitution,^ — prepared to support measures, looking to the restoration of peace and to the establishment of a new Federal compact comprising either the whole or a portion of the actual Union.

However varied the wishes of the majority might be, they agreed in requiring a radical change in the organic law. This intention was their chief claim to popularity. The Boston "Centinel," announcing November 9 the adhesion of Connecticut and Rhode Island to the Hartford Convention, placed over the announcement the head-line, "Second and third Pillars of a new Federal Edifice reared." During November and December, almost every day, the newspapers discussed the question what the convention should do; and the chief divergence of opinion seemed to regard rather the immediate than the ultimate resort to forcible means of stopping the war. The extremists, represented in the press by John Lowell, asked for immediate action.

"Throwing off all connection with this wasteful war," — wrote "A New England Man" in the "Centinel" of

^Otis'a Letters in Defence of the Uartford Convention, p. 10.

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December 17, — "making peace with our enemy and opening once more our commerce with the world, would be a wise and manly course. The occasion demands it of us, and the people at large are ready to meet it."
Apparently Lowell was right. The people showed no sign of unwillingness to meet any decision that might be recommended by the convention. As the moment approached, the country waited with increasing anxiety for the result. The Republican press — the "National Intelligencer" as well as the Boston *' Patriot " — at first ridiculed the convention, then grew irritable, and at last betrayed signs of despair. On both sides threats were openly made and openly defied ; but in Massachusetts the United States government had not five hundred effective troops, and if the convention chose to recommend that the State should declare itself neutral and open its ports, no one pretended that any national power existed in Massachusetts capable of preventing the legislature from carrying the recommendation into effect if it pleased.

From immediate extravagance Massachusetts was saved by the leaders who, knowing the popular excitement, feared lest the convention should be carried too fast into disorder, and for that reason selected representatives who could be trusted to resist emotion. When George Cabot was chosen as the head of the StatJB delegation, the character of the body was fixed. The selection of Cabot did not please the advocates of action. Pickering wrote to Lowell sug-
been despondent as to the course of public affairs, and felt no confidence in the possibility of awakening the people to their true disease, — which was not the war or the Union, but democracy. Lowell did not know "a single bold and ardent man" among the Massachusetts or Connecticut delegates. In the "Centinel" of December 7 he described Cabot's tendencies in language evidently intended as a warning to Cabot himself:

"There are men who know that our troubles are not the offspring of this war alone, and will not die with it. But they despair of relief, and think resistance unavailing. They consider the people in their very nature democratic, and that nothing but the severity of their sufferings has driven them from those men and that system out of which have grown all our evils; that should they be restored to that state of prosperity which they once enjoyed, the same passions and opinions would diffuse themselves through the country, and the same course of conduct be again followed out."

Cabot shocked Pickering by expressing all his favorite political views in one brief question: "Why

can't you and I let the world ruin itself its own way?" Such a turn of mind was commonly the mark of a sceptical spirit, which doubted whether the world at best was worth the trouble of saving; and against this inert and indifferent view of human affairs New England offered a constant protest. Yet the Massachusetts delegation to Hartford was in sympathy with Cabot, while the Massachusetts legislature
seemed to sympathize with Pickering. William Prescott, another member of the delegation, was chiefly remarkable for prudence and caution; Nathan Dane bore the same stamp; Harrison Gray Otis took character and color from his surroundings. The Connecticut delegation — James Hillhouse, Chauncey Goodrich, Roger M. Sherman, and others — were little likely to recommend "effectual measures." The convention consisted of men supposed to be inclined to resist popular pressure, and Cabot was probably serious in replying to a young friend who asked him what he was to do at Hartford: "We are going to keep you young hot-heads from getting into mischief." ^

In the Council Chamber of the State House at Hartford the delegates assembled, December 15, and gave instant evidence of their intention to discourage appeals to popular emotion. Their earliest steps decided their whole course. They chose George Cabot as their President, and they made their sessions secret. Under no circumstances could the convention have regarded itself as a popular body, for the delegates numbered only twenty-three persons, mostly cautious and elderly men, who detested democracy but disliked enthusiasm almost as much. Two new members, appointed by popular meetings in New Hampshire, were next admitted; and toward the close of the sessions another member, representing the county of Windham in Vermont, was given a seat. Thus enlarged, the convention over which George Cabot presided numbered twenty-six mem-

^ Lodge's Cabot, p. 541.
^' Lodge's Cabot, p. 519.
bers besides the secretary, Theodore Dwight.

Excess of caution helped to give the convention an air of conspiracy, which warned future conspirators to prefer acting, or appearing to act, in public. The secrecy of the Hartford conference was chiefly intended to secure freedom for the exchange of opinion, and also in some degree to prevent premature excitement and intrusion of popular feeling; but the secrecy created a belief that the debates would not bear publicity. Possibly much was said which verged on treasonable conspiracy; but the members were not men of a class likely to act beyond their instructions, and they adhered strictly to the practical task imposed on them. Some years afterward, Harrison Gray Otis, laboring to clear his political reputation from the stigma of membership, caused the official journal of the convention to be published; and the record, though revealing nothing of what was said, proved that nothing was formally done or proposed which contradicted the grave and restrained attitude maintained in its public expressions.

On the first day of its meeting the convention appointed a committee to consider and report upon the business to be done. Ghauncej Goodrich, Otis, and three other members formed this committee, which reported the next day the points in dispute between the States and the national government,—the militia power, conscription power, duty and means of defence, and Inatters of a like nature. After two days of discussion, the convention appointed another committee to frame a general project of measures, and again placed a Connecticut man — Nathaniel Smith — at its head, with Otis second. Still another
committee was appointed, December 21, to prepare a report showing the reasons which guided the convention to its results; and of that committee Otis was chairman.

Clearly, Otis took the chief burden of business; and the result could scarcely fail to reflect in some degree the character of the man as well as of the body for which he was acting. Though ambitious of leading, Otis never led. John Lowell described his character, as it was understood in Boston, perhaps somewhat harshly, for Otis was no favorite with any class of men who held fixed opinions: ^ —

^^ Mr. Otis is naturally timid and frequently wavering, — to-day bold, and to-morrow like a hare trembling at every breeze. It would seem by his language that he is

^ Lodge's Cabot, p. 548.

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prepared for the very boldest measures, but he receives anonymous letters every day or two threatening him with bodily harm. It seems the other party suspect his firmness. He is sincere in wishing thorough measures, but a thousand fears restrain him."

Otis was the probable author of the report, adopted December 24, recommending a course to the convention; and he was chairman of the larger committee to which that report was referred, and within which the final report — after a discussion lasting from December 24 to December 30 — was framed. The discussions, both in committee and in convention, took much time and caused some difficulties; but nothing was ever known of the speeches made, or of the motions proposed, or of the amendments offered. All
the reports were finally adopted by the convention; and all proposed business then having been finished^ January 6 the convention adjourned without day, authorizing Cabot to call another meeting at Boston if he should at any time see occasion for it.

The report, therefore, contained all the information which the convention intended to make public, and only from that document could the ultimate object of the members be inferred. It was immediately published in Connecticut, and at the meeting of the legislatures of Massachusetts and Connecticut in January it was laid before them for approval.

Considering the conservative temper of the delegates and their dislike for extreme measures, the report bore striking evidence of the popular passion

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which urged them forward. A few paragraphs in its first pages showed the spirit of its recommendations, and a few more showed the effect expected from them: —

"It is a truth not to be concealed that a sentiment prevails to no inconsiderable extent . . . that the time for a change is at hand. . . . This opinion may ultimately prove to be correct; but as the evidence on which it rests is not yet conclusive, . . . some general considerations are submitted in the hope of reconciling all to a course of moderation and firmness which may . . . probably avert the evil, or at least insure consolation and success in the last resort. ... A severance of the Union by one or more States against the will of the rest, and especially in time of war, can be justified only by absolute necessity."

Having thus discouraged precipitation, and argued in favor of firm and moderate measures as a probable means of preserving the Union, the report sketched the limits of the Union that was to be preserved. In a paragraph closely following the precedent of the Virginia Resolutions of 1798, the report asserted the right and duty of a State to "interpose its authority" for the protection of its citizens from infractions of the Constitution by the general government. In the immediate crisis, this interposition should take the form of State laws to protect the militia or citizens from conscriptions and drafts; of an arrangement with the general government authorizing the States to assume their own defence, and to retain "a reason-

able portion of the taxes collected within the said States" for the purpose; and of State armies to be held in readiness to serve for the defence of the New England States upon the request of the governor of the State invaded.

Such measures involved the establishment of a New England Confederation. The proposed union of the New England States for their own defence
ignored any share to be taken by the general government in the defence of the national territory, and reduced that government to helplessness. What could "*' be done by New England might be done by all; and the Federalists assumed that all would be obliged to do it.

If the general government should reject the request for the proposed arrangement, the ultimate emergency must arise; but with the measures to be then taken the convention would not interfere.

"^\textsuperscript{^\textdaggerdbl} It would be inexpedient for this convention to diminish the hope of a successful issue to such an application by recommending, upon supposition of a contrary event, ulterior proceedings. Nor is it indeed within their province. In a state of things so solemn and trying as may then arise, the legislatures of the States, or conventions of the whole people, or delegates appointed by them for the express purpose in another convention, must act as such urgent circumstances may then require."

Besides the measures of urgency which must be immediately accepted by the national government, the convention recommended seven amendments to

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the Constitution; but on these no immediate action was required. The single issue forced on the government by the convention was that of surrendering to

; Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island ^^a reasonable portion of the taxes collected within said

i States," and consenting to some arrangement " whereby the said States may, separately or in concert, be empowered to assume upon themselves the defence
of their territory against the enemy." The United States government should decline such an arrangement, the State legislatures were to send delegates to another convention to meet at Boston, June 15, "with such powers and instructions as the exigency of a crisis so momentous may require."

While the convention was preparing its report, from December 16 to January 6, the public waited with the utmost curiosity for the result. Major Jesup, famous at Chippawa and Lundy's Lane, was then recruiting for the Twenty-fifth United States Infantry at Hartford, and reported constantly to the President and War Department; but he could tell nothing of the convention that was not notorious. His letters were mere surmises or unmilitary comments on the treasonable intentions of the meeting. The Federalists knew no more than was known to the Republicans; but while they waited, they expressed fear only lest the convention should fall short of their wishes.

^ Ingersoll's History, ii. 232-238; MSS. War Department ArcliiveB.

"I care nothing more for your actings and doings," wrote Gouverneur Morris to Pickering in Congress.*

*"Your decree of conscriptions and your levy of contributions are alike indifferent to one whose eyes are fixed on a star in the East, which he believes to be the day-spring of freedom and glory. The traitors and madmen assembled at Hartford will, I believe, if not too tame and timid, be hailed hereafter as the patriots and sages of their day and generation."

As far as newspapers reflected public opinion,
the people of New England held the same views as those expressed by Gouverneur Morris. The Boston "Centinel" contained, December 28, an address to the Hartford Convention announcing that the once venerable Constitution had expired: "At your hands, therefore, we demand deliverance. New England is unanimous. And we announce our irrevocable decree that the tyrannical oppression of those who at present usurp the powers of the Constitution is beyond endurance. And we will resist it." A meeting at Beading in Massachusetts, January 5, pledged itself to make no more returns for taxation and to pay no more national taxes until the State should have made its decision known.

A newspaper paragraph copied by the Federalist press 2 advised the President to provide himself with a swifter horse than he had at Bladensburg if he meant to attempt to subjugate the Eastern States.

* Morris to Pickering, Dec. 22, 1814; Morris's Works, iii. 324.

* Boston Gazette Jan. 5, 1815.

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"He must be able to escape at a greater rate than forty miles a day, or the swift vengeance of New England will overtake the wretched miscreant in his flight." Such expressions of the press on either side were of little authority, and deserved no great attention; but the language of responsible and representative bodies could not be denied weight. Opposition to the convention seemed cowed. Apparently the State was ready for immediate action; and the convention, in recommending a delay of six months, risked general disapproval.
While the public was in this temper, the convention adjourned, and its report was given to the press. No one doubted that moderate men would approve it. The only persons whose approval was in question were "bold and ardent" partisans, like Gouverneur Morris, Pickering, and John Lowell, who wanted instant action. Chiefly for the sake of unanimity, these men gave in their adhesion. John Lowell hastened to publish his acquiescence in the convention's report. Pickering also approved it, although Pickering's approval was partly founded on the belief that the Union was already dissolved, and no further effort in that direction need be made.

"If the British succeed in their expedition against New Orleans," Pickering wrote to Lowell, — "and if they have tolerable leaders I see no reason to doubt of their success, — I shall consider the Union as severed.

Boston Centinel, Jan. 14, 1815.

Pickering to Lowell, Jan. 23, 1815; Lodge's Cabot, p. 561.

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This consequence I deem inevitable. I do not expect to see a single representative in the next Congress from the Western States."

Governor Strong and Senator Gore also approved the convention’s report. On receiving it at Washington, January 14, Gore wrote to Strong: "The result of the Hartford Convention is here, and affords satisfaction to most if not to all, — to some because they see not the point nor consequence of the recommendation as relates to taxes." The point and consequence of that recommendation were clear to Gore, and he approved of both.
If any leading Federalist disapproved the convention's report, he left no record of the disapproval. In such a case, at such a moment, silence was acquiescence. As far as could be inferred from any speeches made or letters written at the time, the Federalist party was unanimous in acquiescing in the recommendations of the Hartford Convention.

In Massachusetts and Connecticut the acquiescence was express. The legislature, convened at Boston, January 18, hastened to refer the convention's report to a joint committee, which reported, January 24, Resolutions that the legislature "do highly approve" the proceedings of the convention, and that State commissioners should immediately proceed to Washington to effect the arrangement proposed.*

By a very large majority of three to one, the legislature adopted the Resolutions, making the acts of


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thQ convention their own. Three commissioners were quickly appointed, — Harrison Gray Otis at their head, — and in the early days of February started for Washington.

Massachusetts was then more than ever convinced that it must peremptorily insist on taking its share of the national revenue into its own hands. Already the first step toward providing a State army had plunged the State treasury into financial difficulties, and measures for defence were stopped until new resources could be obtained. To the surprise of Governor Strong, the Massachusetts banks, restrained by their charters, applied to the State government
the same rigorous refusal of credit which they had 
applied to the national government, and Strong 
found himself unable to obtain even the loan of one 
million dollars authorized by the legislature at its 
autumn session. The miscarriage cast a shade of 
ridicule on the character of the State which criticised 
so severely the failure of the national government 
to defend it, and found itself unable to take the first 
step toward defence without the aid of the national 
government, bankrupt and impotent though it was. 
Governor Strong sent to the legislature on the first 
day of its winter session a message^ that might 
have been sent by Madison to Congress. He re-
mined the legislature that it had, by a Resolution 
of Oct. 11, 1814, authorized a loan of a million 
dollars from the banks.

^ Niles, vii. ; Supplement, p. 97.

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"At that time," continued Strong's message, ** it was 
supposed that there 'would be no difficulty in procuring 
the requisite sums from that source, and the treasurer 
soon obtained loans to a considerable amount; but the 
directors of some of the banks declared themselves un-
able to lend, and others have expressed such reluctance 
as forbids an expectation that the whole amount can 
be obtained in that way during the continuance of the 
present cautious operations of the banks."

The treasurer had obtained $631,000, and with 
the expenditure of that sum the work of defence and 
the organization of the State army ceased. ^"The 
efforts of defensive preparation which were made 
in this State the last year," Governor Strong de-
clared, "will, if continued at the expense of the Com-
monwealth, be fatal to our finances." The neces-
sary consequence followed, that the State must take the national revenues. Accordingly the committee of both Houses, to which the subject was referred, reported an approval of suspending the organization of State troops "until in virtue of some arrangement to be made with the national government sufficient funds can be provided for their pay and support, without recourse to additional taxes." Under such circumstances the national government was little likely to surrender its resources, and every symptom showed that the State then meant to seize them.

The same committee formally approved the goveiv

1 Boston Centind, Feb. 4, 1816.

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nor's course in declining to co-operate with the national government in expelling the enemy from Maine. The public excuse for the refusal was founded on the condition of the Treasury. In Federalist society the weightier motive was supposed to be the wish to leave on the national government the odium of failure to defend the State. ^

While Massachusetts sustained the Hartford Convention, and pressed to an issue the quarrel with the national government, Connecticut acted with equal zeal in the same sense. The governor, John Cotton Smith, was an old man, and neither his opinions nor his passions were extreme; but as far as concerned the Hartford Convention, his views differed little from those of Pickering and Lowell. He called a special session of the legislature for January 25, to act on the delegates' report; and his speech at the opening of the session would have been taken for irony, had
hii^ moderation of character not been known.* " The temperate and magnanimous course proposed for our adoption cannot fail to allay the apprehensions which many have professed to entertain, and to enliven the hopes of all who cherish our national Union, and are disposed to place it on a solid and durable basis." The legislature without delay approved the measures recommended by the convention, and appointed delegates to accompany those

'Sumner's East Boston, p. 739.

'Speech to the Connecticut Legislature; Niles, vii; Supplement, p. 96.

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sent from Massachusetts to effect the proposed arrangement with the government at Washington.

In later times the Hartford Convention was often and vigorously defended by writers whose works were friendly to the national government, and whose influence was popular. The wisdom, loyalty, and patriotism of George Cabot and his associates became the theme of authors whose authority was above dispute. Nearly always the defence rested on the argument that popular opinion went beyond the convention's report, and that the convention risked its credit by refusing to advise instant withdrawal from the Union. This view was apparently correct. The efforts of the moderate Federalists to praise the moderation of the report, and the labored protests of the extremists against the possible suspicion that they objected to its moderation, showed that the convention was then believed to have offered resistance to what Governor Smith stigmatized as "rash councils or precipitate measures." The tone of the
press and the elections bore out the belief that a popular majority would have supported an abrupt and violent course.

The tone of the minority at the time showed a similar belief that Massachusetts favored disunion. During all the proceedings of the State legislatures*

^ Lodge's Cabot, pp. 504-526; Lossing, p. 1015; Gk>odriici'a Recollections^ ii. pp. 9-61.
* Lodge's Cabot, p. 518.

3 Pickeimg to Lowell, Jan. 23, 1815; Lodge's Cabot, p. 561.
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and the convention, the loyal press and citizens never ceased to point out the dangerous, treasonable, and absurd results to be expected from the course pursued. In the Massachusetts Senate John Holmes of Maine attacked the convention and its doings in a speech that gave him wide reputation.^ Threats of civil war were freely uttered and defied. Among the least violent of Federalists was James Lloyd, recently United States senator from Massachusetts; and to him as a man of known patriotism John Randolph addressed a letter, Dec. 15, 1814, remonstrating against the Hartford Convention that day to meet. Lloyd replied in a letter also published, advising Randolph and the Virginians to coerce Madison into retirement, and to place Rufus King in the Presidency as the alternative to a fatal issue.^ The assertion of such an alternative showed how desperate the situation was believed by the moderate Federalists to be.

A long letter of a similar kind was written, Nov. 26, 1814, by Jonathan Mason to Wilson Gary Nicho-
las. The opinion of the men among whom Mason lived was expressly declared by Mason to the effect that "Great Britain will not treat with Mr. Madison. He must retire, or the country and the Union are at an end. . . . This is plain language, but in my soul I believe it true. We shall not be destroyed to-day

* Niles, vii. ; Supplement, pp. 49-53.


* Mason to Nicholas, Nov. 26, 1814; Nicholas MSS.

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or tomorrow, but it will come; and the end of these measures [of the Administration] will be disunion and disgrace."

In the Republican party the belief was universal that the Hartford Convention could lead only to a New England Confederation; and the belief was not confined to partisans. An anecdote that George Ticknor delighted in telling, illustrated the emotion that then agitated men far beyond the passing and fitful excitements of party politics. Ticknor, a young Federalist twenty-three years old, wished for letters of introduction to Virginia, and asked them from John Adams, then a man of eighty, whose support of the war made him an object of antipathy to the party he had led.

"When I visited him in Quincy to receive these letters," related Ticknor, **I had a remarkable interview with him, which at the time disturbed me not a little. . . . Soon after I was seated in Mr. Adams's parlor, — where was no one but himself and Mrs. Adams, who was knit-
— he began to talk of the condition of the country with great earnestness. I said not a word; Mrs. Adams was equally silent; but Mr. Adams, who was a man of strong and prompt passions, went on more and more vehemently. He was dressed in a single-breasted dark-green coat, buttoned tightly by very large white metal buttons over his somewhat rotund person. As he grew more and more excited in his discourse, he impatiently endeavored to thrust his hand into the breast of his coat. The buttons did not yield readily; at last he forced his

^ Life of Ticknor, i. 12.

Whether George Cabot wanted it or not, he was in danger of becoming what John Adams predicted. He was far from being the first man who had unwillingly allowed himself to be drawn into a position from which escape was impossible. After going so far, neither leaders nor people could retreat. The next and easy step of sequestrating the direct and indirect taxes was one to which the State stood pledged in the event of a refusal by President Madison and Congress to surrender them. After such an act, the establishment of a New England Confederation could hardly be matter of choice.

If so considerable a mass of concurrent testimony did not prove the gravity of the occasion, as it was understood by the most intelligent and best-informed men of the time, ample evidence could be drawn from other sources. William Wirt described the painful
anxiety of Madison as early as the month of October. Throughout Virginia the depression was akin to despair. John Randolph and Wilson Cary Nicholas gave expression to it in letters to prominent New Englanders; but Jefferson in private was still more pronounced in his fears. "The war, had it proceeded, would have upset our government," he wrote to Gallatin a year later, and a new one, whenever tried,

^ Jefferson to Gallatin; Works, vi. 498.

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will do it." George Ticknor, after obtaining at Quincy his letter of introduction from John Adams to Jefferson, delivered it at Monticello at a time when the anxiety for the safety of New Orleans was acute. He found Jefferson convinced that the city must fall, and Jefferson expressed the expectation that the British would hold it indefinitely. ^ Pickering felt the same conviction, and regarded the event as a dissolution of the Union.

The "Federal Republican" of Baltimore published, January 6, the day when the Hartford Convention adjourned, a letter from Washington announcing an explosion at hand; that the President would be called on to resign; and there must be peace by that or a future Administration." The fall of New Orleans was to be the signal for a general demand that Madison should resign, and the Federalist press already prepared the ground by insisting that "Mr. Madison has scarcely raised his little finger to preserve New Orleans" and would finally determine to abandon the State of Louisiana. ^ That Madison's authority could survive two such blows as the capture of Washington and the loss of Louisiana seemed improbable; but that he should resign was impossible, though the
alternative was a collapse of government.

When the month of February arrived, government and people were waiting with keen apprehension for some new disaster, and the least probable solution

» Life of Ticknor, i. 37.

* The Federal Republican, Jan. 14 and 16, 1815.

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was that England knowing the situation would consent—to any tolerable peace. The "Federal Republican" of January 28, commenting on the expected bank veto, summed up the consequences, not unfairly from its point of view, in few words: —

^^ It is impossible, as Mr. Giles said in his luminous and eloquent argument upon the measure [of a national bank], that the government can stand these reiterated shocks. • • • The interest upon the public debt remains unpaid, and there exists not the means, without making the most ruinous sacrifices, to pay it. The government is in arrears to the army upward of nine million dollars; to the navy, about four millions. • • • The condition of our finances is known to the enemy; and is it possible he will be such a fool as to give us peace, after the mortal blow we aimed at him, when he knows we cannot pay the interest on the public debt, that we cannot pay our army or our navy, and when he finds us unable to defend any part of the country at which he strikes?"

CHAPTER Xn.

A DESPATCH from Lord Bathurst, marked ^^most
secret," and dated July 30, 1814, informed Major-General Boss that, after finishing his operations in Chesapeake Bay, he was to sail with his whole force to Jamaica, where he would join an expedition then preparing in England to rendezvous at Cape Negril on the west coast of Jamaica about November 20. Lieutenant-General Lord Hill was to command the combined land-forces. These orders were given before the arrival of a long report from Vice-Admiral Cochrane concerning the military condition of the American territories on the Gulf of Mexico, which Cochrane considered such "that he had no doubt in his mind that three thousand British troops landed at Mobile, where they would be joined by all the Indians, with the disaffected French and Spaniards, would drive the Americans entirely out of Louisiana and the Floridas." »

Circumstances induced the British government to defer sending Lord Hill, with a large force, to the

^ BathuTBt to Ross, July 30, 1814 ; MSS. British Archives.
' Cochrane to Croker, June 20, 1814 ; MSS. British Archives.

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Gulf; and Cochrane was informed by a despatch, dated August 10, that Major-General Ross was directed to carry out the Vice-Admiral's plans, which required fewer men. ^ Orders were sent to Ross, of the same date, informing him that reinforcements amounting to more than twenty-one hundred rank-and-file were preparing to sail from England, which with the Fifth West India regiment and two hundred black pioneers from Jamaica would enable Ross to carry more than five thousand effective rank-and-file to the theatre of his operations. ^
Ross's detailed instructions were dated September 6. They began by recounting the force which was intended to act against New Orleans. The brigade from the Gironde which Ross took to the Chesapeake was estimated at about twenty-three hundred effectives, and a battalion which he had taken from Bermuda was supposed to have raised his rank-and-file to thirty-four hundred men. In addition to this force, a brigade under Major-General Keane, numbering twenty-one hundred and fifty men, was under orders for Jamaica, which with the black troops would enable Ross to proceed to his destination **with near six thousand men, exclusive of the marines and seamen. . . . About the same time you will be joined by the First West India regiment from Guadeloupe."

^ Croker to Coeleaney Aug. 10, 1814; MSS. British Archives.
« Bathurst to Ross, Aug. 10, 1814; MSS. British Archives.
< Bathuist to Boss, Sept 6, 1814; MSS. British Archivea.

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The objects which rendered the success of the expedition "extremely important" were two: first, the command of the mouth of the Mississippi, so as to deprive the back settlements of America of their comminication with the sea; second, "to occupy some important and valuable possession by the restoration of which we may improve the conditions of peace, or which may entitle us to exact its cession as the price of peace."

The point of attack was left to the discretion of Cochrane and Ross. They might proceed directly against New Orleans, or move in the first instance into the back parts of Georgia and the country of the friendly Indians. In either case, the second object
in view could not be attained against the will of the inhabitants. " With their favor and co-operation, on the other hand, we may expect to rescue the whole province of Louisiana from the United States."

" If therefore you shall find in the inhabitants a general and decided disposition to withdraw from their recent connection with the United States, either with the view of establishing themselves as an independent people or of returning under the dominion of the Spanish Crown, you will give them every support in your power; you will furnish them with arms and clothing, and assist in forming and disciplining the several levies, provided you are fully satisfied of the loyalty of their intentions, which will be best evinced by their committing themselves in some act of decided hostility against the United States. • • • You will discountenance any proposition of the inhabitants to place themselves under the dominion

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of Great Britain; and you wiU direct their disposition toward retaining under the protection of the Spanish Crown rather than to the attempting to maintain what it will be much more difficult to secure substantially, — their independence as a separate State; and. you must give them clearly to understand that Great Britain cannot pledge herself to make the independence of Louisiana^ or its restoration to the Spanish Crown, a sine qua non of peace with the United States."

After occupying New Orleans, Ross and Cochrane were to decide whether any further military operations could be carried on; and if nothing of material importance could be attempted, they were to send the disposable part of their force to Bermuda.

Ross's report of the capture of Washington reached
Lord Bathurst September 27, and caused so much satisfaction that the British government decided to show its approval by placing another major-general, Lambert, with a brigade numbering twenty-two hundred rank-and-file, under Ross’s command, to be used without restriction, either in the Middle or the Southern States. The Prince Regent highly applauded the ability with which Ross had conducted the capture of Washington, "an enterprise so creditable to his Majesty's arms, and so well calculated to humble the presumption of the American government, which contrary to the real interests, and as it is believed contrary to the prevailing wish, of the nation has involved that country in an unnecessary and unjust

^ Bathurst to Ross, Sept. 28, 1814; MSB. British Archives.

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war against his Majesty." Only in one respect did Bathurst hint a criticism on the course pursued by Ross. While informing him, September 29, that reinforcements were on their way which would place upward of ten thousand men under his command, to be used very much at his discretion, Bathurst added,^ —

^^ You and your troops have gained great credit in the discipline you observed at Washington. It is no disparagement of your merit to say that it was prudent as well as merciful to show such forbearance. If, however, you should attack Baltimore, and could, consistent with that discipline which it is essential for you not to relax, make its inhabitants feel a little more the effects of your visit than what has been experienced at Washington, you would make that portion of the American people experience the consequences of the war who have most contributed to its existence."
When this despatch was written, Boss had made his attack on Baltimore, and had failed. The report of his failure and death was received by the War Department in London October 17, and Bathurst as soon as possible selected a new commander for the expedition to New Orleans. Orders, dated October 24, were sent to Major-Generals Sir Edward Pakenham and Gibbs to join Vice-Admiral Cochrane forthwith, detailing the force at their command. Pakenham was to follow the instructions already given to

* Bathurst to Ross, Sept. 29, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

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Boss, and was especially enjoined to conciliate the people of Louisiana: —

^^ Yon will for that purpose cause the force under your command to observe the strictest discipline; to respect the lives and the property of all those who are inclined to i\ a peaceable deportment, and by no means to excite the*^ ! black population to rise against their masters." *"

The " Statira " received orders, October 28, to convey Major-Generals Pakenham and Gibbs to the rendezvous at Negril Bay in Jamaica, whither the large force intended for New Orleans was already moving from several distant quarters. The day for beginning the movement on New Orleans was already fixed for November 20, and Pakenham could at that season hardly expect to reach Jamaica in time to sail
with his troops. Meanwhile the English press talked openly of the expedition and its object.

Military District No. 7, in which New Orleans and Mobile were situated, had not been neglected by the United States government. The regular force assigned by Secretary Armstrong for its defence consisted of five regiments of United States Infantry, — the Second, Third, Seventh, Thirty-ninth, and Forty-fourth, with three hundred and fifty artillerists, — an aggregate of two thousand three hundred and seventy-eight men. The provision was relatively liberal. District No. 5, on Chesapeake Bay, contained an aggregate of two thousand two hundred and eight regular troops; District No. 6, including North and South Carolina and Georgia, was allotted two thou-

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hundred and forty-four men. One half the

cy was employed in such garrison duty,

.cev number could not have been allotted

uly with retaining an army in the field. In-

only means by which Armstrong could pro-

j strong a defence, aggregating nearly eight

sand men, for the Southern States was by strip-

g Massachusetts. District No. 1, including Massa-
.nusetts and Maine, contained only six hundred and

fifty-five regular troops; and District No. 2, including
Rhode Island and Connecticut, contained only seven hundred and fourteen. Besides the regular troops, New Orleans enjoyed the protection of gunboats and one or two larger armed vessels. The city needed only an efficient commander to defy any ordinary aDxacKi.

Armstrong supplied a commander who might, as he believed, be safely considered efficient. In the month of May Andrew Jackson was appointed to the command of Military District No. 7, with headquarters at Mobile. At that moment Jackson, having finished the Creek war, was about to make the necessary arrangements for the future control of the Creek nation, and he did not take immediate command of his district. No occasion for haste existed. During the summer of 1814 no British force of consequence approached the Gulf of Mexico, or was likely to approach it until the frosts began. Jackson was detained in the centre of Alabama, undisturbed by fears for New Orleans, until the so-called Treaty of

Capitulation of August 9 with the Creek released him from further duties in that region. He left the Creek country August 11, with his regular troops going by water down the Alabama River, and arriving at Mobile about August 15.

At the same moment government was brought to a stand-still at Washington by the appearance of Gen-
eral Boss's army in the Patuxent, and the raids on Washington and Baltimore. Between August 20 and September 26 the War Department could do little more than attend to its own pressing dangers. Jackson was left independent, substantially dictator over the Southwest. If New England carried out its intentions, and the government sank, as seemed probable, into helplessness, his dictatorship was likely to be permanent.

When Jackson arrived at Mobile, August 15, the defence of New Orleans was not in his mind. The people of Tennessee and Georgia had long been bent on the seizure of the Floridas, and Jackson had been one of the most ardent in favoring the step. The Creek war and the escape of the hostile Creeks to East Florida strengthened his conviction that the Spaniards must be expelled. He had begun the war with the idea of pushing his army directly through the Creek country to Pensacola, which he meant to hold. The instant he succeeded in destroying the military power of the Creeks, he began preparations for invading Florida. As early as July he wrote


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to the War Department suggesting an attack on Pensacola: —

"Will you only say to me, Raise a few hundred militia (which can be quickly done), and with such a regular force as can be conveniently collected, make a descent upon Pensacola and reduce it?" *

At the same time Jackson entered, July 12, into an angry correspondence with the Spanish governor of
Pensacola, and requested him to deliver up the Creek warriors who had taken refuge in East Florida, — a demand with which he knew that the Spaniard had no means of complying. August 10 he wrote to Armstrong announcing that he had given orders for the reoccupation of Mobile Point. "The United States in possession of Pensacola and Mobile, well defended, our whole coast and country in this quarter would be secure." ^ A direct attack by the British on New Orleans had not occurred to his mind.

Although Jackson received no answer from Washington to his suggestion, he came to Mobile, August 15, determined to pursue his object; and his decision was confirmed by the eccentric conduct of Major Nicholls, an Irish officer, who was sent to Pensacola, July 23, with the sloops-of-war "Hermes" and "Carron," with four officers, eleven non-commissioned officers, and ninety-seven privates of the Royal Marines, taking two howitzers, a field-piece, a thousand stand of arms, and three hundred suits of clothing for the Creek warriors. ^ Nicholls landed his marines, seized Fort Barrancas, disembarked arms, and began to collect the fugitive Creeks, commonly known as Red Sticks, with a view to invading Louisiana, while he spread extravagant stories of his plans.

Had the British government sent Nicholls to Pensacola expressly to divert Jackson's attention from

^ Eaton's Jackson, p. 212.

* Jackson to Armstrong, Aug. 10, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

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New Orleans, he could not have used his means more successfully for his purpose. Jackson at Mobile, some sixty miles away, learned within forty-eight hours what Nicholls was doing at Pensacola, and wrote instantly, August 27, to Governor Blount of Tennessee, calling out the whole quota of Tennessee militia, twenty-five hundred men, who were to march instantly to Mobile. "It is currently reported in Pensacola," he added, "that the Emperor of Russia has offered his Britannic Majesty fifty thousand of his best troops for the conquest of Louisiana, and that this territory will fall a prey to the enemy before the expiration of one month."

During the next three months Nicholls with a mere handful of men distracted Jackson's whole attention. From Pensacola, August 29, Nicholls issued a proclamation calling on the natives of Louisiana to assist him in liberating from a faithless, imbecile government. A few days afterward, September 3, a British sloop-of-war, the "Sophie," appeared at Barataria, forty miles south of New Orleans. There for several years smugglers and pirates had established a station, to the scandal of society and with its connivance. Three Frenchmen, the brothers Laffite, — Jean, Pierre, and Dominique, — ruled over this community, and plundered impartially the commerce of England and Spain, while defying the laws of the United States and the power of the national government. The

^ Sir Alexander Gochiane to Croker, July 23, 1814; MSS. British Archives.

* Jackson to Governor Blount, Aug. 27, 1814; Niles, vii. 47.
British sloop-of-war brought to Jean Laffite a letter from Major Nicholls asking him and his men, with their vessels, to enter into British service, under penalty of destruction to their establishment. Laffite, preferring to make terms with the United States, and knowing that the authorities at New Orleans were about to break up his establishment in any case, sent to Governor Claiborne the letters he received from Captain Lockyer of the "Sophie," and offered his services to defend Barataria.

Nothing in these demonstrations suggested a direct attack on New Orleans. Nicholls constantly gave out that he meant to attack Mobile, and from there "push for New Orleans;" * but his force was wholly inadequate*


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quate, and his rank was much too low, to warrant the belief that he intended a serious campaign. Yet such noisy and insulting conduct was adapted to irritate a man of Jackson's temper, and to keep his at-
tention fixed on Mobile and Pensacola. NichoUs even undertook to annoy Jackson in his headquarters.

On a bare sand-point at the entrance of Mobile Bay, General Wilkinson, on taking possession of Mobile in April, 1813, established a battery which he armed with Spanish cannon. The redoubt, which was called Fort Bowyer, could not hold against a land attack properly supported, and offered a temptation to the enemy; but in the absence of a land force competent to besiege it, the fortification was useful to close the entrance of Mobile Bay against marauders. In Fort Bowyer Jackson placed one hundred and sixty men of the Second United States Infantry, commanded by Major William Lawrence. Twenty guns were mounted on the platforms, but according to the American account only two twenty-four pounders and six twelve-pounders were likely to prove serviceable. *

The British force at Pensacola consisted chiefly of four sloops, commanded by Captain W. H. Percy, — the "Hermes," twenty-two guns, the "Carron," twenty, and the "Sophie*' and "Childers** of eighteen guns each. The usual armament of such vessels consisted of thirty-two-pound carronades, with two long-nines or sixes. Apparently the British squadron threw thirty-four thirty-two-pound shot, and four nine

* Latour, p. 34.

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or six pound balls at a broadside. Whether the armament was greater or smaller mattered little, for Captain Percy was unable to use with effect the batteries of either the "Carron*' or the "Childers." With much difficulty, owing to the shoals, he brought his squadron within range of Port Bowyer, and with
more gallantry than discretion prepared for the attack.

According to the British account, the land force at Percy's command consisted of sixty marines and one hundred and twenty Indians, with one five-and-a-half-inch howitzer. According to the American account, a twelve-pound field-piece was placed ashore in battery with the howitzer. Such a force was insufficient to do more than intercept the garrison if it should be driven out of the fort. The brunt of the action fell on the ships, and experience did not warrant Percy in believing that his sloops, with their carronades, could silence a work like Port Bowyer.

Nevertheless Percy gallantly made the attempt. At half-past four of the afternoon of September 16, he brought the "Hermes" close in, and opened fire within musket-shot of the fort. The "Sophie" came to anchor some distance astern, but within range. The "Carron" and the "Childers" anchored so far out that their carronades were useless, and apparently even the American twenty-four-pounders did not touch them. The "Hermes" and the "Sophie" alone sustained injury, but their experience was decisive.

1 James, ii. 344.

After an hour's action, the cable of the "Hermes" being cut, she became unmanageable, and at last grounded and was abandoned. Captain Percy set her on fire, and carried his crew, including the wounded, with much difficulty to his other vessels. The "Sophie" withdrew from fire, and the squadron returned at once to Pensacola.
Assuming that Captain Percy could use with effect only the twenty guns of the broadsides of the "Hermes" and "Sophie" against the twenty guns of the fort, the American gunnery was evidently superior to the British. The "Hermes" lost twenty-five men killed and twenty-four wounded, — a very severe loss in a crew which could not much have exceeded one hundred and fifty men. A better test of marksmanship was offered by the "Sophie," which received comparatively little attention from the fort, but lost six killed and sixteen wounded. The whole American loss was reported as four killed and five wounded, under the combined fire of both ships at close range, the fort having no casemates, and parapets only on the front and flanks. Three guns were dismounted.

Greatly pleased by this success, Jackson issued a counter-proclamation to the people of Louisiana, somewhat in the style of that which NichoUs had issued three weeks before.

**"The base, the perfidious Britons," it began, "have attempted to invade your country. They had the temer-**

* General Orders of Sept. 17, 1814 ; Niles, vii. 95.


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ity to attack Fort Bowyer with their incongruous horde of Indians and negro assassins. . . . The proud, vain-glorious boaster Colonel Nicholls, when he addressed you, Louisianians and Kentuckians, had forgotten that you were the votaries of freedom. . . . I ask you, Louisianians, can we place any confidence in the honor of men who have courted an alliance with pirates and robbers? Have not these noble Britons, these honorable men, Colonel
Nicholls and the honorable Captain W, H. Percy, the true representatives of their royal master, done this? Have they not made offers to the pirates of Barataria to join them and their holy cause? And have they not dared to insult you by calling on you to associate as brethren with them and this hellish banditti?"

With the exception of this proclamation and another of the same date to the free negroes of Louisiana, Jackson paid no attention to the defence of New Orleans, but left it entirely to Governor Claiborne. He disregarded a memorial from the citizens, dated September 18, urging his personal attention and presence. "My whole force would not satisfy the demands they make," he wrote to the War Department, October 10. "As soon as security is given to this section of my district, which is first indispensably necessary, I shall hasten to New Orleans," he wrote from Mobile, October 14. He entertained no doubt

^ Latour, Appendix, p. zxxi.

' Jackson to Monroe, Oct. 10, 1814 ; MSS. War Department Archives.

* Jackson to Monroe, Oct. 14, 1814 ; MSS. War Department Archives.

^ ^
that at Mobile he stood between the British and their object. "Unless Pensacola were reduced," said his confidential biographer ten years afterward, "it was vain to think of defending the country. . . . The attack on Mobile Point was a confirmation of his previous conjectures as to the views of the enemy."

The Government at Washington became alarmed. While Jackson waited at Mobile for the arrival of General Coffee with his Tennesseans to attack Pensacola, Monroe at Washington received warnings from Europe, Halifax, and Bermuda that the British force which had just laid Washington in ashes was but a division of a larger army on its way to attack New Orleans. He wrote to Jackson, September 26, —

** There is great cause to believe that the enemy have set on foot an expedition against Louisiana, through the Mobile, in the expectation that while so strong a pressure was made from Canada and in this quarter, whereby the force of the country and attention of the government would be much engaged, a favorable opportunity would be afforded them to take possession of the lower part of that State, and of all the country along the Mobile."

The President, he continued, had ordered five thousand additional troops from Tennessee to march to Jackson's aid, and had directed the governor of Georgia to hold twenty-five hundred more subject to Jackson's orders. He had also sent one hundred thousand

^ Eaton, pp. 239, 240.

' Monroe to Jackson, Sept. 25, 1814; MSS. War Department Records. Monroe MSS.
dollars in Treasury notes to Governor Blount of Tennessee, to be applied to the necessary expenses of the campaign, and Jackson could draw on him for the necessary funds. The orders to the governor of Tennessee were sent the same day, September 26. A week later, October 8, Monroe wrote to Governor Shelby of Kentucky, requesting him to send twenty-five hundred men to Jackson. Again, October 10, Monroe wrote to Jackson, informing him that not less than twelve thousand five hundred men were already subject to his orders, from Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia:

'\(^\text{1}\) There is strong reason to presume, from intelligence just received from our ministers at Ghent, that a British force consisting of twelve or fifteen thousand men sailed from Ireland early in September for New Orleans and the Mobile, with intention to take possession of that city and of the country through which the great rivers on which the whole of the United States westward of the Alleghany Mountains so essentially depends.'

When Monroe received a letter from Jackson, dated September 9, indicating his intention of attacking Pensacola, the secretary replied October 21, '\(^\text{2}\) forbidding the step. 'I hasten to communicate to you the directions of the President that you should at present take no measures which would involve this government in a contest with Spain.' He reiterated the warning that British forces would probably be directed against Louisiana; but he did not order Jackson to

\(^\text{1}\) Monroe to Jackson, Oct. 21, 1814; MSS. War Department Record B.

\(^\text{2}\) Monroe to Jackson, Oct. 21, 1814; MSS. War Department Record B.

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New Orleans, nor did he notify him that arms would
be sent there. Not until November 2 were orders given that four thousand stand of arms should be sent from Pittsburg, and only November 11 and 16 were the arms shipped, not by steamer but by the ordinary flatboat. Even then the arms were in advance of the men. The governor of Tennessee could not appoint an earlier day than November 18 for mustering the new levies, and on that day three thousand men assembled at Nashville, while two thousand collected at Knoxville. Not till November 20 did the Nashville division start down the river, to arrive a month later at New Orleans.

Jackson quietly waited at Mobile for the twenty-five hundred men he had summoned from Tennessee by his letter of August 27. Two months were consumed in this manner. The Tennessee brigade, under command of General Coffee, marched promptly, and passing through the Indian country arrived October 25 at Mobile. Coffee brought with him somewhat more than the number of men required by the call. His force was about twenty-eight hundred.* Jackson held at Mobile the Second, Third, Thirty-ninth, and Forty-fourth United States Infantry, besides some Mississippi troops and Choctaw Indians. \footnote{1 Monroe to Hngh L. White, Feb. 9, 1827 ; Monroe MSS., State Department Archives.} With the

* Jackson to Qovemor Bloont, Nov. 14, 1814 ; OfBjcial Let-
ten\footnote{\textit{p. 461}}
Notwithstanding Monroe's warning letter of September 25, Jackson still paid no immediate attention to New Orleans. October 28 he wrote to Monroe, acknowledging a letter from him of September 27, and announcing that he was then organizing an attack on Pensacola. Having no authority for the act, and aware that the Government was anxious about New Orleans, he added: "I hope in a few weeks to place this quarter in perfect security, and to be able to move to New Orleans with General Coffee's mounted men."^ October 31 Jackson wrote, apparently for the first time, that he needed arms, and that half the arms of the militia were not fit for use.^

Taking four thousand one hundred men,* without trains, Jackson marched November 8 against Pensacola, which he occupied, November 7, with little resistance, although "Spanish treachery,"* he said,* "kept us out of possession of the fort until nearly twelve o'clock at night." The next morning the British blew up Fort Barrancas, six miles below,

^ Jackson to Monroe, Oct. 28, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

3 Jackson to Monroe, Oct. 31, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

* Jackson to Monroe, Nov. 14, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

* Jackson to Monroe, Nov. 14, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

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where they had established themselves, and Colonel Nicholls sailed away no farther than the Appalachi-cola River, leaving Jackson to do what he pleased with Pensacola, a position of no value to either party.

Even Armstrong, who favored Jackson against what he thought the ill-will of Madison and Monroe, afterward condemned the movement against Pensacola. ℃ ℃ The general's attack and capture of the town on the 7th of November, 1814, was to say the least of it decidedly ill-judged, involving at once an offence to a neutral power, and a probable misapplication of both time and force as regarded the defence of New Orleans." ℃ ℃ Jackson remained only two days at the place, and then returned to Mobile, where he arrived November 11 and remained until November 22, as though still in doubt. He detached Major Blue of the Thirty-ninth United States Infantry, with a thousand mounted men, to the Appalachicola to break up the depot established there for supplying assistance to the Red Stick Indians. ℃ ℃ Nothing indicated that he felt anxiety for the safety of New Orleans, although the British expedition, comprising some fifty vessels, was then at Jamaica, and November 26 actually sailed for the Mississippi. ℃ ℃

Jackson's conduct greatly alarmed the President and the Secretary of War. When the despatches arrived at Washington announcing what was taking

^ Armstrong's Notices, ii. 176.


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place at Mobile and Pensacola, Monroe hastened to
General Gaines to Mobile. He wrote to Jackson, December 7, —

General Gaines is ordered to join you and act under you in the defence of New Orleans and of the district under your command. Full confidence is entertained that this appointment of an officer of his merit will afford to you a very acceptable aid in the discharge of your highly important duties. . . . Much anxiety is felt lest you should remain too long on the Mobile. The city [New Orleans], it is presumed, is the principal object of the enemy, and it cannot be defended on either of the passes by which it may be approached, — one by the river Mississippi itself, another by the Fourche, the third by Lake Pontchartrain, — without occupying the ground bearing on these passes.*

Three days afterward, December 10, Monroe wrote again in stronger terms: —

It is hoped that you will have long since taken a suitable position on the river to afford complete protection to that city. Mobile is a comparatively trifling object with the British government.. Your presence at such a point on the river with the main body of your troops will be of vital importance."

Jackson left Mobile November 22, four days before the British expedition under Sir Edward Pakenham sailed from Jamaica. Both Jackson and Pakenham

^ Monroe to Jackson, Dec 7, 1814 ; MSS. War Department Records.

* Monroe to Jackson, Dec. 10, 1814 ; MSS. War Department Records.
were moving to New Orleans at the same time. Pak-enham brought with him an immense fleet and a large army. Jackson, instead of taking, as Monroe hoped, "the main body" of his troops, left at Mobile the main body, consisting of the Second, Third, and Thirty-ninth regiments, about a thousand or twelve hundred men.

According to his friend's biography, probably founded on his own information, Jackson's "principal fears at present were that Mobile might fall, the left bank of the Mississippi be gained, all communication with the Western States cut off, and New Orleans be thus unavoidably reduced." ^ That the British should advance against the Mississippi by way of Mobile was improbable, as Monroe pointed out; but they could have taken no course which better suited the resources of Jackson. A march of near two hundred miles, through a barren and wooded country, with Jackson's whole force concentrated in their front, was an undertaking that promised little success.

Leaving at Mobile three regular regiments, Jackson ordered the Forty-fourth regiment to New Orleans, and directed Coffee with two thousand of his mounted brigade to march to Baton Rouge. He was himself ill and suffering, and made no excessive haste. "I leave this for New Orleans on the 22d instant," he wrote to Monroe, November 20,^ " and if my health

1 Eaton, pp. 261, 282.

* Jackson to Monroe, Nov. 20, 1814 ; MSS. War Department Archives.
permits, shall reach there in twelve days. I travel by land, to have a view of the points at which the enemy might effect a landing." Starting from Mobile November 22, he arrived at New Orleans, about one hundred and twenty-five miles, only December 2.\(^{\text{1}}\)

His troops were then much scattered. The main body was at Mobile. The Forty-fourth regiment was in march from Mobile to New Orleans, where the Seventh regiment was already stationed. A thousand volunteer horsemen, part of Coffee's brigade, under Major Blue of the Thirty-ninth Infantry, were scouring the Escambia, Yellow Water, and other remote Florida recesses. The remainder of Coffee's brigade was at Baton Rouge December 4, greatly reduced by various causes, and numbering only twelve hundred men.\(^{\text{2}}\) A few Mississippi dragoons were near them. A division of Tennessee militia, twenty-five hundred strong, under General Carroll, had started from Nashville November 20, and might be expected at New Orleans about December 20. A division of Kentucky militia, also twenty-five hundred strong, was on its way, and might arrive about the new year. Meanwhile the British expedition was sailing, with much deliberation, past the shores of Cuba, toward Florida.*

At New Orleans nothing had yet been done for defense; but inaction was not the worst. Jackson found

\(^{\text{1}}\) Jackson to Monroe, Dec. 2, 1814; MSS. War Department Archives.

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the people despondent and distrustful. The legislature showed incompetence and, as Jackson believed, indifference. The whole population of Louisiana was
but small, containing certainly not more than fifty
thousand white inhabitants; while the city of New
Orleans probably numbered hardly more than twenty
thousand persons including slaves. The State govern-
ment supplied one thousand militia under the general
requisition of the President.* The city raised a battal-
ion of volunteers nearly three hundred strong, a rifle
company numbering sixty-two men when in the field,
and a battalion of free mulattoes, chiefly refugees from
St. Domingo, which produced two hundred and ten
men,—in all, between five and six hundred troops.
Jackson immediately reviewed the companies, De-
cember 2, and could expect no further aid from these
sources. No arms were in store, even if men could
be found, and none of the necessary supplies of an
army had been provided.

Jackson's first act after arriving at New Orleans
showed no consciousness of danger. Armstrong,
criticising his measures, afterward said: * "Had the
general been better acquainted with military history,
he would not have suffered a single day of the twenty
he had for preparation to have passed without form-
ing one or more intrenched camps for the protection
of the city." Instead of doing this, Jackson did what

^ Eaton, p. 286; Latour, p. 53.

* General Orders of Aug. 6, 1814; Latour, Appendix, p. xviL

• Notices, ii 177.

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had been done by Armstrong and Winder at Wash-
ington in August. Having arrived in the city De-
cember 2, he started two days afterward to inspect
Fort St. Philip on the river sixty miles below. He
returned to New Orleans December 11,^ believing that the British would approach by the river, and prepared works to arrest their advance.^ He then rode out to Chef Menteur and Lake Pontchartrain on the north, which he thought the next probable point of attack. He was still absent, December 15, examining the situation of different works northward of the city, when the British expedition struck its first blow.^

Sir American gunboats, the whole force on the lakes, watched the entrance of Lake Borgne through which the British must pass if they attacked New Orleans by way of the lakes. They were stationed for observation rather than for resistance,—although for observation a few fishermen's boats would have been more useful. The British expedition, upward of fifty sail, made land December 10,* and was seen by the gunboats, which retired within the lake. The British land-forces were transferred from the heavy ships into the lighter vessels, and under convoy of sloops-of-war entered Lake Borgne December 18. The boats of the squadron, carrying about a thousand seamen and marines,^ left the ships during the night of December 12 in search of the American gunboats, which tried to escape, but were becalmed and obliged by the tide to anchor. After a tedious row of thirty-six hours the British boats overtook the gunboat

^ Jackson to Monroe, Dec. 12, 1814; MS3. War Department Archives.


^ Sir Alexander Cochrane to J. W. Croker, Dec 16, 1814; L»* tour, Appendix, p. cxxxviii.
flotilla December 14, and after a sharp struggle succeeded in capturing the whole, with a loss of seventeen men killed and seventy-seven wounded. The American crews numbered one hundred and eighty-two men, and lost six killed and thirty-five wounded.

News of the capture of the gunboats, which occurred at noon December 14 about forty miles to the eastward of New Orleans, arrived on the evening of December 15, and produced the utmost consternation. Jackson hurried back to the city, where his presence was no longer a matter of choice but necessity. Instantly on hearing the news he sent express to Coffee at Baton Rouge, and to Carroll and Thomas, wherever they might be found on the river, urging them to hasten with all possible speed to New Orleans. He issued a proclamation to the people of the city, in which he threatened them with punishment if they were not unanimous, and at the same time he recommended the legislature to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. Finding the legislature hesitate, Jackson declared martial law by proclamation.

James, ii. 349.

* Report of Captain Lockyer, Dec. 18, 1814; James, ii. 523.
» Letter of Dec. 16, 1814; Niles, vii. 316.

* General Orders, Dec 16, 1814; Niles, vii. 316.

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the same day, December 16, and assumed dictatorial
powers.

Feverish activity followed. General Coffee above Baton Bouge received Jackson's summons on the evening of December 17, and marched the next morning with twelve hundred and fifty men. In two days he made one hundred and twenty miles, camping on the night of December 19 within fifteen miles of New Orleans, with eight hundred men. Carroll, with the Tennessee brigade which left Nashville November 27, arrived at New Orleans December 21, and a squadron of mounted Mississippi volunteers hurried down. The British also lost no time. Their advance disembarked on the Isle aux Poix in Lake Borgne on the night of December 14, and during the following week all the boats and seamen of the fleet were occupied in transporting seven thousand men, with their equipment, thirty miles from the fleet to the island. During, the night of December 18 two British officers reconnoitred the head of Lake Borgne.* At the mouth of Bayou Bienvenu, not fifteen miles from New Orleans, was a fishermen's village. The fishermen were Spaniards, with no love for the United States, and ready to accept British pay. They received the two British officers, and conveyed them in a canoe up the bayou to the Yiller plantation on the bank of the Mississippi only six miles from New Orleans.* There, at their leisure, Lieutenant Peddie

^ Eaton, p. 290.

' Report of Major-General Keane, Dec S6^ 1814; Jamee^ iL529.

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of the quartermaster's department and Captain Spencer of the "Carron" selected the line of advance for the British army, and returned, unmolested and unseen, through the bayou to the lake and the Isle aux Poix.

Only December 21, two days after the British reconnaissance, was an American picket of eight men and a sergeant placed at the fishermen's village, where they remained thirty-six hours without learning that British officers had been on the spot, or that the fishermen were all away, acting as pilots for the approaching British boats. Meanwhile the troops at Isle aux Poix were ready to move almost as soon as Lieutenant Peddie could return to show them the way. At ten o'clock on the morning of December 22 the light brigade — sixteen hundred and eighty-eight rank-and-file,* under Colonel Thornton, who had led the advance at Bladensburg — embarked in boats, and after a day on the lake arrived the next morning, December 28, at daylight, without giving alarm, at the fishermen's village, where they surprised and captured the picket, and then passing up the bayou five miles, landed at a point about three miles from the Mississippi River. No attempt at concealment was made.^ The troops

^ Admiral Cochrane to Mr. Croker, Jan. 18, 1816 ; James, iL 660.


* James, iL 355. * Subaltern, p. 212.

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were formed in column, and found no obstacles to their march except the soft gromid and the ditches.
Through reeds and cypress swamp they made their way about three miles, when their advance suddenly entered open fields skirted by an orange-grove, with the broad Mississippi beyond. They were on the Yiller^ plantation; and they surprised and captured Major Yiller^ and his militia company, in his own house at noon-day, after a march of three miles with sixteen hundred men, from a point which had been recognized by Jackson as one of two or three necessary avenues of approach.

The record of American generalship offered many examples of misfortune, but none so complete as this., Neither Hull nor Harrison, neither Winder nor Samnel Smith, had allowed a large British army, heralded long in advance, to arrive within, seven miles unseen and unsuspected, and without so much as an earth-work, a man, or a gun between them and their object. The disaster was unprecedented, and could be repaired only by desperate measures.

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CHAPTER Xm.

The defence of New Orleans resembled the defence of Washington until the moment when in each case the British expedition came within sight. Jackson was even slower than Winder to see the point of danger or to concentrate his forces. At Washington, Winder took command July 1, and the British expedition arrived August 16 ; at Mobile, Jackson took command August 16, and the British expedition arrived December 14. In neither case was the interval seriously employed for defence. So much was Jackson misled that he collected no troops, and made
no inquiry as to the military means at his disposal at New Orleans. Had he gone there September 1, he would have felt the want of arms and equipment, and would have been able to supply them. During the summer, while yet among the Greeks, he was said to have made requisition for a quantity of war material to be sent to New Orleans; but he certainly showed no interest in its shipment or the causes for its delay in arrival. The arms should have reached New Orleans in October, when he would have had ample time to correct any failure or want

^ Latour, p. 66.

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of supply. He could have used, in case of necessity, the steamboat "Enterprise," which was then regularly plying on the Mississippi, and was not the only steamboat on those waters. If New Orleans was deficient in many articles of military necessity, the fault was not wholly in the War Department.

A similar criticism applied to the political situation at New Orleans. Governor Claiborne wanted authority to control the factions in his legislature, and the legislature wanted an impulse sufficiently energetic to overcome its inertia. Probably Jackson's presence would at any time have given authority to Claiborne and energy to the entire State government. From the moment of his actual arrival, difficulties of this kind seemed to cease. "It is hardly possible," said the military historian of the campaign, to form an idea of the change which his arrival produced on the minds of the people."

When the British expedition was once known to have appeared at the entrance of Lake Borgne, Jack-
son's task was perhaps simpler than Winder's, for Winder might doubt whether the British meant to attack Washington, and in fact General Boss took the decision only at the last moment; but no one could doubt that New Orleans was the object of Pakenham's expedition. Jackson had only to choose his positions and collect his resources. These were small; but on the other hand the British were opposed by natural difficulties much greater at New Orleans.


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than at Washington. Even their greater numbers were a disadvantage when they were obliged to move in widely separated detachments, in open boats, from a point far distant from their column's head, and toward a point easily fortified.

If until the moment of the enemy's appearance Jackson showed no more military capacity than was shown by Winder, his conduct thenceforward offered a contrast the more striking because it proved how Washington might have been saved. Winder lost his head when he saw an enemy. Jackson needed to see his enemy in order to act; he thought rightly only at the moment when he struck. At noon, December 23, New Orleans was in greater danger than Washington on the afternoon of August 23 when the British advanced from the Patuxent. Had Colonel Thornton followed his impulses and marched directly on the city, he must have reached it before a gun could have been fired by the Americans; his own muskets would have given the first news of his arrival. Major-General Keane, his commanding officer, preferred caution,^ and his delay gave a few hours time for Jackson to show his
News that a British column had reached the Yillerg plantation was brought to Jackson at headquarters in New Orleans, at about half-past one o'clock, much as the news was brought to Winder, August 24, that the British were marching on Bladensburg. The

mi. THE ARTILLERY BATTLE. 848

distances were about the same. Winder and Jackson both allowed the enemy to approach within seven miles before anything had been done for defence. In one respect Jackson was more unfortunate than Winder, for his troops were not ready to march; they were not even collected. Jackson sent orders to the different corps, but several hours passed before the men could be brought down and posted between the city and the British.

Fortunately Major Latour, chief-engineer in Military District No. 7, had been sent that morning to examine the approaches from Lake Borgne, and as he rode down the road at noon he met persons flying toward town with news that the British had penetrated through the canal to Viller's house. Latour was a trained French engineer, whose services were extremely valuable, not only during the campaign but afterward; for he subsequently wrote a "History of the War in West Florida and Louisiana," which was far the best military work published in the United States till long after that time, and furnished the only accurate maps and documents of the campaign at New Orleans. On the morning of December 23 Latour approached within rifle-shot of the British force, and judged their number accurately as sixteen or eighteen hundred men. Such exact infor-
information, which could not have been gained from any

^ See Memoir of Latour in Cullam's Campaigns of the War of 1812-1815, p. 309.
* Latour, p. 88.

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ordinary scout, was invaluable. Latour hastened to headquarters, and reported at two o'clock to Jackson the position and numbers of the enemy. The general, on that information, decided to attack.

For such a purpose Jackson's resources were ample. Four miles above the city his Tennessee militia were camped, — Carroll's brigade numbering probably about two thousand effectives, and the remnants of Coffee's mounted brigade numbering some seven hundred men in the field. The Mississippi and New Orleans volunteers could be reckoned at about seven hundred men,^ besides three regiments of city militia. The Seventh United States Infantry produced four hundred and sixty-five men in the ranks ; the Forty-fourth counted three hundred and thirty-one; while a detachment of artillerists, twenty-two in number, with two six-pound field-pieces, added greatly to the numerical strength of the Infantry. ^ Against Thornton's force, numbering one thousand six hundred and eighty-eight rank-and-file, or about nineteen hundred men all told, Jackson could oppose about five thousand Infantry with two field-pieces.

Besides these land forces Jackson was provided with another resource. In the river at New Orleans lay a war-schooner, the " Carolina," rated at fourteen guns, armed with one long twelve-pounder and six twelve-pound carronades on a broadside.' A sixteen-gun sloop-of-war, the " Louisiana," was also at New
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Orleans, but not ready for immediate use. The "Carolina" could be brought instantly into action, and her broadside of seven twelve-pounders, added to the field battery of two six-pounders, gave Jackson immense advantage over the British, who had no artillery except two three-pounders and rockets, and whose lines must be enfiladed by the "Carolina's" fire.

Jackson, aware of his superiority, expected with reason to destroy the British detachment. He did not even think more than half his force necessary for the purpose, but detached the whole of Carroll's brigade and the three regiments of city militia, — fully twenty-five hundred men, — to guard the town against an apprehended attack from the north. Without giving the reasons which led him to believe that the British could approach on that side without ample warning, his report said, —

"Apprehending a double attack by the way of Chef Menteur, I left General Carroll's force and the militia of the city posted on the Gentilly road, and at five o'clock P.M. marched to meet the enemy, whom I was resolved to attack at his first position, with Major Hind's dragoons, general Coffee's brigade, parts of the Seventh and Forty-fourth regiments, the uniformed companies of militia under the command of Major Plauch^, two hundred men of color chiefly from St. Domingo, raised by Colonel Savary and acting under the command of Major Daquin, and a detachment of artillery under the direction of Colonel McRea, with two
six-pounders under the command of Lieutenant Spots, —
not exceeding in all fifteen hundred /

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More exact returns showed that Jackson carried
with him eight hundred and eighty-four regular troops
and two field-pieces, five hundred and sixty-three
mounted riflemen of Coffee's brigade, five hundred
and fifty-nine Louisiana militia, one hundred and
seven Mississippians, and eighteen Choctaw Indians,
in all, twenty-one hundred and thirty-one men
and two guns, besides the " Carolina," which dropped
down the river at four o'clock.^

Jackson did not, like Winder, pass the hours in
looking at his enemy, nor did he, like General Smith
at Baltimore, send out militia under militia officers,
to stand in close order on an open field and wait
attack. His chief difficulty was due to the ground,
which obliged him to make his main assault in a
narrow column along the road. To gain the advan-
tage of his numbers, he detached Coffee with seven
hundred and thirty-two men, mostly armed with
rifles, to make a detour toward the left and fall on
the British flank and rear, while Jackson himself,
with fourteen hundred men and two guns, should
strike the British advance where it was posted on
the levee.

The signal for battle was to be ^ven by the
" Carolina's " guns. Commodore Patterson in the
" Carolina " received his orders at half-past six, and
getting out sweeps, brought his vessel in a few min-
utes abreast of the British camp, where he anchored

^ LatouT, p. 104. Parton, i. 617. Commodore Patterson's
dose in shore and began a heavy fire, soon after seven o'clock. Ten minutes later, Jackson, waiting about two miles above, ordered his men to advance, and moving down the road with his regulara and New Orleans companies struck the British outposts about a mile below his point of departure, at a few minutes before eight o'clock. At the same time Coffee, as he marched along the edge of the swamp hearing the signal, wheeled to the right, and moved toward the British flank.

Night had then fallen. The weary British troops had lain down, when their sentries on the levee gave the alarm, and immediately afterward the roar of seven cannon close beside them threw their camp into confusion. About half an hour afterward, while the "Carolina" still swept the camp with its shot, the British sentries on the levee a mile above gave another alarm, and in a few moments the outposts were sharply attacked.

The accounts of the battle fought along the levee, under the command of Jackson in person, were both confused and contradictory. Thornton's brigade was composed of the Eighty-fifth and Ninety-fifth regiments, a company of rocketeers, one hundred sappers and miners, and the Fourth regiment as a support, — in all, sixteen hundred and eighty-eight rank-and-file.* At the point where the fighting began the


* James, ii. 356.
British had merely an outpost, which was forced back by Jackson's attack, with some difficulty, about one hundred and fifty yards. Colonel Thornton ordered two of his regiments — the Eighty-fifth and Ninety-fifth, eight hundred rank-and-file — to support the outpost, and their arrival checked Jackson's advance. Indeed, the American line was driven back and lost ground, until the two field-pieces were in danger, and were hastily withdrawn. Each party claimed that the other first withdrew from fire; but the American report admitted that the battle which began on the levee at eight ceased before nine, while Jackson seemed not to regard his attack as successful. His first brief report, written December 26, * said, —

"The heavy smoke occasioned by an excessive fire rendered it necessary that I should draw off my troops, after a severe conflict of upward of an hour."

Jackson's official report of December 27 said, ^ —

"There can be but little doubt that we should have succeeded on that occasion with our inferior force in destroying or capturing the enemy, had not a thick fog which arose about eight o'clock occasioned some confusion among the different corps. Fearing the consequences, under this circumstance, of the further prose-

^ Latour's Plan.


* Latour, pp. 96, 97. Parton, iL 90.
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cation of a night attack with troops then acting together for the first time, I contented myself with lying on the field that night."

Although the battle was severest where Jackson commanded, it was most successful where Coffee attacked. On hearing the "Carolina" open fire, Coffee turning to the right advanced on the British flank, striking it nearly opposite to the "Carolina's" position. The British, thus surrounded, were placed in a situation which none but the steadiest troops could have maintained. So great was the confusion that no organized corps opposed Coffee's men. Squads of twenty or thirty soldiers, collecting about any officer in their neighborhood, made head as they best could against Coffee's riflemen, and the whole British position seemed encircled by the American fire. Forced back toward the river, the British rallied behind an old levee which happened at that point to run parallel with the new levee, at a distance of about three hundred yards. Knots of men, mixed in great disorder, here advancing, there retreating, carried on a desultory battle over the field, often fighting with clubbed weapons, knives, and fists. At last the British centre, finding a strong protection in the old levee which answered for an earthwork, held firm against Coffee's further advance, and were also sheltered by the new levee in their rear from the fire of the "Carolina's" guns. At about the same time several companies of the Twenty-first and

^ Latour's Plan of the Battle of December 23; Peddie's Sketch,
Ninety-third re^ments arrived from Lake Borgne, and raised the British force to two thousand and fifty rank-and-file. Coffee then despaired of further success, and withdrew his men from the field.

"My brigade," wrote Coffee immediately afterward, * met the enemy's line near four hundred yards from the river. The fire on both sides was kept up remarkably brisk until we drove them to the river-bank, where they gave a long, heavy fire, and finally the enemy fell behind the levee or river-bank that is thrown up. The battle had now lasted near two and a half hours. The regulars had ceased firing near one hour before I drew my men back."

The "Carolina" began firing soon after seven o'clock, and ceased at nine. Jackson's attack with the regulars began at eight o'clock, and his force ceased firing before nine. Coffee withdrew his men at about half-past nine. The hope of destroying the British force was disappointed; and brilliant as the affair was, its moral effect was greater than the material injury it inflicted. Major-General Keane ofScially reported his loss as forty-six killed, one hundred and sixty-seven wounded, and sixty-four missing, — two hundred and sixty-seven in all. Jackson reported twenty-four killed, one hundred and

^ James, ii. 362. Eeane's Beport; James, ii. 530.
« Parton, ii. 100.

* Patteison to Secretary of Navy, Dec. 28^ 1814; Latour^ Appendix, p. zliii.

* Report of Major-General Keane, Dec. 96^ 1814; JameB^
fifteen wounded, and seventy-four missing, — two
hundred and thirteen in all. The two regular regi-
ments suffered most, losing fifteen killed and fifty-
four wounded. Coffee's Tennesseans lost nine killed
and forty-three wounded. The New Orleans volun-
teer corps and the colored volunteers lost seventeen
wounded.

Compared with the night battle at Lundy's Lane,
the night battle of December 23 was not severe.
Brown's army, probably not more numerous than
Jackson's, lost one hundred and seventy-one men
killed, while Jackson lost twenty-four. Brown lost
five hundred and seventy-one wounded, while Jack-
son lost one hundred and fifteen. Drummond at
Lundy's Lane reported a British loss of eighty-four
killed, while Keane reported forty-six. Drummond
reported five hundred and fifty-nine wounded, while
Keane reported one hundred and sixty-seven. The
total British loss at Lundy's Lane was eight hundred
and seventy-eight men; that of December 23 was two
hundred and sixty-seven. Jackson's battle was com-
paratively short, lasting an hour and a half, while the
fighting at Lundy's Lane continued some five hours.
Lundy's Lane checked the enemy only for a day or
two, and the battle of December 23 could hardly be
expected to do more.

Conscious* that the British army would advance as
soon as its main body arrived, Jackson, like Brown,
hastened to place his men under cover of works. Fail-
ing back the next morning about two miles, he took
position behind an old canal or ditch which crossed the strip of cultivated ground where it was narrowest. The canal offered no serious obstacle to an enemy, for although ten feet wide it was shallow and dry, and fully three quarters of a mile long. Had the British been able to advance in force at any time the next day, December 24, directing their attack toward the skirts of the swamp to avoid the "Carolina's" fire, they might have forced Jackson back upon New Orleans; but they were in no disposition to do on the 24th what they had not ventured to do on the 23d, when they possessed every advantage. Keane believed that Jackson's force in the night battle amounted to five thousand men. Keane's troops, weary, cold, without food, and exposed to the "Carolina's" fire, which imprisoned them all day between the two levees, were glad to escape further attack, and entertained no idea of advance. The day and night of December 24 were occupied by the British in hurrying the main body of their troops from the Isle aux Poix across Lake Borgne to the Bayou Bienvenu.

By very great efforts the boats of the fleet transported the whole remaining force across the lake, until, on the morning of December 25, all were concentrated at the Yiller plantation. With them arrived Major-General Sir Edward Pakenham, and took command. Hitherto the frequent British dif-

^ Keane's Report of December 26, 1814; James, ii. 531.
* Saboltam, pp. 228, 229.
asters at Plattsburg, Sackett's Harbor, Fort Erie, and the Moravian towns had been attributed to their generals. Sir George Prevost, Major-Generals Drummond and Riall, and Major-General Proctor were not officers of Wellington's army. The British government, in appointing Sir Edward Pakenham to command at New Orleans, meant to send the ablest officer at their disposal. Pakenham was not only one of Wellington's best generals, but stood in the close relation of his brother-in-law, Pakenham's sister being Wellington's wife. In every military respect Sir Edward Pakenham might consider himself the superior of Andrew Jackson. He was in the prime of life and strength, thirty-eight years of age, while Jackson, nearly ten years older, was broken in health and weak in strength. Pakenham had learned the art of war from Wellington, in the best school in Europe. He was supported by an efficient staff and a military system as perfect as experience and expenditure could make it, and he commanded as fine an army as England could produce, consisting largely of Peninsula veterans.

Their precise number, according to British authority, was five thousand and forty rank-and-file, on Christmas Day, when Pakenham took command. Afterward many more arrived, until January 6, when ten regiments were in camp at Viller^'s plantation, — Royal Artillery ; Fourteenth Light Dragoons ; Fourth, Seventh, Twenty-first, Forty-third, Forty-fourth, Eighty-fifth, Ninety-third, and Ninety-fifth Infantry, — numbering, with sappers and miners and staff-corps, five thousand nine hundred and thir-

^ James, ii. 363.
teen rank-and-file; or with a moderate allowance of officers, an aggregate of at least sixty-five hundred Europeans. Two West India regiments of black troops accompanied the expedition, numbering ten hundred and forty-three rank-and-file. The navy provided about twelve hundred marines and seamen, perhaps the most efficient corps in the whole body. Deducting eight hundred men for camp-duty, Pakenham, according to British official reports, could put in the field a force of eight thousand disciplined troops, well-officered, well-equipped, and confident both in themselves and in their commander. More were on their way.

The Duke of Wellington believed such a force fully competent to capture New Orleans, or to rout any American army he ever heard of; and his confidence would have been, if possible, still stronger had he known his opponent's resources, which were no greater and not very much better than those so easily overcome by Ross at Bladensburg. The principal difference was that Jackson commanded.

Jackson's difficulties were very great, and were overcome only by the desperate energy which he infused even into the volatile Creoles and sluggish negroes. When he retired from the field of the night battle, he withdrew, as has been told, only two miles. About five miles below New Orleans he halted his troops. Between the river and the swamp, the strip of open and cultivated land was there somewhat narrower than elsewhere. A space of a thousand yards, or about three fifths of a mile, alone required strong defence. A shallow, dry canal, or ditch, ten feet wide, crossed the plain and opened into the river.
on one side and the swamp on the other. All day
the troops, with the negroes of the neighborhood,
worked, deepening the canal, and throwing up a
parapet behind it. The two six-pound field-pieces
commanded the road on the river-bank and the
"Louisiana" descended the river to a point about
two miles below Jackson's line. A mile below the
"Louisiana" the "Carolina" remained in her old
position, opposite the British camp. By nightfall
the new lines were already formidable, and afforded
complete protection from musketry. For further se-
curity the parapet was continued five hundred yards,
and turned well on the flank in the swamp; but this
task was not undertaken until December 28.

The first act of Sir Edward Pakenham gave the
Americans at least three days for preparation. Even
veteran soldiers, who were accustomed to storming
mountain fortresses held by French armies, were an-
noyed at exposing their flank to the fire of fifteen or
twenty heavy guns, which hampered not only every
military movement but also every motion beyond
cover of the bank. Pakenham sent instantly to the
fleet for cannon to drive the ships away. In reality

1 Latoiir, p. 121.

lie could not so relieve himself, for the American
commodore soon placed one twenty-four-pound gun
and two twelve-pounders in battery on the opposite
bank of the river, where they answered every pur-
pose of annoyance, while the ships after December 28
took little part in action. Pakenham gained noth-
ing by waiting; but he would not advance without
artillery, and the sailors, with much labor, brought
up a number of light guns, — nine field-pieces, it was
said, two howitzers, and a mortar. Pakenham passed two days, December 25 and 26, organizing his force and preparing the battery. At daylight, December 27, the guns were ready. Five pieces suddenly opened with hot shot and shell on the "Carolina," and in half an hour obliged the crew to abandon her. The "Louisiana," by extreme exertion, was hauled beyond range while the British battery was occupied in destroying the "Carolina."

Nothing then prevented Pakenham's advance, and the next morning, December 28, the whole army moved forward.

"On we went," said the Subaltern, "for about three miles, without any halt or hindrance, either from man or inanimate nature coming in our way. But all at once a spectacle was presented to us, such indeed as we ought to have looked for, but such as manifestly took our leaders by surprise. The enemy's army became visible. It was posted about forty yards in rear of a canal, and covered, though most imperfectly, by an unfinished breastwork."

The British left, coming under the fire of the "Louisiana," was immediately halted and placed as far as possible under cover. The skirmishers in the swamp were recalled. In the evening the whole
army was ordered to retire beyond cannon-shot and hut themselves.' They obeyed; but "there was not a man among us who failed to experience both shame and indignation."*

Beyond doubt, such caution was not expected from Sir Edward Pakenham. Sir George Prevost at Sackett's Harbor and Plattsburg, and Colonel Brooke at Baltimore had retired before American works; but those works had been finished forts, strongly held and situated on elevated points. Even with such, excuses, and after suffering severe losses, Prevost was discredited for his retreats. Pakenham did not live to make a report, and his reasons remained unavowed; but Admiral Cochrane reported that it was "thought necessary to bring heavy artillery against this work, and also against the ship which had cannonaded the army when advancing."^ The decision implied that Pakenham considered the chances unfavorable for storming the American line.

^ Journal of Major Forrest; Latour, Appendix, p. cxlvii.

> Subaltern, p. 235.

* Cochrane's Report of Jan. 18, 1815; James, ii. 552.

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In effect, Pakenham's withdrawal December 28 was equivalent to admitting weakness in his infantry, and to calling on the artillery as his strongest arm. The experiment showed little self-confidence. Not only must he sacrifice two or three days in establishing batteries, but he must challenge a contest with cannon,—weapons which the Americans were famous for using, both afloat and ashore, with especial skill. Jackson could also mount heavy guns and
allow Pakenham to batter indefinite lines. Sooner or later Pakenham must storm, unless he could turn the American position.

The seamen were once more set to work, and with incredible labor rowed their boats, laden with heavy guns, from the fleet to the bayou, and dragged the guns through three miles of bog to the British headquarters. The Americans also prepared batteries. From the lines one thirty-two-pounder, three twenty-four-pounders, and one eighteen-pounder commanded the plain in their front. Besides these heavy guns, three twelve-pounders, three six-pounders, a six-inch howitzer or mortar, and a brass carronade, useless from its bad condition, — in all, twelve or thirteen guns, capable of replying to the British batteries, were mounted along the American lines. On the west bank of the river, three quarters of a mile away. Commodore Patterson established, December 30 and 31, a battery of one twenty-four-pounder and two long twelve-pounders, which took the British bat-

* Latour, pp. 147, 148.

Sketch of the Position of the British and American Forces

NEAH NEW OHIEANS, FROM THE 3rd OF DECEMBER TO THE 8th OF JANUARY, 1815.

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Thus the Americans possessed fifteen effective guns, six of which were heavy pieces of long range. They were worked partly by regular artillerists, partly by sailors, partly by New Orleans militia, and partly by the "hellish banditti" of Barataria, who to the number of twenty or thirty were received by General Jackson into the service and given the care of two twenty-four-pounders.

The number and position of the British guns were given in Lieutenant Peddie's sketch of the field. Before the reconnoissance of December 28, field-pieces, had been placed in battery on the river-side to destroy the "Carolina" and "Louisiana." Canon Gleig said that "nine field-pieces, two howitzers, and one mortar" were placed in battery on the river-side during the night of December 25. Captain Henley of the "Carolina" reported that five guns opened upon him on the morning of December 26.* Captain Peddie's sketch marked seven pieces mounted in battery on the river-side, bearing on Commodore Patterson's battery opposite, besides four pieces in two batteries below. Their range was sufficient to destroy the "Carolina" and pierce the breastwork across the river,* and therefore they were probably twelve and nine pounders.


* Campaigns, p. 166.

Besides these lighter long-range guns, the British constructed three batteries in the night of December 31.

"^"Fifteen eighteen-poonders," reported Major Forrest, British assistant-quartermaster-general, were placed in a battery formed of hogsheads of sugar, on the mun road, to fire upon the ship if she dropped down. Preparations were also made to establish batteries, — one of six eighteen-poanders, and one of four twenty-four-pound carronades; also batteries for the field-pieces and howitzers, the latter to keep the fire of the enemy under, while the troops were to be moved forward in readiness to storm the works as soon as a practicable breach was effected."

According to Peddie's sketch the Battery No. 6, on the road or new levee, contained not four but two guns. Battery No. 6, some fifty yards from No. 6, contained six guns, as Major Forrest reported. Battery No. 4, to the left of the old levee, contained four guns, probably the carronades. Battery No. 3, to the right of the old levee, contained five guns, probably the field-pieces and howitzers. In all, seventeen guns bore on the American lines, - besides seven, in Batteries No. 7 and No. 8, bearing on Commodore Patterson's three-gun battery across the river. According to Gleig, the British had thirty guns; but in any case they used not less than twenty-four guns, throwing a heavier weight of metal than was...
thrown by the fifteen pieces used by the Americans. The British artillery was served by regular artillerists.

These details were particularly interesting, because the artillery battle of Jan. 1, 1816, offered the best test furnished during the war of relative skill in the use of that arm. The attack had every advantage over the defence. The British could concentrate their fire to effect a breach for their troops to enter; the Americans were obliged to disperse their fire on eight points. The American platforms being elevated, offered a better target than was afforded by the low British batteries, and certainly were no better protected. Three of the American guns were in battery across the river, three quarters of a mile from the main British battery of six eighteen-pounders, while the "Louisiana's" carronades were beyond range, and the "Louisiana" herself was not brought into action.\(^\text{^\textsuperscript{1}}\) On the American side the battle was fought entirely by the guns in Jackson's lines and in Patterson's battery across the river, — one thirty-two-pounder, four twenty-four-pounders, one eighteen-pounder, five twelve-pounders, three six-pounders, and a howitzer, — fifteen American guns in all, matched against ten British eighteen-pounders, four twenty-four-pound carronades, and ten field-pieces and howitzers, — twenty-four guns in all. If the British field-pieces were twelves and nines, the

\(^\text{^\textsuperscript{1}}\) Patterson's Report of Jan. 2, 1815; Latour, Appendix, p. 1, no. zxviii.
weight of metal was at least three hundred and fifty pounds on the British side against two hundred and twenty-four pounds on the American side, besides two howitzers against one.

The main British batteries were about seven hundred yards distant from Jackson's line. Opposite to the battery of six eighteen-pounders were the American thirty-two and three twenty-four-pounders. Behind the British batteries the British army waited for the order to assault. Toward eight o'clock on the morning of Jan. 1, 1815, the British opened a hot fire accompanied by a shower of rockets. The American guns answered, and the firing continued without intermission until toward noon, when the British fire slackened and at one o'clock the British artillerists abandoned their batteries, leaving the guns deserted.

No other battle of the war, except that at Chrystler's Farm, left the defeated party with so little excuse for its inferiority. Commonly apologists ascribed greater force to the victor than to the vanquished, or dwelt upon some accident or oversight which affected the result. For the defeat of the British artillery, Jan. 1, 1815, no excuse was ever suggested. The British army and navy frankly admitted that the misfortune was due to American superiority in the use of artillery. British evidence on that point was ample, for their surprise and mortification were extreme; while the Americans seemed never fully

^ James, ii. 369.
to appreciate the extraordinary character of the feat they performed. The most detailed British account was also the most outspoken.

"Never was any failure more remarkable or unlooked-for than this," said Gleig. "The sun, as if ashamed to shine upon our disgrace, was slow in making its appearance; a heavy mist obscured him, and the morning was far advanced before it cleared away. At last, however, the American lines were visible, and then began a fire from our batteries, so brisk and so steadily kept up that we who were behind made not the smallest doubt of its effect. It was answered for a while faintly, and with seeming difficulty. By and by, however, the enemy's salutation became more spirited, till it gradually surpassed our own, both in rapidity and precision. We were a good deal alarmed at this, and the more that a rumor got abroad that our batteries were not proof against the amazing force of the American shot. We had, it may be stated, imprudently rolled into the parapets barrels filled with sugar, under the impression that sugar would prove as effectual as sand in checking the progress of cannon-balls. But the event showed that we had been completely mistaken. The enemy's shot penetrated these sugar-hogsheads as if they had been so many empty casks, dismounting our guns and killing our artillery-men in the very centre of their works. There could be small doubt, as soon as these facts were established, how the cannonading would end. Our fire slackened every moment; that of the Americans became every moment more terrible, till at length, after not more than two hours and a half of firing, our batteries

1 Subaltern, p. 249 (American edition, 1833).
were all silenced. The American works, on the other hand, remained as little injured as ever, and we were completely foiled."

Admiral Codrington, writing from the British headquarters three days after the battle, expressed equal astonishment and annoyance: ^ —

"On the 1st we had our batteries, by severe labor, ready in situations from which the artillery people were, as a matter of course, to destroy and silence the opposing batteries, and give opportunity for a well-arranged storm. But instead of so doing, not a gun of the enemy appeared to suffer, and our firing too high was not made out until we had expended too much of our hardly-collected ammunition to push the matter further. Such a failure in this boasted arm was not to be expected, and I think it a blot in the artillery escutcheon."

Codrington somewhat under-estimated the effect of the British fire. Three of the American guns, including the thirty-two-pounder, were more or less damaged, and the cotton-bales which formed the cheeks of the embrasures proved to be as little serviceable as the hogsheads of sugar in the British river battery. Two artillery caissons were exploded by the British rockets. Thirty-four men were killed or wounded; while the British reported a loss of seventy-six killed and wounded between Jan. 1 and 6, 1815, most of whom fell in the artillery battle.*

^ Life of Codrington, i. 334.

* Latour, pp. 133, 134.

* Return of Casualties; James, ii. 543.
The British official reports said less, but their silence was equally significant.

"Our batteries made little impression upon the enemy's parapet," wrote Major Forrest. "The order for the assault was therefore not carried into effect. The troops remained in this advanced position, and orders were given to retire the guns in the night. The evening changed to wet, and the ground became in consequence so deep that it required the exeitions of the whole army as a working-party, aided by the seamen, to retire the guns a short distance before daylight. The army then fell back to the position it occupied on the 31st."

Admiral Cochrane's official report was still more brief, and best understood by the comments already quoted from his friend Admiral Codrington:

"On the 1st instant batteries were opened; but our fire not having the desired effect, the attack was deferred until the arrival of the troops under Major-General Lambert, which was daily expected."

If the Subaltern was right, the British defeat resulted in the loss of several guns.

"The enemy having made no attempt to carry off our heavy guns, which we abandoned to their fate," continued Gleig, "it was judged advisable to bring them into the camp as soon as circumstances would allow; and for this purpose working parties were again sent out as soon as the darkness screened them. It was my fortune to accompany them. The labor of dragging a number of huge ship's guns out of the soft soil into which they

^ Journal; Latour, Appendix, p. cxlviL
bad sank, crippled too as most of them were in their carriages, was more extreme by far than any one expected to find it. Indeed, it was not till four o'clock in the morning that our task came to a conclusion, and even then it had been very imperfectly performed. Five guns were eventually left behind. These were rendered useless, it is true, by breaking their trunnions; but it cannot be said that in the course of the late operations the British army came off without the loss of some of its artillery.
CHAPTER XIV.

Effectually stopped by these repeated miscarriages, General Pakenham, with fully five thousand good soldiers at his command, decided to wait an
entire week for Major-General Lambert, who was then on his way with two fresh regiments. In the meanwhile Pakenham adopted a suggestion made first by Vice-Admiral Cochrane, to prepare for throwing a force across the river to turn Jackson's line from the opposite bank. The plan required that the Viller canal should be extended through the levee to the river without the knowledge of the Americans. Perhaps Pakenham would have done better by dragging his boats across the intervening space; but he preferred to dig a canal, and the work, begun January 4, was done so successfully that until January 6, when it was completed, Jackson did not suspect the movement. On the same day Lambert's division arrived.

From this week of inaction the Americans gained little advantage. The lines were strengthened; but although the Kentucky reinforcements, more than


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two thousand in number, under General Thomas and John Adair, arrived January 4, they were ill provided with arms, and Jackson could furnish them neither with arms, clothing, nor equipment. The Louisiana militia were in the same condition. Jackson did his utmost to supply these wants; the people of New Orleans did more, and lent at last the few hundred muskets reserved against the danger of a slave insurrection,^ until in the end, if Adair was correct, a thousand of the Kentuckians were placed in the line of battle. Yet after all the reinforcements had been mustered, Jackson's main dependence was still on his artillery and his intrenchments. In the open
field he could not meet the British force.

In his immediate front, Jackson had little to fear. Three thousand marksmen, behind intrenchments everywhere at least five feet high, defended by heavy guns and supported by the "Louisiana" on the river and a strong battery on the opposite shore, could defy twice or three times their number advancing across an open plain under fire of eight or ten heavy guns. The result of the artillery battle of January 1, as well as the reconnaissance of December 28, showed what the British general and his staff thought of their chances in a front attack. Twice they had refused to attempt it when Jackson's lines were unfinished; they were not likely to succeed when the lines were strengthened by another week of labor.

> Adair's letters of Oct. 21, 1817; Letters of Adair and Jackson, Lexington, 1817.

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In his direct front, therefore, Jackson had reason to think that the British did not intend serious attack*. Their next attempt could hardly fail to be a flanking movement. Jackson had been surprised, December 23, by such a movement, and feared nothing so much as to be surprised again. For this reason he still kept a large body of troops, three regiments of Louisiana militia, on the north of the city. ^ "His greatest fear, and hence his strongest defence next to the one occupied by himself, was on the Chef Menteur road, where Governor Claiborne, at the head of the Louisiana militia, was posted." He kept close watch on the bayous which extended on his immediate flank, and constructed other lines in his rear to which he could retreat in case his left flank should be turned through the swamp. Apparently
the idea did not occur to him that the British might more easily turn his right flank by throwing a force across the river; and when he learned, January 7, that the British were engaged in making this movement, the time had already passed when he could prevent it.

No means had been provided for transporting troops directly from one bank of the river to the other. If obliged to protect the batteries established by Commodore Patterson on the west bank, Jackson must march troops from his lines back five miles to New Orleans, cross them by the ferry, and march them down the other shore. Such a movement required a whole day, and divided the army in a manner hazarding the safety of both wings.

Practically the west bank was undefended when Jackson, January 7, first heard that the British were about to occupy it. Commodore Patterson had mounted there, as has been told, a number of heavy guns in battery, but these guns were not in position to cover their own bank against attack from below. Major Latour was engaged with negroes in laying out lines of defence, but nothing was completed. In an advanced position, about a mile below the line of Jackson's works, a bastion had been raised close to the river, and near it a small redan, or salient, had been constructed. This work, which was untenable in case of attack in flank or rear, was occupied by four hundred and fifty Louisiana militia, commanded by General David Morgan. During the
afternoon of January 7, after the British plan of attack was suspected. General Morgan caused three guns — one twelve-pounder and two six-pounders — to be mounted on his line. Late the same evening General Jackson ordered four hundred men of the Kentucky division to New Orleans, where they were to obtain muskets, then to cross the river, and march down the opposite shore to reinforce Morgan. The Kentuckians obeyed their orders, but they found only about seventy muskets at New Orleans; and not more than two hundred and fifty armed men, weary with marching and faint from want of food, reached Morgan's quarters at four o'clock on the morning —

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of January 8. Adair, who should have known the number best, declared that only one hundred and seventy men were then in the ranks. They were sent a mile farther and stationed as an advanced line, with one hundred Louisiana militia.

Thus seven or eight hundred tired, ill-armed, and unprotected militia, divided in two bodies a mile apart, waited on the west bank to be attacked by a British column which was then in the act of crossing the river. Their defeat was almost certain. A thousand British troops could easily drive them away, capture all the batteries on the west bank, destroy the "Louisiana" as they had destroyed the "Carolina," thus turning all Jackson's lines, and probably rendering necessary the evacuation of New Orleans. For this work Pakenham detached the Eighty-fifth regiment, about three hundred strong, the Fifth West India, two hundred seamen and two hundred marines, — about twelve hundred men in all, — under command of Colonel Thornton, who had led the light brigade at Bladensburg and across
Lake Borgne to the Mississippi. The movement was ordered for the night of January 7, and was to be made in boats already collected in the Yiller^ canal.


' Adair to Jackson^ March 20, 1815; Letters of Adair and Jackson, 1817; Latour, Appendix, p. cxxxii.

* Journal of Major Forrest, Assistant-Quartermaster-General; MSS. British Archives. Lambert's Report, Jan. 10, 1815; Jame% ii. 543.

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With some hesitation ^ Pakenham decided to make a simultaneous attack on Jackson. The arrangements for this assault were simple. The usual store of fascines and ladders was provided. Six of the eighteen-pound guns were once more mounted in battery about eight hundred yards from the American line, to cover the attack. The army, after detaching Thornton's corps, was organized in three divisions, — one, under Major-General Gibbs, to attack Jackson's left; another, under Major-General Keane, to attack along the river-side; a third, the reserve, to be commanded by Major-General Lambert.

^* The principal attack was to be made by Major-General Gibbs," said the British official report.^ The force assigned to Gibbs consisted of the Fourth, Twenty-first, and Forty-fourth regiments, with three companies of the Ninety-fifth, — about two thousand two hundred rank-and-file. ^ The force assigned to Keane consisted of " the Ninety-third, two companies of the Ninety-fifth, and two companies of the Fusileers and Forty-third," * — apparently about twelve hundred
rank-and-file. "The first brigade, consisting of the Fusileers and Forty-third, formed the reserve" under Major-General Keane, apparently also twelve hundred strong. Adding two hundred artillerymen and five hundred black troops of the First West India regi-

» Life of Codrington, i. 336.

s Lambert's Report of Jan. 10^ 1815 ; Niles, viii. 177.

' James, ii. 373.'

^ Lambert's Report ; Niles, viii. 177.

1815, THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS. 373

ment, employed as skirmishers along the edge of the swamp, the whole body of troops engaged on the east bank in the assault, according to the official report and returns of wounded,^ numbered about five thousand three hundred rank-and-file, consisting of the Fourth, Seventh (Fusileers), Twenty-first, Forty-third, Forty-fourth, Ninety-third, and Ninety-fifth regiments, of whom twenty-two hundred were to attack on the right, twelve hundred on the left, and twelve hundred were to remain in reserve.

Thus of the whole British force, some eight thousand rank-and-file, fifty-three hundred were to assault Jackson's line; twelve hundred were to cross the river and assault Morgan; eight hundred and fifty men were detailed for various duties; and the sea-

men, except two hundred with Colonel Thornton^ must have been in the boats.
To meet this assault, Jackson held an overwhelming force, in which his mere numbers were the smallest element. According to a detailed account given by Jackson two years afterward, his left wing, near the swamp, was held by Coffee's brigade of eight hundred and four men; his centre, by Carroll's brigade of fourteen hundred and fourteen men; his rights near the river, by thirteen hundred and twenty-seven men, including all the regulars; while Adair's Kentucky brigade, numbering five hundred and twenty-five men, were in reserve. Adair claimed that the Kentuckians numbered fully one thousand. The dispute mattered little, for barely one third of the entire force, whatever it was, discharged a gun.

Besides three thousand or thirty-five hundred men on the parapets and a thousand in reserve, Jackson had twelve pieces of artillery distributed along the line, covering every portion of the plain. The earth-wall behind which his men rested was in every part sufficiently high to require scaling, and the mud was so slippery as to afford little footing. Patterson's battery on the opposite shore increased in force till it contained three twenty-four-pounders and six twelve-pounders, covered the levee by which the British left must advance. The "Louisiana" took no part in the action, her men being engaged in working the guns on shore; but without the "Louisiana's " broadside, Jackson had more than twenty cannon in position. Such a force was sufficient to repel ten thousand men if the attack were made in open day.
Pakenham, aware of the probable consequences of attacking by daylight, arranged for moving before dawn; but his plan required a simultaneous advance on both banks of the river, and such a combination was liable to many accidents. According to the journal of Major Forrest, the British Assistant-Quartermaster-General, * forty-seven boats were brought up the bayou on the evening of January 7:

* Latour, pp. 147-162.


* Journal of Major Forrest, Assistant-Quartermaster-General; MSS. British Archives.

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As soon as it was dark, the boats commenced to be crossed over into the river. A dam erected below the sternmost boat had raised the water about two feet. Still there was a very considerable fall from the river; and through which, for an extent of two hundred and fifty yards, the boats were dragged with incredible labor by the seamen. It required the whole night to effect this, and the day had dawned before the first detachment of Colonel Thornton's corps (about six hundred men) had embarked; and they just reached the opposite bank when the main attack commenced on the enemy's line."

At six o'clock in broad dawn the columns of Oibb and Keane moved forward toward Jackson's works, which were lined with American troops waiting for the expected attack. Gibbs's column came first under fire, advancing near the swamp in close ranks of about sixty men in front. * Three of the American
batteries opened upon them. Coming within one hundred and fifty yards of the American line, the British column obliqted to the left to avoid the fire of the battery directly in face. As they came within musketry range the men faltered and halted, beginning a confused musketry fire. A few platoons advanced to the edge of the ditch, and then broke. Their officers tried in vain to rally them for another advance. Major-General Gibbs was mortally wounded according to the official report, "within twenty yards of the glacis." Pakenham himself rode forward to


' Lamb's Report of Jan. 10, 1815; Latour, Appendix, p. cxlix

rally Gibbs's column, and was instantly struck by a grape-shot and killed, nearly three hundred yards from the American line. "As I advanced with the reserve," said Lambert's report, "at about two hundred and fifty yards from the Une, I had the mortification to observe the whole falling back upon me in the greatest confusion."

Keane's column on the left moved along the road and between the river and the levee. Pressing rapidly forward, greatly annoyed by Patterson's battery on the west bank, the head of this column reached the American line, and stormed an unfinished redoubt outside the main work at the edge of the river. The concentrated fire of the whole American right almost immediately drove the column back in disorder; the men who reached the redoubt were killed; Major-General Keane was severely wounded and carried off the field, while the casualties among officers of a lower grade were excessive. The Ninety-third
regiment in Keane's brigade lost its lieutenant-colonel and two captains killed, and four more captains severely wounded; three hundred and forty-eight rank-and-file were wounded, ninety-nine were reported missing, and fifty-eight killed. These losses amounted to five hundred and five in seven hundred and seventy-five rank-and-file.*

Lambert's report continued: ^ —

* Latour's Plan.

* Return of Casualties; James, ii. 554.

* James, ii. 373.

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"In this situation, finding that no impression had been made; that though many men had reached the ditch, they were either drowned or obliged to surrender, and that it was impossible to restore order in the regiments where they were, — I placed the reserve in position until I could obtain such information as to determine me how to act to the best of my judgment, and whether or not I should resume the attack; and if so, I felt it could be done only by the reserve."

Just as the main attack ended, Colonel Thornton with his six hundred rank-and-file, having landed on the west bank, advanced against Morgan's line, routed it, turned the redoubt, and advanced on Patterson's heavy battery beyond. Patterson unable to use his guns had no choice but to spike his pieces and retreat. Thornton passed up the river a mile beyond Jackson's line, ^ and needed only a field-piece and some hot shot to burn the "Louisiana" and march opposite New Orleans.
From the eastern shore Jackson watched the progress of Thornton with alarm. His official report of January 9 gave an idea of his emotions.

"Simultaneously with his advance on my lines," Jackson said, "the enemy had thrown over in his boats a considerable force to the other side of the river. These having landed were hardy enough to advance against the works of General Morgan; and what is strange and difficult to account for, at the very moment when their entire discomfiture was looked for with a confidence approaching to certainty, the Kentucky reinforcements in-

^ Latour's Plan.

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gloriously fled, drawing after them by their example the remainder of the forces, and thus yielding to the enemy that most formidable position. The batteries which had rendered me for many days the most important service, though bravely defended, were of course now abandoned, not however until the guns had been spiked. This unfortunate rout had totally changed the aspect of affairs. The enemy now occupied a position from which they might annoy us without hazard, and by means of which they might have been enabled to defeat in a great measure the effect of our success on this side the river."

John Adair, who was then in command of the Kentucky brigade, General Thomas being unwell, took great offence at Jackson's account of the battle on the west bank. "The detachment on the other side of the river," he reported to Governor Shelby,
"were obliged to retire before a superior force. They have been calumniated by those who ought to have fought with them, but did not." The tone of Jackson’s report, and his language afterward, showed a willingness to load the Kentucky troops on the west bank with the responsibility for a military oversight with which they had nothing to do; but the oversight was not the less serious, whoever was responsible for it. The Kentucky and Louisiana troops did not easily yield. The British returns of killed and wounded showed that Thornton’s column suffered a considerable loss. Thornton himself was wounded; his regiment, the Eighty-fifth, numbering two hundred and ninety-

1 Letter of Jan. 13, 1815; Niles, vii. 38a

Mi. IBSL 9ATSW QSP ^W QNtJbA»& &1$

m^ iMk^ud fik» reported a Um^ of fox^-thretQ men

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Jack9w was Wp|^ ta u^terpose. Aab« wd Iw su»L^ Uaisig tb« riv^ bajak», watid^d tbo. prQgrosai ol Tbenrtoft'a ec^uia oa thiQ c^poait eaiol*^», Ja(dueK>i» cgQuld Aq Qotbio^; but be ordered bis vxea ^^ tbat tbe; sbould take off their bata^, aad giye our trox^ on. tb^ ri^t baak three cbeera." Ad»ir^ wba iacliaed to a aevere judgemeat of Jackson’s generalsbip> told tbe a^wy laore picturesquely:^-^

^^ I was standing by him when he gare his erd^^ and with a smile, not of approbation, observed I was afoaU
they could not hear ns. The distance from us to th^ ii^ (m a straight line, was ^ward of one mile and a half; there was a tiiiqk fog, and I confess J could not see tlm tKK^s of ^ther army. All I could discover was th^ blaze from the guns; and seeing that continue to progress up the river was the only knowledge we had that our men were retreating."

^ Thoxatoo's lUport of Jan. 8, 1S15; Jame»„ii. 547.
* Letters of General; Adair sad Qeseral JackBon, 1817.

Jackson then ordered Oeneral Humbert, a French officer acting as a volunteer, to take four hundred men and cross the river at New Orleans to repulse the enemy, cost what it might; ^ but had the enemj pressed his advantage, no force at Jackson's com-
mand could have stopped their advance, without causing the sacrifice of Jackson's lines. Fortunately the only remaining British general, Lambert, was not disposed to make another effort. The eight regi-
ments of regular troops which made the bulk of Pak-
enham's army had suffered severely in the assault. One of these regiments, the Eighty-fifth, was with Thornton on the west shore. Two, the Seventh and Forty-third, had been in the reserve, and except two companies had never approached the works within musket-shot, yet had lost fifty-two killed, and about one hundred wounded and missing, in an aggregate of less than eighteen hundred. The five remaining regiments — the Fourth, Twenty-first, Forty-fourth, Ninety-third, and Ninety-fifth — were nearly de-
stroyed. They went into battle probably about three thousand strong;^ they lost seventeen hundred and fifty men killed, wounded, and missing. The total British loss was two thousand and thirtynsix.' The American loss was seventy-one. Even on the west
bank the American loss was much less than that of the British.

The loss of three major-generals was almost as

^ Latour, p. 175. ' James, IL 373>

* James, ii. 382.

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serious aB the loss of one third of the regular Infantry. Lambert, the fourth major-general, weighed down by responsibility and defeat, had no wish but to escape. He recalled Thornton's corps the same evening from its position on the opposite bank, and the next day, January 9, began preparations for his difficult and hazardous retreat.^

Pakenham's assault on Jackson's lines at New Orleans, January 8, repeated the assault made by Drummond, August 15, at Fort Erie. According to the British account of that battle, Drummond's engaged force numbered twenty-one hundred and forty men; the reserve, about one thousand. ^ Drummond's direct attack, being made by night, was more successful than Pakenham's; his troops approached nearer and penetrated farther than those of Gibbs and Eeane; but the consequences were the same. Of three thousand men, Drummond lost nine hundred and five. Of six thousand, engaged in the double action of Jan. 8, 1815, Pakenham lost two thousand and thirty-six. In each case the officers commanding the assaulting col-
umn's were killed or wounded, and the repulse was complete.

After the battle General Lambert's position was critical. His withdrawal of Thornton's corps from the west bank betrayed his intention of retiring, and his line of retreat was exposed to attack from the

^ Report of General Lambert, Jan. 28, 1816; James, IL 565.
' James, IL 179.

'^S2 BBOUT OF IfiE tnSttSD ST4.T£S. otLWk.

hnjw. wUch lieitdcd near Jadtsoii' « Minp« i^stft-
oiately for fahn, Jackson iras ^otttented ^i^sOi ctodbaig

"'Wi^hfr, Btter the severe loss lie Ims stftftained,*' finite Jftcfeson, ^ve days fftfC»> the lyttttie, ^' ^ he is prepaiv
ing «» nfioni td Ms fidiip{4xig, or td laftke i^till mightier
efforts to attain his first object, t d» };^db pretiOifl Ifi^ vdeterminme. It becomes me te act as th«n^ the Jitter
were his iotentioii." "

If Jargon's inaction allowed Lambeit to escape,
\t was Irkely to liazard a renewal of l^e attack from
«ome otlier quarter ; but the armies remained fer ten
days in iSheir old positions wtihout further liostfli-
ties, esecept from artillery fire, tnttil on Uie night erf
January 18, after maiking careful preparations, the
wtole Britigfti force silently withdrew to fortified po-
sitions at the mouth of tSie bayou, disappearing as
tmddenly and mysteriously as it came, and leaving
behind it only eight or, according to Uie American
report, fourteen* of tlie guns which tad covered Ifee
river und held the " Louisiana " at a, distance? At
the mcwtli off the bayou the army remnined mttffl
January ^7, when it wtus renembafted in ttie ^ps
off Chandeleur's Island.
On the day of the battle of Jaimarry, a British

Jackson to the Secretary of War, Jan. 13, 1815; Kileo, vii. 374.


* Lauibext^ft Bapatt of Jan. '^- Sln; iLatstoi, dapfmmiixt
p. cbcvi

«^piad3Nm ^Bi^peaa^ in like ttvw lidoir f^ortSt ItSBp,
^^ l^Wttb^vtesiels, vmdeir the frotoiMio8i <tf m ^loop, %
effect tmtfl J<jxuat7 1^ ^^im Aiej irfhdraw nt tk^ ftanie lame with the atuy abew.

NotwiNaistairding ike ^iasattrmm Mtute ^ the mast-
ptkga b^ore New OrleaitS) l^t Brittth ^exji^ditioa, "as
it lay off Chandeleur Island Febraary 1^ stiU piMh
geteed nearly as ittuch 4id2>ei%tti as when it <a})(ieared
tbei% December IL Reinforced bj z, liioHsand freah
Aoidi^rs, Lambert detenoadned to ^cfctack M<obile. ^ it
was Aet^ded, ^ Tepwted Lamba^t^ ^that a f <r^ ahduM
ht sent against Fort Bowyer, situated on the edastem
point of the entrance of llie bay, and from every in-
formation that could be obtained it was considered
that a brigade would be suflBcient for this object,
miik a respectable foiree ^f artillery. ^ At daylight
^OL the aaoming of February 8 a whole brigade and
% hf^vy batteriKg-train were ^isendmrked in Hb^ itext

Jackson'« determkstion to defeind Mebile k«l
iktready deprived liim «ef tke i;ise ^ mo^e Uv&ibl kiAE
itte regular troops asi^ned to hi» military district,
wiio recmamed inaetiv^e at Mobile iliuing Iflie monthi
of December luad Janimry. They were ^^emmanded
fby General WinckecAer, wii(M» i*eeerd as ta i&fitary
Colonel Lawrence had no choice but to capitulate which he did February 11. He had not even the opportunity to resist, for the British made regular approaches, and could not be prevented from capturing the place without the necessity of assault. Jackson reported to the Secretary of War that this event was one which he little expected to happen but after the most gallant resistance; that it should have taken place without even a fire from the enemy's batteries is as astonishing as it is mortifying. In truth, the military arrangements, not Lawrence's de-
fence, were responsible for the result; and Jackson had reason to fear that a greater disaster was at hand, for unless General Winchester should promptly evacuate Mobile, the disaster of the River Baisin was likely to be repeated on a larger scale.

END OF VOL. n.

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**TABLE C**

**THB**

**SECOND ADMINISTRATION**

ov

**JAMES MADISOK**
1813—1817

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES.

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VouL L AMD IL^Tam Tamr AmmmrmAfiOM oif JwrwMBmm. 1801-1806.

Vouk m. AMD IV.— TBI BwaoKD AmoMmnLAsion OF JvnawM. 1805-1800.

Voui. y. AMD TL'Thm Fxmt ADimmnunom or EADnOM. 1808-1818.

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HISTORY

OV THB
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DURING THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION OF

JAMES MADISON

By HENRY ADAMS

TABLE 457C

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CHAPTER L

During the spring and summer of 1814 the task of diplomacy was less hopeful than that of arms. Brown and Izard with extreme difficulty defended the frontier; but Gallatin and Bayard could find no starting-point for negotiation. Allowed by Castlereagh’s courtesy to visit England, they crossed the Channel in April, and established themselves in London. There Gallatin remained until June 21, waiting for the British government to act, and striving with tact, caution, and persistency to bring both governments on common ground; but the attempt was hopeless. England was beside herself with the intoxication of European success.

Although the English newspapers expressed a false idea of the general will, and were even at cross purposes with the Ministry in American matters, their tone was in some respects an indifferent barometer for measuring the elation or depression of the public temper, and exercised some influence, rather apparent

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than real, on the momentary attitudes of government. Had Castlereagh and his colleagues been really controlled by the press, no American peace could have been made. Whatever spirit of friendship for Amer-
ica might exist was necessarily silent, and only extravagant enmity found expression either in the press or in society.

Perhaps because ministers were believed to wish for peace with the United States, the London "Times," which was not a ministerial journal, made itself conspicuous in demanding war. The "Times" had not previously shown a vindictive spirit, but it represented the Wellesley and Canning interest, which could discover no better course than that of being more English than England, and more patriotic than the Government. The "Times" was always ably written and well edited, but its language toward the United States showed too strong a connection with that of the Federalists, from whose public and private expressions the press of England formed its estimate of American character.

The "Times" indulged to excess in the pleasure of its antipathy. Next to Napoleon, the chief victim of English hatred was Madison. For so mild a man Madison possessed a remarkable faculty of exciting invective. The English press surpassed the American Federalists in their allusions to him, and the "Times" was second to no English newspaper in the energy of its vituperation. "The lunatic ravings of the philosophic statesman of Washington" were in its politi-

1814. THE MEETING AT GHENT. 8

cal category of a piece with ^^ his spaniel-like fawning on the Emperor of Russia.^^ The most abject of the tools of the deposed tyrant; •••. doubtless he expected to be named Prince of the Potomack or Grand Duke of Virginia." ^ The "Sun" somewhat less abusively spoke of "that contemptible wretch Madison, and his gang;"' but the "Times" habitually
called him Kar and impostor.

** Having disposed of all our enemies in Europe" the "Times" in the middle of April turned its attention to the United States. "Let us have no cant of moderation" was its starting-point. "There is no public feeling in the country stronger than that of indignation against the Americans; . . . conduct so base, so loathsome, so hateful. . . . As we urged the principle, No peace with Bonaparte! so we must maintain the doctrine of, No peace with James Madison!" * To this rule the "Times" steadily adhered with a degree of ill-temper not easily to be described, and with practical objects freely expressed. "Mr. Madison's dirty, swindling manoeuvres in respect to Louisiana and the Floridas remain to be punished," it declared April 27; and May 17 it pursued the idea: "He must fall a victim to the just vengeance of the Federalists. Let us persevere. Let us unmask the impostor. . . . Who cares about the impudence

» The Times, Feb. 4 and 10, 1814.
« The Times, April 23, 1814.

• The Sun, Aug. 4, 1814.

* The Times, April 15, 1814.

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which they call a doctrine? . . . We shall demand indemnity. . . . We shall insist on security for Canada. • • • We shall inquire a little into the American title to Louisiana; and we shall not permit the base attack on Florida to go unpunished." May 18 it declared that Madison had put himself on record as a liar in the cause of his Corsican master. ^^ He has lived an impostor, and he deserves to meet the fate
of a traitor. That fate now stares him in the face."
May 24 the "Times" resumed the topic: "They are
struck to the heart with terror for their impending
punishment; and oh may no false liberality, no
mistaken lenity, no weak and cowardly policy, inter-
pose to save them from the blow! Strike! chastise
the savages, for such they are!... With Madison
and his perjured set no treaty can be made, for no
oath can bind them." When British commissioners
were at last announced as ready to depart for Ghent
to negotiate for peace with the United States, June 2,
the "Times" gave them instructions: "Our demands
may be couched in a single word,—Submission!"

The "Morning Post," a newspaper then carrying
higher authority than the "Times," used language
if possible more abusive, and even discovered, Jan. ♦
18, 1814, "a new trait in the character of the
American government. Enjoying the reputation of
being the most unprincipled and the most contempti-
ble on the face of the earth, they were already known
to be impervious to any noble sentiment; but it is
only of late that we find them insensible of the shame

1814. THE MEETING AT GHENT. 6

of defeat, destitute even of the brutish quality of be-
ing beaten into a sense of their unworthiness and
their Incapacity." Of Madison the "Morning Post"*
held the lowest opinion. He was "a despot in dis-
guise; a miniature imitation" and miserable tool of
Bonapai'te, who wrote his Annual Message; a sense-
less betrayer of his country.-^-

The "Times" and "Morning Post" were inde-
pendent newspapers, and spoke only for themselves;
but the "Courier" was supposed to draw inspiration
from the Government, and commonly received the
first knowledge of ministers' intentions. In temper
the "Courier" seemed obliged to vie with its less
favored rivals. The President's Annual Message of
1813 resembled in its opinion "all the productions of
that vain and vulgar Cabinet;" it was "a compound
of canting and hypocrisy, of exaggeration and false-
hood, of coarseness without strength, of assertions
without proof, of the meanest prejudices, and of the
most malignant passions; of undisguised hatred of
Great Britain, and of ill-concealed partiality and ser-
vility toward France."¹ "We know of no man for
whom we feel greater contempt than for Mr. Madi-
son," said the "Courier" of May 24. These illus-
trations of what the "Courier" called "exaggeration
and falsehood, of coarseness without strength, of as-
sertions without proof, of the meanest prejudices,
and of the most malignant passions" were probably

¹ The Morning Post, Jan. 27 and Feb. 1, 1814.
« The Courier, Jan. 27, 1814.

6 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.

in some degree a form as used by the "Courier,"
which would at a hint from the Ministry adopt a
different tone; but announcements of official adts
and intentions were more serious, and claimed more
careful attention.

Immediately after the capitulation of Paris, March
81, the Ministry turned its attention to the United
States, and the "Courier" announced, April 15, that
twenty thousand men were to go from the Garonne
to America. Mr. Madison, the "Courier" added,
had "made a pretty kettle of fish of it." Twenty
thousand men were about two thirds of Wellington's
English force, and their arrival in America would,
as every Englishman believed, insure the success of
the campaign. Not until these troops were embarked would the Ministry begin to negotiate; but in the middle of May the military measures were complete, and then the "Courier" began to prepare the public mind for terms of peace.

These terms were the same as those announced by the "Times," except that the "Courier" did not object to treating with Madison. The United States were to be interdicted the fisheries; Spain was to be supported in recovering Louisiana; the right of impressment must be expressly conceded, — anything short of this would be unwise and a disappointment. *' There are points which must be conceded by America before we can put an end to the contest." ^ Such language offered no apparent hope of peace; yet what-

1 The Courier, May 19 and 24, 1814.

18U. THE MEETING AT GHENT. 7

ever hope existed lay in Castlereagh, who inspired it. Extravagant as the demands were, they fell short of the common expectation. The "Courier" admitted the propriety of negotiation; it insisted neither on Madison's retirement nor on a division of the Union, and it refrained from asserting the whole British demand, or making it an ultimatum.

The chief pressure on the Ministry came from Canada, and could not be ignored. The Canadian government returned to its old complaint that Canadian interests had been ignorantly and wantonly sacrificed by the treaty of 1783, and that the opportunity to correct the wrong should not be lost. The Canadian official "Gazette" insisted that the United States should be required to surrender the northern part of the State of New York, and that both banks of
the St. Lawrence should be Canadian property. A line from Plattsburg to Sackett’s Harbor would satisfy this necessity; but to secure Canadian interests, the British government should further insist on acquiring the east bank of the Niagara River, and on a guaranty of the Indian Territory from Sandusky to Kaskaskias, with the withdrawal of American military posts in the Northwest. A pamphlet was published in May to explain the subject for the use of the British negotiators, and the required territorial cessions were marked on a map. The control of

J Niles, vi. 322.

' Compressed view of the Points to be discussed in treaty with America. London, 1814.

8 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.1.

the Lakes, the Ohio River as the Indian boundary, and the restitution of Louisiana were the chief sacrifices wished from the United States. The cession of a part of Maine was rather assumed than claimed, and the fisheries were to be treated as wholly English. A memorial from Newfoimdland, dated Nov. 8, 1813, pointed out the advantages which the war had already brought to British trade and fisheries by the exclusion of American competition, to the result of doubling the number of men employed on the Labrador shores; and the memorialists added, —

^^ They cannot too often urge the important policy of wholly excluding foreigners from sharing again in the advantages of a fishery from which a large proportion of our best national defence will be derived."

British confidence was at its highest point when the Emperor of Russia and the Celing of Prussia
visited London, June 7, and received an enthusiastic welcome. Gallatin obtained an interview with the Czar, June 17, and hoped that Russian influence might moderate British demands; but the Czar could give him no encouragement. Gallatin wrote home an often-quoted despatch, dated June 18, warning the President that fifteen or twenty thousand men were on their way to America, and that the United States could expect no assistance from Europe.

*I have also the most perfect conviction," Gallatin continued, *that under the existing unpropitious circumstances of the world, America cannot by a continuance

1 Niles, vi. 238. * Adamses QaUatm, p. 614.

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of the war compel Great Britain to yield any of the maritime points in dispute, and particularly to agree to any satisfactory arrangement on the subject of impressment; and that the most favorable terms of peace that can be expected are the status ante helium.**

Even these terms Gallatin added, depended on American success in withstanding the shock of the campaign. He did not say that at the time he wrote, the status ante helium would be scouted by public opinion in England as favorable to the United States; but his estimate of the situation was more nearly exact than though he had consulted only the apparent passions of the British press.

" Lord Castlereagh," wrote Gallatin to Clay, "is, according to the best information I can collect, the best disposed man in the Cabinet." Yet Castlereagh did not venture at that stage to show a disposition for peace. He delayed the negotiation, perhaps wise-
ly, six weeks after the American negotiators had assembled at Ghent; and his instructions \(^\text{1}\) to the British commissioners, dated July 28, reflected the demands of the press. They offered, not the status ante heliaca\(^2\) but the uti possidetis\(^3\) as the starting-point of negotiation. "The state of possession must be considered as the territorial arrangement which would revive upon a peace, except so far as the same may be modified by any new treaty." The state of possession, in view of the orders that had then been

\(^1\) Gallatin to Clay, April 22, 1814; Adams's Gallatin, p. 606.  
\(^2\) Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 67.

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given, or were to be given, for the invasion of the United States, was likely to cost the Americans half of Maine, between the Penobscot and the Passamaquoddy; Plattsburg, and the northern part of New York, Vermont, and New Hampshire; Fort Niagara, Mackinaw, and possibly New Orleans and Mobile. Besides this concession of the uti possidetis, or military occupation at the date of peace, the Americans were required at the outset to admit as a sine qua non or condition precedent to any negotiation, that England's Indian allies, the tribes of the Northwestern Territory, should be included in the pacification, and that a definite boundary should be assigned to them under a mutual guaranty of both Powers. Eastport, or Moose Island, and the fishing privileges were to be regarded as British. With these instructions of July 28, the British commissioners, early in August, started for Ghent.

Between Castlereagh's ideas and those of Madison no relation existed. Gallatin and his colleagues at Ghent were provided with two sets of instructions.
The first set had been written in 1813, for the expected negotiation at Petersburg. The second set was written in January, 1814, and was brought to Europe by Clay. Neither authorized the American commissioners to discuss such conditions as Castlereagh proposed. The President gave his negotiators authority to deal with questions of maritime law; but even there they were allowed to exercise no discretion on the chief issue in dispute. Monroe's latest

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letter, dated January 28, was emphatic. ^^ On impressment, as to the right of the United States to be exempted from it, I have nothing to add," said the secretary; "^ " the sentiments of the President have undergone no change on that important subject. This degrading practice must cease; our flag must protect the crew, or the United States cannot consider themselves an independent nation." The President would consent to exclude all British seamen, except those already naturalized, from American vessels, and to stipulate the surrender of British deserters; but the express abandonment of impressment was a sine qua non of treaty. ^^ If this encroachment of Great Britain is not provided against," said Monroe, "the United States have appealed to arms in vain. If your efforts to accomplish it should fail, all further negotiations will cease, and you will return home without delay."

On territorial questions the two governments were equally wide apart. So far from authorizing a cession of territorial rights, Monroe instructed the American commissioners, both at St. Petersburg and at Ghent, "to bring to view the advantage to both countries which is promised by a transfer of the upper parts and even the whole of Canada to the
and January 28, 1814, reiterated the reasoning which should decide England voluntarily to cede Canada. "Experience has shown that Great Britain cannot participate in the dominion and navigation of the Lakes without incurring the danger of an early renewal of the war."^ The instructions of January 1

^ Instructions of Jan. 28, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Affairs, iii. 701.

^ Monroe's Instructions of June 23, 1813; MSS. State Department Records.

These instructions were subsequently omitted from the published documents, probably because the Ghent commissioners decided not to act upon them; but when the American negotiators met their British antagonists at Ghent, each party was under orders to exclude the other, if possible, from the Lakes, and the same divergence of opinion in regard to the results of two years' war extended over the whole field of negotiation. The British were ordered to begin by a sine qua non in regard to the Indians, which the Americans had no authority to consider. The Americans were ordered to impose a sine qua non in regard to impressments, which the British were forbidden to concede. The British were obliged to claim the basis of possession; the Americans were not even authorized to admit the status existing before the war. The Americans were required to negotiate about blockades, contraband and maritime rights of neutrals; the British could not admit such subjects into dispute. The British regarded their concessions of fishing-rights as terminated by
1 Instractions of Jan. 1 and Jan. 28, 1814; MSS. State Department Records.

' Diary of J. Q. Adams, ill. 61»

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the war; the Americans could not entertain the idea.

The diplomacy that should produce a treaty from such discordant material must show no ordinary excellence; yet even from that point of view the prospect was not encouraging. The British government made a peculiar choice of negotiators. The chief British commissioner, Lord Gambler, was unknown in diplomacy, or indeed in foreign affairs. A writer in the London "Morning Chronicle" of August 9 expressed the general surprise that Government could make no better selection for the chief of its commission than Lord Gambler, "who was a post-captain in 1794, and happened to fight the 'Defence' decently in Lord Howe's action; who slumbered for some time as a Junior Lord of the Admiralty; who sung psalms, said prayers, and assisted in the burning of Copenhagen, for which he was made a lord."

Gambler showed no greater fitness for his difficult task than was to be expected from his training; and the second member of the commission, Henry Goulburn, could not supply Gambler's deficiencies. Goulburn was Under-Secretary of State to Lord Bathurst; he was a very young man, but a typical under-secretary, combining some of Francis James Jackson's temper with the fixed opinions of the elder Rose, and he had as little idea of diplomacy as was to be expected from an Under-Secretary of State for the
colonies. The third and last member was William Adams, Doctor of Civil Law, whose professional knowledge was doubtless supposed to be valuable to the commission, but who was an unknown man, and remained one.

Experience had not convinced the British government that in dealing with the United States it required the best ability it could command. The mistake made by Lord Shelburne in 1783 was repeated by Lord Castlereagh in 1814. The miscalculation of relative ability which led the Foreign Office to assume that Gambler, Goulburn, and William Adams were competent to deal with Gallatin, J. Q. Adams, J. A. Bayard, Clay, and Russell was not reasonable. Probably the whole British public service, including Lords and Commons, could not at that day have produced four men competent to meet Gallatin, J. Q. Adams, Bayard, and Clay on the ground of American interests; and when Castlereagh opposed to them Gambler, Goulburn, and Dr. Adams, he sacrificed whatever advantage diplomacy offered; for in diplomacy as in generalship, the individual commanded success.

The only serious difficulty in the American commission was its excess of strength. By a natural reaction against the attempt to abolish diplomatic offices, the United States government sent into diplomacy its most vigorous men. Under favorable conditions, four minds and wills of so decided a character could not easily work together; but in the Ghent commission an additional difficulty was created by the unfortunate interference of the Senate. Origi-
tally Gallatin, as was due to his age, services, and

**lily, had been the head of the St. Petersburg com-

*; but the Senate refused to confirm the ap-

^^ it. The President at last removed Gallatin

from the Treasury, and renominated him as a member
of the Ghent commission after the other members
had been nominated and confirmed. The Senate
then gave its approval, — thus making Gallatin the
last member of the commission instead of the first,
and placing J. Q. Adams above them all.

Gallatin was peculiarly fitted to moderate a dis-
cordant body like the negotiators, while Adams was
by temperament little suited to the post of modera-
tor, and by circumstances ill-qualified to appear as a
proper representative of the commission in the eyes
of its other members. Unless Gallatin were one of
the loftiest characters and most loyal natures ever
seen in American politics, Adams's chance of suc-
cess in controlling the board was not within reason-
able hope. Gallatin was six years the senior, and
represented the President, with the authority of close
and continuous personal friendship. The board, in-
cluding Adams himself, instinctively bowed to Galla-
tin's authority; but they were deferential to no one
else, least of aU to their nominal head. Bayard,
whose age was the same as that of Adams, was still
in name a Federalist; but although his party trusted
him little more than it trusted Adams or William
Pinkney, who had avowedly become Republicans, he
was not the more disposed to follow Adams's leader*
ship. Clay, though ten years their junior, was the most difficult of all to control; and Jonathan Buswell, though a New Englander, preferred Clay’s social charm, and perhaps also his political prospects, to the somewhat repellent temper and more than doubtful popularity of Adams.

Personal rivalry and jealousies counted for much in such a group; but these were not the only obstacles to Adams's influence. By a misfortune commonly reserved for men of the strongest wills, he represented no one but himself and a powerless minority. His State repudiated and, in a manner, ostracized him. Massachusetts gave him no support, even in defending her own rights; by every means in her power she deprived him of influence, and loaded him with the burden of her own unpopularity. Adams represented a community not only hostile to the war, but avowedly laboring to produce peace by means opposed to those employed at Ghent.

If the Ghent commission should succeed in making a treaty, it could do so only by some sacrifice of Massachusetts which would ruin Adams at home. If the Ghent commission should fail, Adams must be equally ruined by any peace produced through the reasonable intrigues or overt rebellion of his State.

Such a head to a commission so constituted needed all the force of character which Adams had, and some qualities he did not possess, in order to retain enough influence to shape any project into a treaty.
that he could consent to sign; while Gallatin’s singular tact and nobility of character were never more likely to fail than in the effort to make allowance for the difficulties of his chief’s position. Had Castlereagh improved the opportunity by sending to Ghent one competent diplomatist, or even a well-informed and intelligent man of business, like Alexander Baring, he might probably have succeeded in isolating Adams, and in negotiating with the other four commissioners a treaty sacrificing Massachusetts.

The five American commissioners were ready to negotiate in June; but Castlereagh, for obvious reasons, wished delay, and deferred action until August, doubtless intending to prevent the signature of a treaty on the basis of tdi possidetis until after September, when Sherbrooke and Prevost should have occupied the territory intended to be held. In May and June no one in England, unless it were Cobbett, entertained more than a passing doubt of British success on land and water; less; of all did the three British commissioners expect to yield British demands. They came to impose terms, or to break negotiation. They were not sent to yield any point in dispute, or to seek a cessation of arms.

At one o’clock on the afternoon of August 8, the first conference took place in the Hotel des Pays Bas at Ghent. After the usual civilities and forms had passed, Goulburn took the lead, and presented the points which he and his colleagues were authorized to discuss, — (1) Impressment and allegiance; (2) the Indians and their boundary, a sine qua non; (^3) the Canadian boundary; (4) the privilege of
landing and drying fish within British jurisdiction. Goulburn declared that it was not intended to contest the right of the United States to the fisheries, by which he probably meant the deep-sea fisheries; and he was understood to disavow the intention of acquiring territory by the revision of the Canada boundary; but he urged an immediate answer upon the question whether the Americans were instructed on the point made a sine qua non by the British government.

The Americans, seeing as yet only a small part of the British demands, were not so much surprised at Goulburn's points as unable to answer them. The next day they replied in conference that they had no authority to admit either Indian boundary or fisheries into question, being without instructions on these points; and in their turn presented subjects of discussion,—Blockades and Indemnities; but professed themselves willing to discuss everything.

In the conversation following this reply, the British commissioners, with some apparent unwillingness, avowed the intention of erecting the Indian Territory into a barrier between the British possessions and the United States; and the American commissioners declined even to retire for consultation on the possibility of agreeing to such an article. The British commissioners then proposed to suspend conferences until they could receive further instructions, and their wish was followed. Both parties sent despatches to their Governments.

Lord Castlereagh was prompt. As soon as was reasonably possible he sent more precise instructions.
Dated August 14, these supplementary instructions gave to those of July 28 a distinct outline. They proposed the Indian boundary fixed by the Treaty of Greenville for the permanent barrier between British and American dominion, beyond which neither government should acquire land. They claimed also a "rectification" of the Canadian frontier, and the cession of Fort Niagara and Sackett's Harbor, besides a permanent prohibition on the United States from keeping either naval forces or land fortifications on the Lakes. Beyond these demands the British commissioners were not for the present to go, nor were they to ask for a direct cession of territory for Canada "with any view to an acquisition of territory as such, but for the purpose of securing her possessions and preventing future disputes;" yet a small cession of land in Maine was necessary for a road from Halifax to Quebec, and an arrangement of the North-western boundary was required to coincide with the free navigation of the Mississippi.

As soon as the new instructions reached Ghent the British commissioners summoned the Americans to another conference, August 19; and Goulburn, read-

^ Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 86.

> Note of British Commissioners^ Aug. 19, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Affairs, iii. 710.

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ing from Castlereagh's despatch, gave to the Americans a clear version of its contents. ^ When he had finished, Gallatin asked what was to be done with the American citizens — perhaps one hundred thousand in number — already settled beyond the Greenville line, in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan? Goul-
burn and Dr. Adams replied that these people must shift for themselves. They added also that Moose Island and Eastport belonged to Great Britain as indisputably as the county of Northamptonshire, and were not a subject for discussion; but they would not then make a sine qua non of the proposition regarding the Lakes. The conference ended, leaving the Americans convinced that their answer to these demands would close the negotiation. Clay alone, whose knowledge of the Western game of brag stood him in good stead, insisted that the British would recede.^

The British commissioners the next day, August 20, sent an official note containing their demands, and the Americans before sending their reply forwarded the note to America, with despatches dated August 19 and 20, announcing that they intended to return "a unanimous and decided negative." ^ They then undertook the task of drawing up their reply. Upon Adams as head of the commission fell

^ Diary of J. Q. Adams, iii. 17, 18.

* Despatch of Aug. 19, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Affairs, iii70&

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the duty of drafting formal papers, — a duty which, without common consent, no other member could assume. His draft met with little mercy, and the five gentlemen sat until eleven o'clock of August 24, ^^ sifting, erasing, patching, and amending until we were all wearied, though none of us was yet satiated with amendment." At the moment when they gave final shape to the note which they believed
would render peace impossible, the army of General Boss was setting fire to the Capitol at Washington, and President Madison was seeking safety in the Virginia woods.

Only to persons acquainted with the difficulties of its composition did the American note of August 24 show signs of its diverse origin. In dignified temper, witty reasoning creditable to its authors and decisive on its issues, it assured the British negotiators that any such arrangement as they required for the Indians was contrary to precedent in public law, was not founded on reciprocity, and was unnecessary for its professed object in regard to the Indians. The other demands were equally inadmissible: —

"They are founded neither on reciprocity, nor on any of the usual bases of negotiation, neither on that of uti possidetis nor of statii ante heliium. They are above all dishonorable to the United States in demanding from them to abandon territory and a portion of their citizens; to admit a foreign interference in their domestic concerns, and to cease to exercise their natural rights on their own shores and in their own waters. A treaty concluded on such terms would be but an armistice." 

The negotiators were ready to terminate the war, both parties restoring whatever territory might have been taken, and reserving their rights over their respective seamen; but such demands as were made by the British government could not be admitted even for reference.
The American reply was sent to the British commissioners August 25, "and will bring the negotiation," remarked J. Q. Adams, "very shortly to a close."^ The American commissioners prepared to quit Ghent and return to their several posts, while the British commissioners waited for instructions from London. Even Gallatin, who had clung to the hope that he could effect an arrangement, abandoned the idea, and believing that the British government had adopted a system of conquest, prepared for an immediate return to America.^ Goulbum also notified his Government that the negotiation was not likely to continue, and reported some confidential warnings from Bayard that such conditions of peace would not only insure war, but would sacrifice the Federalist party. "It has not made the least impression upon me or upon my colleagues," reported <Goulbum to Bathurst. ^

' Adams's Gallatin, p. 624.

< Goulbum to Bathurst, Aug. 23, 1814; Wellington, Supplementary Despatches, ix. 189.

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At that point the negotiation remained stationary for two months, kept alive by Liverpool, Castlereagh, and Bathurst, while they waited for the result of their American campaign. The despatch of August 20 crossed the Atlantic, and was communicated to Congress October 10, together with all other papers connected with the negotiation; but not until October 25 did the American commissioners write again to their Government.
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The British note of August 19 and the American rejoinder of August 24, brought about a situation where Lord Castlereagh's influence could make itself felt. Castlereagh had signed the British instructions of July 28 and August 14/ and himself brought the latter to Ghent, where he passed August 19, before going to Paris on his way to the Congress at Vienna. He was at Ghent when Goulburn and his colleagues held their conference and wrote their note of August 19;^ and he could not be supposed ignorant of their language or acts. Yet when he received at Paris letters from Goulburn, dated August 24 and 26,^ he expressed annoyance that the American commissioners should have been allowed to place England in the attitude of continuing the war for purposes of conquest, and still more that the British commissioners should be willing to accept that issue and break off negotiation upon it. In a letter

^ Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 67, 86.

s Diary of J. Q. Adams, Aug. 19 and 20, 1814, iii. 19, 21.

* Goulburn to Bathurst, Aug. 24, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 190. Goulburn to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 193.

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to Lord Bathurst, who took charge of the negotiation in his absence, Castlereagh suggested ideas altogether different from those till then advanced in England.^

^^ The substance of the question is," said Castlereagh,
* Are we prepared to continue the war for territorial arrangements? And if not, is this the best time to make our peace, saving all our rights, and claiming the fisheries, which they do not appear to question? In which case the territorial questions might be reserved for ulterior discussion. Or is it desirable to take the chance of the campaign, and then to be governed by circumstances? • • • If we thought an immediate peace desirable, as they are ready to waive all the abstract questions, perhaps they might be prepared to sign a provisional article of Indian peace as distinct from limits, and relinquish their pretensions to the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, and possibly to admit minor adjustments of frontier, including a right of communication from Quebec to Halifax across their territory. But while I state this, I feel the difficulty of so much letting down the question under present circumstances."

At the same time Castlereagh wrote to Goulburn, directing him to wait at Ghent for new instructions from London. Lord Liverpool shared his disapproval of the manner in which the British commissioners had managed the case, and replied to Castlereagh,

^ Castlereagh to Bathurst, Aug. 28, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, X. 100.

* Castlereagh to Goulburn, Aug. 28, 1814; Castlereagh Correspondence, X* 102.

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September 2, that the Cabinet had already acted in the sense he wished: ^ —
Oar commissioners had certainly taken a very erroneous view of our policy. If the negotiation had been allowed to break off upon the two notes already presented, or upon such an answer as they were disposed to return, I am satisfied that the war would have become quite popular in America.

The idea that the war might become popular in America was founded chiefly on the impossibility of an Englishman's conceiving the contrary; but in truth the Ministry most feared that the war might become unpopular in England.

"It is very material to throw the rupture of the negotiation, if it is to take place, upon the Americans," wrote Liverpool, the same day, to the Duke of Wellington; and not to allow them to say that we have brought forward points as ultimata which were only brought forward for discussion, and at the desire of the American commissioners themselves. The American note is a most impudent one, and, as to all its reasoning, capable of an irresistible answer."

New instructions were accordingly approved in Cabinet. Drawn by Bathurst, and dated September 1, they contained what Liverpool considered an "irresistible answer" to the American note of August 24;

^ Liverpool to Castlereagh, Sept. 2, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 214.

• Liverpool to Wellington, Sept. 2, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 212.

* Draft of note, etc., Sept. 1, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 245.
but their force of logic was weakened by the admission that the previous British demands, though certainly stated as a sine qua non, were in reality not to be regarded as such. In private this retreat was covered by the pretext that it was intended only to keep the negotiation alive until better terms could be exacted.

"We cannot expect that the negotiation will proceed at present," continued Liverpool's letter to Castlereagh; "but I think it not unlikely, after our note has been delivered in, that the American commissioners will propose to refer the subject to their Government. In that case the negotiation may be adjourned till the answer is received, and we shall know the result of the campaign before it can be resumed. If our commander does his duty, I am persuaded we shall have acquired by our arms every point on the Canadian frontier which we ought to insist on keeping."

Lord Goulburn and his colleagues communicated their new instructions to the American negotiators in a long note dated September 4, and were answered by a still longer note dated September 9, which was also sent to London, and considered in Cabinet. Bathurst felt no anxiety about the negotiation in its actual stage. Goulburn wrote to him that "as long as we answer their notes, I believe that they will be ready to give us replies" and urged only that Sir George Prevost should happen his reluctant movements in Canada.

1 Goulburn to Bathurst, Sept. 5 and IS, 1814; Wellington. Supplementary Despatches, ix. 221, 265.
Bathurst wrote more instructions, dated September 16, directing his commissioners to abandon the demands for Indian territory and exclusive control of the Lakes, and to ask only that the Indians should be included in the peace. The British commissioners sent their note with these concessions to the Americans September 19; and then for the first time the Americans began to suspect the possibility of serious negotiation. For six weeks they had dealt only with the question whether they should negotiate at all.

The demand that the Indians should be included in the treaty was one that under favorable circumstances the Americans would have rejected; but none of them seriously thought of rejecting it as their affairs then stood. When the American commissioners discussed the subject among themselves, September 20, Adams proposed to break off the negotiation on that issue; but Gallatin good-naturedly overruled him, and Adams would not himself, on cool reflection, have ventured to take such responsibility. Indeed, he suggested an article for an Indian amnesty, practically accepting the British demand. He also yielded to Gallatin the ungrateful task of drafting the answers to the British notes; and thus Gallatin became in effect the head of the commission.

All Gallatin's abilities were needed to fill the place. In his entire public life he had never been required to

^ Draft of note, etc., Sept. 16, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 263.

s Diary of J. Q. Adams, Sept 20, 1814, iii. 38.

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manage so unruly a set of men. The British commis-
sioners were trying, and especially Ooulbum was
aggressive in temper and domineering in tone; but
with them Gallatin had little trouble. Adams and
Clay were persons of a different type, as far removed
from British heaviness as they were from the Vir-
ginian ease of temper which marked the Cabinet of
Jefferson, or the incompetence which characterized
that of Madison. Gallatin was obliged to exert all
his faculties to control his colleagues; but when-
ever he succeeded, he enjoyed the satisfaction of feel-
ing that he had colleagues worth controlling. They
were bent on combat, if not with the British, at
all events with each other; and Gallatin was partly
amused and partly annoyed by the unnecessary energy
of their attitude.

The first divergence occurred in framing the reply
to the British note of September 19, which while
yielding essentials made a series of complaints
against the United States,—and among the rest re-
proached them for their attempt to conquer Canada,
and their actual seizure of Florida. Adams, who
knew little about the secrets of Jefferson’s and Madi-
on’s Administrations, insisted on resenting the Brit-
ish charges, and especially on justifying the United
States government in its attacks upon Florida. Bay-
ard protested that he could not support such a view,
because he had himself publicly in Congress de-
nounced the Government on the subject of Florida;
and Gallatin was almost equally committed, for, as he

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frankly said, he had opposed in Cabinet for a whole
year what had been done in Florida before he could
succeed in stopping it. Clay said nothing, but he
had strong reasons for wishing that the British nego-
tiators should not be challenged to quote his notorious speeches on the conquest of Canada. Adams produced Monroe's instructions, and in the end compelled his colleagues to yield. His mistake in pressing such an issue was obvious to every one but himself, and would have been evident to him had he not been blinded by irritation at the British note. His colleagues retaliated by summarily rejecting as cant his argument that moral and religious duty required the Americans to take and settle the land of the Indians.^

After much discussion their note was completed and sent, September 26, to the British commissioners,^ who forwarded it as usual to London, with a letter from Goulburn of the same date, written in the worst possible temper, and charging the American commissioners with making a variety of false and fraudulent statements.^

While the British Cabinet detained it longer than usual for consideration, the Americans at Ghent felt their position grow weaker day by day.

^ Diary of J. Q. Adams, Sept. 25, 1814, iii. 41.

s Diary of J. Q. Adams, Sept. 25, 1814, iii. 42.

* American note of Sept. 26, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Affairs, iii. 719.

^ Goulburn to Bathurst, Sept 26, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 287.

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Nodiiig warranted a aeriooB hope of peace. Goul« bfmn and his coUeaghes showed no tiiougfat of rield^ ing acoeptaUe CQnditi<s. The London ^ Courier^
of September 29 announced what might be taken for a semi-official expression of the Ministry: —

*' Peace they [the Americans] may make, but it must be on condition that America has not a foot of land on the waters of the St. Lawrence, ... no settlement on the Lakes, • • • no renewal of the treaties of 1783 and 1794; • • • and they must explicitly abandon their new-fangled principles of the law of nations.**

Liverpool, writing to Castlereagh September 28, ^ said that in his opinion the Cabinet had ^^ now gone to the utmost justifiable point in concession, and if they [the Americans] are so unreasonable as to reject our proposals, we have nothing to do but to fight it out. The military accounts from America are on the whole satisfactory." The news of the cruel humiliation at Bladensburg and the burning of Washington arrived at Ohent October 1, and caused British and Americans alike to expect a long series of British triumphs, especially on Lake Champlain, where they know the British force to be overwhelming.

Goulburn exerted himself to produce a rupture. His letter of September 26 to Bathurst treated the American offer of an Indian amnesty as a rejection of the British ultimatum. Again Lord Bathurst set him right by sending him, October 5, the draft of a reciprocal article replacing the Indians in their situation before the war; and the British commissioners in a note dated October 8^1814, communicated this article once more as an ultimatum. ^ Harrison's treaty of
July 22 with the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanees, and other tribes, binding them to take up arms against the British, had then arrived, and this news lessened the interest of both parties in the Indian question. None of the American negotiators were prepared to break off negotiations on that point at such a time, and Clay was so earnest to settle the matter that he took from Oallatin and Adams the task of writing the necessary acceptance of the British ultimatum. Gallatin and Clay decided to receive the British article as according entirely with the American offer of amnesty, and the note was so written.\(^\) 

With this cordial admission of the British ultimatum the Americans coupled an intimation that the time had come when an exchange of general projects for the proposed treaty should be made. More than two months of discussion had then resulted only in eliminating the Indians from the dispute, and in agreeing to maintain silence in regard to the Lakes. Another great difficulty which had been insuperable was voluntarily removed by President Madison and his Cabinet, who after long and obstinate resistance at

\(^\) British note of Oct. 8, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Affairs, iii. 721.

* American note of Oct 13, 1814 ; State Papers, Foreign Affairs, iii. 723.

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last authorized the commissioners, by instruction dated June 27, to omit impression from the treaty. Considering the frequent positive declarations of the United States government, besides the rejection of Monroe's treaty in 1807 and of Admiral Warren's and Sir George Prevost's armistice of 1812 for
want of an explicit concession on that point, Monroe's letter of June 27 was only to be excused as an act of common-sense or of necessity. The President preferred to represent it as an act of common-sense, warranted by the peace in Europe, which promised to offer no further occasion for the claim or the denial of the British right. On the same principle the subject of blockades was withdrawn from discussion; and these concessions, balanced by the British withdrawal from the Indian ultimatum and the Lake armaments, relieved the American commissioners of all their insuperable difficulties.

The British commissioners were not so easily rescued from their imtenable positions. The American note of October 13, sent as usual to London, was answered by Bathurst October 18 and 20, in instructions revealing the true British terms more completely than had yet been ventured. Bathurst at length came to the cardinal point of the negotiation. As the American commissioners had said in their note of August 24, the British government must choose between the two ordinary bases of treaties of peace, — the state before the war, or status...

* Castlereagh Correspondence, x. 168-173.

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ante helium; and the state of possession, or uti possidetis. Until the middle of October, 1814, the uti possidetis as a basis of negotiation, included what ever country might have been occupied by Sir George Prevost in his September campaign. Bathurst from the first intended to insist on the state of possession,
but had not thought proper to avow it. His instructions of October 18 and 20 directed the British commissioners to come to the point, and to claim the basis of uti possidetis from the American negotiators:

"On their admitting this to be the basis on which they are ready to negotiate, but not before they have admitted it, you will proceed to state the mutual accommodations which may be entered into in conformity with this basis. The British occupy Fort Michillimackinaw, Fort Niagara, and all the country east of the Penobscot. On the other hand the forces of the United States occupy Fort Erie and Fort Amherstburg [Maiden]. On the government of the United States consenting to restore these two forts, Great Britain is ready to restore the forts of Castine and Machias, retaining Fort Niagara and Fort Michillimackinaw."

Thus the British demand, which had till then been intended to include half of Maine and the whole south bank of the St. Lawrence River from Plattsburg to Sackett's Harbor, suddenly fell to a demand for Moose Island, a right of way across the northern angle of Maine, Fort Niagara with five miles circuit, and the Island of Mackinaw. The reason for the

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new spirit of moderation was not far to seek. On the afternoon of October 17, while the British Cabinet was still deliberating on the basis of uti possidetis^ news reached London that the British invasion of northern New York, from which so much had been expected, had totally failed, and that Prevost's large army had precipitately retreated into Canada. The London "Times" of October 19 was frank in its expressions of disappointment:-
"This is a lamentable event to the civilized world. . . . The subversion of that system of fraud and malignity which constitutes the whole policy of the Jeffersonian school . . . was an event to which we should have bent and yet must bend all our energies. The present American government must be displaced, or it will sooner or later plant its poisoned dagger in the heart of the parent State."

The failure of the attempt on Baltimore and Drummond's bloody repulse at Fort Erie became known at the same time, and coming together at a critical moment threw confusion into the Ministry and their agents in the press and the diplomatic service throughout Europe. The "Courier" of October 26 declared that "peace with America is neither practicable nor desirable till we have wiped away this late disaster;" but the "Morning Chronicle" of October 21-24 openly intimated that the game of war was at an end. October 31, the Paris correspondent of the London "Times" told of the cheers that rose from the crowds in the Palais Royal gardens at each recital of the Flattsburg defeat; and October 21 Goulburn wrote from Ghent to Bathurst,^ —

<^ The news from America is very far from satisfactory. Even our brilliant success at Baltimore, as it did not terminate in the capture of the town, will be considered by the Americans as a victory and not as an escape. . . . If it were not for the want of fuel in Boston, T should be
quite in despair."

In truth the blockade was the single advantage held by England; and even in that advantage the Americans had a share long as their cruisers surrounded the British Islands.

Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh, October 21, commenting severely on Prevost's failure, and finding consolation only in the thought that the Americans showed themselves even less patriotic than he had supposed them to be: —

<< The capture and destruction of Washington has not united the Americans: quite the contrary. We have gained more credit with them by saving private property than we have lost by the destruction of their public works and buildings. Madison clings to office, and I am strongly inclined to think that the best thing for us is that he should remain there."

Castlereagh at Vienna found himself unable to make the full influence of England felt, so long as

^ Elk>album to Bathorst; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 366.

* Liverpool to Castlereagh, Oct. 21, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 367.

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Buch mortifjing disasters by land and sea proved her inability to deal with an enemy she persisted in
calling contemptible.

On the American commissioners the news came^ October 21, with the effect of a reprieve from execution. Gallatin was deeply moved; Adams could not believe the magnitude of the success; but as far as regarded their joint action, the overthrow of England's scheme produced no change. Their tone had always been high, and they saw no advantage to be gained by altering it. The British commissioners sent to them, October 21, the substance of the new instructions, offering the basis of uti possidetis^ subject to modifications for mutual convenience.^ The Americans by common consent, October 23, declined to treat on that basis, or on any other than the mutual restoration of territory.^ They thought that the British government was still playing with them, when in truth Lord Bathurst had yielded the chief part of the original British demand, and had come to what the whole British empire regarded as essentials, — the right of way to Quebec, and the exclusion of American fishermen from British shores and waters.

The American note of October 24, bluntly rejecting the basis of uti possidetis^ created a feeling akin to

^ British note of Oct. 21, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Affairs, 2iL724.

^ American note of Oct 24, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Affairs, iii 725.

38 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. Ch.<. consternation in the British Cabinet. At first, ministers' assumed that the war must go on, and deliberated only on the point to be preferred for a rupture. " We
still think it desirable to gain a little more time before the negotiation is brought to a close," wrote Liverpool to the Duke of Wellington,^ October 28; and on the same day he wrote to Castlereagh at Vienna to warn him that the American war " will probably now be of some duration," and treating of its embarrassments without disguise.\(^1\) The Czar's conduct at Vienna had annoyed and alarmed all the great Powers, and the American war gave him a decisive advantage over England; but even without the Russian complication, the prospect for ministers was not cheering.

\(^{1}\) Looking to a continuance of the American war, our financial state is far from satisfactory," wrote Lord Liverpool; " . . . the American war will not cost us less than £10,000,000, in addition to our peace establishment and other expenses. We must expect, therefore, to hear it said that the property tax is continued for the purpose of securing a better frontier for Canada."

A week passed without bringing encouragement to the British Cabinet. On the contrary the Ministry learned that a vigorous prosecution of hostilities would cost much more than ten million pounds, and

1 Liverpool to Wellington, Oct. 28, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 384.

' Liverpool to Castlereagh, Oct. 28, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 382.
that ^^ the continuance of the American war will entail upon us a prodigious expense, much more than we had any idea of." A Cabinet meeting was to be held the next day, November 3, to review the whole course of policy as to America.

Throughout the American difficulties, from first to last, the most striking quality shown by the British government was the want of intelligence which caused the war, and marked the conduct of both the war and the negotiations. If the foreign relations of every government were marked by the same character, politics could be no more than rivalry in the race to blunder; but in October, 1814, another quality almost equally striking became evident. The weakness of British councils was as remarkable as their want of intelligence. The government of England had exasperated the Americans to an animosity that could not forget or forgive, and every dictate of self-interest required that it should carry out its policy to the end. Even domestic politics in Parliament might have been more easily managed by drawing public criticism to America, while in no event could taxes be reduced to satisfy the public demand.^ Another year

* Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 2, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, iz. 382.

s Liverpool to Castlereagh, Jan. 16, 1815; Castlereagh Correspondence, X. 240.
ministers to prefer.

So the Cabinet evidently thought; but instead of making a decision, the Cabinet council of November 8 resorted to the expedient of shifting responsibility upon the Duke of Wellington. The Duke was then Ambassador at Paris. His life had been threatened by angry officers of Napoleon, who could not forgive his victories at Vittoria and Toulouse. For his own security he might be sent to Canada, and if he went, he should go with full powers to close the war as he pleased.

The next day, November 4, Liverpool wrote to Wellington, explaining the wishes of the Cabinet, and inviting him to take the entire command in Canada, in order to bring the war to an honorable conclusion. Wellington replied November 9, — and his words were the more interesting because, after inviting and receiving so decided an opinion from so high an authority, the Government could not easily reject it. Wellington began by reviewing the military situation, and closed by expressing his opinion on the diplomatic contest:*

"I have already told you and Lord Bathurst that I feel no objection to going to America, though I don't

^ Liverpool to Wellington, Nov. 4, 1814; Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 4, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, i. 404, 406.

* Wellington to Castlereagh, Nov. 9, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, i. 426.

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promise to myself much success there. I believe there
are troops enough there for the defence of Canada forever, and even for the accomplishment of any reasonable offensive plan that could be formed from the Canadian frontier. I am quite sure that all the American armies of which I have ever read would not beat out of a field of battle the troops that went from Bordeaux last summer, if common precautions and care were taken of them. That which appears to me to be wanting in America is not a general, or a general officer and troops, but a naval superiority on the Lakes."

These views did not altogether accord with those of Americans, who could not see that the British generals made use of the Lakes even when controlling them, but who saw the troops of Wellington retire from one field of battle after another, — at Plattsburg, Baltimore, and New Orleans, — while taking more than common precautions. Wellington's military comments showed little interest in American affairs, and evidently he saw nothing to be gained by going to Canada. His diplomatic ideas betrayed the same bias:

** In regard to your present negotiations, I confess that I think you have no right, from the state of the war, to demand any concession of territory from, America. . . . You have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military success and now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory on the point of attack. You cannot on any principle of equality in negotiation claim a cession of territory excepting in exchange for other advan-

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tages which you have hi your power. • • • Then if this reasoning be true, why stipulate for the uti possidetis? You can get no territory; indeed, the state of your mili-
tary operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand any."

After such an opinion from the first military authority of England, the British Ministry had no choice but to abandon its claim for territory. Wellington's letter reached London about November 13, and was duly considered in the Cabinet. Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh, November 18, that the Ministry had made its decision; the claim for territory was to be abandoned. For this retreat he alleged various excuses,—such as the unsatisfactory state of the negotiations at Vienna, and the alarming condition of France; the finances, the depression of rents, and the temper of Parliament. Such reasoning would have counted for nothing in the previous month of May, but six months wrought a change in public feeling. The war had lost public favor. Even the colonial and shipping interests and the navy were weary of it, while the army had little to expect from it but hard service and no increase of credit. Every Englishman who came in contact with Americans seemed to suffer. Broke, the only victor by sea, was a lifelong invalid; and Brock and Ross, the only victors on land, had paid for their success with their lives. Incessant disappointment made the war an unpleasant thought with Englishmen. The burning of Washington was an exploit of which they could not boast. The rate of marine insurance was a daily and intolerable annoyance. So rapidly did the war decline in favor, that in the first half of December it was declared to be decidedly unpopular by one of the most

^ Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 18, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 438*

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thought with Englishmen. The burning of Washington was an exploit of which they could not boast. The rate of marine insurance was a daily and intolerable annoyance. So rapidly did the war decline in favor, that in the first half of December it was declared to be decidedly unpopular by one of the most
judicious English liberals, Francis Homer; although Horner held that the Americans, as the dispute then stood, were the aggressors. The tone of the press showed the same popular tendency, for while the "Times" grumbled loudly over the Canada campaign, the "Morning Chronicle" no longer concealed its hostility to the war, and ventured to sneer at it, talking of "the entire defeat and destruction of the last British fleet but one; for it has become necessary to particularize them now."*

While the Cabinet still waited, the first installment of Ghent correspondence to August 20, published in America October 10, returned to England November 18, and received no flattering attention. **We cannot compliment our negotiators," remarked the "Morning Chronicle;" and the "Times" was still less pleased. "The British government has been tricked into bringing forward demands which it had not the power to enforce. . . . Why treat at all with Mr. Madison?" In Parliament, November 19, the liberal opposition attacked the Government

^ Homer to J. A. Murray, Dec. 10, 1814; Homer's Memoirs^
IL213.

< The Morning Chronicle, Nov. 19, 1814.

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for setting up novel pretensions. Ministers needed no more urging, and Bathurst thenceforward could not be charged with waste of time.

During this interval of more than three weeks the negotiators at Ghent were left to follow their own devices. In order to provide the Americans with occupation, the British commissioners sent them a
note dated October 31 calling for a counter-project, since the basis of uti possidetis was refused. This note, with all the others since August 20, was sent by the Americans to Washington on the same day, October 81; and then Gallatin and Adams began the task of drafting the formal project of a treaty. Immediately the internal discords of the commission broke into earnest dispute. A struggle began between the East and the West over the fisheries and the Mississippi.

The treaty of 1783 coupled the American right of fishing in British waters and curing fish on British shores with the British right of navigating the Mississippi River. For that arrangement the elder Adams was responsible. The fisheries were a Massachusetts interest. At Paris in 1783 John Adams, in season and out of season, with his colleagues and with the British negotiators, insisted, with the intensity of conviction, that the fishing rights which the New England people held while subjects of the British crown were theirs by no grant or treaty, but as

^ British note of Oct. 31, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Relations, iii. 726.

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a natural right, which could not be extinguished by war; and that where British subjects had a right to fish, whether on coasts or shores, in bays, inlets, creeks, or harbors, Americans had the same right, to be exercised wherever and whenever they pleased. John Adams's persistence secured the article of the definitive treaty, which, without expressly admitting a natural right, coupled the in-shore fisheries and the navigation of the Mississippi with the recognition of independence. In 1814 as in 1783 John Adams
clung to his trophies, and his son would have waged indefinite war rather than break his father's heart by sacrificing what he had won; but at Ghent the son stood in isolation which the father in the worst times had never known. Massachusetts left him to struggle alone for a principle that needed not only argument but force to make it victorious. Governor Strong did not even write to him as he did to Pickering, that Massachusetts would give an equivalent in territory for the fisheries. As far as the State could influence the result, the fisheries were to be lost by default.

Had Adams encountered only British opposition he might have overborne it as his father had done; but since 1788 the West had become a political power, and Louisiana had been brought into the Union. If the fisheries were recognized as an indefeasible right by the treaty of 1783, the British liberty of navigating the Mississippi was another indefeasible right, which must revive with peace. The Western people

naturally objected to such a proposition. Neither they nor the Canadians could be blamed for unwillingness to impose a mischievous servitude forever upon their shores, and Clay believed his popularity to depend on preventing an express recognition of the British right to navigate the Mississippi. Either Clay or Adams was sure to refuse signing any treaty which expressly sacrificed the local interests of either.

In this delicate situation only the authority and skill of Gallatin saved the treaty. At the outset of the discussion, October 30, Gallatin quietly took the lead from Adams's hands, and assumed the champion-
ship of the fisheries by proposing to renew both privileges, making the one an equivalent for the other. Clay resisted obstinately, while Gallatin gently and patiently overbore him. When Gallatin's proposal was put to the vote November 6, Clay and Russell alone opposed it, — and the support then given by Russell to Clay was never forgotten by Adams. Clay still refusing to sign the offer, Gallatin continued his pressure, until at last, November 10, Clay consented to insert, not in the project of treaty, but in the note which accompanied it, a paragraph declaring that the commissioners were not authorized to bring into discussion any of the rights hitherto enjoyed in the fisheries: "Prom their nature, and from the peculiar character of the treaty of 1783 by which they were recognized, no further stipulation has been deemed necessary by the Government of the United States to entitle them to the full enjoyment of all of them."

Clay signed the note, though unwillingly; and it was sent, November 10, with the treaty project, to the British commissioners, who forwarded it to London, where it arrived at the time when the British Cabinet had at last decided on peace. Bathurst sent his reply in due course; and Goulburn's disgust was great to find that instead of breaking negotiation on the point of the fisheries as he wished, he was required once more to give way. "You know that I was never much inclined to give way to the Americans," he wrote, November 26. "I am still less inclined to do so after the statement of our demands with which the negotiation opened, and which has in every point of view proved most unfortunate."

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States to entitle them to the full enjoyment of all of them."
The British reply, dated November 26,* took no notice of the American reservation as to the fisheries, but inserted in the project the old right of navigating the Mississippi. Both Bathurst and Ooulbum thought that their silence, after the American declaration, practically conceded the American right to the fisheries, though Gambler and Dr. Adams thought

* American note of Nov. 10, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Belations, iii. 733.

Gtoulbum to Bathurst, Nov. 10, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 427.

Goulbum to Bathurst, Nov. 10, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, ix. 452.

British note of Nov. 26, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Belations, iii 740.

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differently.* In either case the British note of November 26, though satisfactory to Adams, was far from agreeable to Clay, who was obliged to endanger the peace in order to save the Mississippi. Adams strongly inclined to take the British project precisely as it was offered,* but Gallatin overruled him, and Clay would certainly have refused to sign. In discussing the subject, November 28, Gallatin proposed to accept the article on the navigation of the Mississippi if the British would add a provision recognizing the fishing rights. Clay lost his temper, and intimated something more than willingness to let Massachusetts pay for the pleasure of peace;* but during the whole day of November 28, and with the same patience November 29, Gallatin continued urging Clay and restraining Adams, until at last on the
third day he brought the matter to the point he wished.

The result of this long struggle saved not indeed the fisheries, but the peace. Clay made no further protest when, in conference with the British commissioners December 1, the Americans offered to renew both the disputed rights.* Their proposal was sent to London, and was answered by Bathurst December 6, in a letter offering to set aside for future negotiation

* Goulbum to Bathurst, Nov. 26, 1814; Wellington Supplementary Despatches, iz. 452.

« Diary of J. Q. Adams, Nov. 27, 1814, iii. 70.

* Diary of J. Q. Adams, iii. 72.

^ Protocol of Dec. 1, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Relations, iz. 748.

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the terms under which the old fishing liberty and the navigation of the Mississippi should be continued for fair equivalents.^ The British commissioners communicated this suggestion in conference December 10, and threw new dissension among the Americans.

The British offer to reserve both disputed rights for future negotiation implied that both rights were forfeited, or subject to forfeiture, by war,—an admission which Adams could not make, but which the other commissioners could not reject. At that point Adam» found himself alone. Even Gallatin admitted that the claim to the natural right of catching and curing-fish on British shores was untenable, and could never
be supported. Adams's difficulties were the greater because the question of peace and war was reduced to two points,—the fisheries and Moose Island,—both interesting to Massachusetts alone. Yet the Americans were unwilling to yield without another struggle, and decided still to resist the British claim as inconsistent with the admitted basis of the status ante helium.

The struggle with the British commissioners then became warm. A long conference, December 12, brought no conclusion. The treaty of 1783 could neither be followed nor ignored, and perplexed the Englishmen as much as the Americans. During December 13 and December 14, Adams continued to

^ Bathurst to the Commissioners, Dec 6, 1814; Castlereagh. Correspondence» x. 214.

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press his colleagues to assert the natural right to the fisheries, and to insist on the permanent character of the treaty of 1783; but Gallatin would not consent to make that point an ultimatum. All the commissioners except Adams resigned themselves to the sacrifice of the fisheries; but Gallatin decided to make one more effort before abandoning the struggle, and with that object drew up a note rejecting the British stipulation because it implied the abandonment of a right, but offering either to be silent as to both the fisheries and the Mississippi, or to admit a general reference to further negotiation of all subjects in dispute, so expressed as to imply no abandonment of right.
The note was signed and sent December 14,^ and the Americans waited another week for the answer. Successful as they had been in driving their British antagonists from one position after another, they were not satisfied. Adams still feared that he might not be able to sign, and Clay was little better pleased. ^^ He said we should make a damned bad treaty, and he did not know whether he would sign it or not."^ Whatever Adams thought of the treaty, his respect for at least two of his colleagues was expressed in terms of praise rarely used by him. Writing to his wife, September 27,* Adams said: "Mr. Gallatin

^ American note of Dec. 14, 1814; State Papers, Foreign Relations, iii. 743.


« J. Q. Adams to his wife, Sept 27, 1814; Adams MSS.

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keepB and increases his influence over us all. It would have been an irreparable loss if our country had been deprived of the benefit of his talents in this negotiation." At the moment of final suspense he wrote again, December 16: —

^^Of the five members of the American mission, the Chevalier [Bayard] has the most perfect control of his temper, the most deliberate coolness; and it is the more meritorious because it is real self-command. His feelings are as quick and his spirits as high as those of any one among us, but he certainly has them more under government. I can scarcely express to you how much both he and Mr. Gallatin have risen in my esteem since we have been here living together. Gallatin has not quite so constant a supremacy over his own emotions; yet
he seldom yields to an ebullition of temper, and recovers from it immediately. He has a faculty, when discussion grows too warm, of turning off its edge by a joke, which I envy him more than all his other talents; and he has in his character one of the most extraordinary combinations of stubbornness and of flexibility that I ever met with in man. His greatest fault I think to be an ingenuity sometimes trenching upon ingenuousness."

Gallatin's opinion of Adams was not so enthusiastic as Adams's admiration for him. He thought Adam's chief fault to be that he lacked judgment "to a deplorable degree." ^ Of Clay, whether in his merits or his faults, only one opinion was possible. Clay's character belonged to the simple Southern or Virginia type, somewhat affected, but

^ Adams's Gallatin, p. 599.

not rendered more complex, by Western influence, — and transparent beyond need of description or criticism.

The extraordinary patience and judgment of Gallatin, aided by the steady support of Bayard, carried all the American points without sacrificing either Adams or Clay, and with no quarrel of serious importance on any side. When Lord Bathurst received the American note of December 14, he replied December 19, yielding the last advantage he possessed: ^ "The Prince Regent regrets to find that there does not appear any prospect of being able to arrive at
such an arrangement with regard to the fisheries as would have the effect of coming to a full and satisfactory explanation on that subject;" but since this was the case, the disputed article might be altogether omitted.

Thus the treaty became simply a cessation of hostilities, leaving every claim on either side open for future settlement. The formality of signature was completed December 24, and closed an era of American history. In substance, the treaty sacrificed much on both sides for peace. The Americans lost their claims for British spoliations, and were obliged to admit question of their right to Eastport and their fisheries in British waters; the British failed to establish their principles of impressment and blockade, and admitted question of their right to navigate the Mississippi and trade with the Indians.

^ Castlereaghi Correspondence, z. 221.

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Perhaps at the moment the Americans were the chief losers; but they gained their greatest triumph in referring all their disputes to be settled by time, the final negotiator, whose decision they could safely trust.
ings of mixed anger and satisfaction. The "Morning Chronicle" seemed surprised at the extreme interest which the news excited. As early as November 24, when ministers made their decision to concede the American terms, the "Morning Chronicle" announced that "a most extraordinary sensation was produced yesterday" by news from Ghent, and by reports that ministers had abandoned their ground. When the treaty arrived, December 26, the same Whig newspaper, the next morning, while observing that ministers had "humbled themselves in the dust and thereby brought discredit on the country," heartily approved what they had done; and added that the city was in a complete state of hurricane during the whole of yesterday, but the storm did not attain its utmost height until toward the evening.

. . . Purchases were made to the extent of many hundred thousand pounds." The importance of the United States to England was made more apparent by the act of peace than by the pressure of war. **At Birmingham," said the "Courier," "an immense assemblage witnessed the arrival of the mail.

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and immediately took the horses out, and drew the mail to the post-office with the loudest acclamations," — acclamations over a treaty universally regarded as discreditable.

The "Times" admitted the general joy, and denied only that it was universal. If the "Times" in any degree represented public opinion, the popular satisfaction at the peace was an extraordinary political symptom, for in its opinion the Government had accepted terms such as "might have been expected from an indulgent and liberal conqueror. . . . We have retired from the combat," it said, December 80,
"with the stripes yet bleeding on our back, — with the recent defeats at Plattsburg and on Lake Champlain unavenged." During several succeeding weeks the "Times" continued its extravagant complaints, which served only to give the Americans a new idea of the triumph they had won.

In truth, no one familiar with English opinion during the past ten years attempted to deny that the government of England must admit one or the other of two conclusions, — either it had ruinously mismanaged its American policy before the war, or it had disgraced itself by the peace. The "Morning Chronicle," while approving the treaty, declared that the Tories were on this point at odds with their own leaders: "Their attachment to the ministers, though strong, cannot reconcile them to this one step, though surely if they would look back with an impartial eye on the imbecility and error with which their idols conducted the war, they must acknowledge their prudence in putting an end to it. One of them very honestly said, two days ago, that if they had not put an end to the war, the war would have put an end to their Ministry." Whatever doubts existed about the temper of England before that time, no one doubted after the peace of Ghent that war with the United States was an unpopular measure with the British people.

Nevertheless the "Times" and the Tories continued their complaints until March 9, when two simultaneous pieces of news silenced criticism of the American treaty. The severe defeat at New Orleans became known at the moment when Napoleon, having
quitted Elba, began his triumphal return to Paris. These news, coming in the midst of Corn Riots, silenced further discussion of American relations, and left ministers free to redeem at Waterloo the failures they had experienced in America.

In the United States news of peace was slow to arrive. The British sloop-of-wal* "Favorite" bore the despatches, and was still at sea when the month of February began. The commissioners from Massachusetts and Connecticut, bearing the demands of the Hartford Convention, started for Washington. Every one was intent on the situation of New Orleans, where a disaster was feared. Congress seemed to have abandoned the attempt to provide means of defence, although it began another effort to create a

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bank on Dallas's plan. A large number of the most intelligent citizens believed that two announcementes would soon be made, — one, that New Orleans was lost; the other, that the negotiation at Ghent had ended in rupture. Under this double shock, the collapse of the national government seemed to its enemies inevitable.

In this moment of suspense, the first news arrived from New Orleans. To the extreme relief of the Government and the Republican majority in Congress, they learned, February 4, that the British invasion was defeated and New Orleans saved. The victory was welcomed by illuminations, votes of thanks, and rejoicings greater than had followed the more important success at Plattsburg, or the more brilliant battles at Niagara; for the success won at New Orleans relieved the Government from a load of anxiety, and postponed a crisis supposed to
be immediately at hand. Half the influence of the Hartford Convention was destroyed by it; and the commissioners, who were starting for the capital, had reason to expect a reception less favorable by far than they would have met had the British been announced as masters of Louisiana. Yet the immediate effect of the news was not to lend new vigor to Congress, but rather to increase its inertness, and to encourage its dependence on militia, Treasury notes, and good fortune.

A week afterward, on the afternoon of Saturday, February 11, the British sloop-of-war "Favorite"

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Bailed up New York harbor, and the city quickly heard rumors of peace. At eight o'clock that evening the American special messenger landed, bringing the official documents intrusted to his care; and when the news could no longer be doubted, the city burst into an uproar of joy. The messenger was slow in reaching Washington, where he arrived only on the evening of Tuesday, February 13, and delivered his despatches to the Secretary of State.

Had the treaty been less satisfactory than it was, the President would have hesitated long before advising its rejection, and the Senate could hardly have gaLd coira«e to reject it. In spite of nunox; from London and significant speculations on the London Exchange, known in America in the middle of January, no one had seriously coimted on a satisfactory peace, as was proved by the steady depression of
government credit and of the prices of American staples. The reaction after the arrival of the news was natural, and so violent that few persons stopped to scrutinize the terms. Contrary to Clay's forebodings, the treaty, mere armistice though it seemed to be, was probably the most popular treaty ever negotiated by the United States. The President sent it to the Senate February 15; and the next day, without suggestion of amendment, and apparently without a criticism, unless from Federalists, the Senate unanimously confirmed it, thirty-five senators uniting in approval.

Yet the treaty was not what the Government had

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expected in declaring the war, or such as it had a right to demand. The Republicans admitted it in private, and the Federalists proclaimed it in the press. Senator Gore wrote to Governor Strong: "The treaty must be deemed disgraceful to the Government who made the war and the peace, and will be so adjudged by all, after the first effusions of joy at relief have subsided." Opinions differed widely on the question where the disgrace belonged,—whether to the Government who made the war, or to the people who refused to support it; but no one pretended that the terms of peace, as far as they were expressed in the treaty, were so good as those repeatedly offered by England more than two years before. Yet the treaty was universally welcomed, and not a thought of continued war found expression.

In New England the peace was received with extravagant delight. While the government messenger who carried the official news to Washington made no
haste, a special messenger started from New York at
ten o'clock Saturday night, immediately on the land-
ing of the government messenger, and in thirty-two
hours arrived in Boston. Probably the distance had
rarely been travelled in less time, for the Boston
"Centinel" announced the expense to be two hun-
dred and twenty-five dollars; and such an outlay was
seldom made for rapidity of travel or news. As the
messenger passed from town to town he announced
^ Goie to Strong, Feb. 18^ 1815; Lodge's Cabot^ p. 563.

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the tidings to the delighted people. ^ Reaching the
** Centinel " office, at Boston, early Monday morning,
he delivered his bulletin, and a few minutes after it
was published all the bells were set ringing ; schools
and shops were closed, and a general holiday taken ;
flags were hoisted, the British with the American;
the militia paraded, and in the evening the city was
illuminated. Yet the terms of peace were wholly
unknown, and the people of Massachusetts had
every reason to fear that their interests were sacri-
ficed for the safety of the Union. Their rejoicing
over the peace was as unreasoning as their hatred
of the war.

Only along the Canadian frontier where the farrn^
ers had for three years made large profits by sup-
plying both armies, the peace was received without
rejoicing. ^ South of New York, although less public
delight was expressed, the relief was probably greater
than in New England. Virginia had suffered most,
and had felt the blockade with peculiar severity.
A few weeks before the treaty was signed, Jefferson
wrote ; * —

^^By the total annihilation in value of the produce
which was to give me sustenance and independence, I shall be like Tantalus, — up to the shoulders in water, yet dying with thirst. We can make indeed enough to eat, drink, and clothe ourselves, but nothing for our salt,

^ Goodrich's Recollections, i. 503-505.

« Montreal Herald, March 18, 1815; Niles, viii. 132.

• Jefferson to W. Short, Nov. 28, 1814 ; Works, vi. 3d8.

1«15. CLOSE OF HOSTILITIES & 61

iron, groceries, and taxes which must be paid in money. For what can we raise for the market? Wheat? — we only give it to our horses, as we have been doing ever since harvest. Tobacco? — it is not worth the pipe it is smoked in."

While all Virginia planters were in this situation February 13, they awoke February 14 to find flour worth ten dollars a barrel, and groceries fallen fifty per cent. They were once more rich beyond their wants.

So violent and sudden a change in values had never been known in the United States. The New York market saw fortunes disappear and other fortunes created in the utterance of a single word. All imported articles dropped to low prices. Sugar which sold Saturday at twenty-six dollars a hundred-weight, sold Monday at twelve dollars and a half. Tea sank from two dollars and a quarter to one dollar a pound; tin fell from eighty to twenty-five dollars a box; cotton fabrics declined about fifty per cent. On the other hand flour, cotton, and the other chief staples of American produce rose in the same proportion. Nominally flour was worth seven and a half dollars
on Saturday, though no large amounts could have been sold; on Monday the price was ten dollars, and all the wheat in the country was soon sold at that rate.

Owing to the derangement of currency, these prices expressed no precise specie value. The effect of the peace on the currency was for a moment to restore

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an apparent equilibrium. In New York the specie premium of twenty-two per cent was imagined for a time to have vanished. In truth. United States six-per-cents rose in New York from seventy-six to eighty-eight in paper; Treasury-notes from ninety-two to ninety-eight. In Philadelphia, on Saturday, six-per-cents sold at seventy-five; on Monday, at ninety-three. The paper depreciation remained about twenty per cent in New York, about twenty-four per cent in Philadelphia, and about thirty per cent in Baltimore. The true value of six-per-cents was about sixty-eight; of Treasury notes about seventy-eight, after the announcement of peace.

As rapidly as possible the blockade was raised, and ships were hurried to sea with the harvests of three seasons for cargo; but some weeks still passed before all the operations of war were closed. The news of peace reached the British squadron below Mobile in time to prevent further advance on that place; but on the ocean a long time elapsed before fighting wholly ceased.
Some of the worst disasters as well as the greatest triumphs of the war occurred after the treaty of peace had been signed. The battle of New Orleans was followed by the loss of Fort Bowyer. At about the same time a British force occupied Cumberland Island on the southern edge of the Georgia coast, and January 13 attacked the fort at the entrance of the St. Mary's, and having captured it without loss, ascended the river the next day to the town of

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St. Mary's, which they seized, together with its mer* chandise and valuable ships in the river. Cockburn established his headquarters on Cumberland Island January 22, and threw the whole State of Georgia into agitation, while he waited the arrival of a brigade with which an attack was to be made on Savannah.

The worst disaster of the naval war occurred January 15, when the frigate "President" — one of the three American forty-fours, under Stephen Decatur, the favorite ocean hero of the American service — suffered defeat and capture within fifty miles of Sandy Hook. No naval battle of the war was more disputed in its merits, although its occurrence in the darkest moments of national depression was almost immediately forgotten in the elation of the peace a few days later.

Secretary Jones retired from the Navy Department Dec. 19, 1814, yielding the direction to B. W. Crown-inshield of Massachusetts, but leaving a squadron ready for sea at New York under orders for distant service. The "Peacock" and "Hornet,"* commanded by Warrington and Biddle, were to sail with a store-ship on a long cruise in Indian waters, where they
were expected to ravage British shipping from the Cape of Good Hope to the China seas. With them Decatur was to go in the "President," and at the beginning of the new year he waited only an opportunity to slip to sea past the blockading squadron. January 14 a strong westerly wind drove the British fleet out of sight. The "President" set sail, but in crossing the bar at night grounded, and continued for an hour or more to strike heavily, until the tide and strong wind forced her across. Decatur then ran along the Long Island coast some fifty miles, when he changed his course to the southeast, hoping that he had evaded the blockading squadron. This course was precisely that which Captain Hayes, commanding the squadron, expected; and an hour before daylight the four British ships, standing to the northward and eastward, sighted the "President," standing to the southward and eastward, not more than two miles on the weather-bow of the "Majestic," — the fifty-six-gun razee commanded by Captain Hayes.

The British ships promptly made chase. Captain Hayes's squadron, besides the "Majestic," consisted of the "Endymion," a fifty-gun frigate, with the "Pomone" and "Tenedos," frigates like the "Guerriere," "Macedonian," and "Java," armed with eighteen-pound guns. Only from the "Endymion" had Decatur much to fear, for the "Majestic" was slow and the other ships were weak; but the "Endymion" was a fast sailor, and especially adapted to
meet the American frigates. The "Endymion," according to British authority, was about one hundred and fifty-nine feet in length on the lower deck, and nearly forty-three feet in extreme breadth; the

^ Report of Captain Hayes, Jan. 17, 1815; James, Appendix, p. clxxx; Niles, viii. 176.

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"President," on the same authority, was about one hundred and seventy-three feet in length, and forty-four feet in breadth. The "Endymion" carried twenty-six long twenty-four-pounders on the main deck; the "President" carried thirty. The "Endymion" mounted twenty-two thirty-two pound car-ronades on the spar deck; the "President" mounted twenty. The "Endymion" had also a long brass eighteen-pounder as a bow-chaser; the "President" a long twenty-four-pounder as a bow-chaser, and another as a stern-chaser. The "Endymion" was short-handed after her losses in action with the "Prince de Neufchatel," and carried only three hundred and forty-six men; the "President" carried four hundred and fifty. The "Endymion" was the weaker ship, probably in the proportion of four to five; but for her immediate purpose she possessed a decisive advantage in superior speed, especially in light winds.

At two o'clock in the afternoon, the "Endymion" had gained so much on the "President" as to begin exchanging shots between the stern and bow-chasers. ^ Soon after five o'clock, as the wind fell, the "Endymion" crept up on the "President's" starboard quarter, and "commenced close action." * After bearing the enemy's fire for half an hour without reply, Decatur was obliged to alter his course and accept
battle, or suffer himself to be crippled. The bat tie lasted two hours and a half, until eight o'clock, when firing ceased; but at half-past nine, according to the "Pomone's" log, the "Endymion" fired two guns, which the "President" returned with one.* According to Decatur's account the "Endymion" lay for half an hour under his stem, without firing, while the "President" was trying to escape. In truth the "Endymion" had no need to fire; she was busy bending new sails, while Decatur's ship, according to his official report, was crippled, and in the want of wind could not escape.

In a letter written by Decatur to his wife immediately after the battle, he gave an account of what followed, as he understood it.*

**"The *Endymion,"" he began, . . . "was the leading ship of the enemy. She got close under my quarters and was cutting my rigging without my being able to bring a gun to bear upon her. To suffer this was making my capture certain, and that too without injury to the enemy. I therefore bore up for the 'Endymion' and engaged her for two hours, when we silenced and beat her
off. At this time the rest of the ships had got within two miles of us. We made all the sail we could from them, but it was in vain. In three hours the ^Pomone' and ^Tenedos' were alongside, and the *Majestic' and ^Endymion' close to us. All that was now left for me to do was to receive the fire of the nearest ship and surrender."

^Decatur's Report of Jan. 18, 1815; Niles» viIL 8»

• Log of the "Pomoue"; "Niles, viii. 133.

• NUses, viL 364.

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The "Pomone's" account of the Burrender com-
pleted the story:—

^^At eleven, being within gunshot of the 'President' who was still steering to the eastward under a press of sail, with royal, top-gallant, topmast, and lower studding-sails set, finding how much we outsailed her our studding-sails were taken in, and immediately afterward we luffed to port and fired our starboard broadside. The enemy then also luffed to port, bringing his larboard broadside to bear, which was momentarily expected, as a few minutes previous to our closing her she hoisted a light abaft, which in night actions constitutes the ensign. Our second broadside was fired, and the ^President' still luffing up as if intent to lay us on board, we hauled close to port, bracing the yards up, and setting the mainsail; the broadside was again to be fired into his bows, raking, when she hoisted down the light, and we hailed demanding if she had surrendered. The reply was in the aftenative, and the firing immediately ceased. The *Tenedos,' who was not more than three miles off, soon afterward came up, and assisted the ^Pomone' in securing the prize and removing the prisoners. At three quarters
past twelve the 'Endymion*' came up, and the * Majestic* 
at three in the morning."

Between the account given by Decatur and that of 
the "Pomone's" log were some discrepancies. In 
the darkness many mistakes were inevitable; but 
if each party were taken as the best authority on its 
own side, the connected story seemed to show that 
Decatur, after beating off the "Endymion," made

» Niles, viii. 133.

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every effort to escape, but was impressed by the con-
viction that if overtaken by the squadron, nothing 
was left but to receive the fire of the nearest ship, 
and surrender. The night was calm, and the "Presi-
dent" made little headway. At eleven o'clock one 
of the pursuing squadron came up, and fired two 
broadsides. "Thus situated," reported Decatur, "with 
about one fifth of my crew killed and wounded, my 
ship crippled, and a more than fourfold force opposed 
to me, without a chance of escape left, I deemed it 
my duty to surrender."

The official Court of Inquiry on the loss of the 
"President" reported, a few months afterward, a 
warm approval of Decatur's conduct: ^ —

^^We fear that we cannot express in a manner that 
will do justice to our feelings our admiration of the 
conduct of Commodore Decatur and his officers and 
crew. ... As well during the chase as through his con-
test with the enemy [he] evinced great judgment and 
skill, perfect coolness, the most determined resolution, 
and heroic courage."
The high praise thus bestowed was doubtless des- 
erved, since the Court of Inquiry was composed of 
persons well qualified to judge; but Decatur's bat- 
tle with the "Endymion" was far from repeating 
the success of his triumph over the "Macedonian." 
Anxious to escape rather than to fight, Decatur in 
consequence failed either to escape or resist with ef- 
cect. The action with the "Endymion" lasted three 

* Niles, viii 147.

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hours from the time when the British frigate gained 
the "President's" quarter. For the first half hour 
the "President" received the "Endymion's" broad- 
sides without reply. During the last half hour the 
firing slackened and became intermittent. Yet for 
two hours the ships were engaged at close range, 
a part of the time within half musket-shot, in a 
calm sea, and in a parallel line of sailing. At all 
times of the battle, the ships were well within point-
blank range, which for long twenty-four-pounders and 
three-two-pound carronades was about two hundred 
and fifty yards. Decatur had needed but an hour 
and a half to disable and capture the "Macedonian," 
although a heavy swell disturbed his fire, and at no 
time were the ships within easy range for grape, 
which was about one hundred and fifty yards. The 
"Endymion" was a larger and better ship than the 
"Macedonian," but the "President" was decidedly 
less efficient than the "United States."

According to Captain Hope's report, the "Endy-
mion" lost eleven men killed and fourteen wounded. 
The "President" reported twenty-five killed and 
sixty wounded. Of the two ships the "President" *
was probably the most severely injured.* The masts of both were damaged, and two days afterward both

* Log of the "Endymion"; * James, p. 428.

* Cooper's Naval History, ii. 466.


* Report of Injuries received by the "President;" James, Appendix, p. cxciv, no. 107.

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were dismasted in a gale; but while the "President" lost all her masts by the board, the "Endymion" lost only her fore and main masts considerably above deck. On the whole, the injury inflicted by the "President" on the "Endymion" was less than in proportion to her relative strength, or to the length of time occupied in the action. Even on the supposition that the "President's" fire was directed chiefly against the "Endymion's" rigging, the injury done was not proportional to the time occupied in doing it. According to the "Pomone's" log, the "Endymion" was able to rejoin the squadron at quarter before one o'clock in the night. According to the "Endymion's" log, she repaired damages in an hour, and resumed the chase at nine o'clock.^

The British ships were surprised that Decatur should have surrendered to the "Pomone" without firing a shot. Apparently the "Pomone's" broadside did little injury, and the "Tenedos" was not yet in range when the "Pomone" opened fire. The question of the proper time to surrender was to be
judged by professional rules; and if resistance was hopeless, Decatur was doubtless justified in striking when he did; but his apparent readiness to do so hardly accorded with the popular conception of his character.

As usual the sloops were more fortunate than the frigate, and got to sea successfully, January 22, in a gale of wind which enabled them to run the

^ James's Naval Occurrences, p. 429.

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blockade. Their appointed rendezvous was Tristan d'Acunha. There the "Hornet" arrived on the morning of March 23, and before she had time to anchor sighted the British sloop-of-war "Penguin," — a new brig then cruising in search of the American privateer "Young Wasp."

Captain Biddle of the "Hornet" instantly made chase, and Captain Dickinson of the "Penguin" bore up and stood for the enemy. According to British authority the vessels differed only by a "trifling disparity of force." ^ In truth the American was somewhat superior in size, metal, and crew, although not so decisively as in most of the sloop battles. The "Hornet" carried eighteen thirty-two-pound carronades and two long twelve-pounders; the "Penguin" carried sixteen thirty-two-pound carronades, two long guns differently reported as twelve-pounders and six pounders, and a twelve-pound carronade. The crews were apparently the same in number, — about one hundred and thirty-two men. Captain Dickinson had equipped his vessel especially for the purpose of capturing heavy privateers, and was then looking for the "Young Wasp," — a vessel decidedly superior to
the "Hornet." Although he had reason to doubt his ability to capture the "Young Wasp," he did not fear a combat with the "Hornet," and showed his confidence by brushing up close alongside and

* James, p. 498.
* Admiral Tyler to Captain Dickinson^ Jan. 31, 1815; Niles^ viii. 345.

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firing a gun, while the "Hornet," all aback, waited for him.

The result was very different from that of Deca-
tur's two-hour battle with the "Endymion." In little more than twenty minutes of close action the "Peng-
quin's" foremast and bowsprit were gone, her cap-
tain killed, and thirty-eight men killed or wounded, or more than one fourth the crew. The brig was
^*a perfect wreck," according to the British official report, when the senior surviving officer hailed and surrendered.^ The "Hornet " was not struck in the hull, but was very much cut up in rigging and spars. She had two killed, and nine wounded. "It was evident," said Captain Biddle's report, "that our fire was greatly superior both in quickness and effect."

The "Penguin " was destroyed, and the "Hornet " and "Peacock" continued their cruise until April 27, when they chased for twenty-four hours a strange sail, which proved to be the British seventy-four
^'* Cornwallis." On discovering the character of the
chase Biddle made off to windward, but found that the enemy "sailed remarkably fast and was very weatherly." At daylight of the 29th, the "Cornwallis" was within gunshot on the "Hornet's" lee-quarter. Her shot did not take effect, and Biddle, by lightening his ship, drew out of fire; but a few hours later the enemy again came up within

^ Report of Lieutenant McDonald, April 6, 1815; Jamesa, Appendix, p. cc, no. 111.

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three quarters of a mile, in a calm sea, and opened once more. Three shot struck the "Hornet," but without crippling her. Biddle threw over everything that could be spared, except one long gun; and a fortunate change of wind enabled him a second time to creep out of fire. He escaped; but the loss of his guns, anchors, cables, and boats obliged him to make for San Salvador, where he heard the news of peace.^

Captain Warrington in the "Peacock" continued his cruise to the Indian Ocean, and captured four Indiamen. In the Straits of Sunda, June 80, he encountered a small East India Company's cruiser, whose commander hailed and announced peace. Warrington replied, "directing him at the same time to haul his colors down if it were the case, in token of it, — adding that if he did not, I should fire into him." The brig refused to strike its colors, and Warrington nearly destroyed her by a broadside.^ For this violence little excuse could be offered, for the "Nautilus" was not half the "Peacock's" strength,
and could not have escaped. Warrington, like most officers of the American navy, remembered the "Chesapeake" too well.

The cruise of the "President," "Peacock," and "Hornet" ended in the loss of the "President," the disabling of the "Hornet," and the arrival of the "Peacock* alone at the point intended for their

» Biddle's Report of June 10, 1815; Niles, viii. 438.
> Warrington's Letter of Nov. 11, 1815; Niles, x. 68.

I

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common cruising-gromid. No other national vessels were at sea after peace was signed, except the "Constitution," which late in December sailed from Boston under the command of Captain Charles Stewart, — a Philadelphian of Irish descent, not thirty-nine years old, but since 1806 a captain in the United States service.

Cruising between Gibraltar and Madeira, at about one o'clock on the afternoon of February 20 Captain Stewart discovered two sail ahead, which he chased and overtook at six o'clock. Both were ship-rigged sloops-of-war. The larger of the two was the ^Cyane." Americans preferred to call her a frigate, but that designation, though vague at best, could hardly be applied to such a vessel. The "Cyane" was a frigate-built sloop-of-war, or corvette, like the "Little Belt," carrying a regular complement of one hundred and eighty-five men. Her length on the lower deck
was one hundred and eighteen feet; her breadth was thirty-two feet. She carried thirty-three guns, all carronades except two long-nines or twelves. Her companion, the "Levant," was also a sloop-of-war of the larger sort, though smaller than the "Cyane." She mounted twenty-one guns, all carronades except two long nine-pounders. Her regular crew was one hundred and thirty-five men and boys.

Either separately or together the British ships were decidedly unequal to the "Constitution," which could, by remaining at long range, sink them both without receiving a shot in return. The "Constitution" carried thirty-two long twenty-four-pounders; while the two sloops could reply to these guns only by four long nine-pounders. The "Constitution" carried four hundred and fifty men; the two sloops at the time of the encounter carried three hundred and thirty-six seamen, marines, and officers. The "Constitution" was built of great strength; the two sloops had only the frames of their class. The utmost that the British captains could hope was that one of the two vessels might escape by the sacrifice of the other.

Instead of escaping, the senior officer, Captain George Douglass of the "Levant," resolved to engage the frigate, "in the hopes, by disabling her, to prevent her intercepting two valuable convoys that sailed from Gibraltar about the same time as the 'Levant' and 'Cyane.'" Captain Douglass knew his relative strength, for he had heard that the American frigate was on his course. Yet he seriously expected to disable her, and made a courageous attempt to do so.
The two ships, close together, tried first for the weather-gauge, but the "Constitution" outsailed them also on that point. They then bore up in hope of delaying the engagement till night, but the "Constitution" overhauled them too rapidly for the success of that plan. They then stood on the starboard tack, the "Cyane" astern, the "Levant" a half-cable length ahead, while the "Constitution" came up to windward and opened fire. Commodore Stewart's report described the result: ^^ —

^^ At five minutes past six ranged up on the starboard side of the sternmost ship [the 'Cyane'], about three hundred yards distant, and commenced the action by broadsides, — both ships returning our fire with great spirit for about fifteen minutes. Then the fire of the enemy beginning to slacken, and the great column of smoke collected under our lee, induced us to cease our fire to ascertain their positions and conditions. In about three minutes the smoke clearing away, we found ourselves abreast of the headmost ship [the 'Levant'], the sternmost ship luffing up for our larboard quarter."

Three hundred yards was a long range for carronades, especially in British sloops whose marksman ship was indifferent at best. According to the British court-martial on the officers of the "Cyane" and "Levant," their carronades had little effect. * If

^ Statement of the actual force, etc., Stewart's Report; Niles, viii. 219.

^ James, Naval Occurrences, p. 458.
* James, Naval Occurrences, p. 458*
Stewart managed his ship as his duty required, the two sloops until that moment should have been allowed to make little effective return of the "Constitution's" broadside of sixteen twenty-four-pounders except by two nine-pounders. They were in the position of the "Essex" at Valparaiso. The "Cyane" naturally luffed up, in order to bring her carronades.

^ Minutes of the Action; Niles, viii. 219.

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to bear, but she was already cut to pieces, and made the matter worse by closing.

"We poured a broadside into the headmost ship," continued the American account, "and then braced aback our main and mizzen topsails and backed astern under cover of the smoke abreast the sternmost ship, when the action was continued with spirit and considerable effect until thirty-five minutes past six, when the enemy's fire again slackened."

The "Levant," after receiving two stern-raking fires, bore up at forty minutes past six and began to repair damages two miles to leeward. The "Cyane," having become unmanageable, struck at ten minutes before seven. The most remarkable incident of the battle occurred after the "Cyane" struck, when the "Constitution" went after the "Levant" which was in sight to leeward. The little "Levant," instead of running away, stood directly for the huge American frigate, more than three times her size, and ranging close alongside fired a broadside into her as the two ships passed on opposite tacks. Although the sloop received the "Constitution's" broadside in return,
she was only captured at last after an hour's chase, at ten o'clock, much cut up in spars and rigging, but still sea-worthy, and with seven men killed and sixteen wounded, or only one casualty to six of her crew.

In truth, the injury inflicted by the "Constitution's" fire was not so great as might have been expected. The "Cyane" lost twelve killed and twenty-six wounded, if the American report was correct. Neither ship was dismasted or in a sinking condition. Both arrived safely, March 10, at Porto Praya. On the other hand, the "Constitution" was struck eleven times in the hull, and lost three men killed and twelve wounded, three of the latter mortally. She suffered more than in her battle with the "Guerriere," — a result creditable to the British ships, considering that in each case the "Constitution" could choose her own range.

Stewart took his prizes to the Cape de Verde Islands. At noon, March 11, while lying in port at Porto Praya, three British frigates appeared off the harbor, and Stewart instantly stood to sea, passing the enemy's squadron to windward within gunshot. The three frigates made chase, and at one o'clock, as the "Cyane" was dropping astern, Stewart signalled to her to tack ship, and either escape, if not pursued, or return to Porto Praya. The squadron paid no attention to the "Cyane," but followed the "Constitution" and "Levant." At three o'clock,
the "Levant" falling behind, Stewart signalled her also to tack. Immediately the whole British squadron abandoned pursuit of the "Constitution" and followed the "Levant" to Porto Praya, where they seized her under the guns of the Portuguese batteries. Meanwhile the "Constitution" and "Cyane" escaped, and reached the United States without further accident. The extraordinary blunders of the British squadron were never satisfactorily explained.

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These combats and cruises, with the last ravages of the privateers, closed the war on the ocean as it had long ceased on land; and meanwhile the people of the United States had turned their energies to undertakings of a wholly different character.

CHAPTER IV.

The long, exciting, and splendid panorama of revolution and war, which for twenty-five years absorbed the world's attention and dwarfed all other interests, vanished more quickly in America than in Europe, and left fewer elements of disturbance. The transformation scene of a pantomime was hardly more sudden or complete than the change that came over the United States at the announcement of peace. In a single day, almost in a single instant, the public turned from interests and passions that had supplied its thought for a generation, and took up a class of ideas that had been unknown or but vaguely defined before.

At Washington the effect of the news was so extraordinary as to shake faith in the seriousness of
party politics. Although the peace affected in no way party doctrine or social distinctions, a new epoch for the Union began from the evening of February 13, when the messenger from Ghent arrived with the treaty. No one stopped to ask why a government, which was discredited and falling to pieces at one moment, should appear as a successful and even a glorious national representative a moment afterward.

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Politicians dismissed the war from their thoughts, as they dismissed the treaty, with the single phrase: "Not an inch ceded or lost!" The commissioners from Massachusetts and Connecticut who appeared at Washington with the recommendations of the Hartford Convention, returned home as quietly as possible, pursued by the gibes of the press. The war was no more popular then than it had been before, as the subsequent elections proved; but the danger was passed, and passion instantly subsided.

Only by slow degrees the country learned to appreciate the extraordinary feat which had been performed, not so much by the people as by a relatively small number of individuals. Had a village rustic, with one hand tied behind his back, challenged the champion of the prize-ring, and in three or four rounds obliged him to draw the stakes, the result would have been little more surprising than the result of the American campaign of 1814. The most intelligent and best educated part of society both in the United States and in Great Britain could not believe it, and the true causes of British defeat remained a subject of conjecture and angry dispute. The enemies of the war admitted only that peace had saved Madison; but this single concession, which included many far-reaching consequences, was
granted instantly, and from that moment the national government triumphed over all its immediate dangers.

* Ingeisoll, ii 311.

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While the Senate unanimously ratified the treaty February 16, the House set to work with much more alacrity than was its habit to dispose of the business before it. Haste was necessary. Barely fourteen days remained before the Thirteenth Congress should expire, and in that interval some system of peace legislation must be adopted. The struggle over the proposed Bank charter was still raging, for the Senate had passed another bill of incorporation February 11, over which the House was occupied the whole day of February 13 in a sharp and close contest. The first effect of the peace was to stop this struggle. By a majority of one vote, seventy-four to seventy-three, February 17, the House laid the subject aside.

Three days afterward, February 20, the President sent to Congress a Message transmitting the treaty with its ratifications, and congratulating the country on the close of a war "waged with the success which is the natural result of the wisdom of the legislative councils, of the patriotism of the people, of the public spirit of the militia, and of the valor of the military and naval forces of the country." After recommending to Congress the interests of the soldiers and sailors, the Message passed to the reduction of expenditures, which required immediate attention:

"There are, however," continued Madison, "impor-
tant considerations which forbid a sudden and general revocation of the measures that have been produced by the war. Experience has taught us that neither the pacific dispositions of the American people, nor the pa-

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cific character of their political institutions, can altogether exempt them from that strife which appears, beyond the ordinary lot of nations, to be incident to the actual period of the world; and the same faithful monitor demonstrates that a certain degree of preparation for war is not only indispensable to avert disasters in the onset, but affords also the best security for the continuance of peace."

The avowal that experience had shown the error of the principle adopted by the nation in 1801 was not confined to President Madison. Monroe spoke even more plainly. In a letter to the military committee, February 24, Monroe urged that an army of twenty thousand men should be retained on the peace establishment. Each soldier of the rank-and-file was supposed to cost in peace about two hundred dollars a year, and Monroe's proposal involved an annual expense of more than five million dollars.

As far as concerned Madison and Monroe the repudiation of old Republican principles seemed complete; but the people had moved less rapidly than their leaders. Had Congress, while debating the subject February 25, known that Napoleon was then quitting Elba to seize once more the control of France, and to rouse another European convulsion with all its possible perils to neutrals, the President's views might have been adopted without serious dispute; but in the absence of evident danger, an army of twenty thousand men seemed unnecessary. The finances
warranted no such extravagance. Dallas wrote to

Eppes, the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, a letter dated February 20, sketching a temporary financial scheme for the coming year. He proposed to fund at seven per cent the outstanding Treasury notes, amounting to $18,637,000; and even after thus sweeping the field clear of pressing claims, he still required the extravagant war-taxes in order to meet expenses, and depended on a further issue of Treasury notes, or a loan, to support the peace establishments of the army and navy. The state of the currency was desperate, and the revenue for the year 1815 was estimated at $18,200,000 in the notes of State banks,—a sum little in excess of the estimated civil necessities.

The military committee of the House showed no sympathy with the new principles urged upon Congress by the Executive. Troup of Georgia reported a bill, February 22, fixing the peace establishment at ten thousand men, with two major-generals and four brigadiers. In submitting this proposal, Troup urged the House, February 25, to accept the reduction to ten thousand as the lowest possible standard, requiring only the expense of two and a half millions; but no sooner did he take his seat than Desha of Kentucky moved to substitute "six" for "ten," and a vigorous debate followed, ending in the adoption of Desha's amendment in committee by a majority of nineteen votes. The war leaders were greatly annoyed by this new triumph of the peace party. As a

1 Annals of Congress, 1814-1815; iii. 1178.
matter of principle, the vote on Desha's amendment affirmed Jefferson's pacific system and condemned the Federalist heresies of Hamilton and Monroe. The war leaders could not acquiesce in such a decision, and rallying for another effort, February 27, they remonstrated hotly. Forsyth of Georgia was particularly emphatic in defining the issue: 

"He had hoped that the spirit of calculation falsely styled economy, whose contracted view was fixed upon present expense, and was incapable of enlarging it to permanent and eventual advantage, had been laid forever by the powerful exorcisms of reason and experience. It would seem however that it had been only lulled by the presence of a more powerful demon. Since the potent spell of necessity had been broken, the troubled spirit of petty calculation was again awakened to vex the counsels and destroy the best hopes of the country."

For three years the friends of strong government, under the pressure of war, had been able to drive Congress more or less in their own direction; but at the announcement of peace their power was greatly lessened, and their unwilling associates were no longer disposed to follow their lead or to tolerate their assumptions of superiority. Desha retaliated in the tone of 1798: —

"Do they suppose that the House do not understand the subject; or do they suppose that by this great flow of eloquence they can make the substantial part of the House change the opinions in so short a time? When I speak of the substantial part of the House, I mean

those who think much and speak but little; who make common-sense their guide, and not theoretical or visionary projects. . . . Some gentlemen advocate ten thousand and others twenty thousand of a standing army. The policy is easy to be seen through. The advocates of a perpetual system of taxation discover that if they cannot retain a considerable standing army, they will have no good plea for riveting the present taxes on the people."

In the process of national growth, public opinion had advanced since 1801 several stages in its development; but the speeches of Forsyth, Calhoun, and Lowndes on one side, like that of Desha on the other, left still in doubt the amount of change. While Forsyth admitted that he had under-estimated the strength of the economical spirit, Desha certainly over-estimated the force of the men "who think much and speak but little." With Federalist assistance, Desha's friends passed the bill for an army of six thousand men by a vote of seventy-five to sixty-five; but the Senate, by a more decided vote of eighteen to ten, substituted "fifteen" for "six."* With this amendment the bill was returned to the House March 2, which by an almost unanimous vote refused to concur. The bill was sent to a conference committee, which reported the original plan of ten thousand men; and in the last hours of the session, March 3, the House yielded. By a vote of seventy to thirty-eight the peace establishment was fixed at ten thousand men.
The movement of public opinion was more evident in regard to the navy. Instead of repeating the experiments of 1801, Congress maintained the whole war establishment, and appropriated four million dollars chiefly for the support of frigates and ships-of-the-line. The vessels on the Lakes were dismantled and laid up; the gunboats, by an Act approved February 27, were ordered to be sold; but the sum of two hundred thousand dollars was appropriated for the annual purchase of ship-timber during the next three years, and the whole navy thenceforward consisted of cruisers, which were to be kept as far as possible in active service. As the first task of the new ships, an Act, approved March 3, authorized hostilities against the Dey of Algiers, who had indulged in the plunder of American commerce.

These hasty arrangements for the two services, coupled with an equally hasty financial makeshift, completed the career of the Thirteenth Congress, which expired March 4, as little admired or regretted as the least popular of its predecessors. Not upon Congress but upon the Executive Departments fell the burden of peace as of war, and on the Executive the new situation brought many embarrassments.

The first and most delicate task of the Government was the reduction of the army. No one could greatly blame Monroe for shrinking from the invidious duty of dismissing two thirds of the small force which had sustained so well and with so little support; the character of the country; but the haste which he showed
in leaving the War Department suggested also how keenly he must have suffered under its burdens. His name was sent to the Senate, February 27, as Secretary of State; no Secretary of War was nominated, but Dallas, with the courage that marked his character, undertook to manage the War Department as well as the Treasury until the necessary arrangements for the new army should be made.

April 8 Dallas wrote to six generals, — Brown, Jackson, Scott, Gaines, Macomb, and Ripley, — requesting their attendance at Washington to report a plan for the new army. Jackson and Gaines were unable to attend. The rest of the board reported a scheme dividing the country into two military districts, north and south; and into nine departments, five in the northern, four in the southern division,—allotting to each the troops needed for its service. May 17 the new arrangements were announced. Brown was ordered to command the northern district, with Ripley and Macomb as brigadiers. Jackson took the southern district, with Scott and Gaines as brigadiers. Eight regiments of infantry, one of riflemen, and one of light artillery were retained, together with the corps of artillery and engineers. As far as possible, all the officers whose names became famous for a generation received rank and reward.

No such operation was necessary for the navy, where no reduction was required. In the civil service, Madison enjoyed the satisfaction of rewarding the friends who had stood by him in his trials. February 27 he sent to the Senate, with the nomination of Monroe as Secretary of State, the name of J. Q. Adams as Minister to England. At the same time
Bayard was appointed to St. Petersburg, and Gallatin to Paris. The nomination of Bayard proved to be an empty compliment, for he arrived, August 1, in the Delaware River, in the last stages of illness, and was carried ashore the next day only to die.

These appointments were well received and readily confirmed by the Senate; but Madison carried favoritism too far for the Senate's approval when, March 1, he nominated Major-General Dearborn to be Secretary of War. Dearborn had few or no enemies, but the distinction thus shown him roused such strong remonstrance that Madison hastened to recall the nomination, and substituted Crawford in Dearborn's place. The Senate had already rejected Dearborn, but consented to erase the record from their journal, and Crawford became Secretary of War.

Thus the government in all its branches glided into the new conditions, hampered only by the confusion of the currency, which could not be overcome. The people were even more quick than the government to adapt themselves to peace. In New Orleans alone a few weeks of alarm were caused by extraordinary acts of arbitrary power on the part of General Jackson during the interval before the peace became officially known; but public order was not seriously dis-

^ Madison to Dearborn, March 4, 1815; Madison's Works, ii. 598.
In truth the cost was moderate. Measured by loss of life in battle, it was less than that reported in many single battles fought by Napoleon. An army which never exceeded thirty thousand effectives, or placed more than four thousand regular rank-and-file in a single action, could not sacrifice many lives. According to the received estimates the number of men killed in battle on land did not much exceed fifteen hundred, including militia, while the total of killed and wounded little exceeded five thousand.\(^\text{1}\) Sickness was more fatal than wounds, but a population of eight millions felt camp-diseases hardly more than its periodical malarial fevers.

The precise financial cost of the war, measured only by increase of debt, was equally moderate. During three years, — from February, 1812, until February, 1815, — the government sold six per cent bonds at various rates of discount, to the amount of fifty million dollars, and this sum was the limit of its loans, except for a few bank discounts of Treasury notes not exceeding a million in all. By forcing Treasury notes on its creditors the Treasury obtained the use of twenty millions more. After the peace it issued bonds and new Treasury notes, which raised the aggregate amount of war debt, as far as could be ascertained, to about eighty million five hundred thousand dollars, which was the war-addition to the old nominal capital of debt, and increased the total indebtedness to one hundred and twenty-seven millions at the close of the year 1815.\(^\text{1}\)

The debt had exceeded eighty millions twenty

\(^1\) Niles, X. 164.
years before, and in the interval the country had greatly increased its resources. The war debt was a trifling load, and would not have been felt except for the confusion of the currency and the unnecessary taxation imposed at the last moments of the war. That the currency and the war taxes were severe trials was not to be denied, but of other trials the people had little to complain.

Considering the dangers to which the United States were exposed, they escaped with surprising impunity. The shores of Chesapeake Bay and of Georgia were plundered; but the British government paid for the slaves carried away, and no town of importance except Washington was occupied by an enemy. Contrary to the usual experience of war, the richest parts of the country suffered least. Only the Niagara frontier was systematically ravaged. When the blockade of the coast was raised, every seaboard city was able instantly to resume its commercial habits without having greatly suffered from the interruption. The harvests of two seasons were ready for immediate export, and the markets of Europe were waiting to receive them. Every man found occupation, and capital instantly returned to its old channels. From the

^ Dallas's Report of Dec. 6, 1816; State Papers, Finance^ iii. 8..

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moment of peace the exports of domestic produce began to exceed five million dollars a month, while four millions was the highest average for any previous twelvemonth, and the average for the seven
years of embargo and blockade since 1807 fell much short of two and a half millions. The returns of commerce and navigation showed that during the seven months from March 1 to October 1, 1815, domestic produce valued at forty-nine million dollars was exported, and American shipping to the amount of eight hundred and fifty-four thousand tons was employed in the business of export.

The ease and rapidity of this revolution not only caused the war to be quickly forgotten, but also silenced political passions. For the first time in their history as a nation, the people of the United States ceased to disturb themselves about politics or patronage. Every political principle was still open to dispute, and was disputed; but prosperity put an end to faction. No evidence could be given to prove that the number or weight of persons who held the opinions commonly known as Federalist, diminished either then or afterward. Massachusetts showed no regret for the attitude she had taken. At the April election, six weeks after the proclamation of peace, although Samuel Dexter was the Republican candidate, the State still gave to Governor Strong a majority of about seven thousand in a total vote of ninety-five thousand. The Federalists reasonably

^ State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, u, 647.

regarded this vote as an express approval of the Hartford Convention and its proposed measures, and asked what would have been their majority had peace not intervened to save the Government from odium. They believed not only that their popular support would have been greater, but that it would also have shown a temper beyond control; yet the
Federalist majority in April was no longer hostile to the Government.

The other elections bore the same general character. Even in New York the popular reaction seemed rather against the war than in its favor. New York city in April returned Federalist members to the State legislature, causing a tie in the Assembly, each party controlling sixty-three votes. In Virginia the peace produced no change so decided as to warrant a belief that the war had become popular. In April John Randolph defeated Eppes and recovered control of his district. The State which had chosen sixteen Republicans and seven opposition congressmen in 1813, elected in 1815 seventeen Republicans and six opposition members. The stability of parties was the more remarkable in New York and Virginia, because those States were first to feel the effects of renewed prosperity.

After the excitement of peace was past, as the summer drew toward a close, economical interests dwarfed the old political distinctions and gave a new character to parties. A flood of wealth poured into the Union at a steady rate of six or seven million dollars a month, and the distribution of so large a sum could not fail to show interesting results. The returns soon proved that the larger portion belonged to the Southern States. Cotton, at a valuation of

^ Hammond, i. 401.
twenty cents a pound, brought seventeen and a half millions to the planters; tobacco brought eight and a quarter millions; rice produced nearly two million eight hundred thousand dollars. Of fifty millions received from abroad in payment for domestic produce within seven or eight months after the peace, the slave States probably took nearly two thirds, though the white population of the States south of the Potomac was less than half the white population of the Union. The stimulus thus given to the slave system was violent, and was most plainly shown in the cotton States, where at least twenty million dollars were distributed in the year 1815 among a white population hardly exceeding half a million in all, while the larger portion fell to the share of a few slave-owners.

Had the Northern States shared equally in the effects of this stimulus, the situation would have remained relatively as before; but the prosperity of the North was only moderate. The chief export of the Northern States was wheat and Indian corn. Even of these staples, Maryland and Virginia furnished a share; yet the total value of the wheat and corn exported from the Union was but eight million

three hundred and fifty thousand dollars, while that of tobacco alone was eight and a quarter millions. While flour sold at nine or ten dollars a barrel, and Napoleon's armies were vying with the Russians and Austrians in creating an artificial demand, the Middle States made a fair profit from their crops,
although much less than was made by the tobacco and cotton planters; but New England produced little for export, and there the peace brought only ruin.

Ordinarily shipping was the source of New England's profits. For twenty-five years the wars in Europe had given to New England shipping advantages which ceased with the return of peace. At first the change of condition was not felt, for every ship was promptly employed; but the reappearance of foreign vessels in American harbors showed that competition must soon begin, and that the old rates of profit were at an end.

Had this been all, Massachusetts could have borne it; but the shipping on the whole suffered least among New England interests. The new manufactures, in which large amounts of capital had been invested, were ruined by the peace. If the United States poured domestic produce valued at fifty million dollars into the markets of Great Britain, Great Britain and her dependencies poured in return not less than forty million dollars' worth of imports into the United States, and inundated the Union with manufactured goods which were sold at any sacrifice to relieve the British markets. Although the imported manufactures paid duties of twenty-five per cent or more, they were sold at rates that made American competition impossible.

The cotton manufacturers of Rhode Island, in their memorial to Congress, dated October 20, 1816, declared that their one hundred and forty manufactories, operating one hundred and thirty thousand
spindles, could no longer be worked with profit, and were threatened with speedy destruction. New England could foresee with some degree of certainty the ultimate loss of the great amount of capital invested in these undertakings; but whether such fears for the future were just or not, the loss of present profits was not a matter of speculation, but of instant and evident notoriety. Before the close of the year 1815 little profit was left to the new industries. The cotton manufacture, chiefly a New England interest, was supposed to employ a capital of forty million dollars, and to expend about fifteen millions a year in wages. The woollen manufacture, largely in Connecticut, was believed to employ a capital of twelve million dollars.* Most of the large factories for these staples were altogether stopped.

From every quarter the peace brought distress upon New England. During the war most of the

1 Annals of Congress, 1815-1816, p. 1651.
< Report on Woollen Manufactures, March 6, 1816; Niles, X. 82.

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richer prizes had been sent to New England ports, and the sale of their cargoes brought money and buyers into the country; but this monopoly ceased at the same moment with the monopoly of manufactures. The lumber trade was almost the last surviving interest of considerable value, but in November Parliament imposed duties on American lumber which nearly destroyed the New England trade. The fisheries alone seemed to remain as a permanent resource.
The effect of these changes from prosperity to adversity was shown in the usual forms. Emigration became active. Thousands of native New Englanders transferred themselves to the valley of the Mohawk and Western New York. All the cities of the coast had suffered a check from the war; but while New York and Philadelphia began to recover their lost ground, Boston was slow to feel the impulse. The financial reason could be partly seen in the bank returns of Massachusetts. In January, 1814, the Massachusetts banks held about 17,300,000 in specie.\(^\text{1}\) In January and February, 1816, when peace was declared, the same banks probably held still more specie, as the causes which led to the influx were not removed. In June, about three months later, they held only $3,464,000 in specie, and the drain steadily continued, until in June, 1816, the specie in their vaults was reduced to $1,260,000, while their

\(^\text{1}\) Niles's Articles on the New England Convention, Dec. 8\(^\text{1}\) 1814; Niles, vii. 196.

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discounts were not increased and their circulation was diminished.\(^\text{1}\)

The state of the currency and the policy pursued by the Treasury added to the burden carried by New England. There alone the banks maintained specie payments. In the autumn of 1815, while the notes of the Boston banks were equivalent to gold, Treasury notes were at eleven per cent discount in Boston; New York bank-notes were at eleven and a half per cent discount; Philadelphia at sixteen; Baltimore at seventeen and eighteen; and United States six-per-
cent bonds sold at eighty-six. In New England the Government exacted payments either in Treasury notes or in the notes of local banks equivalent to specie. Elsewhere it accepted the notes of local banks at a rate of depreciation much greater than that of Treasury notes. This injustice in exacting taxes was doubled by an equivalent injustice in paying debts. In New England the Treasury compelled creditors to take payment in whatever medium it had at hand, or to go unpaid. Elsewhere the Treasury paid its debts in the currency it received for its taxes.

Dallas admitted the wrong, but made no serious attempt to correct it. So complicated was the currency that the Treasury was obliged to keep four accounts with each of its ninety-four banks of deposit, — (1) in the currency of the bank itself; (2) in special deposits of other bank currency; (3) in special deposits of Treasury notes bearing interest; (4) in small Treasury notes not bearing interest. In New England, and also in the cities of New York and Philadelphia, for some months after the peace the taxes were paid in Treasury notes. So little local currency was collected at these chief centres of business that the Treasury did not attempt to discharge its warrants there in currency. As the Treasury notes gradually appreciated in value above the local bank-notes of the Middle States, tax-payers ceased to make payments in them, and paid in their local bank-notes. Little by little the accumulation of local currency in the Treasury deposits at Philadelphia and

^ Schedule etc. ; Massachusetts Senate Document, No. 38, Jan* 17, 1838.

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special deposits of other bank currency; (3) in special deposits of Treasury notes bearing interest; (4) in small Treasury notes not bearing interest. In New England, and also in the cities of New York and Philadelphia, for some months after the peace the taxes were paid in Treasury notes. So little local currency was collected at these chief centres of business that the Treasury did not attempt to discharge its warrants there in currency. As the Treasury notes gradually appreciated in value above the local bank-notes of the Middle States, tax-payers ceased to make payments in them, and paid in their local bank-notes. Little by little the accumulation of local currency in the Treasury deposits at Philadelphia and
New York increased, until the Treasury was able to draw on them in payment of its warrants; but even at those points this degree of credit was not attained in 1816, and in New England the Treasury still made no payments except in Treasury notes, or the notes of distant banks at a discount still greater than that of Treasury notes. This exceptional severity toward New England was admitted by Dallas, and excused only for the reason that if he were just to New England he must be severe to the rest of the country. Every holder of a Treasury warrant would have demanded payment at the place where the local medium was of the highest value, which was Boston; and as the Treasury could not pay specie at Boston without exacting specie elsewhere, Dallas paid no attention to Constitutional scruples or legal objections.

The people of Boston criticised, with much severity and with apparent justice, Dallas's management of the finances, which seemed to require some explanation not furnished in his reports. By an Act approved March 3, Congress authorized a loan of $18,452,800 to absorb the outstanding Treasury notes. At that time, under the momentary reaction of peace excitement, Treasury notes were supposed to be worth about ninety-four cents in the dollar, and Dallas expected to convert them nearly dollar for dollar into six-per-cent bonds. His proposals were issued March 10, inviting bids for twelve millions, and requiring only "that the terms of the proposals should bear some relation to the actual fair price of stock in the market of Philadelphia or New York." When the bids were received, Dallas
rejected them all, because in his opinion they were below the market rates. "In point of fact," he afterward said, "no direct offer was made to subscribe at a higher rate than eighty-nine per cent, while some of the offers were made at a rate even lower than seventy-five per cent." Although the old six-percents were then selling at eighty-nine, eighty-eight, and eighty-seven in Boston and New York, Dallas held that "the real condition of the public credit" required him to insist upon ninety-five as the value of the new stock.

1 Dallas's Report of Dec 3^ 1816 ; State Papers, Finance, ill. 130.

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After failing to obtain ninety-five or even ninety as the price of his bonds, Dallas resorted to expedients best described in his own words. As he could not fund the Treasury notes at the rate he wished, he abandoned the attempt, and used the loan only to supply the local wants of the Treasury: —

^^ The objects of the loan being to absorb a portion of the Treasury-note debt, and to acquire a sufficiency of local currency for local purposes, the price of the stock at the Treasury was of course independent of the daily up-and-down prices of the various stock markets in the Union, and could only be affected by the progress toward the attainment of those objects. Thus while the wants of the Treasury were insufficiently supplied, offers to subscribe were freely accepted, and the parties were sometimes authorized and invited to increase the amount of their offers; but where the local funds had so accumulated as to approach the probable amount of the local demands, the price of the stock was raised at the Treasury, and when the accumulation was deemed adequate to the whole amount of the local demands the loan was
Governments which insisted upon borrowing at rates higher than the money market allowed, could do so only by helping to debase the currency. Dallas's course offered encouragement to the suspended banks alone. The schedule of his loans proved that he paid a premium to insolvency. Of all places where he most needed "a sufficiency of local cur-

* Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, Dec 6, 1815 ; State Papers, Finance, iu. 11.

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rency for local purposes," Boston stood first; but lie borrowed in Boston less than one hundred thousand dollars, and this only in Treasury notes. Next to Boston stood New York; but in New York Dallas borrowed only $668,000, also in Treasury notes. In Philadelphia he obtained more than three millions, and took $1,845,000 in the depreciated local currency. In Baltimore he took nearly two millions in local currency; and in the bank paper of the District of Columbia, which was the most depreciated of all, he accepted $2,282,000 in local currency. Thus the loan which he had asked Congress to authorize for the purpose of absorbing the excess of Treasury notes, brought into the Treasury only about three millions in these securities, while it relieved the banks of Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington of six millions of their depreciated paper, worth about eighty cents in the dollar, and provided nothing to redeem the government's overdue bills at Boston
and New York.

Had Dallas pursued a different course and funded all the overdue Treasury notes at the market rate, he might not have relieved New England, but he would have placed the government in a position to deal effectually with the suspended banks elsewhere. The immediate result of his refusal to redeem the dishonored Treasury notes was to depress their market value, and to discredit the government. Treasury notes fell to eighty-eight and eighty-seven, while the

^ Report of Dec. 6, 1815; State Papers, Finance, iii. 11.

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six-per-cents fell as low as eighty-one. In Washington, Baltimore, and Philadelphia Dallas obtained enough local currency to meet local obligations, and doubtless saved to the government a small percentage by thus trafficking in its own discredit; but in gaining this advantage he offered encouragement to the over-issues of the suspended banks, and he helped to embarrass the solvent banks in the chief commercial centres as well as those in New England.^

At the close of the year 1815 the general effect of the peace was already well defined. The Southern States were in the full enjoyment of extraordinary prosperity. The Middle States were also prosperous and actively engaged in opening new sources of wealth. Only the Eastern States suffered under depression; but there it was so severe as to warrant a doubt whether New England could recover from the shock. The new epoch of American history began by the sudden decline of Massachusetts to the lowest point of relative prosperity and influence she had ever known, and by an equally sudden stimulus to the South and West. So discredited was Massa-
chusetts that she scarcely ventured to complain, for every complaint uttered by her press was answered by the ironical advice that she should call another Hartford Convention.

^<3(allatin to Jefferson, Nov. 27, 1816 ; Gallatin's writings, i. 666. Gallatin to Macon, April 23, 1816 ; Gallatin's writings i. 697.

CHAPTER V.

Between 1801 and 1815, great changes in the American people struck the most superficial observer. The Bights of Man occupied public thoughts less, and the price of cotton more, in the later than in the earlier time. Although in 1816 Europe was suffering under a violent reaction against free government, Americans showed little interest and no alarm, compared with their emotions of twenty years before. Napoleon resumed his empire, and was overthrown at Waterloo, without causing the people of the United States to express a sign of concern in his state ; and France was occupied by foreign armies without rousing among Americans a fear of England. Foreign affairs seemed reduced to the question whether England would consent to negotiate a treaty of concurrence.

After excluding most of the American demands, Lord Castlereagh consented to a commercial convention abolishing discriminating duties, and admitting American commerce with the East Indies. This treaty, signed July 3, seemed to satisfy American demands, and the British Ministry showed no wish to challenge new disputes. With France, the dis-
turbed condition of government permitted no diplomatic arrangement. The only foreign comity that required serious attention was Algiers; and Decatur, with a strong squadron of the new American cruisers, speedily compelled the Dey to sign a treaty more favorable to the United States than he had yet signed with any other nation. Tunis and Tripoli showed a similar disposition, and Decatur returned home in the autumn, having settled to his satisfaction all the matters intrusted to his care.

Under such circumstances, without an anxiety in regard to foreign or domestic affairs, President Madison sent his Annual Message to Congress December 5, 1815. It told a pleasant story of successful administration and of rapidly growing income; but its chief historical interest lay in the lines of future party politics that Madison more or less unconsciously sketched. The Message proved, or seemed to prove, that Madison's views and wishes lay in the direc* tion of strong government. He advised "liberal provision" for defence; more military academies; an improved and enlarged navy; effectual protection to manufactures; new national roads and canals; a national university; and such an organization of the militia as would place it promptly and effectually under control of the national government. Madison seemed to take his stand, beyond further possibility of change, on the system of President Washington. "^ Dallas's report echoed the tone of Alexander Ham-
Very long, chiefly historical, and interesting beyond the common, this Treasury Report of 1816 recommended a scale of annual expenditure exceeding twenty-seven millions, in place of the old scale of ten millions. The expenditure was to be but a part of the system. A protective tariff of customs duties was assumed to be intended by Congress, and a national bank was urged as the only efficient means by which the government could recover control over the currency.

Although the President was less emphatic than the secretary in holding a national bank to be the only cure for the disorders of the currency, he was prepared to go a step further by issuing government paper as a national currency, and suggested that alternative in his Message. A national bank or a national currency was an equally energetic exercise of supreme central powers not expressly granted by the Constitution and much disputed by theorists. Dallas’s objection to the national currency did not relate to its inefficiency, but to the practical difficulty of issuing paper and keeping it in issue. Either course of action implied a recurrence to the principles of President Washington. The Executive proposed to start afresh in 1816 from its point of departure in 1790.

The Fourteenth Congress was well disposed to support the attempt. Under the stress of war the people had selected as their representatives the ablest and most vigorous men of their generation. The
war leaders were mostly returned, — Calhoun, Clay^
Lowndes, Richard M. Johnson, Peter B. Porter, and
John Forsyth, — while the old peace party was strongly
represented by Timothy Pickering, Daniel Webster^
John Randolph, Grosvenor of New York, and Stan-
ford of North Carolina; but perhaps the most distin-
guished member of all was William Pinkney of
Maryland. A swarm of younger men, far above the
average, reinforced both sides of the House. Philip
P. Barbour sat again for Virginia. John McLean
sat again for Ohio. Henry St. George Tucker came
for the first time into the House. Joseph Hopkin-
son, Samuel D. Ingham, and John Sergeant raised
the character of the Pennsylvania delegation; and
Samuel Smith, at last ejected from the Senate by a
Federalist legislature in Maryland, reappeared in th6t
House for the first time since 1803.

The Senate was also improved. The disappearance
of Leib and Samuel Smith was made more suggestive
by the resignation of Giles. David Stone of North
Carolina, another independent much given to opposi-
tion at critical moments, also resigned; and another
of the same class, Joseph Anderson of Tennessee,
who had been a member of the Senate since 1797,
retired to become First Comptroller of the Treasury.
These retirements removed the chief abettors of fac-
tion, and changed the character of the Senate until it
seemed to belong to a different epoch. Jonathan
Roberts still sat in the place of Leib. Armistead
Mason took the seat of Giles, and with James Bar-
bour gave Madison for the first time the full support of Virginia. Macon took the place of David Stone. George W. Campbell took the place of Joseph Anderson. Robert G. Harper, the old champion of Federalism, succeeded Samuel Smith from Maryland. The Senate scarcely recognized itself as the same body that since 1808 had so persistently thwarted and fretted the President.

In the arrangement of new party divisions the Fourteenth Congress, unlike its recent predecessors, consciously aimed to take a decided share. The House seemed for the first time in many years to pride itself on intellectual superiority. William Pinkney, Calhoun, Lowndes, Clay, Daniel Webster, John Randolph, and their associates were not men who bowed to authority, even of the people, but rather looked on the task of government as a function of superior intellect. They proposed to correct what they considered mistaken popular tendencies. Each expressed his ideas with sufficient clearness in the form natural to him. Calhoim generalized before descending to particulars.^

"In the policy of nations," reasoned Calhoun, "there are two extremes: one extreme, in which justice and moderation may sink in feebleness; another, in which that lofty spirit which ought to animate all nations, particularly free ones, may mount up to military violence. These extremes ought to be equally avoided; but of the two, I consider the first far the most dangerous. ... I

consider the extreme of weakness not only the most
dangerous of itself, but as that extreme to which the
people of this country are peculiarly liable."

Clay, aiming at the same objects, dwelt chiefly on
foreign dangers as the motive of the strong govern-
ment he wished to establish. "That man must be
blind to the indications of the future," he declared,^ "who cannot see that we are destined to have war
after war with Great Britain, until, if one of the two
nations be not crushed, all grounds of collision shall
have ceased between us." He wished to create a
government that should control the destinies of both
American continents by a display of armed force.
"He confessed with infinite regret that he saw a
supineness throughout the country which left him
almost without hope that what he believed the
correct policy would be pursued," toward aiding tho
Spanish colonies against their mother country. Both
Calhoun and Clay admitted that they wished to
govern in a sense not approved by an apparent
majority of the nation; and the sympathies of tho
House were openly or secretly with them.

Of the contrary sentiment, John Randolph was
the champion. Although his early career had ended
in the most conspicuous failure yet known in Ameri-
can politics, he returned to the House, with intelli-
genue morbidly sharpened, to begin a second epoch
of his life with powers and materials that gave him

^ Speech of Jan. 29, 1816 ; Amials of Congress, 1815-1816,
p. 787.
the position of equal among men like Calhoun, Pinkney, and Webster. Randolph held a decisive advantage in wishing only to obstruct. He had no legislation to propose, and his political philosophy suited that extreme "to which," according to Calhoun, "the people of this country are peculiarly liable." Early in the session Randolph showed that he understood even better than Calhoun and Clay the division between himself and them. "If the warning voice of Patrick Henry," he said in the debate of January 31, 1816, "had not apprised me long ago, the events of this day would have taught me that this Constitution does not comprise one people, but that there are two distinct characters in the people of this nation." In every growing people two or more distinct characters were likely to rise, else the people would not grow; but the primal character, which Randolph meant to represent, enjoyed the political advantage of passive resistance to impulse from every direction.

In reply to Calhoun, Randolph defined the issue with his usual skill of words: ^ —

"As the gentleman from South Carolina has presented the question to the House, they and the nation cannot have the slightest difficulty in deciding whether they will give up the States or not; whether they will, in fact, make this an elective monarchy. The question is whether or not we are willing to become one great consolidated

nation; or whether we have still respect enough for those old, respectable institutions to regard their integrity and preservation as a part of our policy."

Randolph’s eccentricities, which amounted to insanity, prevented him from exercising in the House the influence to which his experience and abilities entitled him, but did not prevent him from reflecting the opinions of a large part of the nation, particularly in the South. Between these two impulses the Fourteenth Congress was to choose a path, subject to the future judgment of their constituents.

The Executive urged them on. Dallas began by sending to Calhoun, the chairman of the Committee on Currency, a plan for a national bank with a capital of thirty-five millions and power to increase it to fifty millions; with twenty-five directors, five of whom were to be appointed by the government to represent its share in the bank stock, of which the government was to subscribe one fifth.^

In another report, dated Feb. 12, 1816, Dallas recommended a protective tariff and sketched its details. Upon cotton fabrics he proposed a duty of thirty-three and one half per cent on their value; on woollens, twenty-eight per cent; on linen, hemp, and silk, twenty per cent; on paper, leather, etc., thirty-five per cent; on earthenware, glassware, etc., thirty per cent; on bar-iron, seventy-five cents per hundred weight; on rolled iron, a dollar and a half; and

on imenumerated articles, fifteen per cent. These duties were avowedly protective, intended to serve as the foundation of a system, and to perpetuate the policy to which the Government stood pledged by its legislation for the last six years. In connection with a proposed reduction of internal taxes, the Bank and the Tariff covered the financial field.

The House first grappled with the subject of revenue. The Committee of Ways and Means, through William Lowndes, reported, Jan. 9, 1816, a scheme embodied in twelve Resolutions intended to serve as the guide to definite legislation. Lowndes assumed a net annual revenue of $25,369,000; and to obtain this sum he proposed to shift the burden of about seven million dollars from internal taxation to the customs, by an addition of forty-two per cent to the rates of permanent duty. The direct tax was to be retained to the amount of three million dollars, and an annual fund of $13,500,000 was to be set aside for the interest and principal of the national debt.

Hardly had the debate begun when Randolph, January 16, dragged the question of a protective system into the prominence it was thenceforward to maintain. Two years of repose had singularly improved his skill in the choice of language and in the instigation of class against class.

"The manufacturer," said he, "is the citizen of no
place or any place; the agriculturist has his property, his


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lands, his all, his household Gods to defend, — and like that meek drudge the ox, who does the labor and ploughs the ground, then for his reward takes the refuse of the farm-yard, the blighted blades and the mouldy straw, and the mildewed shocks of corn for his support. . . Alert, vigilant, enterprising, and active, the manufacturing interest are collected in masses, and ready to associate at a moment's warning for any purpose of general interest to their body. Do but ring the fire-bell, and you can assemble all the manufacturing interest of Philadelphia in fifteen minutes. Nay, for the matter of that they are always assembled; they are always on the Rialto, and Shylock and Antonio meet there every day as friends, and compare notes, and possess in trick and intelligence what, in the goodness of God to them, the others can never possess/'

Randolph's political sagacity was nowhere better shown than in replying, Jan. 31, 1816, to a speech of Calhoun: "On whom do your impost duties bear?" he asked. ^ "Upon whom bears the duty
on coarse woollens and linens and blankets, upon salt, and all the necessaries of life? On poor men, and on slaveholders." With a perception abnormally keen, Randolph fixed on the tariff and the slaveholders as the necessary combination to oppose the nationalizing efforts of Calhoun and Clay.

No leader of note supported Randolph. He stood alone, or with only the support of Stanford, as far as concerned debate; but he led nearly half the House. Upon Benjamin Hardin’s motion, February 8, to repeal the direct tax immediately and altogether, a motion which struck at the root of Dallas’s scheme, the House decided by eighty-one votes against seventy-three to sustain the secretary. On the passage of the bill to continue the direct tax of three million dollars for one year, the minority lacked but a change of three votes to defeat it. The bill passed, March 4, by a vote of sixty-seven to sixty-three.

On the tariff the House was more closely divided. The Committee of Ways and Means consisted of seven members. Lowndes was chairman. Three other members were from the South, one of whom, Robertson of Louisiana, wished protection for sugar.
Three members were from the North, one of whom, Ingham of Pennsylvania, represented Dallas's views. The chief question concerned the duty on cottons and woollens. So close was the division that Ingham, to use his own words, was struck dumb with astonishment when the committee, after adopting a duty of fifty-six per cent for the protection of sugar, voted to impose a duty of only twenty per cent on cottons and woollens. "It was, however, too glaringly inconsistent and palpably wrong to be persisted in, and therefore it was that the Committee of Ways and Means, upon reconsideration, substituted the twenty-five per cent which was reported in the bill."^ 

When the bill came before the House, Clay moved, March 21, to substitute the rate of thirty-three and one third per cent for that of twenty-five per cent on cottons, for the express purpose of testing the sense of the House. Clay and the Northern protectionists held that the committee's bill did not afford protection enough. The committee, also admitting the propriety of protection, maintained that twenty-five per cent was sufficient. On both sides some temper was shown, and charges of sectionalism were made. By a vote of sixty-eight to sixty-one, the House in committee voted, March 22, to impose a duty of thirty per cent. Daniel Webster then moved to limit this rate to two years, after which the duty should be twenty-five per cent for two years more, when it should be reduced to twenty per cent. Finally the House adopted a duty of twenty-five per cent for three years. Webster also carried, March 27, a motion to reduce the proposed duty on bar-iron from seventy-five to
forty-five cents a hundred weight.

All the members of note, except Randolph, professed to favor protection. Calhoun was as decided as Ingham. " He believed the policy of the country required protection to our manufacturing establishments."^ The bill was assumed to offer protection enough, and the House disputed only whether the adopted duties were or were not sufficient. The actual free-trade sentiment was shown, April 8, when Randolph made a final motion to postpone, and was beaten by a vote of ninety-five to forty-seven.


The bill promptly passed the Senate, and was approved by the President April 27; but the true issue was undecided. No one could deny that if the duty of twenty-five per cent on cottons and woollens should prove to be insufficient, the House was pledged to increase it. The bill was avowedly protective. In regard to the coarser Indian cottons, it was practically prohibitive, since it valued them all, for tariff purposes, at twenty-five cents a yard, — a rate which on the cheaper fabrics raised the duty above one hundred per cent. Yet when the tariff of 1816 proved to be little protective, in after years it was
I commonly represented as a revenue and not a protective tariff. In substance, Randolph's opinions I controlled the House.

Dallas was more fortunate in regard to the Bank. Randolph's hostility to State banks was greater than to the Bank of the United States. Calhoun reported, January 8, the bill to incorporate for twenty years a new National Bank with a capital of thirty-five million dollars, and supported it, February 26, by a speech showing that the Bank was a proper means for attaining the Constitutional object of restoring the money of the country to its true medium. Active opposition came chiefly from the Federalists. Even Samuel Smith seemed to plead rather that the State banks should be gently treated than that the National Bank should be opposed. Randolph, while professing hostility to the new Bank on any and every ground suggested by others, concluded by pledging himself to support any adequate means for reducing the overpowering influence of the State banks. Clay thought himself obliged to leave the Speaker's chair in order to recant in the most public manner his errors of 1811. Forsyth, one of Calhoun's ablest allies, went so far in his support of the measure as to assert without reserve that the power to suspend specie payments — a power expressly reserved to the government by Calhoun's bill — belonged undoubtedly to Congress, an opinion which the House did not share. In the Republican ranks open opposition to the Bank seemed almost silenced; and the member who made himself most conspicuous in hostility to the bill was Daniel Webster, — the last of all in whom such a course was natural.
Webster's criticism on Calhoun's Constitutional argument was made in his loftiest manner. The currency, he said, needed no reform, for it was, by the Constitution and the law, gold and silver; nor had Congress the right to make any other medium current. The true remedy was for Congress to interdict the bills of the suspended banks. Had he been content to rest his opposition on that ground alone, Webster could not have been answered, although he might have been regarded as an impracticable politician; but as the bill came toward its passage, and as several Federalists declared in its favor, he pressed his hostility so far, and with so much dogmatism, that several of his own party revolted, and Grosvenor of New York replied sharply that he did not propose to be drilled to vote on whatever any one might choose to call a principle.

In spite of determined opposition from Webster, Pitkin, John Sergeant, and other Federalists, the House passed the bill, March 14, by a vote of eighty to seventy-one. The majority was small, but of the minority not less than thirty-eight were Federalists; fndy omitting Randolph and Stanford, only thirty-one Republicans voted against the bill. The House contained one hundred and seventeen Republicans. In the Senate the opposition was almost wholly confined to Federalists, and the bill passed by a majority much larger than that in the House. Twenty-two senators voted in its favor; only twelve voted against it, and of the twelve only four were Republicans. The President approved it April 10; and thus, after five years
of financial disorder, the Republican party reverted to the system of Washington, and resumed powers it had found indispensable to government.

The Federalists of New England were in a situation too alarming to bear even the little delay required to organize the Bank. For them a general return to specie payments was the only escape from imminent ruin; and acting on this conviction, Webster moved, April 26, a joint Resolution ordering that all taxes should be collected after Feb. 1, 1817, in some mediumi equivalent to specie, thus allowing but nine months for the work of resumption. The same day the House passed the Resolution by the decisive

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majority of seventy-one to thirty-four. The Senate substituted February 20 as the day of resumption, and passed the Resolution April 29, which was approved by the President the next day.

In contrast with the imbecility of many previous Congresses, the vigor of the Fourteenth Congress in thus settling the new scale of government was remarkable; but other measures of importance were not wanting. An Act approved April 29 appropriated one million dollars annually for three years to build ships of war; an Act approved April 19 authorized the people of Indiana to form a State government. A bill, which passed the House but was postponed by the Senate and became law at the next session, provided for the admission of Mississippi. In still another direction the House showed its self-confidence in a manner that caused unusual popular excitement. It undertook to increase the pay of its own members and of senators.
The scale of salary for public officials was low. The President, relatively highly paid, received twenty-five thousand dollars. The Secretaries of State and Treasury received five thousand; those of War and Navy, four thousand; the Attorney-General, three thousand; Chief-Justice Marshall was paid four thousand, and the six associate justices received thirty-five hundred dollars each.

While the Executive and Judiciary were paid regular salaries, Congress stood on a different footing. Legislators had never been paid what was considered an equivalent for their time and services. They were supposed to be unpaid; but such a rule excluded poor men from the public service, and therefore the colonial legislatures adopted a practice, which Congress continued, of allowing what were supposed to be the reasonable expenses of members. The First Congress fixed upon six dollars a day, and six dollars for every twenty miles of estimated journey, as a suitable scale of expense both for senators and representatives; and the same rate had been continued for twenty-five years. No one supposed it sufficient to support a household, but poor men could live upon it. Desha of Kentucky averred that it was a fair allowance for the average representative. According to him, board was twelve or thirteen dollars a week, and the total cost of a session of one hundred and fifty days amounted to five hundred and seventy or eighty dollars; so that the western and southwestern mem-
bers, with whose habits he was familiar, carried
home, with their mileage, about four hundred and
five hundred dollars in savings.

In the pride of conscious superiority the Fourteenth
Congress undertook to change the system; and Richard
M. Johnson, probably the most popular member
of the House, assumed the risk of popular displeasure.
In moving for a committee, March 4, Johnson re-
pudiated the idea of increasing the pay; and his
committee, including Webster, Pitkin, Jackson, the


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President's brother-in-law, Grosvenor, and McLean
of Ohio, reported through him that fifteen hun-
dred dollars a year was the correct equivalent of
six dollars a day.

The bill known as the Compensation Bill was
reported March 6, and was debated for two days
with some animation. Among its supporters John
Randolph was prominent, and gave offence to the
opponents of the measure by his usual tactics. Most
of the friends of the bill stoutly insisted that it did
not increase the pay; most of its opponents averred
that it more than doubled the amount. Calhoun
admitted the increase of pay, and favored it, in order
to retain "young men of genius without property"
in the public service. The bill was hurried through
the House.

"The Compensation Bill," said Forsyth at the next
session, was the only one of any interest pushed
through the Committee of the whole House and ordered
to a third reading in a single day. All motions to amend were rejected; for the committee to rise and report progress and ask leave to sit again, met with a similar fate. . . . The House refused repeated propositions to adjourn, and continued its sittings until the bill was ordered to be engrossed."

No time was lost. Johnson moved for a committee March 4; the committee reported the bill March 6; the House in committee took it up March 7, and reported it the same day. The House passed it March 8, by a vote of eighty-one to sixty-seven. In the Senate the bill was read for a second time March 12. In the course of the debate one of the New Jersey senators, commenting on the haste shown by the House to pass the bill, added that also in the Senate postponement, commitment, and amendment are all refused, and it is to be pushed through by main strength with a haste altogether unusual." The Senate passed it March 14, by a vote of twenty-one to eleven; and it received the President's signature March 19, barely a fortnight after Johnson's request for a committee.

At the time when the bill was still under consideration by the President, and the House had just passed the Bank Act, the Republican members of both Houses met to nominate a candidate to succeed Madison as President. Three candidates were in the

The choice was a matter of small consequence, for any candidate of the Republican party was sure of almost unanimous election, and all were respectable men; but Tompkins could expect little support at a time when Congress selected the candidate, for only men well known in the national service were likely to satisfy the standard of Congressmen. The true contest lay between Crawford and Monroe, and was complicated, as far as the candidates themselves understood it, by personal intrigues on both sides. Perhaps Crawford’s strength was the greater, for four

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fifths of the New York members voted for Monroe. In cases where no strong feeling fixed results, dexterity in management might overcome a preference between persons; and by some means never explained, the preference of the New York members for Crawford was overcome. One of these members — a competent observer — believed that Martin Van Buren and Peter R. Porter, for reasons of their own, prevented New York from declaring for Crawford when such a declaration would have decided the result. Crawford himself at the last professed to withdraw from the contest, and several of his warm friends did not attend the caucus.

On the evening of March 15, one hundred and nineteen senators and representatives appeared in the hall of the House of Representatives in obedience to an anonymous notice addressed to one hundred and forty-three Republican members. Sixty-five, or less than half the Republican representation, voted for Monroe; fifty-four voted for Crawford; and eighty-five then united in nominating Governor Tompkins.
as Vice-President.

Monroe's character was well known, and his elevation to the Presidency was a result neither of great popularity nor of exceptional force, but was rather due to the sudden peace which left him the residuum of Madison's many Cabinet. A long list of resignations alone remained to recall the memory of his associates. Robert Smith, Cassar Rodney, William Eustis, Paul Hamilton, Gallatin, G. W. Campbell, William Jones, William Pinkney, and John Armstrong had all resigned in succession, leaving Monroe and Dallas in possession of the government when peace was declared. Dallas was not a popular character, whatever were his abilities or services; and no other man occupied high ground. Under such circumstances the strength shown by Crawford was surprising, and proved that Monroe, notwithstanding his advantages, was regarded with no exclusive favor.

In truth Monroe had no party. His original friends were the old Republicans, — John Taylor of Caroline, Littleton Tazewell, John Randolph, and
their associates, from whom he had drawn apart. His new friends were chiefly northern Democrats, whose motives for preferring him to Crawford were selfish. In any case an epoch of personal politics could be foreseen, for men like Crawford, Calhoun, and Clay never submitted long to a superior; and for such an epoch Monroe was probably the best choice.

Shortly after the nomination Dallas gave notice to the President that he meant to retire from the Treasury in order to resume his practice at the bar. Madison immediately wrote to Gallatin, April 12, inviting him to resume charge of the Treasury; but

* Life and Writings of A. J. Dallas, p. 139.

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Gallatin was weary of domestic politics, and preferred diplomacy. He went as minister to France, while Dallas remained at the Treasury until October, to set the new Bank in motion.

These arrangements closed the first session of the Fourteenth Congress, which adjourned April 30, leaving Madison in unaccustomed peace, harassed by no more enemies or dissensions, to wait the close of his public life.

CHAPTER VI.

The prosperity that followed the Peace of Ghent buffered no check during the year 1816, or during the remainder of Madison's term. The exports of
domestic produce, officially valued at $45,000,000 for the year ending Sept. 30, 1815, were valued at nearly $65,000,000 for the following year, and exceeded $68,000,000 for 1817. The Southern States still supplied two thirds of the exported produce. Cotton to the amount of $24,000,000, tobacco valued at nearly $13,000,000, and rice at $3,600,000, contributed more than forty of the sixty-five millions of domestic exports in 1816. The tables showed that while South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana gained with unparalleled rapidity. New England lost ground, and New York only maintained its uniform movement. While the domestic exports of Georgia and Louisiana trebled in value, those of New York increased from eight to fourteen millions.

Notwithstanding the great importations from Europe which under ordinary conditions would have counterbalanced the exports, the exchanges soon turned in favor of the United States. Before the close of 1816

^ State Papers ; Commerce and Navigation, i. 929.

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specie in considerable quantities began to flow into the country. Canada, being nearest, felt the drain first, and suffered much inconvenience from it; but during the summer of 1816 and 1817 Europe also shipped much specie to America. Every ship brought some amount, until the export began to affect the Bank of England, which at last found its bullion diminishing with alarming rapidity. The returns showed a drain beginning in July or August, 1817, when the Bank of England held £11,668,000, until August, 1819, when the supply was reduced to £3,595,000; and in the interval a commercial crisis, with a general destruction of credit, occurred. The
reaction could not fail in the end to affect America as it affected England, but the first result was stimulating beyond all previous experience. In England the drain of specie embarrassed government in returning to specie payments. In the United States the influx of specie made the return easy, if not necessary.

The recovery of internal exchanges kept pace with the influx of specie. At Boston, July 27, 1816, United States six-per-cent bonds were quoted at eighty-five, and Treasury notes at ninety-four to ninety-four and one-half; at New York six-per-cents stood at ninety, and Treasury notes at par; in Philadelphia six-per-cents were worth ninety-eight, and Treasury notes one hundred and seven; in Baltimore six-per-cents were selling at one hundred and two, and Treasury notes at one hundred and twelve.

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During the next five months the recovery was steady and rapid. The banks of New York, September 26, began to cash their one-dollar notes, thus relieving the community from the annoyance of fractional currency. October 26 the six-per-cents stood at ninety-two in Boston, at ninety-three and one-half in New York, at ninety-eight in Philadelphia, and at one hundred and one and one-half in Baltimore. November 28 they sold at ninety-six in Boston; November 30 they sold at ninety-six and one-quarter in New York, at one hundred and one and one-half in Philadelphia, and at one hundred and five in Baltimore. January 1, 1817, the Treasury resumed payments at Boston in Boston money, and no further discredit attached to government securities.
The banks of the Middle States were less disposed than the government to hasten the return of specie payments. In order to do so, they were obliged to contract their circulation and discounts to an extent that would have been unendurable in any time but one of great prosperity; and only the threats of Dallas overcame their reluctance, even under most favorable conditions. Both Dallas and the President were irritated by their slowness. July 22, 1816, the Secretary of the Treasury issued a circular warning them that, at whatever cost, the Treasury must carry into effect the order of Congress to collect the revenue, after Feb. 20, 1817, only in specie or its equivalent. "The banks in the States to the South," he

» Madison to Dallas, July 16, 1816; Life of A. J. Dallas, p. 453.

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saidy^ " and to the west of Maryland, are ready and willing, it is believed, to co-operate in the same measure. The objection, or the obstacle to the measure, principally rests with the banks of the Middle States." Dallas invited them to assist the Treasury in resuming specie payments with the least possible delay; and accordingly the banks of the Middle States held a convention at Philadelphia, August 6, to consider their course.

This convention, on discussing the possibility of resumption, agreed that the banks needed more time than the government was disposed to allow. Credit had been necessarily expanded by the unusual scale of commerce and enterprise. So sudden and violent a contraction as was required for specie payments could not fail to distress the public, and might cause great suffering. Yet in some degree the new United States Bank could relieve this pressure; and there-
before the resumption should not be attempted by the State banks until the National Bank should be fairly opened and ready to begin its discounts. The State banks in convention foresaw, or imagined, that the United States Bank could not begin operations so early as Feb. 20, 1817, and they declined to risk resumption without its aid. Acting on this impression, they met Dallas’s urgency by a formal recommendation that their banks should begin to pay specie, not on the 20th of February, but on the first Monday of July, ISlt

» Niles, X. 376.

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This decision, though unsatisfactory to Dallas and the President, could not be considered unreasonable. Credit was expanded, beyond the limit of safety, and the government was largely responsible for the expansion. Many of the State banks were probably unsound from the first, and needed careful management. Between 1810 and 1830, on a total capital of one hundred and forty millions, the bank failures amounted to thirty millions, or more than one fifth of the whole. In Pennsylvania the country banks reduced their issues from $4,756,000 in November, 1816, to $1,318,000 in November, 1819. The latter moment was one of extreme depression, but the former was probably not that of the greatest expansion. When the banks of the Middle States held their convention, Aug. 6, 1816, contraction had already begun, and steadily continued, while specie flowed into the country to supply a foundation for bank paper. Under such circumstances the banks asked no extrav-
agent favor in recommending that eleven months, instead of seven, should be allowed for resumption,

Dallas was not disposed to concede this favor. Having at last the necessary machinery for controlling the State banks, he used it with the same vigor that marked all his acts. No sooner had the convention announced its unwillingness to co-operate with the Treasury in executing the order of Congress, than Dallas issued instructions, August 16, 1816.

1 Quatin, Banks and Currency; Works, ill. 293. > NUes, X. 423.

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hastening the preparations for opening the National Bank as early as Jan. 1, 1817. Soon afterward, September 12, he renewed his notice that the notes of suspended banks would be rejected by the Treasury after Feb. 20, 1817.

The Bank subscription was filled in August, a deficit of three million dollars being taken by Stephen Girard in a single mass. In October the board of directors was chosen by the shareholders, and in November the directors met and elected as President the former Secretary of the Navy, William Jones. One of their first acts was much debated, and was strongly opposed in the board of directors by J. J. Astor. They sent John Sergeant, of Philadelphia, abroad with authority to purchase some millions of bullion; and his mission was calculated to impress on the public the conviction that specie payments were to be resumed as soon as the Bank could open its doors.

Hurried by Dallas, the Bank actually began its
operations in January, 1817, and under the double pressure from the Treasury the State banks had no choice but to yield. Another meeting was held at Philadelphia, February 1, consisting of delegates from the banks of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Richmond. The convention entered into a compact with the Secretary of the Treasury to resume payments, on certain conditions, at the day fixed by Congress. The compact was carried into effect

^ DaDas to Madison, Aug. 27, 1816; Life of Dallas, p. 471.

February 20, a few days before the close of Madison's Presidency. Its success was magical. In New York, at ten o'clock on the morning of February 20, specie was at two and one half per cent premium. The banks opened their doors, and in half an hour all was once more regular and normal.

Thus the worst financial evil of the war was removed within two years after the proclamation of peace. A debt of about one hundred and thirty millions remained; but the people which only twenty years before had shrunk with fear and disgust from a debt of eighty millions, gave scarcely a thought in 1816 to their funded obligations. The difference between the two periods was not so much economical as political. Population and wealth had increased, but the experience of the people had advanced more rapidly than their numbers or capital. In measuring the political movement shrewd judges might easily err, for the elections of 1816 showed little
apparent change in parties; but in truth parties had outgrown their principles, and in politics, as in finance, the close of Madison’s Administration obliterated old distinctions.

Neither party admitted the abandonment of its dogmas. The New York election in the spring of 1816 showed no considerable change in votes. In 1810 Governor Tompkins was elected by ten thousand majority; even in the dark days of 1813 he had a majority of thirty-six hundred; in 1816, notwithstanding his popularity and the success of his

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war administration, his majority was less than seven thousand. In Massachusetts John Brooks, who succeeded Governor Strong as candidate of the Federalist party, received forty-nine thousand five hundred votes, while Samuel Dexter received forty-seven thousand four hundred. Six years before, in 1810, the Republican candidate, Elbridge Gerry, had received more than forty-six thousand five hundred, and Governor Strong had polled only forty-four thousand. Apparently the Republicans had lost ground in Massachusetts since 1810. In Connecticut, where the election turned on church issues, the result was somewhat different. The Anglican church, a small body but rich and influential, strongly Federalist in politics and conservative in character, joined the Democrats to overthrow the reign of the Congregational clergy. Oliver Wolcott, a Federalist who supported the war, was their candidate; and the combination nearly carried the State. Wolcott received about ten thousand two hundred votes; his Federalist opponent was elected by eleven thousand three hundred and seventy votes. The Federalists also carried Rhode Island, once a strongly Democratic State, and seemed
socially as well as politically to be little affected by their many mistakes and misfortunes.

Yet every one felt that real distinctions of party no longer existed. The Anglicans of Connecticut, the Unitarians of Boston, the Universalists and Baptists, looked chiefly to the overthrow of the established New England church; and the Democrats of New York,

like the Republicans of Virginia and North Carolina, labored for a system of internal improvements and for increased energy in national government. Parties, no longer held together by discipline, were liable at any moment to fall into confusion; and, as frequently happened in such stages of public opinion, they were extraordinarily affected by influences seemingly trivial. In 1816 the relaxation of party spirit resulted in a phenomenon never before witnessed. The whole community rose against its own representatives, and showed evident pleasure in condemning them. The occasion for this outbreak of popular temper was the Compensation Bill; but the instinct that could alone account for the public pleasure in punishing public men, could not be explained by a cause so trifling as that Act.

At the next session of Congress, Calhoun, lapsing in the middle of a speech into his usual meditative speculation, remarked, as though he were perplexed to account for his own theory, that in his belief the House of Representatives was not a favorite with the American people. Had he expressed the opinion
that freedom of thought or speech was not a favorite with the American people, he would have said nothing more surprising. If the House was not a favorite, what part of the government was popular, and what could be hoped for representative government itself? Of all the machinery created by the Constitution, the House alone directly reflected and \^ Annals of Congress, 1816-1817, pp. 392, 505, 604.

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represented the people; and if the people disliked it, they disliked themselves.

The people best knew whether Calhoun was right. Certainly the House, owing in part to its size, its frequent elections and changes, its lack of responsibility and of social unity, was the least steady and least efficient branch of government. Readers who have followed the history here closed, have been surprised at the frequency with which the word imbecility has risen in their minds in reading the proceedings of the House. So strong was the same impression at the time, that in the year 1814, at the close of the war, every earnest patriot in the Union, and many men who were neither earnest nor patriotic, were actively reproaching the House for its final failure, at an apparent crisis of the national existence, to call out or organize any considerable part of the national energies. The people in truth, however jealous of power, would have liked in imagination, though they would not bear in practice, to be represented by something nobler, wiser, and purer than their own average honor, wisdom, and purity. They could not make an ideal of weakness, ignorance, or vice, even their own; and as they required in their religion the idea of an infinitely wise and powerful deity, they revolted in their politics from whatever struck them as sordid
or selfish. The House reflected their own weaknesses; and the Compensation Act seemed to them an expression of their own least agreeable traits. They rebelled against a petty appropriation of money,

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after enduring for years a constant succession of worse ojffences.

"Who would have believed," asked John Randolph, "six months afterward, — " who would have believed," he repeated, "that the people of the United States would have borne all the privations and losses of the late war, and of the measures that led to it ; that they would have quietly regarded a national debt, swelled to an amount unknown, — to an amount greater than the whole expense of our seven years* war; that they would have seen the election of President taken out of their hands [by the caucus] ; that they would have borne with abuse and peculation through every department of the government, — ^and that the great Leviathan, which slept under all these grievances, should be roused into action by the Fifteen-Hundred-Dollar Law?"

Only with difficulty could members persuade themselves that the public anger was real. They could not at first- conceive that the people should be seriously angry because Congress had thought proper to pay its members a sum not in itself extravagant or adequate to their services. Not until the members returned to their homes did they appreciate the force of public feeling ; but they soon felt themselves helpless to resist it. Richard M. Johnson and Henry Clay, the two most popular men in Kentucky, found their entire constituency attacking them. "* When I went home," said Clay, "I do not recollect to have
met with one solitary individual of any description of party who was not opposed to the Act, — who did not, on some ground or other, think it an improper and unjust law." Benjamin Hardin, another of the Kentucky victims, said: "If a man came into the county court to be appointed a constable or surveyor of the road, he entered his solemn protest against the Compensation Law. If a petty demagogue wanted to get into the legislature, he must post up, or put in the newspapers, his protest against it."

"There was at first a violent excitement," said Philip P. Barbour of Virginia, "gentlemen might call it, if they pleased, a storm. But that storm, even when its fury abated, subsided into a fixed and settled discontent at the measure; it met the disapprobation and excited the discontent of the grave, the reflecting, and the deliberate; and such he believed to be the case with an immense majority of the American people."

Grand juries denounced it in Vermont and Georgia; the State legislature denounced it in Massachusetts; town-meetings protested against it; county conventions sat upon it; all classes and parties united in condemning it, and the brunt of this sweeping popular reproval fell upon the House of Representatives. Close as the House stood to the people, its want of popularity was evident, — as Calhoun, with his usual insight, bore witness. The House had as a body few friends and no protection against popular tern-
pests. The first to suffer, it was always the last to escape. One after another the weaker members gave way, and either declined re-election or were not re-elected. The chiefs succeeded for the most part by personal popularity in maintaining their hold on their districts, although several leading members lost their seats.

Even against so feeble and factious a body as the Thirteenth Congress, such condemnation would have seemed exceptional; but the peculiarity that made this popular reproof singular and suggestive was the popular admission that the Fourteenth Congress, for ability, energy, and usefulness, never had a superior, and perhaps, since the First Congress, never an equal. Such abilities were uncommon in any legislative body, American or European. Since Federalist times no Congress had felt such a sense of its own strength, and such pride in its own superiority; none had filled so fully the popular ideal of what the people's representatives should be. That this remarkable body of men should have incurred almost instantly the severest popular rebuke ever visited on a House of Representatives, could not have been mere accident.

The politics of 1816 seemed absorbed in the Compensation Act, and in the union of parties to condemn their representatives. The Senate escaped serious censure; and President Madison, so far from being called to account for errors real or imaginary, seemed to enjoy popularity never before granted to any President at the expiration of his term. The apparent
contentment was certainly not dun to want of grievances. The internal taxes prentted hard on the people, especially in New England, whero Uie afforing was general and in some places Severn; but no popular cry for reduction of taxes disttir*Msd tJin eleetlcoM*
No portion of the country s^mnd displntuind that a fourth Virginian should Im niadn iVeisldnnt by the intrigues of a Congressional caucus. The Htate legislatures for the most part chcmm us usual the Preai
didential electors ; and in December tlin public learned almost without interest, that Jtmns Mo|irua had received one hundred and eighty-*al votes representing sixteen States, wliiln Itufus King had received thirty-four electoral votes, n^pn^senting Mass
Tompkins of New York was ma<ln Vlee-PmHideut by the same process. Nothing in the elnetions, either for President or for Congnms, showed tliat the )hh>-pie were disposed to scrutinixf* sharply the workings of any part of their governin<?ut except the House ikf Representatives.

As the winter approached wlr^n Mudison was to meet Congress for the last time, the sixteen years of his official service, which had been filled witl\ excitement and violence, were ending in {iolltioal stagnation. Party divisions had so nearly disappeiui)d tbl^ nothing prevented the President elect from idtfttlMI ^ head of his Cabinet the son of the last dent, who had been the object of m< from the Republican party than had

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against any other Federalist. Old Republicans, like
Macon and John Randolph, were at loss to know whether James Monroe or J. Q. Adams had departed farthest from their original starting-points. At times they charged one, at times the other, with desertion of principle; but on the whole their acts tended to betray a conviction that J. Q. Adams was still a Federalist in essentials, while Monroe had ceased to be an old Republican. In the political situation of 1817, if Jefferson and his contemporaries were right in their estimates. Federalist views of government were tending to prevail over the views of the Jeffersonian party.

With this tendency, the national prosperity and the state of the Treasury had much to do. Dallas carried out his purpose, and in October quitted the Treasury. In retiring, he left with the President a sketch of the condition of the finances such as no previous secretary had been so fortunate as to present. For the year ending Sept. 30, 1816, the receipts amounted to $47,670,000. From the customs, which Dallas had estimated at $21,000,000, duties to the amount of $36,000,000 were received. A surplus of more than $20,000,000 was likely to accumulate in the Treasury before the close of the year.

Old ideas of economy and strict restraints on expenditure could not long maintain themselves in the presence of such an income; but besides the temptation to expand the sphere of government in expenditure, other influences were at work to establish Federalist principles in the system itself. Dallas remained in office chiefly in order to organize the Bank, and to render certain the resumption of specie pay-
ments. When he retired, in October, 1816, both objects were practically attained. His administration of the Treasury had then lasted two years. He found the government bankrupt; he left it with a surplus of twenty millions for the year. His measures not only relieved the country from financial disorders equalled only by those of the Revolutionary War, but also fixed the financial system in a firm groove for twenty years. He failed only in his attempt to obtain from Congress a larger degree of protection for domestic industries. Had his scheme of protection been adopted, possibly the violence of subsequent changes in revenue and legislation might have been moderated, and certainly the result could have been no more mischievous than it was.

Dallas retired to private life by his own wish, and the public three months afterward heard with surprise and regret the news of his sudden death. Like most of the men who rendered decisive services during the war, he received no public reward commensurate with his deserts. He fared better than Armstrong, who created the army; but even Gallatin, who shaped the diplomatic result, was content to retire into the comparative obscurity of the mission to Paris; while Perry and Macdonough, whose personal qualities had decided the fortunes of two cam-

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paigns and won the military basis on which peace could be negotiated, received no more reward than fell to the lot of third-rate men. In the case of Dallas and Gallatin, the apparent neglect was their own choice. Gallatin might have returned to the Treasury, but declined it; and the President transferred W. H. Crawford from the War Department to the charge of the finances, while Clay was offered the
War Department in succession to Crawford.

These arrangements affected Madison but little. He had no longer an object to gain from the disposal of patronage, and he sought to smooth the path of his successor rather than to benefit himself. Pew Presidents ever quitted office under circumstances so agreeable as those which surrounded Madison. During the last two years of his Administration almost every month brought some difficulty to an end, or accomplished some long-desired result. The restoration of the finances was perhaps his greatest source of satisfaction; but the steadiness with which the whole country, except New England, recovered prosperity and contentment afforded him a wider and more constant pleasure. The ravages of war left few traces. Even at Washington the new public buildings were pressed forward so rapidly that the effects of fire were no longer seen. The Capitol began to rise from its ruins. The new halls of Congress promised to do honor to Madison’s judgment. Benjamin Latrobe was the architect in charge; and his Representative Chamber, without reproducing that

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which Jefferson had helped to design, was dignified and worthy of its object. The old sandstone columns were replaced by another material. On the shore of the Potomac, near Leesburg, Latrobe noticed a conglomerate rock, containing roman pebbles of various sizes and colors, and capable of being worked in large masses. His love of novelty led him to employ this conglomerate as an ornamental stone for the columns of the Hall of Representatives; and the effect was not without elegance.

Several years were still to pass before Congress
occupied its permanent quarters, and Madison did not return to the White House; but the traces of national disaster disappeared in the process of reconstruction before he quitted the Presidency.

Surrounded by these pleasant conditions, Madison saw Congress assemble for the last time to listen to his requests. The Message which he sent to the legislature December 8 showed the extinction of party issues, and suggested no action that seemed likely to revive party disputes in any new form. The President expressed regret at the depression in shipping and manufactures, the branches of industry unfavorably affected by the peace. He suggested that Congress should consider especially the need of laws counteracting the exclusive navigation system of Great Britain. He recommended once more the time-worn subjects of the Militia and a National University. He asked for legislation against the Slave Trade, and urged a re-modification of the Judiciary.

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He requested Congress to create a new Executive department for Home or Interior Affairs, and to place the Attorney-General's office on the footing of a department. He gave a flattering account of the finances; and his Message closed with a panegyric on the people and their government, for seeking "by appeals to reason, and by its liberal examples, to infuse into the law which governs the civilized world a spirit which may diminish the frequency or circumscribe the calamities of war, and meliorate the social and beneficent relations of peace: a government, in a word, whose conduct, within and without, may bespeak the most noble of all ambitions,—that of promoting peace on earth and good-will to man."
For the moment. Congressmen were too much interested in their own quarrel to sympathize strongly with panegyrics on the people or their government. The members of the House returned to Washington mortified, angry, and defiant, disgusted alike with the public and with the public service. No sooner were the standing committees announced, December 4, than Richard M. Johnson moved for a special committee on the repeal of the Compensation Law, and supported his motion in an unusually elaborate speech, filled with argument, complaint, and irritation. The committee was appointed,—Johnson at its head; William Findley of Pennsylvania, second; Daniel Webster, third, with four other members. After twelve days' consideration, December 18, the committee presented a report, written by Webster, defend-

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ing the Act, but recommending a return to the per diem system, in deference to the popular wish. The scale of the new allowance was left for Congress to determine.

Until this personal quarrel was discussed, no other business received attention. The debate—postponed till Jan. 14, 1817, to save the dignity of the House—lasted, to the exclusion of other business, until January 23. As an exhibition of personal and corporate character, it was entertaining; but it contained little of permanent interest or value. Calhoun, always above his subject, spoke with much force against yielding to popular outcry. "This House," he said, "is the foundation of the fabric of our liberty. So happy is its constitution, that in all instances of a general nature its duty and its interests are inseparable. If he understood correctly the structure of our government, the prevailing principle is not so
much a balance of power, as a well-connected chain of responsibility. That responsibility commenced here, and this House is the centre of its operation."
The idea that the people had "resolved the government into its original elements, and resumed to themselves their primitive power of legislation," was inconsistent with the idea that responsibility commenced and centred in the House. "Are we bound in all cases to do what is popular?" asked Calhoun. Could the House shift responsibility from itself to the people without destroying the foundation of the entire fabric?

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Like most of Calhoun's speculations, this question could receive its answer only in some distant future. The Compensation Law lowered permanently the self-respect of the House, which had already declined from the formation of the government. "Of that House," said Richard Henry Wilde of Georgia, "he feared it might be said in the words of Claudian: 'A fronte recedant imperii.' Yes, sir, they were receding,—they had receded from the front of empire. That House, formerly the favorite of the American nation, the first and most important branch of the government, the immediate image of the people, had been losing, and continued to lose,—certainly by no fault of theirs, but by the working of causes not for him to develop,—that rank and power in the government originally belonging to them, and which others at their expense had been secretly acquiring." Yet the House, while repealing the law, refused to admit itself in the wrong. The law was repealed only so far as it applied to subsequent Congresses. Leaving its successors to fix whatever compensation they
thought proper for their services, the Fourteenth Congress adhered to its own scale, and took the money it was expected to refund.

Having disposed of this personal affair, the House turned to serious business, and completed its remarkable career by enacting several measures of far-reaching importance.

The first of these measures was a Navigation Act, ^Annals of Congress^ 1816-1817, p. 604.

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approved March 1, 1817, imposing on foreign vessels the same restrictions and prohibitions which were imposed by foreign nations on Americans. The second resembled the first in its object, but related only to the importation of plaster of Paris from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. These two Acts began a struggle against the foreign ^navigation systems, which ended in their overthrow.

For the present the House postponed the establishment of an Interior Department, and allowed the Attorney-General to remain without an office or a clerk; but it passed an Act, approved March S, 1817, concentrating in the Treasury the accounting business of government, and appointing four more auditors and one more comptroller for the purpose.

The fourth and most important measure that became law was a Neutrality Act, approved March 3, 1817, which authorized collectors of customs to seize and detain any vessel manifestly built for warlike purposes, . . . when the number of men shipped on board, or other circumstances, shall render it prob-
able that such vessel is intended by the owner " to cruise against the commerce of a friendly State. Nearly fifty years were to pass before the people of the United States learned to realize the full importance of this Act, which laid the foundation for all the subsequent measures taken by the United States and Great Britain for preserving neutrality in their relations with warring countries.  

^ Dana's Wheaton^ pp. 541-542, note.

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trality Act of 1817 furnished the measure of neutral obligations.

Besides these important laws, the Fourteenth Congress passed another bill, which closed its own activity and that of President Madison. None of the previous measures bore any direct relation to party politics, either past or future; but the bill for internal improvements, which Congress passed and the President vetoed, was an event of no small meaning in party history.

Calhoun moved, December 16, " that a committee be appointed to inquire into the expediency of setting apart ... a permanent fund for internal improvement." The committee was appointed the same day, — Calhoxm, Sheffey of Virginia, Creighton of Ohio, Grosvenor of New York, and Ingham of Pennsylvania. December 23 Calhoun reported a bill ^ setting aside the bonus paid by the Bank, 11,500,000, and the future dividends from Bank stock, " as a fund for constructing roads and canals." February 4 he introduced his bill by a speech, showing that a system of internal improvements was necessary, and could, in certain instances, be created by the na-
tional government alone.

"Let it not be forgotten," said Calhoun,^ with the air of sombre forecast which marked his mind and features, * let it be forever kept in mind, that the extent of our republic exposes us to the greatest of all calamities, next


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to the loss of liberty, and even to that in its consequence, — disunion. We are great, and rapidly — I was about to say fearfully — growing. This is our pride and danger, our weakness and our strength. Little does he deserve to be intrusted with the liberties of this people, who does not raise his mind to these truths. We are under the most imperious obligation to counteract every tendency to disunion. ... If ... we permit a low, sordid, selfish, and sectional spirit to take possession of this House, this happy scene will vanish. We will divide, and in its consequences will follow misery and despotism."

The Constitutional question Calhoun reserved for the future; he thought it scarcely worth discussion, since the good sense of the States might be relied on to prevent practical evils. Nevertheless he discussed it, and drew sufScient authority from the "general welfare " clause, and from the power to " establish " post-roads. Granting that the Constitution was silent, he saw no restraint on Congress: —
"If we are restricted in the use of our money to the enumerated powers, on what principle can the purchase of Louisiana be justified? ... If it cannot, then are we compelled either to deny that we had the power to purchase, or to strain some of the enumerated powers to prove our right."

The debate was interesting. Timothy Pickering, with the accumulated experience of seventy years, suggested that the right to regulate commerce among the several States, as in the case of light-houses and beacons, covered the proposed appropriation. Clay supported the bill with his usual energy, avowing that among his strongest motives was the wish to add this new distinction to the Fourteenth Congress, so harshly judged by the people. The chief Constitutional argument against the measure was made by Philip P. Barbour of Virginia; but other members opposed it on different grounds, and chiefly because as long as the internal taxes were still exacted, internal improvements should not be undertaken.

If the final vote was a correct test. Constitutional objections had but little weight with Congress. The bill passed the House, February 8, by the small majority of eighty-six to eighty-four. Of the minority no less than thirty-three were New England Federalists, whose opposition was founded on local and sectional reasons. From the slave States about forty-two votes were given against the bill; but a number of these were Federalist, and others were influenced by peculiar reasons. Two thirds of the Virginians voted against the bill; two thirds of the South Carolinians
voted in its favor. Probably not more than twenty-five or thirty members, in the total number of one hundred and seventy, regarded the Constitutional difficulty as fatal to the bill.

In the Senate the bill passed by a vote of twenty to fifteen. Of the minority nine represented New England, and six represented Southern States. Every senator from the Middle States, as well as both senators from Virginia, supported the bill. Both senators from Massachusetts, the Republican Vamimi

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and the Federalist Ashmnn, opposed it; while Jeremiah Mason of New Hampshire and Rufus King of New York voted in its favor. The confusion of parties was extreme; but the State-rights school of old Republicans seemed to command not more than five or six votes in thirty-five.

The divisions on this bill seemed to leave no question that Congress by an overwhehning majority regarded the Constitutional point as settled. No one doubted that the Judiciary held the same opinion. The friends of the bill had reason to feel secure in regard to the Constitutional issue if on nothing else, and were the more disappointed when, March 3, President Madison exercised for the last time his official authority by returning the bill with a veto founded on Constitutional objections.

"The power to regulate commerce among the several States," be said, "cannot include a power to construct roads and canals, and to improve the navigation of water-courses in order to facilitate, improve, and secure such a commerce, without a latitude of construction departing from the ordinary import of the terms, strength-
ened by the known inconveniences which doubtless led to the grant of this remedial power to Congress. To refer the power in question to the clause * to provide for the common defence and general welfare ' would be contrary to the established and consistent rules of interpretation, as rendering the special and careful enumeration of powers which follow the clause nugatory and improper. Such a view of the Constitution would have the effect of giving to Congress a general power of legislation."

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Every one who looked at the Constitution as an instrument or machine to be employed for the first time, must have admitted that Madison was right. Interpreted by no other aid than its own terms and the probable intent of a majority of the Convention which framed and the States which adopted it, the Constitution contained, and perhaps had been intended to contain, no power over internal improvements. The wide difference of opinion which so suddenly appeared between the President and Congress could not have been the result so much of different views of the Constitution, as of conclusions reached since the Constitution was framed. Congress held the bill to be Constitutional, not because it agreed with the strict interpretation of the text, but because it agreed with the interpretation which for sixteen years the Republican party, through Congress and Executive, had imposed upon the text.

On that point Calhoun's argument left no doubt; and his question — the last of his speculations pregnant with future history — echoed unanswered : "On what principle can the purchase of Louisiana be justified?" Dismissing all other violations or violence offered to the Constitution by President Madison or his predecessors, — such as the Bank, the
Embargo; the Enforcement laws, the laws for the goy^rment of Orleans Territory, the seizure of West Florida, — Calhoun's question went to the heart of the issue between President and Congress.

Prom the Virginia side only one answer was pos-

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sible. In returning to their early views of resistance to centralization, Madison and Jefferson must have maintained the invalidity of precedents to affect the Constitution. The veto seemed to create a new classification of public acts into such as were Constitutional; such as were unconstitutional, but still valid; and such as were both unconstitutional and invalid. The admitted validity of an act, like the purchase of Louisiana, even though it were acknowledged to be unconstitutional, did not create a precedent which authorized a repetition of a similar act.

Viewed only from a political standpoint, the veto marked the first decided reaction against the centralizing effect of the war. Unfortunately for the old Republican party, whose principles wore thus for a second time to be adopted in appearance by a majority of the people, sixteen years had affected national character; and although precedents might not bind Congress or Executive, they marked the movement of society.

The Veto Message of March 8, 1817, was Madison's Farewell Address. The next day he surrendered to Monroe the powers of government, and soon afterward retired to Virginia, to pass, with his friend Jefferson, the remaining years of a long life, watching the results of his labors.
CHAPTER VII.

The Union, which contained 5,800,000 inhabitants in 1800, numbered 7,240,000 in 1810, and 9,634,000 in 1820. At the close of Madison’s Administration in 1817, the population probably numbered not less than 8,750,000 persons. The average rate of annual increase was about three and five-tenths per cent causing the population to double within twenty-three years.

The rate of increase was not uniform throughout the country, but the drift of population was well defined. In 1800 the five New England States contained about 1,240,000 persons. Virginia and North Carolina, united, then contained nearly 1,860,000, or ten per cent more than New England. In 1820 the two groups were still nearer equality. New England numbered about 1,665,000; the two Southern States numbered 1,700,000, or about two per cent more than New England. While these two groups, containing nearly half the population of the Union, increased only as one hundred to one hundred and twenty-nine, the middle group, comprising New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, increased in the relation of one hundred to one hundred and ninety-two, — from

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1,402,000 in 1800, to 2,696,000 in 1820. Their rate was about the average ratio for the Union; and the three Western States, — Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, — grew proportionally faster. Their population of 370,000 in 1800 became 1,567,000 in 1820 in the ratio of one hundred to four hundred and twenty-three.
Careful study revealed a situation alarming to New England and Virginia. If only Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, without its district of Maine, were considered, a total population numbering 742,000 in 1800 increased only to 881,000 in 1820, or in the ratio of one hundred to one hundred and eighteen in twenty years. If only the white population of Virginia and North Carolina were taken into the estimate, omitting the negroes, 852,000 persons in 1800 increased to 1,022,000 in 1820, or in the ratio of one hundred to one hundred and twenty. Maryland showed much the same result, while Delaware, which rose from 64,270 in 1800 to 72,674 in 1820, remained stationary, numbering only 72,749 in 1820, — a gain of seventy-five persons in ten years. The white population showed a positive decrease, from 55,861 in 1810 to 55,282 in 1820.

Probably a census taken in 1817 would have given results still less favorable to the sea-coast. The war affected population more seriously than could have been reasonably expected, and stopped the growth of the large cities. New York in 1800 contained 60,000 persons; in 1810 it contained 96,400, but a corpora-

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tion census of 1816 reported a population of only one hundred thousand, although two of the six years were years of peace and prosperity. From that time New York grew rapidly, numbering 124,000 in 1820, — a gain of about twenty-five per cent in four years. Even the interior town of Albany, which should have been stimulated by the war, and which increased four thousand in population between 1800 and 1810, increased only three thousand between 1810 and 1820. Philadelphia fared worse, for its population of
96,000 in 1810 grew only to 108,000 in 1820, and fell rapidly behind New York. Baltimore grew from 26,000 in 1800 to 46,000 in 1810, and numbered less than 63,000 in 1820. Boston suffered more than Baltimore; for its population, which numbered 24,000 in 1800, grew only to 32,000 in 1810, and numbered but 43,000 in 1820. Charleston was still more unfortunate. In 1800 its population numbered about eighteen thousand; in 1810, 24,700; in 1817 a local census reported a decrease to 23,950 inhabitants, and the national census of 1820 reported 24,780, or eighty persons more than in 1810. The town of Charleston and the State of Delaware increased together by the same numbers.

Although the war lasted less than three years, its effect was so great in checking the growth of the cities that during the period from 1810 to 1820 the urban population made no relative increase. During every other decennial period in the national history the city population grew more rapidly than that of

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the rural districts; but between 1810 and 1820 it remained stationary, at four and nine-tenths per cent of the entire population. While Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston advanced slowly, and New York only doubled its population in twenty years. Western towns like Pittsburg, Cincinnati, and Louisville grew rapidly and steadily, and even New Orleans, though exposed to capture, more than trebled in size; but the Western towns were still too small to rank as important. Even in 1820 the only cities which contained a white population of more than twenty thousand were New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston.

The severest sufferers from this situation were
the three southern States of New England, — Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, excluding the district of Maine, which was about to become a separate State. Fortunately the northern part of New England, notwithstanding the war, increased much more rapidly than the southern portion; but this increase was chiefly at the cost of Massachusetts, and returned little in comparison with the loss. The situation of Massachusetts and Connecticut was dark. Had not wealth increased more rapidly than population, Massachusetts would have stood on the verge of ruin; yet even from the economical point of view, the outlook was not wholly cheerful.

Judged by the reports of Massachusetts banks, the increase of wealth was surprising. The official returns of 1808, the first year when such returns were made, reported seven banks in the State, with a capital of $25,000 and deposits of $1,600,000. In June, 1816, twenty-five banks returned capital stock amounting nearly to $11,500,000 and deposits of $2,188,000. The deposits were then small, owing to the decline of industry and drain of specie that followed the peace, but the capital invested in banks had more than quintupled in thirteen years.

This multiplication was not a correct measure of the general increase in wealth. Indeed, the banks were in excess of the public wants after the peace, and their capital quickly shrunk from $11,500,000 in June, 1816, to $9,300,000 in June, 1817, a decline of nearly twenty per cent in a year. From that time it began to increase again, and held its improvement even in the disastrous year 1819. Assuming 1803 and 1817 as the true terms of the equation, the
banking capital of Massachusetts increased in fourteen years from $2,225,000 to $9,300,000, or more than quadrupled.

Oauged by bank discounts the increase of wealth was not so great. In 1803 the debts due to the banks were returned at $3,850,000; in June, 1817, they were $12,650,000. If the discounts showed the true growth of industry, the business of the State somewhat more than trebled in fourteen years. Probably the chief industries that used the increased banking capital were the new manufactures, for the older sources of Massachusetts wealth showed no equivalent gain. Tested by the imports, the improvement was moderate. In 1800 the gross amount

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of duties collected in Massachusetts was less than $3,200,000; in 1816 it somewhat exceeded $6,100,000, but had not permanently doubled in sixteen years. Tested by exports of domestic produce, Massachusetts showed no gain. In 1803 the value of such produce amounted to 15,400,000; in 1816, to $5,008,000.

Other methods of calculating the increase of wealth gave equally contradictory results. The registered tonnage of Massachusetts engaged in foreign trade exceeded two hundred and ten thousand tons in 1800; in 1816 it was two hundred and seventy-four thousand tons. In the coasting-trade Massachusetts employed seventy-five thousand tons in 1800, and one hundred and twenty-nine thousand in 1816. The tonnage employed in the fisheries showed no growth. The shipping of Massachusetts seemed to indicate an increase of about forty per cent in sixteen years.

The system of direct taxation furnished another
standard of comparison. In 1798 a valuation was made in certain States of houses and lands for direct taxes; another was made in 1813; a third in 1815. That of 1798 amounted to eighty-four million dollars for Massachusetts; that of 1813, to one hundred and forty-nine millions; that of 1815, to one hundred and forty-three millions,—a gain of seventy per cent in sixteen years; but such a valuation in 1817 would probably have shown a considerable loss on that of 1815.

Evidently the chief increase in wealth consisted in

1 Pitkin, pp. 55-56.

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the growth of manufactures, but after the prostration of the manufacturing interest in 1816 no plausible estimate of their true value could be made, unless the bank discounts measured their progress. The result of the whole inquiry, though vague, suggested that wealth had increased in Massachusetts more rapidly than population, and had possibly gained seventy or eighty per cent in sixteen years; but in spite of this increase the State was in a pitiable situation. Neither steamboats, canals, nor roads could help it. Thousands of its citizens migrated to New York and Ohio, beyond the possibility of future advantage to the land they left. Manufactures were prostrate. Shipping was driven from the carrying trade. Taxation weighed far more heavily than ever before. A load of obloquy rested on the State on account of its war policy and the Hartford Convention. The national government treated it with severity, and refused to pay for the Massachusetts militia called into service by the President during the war, because the governor had refused to place them
The condition of Massachusetts and Maine was a picture of New England. Democratic Rhode Island suffered equally with Federalist Connecticut. Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont showed growth, but the chief possibility of replacing lost strength lay in immigration. During the European wars, no considerable number of immigrants were able to reach

1 Pitkin, p. 373.

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the United States; but immediately after the return of peace, emigration from Europe to America began on a scale as alarming to European governments as the movement to western New York and Ohio was alarming to the seaboard States of the Union, During the year 1817 twenty-two thousand immigrants were reported as entering the United States. Twelve or fourteen thousand were probably Irish; four thousand were German. More than two thousand arrived in Boston, while about seven thousand landed in New York and the same number in Philadelphia. The greater part probably remained near where they landed, and in some degree supplied the loss of natives who went west. The rapid growth of the northern cities of the sea-coast began again only with the flood of immigration.

Although the three southern States of New England were the severest sufferers, the Virginia group — comprising Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina — escaped little better. In twenty years their white population increased nineteen and five tenths per cent, while that of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island increased eighteen per
cent. The wealth of Southern States consisted largely in slaves; and the negro population of the Virginia group increased about twenty-five per cent in numbers during the sixteen years from 1800 to 1816. The exports of domestic produce increased about forty per cent in value, comparing the average of

1 Niles, 1817.

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1801-1805 with that of 1815-1816. The net revenue collected in Virginia increased nearly seventy per cent, comparing the year 1815 with the average of the five years 1800-1804; while that collected in North Carolina more than doubled.

Measured by these standards, the growth of wealth in the Virginia group of States was not less rapid than in Massachusetts, and the same conclusion was established by other methods. In 1816 Virginia contained two State banks, with branches, which returned for January 1 a capital stock of $4,590,000, with a note circulation of $6,000,000, and deposits approaching $2,500,000. Their discounts amounted to $7,768,000 in January, 1816, and were contracted to $6,128,000 in the following month of November. Although Virginia used only half the banking capital and credits required by Massachusetts, the rate of increase was equally rapid, and the tendency toward banking was decided. In 1817 the legislature created two new banks, one for the valley of Virginia, the other for western Virginia, with a capital stock of $600,000, and branches with capital stock of $100,000 for each. Between 1800 and 1817, banking capital exceeding five million dollars was created in Virginia,
where none had existed before.

If the estimates made by Timothy Pitkin, the best statistician of the time, were correct, the returns for direct taxes showed a greater increase of wealth in Virginia than in Massachusetts. The valuation of

* Niles, ix. 427; xi. 196. « Pitkiu, p. 372.

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Virginia for 1799 was 171,000,000; that of 1815 was 165,000,000. The valuation of North Carolina in 1799 was $30,000,000; that of 1815 was $51,000,000. Maryland was estimated at $82,000,000 in 1799, at $106,000,000 in 1815. The average increase for the three States was in the ratio of one hundred to two hundred and forty, while that for Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut was nearer one hundred to one hundred and seventy-five. The normal increase for the Union was in the ratio of one hundred to two hundred and sixty-three.

The result obtained from the estimates for direct taxes was affected by a doubt in regard to the correctness of the valuation of 1799, which was believed to have been too low in the Southern States; but the general conclusion could not be doubted that the Virginia group of States increased steadily in wealth. The rapidity of increase was concealed by an equally rapid impoverishment of the old tobacco-planting aristocracy, whose complaints drowned argument. As the lands of the ancient families became exhausted, the families themselves fell into poverty, or emigrated to the richer Ohio valley. Their decline or departure gave rise to many regrets and alarms. With the impressions thus created, the people associated the want of economical machinery as a cause
of their backwardness, and became clamorous for roads, canals, and banks. The revolution in their ideas between 1800 and 1816 was complete.

The North Carolinians were first to denounce their old habits of indifference, and to declare their State in danger of ruin on that account. A committee of the State legislature reported Now 30, 1815, that vigorous measures for self-protection could no longer be postponed:

** With an extent of territory sufficient to maintain more than ten millions of inhabitants, ... we can only boast of a population something less than six hundred thousand, and it is but too obvious that this population under the present state of things already approaches its maximum. Within twenty-five years past more than two hundred thousand of our inhabitants have removed to the waters of the Ohio, Tennessee, and Mobile; and it is mortifying to witness the fact that thousands of our wealthy and respectable citizens are annually moving to the West, . . . and that thousands of our poorer citizens follow them, being literally driven away by the prospect of poverty. In this state of things our agriculture is at a stand."

The Virginians showed an equally strong sense of their perils. Twelve months after the North Carolina legislature took the matter in hand, a committee of the Virginia legislature in December, 1816, discussed the same topic and reached the same conclusion.2 Although something had been done by corporations to open canals on the Potomac, the James Eiver, and to the Dismal Swamp, the State of Virginia had in sixteen years made little advance in material welfare. While New England had built
turnpikes wherever a profit could be expected, in

^ Niles, iz., Supplement, p. 165.
* Niles, ix., Supplement, p. 149.

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Virginia, said the committee, "the turnpike-roads of the Commonwealth, except a few short passes of particular mountains and a road recently begun from Fredericksburg to the Blue Ridge, are confined principally to the county of Loudon, the adjacent counties of Fairfax, Fauquier, and Frederick, and to the vicinity of the seat of government." In other respects the situation was worse.

"While many other States," said the committee," "have been advancing in wealth and numbers with a rapidity which has astonished themselves, the ancient Dominion and elder sister of the Union has remained stationary. A very large proportion of her western territory is yet unimproved, while a considerable part of her eastern has receded from its former opulence. How many sad spectacles do her low-lands present of wasted and deserted fields, of dwellings abandoned by their proprietors, of churches in ruins! The genius of her ancient hospitality, benumbed by the cold touch of penury^ spreads his scanty hoard in naked halls, or seeks a coarser but more plenteous repast in the lonely cabins of the West. The fathers of the land are gone where another outlet to the ocean turns their thoughts from the place of their nativity, and their affections from the haunts of their youth."

Another committee reported to the House of Delegates Jan. 5, 1816, in favor of extending the banking system of the State. ^ The report used language new aa an expression of Virginian opinions.
Your committee believe that a prejudice has gone abroad, which they confidently trust experience will prove to be unfounded even to the satisfaction of those by whom it is entertained, that the policy of Virginia is essentially hostile to commerce and to the rights of commercial men. Upon the removal of this prejudice must depend the future contributions of this Commonwealth toward the prosperity and glory if not the happiness and safety of the United States. Without the confidence of foreigners there can exist no foreign commerce. Without foreign commerce there can exist neither ships, seamen, nor a navy; and a tremendous lesson has taught Virginia that without a navy she can have no security for her repose."

Notwithstanding the gloom of these recitals, the evidence tended to show that while the white population of Virginia increased only about nineteen per cent in sixteen years, its wealth nearly doubled. Comparison with the quicker growth of the Middle States — New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania — caused much of the uneasiness felt by New England and Virginia. The banking capital of New York, which probably did not much exceed three million dollars in 1800, amounted in 1816 to nearly $19,000,000; that of Pennsylvania exceeded $16,-000,000. The valuation of houses and lands for the direct tax rose in New York from $100,000,000 in 1799 to nearly $270,000,000 in 1815; and in Pennsylvania, from $102,000,000 in 1799 to $346,000,000 in 1815. The net revenue collected in New York
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was $2,700,000 in 1800, and $14,500,000 in 1815 •, that collected in Pennsylvania was $1,850,000 in 1800, and $7,140,000 in 1815. This rate of increase did not extend to exports. The value of the domestic exports from New York in 1803 was about $7,600,000; in 1816 it exceeded $14,000,000; while the value of Pennsylvanian exports increased little — being $4,021,000 in 1803 and $4,486,000 in 1816. The population of New York doubled while that of Massachusetts and Virginia hardly increased one third. Pennsylvania grew less rapidly in numbers but still about twice as fast as New England.

Although this rate of progress seemed to leave New England and Virginia far behind the Middle States, it was less striking than the other economical changes already accomplished or foreseen. The movement of population or of wealth was not so important as the methods by which the movement was effected. The invention of the steamboat gave a decisive advantage to New York over every rival. Already in 1816 the system had united New York city so closely with distant places that a traveller could go from New York to Philadelphia by steamboat and stage in thirteen hours; or to Albany in twenty-four hours; and taking stage to Whitehall in twelve hours could reach Montreal in thirty hours, and go on to Quebec in twenty-four hours, — thus consuming about five and a half successive days in the long journey from Philadelphia to Quebec, sleeping comfortably on his way, and all at an expense of
fifty dollars. This economy of time and money was a miracle; but New York could already foresee that it led to other advantages of immeasurable value. The steamboat gave impetus to travel, and was a blessing to travellers; but its solid gain for the prosperity of the United States lay not in passenger traffic so much as in freight, and New York was the natural centre of both.

While Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Carolinas were building roads and canals across a hundred miles of mountains, only to reach at last an interior region which enjoyed an easier outlet for freight. New York had but to people a level and fertile district, nowhere fifty miles from navigable water, in order to reach the great Lake system, which had no natural outlet within the Union except through the city of New York. So obvious was the idea of a canal from the Lakes to the Hudson that it was never out of men's minds, even before the war; and no sooner did peace return than the scheme took large proportions. Active leaders of both political parties pressed the plan, — De Witt Clinton, Gouverneur Morris, and Peter B. Porter were all concerned in it; but the legislature and people then supposed that so vast an undertaking as a canal to connect Lake Erie with the ocean, national in character and military in its probable utility, required national aid. Supposing the Administration to be pledged to the policy outlined by Gallatin and approved by Jefferson in the Annual Message of 1806, the New York commissioners applied to Congress for assistance, and uniting with other local interests procured the passage of Calhoun's bill.
for internal improvements.

They were met by Madison's veto. This act, although at first it seemed to affect most the interests of New York, was in reality injurious only to the Southern States. Had the government lent its aid* to the Erie Canal, it must have assisted similar schemes elsewhere, and in the end could hardly have refused to carry out Gallatin's plan of constructing canals from the Chesapeake to the Ohio, and from the Santee to the Tennessee River. The veto disappointed New York only for the moment, but was fatal to Southern hopes. After the first shock of discouragement, the New York legislature determined to persevere, and began the work without assistance. The legislature of Pennsylvania at the same time appropriated half a million dollars for roads and canals, and for improvements of river navigation, devoting nearly one hundred and fifty thousand dollars to aid the turnpike-road to Pittsburg. The fund established by the State of Ohio, as a condition of its admission to the Union, had in 1816 produced means to construct the National or Cumberland Road to the hundred and thirteenth mile. The indifference to internal improvements which had been so marked a popular trait in 1800, gave place to universal interest and activity in 1816; but the Middle States were far in advance of the Eastern and Southern in opening communications with the West; and New York, owing

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in no small degree to the veto, could already foresee the time when it would wrest from Pennsylvania
the supply of the valley of the Ohio, while expanding new tributary territory to an indefinite extent along the Lakes.

When Madison retired from the Presidency, the limits of civilization, though rapidly advancing, were still marked by the Indian boundary, which extended from the western end of Lake Erie across Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Southwestern territory. Only weak and helpless tribes remained east of the Mississippi, waiting until the whites should require the surrender of their lands; but the whites, already occupying land far in advance of their needs, could not yet take the whole. Not until 1826 were the Indian titles generally extinguished throughout Indiana. The military work was done, and the short space of sixteen years had practically accomplished the settlement of the whole country as far as the Mississippi; but another generation was needed in order to take what these sixteen years had won.

As population spread, the postal service struggled after it. Except on the Hudson River, steamboats were still irregular in their trips; and for this reason the mails continued to be carried on horseback through the interior. In 1801 the number of post-offices was 957; in 1817 it was 3,459. In 1801 the length of post-roads was less than 25,000 miles; in 1817 it was 62,689. In 1800 the gross receipts from postage were $280,000; in 1817 they slightly exceeded $1,000,000.

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In each case the increase much surpassed the ratio of population, and offered another means for forming some estimate of the increase of wealth. The Fourteenth Congress pressed the extension of post-routea in western New York, Ohio, and Indiana; they were
already established beyond the Mississippi. Rapidity of motion was also increased on the main routes. From New York to Buffalo, four hundred and seventy-five miles, the traveller went at an average rate of five miles an hour, and, sleeping every night, he arrived in about four days. Between Philadelphia and Pittsburg, where no watercourse shortened the distance, the stage-coach consumed five and a half days, allowing for stoppage at night. These rates of travel were equal to those common on routes of similar length in Europe; but long after 1817 the mail from Washington to New Orleans, by a route 1,880 miles in length, required twenty-four days of travel.

Had the steamboat system been at once perfected, the mail could have been carried with much more rapidity; but the progress of the new invention was slow. After the trial trip of the "Clermont," Aug. 17, 1807, five years elapsed before the declaration of war; yet in 1812 New York possessed no other steam-line than the Albany packets. Steam-ferries plied to Hoboken, Amboy, and other places in the immediate neighborhood; but neither Newport, New London, nor New Haven enjoyed steam communication with New York until after the war. In the spring of 1813 eight or nine steamboats belonged to the city of New York, but only three, which ran to Albany, were more than ferries. At the same time Philadelphia possessed six such ferry-boats. From Baltimore a steamer ran to the head of Chesapeake Bay; but the southern coast and the town of Charleston saw no steamboat until a year after the war was ended.

The West was more favored. In 1811 a boat of four hundred tons was built at Pittsburg and sent
down the river to New Orleans, where it plied between New Orleans and Natchez. Two more were built at the same place in 1813-1814; and one of them, the "Vesuvius," went down the river in the spring of 1814, rousing general interest in the midst of war by making the trip in nine days and a half, or two hundred and twenty-seven hours. The "Vesuvius" remained on the Mississippi for the next two years, but was burned with her cargo in the summer of 1816. By that time the world was thinking much of steamboats, and their use was rapidly extending, though regular trips were still uncommon except in the east.

The result of the sixteen years, considered only in the economical development of the Union, was decisive. Although population increased more rapidly than was usual in human experience, wealth accumulated still faster. From such statistics as the times afforded, a strong probability has been shown that while population doubled within twenty-three years, wealth doubled within twenty. Statistics covering the later period of national growth, warrant the

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belief that a valuation of $1,742,000,000 in 1800 corresponded to a valuation of $3,734,000,000 in 1820; and that if a valuation of $328 per capita is assumed for 1800, a valuation of $386 per capita may be estimated for 1820.

These sixteen years set at rest the natural doubts that had attended the nation's birth. The rate of increase both in population and wealth was established and permanent, unless indeed it should become even more rapid. Every serious difficulty which seemed alarming to the people of the Union in 1800 had been
removed or had sunk from notice in 1816. With the disappearance of every immediate peril, foreign or domestic, society could devote all its energies, intellectual and physical, to its favorite objects. This result was not the only or even the chief proof that economical progress was to be at least as rapid in the future as at the time when the nation had to struggle with political difficulties. Not only had the people during these sixteen years escaped from dangers, they had also found the means of supplying their chief needs. Besides clearing away every obstacle to the occupation and development of their continent as far as the Mississippi River, they created the steamboat, the most efficient instrument yet conceived for developing such a country. The continent lay before them, like an uncovered ore-bed. They could see, and they could even calculate with reasonable accuracy, the wealth it could be made to yield. With almost the certainty of a mathematical formula, knowing the rate of increase of population and of wealth, they could read in advance their economical history for at least a hundred years.


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CHAPTER Vm.

The movement of thought, more interesting than the movement of population or of wealth, was equally well defined. In the midst of political dissension and
economical struggles, religion still took precedence; and the religious movement claimed notice not merely for its depth or for its universality, but also and especially for its direction. Religious interest and even excitement were seen almost everywhere, both in the older and in the newer parts of the country; and every such movement offered some means of studying or illustrating the development of national character. For the most part the tendency seemed emotional rather than intellectual; but in New England the old intellectual pre-eminence, which once marked the Congregational clergy, developed a quality both new and distinctive.

The Congregational clergy, battling with the innate vices of human nature, thought themselves obliged to press on their hearers the consequences of God’s infinite wrath rather than those of his infinite love. They admitted that in a worldly sense they erred, and they did not deny that their preaching sometimes leaned to severity; but they would have been false to their charge and undeserving of their high character had they lost sight of their radical doctrine that every man was by nature personally depraved, and unless born again could not hope to see the kingdom of God. Many intellectual efforts had been made by many ages of men to escape the logic of this doctrine, but without success. The dogma and its consequences could not be abandoned without abandoning the Church.

From this painful dilemma a group of young Boston clergymen made a new attempt to find a path of escape. Their movement drew its inspiration from Harvard College, and was simultaneous with the sway
of Jefferson's political ideas; but the relationship which existed between religious and political innovation was remote and wholly intellectual. Harvard College seemed to entertain no feeling toward Jefferson but antipathy, when in 1805 the corporation appointed Henry Ware, whose Unitarian tendencies were well known, to be HoUis Professor of Theology. The Unitarianism of Henry Ware and his supporters implied at that time no well-defined idea beyond a qualified rejection of the Trinity, and a suggestion of what they thought a more comprehensible view of Christ's divine character; but it still subverted an essential dogma of the Church, and opened the way to heresy. The Calvinists could no longer regard Harvard College as a school proper for the training of clergy; and they were obliged to establish a new theological seminary, which they attached to a previously existing Academy at Andover, in Essex County, Massachusetts. The two branches of the New England Calvinists — known then as old Calvinism and Hopkinsianism — united in framing for the instictors of the Andover school a creed on the general foundation of the Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism, and thus provided for the future education of their clergy in express opposition to Unitarians and Universalists.

Thenceforward the theological school of Harvard College became more and more Unitarian. The Massachusetts parishes, divided between the two schools of theology, selected, as pleased a majority of their church-members, either Orthodox or Unitarian pastors; and while the larger number remained Calvinistic, though commonly preferring ministers who avoided controversy, the Boston parishes followed the Unitarian movement, and gradually filled their pul*
pits with young men. The Unitarian clergy soon won for themselves and for their city a name beyond proportion with their numbers.

Joseph Stevens Buckminster, the first, and while he lived the most influential, of these preachers, began his career in 1805 by accepting a call from one of the old Boston churches. He died in 1812 at the close of his twenty-eighth year. His influence was rather social and literary than theological or controversial. During his lifetime the Unitarian movement took no definite shape, except as a centre of revived interest in all that was then supposed to be best and purest in religious, literary, and artistic feeling. After his death, Unitarians learned to regard William Ellery Ghanning as their most promising leader. Channing had accepted the charge of a Boston church as early as 1808, and was about four years older than Buckminster. A third active member of the Boston clergy was Samuel Cooper Thacher, who took charge of a Boston parish in 1811, and was five years younger than Ghanning. In all, some seven or eight churches were then called Unitarian; but they professed no imiform creed, and probably no two clergymen or parishes agreed in their understanding of the precise difference between them and the Orthodox church. Shades of difference distinguished each Unitarian parish from every other, and the degree of their divergence from the old creed was a subject of constant
interest and private discussion, although the whole body of churches, Congregational as well as Unitarian, remained in external repose.

The calm was not broken until the close of the war relieved New England from a political anxiety which for fifteen years had restrained internal dissensions. No sooner did peace restore to New England the natural course of its intellectual movement than the inevitable schism broke out. In June, 1815, the "Panoplist," the mouthpiece of the Congregational clergy, published an article charging the Unitarians with pursuing an unavowed propaganda, and calling upon the Church to refuse them communion. Ghanning and his friends thought the attack to require reply, and, after consultation, Ghanning pub-

lished a "Letter to the Rev. Samuel C. Thacher," which began a discussion and a theological movement of no slight interest to American history.

Channing's theology at that time claimed no merit for originality. His letter to Thacher betrayed more temper than he would afterward have shown; but in no particular was he more earnest than in repelling the idea that he or his brethren were innovators. In whatever points they disagreed, they were most nearly unanimous in repudiating connection with the English Unitarians who denied the divinity of Christ. Channing declared "that a majority of our brethren believe that Jesus Christ is more than man; that he existed before the world; that he literally came from heaven to save our race; that he sustains other offices than those of a teacher and witness to the truth; and that he still acts for our benefit, and is our intercessor with the Father." So far was Channing from wish-
ing to preach a new theology that he would gladly have accepted the old had he thought it intelligible:

"It is from deep conviction that I have stated once and again that the differences between Unitarians and Trinitarians lie more in sounds than in ideas; that a barbarous phraseology is the chief wall of partition between these classes of Christians; and that could Trinitarians tell us what they mean, their system would generally be found little else than a mystical form of the Unitarian doctrine."

Calvinists could not be blamed for thinking that their venerable creed, the painful outcome of the

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closest and most strenuous reasoning known in the Christian world, was entitled to more respect than to be called "little else than a mystical form of the Unitarian doctrine." The Unitarians themselves scarcely attempted to make the infinite more intelligible to the finite by any new phraseology. They avowed a dislike for dogma as their merit. During these early years they systematically avoided controversy; in the pulpit they never assailed and seldom mentioned other forms of Christian faith, or even the scheme of Trinity which caused their schism.

"So deeply are we convinced," said Channing's letter, "that the great end of preaching is to promote a spirit of love, a sober, righteous, and godly life, and that every doctrine is to be urged simply and exclusively for this end, that we have sacrificed our ease, and have chosen to
be less striking preachers rather than to enter the lists of controversy."

Yet the popular dislike of Calvinistic severity could not wholly make good the want of doctrinal theology. The Unitarian clergy, however unwilling to widen the breach between themselves and the old Church, were ill at ease under the challenges of Orthodox critics, and could not escape the necessity of defining their belief.

'* According to your own concession," rejoined Dr. Samuel Worcester to Channing's letter, "the party in whose behalf you plead generally deny the essential divinity of the Saviour, and hold him to be a being entirely * distinct from God,' entirely * dependent,' — in

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other words, a mere creature. . . . You doubtless do not suppose that by any mere creature atonement could be made for the sins of an apostate world of sufficient merit for the pardon, sanctification, and eternal salvation of all who should trust in him; therefore if you hold to atonement in any sense, yet unquestionably not in the sense of a proper propitiatory sacrifice. Upon this denial of atonement must follow of course the denial of pardon procured by the blood of Christ, of justification through faith in him, of redemption from eternal death unto everlasting life by him. Connected, and generally if not invariably concomitant, with the denial of these doctrines is a denial of the Holy Spirit in his personal character and offices, and of the renewal of mankind unto holiness by his sovereign agency, as held by Orthodox Christians. Now, sir, are these small and trivial points of difference between you and us? "*

Channing protested against these inferences; but
he did not deny — indeed, he affirmed — that Unitarians regarded dogma as unnecessary to salvation. "In our judgment of professed Christians," he replied, "we are guided more by their temper and lives than by any peculiarities of opinion. We lay it down as & great and indisputable opinion, clear as the sun at noonday, that the great end for which Christian truth is revealed is the sanctification of the soul, the formation of the Christian character; and wherever we see the marks of this character displayed in a professed disciple of Jesus, we hope, and rejoice to hope, that he has received all the truth which is necessary to his salvation." The hope might help to soothe anxiety and distress, but it defied conclusions reached by the most anxious and often renewed labors of churchmen for eighteen hundred years. Something more than a hope was necessary as the foundation of a faith.

Not until the year 1819, did Channing quit the cautious attitude he at first assumed. Then, in his 'Sermon on the Ordination of Jared Sparks' at Baltimore, he accepted the obligation to define his relation to Christian doctrine, and with the support of Andrews Norton, Henry Ware, and other Unitarian clergymen gave a doctrinal character to the movement. With this phase of his influence the present history has nothing to do. In the intellectual development of the country, the earlier stage of Unitarianism was more interesting than the later, for it marked a general tendency of national thought. At a time when Boston grew little in population and but moderately in wealth, and when it was regarded with antipathy, both political and religious, by a vast majority of the American people, its society had never been so agreeable or so fecund. No such display
of fresh arid winning genius had yet been seen in America as was offered by the genial outburst of intellectual activity in the early days of the Unitarian schism. No more was heard of the Westminster doctrine that man had lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation, but was dead in sin. So strong was the reaction against old dogmas that for thirty years society seemed less likely to resume the ancient faith in the Christian Trinity than to establish a new Trinity, in which a deified humanity should have place. Under the influence of Ghanning and his friends, human nature was adorned with virtues hardly suspected before, and with hopes of perfection on earth altogether strange to theology. The Church then charmed. The worth of man became under Ghanning's teachings a source of pride and joy, with such insistence as to cause his hearers at last to recall, almost with a sense of relief, that the Saviour himself had been content to regard them only as of more value than many sparrows.

The most remarkable quality of Unitarianism was its high social and intellectual character. The other more popular religious movements followed for the most part a less ambitious path, but were marked by the same humanitarian tendency. In contrast with old stringency of thought, the religious activity of the epoch showed warmth of emotion. The elder Buckminster, a consistent Calvinist clergyman, settled at Portsmouth in New Hampshire, while greatly distressed by his son's leanings toward loose theology, was at the same time obliged to witness the success of other opinions, which he thought monstrous, preached by Hosea Ballou, an active minister in the same town. This new doctrine,
which took the name of Universalism, held as an article of faith "that there is one God, whose nature is love, revealed in one Lord Jesus Christ, by one Holy Spirit of grace, who will finally restore the whole family of mankind to holiness and happiness."*

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In former times any one who had publicly professed belief in universal salvation would not have been regarded as a Christian. With equal propriety he might have preached the divinity of Ammon or Diana. To the old theology one god was as strange as the other; and so deeply impressed was Dr. Buckminster with this conviction, that he felt himself constrained in the year 1809 to warn Hosea Ballou of his error, in a letter pathetic for its conscientious self-restraint. Yet the Universalists steadily grew in numbers and respectability, spreading from State to State under Ballou's guidance, until they became as well-established and as respectable a church as that to which Buckminster belonged.

A phenomenon still more curious was seen in the same year, 1809, in western Pennsylvania. Near the banks of the Monongahela, in Washington County, a divergent branch of Scotch Presbyterianism established a small church, and under the guidance of Thomas Campbell, a recent emigrant from Scotland, issued, Sept. 7, 1809, a Declaration:

'^ Being well aware from sad experience of the heinous nature and pernicious tendency of religious controversy among Christians, tired and sick of the bitter jarrings and janglings of a party spirit, we would desire to be at rest; and were it possible, would also desire to adopt and recommend such measures as would give rest to our brethren throughout all the churches, as would restore
unity, peace, and purity to the whole Church of God. This desirable rest, however, we utterly despair either to find for ourselves, or to be able to recommend to our brethren, by continuing amid the diversity and rancor of party contentions the varying uncertainty and clashings of human opinions; nor indeed can we reasonably expect to find it anywhere but in Christ and his simple word, which is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. Our desire, therefore, for ourselves and our brethren would be that rejecting human opinions and the inventions of men as of any authority, or as having any place in the Church of God, we might forever cease from further contentions about such things, returning to and holding fast by the original standard."

Campbell's Declaration expressed so wide a popular want that his church, in a few years, became one of the largest branches of the great Baptist persuasion. Perhaps in these instances of rapid popular grouping love of peace was to some extent supplemented by jealousy of learning, and showed as much spirit of social independence as of religious instinct. The growth of vast popular sects in a democratic community might testify to intellectual stagnation as well as to religious or social earnestness; but whatever was the amount of thought involved in such movements, one character was common to them all, as well as to the Unitarians, — they agreed in relaxing the strictness of theological reasoning. Channing imitated with Campbell in suggesting that the Church should ignore what it could not comprehend. In a popular and voluntary form they proposed self-restraints which should have the same effect as the formal restraints of the hierarchies.

** Rejecting," like Campbell, " human opinions and
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the inventions of men," — preaching, like Channing and Ballon, "that there is one God, whose nature is love," and that doctrine was useless except to promote a spirit of love, — they founded new churches on what seemed to resemble an argument that the intellectual difficulties in their path must be unessential because they were insuperable.

Wide as the impulse was to escape the rigor of bonds and relax the severity of thought, organizations so deeply founded as the old churches were not capable of destruction. They had seen many similar human efforts, and felt certain that sooner or later such experiments must end in a return to the old standards. Even the Congregational Church of New England, though reduced in Boston to a shadow of its old authority, maintained itself at large against its swarm of enemies, — Unitarian, Universalist, Baptist, Methodist, — resisting, with force of character and reasoning, the looseness of doctrine and vagueness of thought which marked the time. Yale College remained true to it. Most of the parishes maintained their old relations. If the congregations in some instances crumbled away or failed to increase, the Church could still stand erect, and might reflect with astonishment on its own strength, which survived so long a series of shocks apparently fatal. For half a century the Congregational clergy had struggled to prevent innovation, while the people emigrated by hundreds of thousands in order to innovate. Obliged to insist on the infinite
justice rather than on the infinite mercy of God, they shocked the instincts of the new generation, which wanted to enjoy worldly blessings without fear of future reckoning. Driven to bay by the deistic and utilitarian principles of Jefferson's democracy, they fell into the worldly error of defying the national instinct, pressing their resistance to the war until it amounted to treasonable conspiracy. The sudden peace swept away much that was respectable in the old society of America, but perhaps its noblest victim was the unity of the New England Church.

The Church, whether Catholic or Protestant, Lutheran or Calvinistic, always rested in the conviction that every divergence from the great highways of religious thought must be temporary, and that, no permanent church was possible except on foundations already established; but the State stood in a position less self-confident. The old principles of government were less carefully developed, and Democrats in politics were more certain than Unitarians or Universalists in theology that their intellectual conclusions made a stride in the progress of thought. Yet the sixteen years with which the century opened were singularly barren of new political ideas. Apparently the extreme activity which marked the political speculations of the period between 1775 and 1800, both in America and in Europe, had exhausted the energy of society, for Americans showed interest only in the practical working of their experiments, and added nothing to the ideas that underlay them. With
such political thought as society produced, these pages have been chiefly filled; the result has been told. The same tendency which in religion led to reaction against dogma, was shown in politics by general acquiescence in practices which left unsettled the disputed principles of government. No one could say with confidence what theory of the Constitution had prevailed. Neither party was satisfied, although both acquiesced. While the Legislative and Executive branches of the government acted on no fixed principle, but established precedents at variance with any consistent theory, the Judiciary rendered so few decisions that Constitutional law stood nearly still. Only at a later time did Chief-Justice Marshall begin his great series of judicial opinions, — McCuUoch against the State of Maryland in 1819; Dartmouth College in the same year; Cohens against the State of Virginia in 1821. No sooner were these decisive rulings announced, than they roused the last combative energies of Jefferson against his old enemy the Judiciary:

** That body, like gravity, ever acting, with noiseless foot and unalarming advance, gaining ground step by step, and holding what it gains, is engulfing insidiously the special governments."

Marshall had few occasions to decide Constitutional points during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison, but the opinions he gave were emphatic. When Pennsylvania in 1809 resisted, in the case of Gideon Olmstead, a process of the Supreme Court,
United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the Constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals." Pennsylvania yielded; and Marshall, in the following year, carried a step further the authority of his court. He overthrew the favorite dogma of John Randolph and the party of States rights, so long and vehemently maintained in the Yazoo dispute.

The Yazoo claims came before the court in the case of Fletcher against Peck, argued first in 1809 by Luther Martin, J. Q. Adams, and Robert 6. Harper; and again in 1810 by Martin, Harper, and Joseph Story. March 16, 1810, the chief-justice delivered the opinion. Declining, as "indecent in the extreme," to enter into an inquiry as to the corruption of "the sovereign power of a State," he dealt with the issue whether a legislature could annul rights vested in an individual by a law in its nature a contract.

"It may well be doubted," he argued, "whether the nature of society and government does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and if any are to be prescribed, where are they to be found if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation? To the legislature all

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legislative power is granted; but the question whether the act of transferring the property of an individual to
the public be in the nature of the legislative power, is well worthy of serious reflection. It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society: the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments. How far the power of giving the law may involve every other power, in cases where the Constitution is silent, never has been and perhaps never can be definitely stated."

In the case under consideration, Marshall held that the Constitution was not silent. The provision that no State could pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, as well as "the general principles which are common to our free institutions," restrained the State of Georgia from passing a law whereby the previous contract could be rendered void. His decision settled, as far as concerned the Judiciary, a point regarded as vital by the States-rights school. Pour years afterward Congress gave the required compensation for the contract broken by Georgia.

The chief-justice rendered no more leading Constitutional decisions during Madison's term of office; but his influence was seen in a celebrated opinion delivered by Justice Story in 1819, in the case of Martin against Himter's Lessee. There the court came in conflict with the State of Virginia. The Court of Appeals of that State refused to obey a mandate of the Supreme Court, alleging that the proceedings of the Supreme Court were coram non judice or beyond its jurisdiction, being founded on section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which was unconstitutional in extending the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the State

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judice. The inclusion of a provision in the Constitution...
The Court of Appeals was unfortunate in the moment of its resistance to the authority of the national courts. While the case was passing through its last stage peace was declared, and the national authority sprang into vigor unknown before. The chief-justice would not with his own hand humiliate the pride of the Court of Appeals, for which as a Virginian and a lawyer he could feel only deep respect. He devolved the unpleasant duty on young Justice Story, whose own State of Massachusetts was then far from being an object of jealousy to Virginia, and who, a Republican in politics, could not be prejudiced by party feeling against the Virginia doctrine. Much of the opinion bore the stamp of Marshall's mind; much showed the turn of Story's intelligence; yet the same principle lay beneath the whole, and no one could detect a divergence between the Federalism of the Virginia chief-justice and the Democracy of the Massachusetts lawyer.

"It has been argued," said the court, "that such an appellate jurisdiction over State courts is inconsistent with the genius of our governments and the spirit of the Constitution; that the latter was never designed to act upon State sovereignties, but only upon the people; and that if the power exists, it will materially impair the sovereignty of the States and the independence of their courts. We cannot yield to the force of this reasoning; it assumes principles which we cannot admit, and draws conclusions to which we do not yield our assent. It is a mistake that the Constitution was not designed to operate upon States in their corporate capacity. It is crowded with provisions which restrain or annul the sov-
ereignty of the States in some of the highest branches of their prerogatives. . . When, therefore, the States are stripped of some of the highest attributes of sovereignty, and the same are given to the United States; when the legislatures of the States are in some respects under the control of Congress, and in every case are, under the Constitution, bound by the paramount authority of the United States,—it is certainly difficult to support the argument that the appellate power over the decisions of State courts is contrary to the genius of our institutions."

So far were the political principles of the people from having united in a common understanding, that while the Supreme Court of the United States thus differed from the Virginia Court of Appeals in regard to the genius of the government and the spirit of the Constitution, Jefferson still publicly maintained that the national and state governments were "as independent, in fact, as different nations," and that the function of one was foreign, while that of the other was domestic. Madison still declared that Congress could not build a road or clear a watercourse; while Congress believed itself authorized to do both, and in that belief passed a law which Madison vetoed. In politics as in theology, the practial system which

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resulted from sixteen years of experience seemed to rest on the agreement not to press principles to a conclusion.

No new idea was brought forward, and the old ideas, though apparently incapable of existing together, continued to exist in rivalry like that of the dogmas which perplexed the theological world; but between the political and religious movement a distinct difference could be seen. The Church showed no ten-
dency to unite in any creed or dogma, — indeed, religious society rather tended to more divisions; but in politics public opinion slowly moved in a fixed direction. The movement could not easily be measured, and was subject to reaction; but its reality was shown by the protests of Jefferson, the veto of Madison, and the decisions of the Supreme Court. No one doubted that a change had occurred since 1798. The favorite States-rights dogma of that time had suffered irreparable injury. For sixteen years the national government in all its branches had acted, without listening to remonstrance, on the rule that it was the rightful interpreter of its own powers. In this assumption the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary had agreed. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, as well as Virginia and Georgia, yielded. Louisiana had been bought and admitted into the Union; the Embargo had been enforced; one National Bank had been destroyed and another established; every essential function of a sovereignty had been performed, without an instance of failure, though not without question. However unwilling the minority might be to admit in theory the overthrow of their principles, every citizen assented in daily practice to the rule that the national government alone interpreted its own powers in the last resort. From the moment the whole people learned to accept the practice, the dispute over theory lost importance, and the Virginia Resolutions of 1798 marked only a stage in the development of a sovereignty.

The nature of the sovereignty that was to be the result of American political experiment, the amount
of originality which could be infused into an idea so old, was a matter for future history to settle. Many years were likely to elapse before the admitted practice of the government and people could be fully adopted into the substance of their law, but the process thus far had been rapid. In the brief space of thirty years, between 1787 and 1817, — a short generation, — the Union had passed through astonishing stages. Probably no great people ever grew more rapidly and became more mature in so short a time. The ideas of 1787 were antiquated in 1815, and lingered only in districts remote from active movement. The subsidence of interest in political theories was a measure of the change, marking the general drift of society toward practical devices for popular use, within popular intelligence. The only work that could be said to represent a school of thought in politics was written by John Taylor of Caroline, and was probably never read, — or if read, certainly never understood, — north

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of Baltimore by any but curious and somewhat deep students, although to them it had value.

John Taylor of Caroline might without irreverence be described as a vox clamantisy — the voice of one crying in the wilderness. Regarded as a political thinker of the first rank by Jefferson, Monroe, John Randolph, and the Virginia school, he admitted, with the geniality of the class to which he belonged, that his disciples invariably deserted in practice the rules they praised in his teaching; but he continued to teach, and the further his scholars drifted from him the more publicly and profusely he wrote. His first large volume, "An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States," published in 1814, during the war, was in form an answer
to John Adams's "Defence of the Constitutions" published in London twenty-five years before. In 1787 John Adams, like Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and other constitution-makers, might, without losing the interest of readers, indulge in speculations more or less visionary in regard to the future character of a nation yet in its cradle; but in 1814 the character of people and government was formed; the lines of their activity were fixed. A people which had in 1787 been indifferent or hostile to roads, banks, funded debt, and nationality, had become in 1815 habituated to ideas and machinery of the sort on a great scale. Monarchy or aristocracy no longer entered into the public mind as factors in future development. Yet Taylor resumed the discussions of 1787 as though the interval were a blank; and his only conclusion from the experience of thirty years was that both political parties were equally losing in a wrong direction.

"The two parties, called Republican and Federal," he concluded, "have hitherto undergone but one revolution. Yet each when in power preached Filmer's old doctrine of passive obedience in a new form, with considerable success; and each, out of power, strenuously controverted it. The party in power asserted that however absurd or slavish this doctrine was under other forms of the numerical analysis, the people under ours were identified (the new term to cog this old doctrine upon the United States) with the government; and that therefore an opposition to the government was an opposition to the nation itself. . . . This identifying doctrine . . . puts an end to the idea of a responsibility of the government to the nation; . . . it renders useless the freedom of speech and of the press; it converts the representative
into the principal; it destroys the division of power between the people and the government, as being themselves indivisible; and in short it is inconsistent with every principle by which politicians and philosophers have hitherto defined a free government."

The principle to which Taylor so strenuously objected was nevertheless the chief political result of national experience. Somewhere or another a point was always reached where opposition became treasonable, — as Virginia, like Massachusetts, had learned both when in power and when out. Taylor's speculations ended only in an admission of their own practical sterility, and his suggestions for restraining the growth of authority assumed the possibility of returning to the conditions of 1787. Banks were his horror. Stocks and bonds, or paper evidences of indebtedness in any form, he thought destructive to sound principles of government. The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were his best resource for the preservation of civil liberty. However well-founded his fears might be, his correctives could no longer be applied. Political philosophers of all ages were fond of devising systems for imaginary Repub- lics, Utopias, and Oceanas, where practical difficulties could not stand in their way. Taylor was a political philosopher of the same school, and his Oceana on the banks of the Rappahannock was a reflection of his own virtues.

CHAPTER IX.

Society showed great interest in the statesmen or
preachers who won its favor, and earnestly discussed the value of political or religious dogmas, without betraying a wish to subject itself ever again to the rigor of a strict creed in politics or religion. In a similar spirit it touched here and there, with a light hand, the wide circuit of what was called belles lettres, without showing severity either in taste or temper.

For the first four or five years of the century, Dennie's "Portfolio" contained almost everything that was produced in the United States under the form of light literature. The volumes of the "Portfolio" for that period had the merit of representing the literary efforts of the time, for Philadelphia insisted on no standard of taste so exacting as to exclude merit, or even dulness, in any literary form. Jacobins, as Dennie called Democrats, were not admitted into the circle of the "Portfolio"; but Jacobins rarely troubled themselves with belles lettres.

The "Portfolio" reflected a small literary class scattered throughout the country, remarkable chiefly for close adhesion to established English ideas. The English standard was then extravagantly Tory, and the American standard was the same. At first sight the impression was strange. A few years later, no ordinary reader could remember that ideas so illiberal had seriously prevailed among educated Americans. By an effort, elderly men could, in the next generation, recall a time when they had been taught that Oliver Cromwell was a monster of wickedness and hypocrisy; but they could hardly believe that at any period an American critic coldly qualified "Paradise Lost," and "Avenge, Lord, thy slaughtered saints," as good poetry, though written by a Repub-
lican and an enemy of established order. This was the tone of Dennie's criticism, and so little was it confined to him that even young Buckminster, in his Phi Beta Kappa Oration of 1809, which was regarded as making almost an epoch in American literature, spoke of Milton's eyes as "quenched in the service of a vulgar and usurping faction," and of Milton's life as "a memorable instance of the temporary degradation of learning." Buckminster was then remonstrating against the influence of politics upon letters rather than expressing a political sentiment, but his illustration was colored by the general prejudices of British Toryism. Half a century before, Dr. Johnson had taken the tone of Tory patronage toward Milton's genius, and Johnson and Burke were still received in America as final authorities for correct opinion in morals, literature, and politics. The "Portfolio" regarded Johnson not only as a "supreme" moralist and politician, but also as a "sub-

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lime" critic and a "transcendent" poet. Burke and Cicero stood on the same level, as masters before whose authority criticism must silently bow.

Yet side by side with these conventional standards, the "Portfolio" showed tendencies which seemed inconsistent with conservatism, — a readiness to welcome literary innovations contradicting every established canon. No one would have supposed that the critic who accepted Johnson and Pope as transcendent poets, should also delight in Burns and Wordsworth; yet Dennie was unstinted in praise of poetry which, as literature, was hardly less revolutionary than the writings of Godwin in politics. Dennie lost no opportunity of praising Coleridge, and
reprinted with enthusiasm the simplest ballads of Wordsworth. Moore was his personal friend, and Moore's verses his models. Wherever his political prejudices were untouched, he loved novelty. He seemed to respect classical authority only because it was established, but his literary instincts were broader than those of Jefferson.

The original matter of the "Portfolio" was naturally unequal, and for the most part hardly better than that of a college magazine. Dennie was apt to be commonplace, trivial, and dull. His humor was heavy and commonly coarse; he allowed himself entire freedom, and no little grossness of taste. Of scholarship, or scholarly criticism, his paper showed great want. He tried to instruct as well as to amuse, but society soon passed the stage to which his

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writing belonged. The circulation of the "Portfolio" probably never exceeded fifteen hundred copies, and Dennie constantly complained that the paper barely supported itself. When the Bostonians, in the year 1805, began to feel the spirit of literary ambition, they took at once a stride beyond Dennie's power, and established a monthly magazine called the "Anthology and Boston Review," which in 1806 numbered four hundred and forty subscribers. The undertaking was doubly remarkable; for the Anthology Society which supported the Review combined with it the collection of a library, limited at first to periodical publications, which expanded slowly into the large and useful library known as the Boston Athenaeum. The Review and Library quickly became the centre of literary taste in Boston, and, in the words of Josiah Quincy many years afterward, might be considered as a revival of polite learning in America.
The claim was not unreasonable, for the Review far surpassed any literary standards then existing in the United States, and was not much inferior to any in England; for the Edinburgh was established only in 1802, and the Quarterly not till 1809.

The Anthology Society, which accomplished the feat of giving to Boston for the first time the lead of American literary effort, consisted largely of clergy-men, and represented, perhaps unintentionally, the coming Unitarian movement. Its president and controlling spirit had no sympathy with either divi-

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sion of the Congregational Church, but was a clergy-man of the Church of England. John Sylvester John • Gurdiner, the rector of Trinity, occupied a peculiar position in Boston. Of American descent, but English birth and education, he was not prevented by the isolation of his clerical character from taking an active part in affairs, and his activity was sometimes greater than his discretion. His political sermons rivalled those of the Congregational ministers Osgood and Parish, in their violence against Jefferson and the national government; his Federalism was that of the Essex Junto, with a more decided leaning to disunion; but he was also an active and useful citizen, ready to take his share in every good work. When he became president of the Anthology Society, he was associated with a clergyman of Unitarian opinions as vice-president, — the Rev. William Emerson, a man of high reputation in his day, but better known in after years as the father of Ralph Waldo Emerson. The first editor was Samuel Cooper Thacher, to whom, ten years afterward, Channing addressed his earliest controversial letter. Young Buckminster and William Tudor, a Boston man, who
for the next twenty years was active in the literary life of Massachusetts, were also original members. The staff of the "Anthology*" was greatly superior to ordinary editorial resources; and in a short time the Review acquired a reputation for ability and sharpness of temper never wholly forgiven. Its unpopularity was the greater because its aggressiveness

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took the form of assaults on Calvinism, which earned the ill-will of the Congregational clergy.

Buckminster and Channing were the editor's closest friends, and their liberality of thought was remarkable for the time and place; yet the point from which the liberality of Boston started would have been regarded in most parts of the Union as conservative. Channing's fear of France and attachment to England were superstitious.

'* I will not say," began his Fast Day Sermon in 1810, ^ ^ that the present age is as strongly marked or distinguished from all other ages as that in which Jesus Christ appeared; but with that single exception, perhaps the present age is the most eventful the world has ever known. We live in times which have no parallel in past ages; in times when the human character has almost assumed a new form; in times of peculiar calamity, of thick darkness, and almost of despair*. . . . The danger is so vast, so awful, and so obvious, that the blindness, the indifference, which prevail argue infatuation, and give room for apprehension that nothing can rouse us to those efforts by which alone the danger can be averted. Am I asked what there is so peculiar and so tremendous in the times in which we live? ... I answer: In the very heart of Europe, in the centre of the civilized world,* a new power has suddenly arisen on the ruins of old
While Channing felt for France the full horror of his Federalist principles, he regarded England with equivalent affection.

I feel a peculiar interest in England,' he explained in a note appended to the Fast Day Sermon; 'for I believe that there Christianity is exerting its best influences on the human character; that there the perfections of human nature, wisdom, virtue, and piety are fostered by excellent institutions, and are producing the delightful fruits of domestic happiness, social order, and general prosperity."

The majority of Americans took a different view of the subject; but even those who most strongly agreed with Channing would have been first to avow that their prejudice was inveterate, and its consequences sweeping. Such a conviction admitted little room for liberalism where politics were, directly or remotely, involved. Literature bordered closely on politics, and the liberalism of Unitarian Boston was bounded even in literature by the limits of British sympathies. Buckminster's Phi Beta Kappa Oration of 1809 was as emphatic on this point as Channing's Fast Day Sermon of 1810 was outspoken in its political antipathies.

"It is our lot," said Buckminster, "to have been born in an age of tremendous revolution, and the world is yet covered with the wrecks of its ancient glory, especially of its literary renown. The fury of that storm which rose in France is passed and spent, but its ef-
fects have been felt through the whole system of liberal education. The foul spirit of innovation and sophistry has been seen wandering in the very groves of the Lyceum, and is not yet completely exorcised, though the spell is broken."

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The liberalism of Boston began in a protest against "the foul spirit of innovation," and could hardly begin at any point more advanced. "Infidety has had one triumph in our days, and we have seen learning as well as virtue trampled under the hoofs of its infuriated steeds, let loose by the hand of impiety." From this attitude of antipathy to innovation, the Unitarian movement began its attempts to innovate, and with astonishing rapidity passed through phases which might well have required ages of growth. In five years Ghanning began open attack upon the foundation, or what had hitherto been believed the foundation, of the Church; and from that moment innovation could no longer be regarded as foul.

Of the intellectual movement in all its new directions. Harvard College was the centre. Between 1805 and 1817 the college inspired the worn-out Federalism of Boston with life till then unimagined. Not only did it fill the pulpits with Buckminsters, Channings, and Thachers, whose sermons were an unfailing interest, and whose society was a constant stimulus, but it also maintained a rivalry between the pulpit and the lecture-room. The choice of a new professor was as important and as much discussed as the choice of a new minister. No ordinary political event caused more social interest than the appointment of Henry Ware as Professor of Theology in 1805. In the following year J. Q. Adams was
made Professor of Rhetoric, and delivered a course of lectures, which created the school of oratory to which Edward Everett's generation adhered. Pour younger men, whose influence was greatly felt in their branches of instruction, received professorships in the next few years, — Jacob Bigelow, who was appointed Professor of Medicine in 1813; Edward Everett, Greek Professor in 1815; John Collins Warren, Professor of Anatomy in the same year; and George Ticknor, Professor of Belles Lettres in 1816. In the small society of Boston, a city numbering hardly forty thousand persons, this activity of college and church produced a new era. Where thirty-nine students a year had entered the college before 1800, an average number of sixty-six entered it during the war, and took degrees during the four or five subsequent years. Among them were names familiar to the literature and politics of the next half century. Besides Ticknor and Everett, in 1807 and 1811, Henry Ware graduated in 1812, and his brother William, the author of "Zenobia," in 1816; William Hickling Prescott, in 1814; J. G. Palfrey, in 1815; in 1817, George Bancroft and Caleb Gushing graduated, and Ralph Waldo Emerson entered the college. Boston also drew resources from other quarters, and perhaps showed no stronger proof of its vigor than when, in 1816, it attracted Daniel Webster from New Hampshire to identify himself with the intellect and interests of Massachusetts. Even by reaction the Unitarians stimulated Boston, — as when, a few years afterward, Lyman Beecher accepted the
charge of a Boston church in order to resist their encroachments.

The "Anthology," which marked the birth of the new literary school, came in a few years to a natural end, but was revived in 1815 under the name of the "North American Review," by the exertions of William Tudor. The life of the new Review belonged to a later period, and was shaped by other influences than those that surrounded the "Anthology." With the beginning of the next epoch, the provincial stage of the boston school was closed. More and more its influence tended to become national, and even to affect other countries. Perhaps by a natural consequence rather than by coincidence, the close of the old period was marked by the appearance of a short original poem in the "North American Review" for September, 1817: —

"... The hill,
Rock-ribbed and ancient as the sun; the vales
Stretching in pensive quietness between;
The venerable woods; the floods that move
In majesty, and the complaining brooks
That wind among the meads and make them green,—
Are but the solemn declarations all,
Of the great tomb of man. The golden son,
The planets, all the infinite host of heaven
Are glowing on the sad abodes of death
Through the still lapse of ages. All that tread
The globe are but a handful to the tribes
That slumber in its bosom. Take the wings
Of morning, and the Borean desert pierce;
Or lose thyself in the continuous woods
That veil Oregan, where he hears no sound
Save his own dashings, — yet the dead are there;  
And millions in these solitudes, since first 
The flight of years began, have laid them down 
In their last sleep: the dead reign there alone. 
So shalt thou rest: and what if thou shalt faH, 
Unnoticed by the Uving, and no friend 
Take note of thy departure? Thousands more 
Will share thy destiny. The tittering world 
Dance to the grave. The busy brood of care 
Plod on, and each one chases as before 
His favorite phantom. Yet all these shall leave 
Their mirth and their employments, and shall come 
And make their bed with thee."

The appearance of "Thanatopsis" and "Lines to 
a Waterfowl" in the early numbers of the "North 
American Review," while leaving no doubt that a 
new national literature was close at hand, proved also 
that it was not to be the product of a single source; 
for Bryant, though greatly tempted to join the Emer-
sons, Channing, Dana, Allston, and Tudor in Boston, 
turned finally to New York, where influences of a 
different kind surrounded him. The Unitarian school 
could not but take a sober cast, and even its humor 
was sure to be tinged with sadness, sarcasm, or irony, 
or some serious purpose or passion; but New York 
contained no atmosphere in which such a society 
could thrive. Busy with the charge of practical 
work,—the development of industries continually ex-
ceeding their power of control,—the people of New 
York wanted amusement, and shirmed what in 
Boston was considered as intellectual. Their tastes 
were gratified by the appearance of a writer whose
first book created a school of literature as distinctly marked as the Unitarian school of Boston, and more decidedly original. "The History of New York, by Diedrich Knickerbocker," appeared in 1809, and stood alone. Other books of the time seemed to recognize some literary parentage. Channing and Buckminster were links in a chain of theologians and preachers. "Thanatopsis" evidently drew inspiration from Wordsworth. Diedrich Knickerbocker owed nothing to any living original.

The "History of New York" was worth more than passing notice. In the development of a national character, as well as of the literature that reflected it, humor was a trait of the utmost interest; and Washington Irving was immediately recognized as a humorist whose name, if he fulfilled the promise of his first attempt, would have a chance of passing into the society of Rabelais, Cervantes, Butler, and Sterne. Few literary tasks were more difficult than to burlesque without vulgarizing, and to satirize without malignity; yet Irving in his first effort succeeded in doing both. The old families, and serious students of colonial history, never quite forgave Irving for throwing an atmosphere of ridicule over the subject of their interest; but Diedrich Knickerbocker's History was so much more entertaining than ordinary histories, that even historians could be excused for regretting that it should not be true.

Yet the book reflected the political passions which marked the period of the Embargo. Besides the bnr-

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Icsque, the "History" contained satire; and perhaps its most marked trait was the good-nature which, at a time when bitterness was universal in politics, saved Irving's political satire from malignity. Irving meant that no one should mistake the character of the universal genius, (Governor Wilhelmus Kieft, surnamed the Testy, who as a youth had made many curious investigations into the nature and operations of windmills, and who came well-nigh being smothered in a slough of unintelligible learning, — "a fearful peril, from the effects of which he never perfectly recovered."

^^ No sooner had this bustling little man been blown by a whiff of fortune into the seat of government, than he called together his council and delivered a very animated speech on the affairs of the government; • • • and here he soon worked himself into a fearful rage against the Yankees, whom he compared to the Gauls who desolated Rome, and to the Goths and Vandals who overran the fairest plains of Europe. • • • Having thus artfully wrought up his tale of terror to a climax, he assumed a self-satisfied look, and declared with a nod of knowing import that he had taken measures to put a final stop to these encroachments, — that he had been obliged to have recourse to a dreadful engine of warfare, lately invented, awful in its effects but authorized by direful necessity; in a word, he was resolved to conquer the Yankees — by Proclamation.'*

Washington Irving's political relations were those commonly known as Burrite, through his brother Peter, who edited in Burr's interest the "Morning Chronicle." Antipathy to Jefferson was a natural result, and Irving's satire on the President was the
more interesting because the subject offered tempta-
tions for ill-tempered sarcasm such as spoiled Fed-
eralist humor. The Knickerbocker sketch of Jeffer-
son was worth comparing with Federalist modes of 
expressing the same ideas: —

"The great defect of Wilhelmus Kieft’s policy was that 
though no man could be more ready to stand forth in an 
hour of emergency, yet he was so intent upon guarding 
the national pocket that he suffered the enemy to break 
its head. . . . All this was a remote consequence of his 
education at the Hague; where, having acquired a smat-
tering of knowledge, he was ever a great conner of in-
dexes, continually dipping into books without ever 
studying to the bottom of any subject, so that he had the 
scum of all kinds of authors fermenting in his pericra-
nium. In some of these titlepage researches he un-
luckily stumbled over a grand political ccU)ci8tic wordj 
which with his customary facility he immediately incor-
porated into his great scheme of government, to the ir« 
retrievable injury and delusion of the honest province 
of Nieuw NederlandSy and the eternal misleading of all 
experimental rulers."

Little was wanting to make such a sketch bitter; 
but Irving seemed to have the power of deadening 
venom by a mere trick of hand. Readers of the 
"History," after a few years had passed, rarely re-
membered the satire, or supposed that the story con-
tained it. The humor and the style remained to 
characterize a school.

The originality of the Knickerbocker humor was 
the more remarkable because it was allowed to 
stand alone. Irving published nothing else of con-
sequence until 1819, and then, abandoning his early
style, inclined to imitate Addison and Steele, although his work was hardly the less original. Irving preceded Walter Scott, whose "Waverley" appeared in 1814, and "Guy Mannering" in 1815; and if either author could be said to influence the other, the influence of Diedrich Knickerbocker on Scott was more evident than that of "Waverley" on Irving.

In the face of the spontaneous burst of genius which at that moment gave to English literature and art a character distinct even in its own experience, Americans might have been excused for making no figure at all. Other periods produced one poet at a time, and measured originality by single poems; or satisfied their ambition by prose or painting of occasional merit. The nineteenth century began in England with genius as plenty as it was usually rare. To Seattle, Cowper, and Burns, succeeded Wordsworth, Coleridge, Scott, Byron, Crabbe, Campbell, Charles Lamb, Moore, Shelley, and Keats. The splendor of this combination threw American and even French talent into the shade, and defied hope of rivalry; but the American mind, as far as it went, showed both freshness and originality. The divergence of American from English standards seemed insignificant to critics who required, as they commonly did, a national

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literature founded on some new conception, — such as the Shawanee or Aztecs could be supposed to suggest; but to those who expected only a slow variation from European types, the difference was well marked. Channing and Irving were American in literature, as Calhoim and Webster were American in politics. They were the product of influences as peculiar to the country as those which produced Pulton and his
While Bryant published "Thanatopsis" and Irving made his studies for the "Sketch-Book," another American of genius perhaps superior to theirs — Washington Allston — was painting in London, before returning to pass the remainder of his life in the neighborhood of Boston and Harvard College. Between thirty and forty years of age, Allston was then in the prime of his powers; and even in a circle of artists which included Turner, Wilkie, Mulready, Constable, Callcott, Crome, Cotman, and a swarm of others equally famous, Allston was distinguished. Other Americans took rank in the same society. Leslie and Stuart Newton were adopted into it, and Copley died only in 1816, while Trumbull painted in London till 1816; but remarkable though they were for the quality of their art, they belonged to a British school, and could be claimed as American only by blood. Allston stood in elation somewhat different. In part, his appearance: Americanism was due to his later return, and to his identification with American society; but the return itself was probably caused by a peculiar bent of character. His mind was not wholly English.

Allston's art and his originality were not such as might have been expected from an American, or such as Americans were likely to admire; and the same might be said of Leslie and Stuart Newton. Perhaps the strongest instance of all was Edward Malbone, whose grace of execution was not more remarkable than his talent for elevating the subject of his exquisite work. So far from sharing the imagination of Shawanee Indians or even of Demo-
crats, these men instinctively reverted to the most refined and elevated schools of art. Not only did Ailsto show from the beginning of his career a passion for the nobler standards of his profession, but also for technical quality, — a taste less usual.

Washington Irving met him in Rome in 1805, when both were unknown; and they became warm friends.

"I do not think I have ever been more captivated on a first acquaintance," wrote Irving long afterward. "He was of a light and graceful form, with large blue eyes and black silken hair. Everything about him bespoke the man of intellect and refinement. • • • He was exquisitely sensitive to the graceful and the beautiful, and took great delight in paintings which excelled in color; yet he was strongly moved and aroused by objects of grandeur. I well recollect the admiration with which he contemplated the sublime statue of Moses, by Michael Angelo."

The same tastes characterized his life, and gave to his work a distinction that might be Italian, but was certainly not English or usual.

"It was Allston," said Leslie, "who first awakened what little sensibility I may possess to the beauties of color. For long time I took the merit of the Venetians on trust, and if left to myself should have preferred works which I now feel to be comparatively worthless. I remember when the picture of "The Ages" by Titian was first pointed out to me by AUSTON as an exquisite work, I thought he was laughing at me." Leslie, if not a great colorist, was seldom incorrect; Stuart Newton had a fine eye for color, and Malbone was em-
phatically a colorist; but Allston's sensibility to color was rare among artists, and the refinement of his mind was as unusual as the delicacy of his eye.

AUston was also singular in the liberality of his sympathies. "I am by nature, as it respects the arts, a wide liker," he said. In Rome he became acquainted with Coleridge; and the remark of Coleridge which seemed to make most impression on him in their walks "under the pines of the Villa Borghese" was evidently agreeable because it expressed his own feelings. "It was there he taught me this golden rule: never to judge of any work of art by its defects." His admiration for the classics did not prevent him from admiring his contemporaries; his journey through Switzerland not only showed him a

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new world of Nature, but also "the truth of Turner's Swiss scenes, —the poetic truth, —which none before or since have given." For a young American art-student in 1804, such sympathies were remarkable; not so much because they were correct, as because they were neither American nor English. Neither in America nor in Europe at that day could art-schools give to every young man, at the age of twenty-five, eyes to see the color of Titian, or imagination to feel the "poetic truth" of Turner.

Other painters, besides those whose names have been mentioned, were American or worked in America, as other writers besides Bryant and Irving, and other preachers besides Buckminster and Channing, were active in their professions; but for national comparisons, types alone serve. In the course of sixteen years certain Americans became distinguished.
Among these, suitable for types, were Calhoun and Clay in Congress, Pinkney and Webster at the bar, Buckminster and Channing in the pulpit, Bryant and Irving in literature, Allston and Malbone in painting. These men varied greatly in character and qualities. Some possessed strength, and some showed more delicacy than vigor; some were humorists, and some were incapable of a thought that was not serious; but all were marked by a keen sense of form and style. So little was this quality expected, that the world inclined to regard them as un-American because of their refinement. Frenchmen and Italians, and even Englishmen who knew nothing of America

but its wildness, were disappointed that American oratory should be only a variation from Fox and Burke; that American literature should reproduce Steele and Wordsworth; and that American art should, at its first bound, go back to the ideals of Raphael and Titian. The incongruity was evident. The Americans themselves called persistently for a statesmanship, religion, literature, and art which should be American; and they made a number of experiments to produce what they thought their ideals. In substance they continued to approve nothing which was not marked by style as its chief merit. The oratory of Webster and Calhoun, and even of John Randolph bore the same general and common character of style. The poetry of Bryant, the humor of Irving, the sermons of Channing, and the painting of Allston were the objects of permanent approval to the national mind. Style remained its admiration, even when every newspaper protested against the imitation of outworn forms. Dennie and Jefferson, agreeing in nothing else, agreed in this; the South Carolinian Allston saw color as naturally as the New
England Bryant heard rhythm; and a people which seemed devoid of sense or standards of beauty, showed more ambition than older societies to acquire both.

Nothing seemed more certain than that the Americans were not artistic, that they had as a people little instinct of beauty; but their intelligence in its higher as in its lower forms was both quick and refined.

Such literature and art as they produced, showed qualities akin to those which produced the swift-sailing schooner, the triumph of naval architecture. If the artistic instinct weakened, the quickness of intelligence increased.

Until 1815 nothing in the future of the American Union was regarded as settled. As late as January, 1815, division into several nationalities was still thought to be possible. Such a destiny, repeating the usual experience of history, was not necessarily more unfortunate than the career of a single nation*ality wholly American; for if the effects of divided nationality were certain to be unhappy, those of a single_society with equal certainty defied experience or sound speculation. One uniform and harmonious system appealed to the imagination as a triumph of
human progress, offering prospects of peace and ease, contentment and philanthropy, such as the world had not seen; but it invited dangers, formidable because unusual or altogether unknown. The corruption of such a system might prove to be proportionate with its dimensions, and uniformity might lead to evils as serious as were commonly ascribed to diversity.

The laws of human progress were matter not for dogmatic faith, but for study; and although society instinctively regarded small States, with their clashing interests and incessant wars, as the chief obstacle to improvement, such progress as the world knew had been coupled with those drawbacks. The few examples offered by history of great political societies, relieved from external competition or rivalry, were not commonly thought encouraging. War had been the severest test of political and social character, laying bare whatever was feeble, and calling out whatever was strong; and the effect of removing such a test was an untried problem.

'In 1815 for the first time Americans ceased to doubt the path they were to follow. Not only was the unity of their nation established, but its probable divergence from older societies was also well defined. Already in 1817 the difference between Europe and
America was decided. In politics the distinction was more evident than in social, religious, literary, or scientific directions; and the result was singular. For a time the aggressions of England and France forced the United States into a path that seemed to lead toward European methods of government; but the popular resistance or inertia, was so great that the most popular party leaders failed to overcome it, and no sooner did foreign dangers disappear than the system began to revert to American practices; the national government tried to lay aside its assumed powers. When Madison vetoed the bill for internal improvements he could have had no other motive than that of restoring to the government, as far as possible, its original American character.

The result was not easy to understand in theory or to make efficient in practice; but while the drift of public opinion, and still more of practical necessity, drew the government slowly toward the European standard of true political sovereignty, nothing showed that the compromise, which must probably serve the public purpose, was to be European in form or feeling. As far as politics supplied a test, the national character had already diverged from any foreign type. Opinions might differ whether the political movement was progressive or retrograde, but in any case the American, in his political character, was a new variety of man.

The social movement was also decided. The war gave a severe shock to the Anglican sympathies of society, and peace seemed to widen the breach between European and American tastes. Interest in Europe languished after Napoleon's overthrow.
Prance ceased to affect American opinion. England became an object of less alarm. Peace produced in the United States a social and economical revolution which greatly curtailed the influence of New England, and with it the social authority of Great Britain. The invention of the steamboat counterbalanced ocean commerce. The South and West gave to society a character more aggressively American than had been known before. That Europe, within certain limits, might tend toward American ideas was possible, but that America should under any circumstances follow the experiences of European development might thenceforward be reckoned as improbable. American character was formed, if not fixed.

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The scientific interest of American history centred in national character, and in the workings of a destined to become vast, in which individuals were important chiefly, as types. Although this kind of interest was different from that of European history, it was at least as important to the world. Should history ever become a true science, it must expect to establish its laws, not from the complicated story of rival European nationalities, but from the economical evolution of a great democracy. North America was the most favorable field on the globe for the spread of a society so large, uniform, and isolated as to answer the purposes of science. There a single homogeneous society could easily attain proportions of three or four hundred million persons, under conditions of undisturbed growth.

In Europe or Asia, except perhaps in China, undisturbed social evolution had been unknown. Without disturbance, evolution seemed to cease. Wherever
disturbance occurred, permanence was impossible. Every people in turn adapted itself to the law of necessity. Such a system as that of the United States could hardly have existed for half a century in Europe except under the protection of another power. In the fierce struggle characteristic of European society, systems were permanent in nothing except in the general law, that, whatever other character they might possess they must always be chiefly military.

The want of permanence was not the only or the

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most confusing obstacle to the treatment of European history as a science. The intensity of the struggle gave prominence to the individual, until the hero seemed all, society nothing; and what was worse for science, the men were far more interesting than the societies. In the dramatic view of history, the hero (tro i deserved more to be studied than the community to / r which he. belonged.; in truth, he was the society, which existed only to produce him and to perish with him. Against such a view historians were among the last to protest, and protested but faintly when they did so at all. They felt as strongly as their audiences that the highest achievements were alone wortti remembering either in history or in art, and that a reiteration of commonplaces was common-place. With all the advantages of European movement and color, few historians succeeded in enliv-enening or dignifying the lack of motive, intelligence, and morality, the helplessness characteristic of many long periods in the face of crushing problems, and the futility of human efforts to escape from difficul-ties religious, political, and social. In a period exten-ding over four or five thousand years, more or
less capable of historical treatment, historians were content to illustrate here and there the most dramatic moments of the most striking communities. The hero was their favorite. War was the chief field of heroic action, and even the history of England was chiefly the story of war.

The history of the United States promised to be

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free from such disturbances. War counted for little, the hero for less; on the people alone the eye could permanently rest. The steady growth of a vast population without the social distinctions that confused other histories, — without kings, nobles, or armies; without church, traditions, and prejudices, — seemed a subject for the man of science rather than for dramatists or poets. To scientific treatment only one great obstacle existed. Americans, like Europeans, were not disposed to make of their history a mechanical evolution. They felt that they even more than other nations needed the heroic element, because they breathed an atmosphere of peace and industry where heroism could seldom be displayed; and in unconscious protest against their own social conditions they adorned with imaginary qualities scores of supposed leaders, whose only merit was their faculty of reflecting a popular trait. Instinctively they clung to ancient history as though conscious that of all misfortunes that could befall the national character, the greatest would be the loss of the established ideals which alone ennobled human weakness. Without heroes, the national character of the United States had few charms of imagination even to Americans.

Historians and readers maintained Old-World stand-
ards. No historian cared to hasten the coming of an
epoch when man should study his own history in the
same spirit and by the same methods with which he
studied the formation of a crystal. Yet history had

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its scientific as well as its human side, and in Ameri-
can history the scientific interest was greater than
the human. Elsewhere the student could study un-
der better conditions the evolution of the individual^
but nowhere could he study so well the evolution of
a race. The interest of such a subject exceeded that
of any other branch of science, for it brought man-
kind within sight of its own end.

Travellers in Switzerland who stepped across the
Rhine where it flowed from its glacier could follow
its course among mediaeval towns and feudal ruins,
until it became a highway for modern industry, and
at last arrived at a permanent equilibrium in the
ocean. American history followed the same course.
With prehistoric glaciers and mediaeval feudalism
the story had little to do; but from the moment it
came within sight of the ocean it acquired interest
almost painful. A child could find his way in a river-
valley, and a hoy could float on the waters of Holland;
but science alone could sound the depths of the ocean,
measure its currents, foretell its storms, or fix its
relations to the system of Nature. In a democratic
ocean science could see something ultimate. Man
could go no further. The atom might move, but the
general equilibrium could not change.

Whether the scientific or the heroic view were
taken, in either case the starting-point was the same,
and the chief object of interest was to define national
character. WTiether the figures of history were
treated as heroes or as types, they must be taken to

represent the people. American types were especially worth study if they were to represent the greatest democratic evolution the world could know. Readers might judge for themselves what share the individual \(^*\) possessed in creating or shaping the nation; but \(^\cdot\) whether it was small or great, the nation could be understood only by studying the individual. For that reason, in the story of Jefferson and Madison indi-

"": l53ualaj:elainei^eir old inf.Prppf ha fyppa nf r*Tin.r-

X acter^iinQJLaa-aQurcfia.pf power.

/ In the American character antipathy to war ranked ;r first among political traits. The majority of Americans regarded war in a peculiar light, the consequence of comparative security. No European nation could have conducted a war, as the people of America conducted the War of 1812. The possibility of doing so without destruction explained the existence of the national trait, and assured its continuance. In politics, the divergence of America from Europe perpetuated itself in the popular instinct for peaceable methods. The Union took shape originally on .the general lines that divided the civil from the military elements of the British constitution. The party of Jefferson and Gallatin was founded on dislike of every function of government necessary in a military system. Although Jefferson carried his pacific theories to an extreme, and brought about a military re-

action, the reactionary movement was neither universal, violent, nor lasting; and society showed no sign
of changing its convictions. With greater strength

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the country might acquire greater familiarity with warlike methods, but in the same degree was less likely to suffer any general change of habits. Nothing but prolonged intestine contests could convert the population of an entire continent into a race of warriors.

A people whose chief trait was antipathy to war, and to any system organized with military energy, could scarcely develop great results in national administration; yet the Americans prided themselves chiefly on their political capacity. Even the war did not undeceive them, although the incapacity brought into evidence by the war was indisputed, and was most remarkable among the communities which believed themselves to be most gifted with political sagacity. Virginia and Massachusetts by turns admitted failure in dealing with issues so simple that the newest societies, like Tennessee and Ohio, understood them by instinct. That incapacity in national politics should appear as a leading trait in American character was unexpected by Americans, but might naturally result from their conditions. The better test of American character was not political but social, and was to be found not in the government but in the people.

The sixteen years of Jefferson's and Madison's rule furnished international tests of popular intelligence upon which Americans could depend. The ocean was the only open field for competition among nations. Americans enjoyed there no natural or artificial ad-
vantages over Englishmen, Frenchmen, or Spaniards; indeed, all these comitries possessed navies, resources, and experience greater than were to be found in the United States. Yet the Americans developed, in the course of twenty years, a surprising degree of skill in naval affairs. The evidence of their success was to be found nowhere so complete as in the avowals of Englishmen who knew best the history of naval progress. The American invention of the fast-sailing schooner or clipper was the more remarkable because, of all American inventions, this alone sprang from direct competition with Europe. During ten centuries of struggle the nations of Europe had labored to obtain superiority over each other in ship construction, yet Americans instantly made improvements which gave them superiority, and which Europeans were unable immediately to imitate even after seeing them. Not only were American vessels better in model, faster in sailing, easier and quicker in handling and more economical in working than the European, but they were also better equipped. The English complained as a grievance that the Americans adopted new and unwarranted devices in naval warfare; that their vessels were heavier and better constructed, and their missiles of unusual shape and improper use. The Americans resorted to expedients that had not been tried before, and excited a mixture of irritation and respect in the English service, until Yankee smartness became a national misdemeanor.

The English admitted themselves to be slow to change their habits, but the French were both quick
and scientific; yet Americans did on the ocean what the French, under stronger inducements, failed to do. The French privateer preyed upon British commerce for twenty years without seriously injuring it; but not sooner did the American privateer sail from French ports, than the rates of insurance doubled in London, and an outcry for protection arose among English shippers which the Admiralty could not calm. The British newspapers were filled with assertions that the American cruiser was the superior of any vessel of its class, and threatened to overthrow England's supremacy on the ocean.

Another test of relative intelligence was furnished by the battles at sea. Instantly after the loss of the "Guerriere" the English discovered and complained that American gunnery was superior to their own. They explained their inferiority by the length of time that had elapsed since their navy had found on the ocean an enemy to fight. Every vestige of hostile fleets had been swept away, until, after the battle of Trafalgar, British frigates ceased practice with their guns. Doubtless the British navy had become somewhat careless in the absence of a dangerous enemy, but Englishmen were themselves aware that some other cause must have affected their losses. Nothing showed that Nelson's line-of-battle ships, frigates, or sloops were as a rule better fought than the "Macedonian" and "Java," the "Avon" and "Reindeer." Sir Howard Douglas, the chief author on the subject, attempted in vain to explain British reverses by the deterioration of British gunnery. His analysis showed only that American gunnery was extraordinarily good. Of all vessels, the sloop-of-war, — on account of its smallness, its quick motion, and
its more accurate armament of thirty-two-pound car-
ronades, — offered the best test of relative gunnery,
and Sir Howard Douglas in commenting upon the
destruction of the "Peacock" and "Avon" could
only say, —

"^' In these two actions it is clear that the fire of the
British vessels was thrown too high, and that the ord-
nance of their opponents were expressly and carefully
aimed at and took effect chiefly in the hull."

The battle of the "Hornet" and « Pengum" as
well as those of the "Reindeer" and "Avon," showed
that the excellence of American gunnery continued
till the close of the war. Whether at point-blank
range or at long-distance practice, the Americans
used guns as they had never been used at sea before.

None of the reports of former British victories
showed that the British fire had been more destruc-
tive at any previous time than in 1812, and no report
of any commander since the British navy existed
showed so much damage inflicted on an opponent in
so short a time as was proved to have been inflicted
on themselves by the reports of British commanders
in the American war. The strongest proof of Ameri-
can superiority was given by the best British officers,
like Broke, who strained every nerve to maintain an

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equality with American gunnery. So instantaneous
and energetic was the effort that, according to the
British historian of the war, " a British forty-six-gua
frigate of 1813 was half as effective again as a Brit-
ish forty-six-gun frigate of 1812; " and, as he justly
said, " the slaughtered crews and the shattered
hulks " of the captured British ships proved that no
want of their old fighting qualities accounted for their repeated and almost habitual mortifications.^

Unwilling as the English were to admit the superior skill of Americans on the ocean, they did not hesitate to admit it, in certain respects, on land. The American rifle in American hands was affirmed to have no equal in the world. This admission could scarcely be withheld after the lists of killed and wounded which followed almost every battle; but the admission served to check a wider inquiry. In truth, the rifle played but a small part in the war. Winchester's men at the river Raisin may have owed their over-confidence, as the British Forty-first owed its losses, to that weapon, and at New Orleans five or six hundred of Coffee's men, who were out of range, were armed with the rifle; but the surprising losses of the British were commonly due to artillery and musketry fire. At New Orleans the artillery was chiefly engaged. The artillery battle of January 1, according to British accounts, amply proved the superiority of American gunnery on that occasion^ which was probably the fairest test during the war.

^ Jamesy pp. 625, 628.

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The battle of January 8 was also chiefly an artillery battle; the main British column never arrived within fair musket range; Pakenham was killed by a grape-Bhot, and the main column of his troops halted more than one hundred yards from the parapet.

The best test of British and American military qualities, both for men and weapons, was Scott's battle of Chippawa. Nothing intervened to throw
a doubt over the fairness of the trial. Two parallel lines of regular soldiers, practically equal in numbers, armed with similar weapons, moved in close order toward each other, across a wide open plain, without cover or advantage of position, stopping at intervals to load and fire, until one line broke and retired. At the same time two three-gun batteries, the British being the heavier, maintained a steady fire from positions opposite each other. According to the reports, the two infantry lines in the centre never came nearer than eighty yards. Major-General Riall reported that then, owing to severe losses, his troops broke and could not be rallied. Comparison of the official reports showed that the British lost in killed and wounded four hundred and sixty-nine men; the Americans, two hundred and ninety-six. Some doubts always affect the returns of wounded, because the severity of the wound cannot be known; but dead men tell their own tale. Riall reported one hundred and forty-eight killed; Scott reported sixty-one. The severity of the losses showed that the tattle was sharply contested, and proved the personal bravery of both armies. Marksmanship decided the result, and the returns proved that the American fire was superior to that of the British in the proportion of more than fifty per cent if estimated by the entire loss, and of two hundred and forty-two to one hundred if estimated by the deaths alone.

The conclusion seemed incredible, but it was supported by the results of the naval battles. The Americans showed superiority amounting in some cases to twice the efficiency of their enemies in the use of weapons. The best French critic of the naval war, Jurien de la Gravidre said: "An enormous
superiority in the rapidity and precision of their fire can alone explain the difference in the losses sustained by the combatants." So far from denying this conclusion the British press constantly alleged it, and the British officers complained of it. The discovery caused great surprise, and in both British services much attention was at once directed to improvement in artillery and musketry. Nothing could exceed the frankness with which Englishmen avowed their inferiority. According to Sir Francis Head, "gunnery was in naval warfare in the extraordinary state of ignorance we have just described, when our lean children, the American people taught us, rod in hand, our first lesson in the art." The English textbook on Naval Gunnery, written by Major-General Sir Howard Douglas immediately after the peace, devoted more attention to the short American war

^ Guerres Maritimes, li. 286, 287.

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than to all the battles of Napoleon, and began by admitting that Great Britain had " entered with too great confidence on war with a marine much more expert than that of any of our European enemies." The admission appeared "objectionable" even to the author; but he did not add, what was equally true, that it applied as well to the land as to the sea service.

No one questioned the bravery of the British forces, or the ease with which they often routed larger bodies of militia; but the losses they inflicted were
rarely as great as those they suffered. Even at Bladensburg, where they met little resistance, their loss was several times greater than that of the Americans. At Plattsburg, where the intelligence and quickness of Macdonough and his men alone won the victory, his ships were in effect stationary batteries, and enjoyed the same superiority in gunnery. " The * Saratoga,’ ” said his official report, ” had fifty* five round-shot in her hull; the 'Confiance,’ one hundred and five. The enemy's shot passed principally just over our heads, as there were not twenty whole hammocks in the nettings at the close of the action.”

The greater skill of the Americans was not due to special training, for the British service was better trained in gunnery, as in everything else, than the motley armies and fleets that fought at New Orleans and on the Lakes. Critics constantly said that every 1 Naval Gunnery (Second edition), p. 3.

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American had learned from his childhood the use of the rifle, but he certainly had not learned to use cannon in shooting birds or hunting deer, and he knew less than the Englishman about the handling of artillery and muskets. As if to add unnecessary evidence, the battle of Chrystler's Farm proved only too well that this American efficiency was not confined to citizens of the United States.

Another significant result of the war was the sudden development of scientific engineering in the United States. This branch of the military service owed its efficiency and almost its existence to the military school at West Point, established in 1802. The school was at first much neglected by govern-
ment. The number of graduates before the year 1812 was very small; but at the outbreak of the war the corps of engineers was already efficient. Its chief was Colonel Joseph Gardner Swift, of Massachusetts, the first graduate of the academy: Colonel Swift planned the defences of New York harbor. The lieutenant-colonel in 1812 was Walker Keith Armistead, of Virginia, — the third graduate, who planned the defences of Norfolk. Major William McRee, of North Carolina, became chief engineer to General Brown, and constructed the fortifications at Fort Erie, which cost the British General Gordon Drummond the loss of half his army, besides the mortification of defeat. Captain Eleazer Derby Wood, of New York, constructed Fort Meigs, which enabled Harrison to defeat the attack of Proctor in May,

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1818. Captain Joseph Gilbert Totten, of New York, was chief engineer to General Izard at Plattsburg, where he directed the fortifications that stopped the advance of Prevost's great army. None of the works constructed by a graduate of West Point was captured by the enemy; and had an engineer been employed at Washington by Armstrong and Winder, the city would have been easily saved.

Perhaps without exaggeration the West Point Academy might be said to have decided, next to the navy, the result of the war. The works at New Orleans were simple in character, and as far as they were due to engineering skill were directed by Major Latour, a Frenchman; but the war was already ended when the battle of New Orleans was fought. During the critical campaign of 1814, the West Point engineers doubled the capacity of the little American army for resistance, and introduced a new and sci-
entific character into American life.

In the application of science the steamboat was the most striking success; but Fulton's invention, however useful, was neither the most original nor the most ingenious of American efforts, nor did it offer the best example of popular characteristics. Perhaps Fulton's torpedo and Stevens's screw-propeller showed more originality than was proved by the "Clermont." The fast-sailing schooner with its pivot-gun—an invention that grew out of the common stock of nautical intelligence—best illustrated the character of the people.

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That the individual should rise to a higher order either of intelligence or morality than had existed in former ages was not to be expected, for the United States offered less field for the development of individuality than had been offered by older and smaller societies. The chief function of the American Union was to raise the average standard of popular intelligence and well-being, and at the close of the War of 1812 the superior average intelligence of Americans was so far admitted that Yankee acuteness, or smartness, became a national reproach but much doubt remained whether the intelligence belonged to a high order, or proved a high morality. From the earliest ages, shrewdness was associated with unscrupulousness; and Americans were freely charged with want- ing honesty. The charge could neither be proved nor disproved. American morality was such as suited a people so endowed, and was high when compared with the morality of many older societies; but, like American intelligence, it discouraged excess. Probably the political morality shown by the government and by public men during the first sixteen years of the
century offered a fair gauge of social morality. Jjike the character of the popular inventions, the character of the morals corresponded to the wants of a growing democratic society; but time alone could decide whether it would result in a high or a low national ideal.

Finer analysis showed other signs of divergence from ordinary standards. If Englishmen took pride in one trait more than in another, it was in the steady uniformity of their progress. The innovating and revolutionary quality of the French mind irritated them. America showed an un-English, rapidity in movement. In politics, the American people between 1789 and 1817 accepted greater changes than had been known in England since 1688. In religion, the Unitarian movement of Boston and Harvard College would never have been possible in England, where the defection of Oxford or Cambridge, and the best educated society in the United Kingdom, would have shaken Church and State to their foundations. In literature the American school was chiefly remarkable for the rapidity with which it matured. The first book of Irving was a successful burlesque of his own ancestral history; the first poem of Bryant sang of the earth only as a universal tomb; the first preaching of Channing assumed to overthrow the Trinity; and the first paintings of Allston aspired to recover the ideal perfection of Raphael and Titian. In all these directions the American mind showed tendencies that surprised Englishmen more than they struck Americans. Allston defended himself from
the criticism of friends who made complaint of his return to America. He found there, as he maintained, not only a growing taste for art, but "a quicker appreciation" of artistic effort than in any European land. If the highest intelligence of American society were to move with such rapidity, the time could not be far distant when it would

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pass into regions which England never liked to contemplate.

Another intellectual trait, as has been already noticed, was the disposition to relax severity. Between the theology of Jonathan Edwards and that of William Ellery Ghanning was an enormous gap, not only in doctrines but also in methods. Whatever might be thought of the conclusions reached by Edwards and Hopkins, the force of their reasoning commanded respect. Not often had a more strenuous effort than theirs been made to ascertain God's will, and to follow it without regard to weaknesses of the flesh. The idea that the nature of God's attributes was to be preached only as subordinate to the improvement of man, agreed little with the spirit of their religion. The Unitarian and Universalist movements marked the beginning of an epoch when ethical and humanitarian ideas took the place of metaphysics, and even New England turned from contemplating the omnipotence of the Deity in order to praise the perfections of his creatures.

The spread of great popular sects like the Universalists and Campbellites, founded on assumptions such as no Orthodox theology could tolerate, showed a growing tendency to relaxation of thought in that direction. The struggle for existence was already
mitigated, and the first effect of the change was seen in the increasing cheerfulness of religion. Only when men found their actual world almost a heaven, could they lose overpowering anxiety about the world to come. Life had taken a softer aspect, and as a consequence God was no longer terrible. Even the wicked became less mischievous in an atmosphere where virtue was easier than vice. Punishments seemed mild in a society where every offender could cast off his past, and create a new career. For the first time in history, great bodies of men turned away from their old reKon, giving no better reason than that it required them to believe in a cruel Deity, and rejected necessary conclusions of theology because they were inconsistent with human self-esteem.

The same optimism marked the political movement. Society was weary of strife, and settled gladly into a political system which left every disputed point undetermined. The public seemed obstinate only in believing that all was for the best, as far as the United States were concerned, in the affairs of mankind. The contrast was great between this temper of mind and that in which the Constitution had been framed; but it was no greater than the contrast in the religious opinions of the two periods, while the same reaction against severity marked the new literature. The rapid accumulation of wealth and increase in physical comfort told the same story from the standpoint of economy. On every side society showed that ease was for a time to take the place of severity, and enjoyment was to have its full share in the future national existence.

The traits of intelligence, rapidity, and mildness
seemed fixed in the national character as early as

1817 and were likely to become more marked as time should pass. A vast amount of conservatism lingered among the people; but the future spirit of society could hardly fail to be intelligent, rapid in movement, and mild in method. Only in the distant future could serious change occur, and even then no return to European characteristics seemed likely. The American continent was happier in its conditions and easier in its resources than the regions of Europe and Asia, where Nature revelled in diversity and conflict. If at any time American character should change, it might as probably become sluggish as revert to the violence and extravagances of Old-World development. The inertia of several hundred million people, all formed in a similar social mould, was as likely to stifle energy as to stimulate evolution.

With the establishment of these conclusions, a new episode in American history began in 1815. New subjects demanded new treatment, no longer dramatic but steadily tending to become scientific. The traits of American character were fixed; the rate of physical and economical growth was established; and history, certain that at a given distance of time the Union would contain so many millions of people, with wealth valued at so many millions of dollars, became thenceforward chiefly concerned to know what kind of people these millions were to be. They were intelligent, but what paths would their intelligence select? They were quick, but what solution of in-
soluble problems would quickness hurry? They were scientific, and what control would their science exercise over their destiny? They were mild, but what corruptions would their relaxations bring? They were peaceful, but by what machinery were their corruptions to be purged? What interests were to vivify a society so vast and uniform? What ideals were to ennoble it? What object, besides physical content, must a democratic continent aspire to attain? For the treatment of such questions, history required another century of experience.