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Article
The Group Size Paradox Revisited
Journal of Public Economic Theory (2008)
  • Paul Pecorino, University of Alabama
  • Akram Temimi, Qatar University
Abstract

Esteban and Ray (2001) model an increasing marginal cost of effort in providing a public good. If the marginal cost of contribution function has an elasticity greater than 1, then the level of provision is increasing in group size, regardless of the degree of rivalry of the public good. We modify their model to a standard public goods setting, where their results continue to hold. We then add small fixed costs of participation to the model. If the good is sufficiently rival, one of Olson's (1965) central propositions is restored: public goods will fail to be provided in large groups.

Keywords
  • Public Goods,
  • Group Size Paradox,
  • Free Rider
Disciplines
Publication Date
October, 2008
Citation Information
Paul Pecorino and Akram Temimi. "The Group Size Paradox Revisited" Journal of Public Economic Theory Vol. 10 (2008)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/paul_pecorino/41/