Affirmation and Engagement: Continuing the Dialogue

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Response

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The range and richness of responses to my article makes it difficult to do more here than to gesture at the principal points of contention. Struck by the spirit of affirmation and engagement throughout the commentaries, I hope to continue the dialogue in other places, at other times, and in other ways.

DIALOGUE

As a political analyst constantly exposed to the dark side of humanity, I am relieved to be considered an optimist. Like Gramsci, I am indeed an optimist of the will, even if an occasional pessimist of the intellect. Dialogue is no panacea for obdurate problems and is routinely undermined by its unacknowledged conditions and unanticipated consequences. But if it is unrealistic to believe in dialogical routes to the better polity, then it is equally naïve to regard the political order as one of abstracted structural mechanics, unmoved by human voices. Even allowing for a materialist appreciation of the power of social forces, discourses reproduced through dialogical encounters are no mere epiphenomena, but constitutive of the concrete possibilities that shape subsequent political agency.

My approach to dialogue is informed by Habermas’s contributions that establish certain conditions without which there can be no equitable political engagement. Those who employ violence or knowingly trick and deceive, those who oppress others by denying them access to information and insight, and those who withhold basic respect for other participants and refuse to listen, by definition rule themselves out. This is why it is so important to engage actors in dialogue before they have become sworn enemies. But it is

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equally important never to give up. Adams and Paisley are only the latest to demonstrate that even the worst of enemies can be brought to dialogue and mutual accommodation. Unlike Habermas, I do not regard consensus as the *summum bonum* of dialogue. The very point of the agora is to make substantive claims within the context of agreed-upon procedures, often agreeing only on how to disagree.

Despite the symbolism of Adams and Paisley, dialogue as I envisage it is no tea party. Dialogue is argument and may well be agonistic. Impassioned engagement in reasoned persuasion can be relentless and often dispiriting hard work. In dialogue, a social actor recites the script, literally representing what needs expressing. But acting is as much about being as it is about doing, and includes the discretion to process cues in real time from contexts—proximate and distal—as well as from memory. In this challenging process of being and doing, thinking—as Billig says—is socially contextualized argument and thereby open to constant possibilities of transformation. While dialogue can be used cynically and manipulatively, it is nonetheless the basis of the range of skills requisite to promote political choice. Despite impressive social psychological research into resistance toward unwelcome sources of information, the obdurateness of social groups, and the invidiousness of comparisons, there is also evidence that forms of acculturation and socialization to dialogical engagement can be effective under certain conditions.

There are circumstances under which groups and communities are not ready to engage in dialogue; they need to heal, or to develop a discourse prior to broader engagement. There may be *soi-disant* leaders claiming to represent a voice. There are constant dangers in the exotic construction of the Other. Clearly we need to be sensitive and alert, but this should not detract from the ultimate importance of bringing communities, groups, and their political voices into full and frank encounter. Moreover, let us not ridicule those sincere if fumbled attempts to discover each other and to remain fully receptive to the alterity of others.

**DIASPORA**

I should have stated more clearly that it is the external and imposed labelling of a community as a diaspora that is the problem and not the voluntary self-definition. Whether as part of a global/virtual *umma* or for any other reason, the right to name oneself is intrinsic to any state of political dignity. Having said this, I am concerned both with community isolationism and the politics of exit. To the extent that self-described diasporas encourage either such tendency, political communities are impoverished. We need to encourage a civil order of unity and cohesion in which forms of cultural or religious expressivity can flourish.

I have struggled with the word fundamentalism. There are at least four distinct problems with the expression. First, it has acquired a pejorative edge that distracts and can mislead. Second, it is often assumed to apply only to Muslims. Third, it conflates those who privilege certain interpretations, essentialize meanings, and close off texts and traditions from open enquiry (my meaning) with those who merely seek a deeper immersion into the sources of their own traditions. Finally, to employ the label at all may appear to essentialize those agents one regards as essentialists. Uncomfortable with these difficulties, I am nonetheless aware that my elaboration of the concept has common currency across the social sciences. Only through careful specification and qualification should the term be employed.
CANADA

My affirmation of Canada’s political cultures and its regime is qualified and limited. While there is nothing perfect or complete about Canada, among its great strengths is that it has evolved as a regime in which no single nationalist gambit has achieved hegemony, and it remains a polity in which core identities are always in question. In this sense, to promote and support Canada is to affirm and encourage a diverse, open and indeed cosmopolitical order—if only in one place. I like the fact that the ‘we’ in mainstream Canadian discourse is always problematized and uncomfortable. For as long as we do not know precisely who we are, we can avoid categorizations that construct the essential other.

Something of my sense of urgency and proselytizing owes to the fact that Canada has for so long remained marginal. Internally, Canadians are often diffident; externally, Canada is regarded at best a benign enigma. In my judgment, Canadian experiences should be better known. There is a risk that anti-terrorist discourses, which are simultaneously anti-cosmopolitical discourses of essentialism and closure, will achieve greater prominence in Canada and thereby promote forms of banal (and deliberate) nationalism. Without an argument for a cosmopolitical Canada, voices that claim ‘there is no alternative’ will ridicule open and dialogical attempts to sustain the multicultural polity as futile and naïve.

Canada’s recognition of the rights of non-citizens is among the most advanced and it has relatively few denizens. A 2007 decision by the Supreme Court declared federal legislation allowing non-citizens to be arrested and deported without Charter protections unconstitutional. While the process of acquiring Canadian citizenship is relatively quick and easy, it comes with certain minimal obligations. Membership in any political society that claims to uphold the inherent rights of individuals must necessarily also posit a set of corresponding obligations. Such rights and obligations are carefully established through the complex interdependences and balances of individuals, groups, communities, organizations and institutions. Of course, we should argue about those rights and duties, and revise them whenever necessary, but it is incoherent to conceive of any just polity in which large numbers of people could just claim rights in the abstract.

I adopt a broad view of political entitlement and support the cosmopolitical goals of deepening forms of global citizenship with the ultimate goal of a just and equitable planetary state. We can certainly aspire to such a universal utopia, even if it seems remote at present. Of course, our current basis is the existing world of states, themselves constantly being reshaped by the social forces of ‘glocalization,’ and so any evolving concept of citizenship must realistically be situated in such an evolving framework. Within this context of common membership, individuals and groups have every right to be heard and to make claims, and they must also attend with full openness to the claims of those who aspire to citizenship but lack it at present. It is also critical that each of us, no matter our citizenship or lack of it, contributes to a global equity of citizenship rights among the global states as well as for individuals within each state.

ENLIGHTENMENT

Each of us is an intellectual and moral heir to the enlightenment; its precepts infuse each aspect of our existence, including our scientific methods and our core ethical principles. However, being the children of the enlightenment does not mean that we have to be...
obedient. Enlightenment principles of skepticism and agentive self-awareness have facilitated our capacity to bend and probe the very substrata of our own existence.

So where do we stand as social and psychological researchers today on matters of substance? I fail to see how I can be other than normative, even though when working narrowly in my chosen sub-fields I can bracket it out with the best of them. Christian Bay once noted that if political scientists will not articulate the good polity, others are eager to do so. At the very least as engaged public intellectuals we can stand procedurally for dialogue, promoting and protecting those spaces in which diverse voices can be heard, policy options expounded upon and creative accommodations arrived at.