How to Jam Without Getting Caught: Analysis and Empirical Study of Stealthy Periodic JammingIEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking (SECON) (2013)
AbstractDespite the widespread commercial use of spread spectrum technology, advanced algorithms and modern hardware capabilities still allows efficient denial-of-service attacks against wireless communication systems using jamming. Much of the recent work on jamming mitigation has focused on how to adjust the transmitter-receiver system once a jamming attack has been detected. However, characterizing the detectability of certain classes of jamming attacks remains a largely unstudied problem. We aim to narrow this gap by analyzing the effect of a class of periodic jamming attacks on the attack detection metrics of packet delivery ratio (PDR) and received signal strength (RSS). We show that a well-designed jamming signal can effectively defeat RSS-based detection while causing a signiﬁcant and often devastating reduction in PDR, demonstrating that RSS-based detection is insufficient. We further evaluate our claims through implementation of a periodic jammer using a wide range of signal parameters against a transmitter-receiver pair communicating using IEEE 802.15.4, demonstrating the validity of our analytical claims.
Publication DateJune, 2013
Citation InformationBruce DeBruhl and Patrick Tague. "How to Jam Without Getting Caught: Analysis and Empirical Study of Stealthy Periodic Jamming" IEEE International Conference on Sensing, Communication, and Networking (SECON) (2013)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/patrick_tague/28/