Do Norms Still Matter? The Corrosive Effects of Globalization on the Vitality of Norms

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Even in this age of globalization, when borders and distances seem to matter less and less, crime and the control of crime remain local phenomena. No matter how complicated the crime, virtually all illicit activity is driven by local players, operating in a particular place. Consider human trafficking, perhaps the most paradigmatic crime of globalization. It often involves moving people from one side of the world to another, using international criminal networks linked by the latest communications technology. But victims of trafficking enter this nefarious supply chain in a particular place, where local social dynamics and pressures shape their options, constrain their choices, and facilitate or confound the work of smugglers. Regardless of how far they travel, they end up in a particular place, where they are victimized according to other local dynamics.

Similarly, attempts to control human trafficking—so far, largely ineffectual—must have a local focus, even if they are coordinated with broader efforts. Most theories of globalization and crime look at the transnational component: the many ways that globalization has made it easier to move people, money, ideas, and objects from one place to another, and the ways that crime control measures can affect these processes. This focus on movement, the middle of the supply chain, is certainly important, but too often it comes at the expense of consideration of the ends of the supply chain—the local social factors that make illicit activity more or less likely in a particular place. Equally important, this approach implies that criminal activity is the inevitable result of globalization. Approaches to globalization that focus on the global middle of the supply chain rather than the local ends, and assume that increases in criminal activity are an inevitable cost of globalization fail to capture the experience and needs of those most profoundly affected by globalization: people in local communities whose lives are changing in ways large and small.

A recent editorial in The Independent, an independent newspaper in Gambia, provides a vivid illustration of why this issue is important. At issue was a statute designed to combat sex tourism, the practice of foreign tourists traveling to Gambia to engage in sex with prostitutes, including children. The editorial began by noting that “development comes with

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3. See, e.g., Naim, supra note 1, at 100-03 (describing the means by which traffickers move people).
many things—bad or good." It then argued that most Gambians did not wish to give up the economic benefits that come from a vibrant, profitable tourist economy, but that the presence of foreign sex tourists and the emergence of other social changes stemming from this tourism were damaging the country. The goal was to develop a statute that would filter out the unwanted effects of globalization while permitting the benefits to continue. Beyond expressing this fundamental desire, the editorial was noteworthy for other reasons. It did not argue that the harms stemming from globalization are attributable solely to the actions of foreigners, or corporations, or some other external force. Instead, the consequences of globalization—positive or negative—are the result of the interaction of local and global forces. Perhaps most important, the editorial focused attention on many of the most vexing questions of globalization. What is it about globalization that undermines the vitality of social norms which, in most places, moderate behavior? How does a community, subject to the many pressures and changes brought about by globalization, set and enforce norms to regulate conduct within the community?

In this article, I begin to develop a theory of the informal regulation of behavior that accounts for both individual behavior and community action, and the effect of globalization on both dimensions. Consideration of the forces that guide an actor’s behavior is important, but equally important are the forces that guide the behavior of observers. Norms are not freestanding rules that operate of their own force; they are the manifestations of the accumulated responses of observers to what they witness, and the reactions of actors to these responses. Norms exist because observers do things, thereby communicating to actors—via varied and diffuse means, to be sure—what is appropriate, acceptable, worthy of praise, or deserving of criticism. Any discussion of norms must focus on observers, not just on actors. Further, the reactions of observers to what they experience are shaped by decisional biases that affect all people and communities. For example, when faced with the same behavior, observers react differently to low and high status individuals. The important task is to understand the factors that allow local communities to enjoy the benefits of globalization while preserving their ability to protect themselves against the possible negative consequences. Finally, the reactions of observers are constrained in new ways by the realities of globalization, including, for example, the ease with which individuals can exit a community in which they have engaged in norms-violating behavior.

4. Editorial, Can We Arrest Development Challenges?, THE INDEPENDENT (Gam.), Nov. 25, 2005.
I draw on research from behavioral economics, sociology, and criminology to address these questions. My approach has three main elements. First, I argue that because globalizing communities are typically characterized by significant population turnover, their ability to regulate themselves is eroded. For example, there is evidence that in effective communities, residents are willing to intervene in the lives of their neighbors by, for example, scolding children who misbehave in public or teenagers who deface buildings. But in a globalizing community, the conditions that give rise to this willingness to intervene—and a number of other hallmarks of healthy communities—are eroded by the process of globalization. Although the consequences of diminished participation in community self-regulation are varied, the result is that social norms are more difficult to enforce and less effective. Next I argue that globalization can distort the process of creating and enforcing social norms by allowing individuals to, in effect, immunize themselves from the sanctions typically employed to enforce norms. For example, there is substantial evidence that differences in social status affect the ways that observers judge illicit behavior, and the ways that they condemn, condone, or ignore that behavior. Finally, I argue that globalization also makes it possible for individuals to engage in what I call reputational segmentation. In this process, people who wish to engage in an activity that carries social sanctions do so in a place where they are immune to the real effects of those sanctions. For example, Western tourists who travel to the developing world to engage in illicit sexual activity, often with children, may suffer social sanctions in the destination community, but those sanctions do not follow the person back to their country of origin. And because the quality of the person’s life is affected almost entirely by his reputation in his country of origin, the ability to engage in reputational segmentation allows him to escape the consequences of his actions.

My approach brings together globalization and norms literature, but avoids the false choices that can limit the usefulness of both areas. I consider both the role of individuals, and the incentives that shape their actions, and the role of the local communities in the enforcement of norms. With some notable exceptions, most scholarship that considers the power of norms looks at the incentives that guide an individual’s decision to comply with or deviate from social norms. But as communities confront globalization, they evolve in ways that inevitably affect the power and content of norms. The give and take between individuals and communities is therefore central to the way that globalization affects norms. Some norms scholars do consider the ways that norms affect communities, to be sure, but their approach often pits individuals against the community, asking, for example, how the collective is harmed by the actions of a small
number of individuals, or how respect for individual rights can interfere with a community’s ability to set its own standards.\textsuperscript{5} Perhaps it is true for a relatively homogenous, established community, but in a rapidly globalizing community there is no reason that the expression of individual behaviors should ineluctably harm the community.

As with norms literature, contemporary globalization literature is helpful as far as it goes, but its usefulness is limited because it asks narrow questions and arrives at similarly narrow answers. Most of the literature on globalization asks whether globalization is good or bad: do incomes rise or fall? Are indigenous cultures empowered or eroded? The answers are almost always dictated by the premises. Those who would privilege civil, political, or cultural rights over economic development almost always discount the benefits of rising income, if they acknowledge it at all. Those who view economic development as the foundation of social development see social or cultural transformations as a small price to pay for increasing prosperity. Underlying this difference is an important, and frequently unexamined, difference in approach. Those who highlight the economic benefits of globalization take as their unit of concern the individual. Even if they base their arguments on aggregate data, they focus on the ways that globalization affects individuals by conveying benefits typically associated with individuals: higher income, more options regarding where to live or work, and more personal freedom, for example. Those on the other side take as their unit of analysis the collective. They focus on the ways that globalization affects communities, and the evidence that stirs their concern includes things like the disappearance of local languages, the spread of Western consumer culture, and the like. In the end, the literature fails to capture the experience of people in the developing world who live their lives as individuals and as members of a community. Much of the debate calls to mind an old joke: Do you walk to school or carry your lunch?\textsuperscript{6} As the joke reminds us, two very different phenomena can act on the same entity at the same time; it is certainly the case that economic and social effects of globalization can and do occur at the same time. And I argue that choosing one ought not mean foregoing the other.

The article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I critique the contemporary globalization literature. In Part II, I develop a thicker description of the processes of globalization as they affect communities.

\textsuperscript{5} See generally Tracey L. Meares \& Dan M. Kahan, \textit{When Rights are Wrong: The Paradox of Unwanted Rights, in URGENT TIMES: Policing and Rights in Inner-City Communities} 3 (Tracey Meares \& Dan M. Kahan eds., 1999).

\textsuperscript{6} See Philip J. Cook \& Jens Ludwig, \textit{Fact-Free Gun Policy?}, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (2003) (arguing that it is a fallacy to assume that, because there is strong evidence that one factor is important to a decision, a second factor cannot also be important).
Despite the attention paid to globalization, most scholars rely on surprisingly thin accounts of what actually happens when a community undergoes the process of globalization. To avoid generalities, so far as this is possible, I focus on Vietnam’s experience, and attempt to understand the actual dynamics of globalization and how they affected, and were affected by, social dynamics, economic opportunities, and a range of other issues. My goal is to illustrate the effects of globalization on a community so that we can better understand why current theories do not fit, and why this matters. Part III is the heart of the article. There I lay out the evidence supporting my argument that individual behavior need not inevitably lead to community harm, and the dynamic processes that encourage and constrain the development of norms.

The current period of globalization is not, of course, the first time that societies have undergone rapid transformation. Beginning in earnest after the Industrial Revolution, scholars began to attempt to explain the social changes caused by industrialization and urbanization. This literature, which traces its roots most prominently to the work of Emile Durkheim, addresses questions similar to those that I pose, albeit in a much different context. It identifies several factors to explain increases in some types of criminal activity that appeared to accompany the Industrial Revolution and the period of rapid urbanization that accompanied it. This literature provides a number of useful insights, but does not answer the full range of questions that contemporary globalization has made particularly salient. In its most simple form, this approach argues that as individuals move from small towns to big cities, they interact less frequently, which inhibits or prevents the formation of the social norms that suppress illicit behavior. The result is anomie—normlessness—that produces increases in antisocial behavior.7

Again, this work is useful but not sufficient. The unit of analysis remains the actor, not the observer. It too does not give full attention to the incentives that observers have to invest in the creation of norms. In addition, recent research in behavioral economics on the ways that individuals respond to incentives provides a much fuller explanation of why observers act as they do, which is critical to understanding the ways that globalization affects the vitality of norms. Without understanding what observers do and why they do it, it is impossible to arrive at a robust theory to explain the ways that globalization affects informal social control.

7. I note at the outset, with only slight exaggeration, that attempting to present a short summary of the arguments of Durkheim and those he influenced is a bit like attempting to present a short summary of the Bible. For much fuller interpretations and critiques of Durkheim’s work, see Robert K. Merton, Durkheim’s Division of Labor in Society, 40 Am. J. Soc. 319 (1934); Donald Black, The Behavior of Law (1976); Anthony Giddens, Classical Social Theory and the Origins of Modern Sociology, 81 Am. J. Soc. 703 (1976); Edward A. Tiryakian, Revisiting Sociology’s First Classic: “The Division of Labor in Society” and its Actuality, 9 Soc. F. 3 (1994).
Before moving on, two short clarifications are in order. I draw on the work of Durkheim and other social theorists who analyzed the social changes that accompanied the rise of modern cities. I have deliberately returned to first principles, relying on Durkheim’s own work and that of a handful of other social theorists who interpret it. I rely on this work because it provides important insights about contemporary phenomena, but I do so with the knowledge that much has changed since he and his contemporaries wrote. Not only are the factual contexts different, scholarly understanding of human behavior, economic processes, and myriad other phenomena are different. Although Durkheim’s work necessarily reflects then-prevailing understandings of individual behavior, social forces, and the like, it is nonetheless useful. Second, although I draw mainly on a handful of the foundational works in the field, the Durkheimian approach, broadly defined, remains a fruitful source of insight for criminology, sociology, and many other disciplines.

Contemporary globalization raises a host of new challenges, but many of the core issues have been considered before. Emile Durkheim and his many scholarly progeny attempted to explain the relationship between the growth of cities and apparent changes in the patterns of criminal activity. Although it does not fully address the issues that I raise, in many ways this work sheds more light on contemporary globalization than the contemporary globalization literature. In this section, I first sketch out the basics of the theory, then focus on three insights that are important to my theory.

In *The Division of Labor in Society* in 1893 and continuing in subsequent works, Emile Durkheim attempted to identify the ways that social change affects individual behavior, particularly with regard to illicit or criminal behavior. His aim was to explain social changes associated with the Industrial Revolution. Durkheim argued that the shift from the village-based societies to urbanized societies would produce an increase in the variation of individual behavior, including an increase in deviant or criminal behavior. He argued that as societies became more urban, human interaction would cease to be based on what he called mechanical solidarity—or cohesion growing out of shared experiences and rituals—to

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10. See, e.g., *Emile Durkheim, Suicide* (Free Press ed. 1963) (1897).
11. See, e.g., Anthony Giddens, *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber* 65 (1971) (arguing that the goal of Durkheim’s work was to understand the shift from agrarian to urban, industrial society).
organic solidarity, which occurs when labor specialization forces people to cooperate to meet their needs.\textsuperscript{12} This basic idea—that increases in community complexity transform the ways that individuals interact, and are associated with increases in deviant behavior—helped to spark a welter of theories and hypothesis. The Durkheimian approach is useful because it connects individual actions and societal forces to explain how societies evolve, and the effect of this evolution on illicit activity. Although there are too many divisions within this body of work to identify a single, convincing theory, it nonetheless provides important insights along the way.

Durkheim’s first important contribution is to determine why urbanization (or other increases in societal complexity) might contribute to increases in deviant behavior.\textsuperscript{13} The basic model considers the social implications of a transition from village life to urban life. In this model, village life is characterized by frequent interaction among all people, limited social influences on individuals, and relative consensus about social expectations and appropriate behaviors. Urban life is characterized by relative anonymity, labor specialization, and a reduction in consensus about social norms. In village society, it is the “homogeneity of experience” that produces “normative consensus,”\textsuperscript{14} while in urban society, individual concerns predominate because individuals are “left with no essential characteristics in common except those they get from their intrinsic quality of human nature.”\textsuperscript{15} Thus in urbanized societies it is the absence of a shared history, and the reduction in the number of opportunities for repeated interaction with the same people, that reduces consensus about norms.\textsuperscript{16} From this shared starting point\textsuperscript{17} there are several paths that might lead to an increase in deviant behavior. The first, and most basic, is that the reduction in consensus reduces the cost of violating norms, and reduces the

\textsuperscript{12} See generally \textsc{Durkheim}, supra note 10, at 70-132.

\textsuperscript{13} In \textit{The Division of Labor in Society}, Durkheim argued that as societies become more complex, the variability of individual behavior increases. \textit{Id.} at 283-84. Durkheim believed that the extremes of behavior would inevitably be considered deviant, thus his prediction that as societies become more complex, deviant behavior will increase.

\textsuperscript{14} \textsc{Jack P. Gibbs}, \textit{A Formal Restatement of Durkheim’s “Division of Labor” Theory}, 21 \textsc{Soc. Theory} 103, 111 (2003).

\textsuperscript{15} \textsc{Emile Durkheim}, \textsc{Professional Ethics and Civic Morals} 112 (Routledge 1957) (1900). \textit{See also} \textsc{Bruce DiCristina}, \textsc{Durkheim’s Theory of Homicide and the Confusion of the Empirical Literature}, 8 \textsc{Theoretical Criminology} 57, 64-67 (2004) (“Durkheim argued that as societies advance, sentiments related to collective things gradually give way to those related to the individual (humanity”).

\textsuperscript{16} Although it likely goes without saying, there is no consensus in the literature on this point. \textit{See}, e.g., \textsc{Steven F. Messner}, \textit{Societal Development, Social Equality, and Homicide: A Cross-National Test of a Durkheimian Model}, 61 \textsc{Soc. Forces} 225, 226-27 (1982) (noting that empirical tests of the development/crime hypothesis test different theoretical models drawn from the same sources).

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{See}, e.g., \textsc{Peter A. Corning}, \textit{Durkheim and Spencer}, 33 \textsc{Brit. J. Soc.} 359, 364-65 (1982) (noting that with increased societal complexity, “the collective conscience become progressive weakened as a binding force for the social order”).
likelihood of suffering the cost in the first place. It is the “sanctions of public sentiment” that maintain the traditional power of norms. Because there is less consensus about norms, and because enforcement is less likely, individuals, released from the pull of social norms, engage in a broader range of behavior, and some of this behavior invariably ends up labeled criminal. Another causal path holds that the development of society itself creates in people desires or tastes that they previously did not hold, but does not provide sufficient avenues for satisfying those tastes. Both factors contribute to an increase in deviant activity. The decreased normative consensus weakens the forces that regulate individual behavior, while the development of society increases individual desires. The problem, therefore, is the weak fit between the “normative infrastructure” and the forces that it must regulate.

A second and closely related insight is the concept of anomie, which in its most general form is usually described as “a condition characterized by the relative absence or confusion of values in a society or group.” There are a range of theories to explain the causes and consequences of anomie. To some, anomie is a condition that afflicts individuals who live in a society that lacks consensus about norms. In this view, because there is no societal consensus about the content of norms, individuals are left without the social rules that make interaction with others meaningful, predictable, and efficient. Others argue that anomie arises not because individuals lack knowledge of the content of norms, but because norms are not enforced. Thus when norms are not enforced, the result is analogous to the legal defense of desuetude, which permits an individual to avoid the legal consequences of violating a statute that has not been enforced for an
extended period of time.\textsuperscript{24} In this view, the consequences of normative desuetude are that individuals feel unmoored. Rather than being free from the consequences of an unwanted law, individuals are left without the comforting guidance of social norms. The final version of anomie takes a more explicitly economic form. Here, individuals suffer from anomie because of a “dissociation between culturally defined aspirations and socially structured means” to satisfy those aspirations.\textsuperscript{25} This can happen because the factors that affect the creation of desires—such as the influence of others, images from advertisements, and the like—outstrip the social or economic structures that would permit the satisfaction of the desires.

The final cluster of insights relate to the approach of the model, not to any specific arguments. The Durkheimian model attempts to identify the ways that individual behavior shapes society, and that social forces shape individual behavior. This concept incorporates ideas that are found most clearly in the work of Georg Simmel.\textsuperscript{26} Simmel identified several keys to society, three of which are important here. First, he argued that one key was individual reciprocity—the ways that interactions between two individuals can be seen as a series of actions and reactions, which cumulatively produce a relationship. Second, he argued that the accretion of these relationships create society. Finally, he argued that, just as individuals react to each other, so too do individuals and society react to each other. This concept, even in the simplified form I have presented, is left out of most contemporary accounts of globalization. It is critical to recognize the dynamic aspect of globalization—the ways that individual behavior changes in the face of changing incentives and constraints, and the ways that individual decisions and actions can change the norms that regulate conduct.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{24} See generally 4 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 13.5(c) (2d ed. 1999) (describing desuetude as a doctrine “whereunder a statute is abrogated by reason of its long and continued nonuse”).

\textsuperscript{25} Robert K. Merton, Social Structure and Anomie, 3 AM. SOC. REV. 672, 674 (1938). Merton argues that anomie results from a disjunction between desires and means to satisfy those desires. He contrasts that to a society in “effective equilibrium,” which occurs when individuals derive “satisfactions from the achievement of the goals and satisfactions emerging directly from the institutionally canalized modes of striving to attain these ends.” Id.

\textsuperscript{26} See Georg Simmel, How is Society Possible, 16 AM. J. SOC. 372, 384-87 (1910). I draw on Simmel’s work for the point that individuals shape society and society shapes individuals. Simmel's argument goes beyond this and addresses the ways that individual psychological processes form a conception of the self and the ways that those conceptions are both public and private, among many other ideas.

\textsuperscript{27} To be fair, some theories of globalization mention a related concept, what some call glocalization. Thomas Friedman, for example, writes of the need for some cultures to develop “the ability to ‘glocalize’ which he defines as “the ability of a culture, when it encounters other strong cultures, to absorb influences that naturally fit into and can enrich that culture, to resist those things that are truly alien and to compartmentalize those things that, while different, can nevertheless be enjoyed and celebrated as different.” THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 295 (2000).
The Durkheimian model’s second methodological advance is that it is explicitly attempts to reflect and explain reality. Broadly speaking, many earlier social theorists had started their analysis by comparing individuals to a conception about what they ought to believe or do.\textsuperscript{28} Although the new sociological model did not abandon the normative framework, it attempted to engage with contemporary events or recent history in ways that earlier scholarship had not.\textsuperscript{29} This is, of course, perhaps the single most important factor in the emergence of sociology as a distinct scholarly discipline. Durkheim, Simmel, and their scholarly successors stand in contrast to those who, using a variety of epistemological methods, constructed an ideal to which human activities or institutions could be compared.\textsuperscript{30} That is not to say that it is empirical—there is no analysis of data in the ways that contemporary scholars have come to expect. Nonetheless, the research looks not merely to an imagined ideal but to the real world to find both the important questions and likely answers. To see the importance of this insight, contrast it to contemporary globalization scholarship. Despite containing an abundance of data, too much contemporary scholarship ignores the complex reality of globalization. Complicated processes are evaluated in a one-dimensional way, with the focus either on economic benefits or social harms, with little consideration of the other. And, perhaps most important, without consideration of what should be obvious, namely that people live their lives, and measure utility, in a multitude of intersecting dimensions, none of which should be completely ignored or emphasized to the exclusion of all others.

I. THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT THEORIES OF GLOBALIZATION

Most of the globalization literature begins from one of two perspectives. Much of it takes as its starting point the developed world and considers institutions that originated in the West, or that mainly affect the West. Other scholars attempt to disclaim this purpose and argue from the perspective of protectors of a naive native culture, requiring and deserving of protection and preservation at all costs. Left out is consideration of

\textsuperscript{28} See, e.g., Georg Simmel, \textit{The Problem of Sociology}, 6 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci. 52 (1895) (arguing that “sociology as a special science . . . restricts itself entirely to the realm of phenomena and their immediate psychological explanation”).

\textsuperscript{29} There is a small irony here. The specific empirical claim that sparked Durkheim’s interest was that crime rates rose during the Industrial Revolution. More recent evaluation of the evidence available to Durkheim and his contemporaries suggests that this factual claim was likely false. See Lynn McDonald, \textit{Theory and Evidence of Rising Crime in the Nineteenth Century}, 33 Brit. J. Soc. 404, 413-14 (1982).

\textsuperscript{30} See generally Paul Fauconnet, \textit{The Pedagogical Work of Emile Durkheim}, 28 Am. J. Soc. 529, 535 (1923) (arguing that Durkheim “felt a genuine repulsion for all arbitrary constructions . . . [r]eflection on a given fact, on an observable reality . . . was necessary to him”).
globalization from the perspective of people in the developing world, who are concerned with both their economic well-being and the social and cultural consequences of globalization. For people in the developing world, what these theories lack is not supporting data—indeed, writings about globalization overflow with it—or complexity, but perspective. Recall the editorial from Gambia that argued for an approach to globalization that would permit the country to benefit from full engagement with the global economy while allowing communities to preserve their distinctive character. This is an issue of deep importance, but cannot be answered by pointing to data about increases in per capita income or recounting stories about the exploitation of local workers by transnational corporations. Those who favor globalization focus on economic growth and pay little attention to the social changes that often accompany growth. Those who argue against it do not give sufficient weight to the issue of economic growth and the desire of poor people to escape poverty. One issue that both approaches seem to agree on is that economic growth is often linked to negative social consequences, at least in the short term. There is much disagreement about the extent to which this happens, and whether the other side’s evidence supports its assertions, but the linkage between the benefits of economic growth and the attending social harms is common. Neither theory considers a globalization that might encourage economic growth while not imperiling local social structures or cultures.

Part of the problem may be that the theories, although they often use the same language, do not really address the same issues. Those who argue in favor of globalization do so primarily because of its economic benefits. What they really argue for is economic development. Globalization, in the form of free trade and market economies, merely describes their view of the most effective way to achieve development. Those who argue against globalization take as their point of concern the social and cultural transformations that often accompany globalization. Their story is one of forced modernization—a world in which stable, content local communities are forced to accept social practices that are distasteful or even offensive. More important, neither theory provides an account of how globalization happens. The sex tourism example demonstrates the importance of this issue. Myriad activities cross borders—everything from religious observances to modes of dress to market structures—but not all of them take hold in their new location. Why do some activities become entrenched when others do not? This is a complex question, and one that will likely never be satisfactorily answered. But scholars should consider, at the least, the more limited issue of what makes a location vulnerable to the establishment of unwanted activities.
In this Part, I lay out the conventional arguments in the globalization debate and draw lessons from them. I start by describing the debates over the definition of globalization. In many ways, this issue has consumed the scholarly attention that might otherwise have gone to refining the theory. This is true in part because globalization (if not its component parts) is relatively new, and defining it is the natural first step. But it is also true because, for many scholars, the definition of globalization does the work of a theory. I next lay out the conventional arguments for and against globalization. Because determining whether globalization is good or bad depends in part on what the goals are—increasing incomes, empowering poor people, expanding markets—I also discuss the benchmarks used to measure whether globalization is good or bad.

A. Defining Globalization

A workable definition of globalization is an important component of a coherent theory, but there are almost as many ways to define globalization as there are theories. Some argue that globalization is primarily an economic phenomenon, with some inevitable but benign social or cultural consequences. Others argue that globalization amounts to the imposition of the Washington Consensus, a set of economic and political prescriptions favored by the U.S. and many in Europe, on countries in the developing world. Other scholars focus on the network effects of globalization—the development of transnational networks, usually based on economic exchange, that transcend national borders. This position sometimes includes the argument that the global economy has become so powerful that the sovereignty of states, particularly poor states, has largely been eroded. The battle over the definition is, at its core, about whether the focus should be on economic, or social, or cultural issues, or some combination.

Most definitions of globalization start with the ideas of connection and exchange. Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist at the World Bank, defines globalization as the increase in exchange between countries and peoples, due mostly to a radical reduction in the costs of transportation and communication. And there can be no real doubt that there is an increase in exchange between people of different countries. The amount of

31. See infra.
32. See infra.
33. See infra.
34. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 9 (2002) (defining globalization as "the closer integration of countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders"). Indeed, in my own previous work I have used this definition. See Patrick J. Keenan, The New Deterrence: Crime and Policy in the Age of Globalization, 91 IOWA L. REV. 505, 510 (2006).
transnational trade has increased significantly in the last 30 years. The volume of international travel has also increased significantly over the same period. But beyond the basics, there is little agreement on how to define globalization.

What unites these definitions is that globalization is seen as an organic process working primarily through markets. To them, the term globalization describes the results of myriad decisions made by people around the world—decisions about where to invest, which job to take, what products to buy, whom to marry, whether to emigrate. These decisions are the product of individual choice, constrained by economic or social realities, to be sure, but the product of choice nonetheless. One approach considers the increase in connections among economies and firms. This happens through “integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, direct foreign investment (by corporations and multi-nationals), short-term capital flows, international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology.” Of course, those who favor this view do not ignore the social or cultural aspects of globalization, but for them, the “cultural, social and political consequences (and preconditions) . . . are neither part of its definition nor a focus of our attention.”

Another set of definitions looks at the macro-economic policies sometimes associated with globalization as part of a hegemonic agenda pushed by the West in general and the U.S. in particular. One strand in this set of definitions focuses on the Washington Consensus. The term was coined to describe policies designed to address problems in Latin American economies. Initially, the Washington Consensus described three policy reforms—“fiscal austerity, privatization, and market liberalization”—that were aimed at correcting budget deficits and other macro-economic problems in Latin America. As advocates of these policies attempted to implement them in countries with different economic problems, the results were increasingly, and predictably, poor. Since then, the term has come to describe a process: Western governments, often working through

35. In just the past 10 years, the period for which the most reliable data is available, international travel has expanded enormously. Measured by the number of arriving passengers, tourism to East Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean increased by almost 52 million people per year. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline.
38. See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE (1999) (arguing that globalization and the structure of global economic relations are the product of intentional actions on the part of Western governments).
39. STIGLITZ, supra note 34, at 53.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 54.
international institutions, impose economic reforms that damage the environment, impoverish local people, and enrich corporations.42 Even the war in Iraq is sometimes linked to the Washington Consensus.43 A variety of motives are ascribed to the West: ensuring profits for corporations, protecting oil supplies, expanding American influence, and many more. What these definitions have in common is the view that globalization is a set of values and policies imposed by developed countries on developing countries.

B. Weighing Globalization

Despite using a range of methodologies and analytical models, most theories end up taking one of two positions. Either globalization is good because it increases incomes and thereby improves the lives of most people (even if there are bumps in the road along the way); or globalization is bad because it permits corporations to exploit poor people without providing them any real benefits (even if some people make money along the way).

At the core of the pro-globalization argument is David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. He argued that a country should produce for export those products that it could produce more cheaply, relative to its trading partners, than other products.44 From this insight, economists and others favor the free flow of goods, capital, and labor, and argue that globalization is the process by which these benefits can be spread.45 In his recent book Why Globalization Works, Martin Wolf puts the issue this way: “Who imagines that the welfare of Americans would be improved if their economy was fragmented among its fifty states, each with prohibitive barriers to movement of goods, services, capital and people from others?”46 Defenders of globalization typically make a two-step argument. First, freer trade improves economic growth; second, economic growth improves the lives of poor people, even if it also enriches corporations.47 One reason for

42. For a comprehensive review of the reforms associated with the Washington Consensus, see MOISES NAIM, FADS AND FASHION IN ECONOMIC REFORM, WASHINGTON CONSENSUS OR WASHINGTON CONFUSION, (Oct. 26, 1999), http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/Naim.HTM.
43. See, e.g., David Held, Toward a New Consensus: Answering the Dangers of Globalization, 27 HARV. INT’L. REV. 14, 15-16 (2005) (arguing that the principles underlying the Washington economic consensus produced the policies that led to the war in Iraq).
44. DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION LONDON (John Murray ed. 1821) (1817).
45. See, e.g., David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Spreading the Wealth, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 120, 121 (2002) (arguing that “increased participation in international trade and investment” is strongly linked to faster growth, and that “higher growth rates in globalizing developing countries have translated into higher incomes for the poor”).
46. WOLF, supra note 37, at 3.
47. See, e.g., Stanley Fischer, Globalization and its Challenges, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2003) (arguing that “the surest route to poverty reduction is economic growth,” and that “the evidence strongly
this is the assumption that most countries “have somewhat similar income distributions regardless of their political and economic cast.”

This means that increasing the income of the poorest people in the country depends largely on increasing incomes across the board—to “grow the pie” rather than slice it in a novel way. Most of the claims made by pro-globalization scholars come from this basic premise. The lives of women are improved because incomes go up. The lives of children are improved (and child labor is reduced) because incomes go up. Other problems, most notably environmental degradation, are not caused by globalization but by some other mechanism, but would be less harmful if incomes rose.

Some of those who defend economic globalization explicitly disclaim any focus on the “cultural, social and political consequences.” This disclaimer, although not universal, highlights the primary weakness of the pro-globalization group. Economic development happens to people, not economies. With development come changes, and communities are often ill equipped to adapt to the changes, at least in the short term. Related to this point is another weakness of the pro-globalization group. Those who focus on economic growth sometimes argue that, in “the very long run,” the “integration of markets for goods, services and factors of production . . . almost certainly irreversible.” But people do not live their lives “in the very long run.” People must adapt to changes as they occur. And, for some people, the long-term benefits of globalization that will largely accrue to others might seem like a small reward for the short-term costs that they must pay themselves.

Those who argue against globalization do so for a number of reasons. Many focus on poverty. They argue that governments in poor countries have been driven to radically reduce their social safety nets in order to reform their economies to compete in a globalized world. Another version of this argument is that governments have effectively ceded control of their economic and social policy to corporations or to transnational supports the conclusion that growth requires . . . and orientation toward integration into the global economy”).

48. BHAGWATI, supra note 36, at 54.
49. Id.
50. To be sure, some economists who generally favor economic integration have noted the mixed economic consequences of the process. See, e.g., Paul Krugman & Anthony J. Venables, Globalization and the Inequality of Nations, 110 Q. J. ECON. 857, 876 (1995) (arguing that, as economic integration become entrenched, the benefits flowing to poor countries may be reduced).
51. WOLF, supra note 37, at 19 (“The economic globalization discussed here has cultural, social and political consequences (and preconditions). But those consequences and preconditions are neither part of its definition nor a focus of our attention.”).
52. Id. at 96.
53. See, e.g., FALK, supra note 38, at 3 (arguing that economic changes have forced the governments of poor countries to weaken the “social contract that was forged between state and society”).
organizations that are not responsive to the needs of local people. Variations of this argument devote particular attention to the plight of a segment of society, typically children or women.

Another strand of the anti-globalization literature focuses on the effect of globalization on indigenous culture. They argue that as goods and capital now move around the globe, so too do cultural attitudes and symbols. Their primary concern is that indigenous cultures—usually described as those from poor countries—are unable to compete with global culture, which is usually taken to mean the symbols of American culture such as modes of dress, taste in music, and the like. Related to this argument is the concern that indigenous cultures are being appropriated by corporations; that local knowledge is being used to the advantage of corporations without compensation for local people.

What these theories leave out is any account of globalization that might meet the challenge posed by the Gambian editorial. How can communities enjoy the benefits of economic, social, and cultural linkages with the wider world without paying for those benefits with higher crime and more illicit activity? In the next Part, I develop a richer picture of the process and effects of globalization as a first step towards answering this question. I look closely at Vietnam’s experience of globalization to determine what happened and why. Doing so serves three purposes. First, only by looking closely is it possible to understand what happens. As I have argued, definitions and theories are not sufficient, especially if they are not informed by experience. Second, and most important, developing a richer picture helps to identify the moving parts in the process of globalization. Recall that I argue that the causes and consequences of globalization erode a community’s ability to exert social control within its territory. Understanding what happens is therefore central to understanding why it happens. I present a thicker description of globalization that will be serve as raw material as I develop my own theory of some of the causal mechanisms that influence the social changes that accompany globalization.

II. THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION: A SNAPSHOT OF VIETNAM’S EXPERIENCE

54. See, e.g., Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization, Kitsch and Conflict: Technologies of Work, War and Politics, 9 REV. OF INT’L POL. ECON. 1, 2 (2002) (arguing that the “nation state has become one institutional domain among several and state authority is making place for a multi-scalar network of governance structures from the local to the global”).

55. See, e.g., Beng-Huat Chua, World Cities, Globalization and the Spread of Consumerism: A View from Singapore, 35 URB. STUD. 981, 988 (1998) (noting that, as Singapore has continued to be integrated into the global economy, “the ‘cultural’ content of American products” has created “anti-Western and anti-American sentiments”).
Despite the surfeit of words devoted to defining globalization, it is still difficult to understand what actually happens when a community globalizes. What challenges does it face? What work must the community do to preserve its vitality while adapting to the changes that come with globalization? Is this even possible? To get some traction on these questions, in this Part I focus particular attention on the process of globalization in Vietnam. My goal is to use this description of the actual dynamics of globalization to help develop a theory of how globalization affects the enforcement of the law and norms that regulate anti-social behavior. I choose Vietnam for three primary reasons. First, its experience with globalization, typical of many countries, serves as a good illustration of the process. In Vietnam, as in many other countries, the process of globalization includes several simultaneous (or nearly simultaneous) changes in economic policy, business practices, and social relations. Thus it embodies the messy and muddled nature of the process. Second, Vietnam is beginning to confront many of the challenges of globalization; its experience has not been entirely positive (or negative, for that matter). Understanding the trade-offs inherent in globalization is critical. Finally, primarily for historical reasons, it is easier to identify a starting point (or, perhaps more accurately, a starting period) for Vietnam’s experience with globalization than with most other countries.\(^\text{56}\)

### A. Economic Changes

Vietnam’s experience with globalization began in 1986, when the communist government began a transition to a market economy with its *doi moi* program. At the start, the changes were principally in the area of economic policy. For example, the economy became much more export-oriented—exports, measured as a share of the gross domestic product, rose from 7 in 1986 to 66 in 2004.\(^\text{57}\) In addition, after Vietnam gained access to the European Union market in 1992 and the U.S. embargo was lifted in 1994, there was substantial foreign direct investment in the economy.\(^\text{58}\)

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\(^{56}\) Although Vietnam’s experience is sufficiently typical to that of other countries to serve as a good illustration of the process, it is by no means universal. Vietnam’s experience with globalization began when the government opened the country to the global economy, a process described above. But Vietnam did not embrace some of the economic policies as quickly as other countries had, making its experience somewhat different. Most importantly, after initially encouraging foreign direct investment only to see investors flee after a few years, Vietnam began to slow the pace of legal and economic restructuring. See, e.g., William Pesek, Jr., *Slow is Not a Dirty Word for Vietnam’s Economy*, INT’L HERALD TRIB., March 23, 2006, at 17. In addition, Vietnam’s history, especially the legacy of the war in the 1960s and its communist government, complicated its transition to a market economy. See generally Andrew J. Pierre, *Vietnam’s Contradictions*, 79 FOREIGN POL’Y 69 (2000).


\(^{58}\) Id.
changes in economic policy have been profound and have generated substantial popular and scholarly attention. Encouraging foreign direct investment has had a powerful impact on Vietnam. Between 1988 and 2004, foreign direct investment in Vietnam increased from $8 million to $1.6 billion. This investment came with a "high level of imported inputs," especially in the industrial sector. Foreign investment thus came with foreign involvement in the economy and processes of production. As with foreign investment, the reduction of trade barriers and partial conversion to an export-oriented economy has increased the amount of economic activity in Vietnam and increased the contacts between Vietnamese businesses and foreign firms. Vietnamese firms now manufacture goods for trade with other countries, further increasing interaction with foreign firms.

Another important change came in land policy. Before doi moi, land was held collectively, and people worked the land on behalf of their commune. Under doi moi, local governments were permitted to allocate land to individual households. A new land law in 1993 created land titles and permitted land transactions. The government still owned the land, but individuals were permitted to hold long usage rights and to sell or mortgage those rights.

As these and many other economic changes were occurring, Vietnam also began to experience the kinds of changes in communications and travel that most of the rest of the world experienced. For example, between 1982 and 2004, the number of telephone subscribers (both mobile phones and fixed lines) increased from just over 1 per 1000 people to over 130 per 1000 people. Between 1996 and 2004, the number of internet users increased from approximately 100 to more than 5.8 million. From 1992 to 2004, the number of personal computers increased from approximately 10,000 to just over 1 million.

The economic changes had profound and wide-ranging social effects. One important consequence has been an increase in income inequality. During rapid economic expansion of the 1990s, poverty and other

64. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
indicators of well-being changed dramatically and for the better. For example, poverty decreased, more children went to school, fewer children were malnourished, and more people had access to clean water.68 But even as poverty decreased, income inequality increased.69 The period of globalization has seen fewer people living in poverty than before,70 but a larger gap between those at the bottom of the economic scale and those at the top. In addition to an increase in inequality, there was also substantial instability in the ranks of the poor. Many people fell into poverty during this period, and many people moved out of poverty.71 In addition, as Vietnam globalized, there were significant population shifts. The percentage of the population living in rural areas decreased from 80% in 1984 to just under 74% in 2004.72 Not surprisingly, this meant that there were significantly fewer farmers and more people with service or white-collar jobs.73 How children spent their time also changed in important ways. Between 1993 and 1998, the percentage of girls enrolled in school increased substantially.74 Interestingly, the percentage of school-age girls working also increased substantially during the same period.75

B. Social Changes

Contemporary Vietnam is significantly different from the Vietnam of even 20 years ago. People are less tied to land than they were earlier; there are fewer farmers, more people leave home to seek jobs elsewhere, and economic instability has caused the financial situation of families to change rapidly. There is an increasing youth culture, with more children being educated—and thus equipped to compete for jobs—and more children, especially girls, working outside the home. Children thus spend less time at home, and less time under the influence of their parents, and are exposed to a wider range of social influences. Young people are also exposed to influence through the Internet, giving them the opportunity to create more links with the world outside their homes. The social worlds for all people, especially young people, are more defined by choice than constrained by

68. See Litchfield & Justino, supra note 62, at 147.
69. See id. at 163.
70. Interestingly, when comparing poverty levels in 1993 and 1998, researchers found that “a large proportion of the population who were initially poor remained poor, or were poor again.” Id. at 158. This suggests that although economic development benefited many poor people, people who had more resources at the beginning did better.
73. See Litchfield & Justino, supra note 62, at 161
74. Haughton, supra note 71, at 78.
75. Id. at 80-81.
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geography. People can choose to create “virtual” friendships with like-minded individuals rather than being forced, by geography and tradition, to engage with their neighbors.

A focus on economic changes can mask the important social changes that accompany them. Consider the rural-to-urban population shift. Most rural residents were farmers. Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, most farmers are not unsophisticated. They would be better thought of as small business owners who happen to raise crops or animals than as rural residents who are unable to find other work. As small business owners, they face the same incentives and constraints as other small business owners. Their time horizon is long, as their interest in current production must be balanced against stewardship of the land for future productivity. Their main asset—and virtually the only asset that can be passed on to another generation—is land, deepening their investment, both social and economic, in the land. My aim is not to present a naive, romanticized portrait of rural life, but to recognize the ways that economic changes can change community structures or consider the social implications of the shift in how girls spent their time. The number of hours of work girls did at home, as opposed to work outside the home, declined substantially. Thus, it appears that both education and outside work became more valuable, and therefore worthy of investment, as compared with work in the home. Contemporaneous with this change was the apparent disappearance of son preference: the desire for parents to have at least one son. Based on factors such as the differential rate of contraceptive use in families in which the first child was a son versus those in which the first born was a daughter, researchers concluded that the historical preference for sons disappeared. While the evidence cannot answer conclusively why this happened, it appears that, as real economic opportunities increased, and as people began to perceive that there were economic opportunities in the city or abroad (even if this was untrue), sons became “increasingly likely to move away, rather than stay and look after the old folks.”

Two detailed examples—one showing the dynamics surrounding a place, the other the dynamics surrounding an activity—illustrate the complicated nature of globalization. In the early 1980s, Hanoi was surrounded by a string of small villages that produced flowers and vegetables for consumption in the city. The economic expansion of the 1990s changed that; farmers sold their plots to developers and land brokers

76. Id.
77. Id. at 73-74.
78. Id. at 74.
who recognized the investment potential of plots near a lake so close to the city.\textsuperscript{80} The result was the wholesale transformation of the area, with the small houses and garden plots of the flower villages replaced by three, four, or five story luxury “villas,” intermixed with restaurants, hotels, and karaoke bars.\textsuperscript{81}

The consequences of this transformation were significant. Residents no longer worked in the community; instead many commuted to Hanoi for jobs.\textsuperscript{82} Others lost their status as land owners and farmers and became day laborers for new businesses.\textsuperscript{83} Other changes included a rapid turnover in the population of the area and an increase in absentee business owners.

The second example is from Vietnam’s experience with sex tourism, a consequence of its increased openness and encouragement of tourism.\textsuperscript{84} According to Vietnamese officials, the first organized sex tour operation was discovered only in 2005.\textsuperscript{85} The operation involved ten luxury hotels and, according to the police, was set up to service foreign customers.\textsuperscript{86} Although prostitution, including child prostitution, was present in Vietnam long before the process of globalization began to be felt there, it had “long been severely condemned by society.”\textsuperscript{87} Despite this, there is substantial evidence that child prostitution is a growing phenomenon, and that its growth is fueled at least in part by globalization.\textsuperscript{88} A number of factors are involved. First, empirical evidence suggests that approximately 70\% of child prostitutes became involved by choice.\textsuperscript{89} (To be sure, their reasons varied, and their choices were, in many instances, significantly influenced by family obligations or other constraints.)\textsuperscript{90} Second, although economic conditions improved for some people during the 1990s, many people lost ground. This economic pressure made prostitution an increasingly attractive option, even considering the attendant costs.

These two brief examples highlight several important issues. First, and most simply, the Hanoi example shows the way that economic changes can contribute to social changes. Changes to the land laws and increasing economic opportunities appear to have contributed to neighborhood-level

\textsuperscript{80} Id. at 27.
\textsuperscript{81} Id.
\textsuperscript{82} Id.
\textsuperscript{83} Id.
\textsuperscript{84} Id.
\textsuperscript{85} The number of international tourist arrivals increased from 1.35 million 1995 to almost 3 million in 2004. \textit{World Bank, World Development Indicators}, http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline.
\textsuperscript{87} Id.
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{International Labour Organization, Viet Nam—Children in Prostitution in Hanoi, Hai Phong, Ho Chi Minh City and Can Tho: A Rapid Assessment} 13 (2002).
\textsuperscript{89} See generally id.
\textsuperscript{90} Id. at 45.
population shifts. One of the shifts involves long-time residents with a social investment in the community moving out, to be replaced by newcomers with less social investment. Another involves residents who begin to commute to work, reducing the number of people physically present in the neighborhood at any one time.

Next, the sex tourism example shows one of the difficulties of globalization. A range of phenomena—an increase in access to the Internet, wealthy tourists visiting the country, more time spent working outside the home, and a host of others—help to create new preferences and desires. Indeed, one of the primary factors prompting young people to enter the sex business was “rising expectations,” brought about by increased connection to other parts of the world, that have created “both real and perceived needs among a growing segment of the population.” People, especially young people, become aware of new products, experiences, and ideas they want but cannot afford if they stay in traditional roles or rely on traditional economic opportunities. As it creates new tastes, globalization also provides new opportunities to satisfy those tastes, often through activities such as sex work.

Thus, child prostitutes commonly cited two reasons for their decision. The first I call a survival strategy: to earn money to pay for necessities, whether for themselves or their families. The second I call an improvement strategy: to earn money for goods that the children or their families desired but were not among life’s core necessities. The processes of globalization create new needs, and provide avenues to satisfy those needs. One problem is an absence of economic opportunities that are norms-consistent or, at the very least, not norms-defying. In Vietnam at least, the evidence suggests that the exposure to new influences helps to create a demand for non-essential material goods that is strong enough to prompt children to enter prostitution.

The complicated social role of prostitution highlights another difficulty inherent in globalization. As with any activity, even one that violates widely-held norms, those who engage in it do so because it brings them some benefit. Indeed, some are even pushed to do it, despite its negative associations, for reasons that appear perfectly rational. The challenge of globalization, therefore, is not to arrive at moral judgments about behavior

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91. Statistics from Vietnam help to illustrate this point. In Vietnam, 3 out of every 4 jobs created between 1990 and 2000, the most active years of globalization in that country, were in the service sector. Jenkins, supra note 61, at 193. These jobs, in fields such as retail trade, transportation, and communications, are the most likely to provide opportunities for interaction with strangers, including other Vietnamese, immigrants and entrepreneurs from other countries, and tourists.

92. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, supra note 87, at 13.

93. Id. at 33-41.

94. Id. at 13.
and then attempt to create incentives, through criminal laws or otherwise, to implement those judgments. Instead, the challenge is to identify the choices faced by members of a globalizing community, including the constraints on those choices, and identify the social forces that lead individuals to make choices that are damaging to the community. One of the primary effects is a version of what economists call an externality: “the ways the behavior of a person . . . may influence the welfare of others.” Although externalities may be positive or negative, I focus here on those that are negative. Externalities are typically analyzed in connection to property rights, the concept is useful in a discussion of community well-being as well. For example, when an individual engages in prostitution, even if her decision to do so is rational from her point of view, her behavior causes harm felt by many others. One harm may be immediate—observers offended by the notion of prostitution, or endangered by the actions of those associated with it. But another harm is less immediate. As I show below, the harms associated with pervasive misbehavior have a dynamic effect. Such behavior is like a disease that erodes a patient’s ability to fight off other illnesses in the future.

III. THE CORROSIVE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON NORMS

Considered in the abstract, the challenge that a globalizing community faces is identical to the challenge faced by any other community: to shape and regulate individual behavior to promote economic activity; encourage individual expression, innovation, and actualization; and support family and community life. And globalizing communities have the same basic tools at their disposal: social norms and the law. What is different about globalizing communities is that the process of globalization itself, which creates so many benefits for individuals and communities, can also undermine a community’s capacity to respond to challenges. For many globalizing communities, the conditions created by globalization can erode positive social norms, impede the development of new norms, and make the enforcement of norms much more difficult. It should come as no surprise that many globalizing communities face an increase in anti-social activity.

A. Community Stability, Disruption, and Illicit Activity

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95. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 77 (2004).
96. I use the term "anti-social activity" to describe both criminal activity and norms-violating activity. Norms-violating activity may be also be criminal, but need not be. Further, whether an activity violates norms should be considered from the point of view of the community. Because many communities hold ambiguous or even conflicting norms, there will be instances in which it is difficult or impossible to determine whether an activity violates a local norm.
Across a range of dimensions, some communities are healthier than others. Compared to people in similar communities, those in healthy communities can expect to live longer, suffer fewer illnesses (both physical and mental), earn more money, and experience less crime. People in these communities are also better able to govern their own affairs. Crime is relatively low not because of an increased police presence, or because the people in these communities are not subject to the economic, social, or demographic factors that increase crime in other places. Instead, crime is low because the members of the community are able to set and enforce their own norms better than members of similar communities. Determining why this is true is the difficult question, and one that does not have any single answer. But there are several related factors that appear to help explain a great deal of the differences among communities. Among them are the degree to which members of the community trust each other, whether community members are willing to intervene in the lives of their neighbors or acquaintances, whether the population of the community is stable over time, and the extent of linkages between members of the community through civic organizations or voluntary activities. At their core, all of these factors focus on the extent to which members of a community are connected to their neighbors and others in the community, and the effect that this engagement has on community well-being.

In this Section, I explore the ways that globalization can disrupt the social forces that make some communities better able than others to exert social control and maintain community vitality. I first introduce a cluster of related concepts—variously called social capital, social cohesion, or community efficacy—that measure the activities and attitudes of members of a community and the effects these measures on community life. There is no direct measure of social cohesion, social capital, or community efficacy; instead, whether these attributes exist or not is got at through the identification of proxies. After describing the ways that social cohesion is measured and some of its effects, I turn to the more difficult issue: explaining why social cohesion matters, particularly with respect to illicit activity and a community’s ability to exert social control. Finally, I conclude this Part by arguing that the process of globalization is almost perfectly suited to erode social cohesion and help increase illicit activity.

1. Social Cohesion, Social Capital, and Community Efficacy

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97. Although social cohesion, social capital, and community efficacy are related concepts, they are not the same, as I discuss more fully below. Despite this, unless I note otherwise, I use the term “social cohesion” as a shorthand for the cluster of concepts.
The goal of social cohesion theory is to identify those factors that make a community capable of responding effectively to challenges. In many ways, this involves considering many of the same questions asked by scholars in the Durkheimian school. The most direct link is to the concept of *anomie*, which describes a state in which individuals do not respond to the pull of social norms because their tastes outstrip their means, or because the norms themselves are either obscure or underenforced. Social cohesion theory goes beyond the Durkheimian approach, however, by attempting to specify causal connections and identify the dynamic processes by which individual behavior contributes to social norms.

The cluster of social cohesion theories operates on several levels. It describes a "set of attitudes and norms that includes trust, a sense of belonging and the willingness to participate and help,"98 The theory includes a sense that people are attached to their community and its identity.99 It may be this attachment to the community that motivates people to engage in potentially risky behavior like confronting people who are creating a disturbance in public. But it is more than a set of attitudes. The theory necessarily includes the "behavioral manifestations" of those attitudes—members of the community acting on their beliefs.100 It also operates on two dimensions: relations “between the state and society at large,” and “interactions among different individual and groups within society.”101 In this Section, I lay out the elements of social cohesion theory and discuss the differences between social cohesion, social capital, and community efficacy.

Social cohesion is a community-level concept. It describes the “interactions among members of society,” including “interactions among different individuals and groups” and “the relationship between the state and society at large.”102 In contrast, social capital measures mostly individual-level factors, “like the networks maintained by each individual and the personal benefits that flow from them.”103 Because social capital measures the “quantity and quality of local associational life,”104 it necessarily includes some consideration of an individual’s ability to work

100. Chan et al., supra note 98, at 290.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 292.
effectively in the larger community. Social cohesion measures the collective effect of social capital on a community.

Finally, also important is the association between social cohesion and what researchers call “collective efficacy.” Collective efficacy describes a community’s ability to exercise social control. It is collective efficacy that permits a community to pursue its goals and enforce its norms and social rules even without the coercive power of the state. Collective efficacy is closely linked to social cohesion; indeed it is influenced by the same factors that influence the level of social cohesion. But collective efficacy is important for two main reasons. First, it describes the point of social cohesion. Cohesiveness is not an end in itself. Although there are doubtless people who derive pleasure merely from knowing their neighbors, it is not this utility that matters. Instead, it is the consequences of social cohesion that matter; collective efficacy is a way to measure and identify the link between social cohesion (or its absence) and its consequences. Second, collective efficacy highlights the importance of information. Communities cannot effectively exert social control without information about who is coming and going, what people are doing, where the state has invested its enforcement resources, and many other things. Interruptions in the flow of information to a community, and within a community, can cripple its ability to confront challenges.

One essential element is community stability, defined as a low rate of residential turnover. Large-scale empirical investigations reveal a consistent result: factors such as “immigration concentration and residential stability” help to predict how well a community will be able to exert social control. There are several hypotheses about why this is so. First, residential stability contributes to the formation of networks, allows time for trust to develop and provides opportunities for participation in civic organizations. Second, it can contribute to a sense of shared values, which permits communities to work effectively for at least two reasons. When members of a community “share common values,” they can “identify and support common aims and objectives.” The practical effect of this is to reduce wasted energy. Members of a community with common aims do not waste time working against themselves, which allows the community to

108. Sampson et al., supra note 105, at 923.
benefit from the full energies of its members. Further, communities with “a
common set of moral principles and codes of behaviour through which they
conduct their relations with one another” agree on the process by which
they make decisions. 110

Another factor associated with greater social cohesion is that members
of the community trust each other. To contribute to social cohesion, the
trust felt by community members “does not require that my neighbour or
the local police officer be my friend.” 111 Instead, trust requires only that the
neighborhood “rules” be clear and that people not “fear one another.” 112 To
help measure the level of trust in the community, researchers attempt to
identify the density of “local friendship and acquaintanceship networks.” 113
To supplement this evidence, researchers rely on qualitative data as well,
including, for example, surveys asking respondents if they “think that most
people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would
they try to be fair.” 114 These measures show the link between cohesion and
trust.

Trust is closely linked to another important factor: “the willingness
of local residents to intervene for the common good.” 115 This willingness
contributes to the creation of social cohesion, and also contributes to the
good that social cohesion can do. The concept of intervention is broad. It
can include anything from “monitoring of spontaneous play groups among
children” 116 to supervising teenagers. 117 In addition to simple acts like
attending to neighbors’ children, it includes acts such as confronting
“persons who are exploiting or disturbing public space.” 118 A separate
dimension of willingness to intervene includes the willingness to interact
with public officials. For example, the “evidence has long shown that more
than nine in ten police-citizen encounters derive from citizen calls.” 119
Members of the community are thus “central[. . . ] to the engine of crime
control.” 120 In addition, there is evidence that “alienation from police
authority undermines the ability of the community to aid in their own
protection through mutual cooperation.” 121 Thus, a community’s

110. Id.
111. Sampson, supra note 107, at 108.
112. Sampson et al., supra note 105, at 919.
113. A. Hirschfield & K.J. Bowers, The Effect of Social Cohesion on Levels of Recorded Crime in
Disadvantaged Areas, 34 URB. STUD. 1275, 1276 (1997).
114. John Brehm & Wendy Rahn, Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of
115. Sampson et al., supra note 105, at 919.
116. Id. at 918.
118. Sampson et al., supra note 105, at 918.
119. Sampson, supra note 107, at 110.
120. Id.
121. Id.
unwillingness to interact with the police (regardless of the reasons why) not only reduces the ability of the law enforcement officials to control crime, it also undermines the community’s own ability to police itself. One proxy used to measure the willingness of citizens to intervene or participate in the community is the rate of participation in community organizations. Researchers also measure willingness to intervene by looking at the “demand for formal social control (which, by definition, indicates a lack of informal social control).” In other words, communities that frequently call for formal social control—by asking that the police intervene with their neighbors, rather than talking directly to their neighbors—are less cohesive.

Another important factor that affects those discussed above is income inequality. Even “controlling for poverty and access to firearms,” researchers have found that “income inequality is powerfully related to the incidence of homicide in violent crimes via the depletion of social capital.” Inequality appears to erode trust and make residents less likely to interact with each other. This reduces social cohesion, which increases the incidence of some crimes. To be sure, “concentrated disadvantage” is an important factor in a community’s ability to respond effectively to challenges, but inequality appears to be profoundly important as well.

2. The Consequences of Social Cohesion and its Variants

The broad effects of a lack of social cohesion are well documented. The strongest evidence relates to social cohesion and public health. There is extensive evidence demonstrating that a lack of social cohesion—measured primarily by income inequality—is powerfully and consistently associated with increased individual mortality. Where there is substantial income inequality, health outcomes tend, on average, to be worse. In “countries with wider income differences,” diseases, infections, and

122. Sampson & Groves, supra note 106, at 799.
123. Brehm & Rahn, supra note 114, at 1017.
126. Id.
127. Sampson et al., supra note 105, at 923.
accidents are more common than in countries with higher income but less income inequality.\textsuperscript{129} A related factor that makes such a community vulnerable to public health crises has to do with the extent to which behavior that contributes to good or bad health is expressed or suppressed. For example, “risky behavior (from a health perspective), which tends to be suppressed in small, sedentary communities, often occurs in connection with the anonymity afforded by large-scale movement and urbanization.”\textsuperscript{130} The structure and norms of other communities encourage the expression of health-promoting behavior, like exercise, refraining from smoking, and the like.\textsuperscript{131}

### B. Crime and Social Cohesion

So far, this Part has analyzed social cohesion generally. In this Section, I examine the specific issue most important to my theory: the relationship between social cohesion and illicit activity. I first present the evidence showing that relatively high levels of social cohesion, or related measures like collective efficacy or social capital, are associated with lower levels of violence, criminal activity (including non-violent crimes), and victimization. Even controlling for income, age, race, and a host of other factors, the evidence shows convincingly that communities with higher levels of social cohesion are likely to be more peaceful than other communities. I then turn to the more difficult questions—determining why and how social cohesion is associated with illicit activity.

#### 1. Social Cohesion and Illicit Activity: The Evidence

As social cohesion and related concepts have gained traction in discussions about the causes of criminal activity, there have been a number of large empirical studies examining the effect of social cohesion on criminal activity. Robert Sampson’s study of Chicago is perhaps the leading one.\textsuperscript{132} Sampson and his colleagues drew on interviews with over 8,000 residents of Chicago\textsuperscript{133} and census data reflecting patterns of crime in neighborhoods home to more than 2.7 million people.\textsuperscript{134} They first

\textsuperscript{129} WILKINSON, supra note 128, at 154.
\textsuperscript{130} Gretchen C. Daily & Paul R. Ehrlich, Global Change and Human Susceptibility to Disease, 21 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENVIRON. 125, 130 (1996).
\textsuperscript{131} Note that I do not argue that the expression of a wider variety of behaviors is in any way inappropriate or normatively undesirable. Such avenues of self-actualization can be positive for communities and essential for individuals. My point is that it is important to recognize this effect, not to argue that the effect is negative.
\textsuperscript{132} See Sampson et al., supra note 105, at 918.
\textsuperscript{133} Id. at 919.
\textsuperscript{134} Id.
attempted to measure levels of social cohesion, community involvement in informal social control, and trust.\textsuperscript{135} They then measured levels of violence in those communities, both by asking interview subjects if they had been victims of a crime and by examining census data.\textsuperscript{136} They found a strong association between “residential stability and disadvantage with multiple measures of violence.”\textsuperscript{137} More important, they found that, after adjusting for a range of demographic factors, including prior violence, “the combined measure of informal social control and cohesion remained a robust predictor of lower rates of violence.”\textsuperscript{138} A number of other studies have shown similar results.\textsuperscript{139}

2. Explaining the Link Between Social Cohesion and Levels of Illicit Activity

The link between levels of social cohesion and criminal activity appears solid. In this Section, I analyze why this is true and argue that the conditions of globalization undermine social cohesion and increase illicit activity. What are the mechanisms that transform social cohesion into a reduction in illicit activity?\textsuperscript{140} How does globalization affect this process?

a. Residential Stability

One of the most powerful predictors of whether a community is likely to be able to effectively exert social control is the stability of its population. Communities in which a large number of residents come and go every year appear to suffer more illicit activity and are less able to control unwanted activity through social norm. Consider an example. As part of a pilot

\textsuperscript{135} Id. at 919-20.
\textsuperscript{136} Id. at 920.
\textsuperscript{137} Id. at 923.
\textsuperscript{138} Sampson et al., supra at note 105, at 923.
\textsuperscript{139} See, e.g., Kennedy et al., supra note 125, at 7 (arguing that indicia of low social capital, such as “income inequality, or other indices of relative deprivation, are considered to be stronger predictors of homicide and violent crime than indices of absolute deprivation, such as poverty”); Sampson & Groves, supra note 106, at 799 (“our empirical analyses established that communities characterized by sparse friendship networks, unsupervised teenage peer groups, and low organizational participation had disproportionately high rates of crime and delinquency”); Hirshfield & Bowers, supra note 113, at 1292 (empirical results show “that there is a significant relationship between social cohesion levels in disadvantaged areas and levels of certain types of crime”).
\textsuperscript{140} A short caveat is in order at this point. Social cohesion and its related concepts cannot be measured directly; they are measured through proxies like expressions of trust, participation in formal and informal community organizations, and a number of other factors. Social cohesion thus describes an amalgam of social forces that together appear to have an effect on the lives of individuals and the vitality of communities. But there is no precise, agreed-upon list of the factors that combine to create social cohesion. Establishing causal linkages between any two social phenomena can be difficult, but showing the effects caused by such an amalgam is particularly dicey. For this reason, even though some of the econometric studies upon which I rely argue that causation has been proven, I claim only that there is a persistent association between the variables measured and the effects observed.
project, a group of researchers asked villagers in rural Uganda to identify those regions of the country that were least developed, and that were least able to work cohesively on important projects. A number of interviewees named the same district—Tororo—and identified similar reasons for its lawlessness and failure to develop economically. First, they suggested that the presence of “people from five different ethnic groups whose languages were mutually incomprehensible” kept people from working together. Second, they noted the fact that a large number of Tororo residents were recent immigrants. Finally, they noted that many of the recent arrivals had fled conflict in another part of the country, bringing with them “a diffidence born of their uprooting.” Communities in the Tororo district, because of their relatively transient populations, thus appeared to struggle because residents found it difficult to do much of the work necessary to sustain a healthy community: identify shared values and norms, work toward collective goals, encourage residents to make long-term investments in the community, and make useful social contacts across demographic or other barriers.

These factors mirror the findings of a number of large-scale studies of social cohesion and violence. For example, scholars in the United Kingdom examined the link between social cohesion and crime in poor areas of England. They found that social cohesion can have a profound effect on levels of crime, even in areas in which demographic factors such as poverty might otherwise increase crime. They found that “[p]opulation turnover” was a factor that eroded social cohesion and was associated with higher levels of crime. Communities with a large number “short-term residents” suffered because those residents were “less likely to establish, or become involved in, either formal or informal arrangements which facilitate social control.” They also noted that “heterogeneity acts as a barrier to communication,” which can interfere with the ability of a community to identify shared goals and problems.

Another study—of neighborhoods in Chicago—described more fully above, identified similar issues. There, scholars found that two factors

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142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
146. Id. at 1292.
147. Id. at 1276.
148. Id.
149. Sampson et al., *supra* note 105, at 921 (noting that at “the neighborhood level,” after controlling for other factors, “concentrated disadvantage and immigrant population were significantly
explained much of the effect of population turnover on social cohesion. First, because “the formation of social ties takes time,” it is to be expected that communities with a large number of short-time residents would have fewer and weaker social networks. Recall that it is through social networks that norms and values are shared and enforced; without a cohesive “norms market,” informal control is difficult. Second, the financial investment of home ownership—an indicator of both residential stability and a long time horizon— creates “a vested interest in supporting the commonweal of neighborhood life.”

b. Participation in Community Life

Critical to the creation of social cohesion is trust, and critical to the creation of trust is interaction among residents of a community. The more people trust their neighbors, the more likely it is that the community will be able to set and enforce productive social norms. The causes and consequences of trust among members of a community cannot, of course, be reduced to a simple formula. But it is possible to identify several important steps in the process. First, interaction among neighbors can encourage trust by providing people with important information about other members of the community. Second, once trust is created, it can provide a basis for intervention in community activities, which helps the community set and enforce norms.

The process by which participation can produce trust depends mainly on two factors: the flow of information within the community, and the value that members of the community place on future goals versus the value they place on more immediate concerns. One hallmark of effective communities is that people in them do not ignore violations of community norms. But intervention depends in significant part on whether those who would intervene can predict the likely consequences of their actions. Participation in formal and informal community organizations provides people with the opportunity to learn about the character and attributes of

negatively associated with collective efficacy, whereas residential stability was positively associated with collective efficacy”).

150. Id. at 919.
151. See, e.g., Sampson & Groves, supra note 106, at 790 (noting that “the data suggest that communities characterized by extensive friendship networks, high organizational participation, and effective control of teenage peer groups have lower than average rates of burglary”).
152. Sampson et al., supra note 105, at 919.
153. See id.
154. See id. (noting that members of a community are “unlikely to intervene in a neighborhood context in which the rules are unclear and people mistrust or fear one another”).
other people.\textsuperscript{155} Frequent interaction is not the only way that people can learn about their neighbors, of course, but it can be the most efficient. Frequent interaction “lowers the cost and raises the benefits associated with discovering more about the characteristics, recent behaviour, and likely future actions” of other members of the community.\textsuperscript{156} Such information is important to community governance. People who are able to predict how their neighbors will act are more likely to initiate interactions, intervene if they see something amiss, and share knowledge and skills.\textsuperscript{157}

A number of factors affect the level of participation. One important factor is income inequality. Increases in income inequality appear to reduce opportunities for interaction, which reduces participation and trust. As inequality rises, trust declines; and as trust declines, participation in community activities declines.\textsuperscript{158} In addition, as inequality declines and interaction becomes less frequent, individuals in the community have less information about their neighbors, with all of the effects discussed above. Another important variable centers on trust and social sanctions. As people become more confident that their neighbors will not ignore norms violations, they may become more willing to forego present benefits for the sake of future benefits.\textsuperscript{159}

Although trust and participation are related, trust is not a prerequisite of participation. Consider an example from Cape Town, South Africa.\textsuperscript{160} In 1995, soon after the end of apartheid and the introduction of majority
rule, a branch of the ANC began a program to bus black students to formerly all-white neighborhood schools. In Ruyterwacht, a poor white neighborhood in Cape Town, the program created significant problems:

[T]he... National Education Crisis Committee began busing 3,000-4,000 black students daily into the neighborhood, ostensibly to attend school. The school itself, however, had no teachers, no desks, no books, and a maximum capacity of 500 students. Students were left in Ruyterwacht with nothing to do until the buses returned to take them home at 4 o’clock.161

White residents of the community objected to the program. After a series of meetings, they started a community movement that eventually led to the suspension of the program.162 Important for my purposes are two observations. Before the collective action, the community was not marked by high levels of trust or solidarity, but it was afterwards; the action helped to create trust where it had not existed before.163 The trust created by the activity “did appear to create a more lasting focal point of networks [and] norms” that persisted even after the initial busing program was suspended.164 This observation is consistent with the results of other research showing that it is likely easier to generate trust by creating incentives for more participation than it is to increase participation by encouraging people to trust their neighbors.165

C. Information, Intervention, and the Vitality of Norms

Norms work when people who observe behavior react to that behavior. If I see a group of neighborhood children tormenting a stray dog and do nothing, the children avoid any sanction for their misbehavior and I run the risk of undermining future attempts to correct similar behavior. To be sure, my reaction to a single incident of misbehavior is unlikely to create or destroy an established norm, but the reactions of many people, over some period of time, can have a profound social effect. Although it has seldom been considered in the context of globalization, there is substantial evidence from the behavioral sciences detailing the conditions under which observers are likely to intervene and when they are not. In this Section, I assess the ways that the processes and consequences of globalization undermine the

161. Id.
162. Id. at 148.
163. Id. at 170 (“collective action sparked by the combination of communal threat and efficacy can produce trust, even where none has existed before”).
164. Id. at 169.
165. See, e.g., Brehm & Rahn, supra note 114, at 1017 (noting that “it is probably easier for a community to generate greater levels of participation (by subsidizing the selective incentives for participation, for instance) than it is for that community to instill more trusting attitudes in others”).
conditions that encourage intervention, thereby undermining the force and effect of norms.

In most communities, the actions of most people are encouraged or constrained by an amalgam of forces, of which legal rules are just one. A range of factors influence individual behavior, including “personal ethics . . ., contracts . . ., norms . . ., organization rules . . ., [and] law.”166 For my purposes, norms are “informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both.”167 Norms are everywhere; indeed, norms “so thoroughly pervade” human activity that “it is difficult to even imagine a normless world.”168 Despite their ubiquity, norms require the right conditions to emerge and thrive. Put most generally, for norms to come into being, the community involved must be aware of and, to some extent agree on, the content of norms; people must know enough about the behavior of others to identify those who violate norms and those who comply; and individuals must have the power and mechanisms to enforce norms.169

Norms work when residents of a community know of and come to similar beliefs about the content and existence of a norm.170 This condition can arise in a number of ways. First, members of the community may have similar preferences and, acting out of self-interest, independently decide to reward or punish behaviors that benefit or harm them.171 The norm arises because similar preferences give rise to similar reward and punishment decisions, even in the absence of agreement, coordination, or even knowledge. Second, and perhaps obviously, members of a group or community may discuss behaviors and rules and decide that a behavior is desirable or undesirable.172 Finally, a consensus may emerge simply because those who disagree with the norm leave the community.173 Once the dissenters are gone, the beliefs of those who remain become, almost by default, the community’s norms.

168. Id. at 359 n.91.
169. See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 166, at 177 (“social conditions within a group” must “provide members with information about norms and violations and also the power and enforcement opportunities needed to establish norms”).
170. See McAdams, supra note 167, at 358-59.
171. See id. at 359 (citing Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 Ethics 725, 744 (1990)). Building on Pettit, McAdams labels this mechanism “selfish esteem allocation,” and uses the term to describe the granting or withholding of esteem based on whether the behavior at issue benefits or harms the observer/enforcer. Id.
172. Id. at 360.
173. Id.
The state that I am describing—something approaching agreement or consensus—about the content of a norm need not arise because everyone in the community actually agrees with the norm. It is, of course, entirely possible for individuals to recognize norms with which they disagree. It is also possible for individuals to comply with, or even embrace, norms with which they disagree. Some people may comply because they suppose that others—the early adopters of the norm—know something that they do not. In other words, they go “along with the crowd on the ground that the crowd is probably right.” Others may comply not because they believe that the early adopters know more than they do or are right, but “to avoid the social disapproval that may be visited on those who are out of step.” In the end, what matters is that members of the community must know the content of norms. It is not necessary that every single individual be able to articulate the norm in precisely the same way. It is also not necessary that every individual recognize that her preference is, in fact, a norm. But a critical mass of individuals must know the content of the rules and believe that they are, in fact, rules.

The next important condition is that individuals within the community must recognize that if they violate a norm, someone will learn about it. If people are certain that there is no chance that their behavior will be discovered, then rewards and sanctions, apart from those that are purely internal, are irrelevant. Information is thus essential to the emergence and vitality of norms. Put another way, members of the community must be part of the same reputation market. The person whose behavior is at issue must be susceptible to the punishments or desire the rewards available to those who observe her behavior and would enforce the norm. This might be thought of as a jurisdictional point: I only fear a sovereign who has the power to punish me; if I have immunity from the sovereign’s punishment, then I will not modify my behavior in response to its laws.

The reactions of those who observe norms-violating behavior are critical to the emergence and vitality of norms. Observers must first have at their disposal an effective sanction, which might take many forms. For example, an observer may decide that an appropriate sanction is to withhold esteem; her opinion of the actor may harden, and she may share her

175. Id.
176. McAdams, supra note 167, at 361 (arguing that there must be “an inherent risk that anyone who engages in the behavior at issue will be detected”).
177. See Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions 73 ECONOMETRICA 2017, 2028 (2005) (“The willingness to sanction norm violations and noncooperative behavior is crucial for the maintenance of social order. Such sanctions sustain the viability of a myriad of informal agreements in markets, organizations, families, and neighborhoods”).
opinion, and the basis for it, with others in the community.\textsuperscript{178} Other observers may interpret misbehavior as a signal that the actor is not a worthy partner for future interaction and decide to withhold opportunities for exchange or commerce.\textsuperscript{179} For my purposes, the precise range of sanctions is not a central concern. My own intuition is that most people use a range of sanctions. Most important is that there are sanctions available to observers.

Just as there are substantive norms—discouraging stealing or encouraging voting, for example—there are norms that regulate the enforcement of the substantive norms.\textsuperscript{180} These enforcement norms are an essential component of the story of the vitality of social norms. There are a range of variables that can affect enforcement norms, and these variables are all, to some degree, affected by the processes of globalization. One important factor in enforcement norms is the cost of sanctioning to the sanctioner.\textsuperscript{181} If I see someone do something wrong, what will happen to me if I confront her or impose some other penalty, such as gossiping about her? A second variable is the extent of cohesion within the community or group.\textsuperscript{182} The more cohesive the group, the more likely it is that enforcement norms will be strong, and the more likely it is that norm-violating behavior will be punished.

Not surprisingly, the available evidence suggests that as the costs of imposing a sanction increase, the likelihood that a member of the community will impose a sanction decreases.\textsuperscript{183} The costs of a imposing a sanction may be time or money, but they may also include physical injury or social awkwardness, or the risk of suffering one of these costs.\textsuperscript{184} Without rules governing this, people bear the costs of gathering information and all the attendant risks. Because one benefit of social norms is that they make the behavior of others more predictable, norms that contribute to predictability can have obvious efficiency pay-offs.\textsuperscript{185} For example, a norm regulating how staff meetings are run would save the organization from having to decide anew at each meeting how to run the meeting. But

\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{178} McAdams, supra note 167, at 340.
\item\textsuperscript{179} ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 11-35 (2000).
\item\textsuperscript{180} What I have called “enforcement norms” are sometimes referred to as “meta-norms,” describing the social rules that encourage or discourage the imposition of an informal sanction on a person observed to have violated a norm. See Christine Horne & Anna Cutlip, Sanctioning Costs and Norm Enforcement: An Experimental Test, 14 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 285, 288 (2002) (“Meta-norms are rules about how group members respond to deviance”).
\item\textsuperscript{181} See id.
\item\textsuperscript{182} See id.
\item\textsuperscript{183} See id. at 300.
\item\textsuperscript{184} See id. at 288.
\end{enumerate}
predictability also contributes to enforcement norms by reducing the costs associated with imposing a sanction.

There are a range of reasons why an observer might impose a sanction; two motivations appear most important. The first is that the observer feels that the actor has behaved unfairly.\(^{186}\) For example, people who shirk their duties when others are working, or people who seek more than their fair share of a common fund, are more likely to face informal sanctions.\(^{187}\) Second, many observers “seem to be driven by a less kind motive—spitefulness.”\(^{188}\) Observers who have been disadvantaged sometimes appear to be willing to impose sanctions on others who have not been similarly disadvantaged.

An observer must not only have a motive to impose a sanction, it is also important that she not have an impediment to the imposition of a sanction. The impediment may take the form of an internal belief that she is incapable of acting. The impediment may stem from the relationship between the actor and the observer. For example, a significant difference in status between the observer and the actor appears to operate as an impediment to sanctioning behavior that the actor would, under other circumstances, believe to violate a norm.\(^{189}\)

The Vietnam example shows how globalization complicates the equation. One of the characteristics of a globalizing community is population turnover, with people from other parts of Vietnam and other parts of the world moving into and out of communities that has been stable. Each newcomer comes with her own understanding of what constitutes appropriate behavior, including an understanding of the appropriate ways to respond when others express disapproval of her behavior or impose other social sanctions. It should come as no surprise that such a community would have a difficult time enforcing norms (or developing new norms). Uncertainty about enforcement norms represents a potentially significant cost that will make the imposition of sanctions less likely. In stable communities, social cohesion operates as a kind of counterweight to the effect of rising costs. Recall that as the costs to the sanctioner rise, the likelihood that sanctions will be imposed falls. But in a cohesive community, group cohesion has the effect of increasing the likelihood of

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\(^{186}\) See Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 177, at 2028-29.

\(^{187}\) See id.

\(^{188}\) See id.

imposing sanctions. Indeed, in particularly cohesive communities, there is a real risk of over-enforcement of norms, even when sanctions are costly by other measures. One reason for this may be that group members value highly the rewards they receive from their fellows for enforcing norms (which create benefits for the entire group). Most important for my purposes is that uncertainty about the likely reaction of strangers to the imposition of sanctions, coupled with the low expected value of the rewards that people might receive for imposing sanctions, combine to reduce the likelihood that observers of deviant behavior will impose sanctions.

D. Status, Judgment, Sanctions, and the Power of Norms

Social relationships are a critical variable in the emergence and effectiveness of norms, and status is central to social relationships. Status affects the maintenance of norms in two related ways. First, it distorts the process of judgment. Observers come to different conclusions about the appropriateness of a particular action depending on the social status of the actor (and, of course, their own social status). Observers who witness people of high status engaging in activity that would otherwise violate a norm are less likely to conclude that the act was, in fact, inappropriate. Second, in those instances in which an observer concludes that the actor’s behavior was inappropriate, their relative levels of status affect the observer’s assessment of the appropriate sanction. To put the point in the language of the criminal process, people of high status are less likely to be convicted of their crimes, and if convicted, are less likely to face the maximum punishment. Complicating the matter even further is that the two processes appear to work together, making it difficult to distinguish one effect from the other.

Observers react not only to what they see, but to whom they see doing it. Status affects the processes of approval and disapproval in complicated ways. One initial reason to attend to status differences is that people with high status are typically more visible than others. They receive “more attention for the same level of performance” than people of lower status, and their actions are “taken more seriously” than the actions of low-status people. This has a clear effect on the allocation of esteem, but a much

190. See Horne & Cutlip, supra note 180, at 300 (“As the costs of norm enforcement increase, sanctioning of deviant behavior declines, but meta-norms encouraging such sanctioning grow stronger”).
191. See id. at 301.
192. See id.
193. I analyzed the relationship between status and norms in much greater depth in earlier work. See Keenan, supra note 34, at 545-58.
less clear effect on the allocation of disesteem. Regarding esteem, those “of higher social status” receive more esteem than those of lower status for the same levels of performance.195

For disesteem, other factors appear to be at work. Visibility still plays an important role, and can cause those with high visibility to suffer greater disesteem than those with lower visibility. But another force works in the other direction. Misbehavior costs people of high status less because “the interpretation of an act as deviant is more problematic for high status people.”196 Thus, even though their actions are more likely to be witnessed by observers, they are less likely to face disapproval for the same action that would bring disapproval if done by someone of lower status. Interestingly, the effect is greater with respect to acts that are in a normative grey area—those that may, but do not clearly, violate an established norm.197

High visibility, a common attribute of those with high status, deserves special attention. There is some evidence that individuation for any reason, as opposed to high status, may be doing most of the work. This makes intuitive sense: just as observers’ eyes are drawn to those of high status because of their difference, it is reasonable to expect that their eyes will be drawn to people who are different in other ways, such as race or color, mode of dress, or manner of speech. What matters is that the individual receives attention.198 Thus, even if foreigners are not accorded higher status, their prominence may act as an analogue of status, meaning that those who stand out are likely to be treated in the same way as those with high status.

E. Reputational Segmentation

Social controls that use reputational penalties as the primary sanction depend on physical or social proximity: those who observe inappropriate behavior must have access to the reputation of the offender. Without this, sanctions are irrelevant. Put another way, for informal social control to be effective, those who witness misbehavior and those who engage in it must

195. Id. The allocation of esteem does not follow a simple curve. Esteem does not rise at the same rate that performance does. It is true that small improvements in performance lead to small increases in esteem. But the allocation of esteem is skewed toward people who perform at very high levels. In other words, at the low end of the performance scale, a 1-step increase in performance might lead to a 1-step increase in esteem. At the high end of the performance scale, a 1-step increase in performance might lead to a 5-step increase in esteem. Id.
196. Id.
be part of the same norm community. To be part of the same norm community does not mean that everyone in the community must be friends, or even personally acquainted. What matters is that members of the community desire the approval of those around them, wish to avoid their disapproval, or wish to be seen as a competent and reliable partner for economic or social interaction. The realities of globalization have made it more difficult to establish and maintain stable norm communities for several reasons. In this section, I focus on the possibility of reputational segmentation: the possibility that individuals can purposefully create, or, at the least, benefit from, having different reputations in different areas. Reputational segmentation is a strategy that can permit a person to violate the norms of one community without suffering any effects in another community. Put another way, a “social norm of behavior . . . is limited in its ability to control an individual’s behavior by what that person has to lose . . . if he or she deviates from the social norm’s prescriptions.”

Consider a concrete example. Beginning in the early 1990s, Marvin Hersh regularly traveled to Honduras, and other developing countries, to engage in sex with children. Hersh made at least nine trips to Honduras and Thailand, and on each trip he engaged in sexual activity with one or more young boys. During this time, Hersh was also a university professor, first at Emory and then at Florida International. Despite the frequency with which he engaged in sex tourism, his university colleagues had no idea of his activities. In a similar case, Nicholas Bredimus regularly traveled to Thailand to have sex with children. His work colleagues had no idea of his activities. Common to both cases was the ease with which they procured their child victims in the destination communities, and the outrage expressed by their colleagues, friends, and families in the source communities. Before their arrests, there was no evident reputational spillover—both men had successfully segmented their reputations.

Of course, it is important to acknowledge that there is nothing new about the possibility that a criminal could lead a double life—engaging in illicit activity in one location while maintaining a positive reputation in another. But this phenomenon has taken on new importance in the age of globalization. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 919 (1996) (“The fact that norms are contested within a heterogeneous society can lead to the creation of many diverse norms communities”).

Harold L. Cole et al., Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms, 70 J. PUB. ECON. 5, 6 (1998).

See United States v. Hersh, 297 F.3d 1233, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002).

Id. at 1236-38.


Id.
globalization. Recall the Vietnam example. Between 1995 and 2004, the number of tourists arriving in Vietnam increased from 1,351,000 to 2,928,000. For Cambodia and Thailand, the increases were even more pronounced. Even if the possibility of reputational segmentation is not a new phenomenon, it is certainly a new challenge for communities and law enforcement authorities.

Reputational segmentation poses a profound challenge to informal means of social control. Marvin Hersh and Nicholas Bredimus were able to leave behind one norm community for another. Their primary norm community—where they worked, raised their families, and lived most of their lives—did not have the information necessary to exert any control over their illicit activity. In their destination communities, both men’s proclivities were well known; indeed, the evidence presented at Bredimus’s trial suggested that people lined up outside his room with child prostitutes. If their norm communities had been the same as their geographic communities, it would have been much more difficult for them to segment their reputations so completely. The economic, social, and psychological processes that underlie reputational segmentation are complex. Economic and status differences can permit individuals who engage in norm-violating activity to avoid the opprobrium that they would otherwise deserve. Psychologists have long recognized that, for most people, there is a “distinction between private and social aspects of the self.” These two aspects of the self combine to shape individual behavior by supplying reasons for action. For example, the private component of the self might be motivated by a desire to achieve a particular outcome while the social (or public) component might be motivated by a desire to gain the esteem of others or avoid their disapproval. In most situations, both components should be engaged: as she decides whether a particular action will bring her personal satisfaction or pleasure, an individual must also decide if engaging in the action will affect the esteem in which she is held by other people. Although the interaction of these two sets of motivations is complicated, and likely difficult to pinpoint directly, it is clear that social expectations can moderate personal desires, and vice-versa. Put another way, social forces can moderate the behavior of individuals whose private desires, if acted upon, would make them social outliers in their communities.


206. Id.


208. See, e.g., IZCH AIZEN & MARTIN FISHBEIN, UNDERSTANDING ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR 80-86 (1980) (arguing that behavior is shaped by the interaction of internal and external motivations).

209. CARVER & SCHEIER, supra note 207, at 110-12.
Globalization changes the calculation. Economic and status differences, communications problems, or simple distance can relieve a person from having to fully consider social expectations when making decisions about illicit behavior. Individuals are thus relieved of one of the primary costs of inappropriate behavior. When communities cannot rely on these critical moderating forces on individual behavior, they are left without a vital tool of social control. Consideration of the psychological issues underlying reputational segmentation is important because it helps explain the connection between individual and group behavior. Individuals respond to their own preferences and to their perceptions of what others want or expect of them. Community life is determined, in large part, by the effect of individual decisions.

Consider the consequences of having a Hersh or Bredimus in the community. What happens in a community when individuals who violate norms are, in effect, judgment proof? First, when sanctions are ineffective, we should expect that eventually they will be imposed less frequently. Sanctions are often costly; members of the community impose them because they anticipate some benefit. If observers know from experience that the benefit will not materialize, they will become less willing to pay the cost. Second, sanctions for norm-violating behavior are often part of the process of putting the behavior in an appropriate social context. Whether and how an offender accounts for his deviant behavior can play an important role in preserving the vitality of substantive social norms, and of enforcement norms, the meta-norms that regulate when and how people impose sanctions. Third, it is possible to conceive of social norms as society’s cure for individual myopia. If individuals are myopic—that is, they seek to satisfy their immediate desires without regard for the negative

210. There is an interesting parallel here between contemporary globalization and the perceived effects of the Industrial Revolution. One consequence of the Industrial Revolution was a shift from a local, integrated economy, in which people knew those with whom they traded, and a cash-based urban economy. In a classic article, Robert K. Merton, drawing on Georg Simmel, put the issue this way: money is highly abstract and impersonal. However acquired, through fraud or institutionally, it can be used to purchase the same goods and services. The anonymity of metropolitan culture, in conjunction with this peculiarity of money, permits wealth, the sources of which may be unknown to the community in which the plutocrat lives, to serve as a symbol of status. Merton, supra note 25, at 675 n.8. In Merton’s time, it was the combination of relative anonymity and wealth that deprived onlookers of the information they needed to fairly evaluate those who lived in their midst. In the current age of globalization, these factors are compounded by the role of social status and the ease of transport.

211. To be sure, social expectations do not invariably pull individuals toward positive decisions or away from negative decisions. It is entirely possible that, in some circumstances, individuals with personal preferences likely to produce positive externalities will moderate their behavior in ways that reduce the benefits that they would otherwise create. Indeed, there is experimental evidence that test subjects are more likely to provide an answer they know to be wrong if the answer is given in public and the majority of the group gives the same incorrect answer. See Carver & Scheier, supra note 207, at 115.
externalities that their behavior might produce—then norms can provide countervailing incentives. Norms operate as a promise of a future reward (or a threat of a future punishment) for individuals who are willing to postpone, modify, or completely forego their personal desires.

One element of the calculus—the dynamic effect that sanctioning behavior has on future sanctioning behavior—bears special consideration. It comes as no surprise that the effectiveness of sanctions is related to the willingness of “agents . . . to spend resources on punishment.” But these effects are not always intuitive. For example, there is evidence suggesting that if punishment is too effective, then community members can become less vigilant about enforcing norms, eventually leading to an increase in norm-violating behavior. Members of the community—all potential sanctioners—thus modify the degree of their involvement in the norms regime based on the effect of previous sanctioning behavior. One way to conceive of sanctioning behavior is as a type of investment. Community members engage in costly present behavior in the hope of receiving a future benefit (or preserving a congenial status quo that would otherwise suffer). Considered in this way, it should be no surprise that the imposition of sanctions that prove to be ineffective would affect behavior. Richard Thaler’s work on choice helps to illustrate this effect. In one experiment he showed that test subjects felt that the loss of $9 after having lost $30 hurt more than a $9 loss standing alone. The effect of a prior loss was to make individuals more risk averse than they had been previously. To understand the importance of this point, consider an example.

Sanctioning behavior not only affects future sanctioning behavior—that is, meta-norms—it also affects the boundaries of substantive norms. Specifically, an offender’s response to a sanction helps determine the future vitality of norms. People who engage in norm-violating behavior can undermine substantive norms by appearing to ignore or challenge the norms. But they can also help to reinforce the power of the norm if they adequately account for their behavior. Accounting for inappropriate behavior does not necessarily mean excusing or even explaining it. Instead,

213. *Id.* at 2.
214. Richard H. Thaler, *Quasi-Rational Economics* 59-60 (1991). Thaler’s findings also show the complexity of the problem. He found that losing $9 after having lost $30 hurts more than just losing $9. But he also found that “a small majority [of test subjects] say that the $9 loss hurts less after the large $250 (or $1000) loss than alone.” *Id.* at 58. He hypothesized that a small loss after an enormous loss hurt less because a “large loss may numb the individual to additional small losses.” *Id.* at 60.
215. *Id.* at 67.
what is important is that the offender be seen to engage in some kind of “[r]emedial ritual” to help put the behavior in its appropriate context.\footnote{See id.} Indeed, there is some evidence that for many social infractions, “a failure to provide the required remedies” can cause more harm than the initial infraction.\footnote{Id. (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES IN THE PUBLIC ORDER (1971)).} Although the harm can be personal—no one likes a person who refuses to apologize for misbehavior—it can also be systemic. In this way, individuals who engage in reputational segmentation not only avoid the cost of a social sanction, they also rob the community of the opportunity to reprocess the misbehavior and transform it from an assault on community standards into an example of community effectiveness and power.

The final social consideration regarding reputational segmentation relates to the difference between what is good for the community and what is good for individuals. Social norms, backed up by sanctions, can be a cure for a kind of myopia by requiring individuals to account in some way for the externalities their actions create.\footnote{See generally Cole et al., supra note 200, at 26.} In economic terms, an externality occurs when the “benefits or costs” of an activity “fall on people not directly involved in the” activity.\footnote{ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 613 (5th ed. 2003).} This can create a problem because if those considering whether to engage in an activity do not pay all the costs associated with the activity (or reap all the benefits), there is a chance that the activity will be over- or under-produced.\footnote{MATTHEW BISHOP, ESSENTIAL ECONOMICS 95 (2004).} For a globalizing community, as with all communities, the behaviors of individuals can create significant externalities. Consider the effect of the conversion of property from a farm to a resort, or the decision of a teenager to quit school to become a prostitute. If the person facing the decision is susceptible to social norms—if her behavior will be affected by her desire for her community’s esteem, for example—then she must weigh the potential cost of social sanctions along with all the other costs associated with the activity. But if she is able to engage in reputational segmentation—and therefore make herself immune from social sanctions—then she is free to ignore what may be significant costs as she makes her decision. Social norms, and the possibility of sanctions, thus operate as a kind of remedy for myopic behavior, and amount to another tool of social control.
DO NORMS STILL MATTER?

THE CORROSIVE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE VITALITY OF NORMS

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Abstract

Why does the process of globalization undermine the power of social norms to regulate behavior? Norms are the social regularities that shape individual behavior and help to create vibrant—or dysfunctional—communities. Most theories of norms do not account for the many ways that globalization affects the foundations of norms. This article fills the gap by developing a more robust theory of the informal regulation of behavior that considers the ways that the process of globalization can interfere with the creation of norms and erode their power. Drawing on behavioral economics, sociology, and criminology, my theory contains three claims. First, I argue that because individuals in a globalizing community typically suffer from significant disruptions in relationships, the community’s ability to regulate itself is eroded. In vibrant communities, residents are willing to intervene in the lives of their neighbors by, for example, scolding children who misbehave in public or teenagers who deface buildings. But in a globalizing community, the conditions that give rise to this willingness to intervene are eroded by the process of globalization. Second, I argue that globalization can distort the process of creating and enforcing social norms by allowing individuals to, in effect, immunize themselves from the sanctions typically employed to enforce norms. For example, differences in social status affect the ways that observers judge illicit behavior, and the ways that they condemn, condone, or ignore that behavior. Third, I argue that globalization also makes it possible for individuals to engage in what I call reputational segmentation. In this process, people who wish to engage in an activity that carries social sanctions do so in a place where they are immune to the real effects of those sanctions. For example, a Western tourist who travels to the developing world to engage in illicit sexual activity, often with children, may suffer social sanctions in the destination community, but those sanctions do not follow him back to his country of origin. And because the quality of the person’s life is affected almost entirely by his reputation in his country of origin, the ability to engage in reputational segmentation allows him to escape the consequences of his actions. My theory differs from other work on norms and globalization because I consider both the role of individuals, and the incentives that shape their actions, and the role of communities in the enforcement of norms. With some notable exceptions, most scholarship that considers the power of norms looks at the incentives that guide an individual’s decision to comply with or deviate from social norms. But as communities confront globalization, they evolve in ways that inevitably affect the power and content of norms. The give and take between individuals and communities is therefore central to the way that globalization affects norms.