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Article
Alliances and negotiations: an incomplete information example
Review of Economic Design (2009)
  • Paola Manzini, University of St Andrews
  • Marco Mariotti
Abstract
We study a bargaining game between an individual and an ‘alliance’ in the sense of Manzini and Mariotti (J Econ Theory 121:128–41, 2005), in which the opponent of the alliance is incompletely informed about the relative strengths of its members. The best equilibrium outcome for the alliance under a unanimity rule is not attainable with a non-unanimity rule. However, unlike in the complete information model, less than optimal outcomes and delays may occur with positive probability even under unanimity, depending on the prior beliefs and the preferences of the agents.
Keywords
  • Alliances,
  • Multiperson Bargaining,
  • Incomplete information,
  • Voting Procedures
Disciplines
Publication Date
2009
DOI
10.1007/s10058-008-0053-8
Publisher Statement
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10058-008-0053-8
Citation Information
Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti. "Alliances and negotiations: an incomplete information example" Review of Economic Design Vol. 13 Iss. 3 (2009) p. 195 - 203
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/paola-manzini/12/
Creative Commons license
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC_BY-NC-ND International License.