In R. v. Myers, reported ante p. 1, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized, once again, that pre-trial detention harms presumptively innocent people and must be avoided whenever possible. It recognized, further, that the harms of pretrial detention are exacerbated by trial delay. In light of this dynamic, the Court observed: "It is a longstanding principle of our criminal justice system that individuals in pre-trial custody should be given a certain priority in scheduling trials. This general guiding premise has not been displaced by R. v. Jordan". With all due respect, the Myers Court's reading of Jordan is hard to accept. Under Jordan, bail status no longer informs s.11(b) analyses. Institutional actors are incentivized to prioritize cases that are approaching the Jordan ceiling without regard to bail status. I argue here that the Court should rework the Jordan test to correct this incentive structure and give teeth to the recently reaffirmed principle that those in pre-trial custody ought to receive scheduling priority.