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Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2013)
  • Paan Jindapon, University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa
  • Carlos Oyarzun, University of Queensland

We study persuasion in a modified Crawford-Sobel sender-receiver game in which the receiver makes a binary decision to accept or reject a good recommended by the sender. The good's quality and the sender's type (neutral or biased) are not observable to the receiver. These slight alterations yield a simple model with a unique equilibrium in which neutral senders fully separate. The neutral sender can only communicate low quality levels with precision and the biased sender adopts a mixed strategy that on average can successfully persuade the receiver to accept the good. This strategy is robust under competition between multiple senders. We provide a sufficient condition for the receiver to prefer this equilibrium to delegating decision-making authority to a sender of unknown type. Several less-informative equilibria exist; however, only announcement-proof equilibria are outcome-equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium.

  • Strategic Information Transmission,
  • Persuasion,
  • Equilibrium-announcement-proofness
Publication Date
Citation Information
Paan Jindapon and Carlos Oyarzun. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Vol. 95 (2013)
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