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Article
Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2013)
  • Paan Jindapon, University of Alabama - Tuscaloosa
  • Carlos Oyarzun, University of Queensland
Abstract

We study persuasion in a modified Crawford-Sobel sender-receiver game in which the receiver makes a binary decision to accept or reject a good recommended by the sender. The good's quality and the sender's type (neutral or biased) are not observable to the receiver. These slight alterations yield a simple model with a unique equilibrium in which neutral senders fully separate. The neutral sender can only communicate low quality levels with precision and the biased sender adopts a mixed strategy that on average can successfully persuade the receiver to accept the good. This strategy is robust under competition between multiple senders. We provide a sufficient condition for the receiver to prefer this equilibrium to delegating decision-making authority to a sender of unknown type. Several less-informative equilibria exist; however, only announcement-proof equilibria are outcome-equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium.

Keywords
  • Strategic Information Transmission,
  • Persuasion,
  • Equilibrium-announcement-proofness
Disciplines
Publication Date
2013
Citation Information
Paan Jindapon and Carlos Oyarzun. "Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Vol. 95 (2013)
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/oyarzun/4/