|Present||Faculty Member, The University of Queensland, Australia|
Behavioral Economics and Economic Theory
Honors and Awards
- Juan de la Cierva Fellowship, Ministry of Science and Technology, Spain (Jan 10-Dec. 12)
- Jose Castillejo Fellowship, Ministry of Science and Technology, Spain (Jan. 09-Aug. 09)
School of Economics
University of Queensland
Brisbane, Queensland 4072
Phone: +61 7 336 56579
Working Papers (1)
Published Articles (8)
Imitation in Heterogeneous Populations Economic Theory (2018)
Abstract We study a boundedly rational model of imitation when payoff distributions of actions differ across types of individuals. Individuals observe others' actions and payoffs, and a comparison signal. Two possible inefficiencies may arise: (i) ...
Response functions European Economic Review (2017)
We introduce a simple two-period adaptive-learning model to analyze how “primitive” choice behavior affects payoffs in minimal information settings, and then we conduct an experiment to observe how this behavior (thus payoffs) varies across people. ...
Convergence in Models with Bounded Expected Relative Hazard Rates Journal of Economic Theory (2014)
We provide a general framework to study stochastic sequences related to an array of models in different literatures, including models of individual learning in economics, learning automata in computer sciences, social learning in marketing, and ...
A Note on Absolutely Expedient Learning Rules Journal of Economic Theory (2014)
I provide a full characterization of the set of absolutely expedient learning rules introduced in Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004) [“Expedient and monotone learning rules,” Econometrica, 72, 383–405]. The expected change in the expected payoff ...
Persuasive communication when the sender's incentives are uncertain Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2013)
We study persuasion in a modified Crawford-Sobel sender-receiver game in which the receiver makes a binary decision to accept or reject a good recommended by the sender. The good's quality and the sender's type (neutral ...