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Article
Selfishness as Second-Order Altruism
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
  • Omar Tonsi Eldakar, Binghamton University--SUNY
  • David Sloan Wilson, Binghamton University--SUNY
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
5-13-2008
Keywords
  • Punishment,
  • Cooperation,
  • Mutualism,
  • Game Theory,
  • Public Goods
Disciplines
Abstract
Selfishness is seldom considered a group-beneficial strategy. In the typical evolutionary formulation, altruism benefits the group, selfishness undermines altruism, and the purpose of the model is to identify mechanisms, such as kinship or reciprocity, that enable altruism to evolve. Recent models have explored punishment as an important mechanism favoring the evolution of altruism, but punishment can be costly to the punisher, making it a form of second-order altruism. This model identifies a strategy called “selfish punisher” that involves behaving selfishly in first-order interactions and altruistically in second-order interactions by punishing other selfish individuals. Selfish punishers cause selfishness to be a self-limiting strategy, enabling altruists to coexist in a stable equilibrium. This polymorphism can be regarded as a division of labor, or mutualism, in which the benefits obtained by first-order selfishness help to “pay” for second-order altruism.
ORCID ID
0000-0002-4807-4979
DOI
10.1073/pnas.0712173105
Citation Information
Omar Tonsi Eldakar and David Sloan Wilson. "Selfishness as Second-Order Altruism" Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America Vol. 105 Iss. 19 (2008) p. 6982 - 6986 ISSN: 1091-6490
Available at: http://works.bepress.com/omar-eldakar/19/